Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Updated February 11, 2019
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44533

Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence separate
from and independent of Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), an alliance of
six Gulf monarchies. Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and
Libya, and has engaged both Sunni Islamist and Iran-backed Shiite groups in Lebanon, Sudan, the
Gaza Strip, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran while also
supporting U.S. and GCC efforts to limit Iran’s regional influence.
Qatar’s independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood
organizations and hosting a global media network often critical of Arab leaders called Al Jazeera,
have caused a backlash against Qatar by Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. A rift
within the GCC opened on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by
Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry
and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump
Administration has sought, unsuccessfully to date to mediate a resolution of the dispute. The
dispute threatens U.S efforts to assemble the GCC, Jordan, and Egypt into a new “Middle East
Strategic Alliance” to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups and has caused repeated
postponements of another U.S.-GCC summit. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with
new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran.
As do the other GCC leaders, Qatar’s leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their
external security since the 1980s. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar,
consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the
DCA, Qatar hosts about 13,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S.
forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-
made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States
inaugurated a “Strategic Dialogue” to strengthen the U.S.-Qatar defense partnership, which Qatar
says might include permanent U.S. basing there. The second iteration of the dialogue, in January
2019, resulted in a U.S.-Qatar memorandum of understanding to expand Al Udeid Air Base to
improve and expand accommodation for U.S. military personnel. Qatar signed a broad
memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international
terrorism. That MOU appeared intended to counter assertions that Qatar’s ties to regional Islamist
movements support terrorism.
The voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar’s former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin
Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain
in power for life. However, Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet
formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected. Further, U.S. and international reports
criticize Qatar for failing to adhere to international standards of human and labor rights practices,
and for failing to protect expatriate workers from abuses by Qatari employers.
As are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons
prices since 2014, now compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather
these headwinds because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. But, Qatar
shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on
revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar announced it would
withdraw from the OPEC oil cartel in order to focus on its natural gas export sector.
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................................... 24
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Brief History
Prior to 1867, Qatar was ruled by the leaders of neighboring Bahrain, the Al Khalifa family. That
year, following an uprising against the Al Khalifa, Britain, then the main Western power in the
Persian Gulf region, installed the head of a leading Qatari family, Muhammad bin Thani Al
Thani, as ruler of what is now Qatar. In 1916, in the aftermath of World War I and the demise of
the Ottoman Empire, Qatar and Britain signed an agreement under which Qatar formally became
a British protectorate.
In 1971, after Britain announced it would no longer exercise responsibility for Persian Gulf
security, Qatar and Bahrain considered joining with the seven emirates (principalities) that were
then called the “Trucial States” to form the United Arab Emirates. However, Qatar and Bahrain
decided to become independent rather than join that union. The UAE was separately formed in
late 1971. Qatar adopted its first written constitution in April 1970 and became fully independent
on September 1, 1971. The United States opened an embassy in Doha in 1973. The last U.S.
Ambassador to Qatar, Dana Shell Smith, resigned from that post in June 2017, reportedly over
disagreements with the Trump Administration. Mary Catherine Phee has been nominated as a
replacement.
The Al Thani family claims descent from the central Arabian tribe of Banu Tamim, the tribe to
which Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd Al Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, belonged.1 Thus,
Qatar officially subscribes to Wahhabism, a conservative Islamic tradition that it shares with
Saudi Arabia.
Table 1. Senior Leaders of Qatar
Position
Leader
Amir (ruler) and Minister of Defense
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani
Deputy Amir and Crown Prince (heir apparent)
Abdul ah bin Hamad Al Thani
Prime Minister and Minister of Interior
Abdul ah bin Nasir bin Khalifa Al Thani
Deputy Prime Minister
Ahmad bin Abdallah al-Mahmud
Minister of State for Defense Affairs
Khalid bin Muhammad Al-Attiyah
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Muhammad bin Abd al-Rahman Al Thani
Minister of Finance
Ali Sharif al-Imadi
Ambassador to the United States
Mishal bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, “Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments.”

1 Information in this section is taken from Bernard Haykel. “Qatar and Islamism.” Policy Brief: Norwegian
Peacebuilding Resource Centre. February 2013.
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Figure 1. Qatar at-a-Glance

Area
11,586 sq km (slightly smaller than Connecticut)
People
Population: 2.3 mil ion (July 2017 estimate), of which about 90% are expatriates
Religions: Muslim 68%, of which about 90% are Sunni; Christian 14%; Hindu 14%; 3% Buddhist; and
1% other. Figures include expatriates.
Ethnic Groups: Arab 40%; Pakistani 18%; Indian 18%; Iranian 10%; other 14%. Figures include
expatriates. Virtually all citizens are Arab.
Economy
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $341 bil ion (2017) on purchasing power parity (ppp) basis
GDP per capita: $125,000 (2017) on ppp basis
Inflation: 1% (2017)
GDP Growth Rate: 2.5% (2017)
Export Partners: (In descending order) Japan, South Korea, India, China, Singapore, UAE
Import Partners: (In descending order) United States, China, UAE, Germany, Japan, Britain, Italy,
Saudi Arabia (pre-2017 GCC rift)
Oil and Gas
Oil Exports: Slightly more than 700,000 barrels per day. Negligible amounts to the United States
Natural Gas Exports: Almost 125 bil ion cubic meters in 2014
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map borders and cities generated by Hannah Fischer using data from
Department of State, 2013; Esri, 2013; and Google Maps, 2013. At-a-glance information from CIA, The World
Factbook.
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Governance
Qatar’s governing structure approximates that of the other GCC states. The country is led by a
hereditary Amir (literally “prince,” but interpreted as “ruler”), Shaykh2 Tamim bin Hamad Al
Thani. Amir Tamim became Amir in June 2013 when his father, Amir Hamad bin Khalifa Al
Thani, relinquished power voluntarily. The Amir governs through a prime minister, who is a
member of the Al Thani family, and a cabinet, several of whom are members of the Al Thani
family or of prominent allied families. Amir Tamim serves concurrently as Minister of Defense,
although most of the defense policy functions are performed by the Minister of State for Defense,
a position with less authority than that of full minister. In November 2014, Amir Tamim
appointed a younger brother, Shaykh Abdullah bin Hamad, to be deputy Amir and the heir
apparent. The Prime Minister, Shaykh Abdullah bin Nasir bin Khalifa Al Thani, serves
concurrently as Interior Minister. There are dissidents within the Al Thani family—mostly those
of lineages linked to ousted or other former Qatari rulers—who question Amir Tamim’s
legitimacy and policies, but no significant challenge to his rule is evident. There were no
significant protests in Qatar during the “Arab Spring” uprising of 2011 or since. Some experts
assess that the Saudi-led move to isolate Qatar, discussed in detail below, might have been
intended, at least in part, to replace Amir Tamim with a pro-Saudi royal family member.
Political parties are banned, and unlike in Kuwait and Bahrain, there are no well-defined
“political societies” that act as the equivalent of parties. Disputes and disagreements within the
leadership, and between leaders and citizens, tend to be aired only in private as part of a process
of consensus building.3
Then-Amir Hamad put a revised constitution to a public referendum on April 29, 2003, and it
achieved a 98% “yes” vote. Nevertheless, it left in place significant limitations: for example, it
affirms that Qatar is a hereditary emirate. Some Western experts also criticize Qatar’s constitution
for specifying Islamic law as the main source of legislation.4 The constitution stipulates that
elections will be held for 30 of the 45 seats of the country’s Advisory Council (Majlis Ash-
Shura), a national legislative body, but elections have been repeatedly delayed. The elected
Council is also to have broader powers, including the ability to remove ministers (two-thirds
majority vote), to approve a national budget, and to draft and vote on proposed legislation that
can become law (two-thirds majority vote and concurrence by the Amir). In 2008, it was agreed
that naturalized Qataris who have been citizens for at least 10 years will be eligible to vote, and
those whose fathers were born in Qatar will be eligible to run. Qatar is the only GCC state other
than Saudi Arabia not to have held elections for any seats in a legislative body.
The country holds elections for a 29-seat Central Municipal Council. Elections for the fourth
Council (each serving a four-year term) were held on May 13, 2015. The Central Municipal
Council advises the Minister of Municipality and Urban Affairs on local public services. Voter
registration and turnout—21,735 voters registered out of an estimate 150,000 eligible voters, and
15,171 of those voted—were lower than expected.5 The low participation rate could suggest that

2 Shaykh is an honorific term.
3 The Economist. “Qatar: Democracy? That’s for Other Arabs.” June 8, 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-
east-and-africa/21579063-rumours-change-top-do-not-include-moves-democracy-democracy-thats.
4 Amy Hawthorne. “Qatar’s New Constitution: Limited Reform from the Top.” August 26, 2008.
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=21605.
5 Department of State. Human Rights Report for 2015: Qatar. p. 13.
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Qatari citizens view the Council as lacking influence. The State Department human rights report
for 2016 stated that “observers considered [the municipal council elections] free and fair.”6
Human Rights Issues7
Recent State Department reports identify the most significant human rights problems in the
country as limits on the ability of citizens to choose their government in free and fair elections;
restrictions on freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, and access to a fair trial for persons held
under the “Protection of Society Law” and “Combating Terrorism Law”; restrictions on freedom
of religion and movement; legal and institutional discrimination against women; prohibitions on
political parties and labor unions; restrictions on the freedom of movement for migrant workers’
travel abroad; criminalization of male homosexual activity; and the unresolved legal status of so-
called “stateless persons,” or “bidoons.”8
A nominally independent National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) investigates allegations of
human rights abuses in the country, but it is administratively under the authority of the broader
Qatar Foundation that was founded and is still run by the Amir’s mother, Shaykha Moza.
Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the Amir, based on
recommended selections from the Supreme Judicial Council, appoints all judges, who hold their
positions at his discretion.9
Freedom of Expression
As have the other GCC states, Qatar has, since the 2011 “Arab Spring” uprisings, issued new
laws that restrict freedom of expression and increase penalties for criticizing the ruling
establishment. In 2014, the government approved a new cybercrimes law that provides for up to
three years in prison for anyone convicted of threatening Qatar’s security, and compels internet
providers in Qatar to block “objectionable” content. A November 2015 law increased penalties for
removing or expressing contempt at the national flag or the GCC flag. However, the country
continues to host the headquarters of the Al Jazeera satellite television network, which has
evolved into a global media conglomerate that features debates on controversial issues, as well as
criticism of some Arab leaders. Some Members of Congress have asserted that Al Jazeera is an
arm of the Qatar government and that its U.S. bureau should be required to register under the
Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).
The government has sometimes blocked the websites of independent media, such as the English
language Doha News.10 In July 2017, the country held a national conference on freedom of
expression at which, according to the State Department, members of international human rights
organizations were able to criticize the country’s human rights record.11

6 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265728.pdf.
7 Much of the information in this section is based on: Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights for 2017:
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper.
8 Bidoon is the Arabic word for “without,” and refers to persons without documentation for their residency in country.
9 State Dept human rights report on Qatar for 2017, op. cit.
10 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/12/qatar-blocking-of-doha-news-website-is-an-outright-attack-on-
media-freedom/.
11 State Dept. human rights report on Qatar for 2017, op. cit.
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Qatari Leadership

Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani
Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani was born on June 3, 1980. He is the fourth son of
the former Amir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, and the ninth Al Thani ruler in Qatar.
He was appointed heir apparent in August 2003 when his elder brother, Shaykh
Jasim, renounced his claim reportedly based on his father’s lack of confidence in
Shaykh Jasim’s ability to lead. Shaykh Tamim became Amir on June 25, 2014, when
Amir Hamad stepped down voluntarily to pave the way for the accession of a new
generation of leadership. Amir Tamim was educated at Great Britain’s Sherbourne
School and graduated from its Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in 1998, from
which his father graduated in 1971. Concurrently, Amir Tamim heads the Qatari
Investment Authority, which has bil ions of dol ars of investments in Europe,
including in Harrod’s department store in London, the United States, and elsewhere.
He is reportedly highly popular for resisting Saudi-led pressure in the intra-GCC
crisis.

Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
Amir Tamim’s father, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, took power in June 1995,
when his father, Amir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, was in Europe. In 1972, after
finishing his education in Britain and assuming command of some Qatari military
units, Hamad had helped his father depose his grandfather in a bloodless seizure of
power while then Amir Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani was on a hunting trip in Iran.
While Shaykh Hamad is no longer Qatar’s ruler, he, his wife, and several of their
other children remain key figures in the ruling establishment. Qatari media refer to
Shaykh Hamad as “The Father Amir” and acknowledge that he has some continuing
role in many aspects of policy. His favored wife (of three), Shaykha Moza al-Misnad
Al Thani, continues to chair the powerful Qatar Foundation for Education, Science,
and Community Development (QF). The QF runs Doha’s Education City, where
several Western universities have established branches and which is a large investor
in the United States and Europe. One daughter (and ful sister of the current Amir),
Shaykha Mayassa, chairs the Qatar Museums, a major buyer of global artwork.
Another daughter, Shaykha Hind, is vice chairman of the QF. Both daughters
graduated from Duke University. Another relative, Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani,
remains active in Qatar’s investment activities and international circles. During Amir
Hamad’s rule, Shaykh Hamad bin Jasim was Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, and
architect of Qatar’s relatively independent foreign policy. Shaykh Hamad’s father—
and the current Amir’s grandfather—Khalifa bin Hamad died in October 2016.
Sources: http://www.mofa.gov, author conversations with Qatari and U.S. officials.

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Women’s Rights
According to recent State Department human rights reports on Qatar, institutional discrimination
against women continues. No specific law criminalizes domestic violence, and a national housing
law discriminates against women married to noncitizen men and divorced women. Testimony by
women in court cases is either dismissed or carries less weight than that of a man. On the other
hand, women in Qatar drive and own property, and constitute about 15% of business owners and
more than a third of the overall workforce, including in professional positions. The law
criminalizes rape and, in some cases, allows the death penalty for that crime.
Women serve in various roles in public office, such as minister of public health, chair of the Qatar
Foundation, head of the General Authority for Museums, permanent representative to the United
Nations, and ambassadors to Croatia and the Holy See. In November 2017, the Amir appointed
four women to the national consultative council for the first time in the legislative body’s history.
There is one female minister (the Minister of Public Health); most of the other small GCC states
now have more than one female minister.
Trafficking in Persons and Labor Issues12
The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 2018 upgraded Qatar’s ranking to “Tier
2” from Tier 2: Watch List, on the basis that the government has made significant efforts to
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking over the past year. Qatar
enacted a Domestic Worker Law to better protect domestic workers and, in recent years, it also
established a coordinating body to oversee and facilitate anti-trafficking initiatives and enacting a
law that reforms the sponsorship system to significantly reduce vulnerability to forced labor.
But Qatar remains a destination country for men and women subjected to forced labor and, to a
much lesser extent, forced prostitution. Female domestic workers are particularly vulnerable to
trafficking due to their isolation in private residences and lack of protection under Qatari labor
laws. In the course of the January 2018 U.S.-Qatar “Strategic Dialogue,” the two countries signed
a memorandum of understanding to create a framework to combat trafficking in persons.
The State Department assesses Qatar’s labor rights as not adequately protecting the rights of
workers to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, or bargain collectively. The
labor code only allows for one trade union, the General Union of Workers of Qatar, which the
State Department assesses as “not a functioning entity.” Qatari law does not prohibit antiunion
discrimination or provide for reinstatement of workers fired for union activity. In October 2015,
the government enacted a reform to its labor policy—which went into effect December 13,
2016—to offer greater protections for the large population of foreign workers. The law changed
the “kafala” system (sponsorship requirement for foreign workers) to enable employees to switch
employers at the end of their labor contracts rather than having to leave Qatar when their
contracts end. Still, critics say that increased freedom for foreign workers will be modest.13
International scrutiny of Qatar’s labor practices has increased as Qatar makes preparations to host
the 2022 FIFA World Cup soccer tournament; additional engineers, construction workers, and
other laborers have been hired to work in Qatar. Some workers report not being paid for work and

12 This section is based on the State Department “Trafficking in Persons” report for 2018, https://www.state.gov/j/tip/
rls/tiprpt/2018/index.htm.
13 James Dorsey. “New Qatari Labour Law: Too Little, Too Late.” Huffington Post, October 28, 2015.
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a lack of dispute resolution, causing salary delays or nonpayment.14 Some human rights groups
have criticized Qatar for allowing outdoor work (primarily construction) in very hot weather.15
Religious Freedom16
Qatar’s constitution stipulates that Islam is the state religion and Islamic law is “a main source of
legislation,” but Qatari laws incorporate secular legal traditions as well as Islamic law. The law
recognizes only Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. The overwhelming majority (as much as 95%)
of Qatari citizens are Sunni Muslims, possibly explaining why there have been no signs of
sectarian schisms within the citizenry. The government permits eight registered Christian
denominations to worship publicly at the Mesaymir Religious Complex (commonly referred to as
“Church City”), and it has allowed the Evangelical Churches Alliance of Qatar to build a church.
Jews and adherents of unrecognized religions—such as Hindus, Buddhists, and Baha’is—are
allowed to worship privately but do not have authorized facilities in which to practice their
religions. Qatari officials state that they are open to considering the creation of dedicated worship
spaces for Hindus, Jews, and Buddhists and that any organized, non-Muslim religious group
could use the same process as Christians to apply for official registration. Members of at least one
group reportedly filed for land in previous years to build their own complex but received no
response from the government.
Foreign Policy
Qatar uses its financial resources to implement a foreign policy that engages a wide range of
regional actors, including those that are at odds with each other. Qatari officials periodically meet
with Israeli officials while at the same hosting leaders of the Palestinian militant group, Hamas.
Qatar maintains consistent ties to Iran while at the same time hosting U.S. forces that contain
Iran’s military power. Qatar hosts an office of the Afghan Taliban movement that facilitates U.S.-
Taliban talks. Its policies have enabled Qatar to mediate some regional conflicts and to obtain the
freedom of captives held by regional armed groups. Yet, Qatar often backs regional actors at odds
with those backed by de facto GCC leader Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, causing Saudi
Arabia and its close allies in the GCC to accuse Qatar of undermining the other GCC countries.
As have some of the other GCC states, Qatar has shown an increasing willingness to use its own
military forces to try to shape the outcome of regional conflicts.
Qatar and the Intra-GCC Dispute
A consistent source of friction within the GCC has been Qatar’s embrace of Muslim Brotherhood
movements as representing a moderate political Islamist movement that can foster regional
stability. Qatar hosts Islamists who adhere to the Brotherhood’s traditions, including the aging,
outspoken Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi. In 2013-2014, differences over this and other
issues widened to the point where Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors
from Doha in March 2014, accusing Qatar of supporting “terrorism.”17 The Ambassadors returned

14 Business and Human Rights Resources Center. May 23, 2018.
15 Statement by Human Rights Watch, September 27, 2017.
16 This section is based on the State Department report on International Religious Freedom for 2017,
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2017&dlid=281002#wrapper.
17 Author conversations with GCC officials. 2013-2015.
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in November 2014 in exchange for a reported pledge by Qatar to fully implement a November
2013 “Riyadh Agreement” that committed Qatar to noninterference in the affairs of other GCC
states and to refrain from supporting Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations.18
These differences erupted again into a crisis following the May 20-22, 2017, visit of President
Donald Trump to Saudi Arabia, during which the President met with Amir Tamim but expressed
substantial support for Saudi leaders. On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain, joined
by Egypt and a few other Muslim countries, severed diplomatic relations with Qatar, expelled
Qatar’s diplomats, recalled their ambassadors, and imposed limits on the entry and transit of
Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. They accused Qatar of
supporting terrorist groups and Iran.
On June 22, 2017, the Saudi-led group presented Qatar with 13 demands,19 including closing Al
Jazeera, severing relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, scaling back relations with Iran, closing
a Turkish military base in Qatar, and paying reparations for its actions. Qatar indicated that it is
open to negotiations but would not “surrender” its sovereignty. The Saudi-led group subsequently
reframed its demands as six “principles,” among which were for Qatar to “combat extremism and
terrorism” and prevent their financing, suspend “all acts of provocation,” fully comply with the
commitments Qatar made in 2013 and 2014 (see above), and refrain “from interfering in the
internal affairs of states.”20
President Trump initially responded to the crisis by echoing the Saudi-led criticism of Qatar’s
policies, but later sought to settle the rift.21 Then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, working with
Kuwait, took the lead within the Trump Administration to mediating the dispute, including by
conducting “shuttle diplomacy” in the region during July 10-13, 2017. President Trump facilitated
a phone call between Amir Tamim and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman on
September 9, 2017,22 but the direct dialogue faltered immediately over a dispute about which
leader had initiated the talks, and no subsequent meetings between President Trump and the
leaders of the parties to the dispute, or subsequent actions or proposals, have produced any
significant progress toward resolution of the rift. Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit to the Gulf
states in January 2019 produced no evident movement, and the U.S. envoy who was assigned to
work on this issue, Gen. (ret.) Anthony Zinni, resigned as envoy in early January 2019.
The dispute has to date thwarted U.S. efforts to assemble the GCC, Jordan, and Egypt into a new
“Middle East Strategic Alliance” to counter Iran and regional terrorist groups. This alliance
concept is reportedly to be the focus of a U.S.-GCC summit planned that was first planned for the
spring of 2018, put off until October 12-13, 2018,23 later postponed again until at least early 2019.
No date is now scheduled. U.S. officials reportedly want the intra-GCC rift resolved before any
U.S.-GCC summit is held, but the convening of the meeting is likely further complicated by the
global criticism of Saudi de-facto leader Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman for his possible

18 Cable News Network released the text of the November 2013 agreement, which was signed between Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Qatar. The November 2014 agreement was among all the GCC states except Oman.
19 The list of demands can be found at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/list-of-demands-on-qatar-by-saudi-
arabia-other-arab-nations/2017/06/23/054913a6-57d0-11e7-840b-512026319da7_story.html?utm_term=
.5bde2f68b6b1.
20 The text of the joint statement can be found at http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/792679.
21 White House Office of the Press Secretary. Readout of President Donald J. Trump’s Call with Amir Sheikh Tameem
Bin Hamad Al Thani of Qatar. June 7, 2017.
22 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41209610.
23 Yara Bayoumy, Jonathan Landay, and Warren Strobel, “Trump Seeks to Revive ‘Arab NATO’ to Confront Iran,”
Reuters, July 27, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-gulf-alliance/trump-seeks-to-revive-arab-nato-to-
confront-iran-idUSKBN1KH2IK.
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involvement in the October 2018 killing of U.S.-based Saudi journalist Jamal Kashoggi at the
Saudi consulate in Istanbul.
Some warn that the dispute could yet escalate. Qatar asserts that the blockading countries are
seeking to change Qatar’s leadership and might take military action to force Qatar to accept their
demands. In December 2017, Saudi Arabia “permanently” closed its Salwa border crossing into
Qatar, which had been closed temporarily since the crisis erupted. Some press reports said Saudi
Arabia is contemplating building a canal that would physically separate its territory from that of
Qatar. Qatari officials assert that the country’s ample wealth is enabling it to limit the economic
effects of the Saudi-led move, but that the blockade has separated families and caused other social
disruptions. Qataris reportedly have rallied around their leadership to resist Saudi-led demands.
Some signs have emerged that Saudi Arabia and the UAE, facing criticism over the Kashoggi
issue and their involvement in Yemen, might want to de-escalate the dispute. Qatari forces
participated in GCC “Gulf Shield” military exercises in Saudi Arabia in March-April 2018. All
the chiefs of staff of GCC militaries met in Kuwait, along with the U.S. commander of U.S.
Central Command, in September 2018. Amir Tamim was invited by Saudi Arabia to the annual
GCC summit in Dammam, Saudi Arabia during December 7-9, 2018, but he did not attend. Amir
Tamim and the host, Shaykh Sabah of Kuwait, were the only two GCC leaders that attended the
December 4, 2017, GCC summit in Kuwait that was adjourned after only two hours.
Qatar’s disputes with other GCC countries have come despite the resolution in 2011 of a long-
standing territorial dispute between Qatar and Bahrain, dating back to the 18th century, when the
ruling families of both countries controlled parts of the Arabian peninsula. Qatar and Bahrain
referred the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1991 after clashes in 1986 in
which Qatar landed military personnel on a disputed man-made reef (Fasht al-Dibal). In March
2001, the ICJ sided with Bahrain on the central dispute over the Hawar Islands, but with Qatar on
ownership of the Fasht al-Dibal reef and the town of Zubara on the Qatari mainland, where some
members of the ruling Al Khalifa family of Bahrain are buried. Two smaller islands, Janan and
Hadd Janan, were awarded to Qatar. Qatar accepted the ruling as binding.
Iran
Even though the Saudi-led bloc justified its blockade of Qatar in part on the assertion that Qatar
had close relations with Iran, Qatar has long helped counter Iran strategically. Qatar enforced
international sanctions against Iran during 2010-2016, and no Qatar-based entity has been
designated by the United States as an Iran sanctions violator. Amir Tamim attended both U.S.-
GCC summits (May 2015 at Camp David and April 2016 in Saudi Arabia) that addressed GCC
concerns about the July 2015 U.S.-led multilateral agreement on Iran’s nuclear program (Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA).24 Qatar withdrew its Ambassador from Tehran in
January 2016 in solidarity with Saudi Arabia over the Saudi execution of a dissident Shiite cleric,
and Qatar joined the February 2016 GCC declaration that Lebanese Hezbollah is a terrorist group.
Yet Qatari leaders have always argued that dialogue with Iran is key to reducing regional
tensions. Qatar and Iran have shared a large natural gas field in the Persian Gulf without incident,
although some Iranian officials have occasionally accused Qatar of cheating on the

24 The U.S.-GCC summits have resulted in new U.S. commitments to assist the GCC states against Iran and other
regional threats, including through new arms sales, counterterrorism cooperation, countering cyberattacks, joint
military exercises, and other measures. See White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Annex to U.S.-Gulf
Cooperation Council Joint Statement.” May 14, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/14/annex-
us-gulf-cooperation-council-camp-david-joint-statement.
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arrangement.25 In February 2010, Shaykh Tamim, who was at that time the Crown Prince, visited
Iran for high-level talks with Iranian leaders, and as Amir, he has maintained direct contact with
Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani.26
Apparently perceiving that the June 2017 intra-GCC rift provided an opportunity to drive a wedge
within the GCC, Iran supported Qatar in the dispute and has exported additional foodstuffs to
Qatar to help it compensate for the cutoff of Saudi food exports. It has permitted Qatar’s flagship
airline, Qatar Airways, to overfly its airspace in light of the Saudi, UAE, and Bahraini denial of
their airspace to that carrier. In August 2017, Qatar formally restored full diplomatic relations
with Iran. Possibly as a consequence of the intra-GCC dispute, Qatar did not publicly support the
May 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, instead issuing a statement hoping that efforts to
“denuclearize” the region will not lead to “escalation.”27
Saudi official statements also cited Qatar’s alleged support for pro-Iranian dissidents in Bahrain
as part of the justification for isolating Qatar in June 2017. Contributing to that Saudi perception
was Qatar’s brokering in 2008 of the “Doha Agreement” to resolve a political crisis in Lebanon
that led to clashes between Lebanon government forces and Hezbollah. Qatar’s role as a mediator
stemmed, at least in part, from Qatar’s role in helping reconstruct Lebanon after the 2006 Israel-
Hezbollah war, and from then-Amir Hamad’s postwar visit to Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon.
Further fueling Saudi and UAE suspicions was a 2017 Qatari payment to certain Iraqi Shiite
militia factions several hundred million dollars to release Qatari citizens, including royal family
members, who were kidnapped in 2016 while falcon hunting in southern Iraq.28
Egypt
In Egypt, after the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, a Muslim Brotherhood-
linked figure, Muhammad Morsi, won presidential elections in 2012. Qatar contributed about $5
billion in aid,29 aggravating a split between Qatar and the other GCC states over the Muslim
Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed Morsi’s ouster by Egypt’s military in 2013.
Because of its support for Morsi, Qatar’s relations with former military leader and now President
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have been strained, and Egypt joined the 2017 Saudi-led move against Qatar.
Libya
In Libya, Qatar joined the United States and several GCC and other partner countries in air
operations to help oust Qadhafi in 2011. Subsequently, however, Qatar has supported Muslim
Brotherhood-linked factions in Libya opposed by the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.30 This
difference in approaches in Libya among the GCC states contributed to the intra-GCC rift.

25 “Iran, Qatar, Face Off Over North Field, South Pars. Oil and Gas News,” June 6-12, 2016.
http://www.oilandgasnewsworldwide.com/Article/35647/Iran,_Qatar_face_off_over_North_Field,_South_Pars.
26 Al Arabiya, “Iran, Qatar Seek Improved Relations Despite Differences,” June 19, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/
en/News/middle-east/2015/06/19/Iran-Qatar-seek-improved-relations-despite-differences-.html.
27 https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/statements/statement-on-the-developments-of-the-iranian-nuclear-deal.
28 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/world/middleeast/big-ransom-and-syria-deals-win-release-of-royal-qatari-
hunters.html.
29 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-PDF-English.pdf.
30 U.N. Security Council. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973
(2011). March 9, 2016. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/209.
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Yemen
In 2015, Qatar joined the Saudi-led military coalition that is battling Iran-backed Zaidi Shiite
Houthi rebels in Yemen, including conducting air strikes against Houthi and allied positions. This
was a departure from Qatar’s 2006-2007 failed efforts to mediate between the Houthis and the
government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who left office in 2012 following an “Arab Spring”-
related uprising in Yemen. In September 2015, Qatar deployed about 1,000 military personnel,
along with armor, to Yemen. Four Qatar soldiers were killed fighting there. As a result of the
intra-GCC rift, in mid-2017 Qatar withdrew from the Saudi-led military effort in Yemen.
Syria, Iraq, and Anti-Islamic State Operations
In Syria, Qatar provided funds and weaponry to rebels fighting the regime of President Bashar Al
Asad,31 including those, such as Ahrar Al Sham, that competed with and sometimes fought anti-
Asad factions supported by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Qatar also built ties to Jabhat al Nusra
(JAN), an Al Qaeda affiliate that was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO),32 although Qatari officials assert that their intent was to induce the group to
sever its ties to Al Qaeda, which it formally did in July 2016. Qatari mediation also succeeded on
a few occasions in obtaining the release of Lebanese and Western prisoners captured by that
group. However, Asad regime recent gains in Syria likely render Qatar’s involvement moot. Qatar
has not, to date, followed Kuwait or Bahrain in reopening its embassy in Damascus; its Foreign
Minister stated in January 2019 that Qatar saw “no reason” to do so.33
Qatar is a member of the U.S.-led coalition combating the Islamic State. In 2014, Qatar flew
some airstrikes in Syria against Islamic State positions. However, after several weeks, the
coalition ceased identifying Qatar as a participant in coalition strikes inside Syria. Neither Qatar
nor any other GCC state participated in coalition air operations against the Islamic State inside
Iraq. In April 2017, Qatar reportedly paid ransom to obtain the release of 26 Qatari ruling family
members abducted while on a hunting trip in southern Iraq in 2015, reportedly by Iraqi Shiite
militias. The Iraqi government said in June 2017 that it, not Shiite militias, received the ransom.
Lebanon
Qatar has sought to exert some influence in Lebanon, possibly as a counterweight to that exerted
by Saudi Arabia. In January 2019, Amir Tamim was one of the few regional leaders to attend an
Arab League summit held in Beirut. In late January 2019, Qatar announced a $500 million
investment in Lebanon government bonds to support that country’s ailing economy.34

31 Mark Mazzetti and Matt Apuzzo, “U.S. Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels,” New York Times,
January 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/world/middleeast/us-relies-heavily-on-saudi-money-to-support-
syrian-rebels.html?_r=0.
32 Al Jazeera, December 2, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/lebanese-hostages-released-prisoner-swap-
151201072408599.html.
33 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/qatar-normalise-relations-syria-foreign-minister-190114080234797.html.
34 “Making a Levantine Comeback: Qatar Boost Bonds with Lebanon with $500 million investment. Alaraby.co.uk.
January 21, 2019.
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Israeli-Palestinian Issues/Hamas
Qatar has attempted to play a role in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations by engaging all parties.
In 1996, then-Amir Hamad hosted then-Prime Minister of Israel Shimon Peres and allowed Israel
to open a formal trade office in Doha—going beyond the GCC’s dropping in 1998 of the
secondary Arab League boycott of Israel. In April 2008, then-Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni
attended the Qatar government-sponsored Doha Forum conference and met with Hamad.35 Qatar
ordered the Israeli offices in Doha closed in January 2009 at the height of an Israel-Hamas
conflict and the offices have not formally reopened. Amir Tamim regularly accuses Israel of
abuses against the Palestinians and insincerity in seeking a political solution to the dispute.36Still,
small levels of direct Israel-Qatar trade reportedly continue; Israeli exports to Qatar consist
mostly of machinery and technology, and imports from Qatar are primarily plastics.37
Qatar has allowed senior leaders of the Islamist group Hamas—a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot
that has exercised de facto control of the Gaza Strip since 2007—to operate in Doha. Hamas
supporters and leaders also regularly appear on Al Jazeera. Qatari officials assert that engagement
with Hamas is part of the country’s efforts to broker reconciliation between Hamas and the Fatah-
led Palestinian Authority (PA), but U.S. and some other GCC officials criticize Qatar’s relations
with Hamas as support for a terrorist organization. Qatari officials assert that the country funds
only humanitarian and civilian projects that benefit the residents of the Gaza Strip and have no
military applications. Qatar’s leaders express consistent support for Palestinian efforts for full
United Nations membership and recognition, while at the same time backing negotiations
between the Palestinians and Israel. Qatar reportedly asked former Hamas political bureau chief
Khalid Meshal to leave Qatar after the intra-GCC rift erupted, apparently to accommodate the
blockading states. In the 115th Congress, the Palestinian International Terrorism Support Act of
2017 (H.R. 2712), which was ordered to be reported to the full House on November 15, 2017,
appeared directed at Qatar by mandating sanctions on agencies of foreign governments
determined to be providing financial or other material support to Hamas or its leaders.
As have the other Gulf states, Qatar has sought to compensate for a curtailment of U.S.
contributions to the U.N. Relief Works Agency (UNRWA). In April 2018, Qatar donated $50
million to that agency. In December 2018, Qatar reached a two-year agreement with UNRWA to
donate to that agency’s programs in education and health care.
Afghanistan/Taliban Office
Qatari forces did not join any U.S.-led military operations inside Afghanistan, but its facilities and
forces support U.S. operations there, and Qatar has brokered talks between the United States and
Taliban representatives. Unlike Saudi Arabia and UAE, Qatar did not recognize the Taliban as the
legitimate government of Kabul when the movement ruled during 1996-2001. In June 2013, the
Taliban opened a representative office in Qatar, but it violated U.S.-Qatar-Taliban understandings
by raising a flag of the former Taliban regime on the building and Qatar, at U.S. request,
immediately closed the office. Taliban officials remained in Qatar, and revived U.S.-Taliban talks
led to the May 31, 2014, exchange of captured U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl for five Taliban

35 “Qatar and Israel: A Strategic but Complicated Alliance.” Fanack Chronicle of the Middle East and North Africa.
April 27, 2013.
36 “Israel Doesn’t Want Peace: Emir.” Qatar The Peninsula, September 29, 2015. http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/
news/qatar/353598/israel-doesn-t-want-peace-emir.
37 Ibid.
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figures held by the United States at the prison facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The five were
banned from traveling outside Qatar until there is an agreed solution that would ensure that they
could not rejoin the Taliban insurgency. In November 2018, the five joined the Taliban
representative office in Doha.
Qatar permitted the Taliban office in Qatar to formally reopen in 2015.38 Some informal talks
between the Taliban and Afghan and other officials took place there subsequently. A State
Department official, deputy assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Alice Wells,
reportedly met with Taliban figures from that office in Doha in July 2018 for discussions about a
future peace settlement in Afghanistan.39 Since mid-2018, further talks, with increasingly levels
of intensity, have taken place in Doha between Taliban negotiators and the U.S. envoy for
Afghanistan, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.
Qatar might also have some contacts with the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) that is allied with the Taliban. In January 2016, Qatari mediation
reportedly caused the Haqqani Network to release a Canadian hostage, Colin Rutherford.40 The
mediation did not as Qatar hoped, lead to the freedom of the Coleman family, also held by that
group, which was rescued from the group by a U.S. and Pakistani operation in October 2016.
In January 2018, Qatar’s air force completed the first two flights of its C-17 (Globemaster) cargo
aircraft to Afghanistan and back. According to Defense Secretary Mattis, the flights provided
logistical support to the NATO “counterterrorism” campaign there.
Other Qatari Relationships and Mediation Efforts41
Somewhat outside the traditional Middle East:
 Qatar has played an active role in mediating conflict over Sudan’s Darfur region.
In 2010, Qatar helped broker a series of agreements, collectively known as the
Doha Agreements, between the government and various rebel factions. Qatar’s
grants and promises of investment reportedly were pivotal to achieving these
outcomes. In March 2018, Qatar and Sudan signed an agreement to jointly invest
$4 billion to develop the Res Sea port of Suakin off Sudan’s coast.
 Qatar has forged relationships with several countries in Central Asia based on
shared—or potentially competing—interests in shaping energy delivery routes in
the region.42 Amir Tamim has exchanged leadership visits with the President of
Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov. Amir Tamim visited
Turkmenistan in March 2016 and Berdymukhamedov visited Doha in March
2017. The two countries are major world gas suppliers. The leader of Tajikistan,
Imamali Rahmonov, visited Doha in February 2017 to reportedly discuss Qatari
investment and other joint projects. Qatar funded a large portion of a $100

38 Author meeting with Pugwash representatives, June 2015.
39 Kathy Gannon, “Taliban Official Says Group Spoke with US Official,” Associated Press, July 28, 2018,
https://apnews.com/b621f29320f546d0a0d6adb27ff6ac96.
40 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/militants-free-american-woman-and-family-held-for-5-years-in-
afghanistan.html.
41 For more information on Qatar’s mediation efforts, see Sultan Barakat, Brookings Doha Center publication “Qataru
Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final-PDF-
English.pdf.
42 See Natalie Koch. Qatar and Central Asia. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 484, 2017.
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million mosque in Dushanbe, which purports to be the largest mosque in Central
Asia.
U.S.-Qatar Defense and Security Cooperation
U.S.-Qatar defense and security relations are long-standing and extensive—a characterization
emphasized by senior U.S. officials in the course of the two U.S.-Qatar “Strategic Dialogue”
sessions—in Washington, DC, in January 2018, and in Doha in January 2019. At these sessions
and in other official meetings, senior U.S. officials have praised Qatar as “a longtime friend and
military partner for peace and stability in the Middle East and a supporter of NATO’s mission in
Afghanistan.”43
The U.S-Qatar defense relationship emerged during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. The six Gulf
monarchies formed the GCC in late 1981 and collectively backed Iraq against the threat posed by
Iran in that war, despite their political and ideological differences with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. In
the latter stages of that war, Iran attacked international shipping in the Gulf and some Gulf state
oil loading facilities, but none was in Qatar.
After Iraq invaded GCC member Kuwait in August 1990, the GCC participated in the U.S.-led
military coalition that expelled Iraq from Kuwait in February 1991. In January 1991, Qatari
armored forces helped coalition troops defeat an Iraqi attack on the Saudi town of Khafji. The
Qatari participation in the U.S.-led coalition largely ended U.S.-Qatar strains over Qatar’s illicit
procurement in the late 1980s of U.S.-made “Stinger” shoulder-held antiaircraft missiles.44 After
the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, U.S.-Qatari defense relations deepened and the two countries
signed a formal defense cooperation agreement (DCA), discussed below. Since then, defense
cooperation has expanded and deepened, including through U.S. sales of increasingly
sophisticated arms and missile defense systems. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
Commander General Joseph Votel testified on February 27, 2018, that U.S. regional operations
have not been affected by the intra-GCC rift.
Qatar, one of the wealthiest states in the world on a per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
basis, receives virtually no U.S. military assistance. At times, small amounts of U.S. aid have
been provided to help Qatar develop capabilities to prevent smuggling and the movement of
terrorists or proliferation-related gear into Qatar or around its waterways.
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
The United States and Qatar signed a formal defense cooperation agreement (DCA) on June 23,
1992. The DCA was renewed for 10 years, reportedly with some modifications, in December
2013. The text of the pact is classified, but it reportedly addresses U.S. military access to Qatari
military facilities, prepositioning of U.S. armor and other military equipment, and U.S. training of
Qatar’s military forces.45

43 Ibid.
44 Elaine Sciolino. “Qatar Rejects U.S. Demand for Return of Illicit Stingers.” New York Times, June 28, 1988.
Congress responded to the Qatari Stinger acquisition by enacting a ban on arms sales to Qatar (Section 566(d) of P.L.
100-461). The ban was repealed by Section 568 of the foreign aid appropriations act for FY1991 (P.L. 101-513).
45 U.S. Library of Congress. Country Studies: Persian Gulf States. Some provisions of DCA’s with other GCC states
are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War College:
Strategic Studies Institute), March 2002, p. 27.
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Approximately 13,000 U.S. troops are currently deployed at the various facilities in Qatar. Most
are U.S. Air Force personnel based at the large Al Udeid air base southwest of Doha, working as
part of the Coalition Forward Air Component Command (CFACC).46 The U.S. personnel
deployed to Qatar participate in U.S. operations such as Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) to
combat the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria.
The U.S. Army component of U.S. Central Command prepositions armor (enough to outfit one
brigade) at Camp As Sayliyah outside Doha.47 U.S. armor stationed in Qatar was deployed in
Operation Iraqi Freedom that removed Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq in 2003.
The DCA also reportedly addresses U.S. training of Qatar’s military. Qatar’s force of about
11,800 is the smallest in the region except for Bahrain. Of that force, about 8,500 are ground
forces, 1,800 are naval forces, and 1,500 are air forces. A 2014 law mandates four months (three
months for students) of military training for males between the ages of 18 and 35, with a reserve
commitment of 10 years (up to age 40). General Votel’s February 2018 testimony, referenced
above, stated that Qatar is seeking to expand its military both in size and capacity.
Al Udeid Expansion/Permanent U.S. Basing in Qatar?48
Since 2002, Qatar has contributed over $8 billion to support U.S. and coalition operations at Al
Udeid. The air field, which also hosts the forward headquarters for CENTCOM, has been steadily
expanded and enhanced not only with Qatari funding but also about $450 million in U.S. military
construction funding since 2003.49 In March 2018, the State Department approved the sale to
Qatar of equipment, with an estimated value of about $200 million, to upgrade the Air Operation
Center at Al Udeid.
The January 2018 Strategic Dialogue resulted in a number of U.S.-Qatar announcements of
expanded defense and security cooperation, including Qatari offers to fund capital expenditures
that offer the possibility of an “enduring” U.S. military presence in Qatar and to discuss the
possibility of “permanent [U.S.] basing” there. To enable an enduring U.S. presence, Qatar is
expanding and enhance Al Udeid over the next two decades—an effort that would facilitate an
enduring U.S. presence there. On July 24, 2018, the U.S. and Qatari military attended a
groundbreaking ceremony for the Al Udeid expansion, which will include over 200 housing units
for families of officers and expansion of the base’s ramps and cargo facilities. On January 24,
2019, in the course of the second U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue, the Qatar Ministry of Defense
and the U.S. Department of Defense signed a memorandum of understanding that DOD referred
to as a “positive step towards the eventual formalization of Qatar’s commitment to support
sustainment costs and future infrastructure costs at [Al Udeid Air Base].”50 Qatar has also
extended the Hamad Port to be able to accommodate U.S. Navy operations were there a U.S.
decision to base such operations in Qatar.51

46 See http://www.afcent.af.mil/.
47 See Global Security.org at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-as-sayliyah.htm.
48 Department of State. Joint Statement of the Inaugural United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue. January 30, 2018.
49 Figures compiled by CRS.
50 Department of Defense. “U.S. and Qatar sign MoU Reaffirming Qatar’s Commitment to Supporting U.S. Military
Activities at Al Udeid Air Base.”
51 Qatar Defense Attache in Washington, DC, press release, July 24, 2018.
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U.S. Arms Sales to Qatar
Qatar’s forces continue to field mostly French-made equipment, such as the AMX-30 main battle
tank, but Qatar is increasingly shifting its weaponry mix to U.S.-made equipment.52 According to
General Votel’s February 27, 2018, testimony, Qatar is currently the second-largest U.S. Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) customer, with $25 billion in new FMS cases. And, Qatar is “on track” to
surpass $40 billion in the next five years with additional FMS purchases. The joint statement of
the U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue in January 2018 said that Qatari FMS purchases had resulted in
over 110,000 American jobs and the sustainment of critical U.S. military capabilities.
 Tanks. Qatar’s 30 main battle tanks are French-made AMX-30s. In 2015,
Germany exported several “Leopard 2” tanks to Qatar. Qatar has not purchased
U.S.-made tanks, to date.
 Combat Aircraft. Qatar currently has a small inventory of combat aircraft—18
aircraft, of which 12 are French-made Mirage 2000s. In July 2013, Qatar
submitted a letter of request to purchase 72 U.S.-made F-15s. After a long delay
reportedly linked to the U.S. commitment to Israel’s “Qualitative Military Edge”
(QME), on November 17, 2016, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA) notified Congress of the potential sale which, along with support,
training, and related equipment, has an estimated value of $21 billion
(Transmittal Number 16-58). The FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act
(Section 1278 of P.L. 114-92) required a Department of Defense briefing for
Congress on the risks and benefits of the F-15 sale, including the effect of such a
sale on the U.S. commitment to maintain Israel’s QME. On June 14, 2017,
Secretary of Defense Mattis and Qatar’s Minister of State for Defense Khalid al-
Attiyah signed an agreement for a reported 36 of the F-15 fighters, which
predated (and therefore were not covered by) Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker’s June 26, 2017, letter to Secretary of
State Tillerson saying he would not provide informal concurrence to arms sales to
the GCC countries until the intra-GCC rift was resolved. (Senator Corker
revoked that blanket hold on February 8, 2018.) In December 2017, the Defense
Department announced that Qatar would buy the second group of 36 F-15s under
the sale agreement. Deliveries of all aircraft are to be completed by the end of
2022. Qatar signed a $7 billion agreement in May 2015 to purchase 24 French-
made Rafale aircraft,53 and, in September 2017, a “Statement of Intent” with
Britain to purchase 24 Typhoon combat aircraft.
 Helicopters. In 2012, the United States sold Qatar AH-64 Apache attack
helicopters and related equipment; UH-60 M Blackhawk helicopters; and MH-60
Seahawk helicopters. The total potential value of the sales was estimated at about
$6.6 billion, of which about half consisted of the Apache sale. On April 9, 2018,
DSCA announced that the State Department had approved a sale to Qatar of
5,000 Advanced Precision Kill Weapons Systems II Guidance Sections for use on
its Apache fleet, with an estimated sale value of $300 million.
 Short-Range Missile and Rocket Systems. Qatar is not known to have any
extended range missiles, but various suppliers have provided the country with

52 Information on Qatar’s existing military forces and equipment is derived from The International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS). “The Military Balance: 2016.” Chapter 7: The Middle East and North Africa.
53 Tom Hussain. “Is France Positioning Itself for Lead Role in Persian Gulf?” McClatchy, May 1, 2015; “Senators
Begin Push for Jet Sales to Kuwait, Qatar.” Defense News, January 22, 2016.
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short range systems that can be used primarily in ground operations. During
2012-2013, the United States sold Qatar Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, Javelin
guided missiles, the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS),
the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and the M31A1 Guided Multiple
Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). The total potential value of the sales was
estimated at about $665 million. On April 22, 2016, the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency notified to Congress a potential sale to Qatar of 252 RIM-
116C Rolling Airframe Tactical Missiles and 2 RIM 116C-2 Rolling Airframe
Telemetry Missiles, plus associated equipment and support, with an estimated
sale value of $260 million.54 On May 26, 2016, DSCA notified to Congress an
additional sale of 10 Javelin launch units and 50 Javelin missiles plus associated
equipment and support. The potential sale has an estimated value of $20
million.55 On November 27, 2018, DSCA notified Congress of a State
Department approval of a commercial sale by Raytheon of 40 National Advanced
Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NADSAMS) at an estimated value of $215
million.
 Ballistic Missiles. At its national day parade in Doha in mid-December 2017, the
Qatari military displayed its newly purchased SY 400-BP-12A ballistic missile,
which has a 120-mile range and is considered suited to a surface attack mission.
The display was widely viewed as an effort to demonstrate to the Saudi-led bloc
Qatar’s capabilities to resist concerted pressure.56
 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Systems. Qatar has purchased various U.S.-
made BMD systems, consistent with U.S. efforts to promote a coordinated Gulf
missile defense capability against Iran’s missile arsenal. In 2012, the United
States sold Qatar Patriot Configuration 3 (PAC-3, made by Raytheon) fire units
and missiles at an estimated value of nearly $10 billion. Also that year, the
United States agreed to sell Qatar the Terminal High Altitude Area Air Defense
(THAAD), the most sophisticated ground-based missile defense system the
United States has made available for sale.57 However, because of Qatar’s budget
difficulties and operational concerns, the THAAD sale has not been finalized.58
In February 2017, Raytheon concluded an agreement to sell Qatar an early
warning radar system to improve the capabilities of its existing missile defense
systems, with an estimated value of $1.1 billion. In December 2017, the Defense
Department awarded Raytheon a $150 million contract to provide Qatar with
services and support for its PAC-3 system.
 Naval Vessels. In August 2016, DSCA transmitted a proposed sale to Qatar of an
unspecified number of U.S.-made Mk-V fast patrol boats, along with other
equipment, with a total estimated value of about $124 million. In August 2017,
Qatar finalized a purchase from Italy of four multirole corvette ships, two fast

54 Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Transmittal Number 16-07.
55 Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Transmittal Number 16-20.
56 Why is Qatar Showing Off its New Short-Range Ballistic Missile Arsenal?” Al Arabiya English, December 20, 2017.
57 Defense Security Cooperation Agency announcement. November 5, 2012. http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/
qatar-terminal-high-altitude-area-defense-thaad.
58 “Lockheed Says Qatar Budget Woes Could Delay Defense Deal.” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2016.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/lockheed-says-qatar-budget-woes-could-delay-defense-deal-1461692108.
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patrol missile ships, and an amphibious logistics ship, with an estimated value of
over $5 billion.59
Other Defense Partnerships
Qatar has also developed relations with NATO under the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” (ICI).
Qatar’s Ambassador to Belgium serves as the interlocutor with NATO, the headquarters of which
is based near Brussels. In June 2018, Qatar’s Defense Minister said that his country’s long-term
strategic “ambition” is to join NATO.60
Turkey
Qatar’s defense relationship with Turkey has become an element in Qatar’s efforts to resist the
Saudi-led pressure in the intra-GCC crisis. In 2014, Qatar allowed Turkey—a country that, like
Qatar, often supports Muslim Brotherhood—to open a military base (Tariq bin Ziyad base) in
Qatar,61 an initiative that might have contributed to Turkey’s support for Qatar in the June 2017
intra-GCC rift. One of the “13 demands” of the Saudi-led bloc has been that Qatar close the
Turkish base in Qatar—a demand Qatari officials say will not be met. Turkey has demonstrated
its support for Qatar by sending additional troops there and conducting joint exercises in August
2017 and by increasing food exports to replace those previously provided by Saudi Arabia.
Turkey further added to its Qatar troop contingent in December 2017.
Russia
Qatar has broadened its relationship with Russia since early 2016 in conjunction with efforts to
resolve the conflict in Syria and in recognition of Russia’s heightened role in the region. One of
Qatar’s sovereign wealth funds has increased its investments in Russia, particularly in its large
Rosneft energy firm. Amir Tamim has made several visits to Russia, the latest of which was in
March 2018. During the visit, it was announced that Qatar Airways would buy a 25% stake in the
Vnukovo International Airport, one of Moscow’s airports.
Qatar is also reportedly considering buying the S-400 sophisticated air defense system. Qatar-
Russia discussions about the purchase have apparently caused a degree of alarm among the
Saudi-led states, with Saudi Arabia going so far as to threaten military action against Qatar if it
buys the system. Saudi officials also reportedly asked French President Emmanuel Macron to
persuade Qatar not to buy the weapon.62 Were Qatar to purchase the S-400, it might be subject to
U.S. sanctions under Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act
(P.L. 115-44). That section sanctions persons or entities that conduct transactions with Russia’s
defense or intelligence sector. It mandates the imposition of several sanctions that might include
restrictions on certain exports to Qatar, restrictions on Qatari banking activities in the United
States, restrictions on Qatari acquisition of property in the United States, and a ban on U.S.
investments in any Qatari sovereign debt.

59 “Qatar’s EUR5 Billion Naval Deal with Italy Sees Three Ship Types to Be Delivered.” IHS Jane’s Navy
International, June 17, 2016.
60 AFP, June 6, 2018.
61 Heather Murdock, “Turkey Opens First Mideast Military Base in Qatar,” Voice of America News, May 10, 2016,
http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-opens-first-middle-east-military-base-in-qatar/3323653.html.
62 AFP, June 6, 2018.
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Counterterrorism Cooperation63
U.S.-Qatar’s cooperation against groups that both countries agree are terrorist groups, such as the
Islamic State organization, is extensive. However, some groups that the United States considers as
terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, are considered by Qatar to be Arab movements pursuing
legitimate goals. Perhaps in part as a means to attract U.S. support in the context of the intra-GCC
rift, on July 10, 2017, Qatar’s foreign minister and then-Secretary Tillerson signed in Doha a
Memorandum of Understanding on broad U.S.-Qatar counterterrorism cooperation, including but
going beyond just combatting terrorism financing.64 The United States and Qatar held a
Counterterrorism Dialogue on November 8, 2017, in which they reaffirmed progress on
implementing the MoU. The joint statement of the January 2018 Strategic Dialogue noted
“positive progress” under the July 2017 MoU, and thanked Qatar for its action to counter
terrorism. The statement also noted the recent conclusion of a memorandum of understanding
between the U.S. Attorney General and his Qatari counterpart on the fight against terrorism and
its financing and combating cyber-crime.
In an effort to implement the U.S.-Qatar MoU, and perhaps also as a gesture to the blockading
states, on March 22, 2018, the Qatar Ministry of Interior issued list of 19 individuals and eight
entities that it considers as “terrorists.” The list includes 10 persons who are also are also named
as terrorists by the blockading GCC states. On April 2-5, 2018, Qatar held a conference attended
by international experts and security professionals from 42 countries.
Qatar participates in the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program to boost
domestic security capabilities, and it has continued to participate in and host Global
Counterterrorism Forum (CGTF) events. Under the ATA program, participating countries are
provided with U.S. training and advice on equipment and techniques to prevent terrorists from
entering or moving across their borders. However, Qatari agencies such as the State Security
Bureau and the Ministry of Interior have limited manpower and are reliant on nationals from third
countries to fill law enforcement positions—a limitation Qatar has tried to address by employing
U.S. and other Western-supplied high technology.65
In the past, at least one high-ranking Qatari official provided support to Al Qaeda figures residing
in or transiting Qatar, including suspected September 11, 2001, attacks mastermind Khalid
Shaykh Mohammad.66 None of the September 11 hijackers was a Qatari national.
Terrorism Financing Issues
U.S. officials have stated that Qatar has taken steps in recent years to prevent terrorism financing
and the movement of suspected terrorists into or through Qatar. The country is a member of the
Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a regional financial action
task force that coordinates efforts combatting money laundering and terrorism financing. In 2014,
the Amir approved Law Number 14, the “Cybercrime Prevention Law,” which criminalized
terrorism-linked cyber offenses, and clarified that it is illegal to use an information network to

63 Much of the information in this section is taken from: Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism. “Country Reports on Terrorism: 2017.” It can be accessed at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/
282844.htm.
64 Carol Morello. “Qatar Agrees to Curb Terrorism Financing Under Deal with U.S.” Washington Post, July 11, 2017.
65 Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. “Country Reports on Terrorism: 2014.”
66 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
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contact a terrorist organization or raise funds for terrorist groups, or to promote the ideology of
terrorist organizations. In 2017, the country passed updated terrorism financing legislation.
Nevertheless, according to U.S. officials, “entities and individuals within Qatar continue to serve
as a source of financial support for terrorist and violent extremist groups, particularly regional Al
Qa’ida affiliates such as the Nusrah Front.”67 In October 2016, Daniel Glaser, then Assistant
Secretary for Terrorist Financing in the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, told a
Washington, DC, research institute that, over the past decade, Qatar had made less progress in
countering terrorism financing than had Saudi Arabia.68 The United States has imposed sanctions
on several persons living in Qatar, including Qatari nationals, for allegedly raising funds or
making donations to both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.69
In February 2017, perhaps in an effort to demonstrate increased cooperation, Qatar hosted a
meeting of the “Egmont Group” global working group consisting of 152 country Financial
Intelligence Units. Qatar is a member of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC), a U.S.-
GCC initiative announced during President Trump’s May 2017 visit to Saudi Arabia. In October
2017, and despite the intra-GCC rift, Qatar jointed the United States and other TFTC countries in
designating terrorists affiliated with Al Qaeda and ISIS. The State Department’s 2017 report on
international terrorism says that, in 2017, Qatar took sweeping measures to monitor and restrict
the overseas activities of Qatari charities.
Countering Violent Extremism
Qatar has hosted workshops on developing plans to counter violent extremism and has
participated in similar sessions hosted by the UAE’s Hedayat Center that focuses on that issue.
Also in 2015, Qatar pledged funding to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to help
address violent extremism and radicalization among youth and vulnerable populations. However,
some experts have noted that the government has violated a pledge to the United States not to
allow Qatari preachers to conduct what some consider religious incitement in mosques in
Education City, where several U.S. universities have branches.70 Education City was established
by the Qatar Foundation, which is at the core of Qatar’s strategy to counter violent extremism
through investment in education.
Economic Issues
Even before the June 2017 intra-GCC rift, Qatar had been wrestling with the economic effects of
the fall in world energy prices since mid-2014—a development that has caused GCC economic
growth to slow, their budgets to fall into deficit, and the balance of their ample sovereign wealth
funds to decline. Oil and gas reserves have made Qatar the country with the world’s highest per
capita income. Qatar is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), along with other GCC states Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE and other countries.
However, on December 3, 2018, Qatar announced it would withdraw from OPEC in early 2019 in

67 State Department report on international terrorism for 2015.
68 Barbara Slavin. “U.S. Treasury Official Praises Saudi Cooperation Against Terror Funding.” Al Monitor, October 14,
2016.
69 U.S. Department of the Treasury: “Treasury Designated Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators,” September
24, 2014; “Treasury Designated Al-Qa’ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen,” December 18, 2013; “Treasury Targets
Key Al-Qa’ida Funding and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical Transit Point,” July 28, 2011.
70 David Weinberg. “Hate Preachers on Qatar Campus: Obama Gives Qatar Undeserved A+ on Fighting Incitement.”
The Huffington Post, May 2, 2016.
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order to focus on its more high priority natural gas exports. Some observers attributed the
decision, at least in part, to the ongoing intra-GCC rift, insofar as rival Saudi Arabia is considered
the dominant actor within OPEC.
The economic impact on Qatar of the June 2017 intra-GCC rift is difficult to discern. About 40%
of Qatar’s food was imported from Saudi Arabia precrisis, and there were reports of runs on
stocks of food when the blockade began. However, the government’s ample financial resources
enabled it to quickly arrange substitute sources of goods primarily from Turkey, Iran, and India.
The effects on Qatar’s growing international air carrier, Qatar Airways, have been significant
because of the prohibition on its overflying the blockading states. In November 2017, Iran and
Turkey signed a deal with Qatar to facilitate the mutual transiting of goods.
Qatar’s main sovereign wealth fund, run by the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), as well as
funds held by the Central Bank, total about $350 billion, according to Qatar’s Central Bank
governor in July 2017, giving the country a substantial cushion to weather its financial
demands.71 QIA’s investments consist of real estate and other relatively illiquid holdings, such as
interest in London’s Canary Wharf project. In May 2016, Qatar offered $9 billion in bonds as a
means of raising funds without drawing down its investment holdings.72 In April 2018, the
country raised $12 billion in another, larger, bond issue. Qatar also has cut some subsidies to
address its budgetary shortfalls. In early October 2017, it was reported that QIA is considering
divesting a large portion of its overseas assets and invest the funds locally—a move that is at least
partly attributable to the economic pressures of the intra-GCC rift.73
The intra-GCC rift has not harmed Qatar’s ability to earn substantial funds from energy exports.
Oil and gas still account for 92% of Qatar’s export earnings, and 56% of government revenues.74
Proven oil reserves of about 25 billion barrels are far less than those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
but enough to enable Qatar to continue its current levels of oil production (about 700,000 barrels
per day) for over 50 years. Its proven reserves of natural gas exceed 25 trillion cubic meters,
about 13% of the world’s total and third largest in the world. Along with Kuwait and UAE, in
November 2016 Qatar agreed to a modest oil production cut (about 30,000 barrels per day) as
part of an OPEC-wide production cut intended to raise world crude oil prices.
Qatar is the world’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which is exported from the
large Ras Laffan processing site north of Doha. That facility has been built up with U.S.-made
equipment, much of which was exported with the help of about $1 billion in Export-Import Bank
loan guarantees. Qatar is a member and hosts the headquarters of the Gas Exporting Countries
Forum (GECF), which is a nascent natural gas cartel and includes Iran and Russia, among other
countries. State-run Qatar Petroleum is a major investor in the emerging U.S. LNG export market,
with a 70% stake (Exxon-Mobil and Conoco-Phillips are minority stakeholders) in an LNG
terminal in Texas that is seeking U.S. government approval to expand the facility to the point
where it can export over 15 million tons of LNG per year.75 In June 2018, Qatar Petroleum bought

71 Qatar Has $340 Billion in Reserves, Can Withstand ‘Any Kind of Shock,’ Central Bank Says. Istanbul Sabah Online,
July 10, 2017.
72 https://finance.yahoo.com/news/saudi-arabia-might-pull-qatar-174900348.html.
73 Qatar Fund Explores Asset Sales as it Looks Homeward. Bloomberg News, October 3, 2017.
74 CIA,The World Factbook. June 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
print_qa.html.
75 Adam Schreck. “AP Interview: Qatar Energy Minister Wants ‘Fair’ Oil Price.” Associated Press, May 24, 2016.
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link to page 28 Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

a 30% state in an Exxon-Mobil-run development of an onshore shale natural gas basin in
Argentina (Vaca Muerta).76
Qatar is the source of the gas supplies for the Dolphin Gas Project established by the UAE in
1999 and which became operational in 2007. The project involves production and processing of
natural gas from Qatar’s offshore North Field, which is connected to Iran’s South Pars Field (see
Figure 2), and transportation of the processed gas by subsea pipeline to the UAE and Oman.77 Its
gas industry gives Qatar some counter leverage against the Saudi-led group, but Qatar has said it
will not reduce its gas supplies under existing agreements with other GCC states. But, Qatar has
filed a complaint at the WTO over a UAE boycott of Qatari goods. The United States reportedly
has backed the UAE’s argument in that dispute, particularly the UAE does not have the authority
to adjudicate issues of national security.78
Because prices of hydrocarbon exports have fallen dramatically since mid-2014, in 2016 Qatar
ran its first budget deficit (about $13 billion). As have other GCC rulers, Qatari leaders assert
publicly that the country needs to diversify its economy, that generous benefits and subsidies need
to be reduced, and that government must operate more efficiently. At the same time, the
leadership apparently seeks to minimize the effect of any cutbacks on Qatari citizens.79 Still, if oil
prices remain far below their 2014 levels and the intra-GCC rift continues much further, it is
likely that many Qatari citizens will be required to seek employment in the private sector, which
they generally have shunned in favor of less demanding jobs in the government.
The national development strategy from 2011 to 2016 focused on Qatar’s housing, water, roads,
airports, and shipping infrastructure in part to promote economic diversification, as well as to
prepare to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup soccer tournament, investing as much as $200 billion.
In Doha, the result has been a construction boom, which by some reports has outpaced the
capacity of the government to manage, and perhaps fund. A metro transportation system is under
construction in Doha.
U.S.-Qatar Economic Relations
In contrast to the two least wealthy GCC states (Bahrain and Oman), which have free trade
agreements with the United States, Qatar and the United States have not negotiated an FTA.
However, in April 2004, the United States and Qatar signed a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA). Qatar has used the benefits of the more limited agreement to undertake large
investments in the United States, including the City Center project in Washington, DC. Also,
several U.S. universities and other institutions, such as Cornell University, Carnegie Mellon
University, Georgetown University, Brookings Institution, and Rand Corporation, have
established branches and offices at the Qatar Foundation’s Education City outside Doha. In 2005,
Qatar donated $100 million to the victims of Hurricane Katrina. The joint statement of the
January 2018 U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue “recognized” QIA’s commitment of $45 billion in
future investments in U.S. companies and real estate.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s “Foreign Trade Statistics” compilation, the United States
exported $4.9 billion in goods to Qatar in 2016 (about $600 million higher than 2015), and
imported $1.16 billion worth of Qatari goods in 2016, slightly less than in 2015. U.S. exports to

76 Qatar Taps into Giant Argentinean Shale Reserve. UPI, June 4, 2018.
77 Dolphin Energy website. http://www.dolphinenergy.com/en/6/about-dolphin-energy/about-us.
78 “UAE Challenges Qatar at the WTO in Case with National Security Implications.” Inside Trade, February 4, 2019.
79 Giorgio Cafiero. “Qatar Cuts Spending to Cope with Low Oil Prices.” Middle East Institute, March 1, 2016.
http://www.mei.edu/content/article/qatar-cuts-spending-cope-low-oil-prices.
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Qatar consist mainly of aircraft, machinery, and information technology. U.S. imports from Qatar
consist mainly of petroleum products, but U.S. imports of Qatar’s crude oil or natural gas have
declined to negligible levels in recent years, reflecting the significant increase in U.S. domestic
production of those commodities. U.S. exports to Qatar for 2017 ran at about half the level of
2016, but U.S. imports from Qatar in 2017 were about the same as in 2016.
Qatar’s growing airline, Qatar Airways, is a major buyer of U.S. commercial aircraft. In October
2016, the airline agreed to purchase from Boeing up to another 100 passenger jets with an
estimated value of $18 billion—likely about $10 billion if standard industry discounts are applied.
However, some U.S. airlines are challenging Qatar Airways’ benefits under a U.S.-Qatar “open
skies” agreement. The U.S. carriers assert that the airline’s privileges under that agreement should
be revoked because the airline’s aircraft purchases are subsidized by Qatar’s government, giving
it an unfair competitive advantage.80 The Obama Administration did not reopen that agreement in
response to the complaints, and the Trump Administration, including during President Trump’s
February 2017 meeting with airline executives, has not indicated it would do so either. The U.S.-
Qatar Strategic Dialogue joint statement said the two countries had reached a set of
“understandings” on civil aviation on January 29, 2018, aimed at ensuring healthy competition on
civil aviation while maintaining the Open Skies framework.
U.S. Assistance
As one of the wealthiest countries per capita in the world, Qatar gets negligible amounts of U.S.
assistance. In FY2016, the United States spent about $100,000 on programs in Qatar, about two-
thirds of which was for counternarcotics programming. In FY2015, the United States spent
$35,000 on programs in Qatar, of which two-thirds was for counternarcotics.

80 “Open Skies Dispute Between US and Gulf Airlines Escalates.” UAE the National, January 30, 2016.
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Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure

Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency, as adapted by CRS.

Author Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Acknowledgments
This report acknowledges and adapts analysis and previous CRS reports on Qatar by Christopher M.
Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
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