Updated May 8, 2019
U.S. Relations with Burma: Key Issues in 2019
In 2018, the 115th Congress was generally critical of the
Figure 1. Map of Burma (Myanmar)
Trump Administration’s Burma policy, particularly its
limited response to atrocities committed by the Burmese
military, intensifying conflict with ethnic insurgencies, and
rising concerns about political repression and civil rights. In
December 2018, Congress passed the Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-409), which prohibits
funding for International Military Education and Training
(IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program in
Burma for fiscal years 2019 through 2023.
Major Developments in Burma
At the end of 2018, an estimated one million Rohingya,
most of whom fled atrocities committed by Burma’s
military (Tatmadaw) in late 2017, remained in refugee
camps in Bangladesh, unable and unwilling to return to
Burma’s Rakhine State given the current policies of the
Burmese government. Also in 2018, fighting between
Burma’s military and various ethnic armed organizations
(EAOs) escalated in Kachin and Shan States, and spread
into Chin, Karen (Kayin), and Rakhine States, while efforts
to negotiate a nationwide ceasefire stalled.
The Rohingya Crises Continue
More than 700,000 Sunni Rohingya fled to Bangladesh in
late 2017, seeking to escape Tatmadaw forces that
destroyed almost 400 Rohingya villages, killed at least
6,700 Rohingya (according to human rights groups and
Doctors Without Borders), and sexually assaulted hundreds
of Rohingya women and girls. Repatriation under an
October 2018 agreement between the two nations is stalled
as the Burmese government is unable or unwilling to
Source: CRS
establish conditions that would allow the voluntary, safe,
dignified, and sustainable return of the Rohingya. Among
The Stalled Peace Process, Escalating Fighting
the conditions sought by the Rohingya are their return to
The 3rd session of the 21st Century Panglong Conference—
locations at or near their original villages, recognition as an
an effort to forge a nationwide ceasefire agreement between
indigenous ethnic minority, restoration of their full
the government, the military, and EAOs—was held in July
citizenship, and establishment of an accountability
2018, but made little progress. Two of the larger EAOs, the
mechanism to investigate and prosecute the alleged
Karen National Union and the Restoration Council of Shan
atrocities. Meanwhile, smaller numbers of refugees
State, subsequently suspended their participation in the
continue to cross into Bangladesh.
formal peace process.
Burma’s mixed military/civilian government has so far
In December 2018, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing
denied any systematic and/or widespread misconduct by
announced a four-month unilateral ceasefire in eastern (but
Burma’s security forces, and continues to deny the United
not western) Burma, and reversed his previous objection to
Nations, international humanitarian assistance
the inclusion of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National
organizations, and local and international media
Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National
unrestricted access to northern Rakhine State. Prospects for
Liberation Army in the peace talks, raising some hopes that
the Rohingyas’ voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable
the peace process would regain momentum.
return to their homes are dim as conditions in northern
Rakhine State have worsened in 2019, in part due to
On April 30, 2019, Min Aung Hlaing extended the ceasefire
fighting between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw.
for two more months, but prospects for peace remain bleak.
Fighting between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw in
northern Rakhine State has intensified, with allegations that
Tatmadaw soldiers are targeting civilians. Despite the
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unilateral ceasefire, periodic skirmishes have increased in
The Trump Administration has provided funding for
frequency in northern Shan State. Sources close to the
humanitarian assistance in Bangladesh and Rakhine State
larger EAOs indicate they anticipate an intensification of
(nearly $500 million), stopped providing visa waivers for
the low-grade civil war after the ceasefire ends.
senior Tatmadaw officers, placed economic sanctions on
five Tatmadaw officers and two military units under the
Violation of Human Rights and Civil Liberties
Global Magnitsky Act, and called for a global ban on arms
According to some analysts, Burma’s mixed
sales to Burma.
military/civilian government responded to domestic and
international criticism in 2018 by curtailing freedom of
On September 18, 2018, an independent U.N. fact-finding
speech and press freedom. In September 2018, Kyaw Soe
mission on Myanmar released its final report, determining
Oo and Wa Lone, reporters investigating alleged human
that the actions of Burma’s security forces in Kachin,
rights abuses in Rakhine State, were convicted of violating
Rakhine, and Shan States possibly constituted genocide,
Burma’s 1923 Official Secrets Act, and sentenced to seven
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It recommended
years in prison. They were granted a presidential pardon on
the U.N. Security Council “refer the situation to the
May 7, 2019. Other journalists have been arrested following
International Criminal Court or create an ad hoc
interviews with EAO leaders or for publishing articles
international criminal tribunal.” On September 24, 2018,
critical of the Tatmadaw.
the State Department released the findings of its own study,
concluding “the vast majority of Rohingya refugees
Peaceful protesters have faced criminal charges for
experienced or directly witnessed extreme violence and the
allegedly violating the 2011 Peaceful Processions and
destruction of their homes,” and the refugees “identified the
Peaceful Assembly Act. Several critics of the government
Burmese military as a perpetrator in most cases.” It also
have been charged under section 66(d) of the 2013
stated “that the recent violence in northern Rakhine State
Telecommunications Act for allegedly defaming or
was extreme, large-scale, widespread, and seemingly
threatening government officials. According to the
geared toward both terrorizing the population and driving
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), as
out the Rohingya residents,” and “(t)he scope and scale of
of March 2019, 364 people were either serving sentences or
the military’s operations indicate they were well-planned
awaiting trial for their political activities.
and coordinated.” Since the release of the two reports, the
Trump Administration has declined to characterize the
State of Political Reforms
human rights abuses as either genocide or crimes against
Many observers expected Aung San Suu Kyi and the
humanity.
National League for Democracy (NLD) to implement
political reforms following their parliamentary victory in
Looking Ahead: Leading Policy Issues
2015. However, since taking power in 2016, the NLD has
Given the humanitarian situation in Bangladesh and
made little progress on political reforms, and in some cases,
Rakhine State, Congress may choose to consider funding
it appears that the mixed military/civilian government has
for assistance to the displaced Rohingya. Congress may
found it advantageous to use various restrictive laws to
also examine ways to ensure that a credible, independent
suppress political opposition (see “Violation of Human
investigation of the alleged abuses in Kachin, Rakhine, and
Rights and Civil Liberties” above). A special commission
Shan States occurs, and that those determined to be
set up by the NLD-led government identified more than 140
culpable are held accountable for their actions.
laws that should be abolished or amended; a few have been
addressed by the Union Parliament.
Another issue Congress may consider is what ways the
United States can best serve to promote the peaceful
Status of U.S. Policy Toward Burma
resolution of Burma’s civil war. In addition, Congress may
The Obama Administration responded to what it perceived
weigh what forms of assistance to provide in Burma, and if
as positive developments in Burma by suspending various
any of that assistance should be contingent on the behavior
sanctions imposed by Congress when the nation was ruled
of Aung San Suu Kyi, her government or the Tatmadaw in
by a military junta. According to some Members of
addressing the issues mentioned above.
Congress and other observers, the waiving of those
sanctions has emboldened the Tatmadaw to utilize its
Both the Obama and Trump Administrations based their
constitutional powers to control developments in Burma.
policies on the premise that Burma is part way through a
transition from a military junta to a democratically-elected
Approach of the Trump Administration
civilian government. However, some analysts argue that
Initially, the Trump Administration largely continued the
recent events indicate that Burma’s military leaders never
approach of the Obama Administration in relations with
supported such a transition, and that the current governance
Burma. After the Rohingya crises arose, then-U.N.
system, as embodied in the 2008 constitution, was the
Ambassador Nikki Haley, then-Secretary of State Rex
intended endpoint for any political reforms. Congress’s
Tillerson, and other State Department officials condemned
sense of which assessment is more convincing may guide
the violence committed by both Rohinyga militants and the
its actions towards Burma in 2019.
Tatmadaw in Rakhine State. In November 2017, Secretary
Tillerson determined that the Tatmadaw’s “clearance
Michael F. Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
operation” constituted “ethnic cleansing,” and announced
that United States would “pursue accountability through
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U.S. law, including possible targeted sanctions.”
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U.S. Relations with Burma: Key Issues in 2019
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11068 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED