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Updated April 3, 2019
U.S.-India Trade Relations 
The United States and India view one another as important 
mostly failed effort to address tax evasion and corruption, 
strategic partners to advance common interests regionally 
and the roll-out of new national value-added goods and 
and globally. Bilateral trade in goods and services is 2% of 
service tax in 2017 to streamline the tax regime.  
U.S. world trade, and has grown in recent years (Figure 1). 
Selected Issues 
The trade relationship is more consequential for India; in 
2017, the United States was its second largest export market 
Tariffs. Bilateral tensions have increased over each side’s 
(16% share) after the European Union (EU, 17%), and third 
tariff policies. These include the U.S. 25% steel and 10% 
largest import supplier (6%) after China (17%) and the EU 
aluminum tariffs under the national-security based “Section 
(10%). U.S.-India foreign direct investment (FDI) is small, 
232” law. India did not receive an initial exception like 
but growing. Defense sales also are significant in bilateral 
some trading partners, nor negotiate an alternative quota 
trade. Civilian nuclear commerce, stalled for years over 
arrangement. India supplied less than 3% of U.S. steel and 
differences on liability protections, has produced major 
aluminum in 2017. India has delayed further imposing its 
potential U.S. supply contracts. The Trump Administration, 
planned retaliatory tariffs until May 2, 2019, in hopes of a 
which views bilateral trade balances as an indicator of the 
bilateral resolution; these tariffs of 10% to 50% would 
health of a trading relationship, takes issue with the U.S. 
target $241 million in U.S. goods such as nuts, apples, steel, 
trade deficit with India, and has criticized India for a range 
and motorcycles. India also is challenging the U.S. tariff 
of “unfair” trading practices. Countering this view, India 
increases in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
notes that the U.S. bilateral trade deficit dropped in 2018. 
President Trump has called India “a very high-tariff nation” 
The causes and consequences of trade deficits are debated. 
and criticized tariff imbalances, such as on motorcycles 
Figure 1. U.S. Trade and Investment with India 
(which previously faced 100%, now 50%, Indian tariffs, 
compared to U.S. tariffs of 0% to 2.4%). India has 
relatively high average tariff rates, especially in agriculture. 
It can raise its applied rates to bound rates without violating 
its commitments under the WTO, causing uncertainty for 
U.S. exporters. India’s tariff hikes include raising tariffs on 
cell phones from 0% originally to 15% to 20%, prompting 
the United States and others to question India’s compliance 
with the WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA). 
India also raised duties on certain “non-essential” consumer 
and other goods to stem its current account deficit. The EU 
initiated WTO dispute settlement consultations, claiming 
that certain tariff hikes by India exceed bound rates. U.S. 
concerns over Indian market access include price controls 
on medical devices, and investment and other non-tariff 
barriers. 
U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). On 
March 4, 2019, President Trump notified Congress of his 
intent to terminate India’s GSP eligibility, which gives 
 
duty-free tariff treatment to certain U.S. imports from 
Source: CRS analysis, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data.  
eligible developing countries to support their economic 
India’s Economy 
development. The notice followed a U.S. review of India’s 
market access practices, as well as petitions by the U.S. 
India is one of the world’s fastest-growing economies 
medical device and dairy industry. By law, the President 
(more than 7% growth projected for 2019), third largest 
must notify Congress at least 60 days prior to a GSP change 
economy on a purchasing power parity basis, and second 
taking effect. India is GSP’s top beneficiary. In 2018, GSP 
largest country by population, with an expanding middle 
represented 11% ($6.3 billion) of U.S. merchandise imports 
class. Economic challenges include poverty, difficulty 
from India, such as chemicals, auto parts, and tableware. 
absorbing millions of young new workers joining the labor 
GSP removal would reinstate U.S. tariffs, which range from 
force, and infrastructure gaps. India imports about 80% of 
1% to 7% on the top 15 GSP bilateral imports. India sought 
its oil needs. Rising energy prices and other global factors 
continuation of its eligibility, but since the President’s 
have led to depreciation of the Indian rupee against the U.S. 
announcement, has downplayed the impact of the proposed 
dollar, leading to inflation concerns. Domestic economic 
change. India plans to treat retaliatory tariffs separately.  
measures include “demonetization” in 2016, which 
Services. The United States and India are competitive in 
removed 86% of currency by value from circulation in a 
certain services industries. Barriers to U.S. firms’ market 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
U.S.-India Trade Relations 
access include India’s limits on foreign ownership and local 
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 
presence requirements. A key issue for India is U.S. 
(P.L. 115-44). 
temporary visa policies, which affect Indian nationals 
Current Negotiations and Agreements 
working in the United States. India is challenging U.S. fees 
for worker visas in the WTO, and monitoring potential U.S. 
Bilateral Engagement. The United States and India have 
action to revise the H-1B (specialized worker) visa 
held “intensive” negotiations to address the U.S. steel and 
program. India also continues to seek a “totalization 
aluminum tariffs, India’s GSP status, and other trade issues. 
agreement” to coordinate social security protection for 
Dialogues include the government-to-government Strategic 
workers who split their careers between the two countries. 
and Commercial Dialogue (S&CD) and Trade Policy 
Agriculture. Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) barriers in 
Forum, and the private sector-based CEO Forum. 
India limit U.S. agricultural exports. The United States 
“… after intensive [bilateral] engagement…, I have 
questions the scientific and risk-based justifications of such 
determined that India has not assured the United States 
barriers. An ongoing issue is India’s purported compliance 
that it wil  provide equitable and reasonable access to the 
with a WTO decision against its ban on U.S. poultry 
markets of India….”—President Trump’s GSP notification 
imports and live swine due to avian influenza concerns; the 
letter to Congress, March 4, 2019 
WTO held that India’s measures violated WTO SPS rules. 
“… India was able to offer a very meaningful way forward 
Each side also sees the other’s agricultural support 
on almost al  the US requests. In a few instances, specific 
programs as market-distorting; India’s view of its programs 
US requests were not found reasonable and doable … in 
from a broad food security lens complicates matters.  
light of public welfare concerns reflective of India’s 
Intellectual Property (IP). The two sides differ on how to 
developing country status….”—Indian Ministry of 
balance IP protection to incentivize innovation and support 
Commerce statement, March 5, 2019 
other policy goals, such as access to medicines. India’s IP 
regime remains a top U.S. concern, and India remains on 
The United States and India do not have a bilateral free 
the “Special 301” Priority Watch List for 2018, based on 
trade agreement (FTA). In October 2018, President Trump 
such concerns as its treatment of patents, infringement 
stated that India expressed interest in negotiating an FTA. 
rates, and protection of trade secrets.  
Some India watchers advocate for an FTA, while others 
question India’s willingness to open its markets. Past 
“Forced” Localization. The United States continues to 
negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty are stalled.  
press India on its “forced” localization practices. Initiatives 
Regional Integration. India is party to negotiations on the 
to grow India’s manufacturing base and support jobs 
include requirements for in-country data storage, domestic 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
content (such as laws protecting India’s solar sector), and 
with China and 15 other Asia-Pacific nations. Seven RCEP 
domestic testing in some sectors. Adding to U.S. concerns 
members (but not India) are among the 11 remaining parties 
are India’s new data localization requirements for electronic 
of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); they 
payment service suppliers (e.g., MasterCard, Visa).  
concluded a new trade agreement after President Trump 
ceased U.S. participation in the TPP. Among other issues, 
Investment. India aims to attract foreign investment and 
India has long sought to join the Asia-Pacific Economic 
has made FDI reforms, such as raising foreign equity caps 
Cooperation (APEC) group of the United States, China, and 
for insurance and defense, and other strides to improve its 
19 other economies. The United States stated previously 
business environment (World Bank, Doing Business 
that it welcomes India in APEC. Some question if India is 
Indicators). U.S. concerns about investment barriers remain 
willing to make sufficient economic reforms to join APEC.  
nevertheless, heightened by new Indian restrictions on how 
e-commerce platforms such as Amazon and Walmart-
WTO. Differing U.S. and Indian views have constrained 
owned Flipkart conduct business. From the U.S. view, 
multilateral negotiations to liberalize trade in the WTO. The 
India’s weak regulatory transparency and other issues, such 
Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) to remove customs 
as India’s IPR and localization policies (see above), add to 
barriers, the first multilateral agreement concluded in over 
concerns about FDI barriers. Two-way U.S.-Indian FDI is 
20 years, entered into force in 2017 after India reversed its 
linked to U.S. jobs and exports in a range of sectors, yet 
prior blocking of the TFA. This change followed a U.S.-
U.S. FDI in India prompts some offshoring concerns. 
Indian understanding not to challenge specific food security 
programs until the WTO reaches a solution on public 
Defense Trade. The two nations have signed defense 
stockholding for food security, a top Indian priority. The 
contracts worth more than $15 billion since 2008, up from 
WTO’s future direction is unclear amid institutional issues.  
$500 million in all previous years combined. Major 
Congressional Interest 
anticipated sales include 24 MH-60 Seahawk multi-role 
naval helicopters and a potential commercial sale of AH-64 
Questions on U.S.-India trade relations may include 
Apache attack helicopters. India is eager for more 
  What are prospects for a bilateral resolution to trade 
technology-sharing and co-production; some reports 
frictions? What role would GSP eligibility termination 
indicate U.S. and Indian interest in producing F-16 combat 
play? Are multilateral or regional solutions possible?  
aircraft there. The United States, meanwhile, urges more 
  Given the Trump Administration’s focus on greater 
reforms in India’s defense offsets policy and higher FDI 
reciprocity in U.S. trade relations, what are ways to 
caps in its defense sector. India’s pursuit of a multibillion-
strengthen U.S.-Indian trade and investment ties? Is 
dollar deal to purchase the Russian-made S-400 air defense 
there potential for broader trade agreement negotiations?
system may trigger U.S. sanctions on India under the 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
U.S.-India Trade Relations 
   
K. Alan Kronstadt, Specialist in South Asian Affairs   
Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Specialist in International Trade 
IF10384
and Finance   
 
 
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10384 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED