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Updated April 11, 2019
U.S.-China Relations
The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC
Beijing; and on December 1, 2018, on the sidelines of the
or China) are this year marking the 40th anniversary of their
G-20 summit in Buenos Aires. On December 3, 2018,
establishment of diplomatic relations. Both are permanent
President Trump tweeted that he and President Xi “have a
members of the United Nations Security Council. Today,
very strong and personal relationship.”
they lead the world in the size of their economies, their
defense budgets, and their global greenhouse gas emissions.
Select Issues in the Relationship
In 2018, they were each other’s largest trading partners.
Trade
Since late 2017, the Administration of President Donald J.
Trade issues have dominated the Trump Administration’s
Trump has framed its policy toward China in terms of
China policy, with the White House accusing China of
“great power competition,” even as it has sought China’s
“economic aggression” and “non-reciprocal commercial
cooperation in reining in North Korea’s nuclear and missile
relations.” In March 2018, the U.S. Trade Representative
programs and curbing the flow of a class of deadly
(USTR) released the findings of an investigation into PRC
synthetic opioids, fentanyl, from China to the United States.
policies related to technology transfer, intellectual property,
The Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS),
and innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
released in December 2017, describes both China and
(P.L. 93-618). The investigation identified four PRC
Russia as seeking to “challenge American power, influence,
practices of particular concern: forced technology transfer
and interests, attempting to erode American security and
requirements, discriminatory licensing requirements, state-
prosperity.” The U.S. National Defense Strategy summary
directed investments in and acquisitions of U.S. companies
released in January 2018 describes China as a “strategic
to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property
competitor” and charges that it is pursuing a military
(IP), and state-directed cyber-theft of U.S. trade secrets. To
modernization program that “seeks Indo-Pacific regional
pressure China to address those issues, the United States
hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United
imposed three rounds of Section 301 tariffs on imports from
States to achieve global preeminence in the future.” The
the PRC. (See Table 1 below.) China’s retaliatory tariffs hit
National Intelligence Strategy, released in January 2019,
U.S. soybean exports particularly hard.
places China in a category of “traditional adversaries.”
Table 1. Section 301 Tariffs on Imports from the PRC
The Trump Administration has leveled its strongest
criticism at China’s economic practices. In a major October
Volume of
Additional tariff
4, 2018, address on China policy, Vice President Mike
Date
imports affected
rate
Pence charged that China has used “an arsenal of policies
July 6, 2018
$34 billion
25%
inconsistent with free and fair trade” to build its
manufacturing base, “at the expense of its competitors—
August 23, 2018
$16 billion
25%
especially America.” He asserted that China’s security
agencies had “masterminded the wholes
September 24,
$200 billion
10%
ale theft of
2018
American technology—including cutting edge military
blueprints” and that “using that stolen technology, the
Source: USTR.
Chinese Communist Party is turning plowshares into
swords on a massive scale….”
The 10% rate on the third tranche of PRC imports was
slated to rise to 25% on January 1, 2019. When the two
Responding to the NSS, China’s Foreign Ministry urged the
presidents met on December 1, 2018, however, the White
United States “to stop deliberately distorting China’s
House said President Trump agreed to suspend that tariff
strategic intentions.” PRC Premier Li Keqiang told China’s
increase for 90 days, to allow for further trade negotiations.
parliament on March 5, 2019, that the environment for
On February 24, 2018, President Trump tweeted that he had
China’s development would be “graver and more
suspended the tariff hikes indefinitely due to “substantial
complicated” in 2019, likely reflecting heightened tensions
progress” in trade talks. U.S. negotiators indicate that the
with the United States. Yet he also asserted, “China is still
talks are focused on structural changes to China’s economy,
in an important period of strategic opportunity,” indicating
including IP and innovation policies, market barriers, and
no official change in overall PRC threat perception.
currency. The United States also seeks to reduce the
bilateral trade imbalance, in part by persuading China to
President Trump and President Xi have met face-to-face
purchase a “substantial amount” of U.S. agricultural,
four times: in April 2017 at President Trump’s Mar-a-Lago
energy, and manufactured goods. On April 11, 2019,
estate in Florida; in July 2017 on the sidelines of the G-20
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said the two sides had
summit in Hamburg, Germany; in November 2017 in
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U.S.-China Relations
“pretty much agreed” to establish enforcement officers to
U.S. right to fly, sail, and operate wherever international
monitor implementation of any agreement.
law allows, the U.S. military undertakes both freedom of
navigation operations (FONOPs) and presence operations in
Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Drugs
the sea, and undertakes Air Force bomber flights over the
According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
sea. China argues that such operations infringe on its
Prevention, synthetic opioids, primarily fentanyl, accounted
sovereignty and undermine “peace, security, and order.”
for more than 28,000 U.S. drug overdose deaths in 2017.
Huawei
The Drug Enforcement Administration states that illicit
fentanyl and other synthetic opioids are “primarily sourced
The Trump Administration has sought to dissuade allies and
from China and Mexico.”
partners from including equipment from Chinese
Responding to pressure from the
telecommunications giant Huawei in their critical
Trump Administration, on April 1, 2019, China announced
information systems, citing national security concerns. In
that effective May 1, 2019, it would add all fentanyl-related
February 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned
substances to a controlled substances list. A senior PRC
that if countries work with Huawei, “we won’t be able to
counter-narcotics official said China would also step up
share information with them, we won’t be able to work
criminal investigations focused on the manufacturing and
alongside them.” China’s Foreign Ministry accuses the
trafficking of fentanyl substances and other drugs. China
United States of seeking to “strangle [Chinese companies’]
has not yet controlled all precursor chemicals used to
lawful and legitimate operations.” Separately, Canada in
manufacture fentanyl.
December 2018 detained a senior Huawei executive, who is
Mass Internment of Muslim Minorities
also a daughter of Huawei’s founder, at the request of the
In the name of preventing terrorism, extremism, and
United States, which subsequently charged her with
separatism, authorities in China’s Xinjiang region are
financial fraud. China appeared to punish Canada for the
believed to have interned as many as 1 million
move by detaining Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael
predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities, including
Spavor and later accusing them of espionage, and by cutting
Uyghurs. In his October 2018 speech, Vice President Pence
off imports of Canadian canola seed.
asserted that Uyghurs were being subjected to “around-the-
clock brainwashing” and that survivors see the camps as an
China’s Belt and Road Initiative
effort to “stamp out the Muslim faith.” Chinese authorities
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013,
describe the camps as “education and training centers”
aims to boost economic connectivity among as many as 125
in
which “
countries. The Trump Administration has sought to warn
students” learn the Chinese language and job skills
and undergo “de
countries away from participation in BRI, portraying BRI
-extremization.”
projects as saddling countries with unsustainable levels of
Taiwan and the U.S. “One-China” Policy
debt and, in Secretary of State Pompeo’s words, exacting “a
Under the U.S. “one-China” policy, the United States
political cost … which will greatly exceed the economic
maintains only unofficial relations with Taiwan, while
value of what you were provided.” The Better Utilization of
upholding the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8),
Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act of 2018
including provisions requiring U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
(P.L. 115-254), enacted in October 2018, was widely
The PRC, which claims sovereignty over Taiwan, has long
viewed as a response to BRI. China’s Foreign Ministry has
been wary of U.S. moves that the PRC sees as introducing
called U.S. statements against BRI “very disappointing,”
“officiality” into the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Beijing
and urged the United States to “at least refrain from
decried the March 2018 enactment of the Taiwan Travel
obstructing assistance provided to these developing
Act (P.L. 115-135) and urged the United States to “stop
countries by others.”
pursuing any official ties with Taiwan or improving its
Select Legislation in the 116th Congress
current relations with Taiwan in any substantive way….”
Legislation related to China introduced in the 116th
North Korea
Congress includes bills on trade (S. 2 and H.R. 704, S. 75
The United States and China agree on the goal of
and H.R. 595, S. 577 and H.R. 1452, H.R. 902, S. 188, S.
denuclearization of North Korea, but have sometimes
1092); cybersecurity (H.R. 739); fentanyl (H.R. 1542,
disagreed on the best path to that goal. Between 2006 and
H.R. 1098, and S. 400); immigration (S. 386 and H.R.
2017, China voted for U.N. Security Council resolutions
1044); PRC political influence operations (S. 480 and
imposing ever-stricter sanctions on North Korea over its
H.R. 1811, S. 245); PRC telecommunications firms (S.
nuclear weapons and missile programs, though it often
152 and H.R. 602, S. 335, S.Con.Res. 10, S.Res. 96, S.
sought to weaken the resolutions first. The U.S. government
245); Saudi-PRC nuclear or missile cooperation (S. 612
has broadly credited China with enforcing the resolutions,
and H.R. 1471); Taiwan (H.R. 237 and S. 249, S. 878 and
and seeks to persuade China to maintain “maximum
H.R. 2002, S.Con.Res. 13 and H.Res. 273, H.Res. 248); and
pressure” on North Korea.
Uyghur human rights (S. 178, H.R. 1025). S. 987 would
South China Sea
implement recommendations of the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission in multiple areas.
Since 2013, the PRC has built and fortified artificial islands
on seven sites in the Spratly Island chain in the South China
Sea. In May 2018, the United States disinvited the PRC
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
from the 2018 edition of the U.S.-hosted Rim of the Pacific
Wayne M. Morrison, Specialist in Asian Trade and
(RIMPAC) maritime exercise over the PRC’s “continued
Finance
militarization” of the sites. To challenge what the United
Jonah Langan-Marmur, Research Associate
States considers excessive maritime claims and to assert the
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U.S.-China Relations
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