INSIGHTi

Libya: Military Moves Challenge U.S.-Backed
Transition Plan
April 4, 2019
On April 4, 2019, Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) movement that has
controlled eastern Libya with foreign support since 2014, ordered forces loyal to him to begin a unilateral
military operation to secure the capital, Tripoli. Tripoli is the seat of the Government of National Accord
(GNA), an interim body recognized by the United States and United Nations Security Council as Libya’s
legitimate governing entity. The LNA stated its deployment to northwestern Libya is meant “to purge it of
the remainder of the terrorist groups present in their last hideouts” (CRS translation from Arabic). In
response to LNA movements, GNA Prime Minister-designate Fayez al Serraj mobilized pro-GNA forces.
Fighting has been reported in some areas near Tripoli.
United Nations (U.N.) Secretary General António Gutteres was in Tripoli as these events occurred,
visiting in a show of solidarity for a planned U.N.-sponsored conference among Libyans scheduled to
begin on April 14. The conference, endorsed by the U.N. Security Council and facilitated by Gutteres’
Special Representative and United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) head Ghassan Salamé,
is being convened to produce consensus among Libyan factions on principles to guide the completion of
the country’s extended post-2011 transition. Specifically, the conference seeks Libyans’ endorsement of
new interim power sharing and national security arrangements and an agreed schedule for legislative and
presidential elections in 2019. Conflict and discord over these issues have disrupted Libya’s post-Qadhafi
transition since 2011, producing rival governments and empowering local militias.
U.N. and other international efforts to reach consensus among Libyans during 2018 faltered as armed
groups competed over strategic territory. LNA military moves in 2018 resulted in the country’s major oil
producing areas and infrastructure in the center and southwest coming under the effective control of
LNA-aligned fighters. The United States and other international actors issued statements insisting that the
LNA not wrest control of oil resources and revenue from the National Oil Corporation and GNA.
Nevertheless, the de facto changes in the balance of power on the ground appear to have strengthened the
LNA’s hand in negotiations. The developments also generated a renewed sense of international urgency
to conclude the transition before wider conflict erupts.
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Figure 1. Map of Libya

Source: CRS using ESRI, U.S. government, and United Nations data.
Notes: This map does not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government with regard to geographic
names or boundaries. Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative.
International statements issued in the wake of recent Libyan mobilizations reflect common perspectives
and concerns. On April 4:
 The governments of the United States, France, Italy, the United Arab Emirates, and the
United Kingdom jointly stated their deep concern about fighting near Gharyan, where LNA
forces announced they had been welcomed just 60 miles south of the capital (CRS translation
from Arabic) (Figure 1). The U.S. government and its fellow signatories urged all parties “to
immediately de-escalate tensions.” The governments jointly affirmed that “our governments
oppose any military action in Libya and will hold accountable any Libyan faction that
precipitates further civil conflict.” The United States had previously joined other members of
the U.N. Security Council on March 26 in expressing support for the national conference.

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 U.N. Secretary-General Gutteres called for “calm and restraint,” expressing his concern about
military movements and “the risk of confrontation.” Gutteres flew to eastern Libya for
consultations on April 5, and, on departure, signaled with “a heavy heart” his hope for peace.
 Russia’s Libya Envoy Lev Dengov told Interfax that, “Russia is continuing to support a peace
process in Libya,” and described calls for mobilization “as provocative and
counterproductive.”
The LNA’s moves and counter-mobilizations by the GNA and other western Libyan forces directly
challenge the stated preferences of the Security Council and the U.S. government. The developments pose
complex questions for U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress. These include:
 How might military confrontation in western Libya or dramatic changes in governing
arrangements affect U.S. counterterrorism operations? According to the U.S. intelligence
community, the capabilities of the Libya-based Islamic State affiliate “have been degraded,
but it is still capable of conducting attacks on local and Western targets in Libya and possibly
elsewhere in the region.” IS supporters carried out attacks across Libya in 2018. U.S. forces
have partnered with some forces nominally aligned with the GNA. Periodic U.S. airstrikes
continue to target suspected IS or AQ personnel. Widespread instability or conflict could
presumably give IS supporters and other extremists new opportunities.
 What tools do the Administration and Congress have to deter further unilateral actions
by Libyan parties that may undermine U.S.-supported, U.N.-facilitated transition plans
or respond if such actions occur? A U.N. arms embargo and asset freeze is in place, and
U.S. executive orders provide for sanctions against those undermining Libya’s transition. The
Administration could seek to convince the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions or
restrict oil transactions to influence the decisions of Libyan actors. Congress could move to
require the imposition of U.S. sanctions currently provided for by executive order. Congress
has conditionally funded limited U.S. transition support and security assistance programs for
Libya since 2011 and is considering the Trump Administration’s request for assistance funds
for FY2020.
 How might military confrontation in western Libya affect Libya’s neighbors and
Europe? Instability in western Libya has displaced Libyans and threatened the security of
Tunisia and Algeria since 2011. Western Libya also hosts a foreign migrant population that
could be vulnerable in the event of conflict. European cooperation with western Libya-based
actors on security and migration could be disrupted by renewed fighting. National elections
are scheduled for October and November 2019 in Tunisia, and Algeria is now undergoing a
sensitive political transition. U.S. AFRICOM identifies containing instability in Libya as one
of its six main lines of effort and works to support diplomatic efforts to reconstitute the
Libyan state.
How is the United States postured to respond to related contingencies? U.S. diplomatic
personnel continue to operate from the Libya External Office (LEO) in Tunis, Tunisia, led by
Charge d’Affaires-Ad Interim Peter Bodde (the former U.S. Ambassador to Libya). State
Department and USAID personnel operate from LEO Tunis in support of U.S.-funded foreign
and humanitarian assistance programs in Libya. Bodde and U.S. AFRICOM Commander
General Thomas Waldhauser visited Tripoli in March 2019 in a show of support for the GNA
government. AFRICOM and the U.S. military have established liaison relationships with local
security actors in several parts of Libya.

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Author Information

Christopher M. Blanchard

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs


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