Iran Sanctions

Updated February 4, 2019
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
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Iran Sanctions

Summary
U.S. sanctions have been used extensively by successive Administrations to try to change Iran’s
behavior. Sanctions had a substantial effect on Iran’s economy and on some major strategic
decisions, but little or no effect on Iran’s regional malign activities. During 2012-2015, when the
global community was relatively united in pressuring Iran, Iran’s economy shrank as its crude oil
exports fell by more than 50%, and Iran had limited ability to utilize its $120 billion in assets held
abroad. The 2015 multilateral nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA)
provided Iran broad relief from the international and U.S. secondary sanctions as the Obama
Administration waived relevant sanctions, revoked relevant executive orders (E.O.s), and
corresponding U.N. and EU sanctions were lifted. Remaining in place were a general ban on U.S.
trade with Iran and sanctions imposed on Iran’s support for regional governments and armed
factions, its human rights abuses, its efforts to acquire missile and advanced conventional
weapons capabilities, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, non-binding U.N. restrictions on Iran’s
development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and a binding ban on its importation or
exportation of arms remain in place for several years. Iran has defied the Resolution by
continuing longstanding support regional armed factions and development of ballistic missiles.
Iran was able to pursue these policies even when strict international economic sanctions imposed
significant harm to its economy during 2010-2015.
JCPOA sanctions relief enabled Iran to increase its oil exports to nearly pre-sanctions levels,
regain access to foreign exchange reserve funds and reintegrate into the international financial
system, achieve about 7% yearly economic growth, attract foreign investments in key sectors, and
buy new passenger aircraft. The sanctions relief contributed to Iranian President Hassan
Rouhani’s reelection in the May 19, 2017, vote. Yet, the economic rebound did not prevent
sporadic unrest that has erupted since December 2017.
On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would no longer participate
in the JCPOA and that all U.S. secondary sanctions would be re-imposed after a maximum
“wind-down period” of 180 days (ending November 4, 2018). The re-imposition of U.S.
sanctions is harming Iran’s economy as major companies exit the Iranian economy rather than
risk being penalized by the United States. Iran’s oil exports have decreased significantly and the
value of Iran’s currency has sharply declined and economic-based unrest has continued, although
not to the point where the regime is threatened. But it remains uncertain how extensively Iran’s
economy will be damaged, because the European Union and other countries are trying to keep the
economic benefits of the JCPOA flowing to Iran in order to persuade Iran to remain in the
JCPOA. To that end, in January 2019 the European countries created a trading mechanism
(Special Purpose Vehicle) that presumably can increase trade with Iran by circumventing U.S.
secondary sanctions. On November 5, 2018, the Administration granted six-month exceptions to
eight countries that the Administration asserts significantly reduced oil imports from Iran –
including to China and India even though the two countries combined continued to import over 1
million barrels per day of Iranian crude oil in October. The economic difficulties have prompted
Iranian hardliners to urge reconsideration of Iran’s continued adherence to the JCPOA.
See also CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit, by Paul K. Kerr and
Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to
Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack.
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Iran Sanctions

Overview and Objectives
Sanctions have been a significant component of U.S. Iran policy since Iran’s 1979 Islamic
Revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran, a U.S. ally. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. sanctions were
intended to try to compel Iran to cease supporting acts of terrorism and to limit Iran’s strategic
power in the Middle East more generally. After the mid-2000s, U.S. and international sanctions
focused largely on ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program is for purely civilian uses. During 2010-
2015, the international community cooperated closely with a U.S.-led and U.N.-authorized
sanctions regime in pursuit of the goal of persuading Iran to agree to limits to its nuclear program.
Still, sanctions against Iran have multiple objectives and address multiple perceived threats from
Iran simultaneously.
This report analyzes U.S. and international sanctions against Iran. CRS has no way to
independently corroborate whether any individual or other entity might be in violation of U.S. or
international sanctions against Iran. The report tracks “implementation” of the various U.S. laws
and Executive Orders as designations and imposition of sanctions. Some sanctions require the
blocking of U.S.-based property of sanctioned entities. CRS has not obtained information from
the executive branch indicating that such property has been blocked, and it is possible that
sanctioned entities do not have any U.S. assets that could be blocked.
The sections below are grouped by function, in the chronological order in which these themes
have emerged.1
Blocked Iranian Property and Assets
Post-JCPOA Status: Iranian Assets Still Frozen, but Some Issues Resolved
U.S. sanctions on Iran were first imposed during the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981, in the
form of executive orders issued by President Jimmy Carter blocking nearly all Iranian assets held
in the United States. These included E.O. 12170 of November 14, 1979, blocking all Iranian
government property in the United States, and E.O 12205 (April 7, 1980) and E.O. 12211 (April
17, 1980) banning virtually all U.S. trade with Iran. The latter two Orders were issued just prior
to the failed April 24-25, 1980, U.S. effort to rescue the U.S. Embassy hostages held by Iran.
President Jimmy Carter also broke diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980. The trade-
related Orders (12205 and 12211) were revoked by Executive Order 12282 of January 19, 1981,
following the “Algiers Accords” that resolved the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis. Iranian assets still
frozen are analyzed below.
U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal
The Accords established a “U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal” at the Hague that continues to arbitrate
cases resulting from the 1980 break in relations and freezing of some of Iran’s assets. All of the
4,700 private U.S. claims against Iran were resolved in the first 20 years of the Tribunal, resulting
in $2.5 billion in awards to U.S. nationals and firms.

1 On November 13, 2012, the Administration published in the Federal Register (Volume 77, Number 219) “Policy
Guidance” explaining how it implements many of the sanctions, and in particular defining what products and chemicals
constitute “petroleum,” “petroleum products,” and “petrochemical products” that are used in the laws and executive
orders discussed below. See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-13/pdf/2012-27642.pdf.
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The major government-to-government cases involved Iranian claims for compensation for
hundreds of foreign military sales (FMS) cases that were halted in concert with the rift in U.S.-
Iran relations when the Shah’s government fell in 1979. In 1991, the George H. W. Bush
Administration paid $278 million from the Treasury Department Judgment Fund to settle FMS
cases involving weapons Iran had received but which were in the United States undergoing repair
and impounded when the Shah fell.
On January 17, 2016, the day after Implementation Day of the JCPOA, the United States
announced it had settled with Iran for FMS cases involving weaponry the Shah was paying for
(funds deposited into a DOD-managed “Iran FMS Trust Fund”) but that was not completed and
delivered to Iran when the Shah fell. The Trust Fund had a balance after 1990—the year $200
million was paid to Iran to settle some FMS cases—of about $400 million. Under the 2016
settlement, the United States sent Iran the $400 million balance in Trust Fund plus $1.3 billion in
accrued interest, paid from the Department of the Treasury’s “Judgment Fund.” In order not to
violate U.S. regulations barring direct U.S. dollar transfers to Iranian banks, the funds were
remitted to Iran in late January and early February 2016 in foreign hard currency from the central
banks of the Netherlands and of Switzerland. Some remaining claims involving the FMS program
with Iran remain under arbitration at the Tribunal.
Other Iranian Assets Frozen
Iranian assets in the United States are blocked under several provisions, including Executive
Order 13599 of February 2010. The United States did not unblock any of these assets as a
consequence of the JCPOA.
 About $1.9 billion in blocked Iranian assets are bonds belonging to Iran’s Central
Bank, frozen in a Citibank account in New York belonging to Clearstream, a
Luxembourg-based securities firm, in 2008. The funds were blocked on the
grounds that Clearstream had improperly allowed those funds to access the U.S.
financial system. Another $1.67 billion in principal and interest payments on that
account were moved to Luxembourg and are not blocked.
 About $50 million of Iran’s assets frozen in the United States consists of Iranian
diplomatic property and accounts, including the former Iranian embassy in
Washington, DC, and 10 other properties in several states, and related accounts.2
 Among other frozen Iranian assets are real estate holdings of the Assa Company,
a UK-chartered entity, which allegedly was maintaining the interests of Iran’s
Bank Melli in a 36-story office building in New York City and several other
properties around the United States (in Texas, California, Virginia, Maryland, and
other parts of New York City). An Iranian foundation, the Alavi Foundation,
allegedly is an investor in the properties. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern
District of New York blocked these properties in 2009. The Department of the
Treasury report avoids valuing real estate holdings, but public sources assess
these blocked real estate assets at nearly $1 billion. In June 2017, litigation won
the U.S. government control over the New York City office building.
Use of Iranian Assets to Compensate U.S. Victims of Iranian Terrorism
There are a total of about $46 billion in court awards that have been made to victims of Iranian
terrorism. These include the families of the 241 U.S. soldiers killed in the October 23, 1983,

2 http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/tar2010.pdf.
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bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. U.S. funds equivalent to the $400 million balance
in the DOD account (see above) have been used to pay a small portion of these judgments. The
Algiers Accords apparently precluded compensation for the 52 U.S. diplomats held hostage by
Iran from November 1979 until January 1981. The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriation (Section
404 of P.L. 114-113) set up a mechanism for paying damages to the U.S. embassy hostages and
other victims of state-sponsored terrorism using settlement payments paid by various banks for
concealing Iran-related transactions, and proceeds from other Iranian frozen assets.
In April 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court determined the Central Bank assets, discussed above,
could be used to pay the terrorism judgments, and the proceeds from the sale of the frozen real
estate assets mentioned above will likely be distributed to victims of Iranian terrorism as well.3
On the other hand, in March 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that U.S. victims of an Iran-
sponsored terrorist attack could not seize a collection of Persian antiquities on loan to a
University of Chicago museum to satisfy a court judgment against Iran.
Other past financial disputes include the mistaken U.S. shoot-down on July 3, 1988, of an Iranian
Airbus passenger jet (Iran Air flight 655), for which the United States paid Iran $61.8 million in
compensation ($300,000 per wage-earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage earner) for the 248
Iranians killed. The United States did not compensate Iran for the airplane itself, although
officials involved in the negotiations told CRS in November 2012 that the United States later
arranged to provide a substitute used aircraft to Iran.
For more detail on how Iranian and other assets are used to compensate victims of Iranian
terrorism, see CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by
Jennifer K. Elsea and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10104, It Belongs in a Museum: Sovereign
Immunity Shields Iranian Antiquities Even When It Does Not Protect Iran, by Stephen P.
Mulligan.
Executive Order 13599 Impounding Iran-Owned Assets
Post-JCPOA Status: Still in Effect
Executive Order 13599, issued February 5, 2012, directs the blocking of U.S.-based assets of
entities determined to be “owned or controlled by the Iranian government.” The order was issued
to implement Section 1245 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81) that
imposed secondary U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank. The Order requires that any U.S.-based
assets of the Central Bank of Iran, or of any Iranian government-controlled entity, be blocked by
U.S. banks. The order goes beyond the regulations issued pursuant to the 1995 imposition of the
U.S. trade ban with Iran, in which U.S. banks are required to refuse such transactions but to return
funds to Iran. Even before the issuance of the Order, and in order to implement the ban on U.S.
trade with Iran (see below) successive Administrations had designated many entities as “owned or
controlled by the Government of Iran.”
Numerous designations have been made under Executive Order 13599, including the June 4,
2013, naming of 38 entities (mostly oil, petrochemical, and investment companies) that are
components of an Iranian entity called the “Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order” (EIKO).4

3 “U.S. Court Reverses Record Forfeiture Order over Iran Assets.” Associated Press. July 21, 2016.
4 http://global.factiva.com/hp/printsavews.aspx?pp=Print&hc=Publication; and Department of Treasury announcement
of June 4, 2013.
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EIKO was characterized by the Department of the Treasury as an Iranian leadership entity that
controls “massive off-the-books investments.”
Implementation of the U.S. JCPOA Withdrawal. To implement the JCPOA, many 13599-
designated entities specified in the JCPOA (Attachment 3) were “delisted” from U.S. secondary
sanctions (no longer considered “Specially Designated Nationals,” SDNs). The delisted entities
are presented in the tables at the end of the report. However, U.S. persons (or foreign entities
owned or controlled by a U.S. person) continued to be prohibited from conducting transactions
with these entities under Iran Transactions Regulations. The Treasury Department announced on
May 8, 2018, in concert with the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, that almost all of the 13599-
designated entities that were delisted as SDNs will be relisted as SDNs on November 5, 2018.5
On November 5, 2018, the Treasury Department published an updated list of SDNs in concert
with redesignating “delisted” SDNs that were previously added to the designees blocked “solely
pursuant to E.O 13599.”6
Civilian Nuclear Entity Exception. One notable exception to the relisting policy implemented in
2018 is the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The entity, along with 23 of its
subsidiaries, were re-designated under E.O. 13599 but not as entities subject to secondary
sanctions under E.O. 13382. This U.S. listing decision was made in order to facilitate continued
IAEA and EU and other country engagement with Iran’s civilian nuclear program under the
JCPOA. 7
Sanctions for Iran’s Support for Terrorism and
Regional Activities
Most of the hostage crisis-related sanctions were lifted upon resolution of the crisis in 1981. The
United States began imposing sanctions against Iran again in the mid-1980s for its support for
regional groups committing acts of terrorism. The Secretary of State designated Iran a “state
sponsor of terrorism” on January 23, 1984, following the October 23, 1983, bombing of the U.S.
Marine barracks in Lebanon by elements that later established Lebanese Hezbollah. This
designation triggers substantial sanctions on any nation so designated.
None of the laws or Executive Orders in this section were waived or revoked to implement the
JCPOA. No entities discussed in this section were “delisted” from sanctions under the JCPOA.
Sanctions Triggered by Terrorism List Designation
The U.S. naming of Iran as a “state sponsor of terrorism”—commonly referred to as Iran’s
inclusion on the U.S. “terrorism list”—triggers several sanctions. The designation is made under
the authority of Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72, as amended),
sanctioning countries determined to have provided repeated support for acts of international
terrorism. The sanctions triggered by Iran’s state sponsor of terrorism designation are as follows:
 Restrictions on sales of U.S. dual use items. The restriction—a presumption of
denial of any license applications to sell dual use items to Iran—is required by
the Export Administration Act, as continued by executive orders under the

5 For a full list of entities designated under E.O. 13599, go to the following link: https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/
downloads/13599/13599list.pdf.
6 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20181105_names.aspx.
7 U.S. diplomatic “non-paper” provided to CRS.
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authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, IEEPA. The
restrictions are enforced through Export Administration Regulations (EARs)
administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the Commerce
Department.
 Ban on direct U.S. financial assistance and arms sales to Iran. Section 620A of
the Foreign Assistance Act, FAA (P.L. 87-95) and Section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act (P.L. 95-92, as amended), respectively, bar any U.S. foreign
assistance to terrorism list countries. Included in the definition of foreign
assistance are U.S. government loans, credits, credit insurance, and Ex-Im Bank
loan guarantees. Successive foreign aid appropriations laws since the late 1980s
have banned direct assistance to Iran, and with no waiver provisions.
 Requirement to oppose multilateral lending. U.S. officials are required to vote
against multilateral lending to any terrorism list country by Section 1621 of the
International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118, as amended [added by
Section 327 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L.
104-132)]). Waiver authority is provided.
 Withholding of U.S. foreign assistance to countries that assist or sell arms to
terrorism list countries. Under Sections 620G and 620H of the Foreign
Assistance Act, as added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(Sections 325 and 326 of P.L. 104-132), the President is required to withhold
foreign aid from any country that aids or sells arms to a terrorism list country.
Waiver authority is provided. Section 321 of that act makes it a crime for a U.S.
person to conduct financial transactions with terrorism list governments.
 Withholding of U.S. Aid to Organizations That Assist Iran. Section 307 of the
FAA (added in 1985) names Iran as unable to benefit from U.S. contributions to
international organizations, and require proportionate cuts if these institutions
work in Iran. For example, if an international organization spends 3% of its
budget for programs in Iran, then the United States is required to withhold 3% of
its contribution to that international organization. No waiver is provided for.
Exception for U.S. Humanitarian Aid
The terrorism list designation, and other U.S. sanctions laws barring assistance to Iran, do not bar
U.S. disaster aid. The United States donated $125,000, through relief agencies, to help victims of
two earthquakes in Iran (February and May 1997); $350,000 worth of aid to the victims of a June
22, 2002, earthquake; and $5.7 million in assistance for victims of the December 2003 earthquake
in Bam, Iran, which killed 40,000. The U.S. military flew 68,000 kilograms of supplies to Bam.
Requirements for Removal from Terrorism List
Terminating the sanctions triggered by Iran’s terrorism list designation would require Iran’s removal from the
terrorism list. The Arms Export Control Act spells out two different requirements for a President to remove a
country from the list, depending on whether the country’s regime has changed.
If the country’s regime has changed: the President can remove a country from the list immediately by certifying that
regime change in a report to Congress.
If the country’s regime has not changed: the President must report to Congress 45 days in advance of the effective
date of removal. The President must certify that (1) the country has not supported international terrorism within
the preceding six months, and (2) the country has provided assurances it wil not do so in the future. In this latter
circumstance, Congress has the opportunity to block the removal by enacting a joint resolution to that effect. The
President has the option of vetoing the joint resolution, and blocking the removal would require a veto override.
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Sanctions on States “Not Cooperating” Against Terrorism
Section 330 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132) added a
Section 40A to the Arms Export Control Act that prohibits the sale or licensing of U.S. defense
articles and services to any country designated (by each May 15) as “not cooperating fully with
U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.” The President can waive the provision upon determination that a
defense sale to a designated country is “important to the national interests” of the United States.
Every May since the enactment of this law, Iran has been designated as a country that is “not fully
cooperating” with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. However, the effect of the designation is largely
mooted by the many other authorities that prohibit U.S. defense sales to Iran.
Executive Order 13224 Sanctioning Terrorism-Supporting Entities
Executive Order 13324 (September 23, 2001) mandates the freezing of the U.S.-based assets of
and a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determined by the Administration to be supporting
international terrorism. This order was issued two weeks after the September 11, 2001, attacks on
the United States, under the authority of the IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, the U.N.
Participation Act of 1945, and Section 301 of the U.S. Code, initially targeting Al Qaeda.
Use of the Order to Target Iranian Arms Exports
E.O. 13224 is not specific to Iran and does not explicitly target Iranian arms exports to
movements, governments, or groups in the Middle East region. However, successive
Administrations have used the Order—and the orders discussed immediately below—to sanction
such Iranian activity by designating persons or entities that are involved in the delivery or receipt
of such weapons shipments. Some persons and entities that have been sanctioned for such activity
have been cited for supporting groups such as the Afghan Taliban organization and the Houthi
rebels in Yemen, which are not named as terrorist groups by the United States.
Application to the Revolutionary Guard by the Countering America’s
Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44)
Section 105 of CAATSA, signed on August 2, 2017, mandates the imposition of E.O. 13324
penalties on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its officials, agents, and affiliates
by October 30, 2017 (90 days after enactment). The IRGC was named as a terrorism-supporting
entity under E.O 13224 within that deadline. The Treasury Department made the designation of
the IRGC as a terrorism-supporting entity under that E.O. on October 13, 2017.
Implementation
As noted, no entities designated under E.O. 13224 were delisted to implement the JCPOA.
Additional Iran-related entities have been designated under the Order since JCPOA
implementation, as shown in the table at the end of this report.
Sanctions on Iran’s Malign Regional Activities
Some sanctions have been imposed with the specific objective of trying to curtail Iran’s
destabilizing influence in the region.
 Executive Order 13438 on Threats to Iraq’s Stability. Issued on July 7, 2007, the
order blocks U.S.-based property of persons who are determined by the
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Administration to “have committed, or pose a significant risk of committing” acts
of violence that threaten the peace and stability of Iraq, or undermine efforts to
promote economic reconstruction or political reform in Iraq. The Order extends
to persons designated as materially assisting such designees. The Order was
clearly directed at Iran for its provision of arms or funds to Shiite militias there.
Persons sanctioned under the Order include IRGC-Qods Force officers, Iraqi
Shiite militia-linked figures, and other entities. Some of these sanctioned entities
worked to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and are in prominent roles in Iraq’s
parliament and political structure.
 Executive Order 13572 on Repression of the Syrian People. Issued on April 29,
2011, the order blocks the U.S.-based property of persons determined to be
responsible for human rights abuses and repression of the Syrian people. The
IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), IRGC-QF commanders, and others are
sanctioned under this order.
 The Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act (P.L. 114-102) and
Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act of 2018. The
Amendments Act (S. 1595, P.L. 115-272) was signed by President Trump on
October 23, 2018, the 25th anniversary of the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut.
The original law, modeled on the 2010 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act (“CISADA,” see below), excludes from the
U.S. financial system any bank that conducts transactions with Hezbollah or its
affiliates or partners. The more recent law expands the authority of the original
law by authorizing the blocking of U.S.-based property of and U.S. transactions
with any “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” that conducts joint
operations with or provides financing or arms to Lebanese Hezbollah. These
latter provisions clearly refer to Iran’s substantial support for Hezbollah, but are
largely redundant with other sanctions on Iran.
Ban on U.S. Trade and Investment with Iran
Status: Trade ban eased for JCPOA, but back in full effect on August 6, 2018
In 1995, the Clinton Administration expanded U.S. sanctions against Iran by issuing Executive
Order 12959 (May 6, 1995) banning U.S. trade with and investment in Iran. The order was issued
under the authority primarily of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.),8 which gives the President wide powers to regulate commerce with a foreign
country when a ”state of emergency” is declared in relations with that country. E.O. 12959
superseded Executive Order 12957 (March 15, 1995) barring U.S. investment in Iran’s energy
sector, which accompanied President Clinton’s declaration of a “state of emergency” with respect
to Iran. Subsequently, E.O 13059 (August 19, 1997) added a prohibition on U.S. companies’
knowingly exporting goods to a third country for incorporation into products destined for Iran.
Each March since 1995, the U.S. Administration has renewed the “state of emergency” with
respect to Iran. IEEPA gives the President the authority to alter regulations to license transactions
with Iran—regulations enumerated in Section 560 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Iranian
Transactions Regulations, ITRs).

8 The executive order was issued not only under the authority of IEEPA but also the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; §505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-
9) and §301 of Title 3, United States Code.
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Section 103 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(CISADA, P.L. 111-195) codified the trade ban and reinstated the full ban on imports that was
relaxed by April 2000 regulations that allowed importation into the United States of Iranian nuts,
fruit products (such as pomegranate juice), carpets, and caviar. U.S. imports from Iran after that
time were negligible.9 Section 101 of the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293) separately
codified the ban on U.S. investment in Iran, but gives the President the authority to terminate this
sanction if the President notifies Congress 15 days in advance (or three days in advance if there
are “exigent circumstances”).
JCPOA-Related Easing and Reversal
In accordance with the JCPOA, the ITRs were relaxed to allow U.S. importation of the Iranian
luxury goods discussed above (carpets, caviar, nuts, etc.), but not to permit general U.S.-Iran
trade. U.S. regulations were also altered to permit the sale of commercial aircraft to Iranian
airlines that are not designated for sanctions. The modifications were made in the Departments of
State and of the Treasury guidance issued on Implementation Day and since.10 In concert with the
May 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, the easing of the regulations to allow for
importation of Iranian carpets and other luxury goods was reversed on August 6, 2018.
What U.S.-Iran Trade Is Allowed or Prohibited?
The following provisions apply to the U.S. trade ban on Iran as specified in regulations (Iran
Transaction Regulations, ITRs) written pursuant to the executive orders and laws discussed above
and enumerated in regulations administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of
the Department of the Treasury.
 Oil Transactions. All U.S. transactions with Iran in energy products are banned.
The 1995 trade ban (E.O. 12959) expanded a 1987 ban on imports from Iran that
was imposed by Executive Order 12613 of October 29, 1987. The earlier import
ban, authorized by Section 505 of the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9), barred the importation of Iranian
oil into the United States but did not ban the trading of Iranian oil overseas. The
1995 ban prohibits that activity explicitly, but provides for U.S. companies to
apply for licenses to conduct “swaps” of Caspian Sea oil with Iran. These swaps
have been prohibited in practice; a Mobil Corporation application to do so was
denied in April 1999, and no applications have been submitted since. The ITRs
do not ban the importation, from foreign refiners, of gasoline or other energy
products in which Iranian oil is mixed with oil from other producers. The product
of a refinery in any country is considered to be a product of the country where
that refinery is located, even if some Iran-origin crude oil is present.
 Transshipment and Brokering. The ITRs prohibit U.S. transshipment of
prohibited goods across Iran, and ban any activities by U.S. persons to broker
commercial transactions involving Iran.

9 Imports were mainly of artwork for exhibitions around the United States, which are counted as imports even though
the works return to Iran after the exhibitions conclude.
10 The text of the guidance is at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/
implement_guide_jcpoa.pdf.
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 Iranian Luxury Goods. Pursuant to the JCPOA, Iranian luxury goods, such as
carpets and caviar, could be imported into the United States after January 2016.
This prohibition went back into effect on August 6, 2018 (90-day wind-down).
 Shipping Insurance. Obtaining shipping insurance is crucial to Iran’s expansion
of its oil and other exports. A pool of 13 major insurance organizations, called the
International Group of P & I Clubs, dominates the shipping insurance industry
and is based in New York. The U.S. presence of this pool renders it subject to the
U.S. trade ban, which complicated Iran’s ability to obtain reinsurance for Iran’s
shipping after Implementation Day. On January 16, 2017, the Obama
Administration issued waivers of Sections 212 and 213 of the ITRSHRA to allow
numerous such insurers to give Iranian ships insurance.11 However, this waiver
ended on August 6, 2018 (90-day wind-down).
 Civilian Airline Sales. The ITRs have always permitted the licensing of goods
related to the safe operation of civilian aircraft for sale to Iran (§560.528 of Title
31, C.F.R.), and spare parts sales have been licensed periodically. However, from
June 2011 until Implementation Day, Iran’s largest state-owned airline, Iran Air,
was sanctioned under Executive Order 13382 (see below), rendering licensing of
parts or repairs for that airline impermissible, and several other Iranian airlines
also remain sanctioned under that and Executive Order 13224. In accordance
with the JCPOA, the United States relaxed restrictions on to allow for the sale to
Iran of finished commercial aircraft, including to Iran Air (which was “delisted”
in accordance with the JCPOA).12 A March 2016 general license allowed for U.S.
aircraft and parts suppliers to negotiate sales with Iranian airlines that are not
sanctioned, and Boeing and Airbus subsequently concluded major sales to Iran
Air. In keeping with the May 8, 2018, U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA,
preexisting licensing restrictions went back into effect on August 6, 2018, and the
licenses issued to Boeing and Airbus for aircraft sales to Iran were revoked. Sales
of some spare parts (“dual use items”) for civilian aircraft to Iran also require a
waiver of the relevant provision of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act,
discussed below.
 Personal Communications, Remittances, and Publishing. The ITRs permit
personal communications (phone calls, emails) between the United States and
Iran, personal remittances to Iran, and Americans to engage in publishing
activities with entities in Iran (and Cuba and Sudan).
 Information Technology Equipment. CISADA exempts from the U.S. ban on
exports to Iran information technology to support personal communications
among the Iranian people and goods for supporting democracy in Iran. In May
2013, OFAC issued a general license for the exportation to Iran of goods (such as

11 Shipping insurers granted the waiver include Assuranceforeningen Skuld, Skuld Mutual Protection and Indemnity
Association, Ltd. (Bermuda), Gard P and I Ltd. (Bermuda), Assuranceforeningen Gard, the Britannia Steam Ship
Insurance Association Limited, The North of England Protecting and Indemnity Association Ltd., the Shipowners’
Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (Luxembourg), the Standard Club Ltd., the Standard Club Europe Ltd.,
The Standard Club Asia, the Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd. (Bermuda), the Swedish Club, United
Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Assurance Association Ltd. (Bermuda), United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Association
Ltd. (Europe), and the West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association (Luxembourg).
12 Reuters, February 21, 2014; “Exclusive: Boeing Says Gets U.S. License to Sell Spare Parts to Iran,” Reuters, April 4,
2014.
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cell phones) and services, on a fee basis, that enhance the ability of the Iranian
people to access communication technology.
 Food and Medical Exports. Since April 1999, sales to Iran by U.S. firms of food
and medical products have been permitted, subject to OFAC stipulations. In
October 2012, OFAC permitted the sale to Iran of specified medical products,
such as scalpels, prosthetics, canes, burn dressings, and other products, that could
be sold to Iran under “general license” (no specific license application required).
This list of general license items list was expanded in July and November 2013,
and in December 201613 to include more sophisticated medical diagnostic
machines and other medical equipment. Licenses for exports of medical products
not on the general license list are routinely expedited for sale to Iran, according
to OFAC. The regulations have a specific definition of “food” that can be
licensed for sale to Iran, and that definition excludes alcohol, cigarettes, gum, or
fertilizer.14 The definition addresses information in a 2010 article that OFAC had
approved exports to Iran of condiments such as food additives and body-building
supplements that have uses other than purely nutritive.15
 Humanitarian and Related Services. Donations by U.S. residents directly to
Iranians (such as packages of food, toys, clothes, etc.) are not prohibited, but
donations through relief organizations broadly require those organizations’
obtaining a specific OFAC license. On September 10, 2013, the Department of
the Treasury eliminated licensing requirements for relief organizations to (1)
provide to Iran services for health projects, disaster relief, wildlife conservation;
(2) to conduct human rights projects there; or (3) undertake activities related to
sports matches and events. The amendment also allowed importation from Iran of
services related to sporting activities, including sponsorship of players, coaching,
referees, and training. In some cases, such as the earthquake in Bam in 2003 and
the earthquake in northwestern Iran in August 2012, OFAC has issued blanket
temporary general licensing for relief organizations to work in Iran.
 Payment Methods, Trade Financing, and Financing Guarantees. U.S. importers
are allowed to pay Iranian exporters, including with funds denominated in
dollars. However, funds cannot go directly to Iranian banks, but must instead
pass through third-country (such as European) banks. In accordance with the
ITRs’ provisions that transactions that are incidental to an approved transaction
are allowed, financing for approved transactions are normally approvable. Private
letters of credit (from non-Iranian banks) can be used to finance approved
transactions. Title IX of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387) bans the use of official credit guarantees (such as the
Ex-Im Bank) for food and medical sales to Iran and other countries on the U.S.
terrorism list, except Cuba, although allowing for a presidential waiver to permit
such credit guarantees. The Ex-Im Bank is prohibited from guaranteeing any
loans to Iran because of Iran’s continued inclusion on the terrorism list, and the
JCPOA did not commit the United States to provide credit guarantees for Iran.

13 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20161222.aspx?platform=hootsuite.
14 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/gl_food_exports.pdf.
15 The information in this bullet is taken from Jo Becker, “With U.S. Leave, Companies Skirt Iran Sanctions,” New
York Times, December 24, 2010.
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Application to Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Firms
The ITRs do not ban subsidiaries of U.S. firms from dealing with Iran, as long as the subsidiary is
not “controlled” by the parent company. Most foreign subsidiaries are legally considered foreign
persons subject to the laws of the country in which the subsidiaries are incorporated. Section 218
of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syrian Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA, P.L. 112-158) holds
“controlled” foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to the same standards as U.S. parent firms,
defining a controlled subsidiary as (1) one that is more than 50% owned by the U.S. parent; (2)
one in which the parent firm holds a majority on the Board of Directors of the subsidiary; or (3)
one in which the parent firm directs the operations of the subsidiary. No waiver is specifically
provided under Section 218.
JCPOA Regulations and Reversal. To implement the JCPOA, the United States has licensed
“controlled” foreign subsidiaries to conduct transactions with Iran that are permissible under
JCPOA (almost all forms of civilian trade). The Administration asserts that the President has
authority under IEEPA to license transactions with Iran, the ITRSHRA notwithstanding. This was
implemented with the Treasury Department’s issuance of “General License H: Authorizing
Certain Transactions Relating to Foreign Entities Owned or Controlled by a United States
Person.”16 This licensing policy will revert to pre-JCPOA status as of November 5, 2018.
Trade Ban Easing and Termination
Termination: Section 401 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(CISADA, P.L. 111-195) provides for the President to terminate the trade ban if the Administration certifies to
Congress that Iran no longer satisfies the requirements to be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism and that
Iran has ceased pursuing and has dismantled its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and
related launch technology. Alternatively, the trade ban provision in CISADA could be repealed by congressional
action.
Waiver Authority: Section 103(b)(vi) of CISADA allows the President to license exports to Iran if he
determines that doing so is in the national interest of the United States. There is no similar provision in CISADA
to ease the ban on U.S. imports from Iran. The State and Treasury Department guidance issued on
Implementation Day asserts that the statement of licensing policy fulfil s the requirements of Section 103 of
CISADA.
Sanctions on Iran’s Energy Sector
Status: Energy sanctions waived for JCPOA, back in effect November 5, 2018
In 1996, Congress and the executive branch began a long process of pressuring Iran’s vital energy
sector in order to deny Iran the financial resources to support terrorist organizations and other
armed factions or to further its nuclear and WMD programs. Iran’s oil sector is as old as the
petroleum industry itself (early 20th century), and Iran’s onshore oil fields are in need of
substantial investment. Iran has 136.3 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third largest after
Saudi Arabia and Canada. Iran has large natural gas resources (940 trillion cubic feet, exceeded
only by Russia), but Iran’s gas export sector remains small but is expanding—most of Iran’s gas
is injected into its oil fields to boost their production. The energy sector still generates about 20%
of Iran’s GDP and as much as 30% of government revenue.

16 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/implement_guide_jcpoa.pdf.
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The Iran Sanctions Act (and Triggers added by other Laws)
The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) has been a pivotal component of U.S. sanctions against Iran’s
energy sector. Since its enactment in 1996, ISA’s provisions have been expanded and extended to
other Iranian industries. ISA sought to thwart Iran’s 1995 opening of the sector to foreign
investment in late 1995 through a “buy-back” program in which foreign firms gradually recoup
their investments as oil and gas is produced. It was first enacted as The Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act (ILSA, (P.L. 104-172, signed on August 5, 1996) but was later retitled the Iran Sanctions Act
after it terminated with respect to Libya in 2006. ISA was the first major “extra-territorial
sanction” on Iran—a sanction that authorizes U.S. penalties against third country firms.
Key Sanctions “Triggers” Under ISA
ISA consists of a number of “triggers”—transactions with Iran that would be considered
violations of ISA and could cause a firm or entity to be sanctioned under ISA’s provisions. The
triggers, as added by amendments over time, are detailed below:
Trigger 1 (Original Trigger): “Investment” To Develop Iran’s Oil and Gas Fields
The core trigger of ISA when first enacted was a requirement that the President sanction
companies (entities, persons) that make an “investment”17 of more than $20 million18 in one year
in Iran’s energy sector.19 The definition of “investment” in ISA (§14 [9]) includes not only equity
and royalty arrangements but any contract that includes “responsibility for the development of
petroleum resources” of Iran. The definition includes additions to existing investment (added by
P.L. 107-24) and pipelines to or through Iran and contracts to lead the construction, upgrading, or
expansions of energy projects (added by CISADA).
Trigger 2: Sales of WMD and Related Technologies, Advanced Conventional
Weaponry, and Participation in Uranium Mining Ventures
This provision of ISA was not waived under the JCPOA.
The Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293, signed September 30, 2006) added Section 5(b)(1)
of ISA, subjecting to ISA sanctions firms or persons determined to have sold to Iran (1)
“chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies” or (2) “destabilizing numbers
and types” of advanced conventional weapons. Sanctions can be applied if the exporter knew (or
had cause to know) that the end-user of the item was Iran. The definitions do not specifically
include ballistic or cruise missiles, but those weapons could be considered “related technologies”
or, potentially, a “destabilizing number and type” of advanced conventional weapon.

17 As amended by CISADA (P.L. 111-195), these definitions include pipelines to or through Iran, as well as contracts
to lead the construction, upgrading, or expansions of energy projects. CISADA also changes the definition of
investment to eliminate the exemption from sanctions for sales of energy-related equipment to Iran, if such sales are
structured as investments or ongoing profit-earning ventures.
18 Under §4(d) of the original act, for Iran, the threshold dropped to $20 million, from $40 million, one year after
enactment, when U.S. allies did not join a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran. P.L. 111-195 explicitly sets the
threshold investment level at $20 million. For Libya, the threshold was $40 million, and transactions subject to
sanctions included export to Libya of technology banned by Pan Am 103-related Security Council Resolutions 748
(March 31, 1992) and 883 (November 11, 1993).
19 The original ISA definition of energy sector included oil and natural gas, and CISADA added to that definition
liquefied natural gas (LNG), oil or LNG tankers, and products to make or transport pipelines that transport oil or LNG.
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The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA, P.L. 112-158, signed August
10, 2012) created Section 5(b)(2) of ISA subjecting to sanctions entities determined by the
Administration to participate in a joint venture with Iran relating to the mining, production, or
transportation of uranium.
Implementation: No ISA sanctions have been imposed on any entities under these provisions.
Trigger 3: Sales of Gasoline to Iran
Section 102(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(CISADA, P.L. 111-195, signed July 1, 2010) amended Section 5 of ISA to exploit Iran’s
dependency on imported gasoline (40% dependency at that time). It followed enacted legislation
such as P.L. 111-85 that prohibited the use of U.S. funds to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
with products from firms that sell gasoline to Iran; and P.L. 111-117 that denies Ex-Im Bank
credits to any firm that sold gasoline or related equipment to Iran. The section subjects the
following to sanctions:
 Sales to Iran of over $1 million worth (or $5 million in a one year period) of
gasoline and related aviation and other fuels. (Fuel oil, a petroleum by-product, is
not included in the definition of refined petroleum.)
 Sales to Iran of equipment or services (same dollar threshold as above) which
would help Iran make or import gasoline. Examples include equipment and
services for Iran’s oil refineries or port operations.
Trigger 4: Provision of Equipment or Services for Oil, Gas, and
Petrochemicals Production
Section 201 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHA, P.L.
112-158, signed August 10, 2012) codified an Executive Order, 13590 (November 21, 2011), by
adding Section 5(a)(5 and 6) to ISA sanctioning firms that
 provide to Iran $1 million or more (or $5 million in a one year period) worth of
goods or services that Iran could use to maintain or enhance its oil and gas sector.
This subjects to sanctions, for example, transactions with Iran by global oil
services firms and the sale to Iran of energy industry equipment such as drills,
pumps, vacuums, oil rigs, and like equipment.
 provide to Iran $250,000 (or $1 million in a one year period) worth of goods or
services that Iran could use to maintain or expand its production of petrochemical
products.20 This provision was not altered by the JPA.
Trigger 5: Transporting Iranian Crude Oil
Section 201 of the ITRSHRA amends ISA by sanctioning entities the Administration determines
 owned a vessel that was used to transport Iranian crude oil. The section also
authorizes but does not require the President, subject to regulations, to prohibit a
ship from putting to port in the United States for two years, if it is owned by a
person sanctioned under this provision (adds Section 5[a][7] to ISA). This

20 A definition of chemicals and products considered “petrochemical products” is found in a Policy Guidance
statement. See Federal Register, November 13, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-13/pdf/2012-
27642.pdf.
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sanction does not apply in cases of transporting oil to countries that have
received exemptions under P.L. 112-81 (discussed below).
 participated in a joint oil and gas development venture with Iran, outside Iran, if
that venture was established after January 1, 2002. The effective date exempts
energy ventures in the Caspian Sea, such as the Shah Deniz oil field there (adds
Section 5[a][4] to ISA).
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA): ISA Sanctions
for insuring Iranian oil entities, purchasing Iranian bonds, or engaging in
transactions with the IRGC
Separate provisions of the ITRSHR Act—which do not amend ISA—require the application of
ISA sanctions (the same 5 out of 12 sanctions as required in ISA itself) on any entity that
 provides insurance or reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)
or the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) (Section 212).
 purchases or facilitates the issuance of sovereign debt of the government of Iran,
including Iranian government bonds (Section 213). This sanction went back into
effect on August 6, 2018 (90-day wind-down period).
 assists or engages in a significant transaction with the IRGC or any of its
sanctioned entities or affiliates. (Section 302). This section of ITRSHRA was not
waived to implement the JCPOA.
Implementation. Section 312 of ITRSHRA required an Administration determination, within 45
days of enactment (by September 24, 2012) whether NIOC and NITC are IRGC agents or
affiliates. Such a determination would subject financial transactions with NIOC and NITC to
sanctions under CISADA (prohibition on opening U.S.-based accounts). On September 24, 2012,
the Department of the Treasury determined that NIOC and NITC are affiliates of the IRGC. On
November 8, 2012, the Department of the Treasury named NIOC as a proliferation entity under
Executive Order 13382—a designation that, in accordance with Section 104 of CISADA, bars
any foreign bank determined to have dealt directly with NIOC (including with a NIOC bank
account in a foreign country) from opening or maintaining a U.S.-based account.
Sanctions on dealings with NIOC and NITC were waived in accordance with the interim nuclear
deal and the JCPOA, and designations of these entities under Executive Order 13382 were
rescinded in accordance with the JCPOA. These entities will again be designated on November 5,
2018. Some NIOC partners were not sanctioned, including the Iranian Offshore Oil Company; the
National Iranian Gas Export Co.; and Petroleum Engineering and Development Co. Several
independent Iranian energy firms were not sanctioned, including Pasargad Oil Co., Zagros
Petrochem Co., Sazeh Consultants, Qeshm Energy, and Sadid Industrial Group. Their relations
with NIOC or the IRGC are unclear.
Executive Order 13622: Sanctions on the Purchase of Iranian Crude Oil and
Petrochemical Products, and Dealings in Iranian Bank Notes
Status: Revoked (by E.O. 13716) but will back into effect as stipulated below
Executive Order 13622 (July 30, 2012) imposes specified sanctions on the ISA sanctions menu,
and bars banks from the U.S. financial system, for the following activities (E.O. 13622 did not
amend ISA itself):
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 the purchase of oil, other petroleum, or petrochemical products from Iran.21 The
part of this order pertaining to petrochemical purchases was suspended under
the JPA. The wind-down period was 180 days (ending November 4, 2018).
 transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or Naftiran
Intertrade Company (NICO) (180-day wind-down period).
 E.O. 13622 also blocks U.S.-based property of entities determined to have
 assisted or provided goods or services to NIOC, NICO, the Central Bank of
Iran (180-day wind-down period).
 assisted the government of Iran in the purchase of U.S. bank notes or
precious metals, precious stones, or jewels. (The provision for precious
stones or jewels was added to this Order by E.O. 16345 below.) (90-day
wind-down period.)
E.O. 13622 sanctions do not apply if the parent country of the entity has received an exemption
under Section 1245 of P.L. 112-81, discussed below. An exemption also is provided for projects
that bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey, if such project was initiated prior to the
issuance of the Order.
Executive Order 13645: Application of ISA and Other Sanctions to Iran’s
Automotive Sector, Rial Trading, and Precious Stones
JCPOA Status: Revoked (by E.O 13716) but most provisions below went back into effect as of
August 6, 2018 (90-day wind-down period).
Executive Order 13645 of June 3, 2013 (effective July 1, 2013), contains the provisions below.
(E.O. 13645 did not amend ISA itself.)
 Imposes specified ISA-related sanctions on firms that supply goods or services to
Iran’s automotive (cars, trucks, buses, motorcycles, and related parts) sector, and
blocks foreign banks from the U.S. market if they finance transactions with Iran’s
automotive sector. (An executive order cannot amend a law, so the order does not
amend ISA.)
 Blocks U.S.-based property and prohibits U.S. bank accounts for foreign banks
that conduct transactions in Iran’s currency, the rial, or hold rial accounts. This
provision mostly affected banks in countries bordering or near Iran. The order
applies also to “a derivative, swap, future, forward, or other similar contract
whose value is based on the exchange rate of the Iranian rial.” If Iran implements
plans to develop a digital currency, or cryptocurrency, backed by or tied to rials,
it would appear that the Order also applies to that digital currency.
 Expands the application of Executive Order 13622 (above) to helping Iran
acquire precious stones or jewels (see above).
 Blocks U.S.-based property of a person that conducts transactions with an Iranian
entity listed as a Specially Designated National (SDN) or Blocked Person. SDNs
to be “relisted” on November 5, 2018.

21 A definition of what chemicals and products are considered “petroleum products” for the purposes of the order are in
the policy guidance issued November 13, 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-13/pdf/2012-27642.pdf.
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Mandate and Time Frame to Investigate ISA Violations
In the original version of ISA, there was no firm requirement, and no time limit, for the
Administration to investigate potential violations and determine that a firm has violated ISA’s
provisions. The Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293, signed September 30, 2006) added a
provision calling for, but not requiring, a 180-day time limit for a violation determination.22
CISADA (Section 102[g][5]) mandated that the Administration begin an investigation of potential
ISA violations when there is “credible information” about a potential violation, and made
mandatory the 180-day time limit for a determination of violation.
The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158) defines the “credible
information” needed to begin an investigation of a violation to include a corporate announcement
or corporate filing to its shareholders that it has undertaken transactions with Iran that are
potentially sanctionable under ISA. It also says the President may (not mandatory) use as credible
information reports from the Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Research
Service. In addition, Section 219 of ITRSHRA requires that an investigation of an ISA violation
begin if a company reports in its filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that it
has knowingly engaged in activities that would violate ISA (or Section 104 of CISADA or
transactions with entities designated under E.O 13224 or 13382, see below).

22 Other ISA amendments under that law included recommending against U.S. nuclear agreements with countries that
supply nuclear technology to Iran and expanding provisions of the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56) to curb money-
laundering for use to further WMD programs.
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Available Sanctions Under ISA
Once a firm is determined to be a violator, the original version of ISA required the imposition of two of a menu of
six sanctions on that firm. The Iran Freedom Support Act added three new possible sanctions and required the
imposition of at least three out of the nine against violators. CISADA added three more sanctions to the ISA
menu and required imposition of at least 5 out of the 12 sanctions. Executive Orders 13590 and 13622 provide for
exactly the same penalties as those in ISA. The 12 available sanctions against the sanctioned entity, from which the
Secretary of State or the Treasury can select, are as fol ows:
1. denial of Export-Import Bank loans, credits, or credit guarantees for U.S. exports to the sanctioned entity
(original ISA)
2. denial of licenses for the U.S. export of military or militarily useful technology to the entity (original ISA)
3. denial of U.S. bank loans exceeding $10 mil ion in one year to the entity (original ISA)
4. if the entity is a financial institution, a prohibition on its service as a primary dealer in U.S. government bonds;
and/or a prohibition on its serving as a repository for U.S. government funds (each counts as one sanction)
(original ISA)
5. prohibition on U.S. government procurement from the entity (original ISA)
6. prohibitions in transactions in foreign exchange by the entity (added by CISADA)
7. prohibition on any credit or payments between the entity and any U.S. financial institution (added by CISADA)
8. prohibition of the sanctioned entity from acquiring, holding, using, or trading any U.S.-based property which the
sanctioned entity has a (financial) interest in (added by CISADA)
9. restriction on imports from the sanctioned entity, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA; 50 U.S.C. 1701) (original ISA)
10. a ban on a U.S. person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a
sanctioned person (added by ITRSHRA)
11. exclusion from the United States of corporate officers or control ing shareholders of a sanctioned firm (added
by ITRSHRA)
12. imposition of any of the ISA sanctions on principal offices of a sanctioned firm (added by ITRSHRA).
Mandatory Sanction: Prohibition on Contracts with the U.S. Government CISADA (§102[b]) added a requirement
in ISA that companies, as a condition of obtaining a U.S. government contract, certify to the relevant U.S.
government agency that the firm—and any companies it owns or controls—are not violating ISA. Regulations to
implement this requirement were issued on September 29, 2010.
Executive Order 13574 of May 23, 2011, specifies which sanctions are to be imposed. This executive
order made a blanket stipulation that, when an entity is sanctioned under Section 5 of ISA, the penalties to be
imposed are numbers 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9, above. The order also clarified that it is the responsibility of the
Department of the Treasury to implement those ISA sanctions that involve the financial sector, including bans on
loans, credits, and foreign exchange for, or imports from, the sanctioned entity, as well as blockage of property of
the sanctioned entity (if these sanctions are selected by the Secretary of State, who makes the decision which
penalties to impose on sanctioned entities). This order was revoked by E.O. 13716 on Implementation Day, in
accordance with the JCPOA.
Oversight
Several mechanisms for Congress to oversee whether the Administration is investigating ISA
violations were added by ITRSHRA. Section 223 of that law required a Government
Accountability Office report, within 120 days of enactment, and another such report a year later,
on companies that have undertaken specified activities with Iran that might constitute violations
of ISA. Section 224 amended a reporting requirement in Section 110(b) of CISADA by requiring
an Administration report to Congress every 180 days on investment in Iran’s energy sector, joint
ventures with Iran, and estimates of Iran’s imports and exports of petroleum products. The GAO
reports have been issued; there is no information available on whether the required
Administration reports have been issued as well.
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Interpretations of ISA and Related Laws
The sections below provide information on how some key ISA provisions have been interpreted
and implemented.
Application to Energy Pipelines
ISA’s definition of “investment” that is subject to sanctions has been consistently interpreted by
successive Administrations to include construction of energy pipelines to or through Iran. Such
pipelines are deemed to help Iran develop its petroleum (oil and natural gas) sector. This
interpretation was reinforced by amendments to ISA in CISADA, which specifically included in
the definition of petroleum resources “products used to construct or maintain pipelines used to
transport oil or liquefied natural gas.” In March 2012, then-Secretary of State Clinton made clear
that the Obama Administration interprets the provision to be applicable from the beginning of
pipeline construction.23
Application to Crude Oil Purchases
The original version of ISA did not provide for sanctioning purchases of crude oil from Iran.
However, subsequent laws and executive orders took that step.
Application to Purchases from Iran of Natural Gas
The Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation Act (IFCA, discussed below) authorized sanctions on
transactions with Iran’s energy sector, but specifically excluded from sanctions purchases of
natural gas from Iran. But construction of gas pipelines involving Iran is subject to sanctions.
Exception for Shah Deniz and other Gas Export Projects
The effective dates of U.S. sanctions laws and Orders exclude long-standing joint natural gas
projects that involve some Iranian firms—particularly the Shah Deniz natural gas field and
related pipelines in the Caspian Sea. These projects involve a consortium in which Iran’s Naftiran
Intertrade Company (NICO) holds a passive 10% share, and includes BP, Azerbaijan’s natural gas
firm SOCAR, Russia’s Lukoil, and other firms. NICO was sanctioned under ISA and other
provisions (until JCPOA Implementation Day), but an OFAC factsheet of November 28, 2012,
stated that the Shah Deniz consortium, as a whole, is not determined to be “a person owned or
controlled by” the government of Iran (as defined in Executive Order 13599) and that transactions
with the consortium were permissible.
Application to Iranian Liquefied Natural Gas Development
The original version of ISA did not apply to the development by Iran of a liquefied natural gas
(LNG) export capability. Iran has no LNG export terminals, in part because the technology for
such terminals is patented by U.S. firms and unavailable for sale to Iran. CISADA specifically
included LNG in the ISA definition of petroleum resources and therefore made subject to
sanctions LNG investment in Iran or supply of LNG tankers or pipelines to Iran.

23 http://dawn.com/2012/03/01/tough-us-warning-on-iran-gas-pipeline/.
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Application to Private Financing but Not Official Credit Guarantee Agencies
The definitions of investment and other activity that can be sanctioned under ISA include
financing for investment in Iran’s energy sector, or for sales of gasoline and refinery-related
equipment and services. Therefore, banks and other financial institutions that assist energy
investment and refining and gasoline procurement activities could be sanctioned under ISA.
However, the definitions of financial institutions are interpreted not to apply to official credit
guarantee agencies—such as France’s COFACE and Germany’s Hermes. These credit guarantee
agencies are arms of their parent governments, and ISA does not provide for sanctioning
governments or their agencies.
Implementation of Energy-Related Iran Sanctions
Entities sanctioned under the Executive Orders or laws cited in this section are listed in the tables
at the end of this report. As noted, some of the Orders cited provide for blocking U.S.-based
assets of the entities designated for sanctions. OFAC has not announced the blocking of any U.S.-
based property of the sanctioned entities, likely indicating that those entities sanctioned do not
have a presence in the United States.

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ISA Waiver, Exemptions, and Sunset Provisions

The President can waive ISA sanctions in several ways—general, country-specific, or company-specific.
General Waiver. Under Section 4(c)(1)(a), the President can waive (for six months at a time) the requirement to
investigate violations every six (6) months. To implement the JCPOA, this waiver was exercised by the Obama
Administration (the latest on January 18, 2017), and was last renewed by the Trump Administration on January 12,
2018.
Country-Specific Waiver. Under Section 4(c)(1)(B), the President can waive ISA sanctions (for 12 months at a time)
of all companies whose governments are determined to be “closely cooperating with the United States in
multilateral efforts to prevent Iran from” acquiring WMD or acquiring advanced conventional weapons. The
President must also certify that the waiver is vital to the national security interests of the United States.
Company-Specific Waiver. Under Section 9(c), the President can waive ISA sanctions (for one year at a time) on any
company for which the President determines that the waiver is “essential to the national security interests of the
United States.” This waiver was used in 1998 to avoid penalizing Total, Gazprom, and Petronas for an Iran
investment.
Once ISA snaps back into effect, some governments reportedly might seek the country-specific or country-specific
waivers to avoid penalties on their companies that invested in Iran while U.S. sanctions were waived.
ISA (§5[f]) also contains several exceptions such that the President is not required to impose sanctions that
prevent procurement of defense articles and services under existing contracts, in cases where a firm is the sole
source supplier of a particular defense article or service. The President is not required to prevent procurement of
essential spare parts or component parts.

“Special Rule” Exempting Firms That End Their Business with Iran
Under a provision added by CISADA (§102[g][5]), ISA provides a means—a so-called “special rule”—for firms to
avoid ISA sanctions by pledging to verifiably end their business with Iran and such business with Iran in the future.
Under the special rule, which has been invoked on several occasions, as discussed below, the Administration is not
required to impose sanctions against a firm that makes such pledges. However, firms are allowed several years, in
some cases, to wind down existing business in Iran, in part because the buy-back program used by Iran pays
energy firms back their investment over time, making it highly costly for them to suddenly end operations in Iran.

Administration Termination Process and Requirements
The Administration can immediately terminate all ISA provisions if the Administration certifies that Iran:
(1) has ceased its efforts to acquire WMD; (2) has been removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism;
and (3) no longer “poses a significant threat” to U.S. national security and U.S. allies.24
This termination provision, and the sunset provision discussed below, does not apply to those laws that apply ISA
sanctions without specifically amending ISA. The executive orders and laws that apply ISA sanctions to specified
violators but without amending ISA itself can be revoked by a superseding executive order or congressional action
that amends or repeals the provisions involved.

Sunset and Other Expiration Provisions
ISA was scheduled to sunset on December 31, 2016, as provided for by CISADA. This fol owed prior sunset
extensions to December 31, 2011 (by P.L. 109-293); December 31, 2006 (P.L. 107-24, August 3, 2001); and
August 5, 2001 (original law). In December 2016, P.L. 114-277 extended the law, as is, until December 31, 2026.
P.L. 107-24 also required an Administration report on ISA’s effectiveness within 24 to 30 months of enactment,
with the report to include an administration recommendation whether ISA be repealed. That report was
submitted to Congress in January 2004, and did not recommend that ISA be repealed.

24 This termination requirement added by P.L. 109-293 formally removed Libya from the act. Application of the act to
Libya terminated on April 23, 2004, with a determination that Libya had fulfilled U.N. requirements.
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Iran Oil Export Reduction Sanctions: Section 1245 of the FY2012
NDAA Sanctioning Transactions with Iran’s Central Bank
Status: Waived pursuant to JCPOA, but went back into effect November 5, 2018
In 2011, Congress sought to reduce Iran’s exportation of oil by imposing sanctions on the
mechanisms that importers use to pay Iran for oil. The Obama Administration asserted that such
legislation could lead to a rise in oil prices and harm U.S. relations with Iran’s oil customers, and
President Obama, in his signing statement on the bill, indicated he would implement the provision
so as not to damage U.S. relations with partner countries.
The law imposed penalties on transactions with Iran’s Central Bank. Section 1245 of the FY2012
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 112-81, signed on December 31, 2011):
 Requires the President to prevent a foreign bank from opening an account in the
United States—or impose strict limitations on existing U.S. accounts—if that
bank is determined to have conducted a “significant financial transaction” with
Iran’s Central Bank or with any sanctioned Iranian bank. The provision applies
to a foreign central bank only if the transaction with Iran’s Central Bank is for oil
purchases. The provision went fully into effect after 180 days (June 28, 2012).
 Significant Reduction Exception (SRE): The law provides incentive for Iran’s oil
buyers to cut purchases of Iranian oil by providing for an exception (exemption)
for the banks of any country determined to have significantly reduced its
purchases of oil from Iran. For countries granted the exception, the banks of that
country may continue to conduct transactions (for any purpose, including oil)
goods, with the Central Bank (not just for oil) or with any sanctioned Iranian
bank. The SRE exception is reviewed every 180 days and, to maintain the
exception, countries are required to reduce their oil buys from Iran, relative to the
previous 180-day period. ITRSHRA amended Section 1245 such that any country
that completely ceased purchasing oil from Iran entirely would retain an
exception. The law lacks a precise definition of “significant reduction” of oil
purchases, but the Obama Administration adopted a standard set in a January
2012 letter by several Senators to then-Treasury Secretary Geithner setting that
definition at an 18% purchase reduction based on total paid for the Iranian oil
(not just volume reduction).25
 Sanctions on transactions for oil apply only if the President certifies to Congress
every 90 days, based on a report by the Energy Information Administration, that
the oil market is adequately supplied, and, an Administration determination every
180 days that there is a sufficient supply of oil worldwide to permit countries to
reduce purchases from Iran. The required EIA reports and Administration
determinations have been issued at the prescribed intervals, even during the
period when the law is in a state of waiver. The latest such determination of
sufficient oil supply was made on November 15, 2017, and the next
determination of oil supply sufficiency is due by May 14—a few days after the
next waiver of the law is due. If the President does not renew the waiver of this
law, the compliance by foreign countries in cutting their oil purchases would be

25 Text of letter from Senators Mark Kirk and Robert Menendez to Secretary Geithner, January 19, 2012.
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assessed on/about November 8, 2018, at which time sanctions for any
noncompliance could be imposed.
Implementation
The EU embargo on purchases of Iranian oil, which took full effect by July 1, 2012, helped all
EU oil customers of Iran obtain the SRE (sanctions exception). The table below on major Iranian
oil customers indicates cuts made by major customers compared to 2011.
 In March 20, 2012, Japan received an SRE.
 In September 2012, 10 EU countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Britain) received the
SRE because they ended purchases pursuant to the EU Iran oil purchase embargo
of July 1, 2012. Seventeen EU countries were not granted the SRE because they
were not buying Iran’s oil and could not “significantly reduce” buys from Iran.
 In December 2012, the following countries/jurisdictions received the SRE:
China, India, Malaysia, South Africa, South Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Turkey,
and Taiwan.
Reactivation on November 5, 2018, and Exceptions Granted
The January 2016 waivers issued to implement the JCPOA suspended the requirement for a
country to cut oil purchases from Iran in order to maintain their exceptions, and Iran’s historic oil
customers quickly resumed buying Iranian oil. The provision went back into effect on November
5, 2018, and countries were required to have cut their oil purchases since May 2018 in order to
requalify for an exception.26 On June 26, 2018, a senior State Department official, in a
background briefing, stated that department officials, in meetings with officials of countries that
import Iranian oil, were urging these countries to cease buying Iranian oil entirely by November
4, 2018.27 However, Administration officials later indicated that requests for exceptions will be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the ease of substituting for Iranian oil,
country-specific needs, and the need for global oil market stability.
 On November 5, 2018, in the first SRE grants available under reimposed U.S.
sanctions, the following eight countries received the SRE: China, India, Italy,
Greece, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey.

26 Department of State. Background Briefing on President Trump’s Decision to Withdraw from the JCPOA. May 8,
2018.
27 Department of State. “Senior State Department Official on U.S. Efforts to Discuss the Reimposition of Sanctions on
Iran with Partners Around the World.” June 26, 2018.
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Waiver and Termination Provisions
The law provides for the President to waive the sanctions for 120 days, renewable for successive 120-day periods,
if the President determines that doing so is in the national security interest. Outright repeal or amendment of this
law would require congressional action.
This provision was waived to implement the JPA (to allow Iran’s oil customers to maintain purchases level at 1.1
mil ion barrels per day) and again to implement the JCPOA (to remove any ceiling on Iran’s exports of oil).
Waivers to Implement the JCPOA
The provision (Section 1245(d)(5)) was waived on January 18, 2017, just before the Obama Administration left office. The
Trump Administration renewed the waiver on May 18, 2017, on September 14, 2017, and on January 12, 2018. This law
went back into effect on November 5, 2018 (180-day wind-down period).
Iran Foreign Bank Account “Restriction” Provision
Status: Waived but Went Back into Effect on November 5, 2018
The ability of Iran to repatriate hard currency—U.S. dollars are the primary form of payment for
oil—to its Central Bank was impeded by a provision of the ITRSHRA which went into effect on
February 6, 2013 (180 days after enactment). Section 504 of the ITRSHRA amended Section
1245 of the FY2012 NDAA (adding “clause ii” to Paragraph D[1]) by requiring that any funds
paid to Iran as a result of exempted transactions (oil purchases, for example) be credited to an
account located in the country with primary jurisdiction over the foreign bank making the
transaction.
This provision essentially prevents Iran from repatriating to its Central Bank any hard currency
Iran held in foreign banks around the world. Most of Iran’s funds held abroad are in banks located
in Iran’s main oil customers. The provision largely compels Iran to buy the products of the oil
customer countries. Some press reports refer to this arrangement as an “escrow account,” but
State Department officials describe the arrangement as “restricted” accounts.
Waiver for Bank Account Restriction

The waiver provision that applies to the sanctions imposed under the FY2012 NDAA (P.L. 112-81) applies to this
Iran foreign bank account restriction provision. A waiver period of six months is permitted.
To implement the JPA, a waiver was issued under P.L. 112-81 (Section 212 and 213) to allow Iran to receive some
hard currency from ongoing oil sales in eight installments during the JPA period. Iran remained unable under the
JPA to remove hard currency from existing accounts abroad. As of Implementation Day, the restriction was
waived completely, enabling Iran to gain access to hard currency from ongoing purchases of its oil.

Waivers to Implement the JCPOA
Sections 212(d)(10 and 2134(b)(1) of ITRSHRA were waived by the Obama Administration on January 18, 2017. The
waiver was last renewed on January 12, 2018. Its provisions went back into effect on November 5, 2018.
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Table 1. Iran Crude Oil Sales
(amounts in barrels per day, including condensates)
JPA period
Levels at U.S.
average
JCPOA Exit
Country/Bloc
2011 Average
(2014-2016)
November 2018
European Union
600,000
Negligible
520,000 +
0
(particularly Italy,
Spain, Greece)
China
550,000
410,000
700,000
600,000
Japan
325,000
190,000
133,000
0
India
320,000
190,000
620,000
200,000
South Korea
230,000
130,000
100,000
0
Turkey
200,000
120,000
200,000
0
South Africa
80,000
negligible
negligible
0
Other Asia (Malaysia,
90,000
negligible
negligible
0
Sri Lanka, Indonesia)
Taiwan
35,000
10,000
67,000
0
Singapore
20,000
negligible
negligible
0
Syria
negligible
negligible
33,000
0
Other (UAE, Iraq
55,000
negligible
100,000
201,000
swaps, unknown)

Total (mbd)
2.5
1.06
2.45
1.0
Source and Note: Bloomberg News and other press articles on Iran oil customer purchase volumes. Initial
information on actual Iranian exports is often preliminary, incomplete, and inaccurate, and this table therefore
contains figures from at least one month prior. Figures might not reflect actual deliveries due to reported
activities by Iran and various oil customers to conceal purchases or avoid tracking of oil tankers. Figures do not
include purchases of condensates, which are light petroleum liquids that are associated with oil and natural gas
production. South Korea is a large customer for Iranian condensates, and as of August 2018 it had cut its
purchases of that product from Iran to zero.
Sanctions on Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Missiles, and Conventional Arms Transfers
Status: No sanctions in this section eased to implement JCPOA
Several laws and executive orders seek to bar Iran from obtaining U.S. or other technology that
can be used for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Sanctions on Iran’s exportation
of arms are discussed in the sections above on sanctions for Iran’s support for terrorist groups.
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act and Iraq Sanctions Act
The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (Title XIV of the FY1993 National Defense
Authorization Act, P.L. 102-484, signed in October 1992) imposes a number of sanctions on
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foreign entities that supply Iran with WMD technology or “destabilizing numbers and types of
advanced conventional weapons.”28 Advanced conventional weapons are defined as follows:
(1) such long-range precision-guided munitions, fuel air explosives, cruise missiles, low
observability aircraft, other radar evading aircraft, advanced military aircraft, military satellites,
electromagnetic weapons, and laser weapons as the President determines destabilize the military
balance or enhance the offensive capabilities in destabilizing ways;
(2) such advanced command, control, and communications systems, electronic warfare systems,
or intelligence collections systems as the President determines destabilize the military balance or
enhance offensive capabilities in destabilizing ways; and
(3) such other items or systems as the President may, by regulation, determine necessary for the
purposes of this title.
The definition is generally understood to include technology used to develop ballistic missiles.
Sanctions to be Imposed: Sanctions imposed on violating entities include
 a ban, for two years, on U.S. government procurement from the entity;
 a ban, for two years, on licensing U.S. exports to that entity;
 authority (but not a requirement) to ban U.S. imports from the entity.
If the violator is determined to be a foreign country, sanctions to be imposed are
 a one-year ban on U.S. assistance to that country;
 a one-year requirement that the United States vote against international lending
to it;
 a one-year suspension of U.S. coproduction agreements with the country;
 a one-year suspension of technical exchanges with the country in military or dual
use technology;
 a one-year ban on sales of U.S. arms to the country;
 an authorization to deny the country most-favored-nation trade status; and to ban
U.S. trade with the country.
Section 1603 of the act amended an earlier law, the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586G(a)
of P.L. 101-513), to provide for a “presumption of denial” for all dual use exports to Iran
(including computer software).
Implementation
A number of entities were sanctioned under the act in the 1990s, as shown in the tables at the end
of this paper. None of the designations remain active, because the sanctions have limited duration.
Waiver
Section 1606 of the act provides a presidential waiver for the provisions of the act, and for those imposed
pursuant to the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, if the President determines that it is “essential to the national
interest.”

28 The act originally only applied to advanced conventional weapons. The extension to WMD, defined as chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons-related technology was added by the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
104-106).
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Banning Aid to Countries that Aid or Arm Terrorism List States:
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Another law reinforces the authority of the President to sanction governments that provide aid or
sell arms to Iran (and other terrorism list countries). Under Sections 620G and 620H of the
Foreign Assistance Act, as added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(Sections 325 and 326 of P.L. 104-132), the President is required to withhold foreign aid from any
country that provides to a terrorism list country financial assistance or arms. Waiver authority is
provided. Section 321 of that act also makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons to conduct
financial transactions with terrorism list governments.
No foreign assistance cuts or other penalties under this law have been announced.
Proliferation-Related Provision of the Iran Sanctions Act
As noted above, Section 5(b)(1) of ISA subjects to ISA sanctions firms or persons determined to
have sold to Iran (1) technology useful for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or (2)
“destabilizing numbers and types” of advanced conventional weapons. This, and Section 5(b)(2)
pertaining to joint ventures to mine uranium, are the only provisions of ISA that were not waived
to implement the JCPOA.
As noted, no sanctions under this section have been imposed.
Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act
The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178, signed in March 2000) is now called the Iran-North
Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) after amendments applying its provisions to North
Korea and to Syria. It authorizes sanctions—for two years unless renewed—on foreign persons
(individuals or corporations, not governments) that are determined in a report by the
Administration to have assisted Iran’s WMD programs. Sanctions imposed include (1) a
prohibition on U.S. exportation of arms and dual use items to the sanctioned entity; and (2) a ban
on U.S. government procurement and of imports to the United States from the sanctioned entity
under Executive Order 12938 (of November 14, 1994). INKSNA also banned U.S. extraordinary
payments to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency in connection with the international space
station unless the President certified that the agency had not transferred any WMD or missile
technology to Iran within the year prior.29
Implementation
Entities that have been sanctioned under this law are listed in the tables at the end of the report.
Designations more than two years old are no longer active. The JCPOA required the United States
to suspend INKSNA sanctions against “the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and
services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA,” but no entities were “delisted” to
implement the JCPOA.

29 The provision contains certain exceptions to ensure the safety of astronauts, but it nonetheless threatened to limit
U.S. access to the international space station after April 2006, when Russia started charging the United States for
transportation on its Soyuz spacecraft. Legislation in the 109th Congress (S. 1713, P.L. 109-112) amended the provision
in order to facilitate continued U.S. access and extended INA sanctions provisions to Syria.
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Waiver and Termination
Section 4 gives the President the authority to not impose sanctions if the President justifies that decision to
Congress. Section 5 provides for exemptions from sanctions if certain conditions are met, particularly that the
government with jurisdiction over the entity cooperating to stop future such transfers to Iran.
Termination of this law would require congressional action.
Executive Order 13382 on Proliferation-Supporting Entities
Status: Order Remained in Force, but Numerous Entities “Delisted”
Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005) allows the President to block the assets of proliferators of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters under the authority granted by the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and Section 301 of Title 3, United States Code.
Implementation. The numerous entities sanctioned under the order for dealings with Iran are
listed in the tables at the end of this report. Entities delisted and which were to be delisted in
accordance with the JCPOA (in October 2023) are in italics and boldface type, respectively. All
entities delisted to implement the JCPOA are to be relisted on November 5, 2018, according to
the Treasury Department.
Arms Transfer and Missile Sanctions: The Countering America’s
Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44)
The CAATSA law, signed on August 2, 2017, mandates sanctions on arms sales to Iran and on
entities that “materially contribute” to Iran’s ballistic missile program.
 Section 104 references implementation of E.O. 13382, which sanctions entities
determined by the Administration to be assisting Iran’s ballistic missile program.
The section mandates that the Administration impose the same sanctions as in
E.O. 13382 on any activity that materially contributes to Iran’s ballistic missile
program or any system capable of delivering WMD. The section also requires an
Administration report every 180 days on persons (beginning on January 29,
2018) contributing to Iran’s ballistic missile program in the preceding 180 days.
 Section 107 mandates imposition of sanctions (the same sanctions as those
contained in E.O. 13382) on any person that the President determines has sold or
transferred to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran: the weapons
systems specified as banned for transfer to or from Iran in U.N. Security Council
Resolution 2231. These include most major combat systems such as tanks,
armored vehicles, warships, missiles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. The
provision goes somewhat beyond prior law that mandates sanctions mainly on
sales to Iran of “destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional
weapons.” The imposition of sanctions is not required if the President certifies
that a weapons transfer is in the national security of the United States; that Iran
no longer poses a significant threat to the United States or U.S. allies; and that
the Iranian government no longer satisfies the requirements for designation as a
state sponsor of terrorism.
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Sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Numerous sanctions discussed in this report target Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which plays
a role in repressing domestic dissent, developing Iran’s energy sector, developing Iran’s WMD programs
particularly by procuring technology abroad, and supporting pro-Iranian militant movements and governments in
the Middle East region. Many of the IRGC’s subordinate units, such as the IRGC Qods Force and the Basij militia,
have been designated for sanctions under various Executive Orders, as have corporate entities owned or
control ed by the IRGC. One such firm is the large engineering firm Khatam ol-Anbia. Secretary of State Michael
Pompeo has cited estimates that the IRGC’s affiliates might control about 20% of Iran’s economy, but details of
how such figures are arrived at are scant. Sanctions targeting the IRGC are discussed below—and no IRGC-
related sanctions were waived or terminated to implement the JCPOA. IRGC-related entities designated for
sanctions are in the tables at the end of the report.

The IRGC is named as a proliferation-supporting entity under Executive Order 13382, and the Qods Force,
the unit of the IRGC that assists pro-Iranian movements and countries abroad, is named as a terrorism-
supporting entity under Executive Order 13324. Several Iranian firms linked to the IRGC are sanctioned, as
noted in the tables at the end of this report. Several IRGC commanders are named under other executive
orders, discussed below, sanctioning Iranian human rights abusers, abusers of Syrian human rights, and
entities undermining stability in Iraq.

Section 311 of the ITRSHRA requires a certification by a contractor to the U.S. government that it is not
knowingly engaging in a significant transaction with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or any
of its agents or affiliates that have been sanctioned under several executive orders discussed below. A
contract may be terminated if it is determined that the company’s certification of compliance was false.

Section 302 of the Iran Threat Reduction Act imposes at least 5 out of 12 ISA sanctions on persons that
materially assist, with financing or technology, the IRGC, or assist or engage in “significant” transactions with
any of its affiliates that are sanctioned under Executive Order 13382, 13224, or similar executive orders
discussed below—or which are determined to be affiliates of the IRGC. Section 302 did not amend ISA.

Section 301 of the Iran Threat Reduction Act requires the President, within 90 days of enactment (by
November 9, 2012), to identify “officials, agents, or affiliates” of the IRGC and to impose sanctions in
accordance with Executive Order 13382 or 13224, including blocking any such designee’s U.S.-based assets
or property. Some of these designations, including of National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), were made by
the Treasury Department on November 8, 2012.

Section 303 of the ITRSHRA requires the imposition of sanctions on agencies of foreign governments that
provide technical or financial support, or goods and services to sanctioned (under U.S. executive orders or
U.N. resolutions) members or affiliates of the IRGC. Sanctions include a ban on U.S. assistance or credits for
that foreign government agency, a ban on defense sales to it, a ban on U.S. arms sales to it, and a ban on
exports to it of control ed U.S. technology.

Section 104 of CISADA sanctions foreign banks that conduct significant transactions with the IRGC or any of
its agents or affiliates that are sanctioned under any executive order. It also sanctions any entity that assists
Iran’s Central Bank efforts to help the IRGC acquire WMD or support international terrorism.

The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (P.L. 115-44) mandates sanctions contained in
E.O. 13224 (terrorism entities) on the IRGC and its officials, agents and affiliates be applied by October 30,
2017. On October 13, 2017, the Treasury Department designated the IRGC under E.O. 13224.

In October 2018, 20 entities, including a steel company and acid and zinc mining firms, that help provide
revenue to the Basjij militia, an arm of the IRGC, were designated as terrorism entities under Executive
Order 13224.
No IRGC-related laws or executive orders were waived or suspended to implement the JCPOA and no IRGC affiliates were
“delisted.” There are no commitments in the JCPOA for the United States to suspend any IRGC-related sanctions.
Foreign Aid Restrictions for Named Suppliers of Iran
Some past foreign aid appropriations have withheld U.S. assistance to the Russian Federation
unless it terminates technical assistance to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missiles programs. The
provision applied to the fiscal year for which foreign aid is appropriated. Because U.S. aid to
Russia generally has not gone to the Russian government, little or no funding was withheld as a
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result of the provision. The JCPOA makes no reference to any U.S. commitments to waive this
sanction or to request that Congress not enact such a provision.
Sanctions on “Countries of Diversion Concern”
Title III of CISADA established authorities to sanction countries that allow U.S. technology that
Iran could use in its nuclear and WMD programs to be reexported or diverted to Iran. Section 303
of CISADA authorizes the President to designate a country as a “Destination of Diversion
Concern” if that country allows substantial diversion of goods, services, or technologies
characterized in Section 302 of that law to Iranian end-users or Iranian intermediaries. The
technologies specified include any goods that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear or WMD
programs, as well as goods listed on various U.S. controlled-technology lists such as the
Commerce Control List or Munitions List. For any country designated as a country of diversion
concern, there would be prohibition of denial for licenses of U.S. exports to that country of the
goods that were being reexported or diverted to Iran.
Implementation: To date, no country has been designated a “Country of Diversion Concern.”
Some countries adopted or enforced antiproliferation laws apparently to avoid designation.
Waiver and Termination
Waiver: The President may waive sanctions on countries designated as of Diversion Concern for 12 months, and
additional 12-month periods, pursuant to certification that the country is taking steps to prevent diversions and
re-exports.
Termination: The designation terminates on the date the President certifies to Congress that the country has
adequately strengthened its export controls to prevent such diversion and reexports to Iran in the future. The
JCPOA makes no reference to waiving or terminating this sanction.
Financial/Banking Sanctions
U.S. efforts to shut Iran out of the international banking system were a key component of the
2010-2016 international sanctions regime.
Targeted Financial Measures
Status: Initiative Suspended during JCPOA Implementation
During 2006-2016, the Department of the Treasury used longstanding authorities to persuade
foreign banks to cease dealing with Iran, in part by briefing them on Iran’s use of the international
financial system to fund terrorist groups and acquire weapons-related technology. According to a
GAO report of February 2013, the Department of the Treasury made overtures to 145 banks in 60
countries, including several visits to banks and officials in the UAE, and convinced at least 80
foreign banks to cease handling financial transactions with Iranian banks. Upon implementation
of the JCPOA, the Treasury Department largely dropped this initiative, and instead largely sought
to encourage foreign banks to conduct normal transactions with Iran.
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Ban on Iranian Access to the U.S. Financial System/Use of Dollars
Status: Remains in Force
There is no blanket ban on foreign banks or persons paying Iran for goods using U.S. dollars. But,
U.S. regulations (ITRs, C.F.R. Section 560.516) ban Iran from direct access to the U.S. financial
system. The regulations allow U.S. banks to send funds (including U.S. dollars) to Iran for
allowed (licensed) transactions. However, the U.S. dollars cannot be directly transferred to an
Iranian bank, but must instead be channeled through an intermediary financial institution, such as
a European bank. Section 560.510 specifically allows for U.S. payments to Iran to settle or pay
judgments to Iran, such as those reached in connection with the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal,
discussed above. However, the prohibition on dealing directly with Iranian banks still applies.
On November 6, 2008, the Department of the Treasury broadened restrictions on Iran’s access to
the U.S. financial system by barring U.S. banks from handling any transactions with foreign
banks that are handling transactions on behalf of an Iranian bank (“U-turn transactions”).30 This
means a foreign bank or person that pays Iran for goods in U.S. dollars cannot access the U.S.
financial system (through a U.S. correspondent account, which most foreign banks have) to
acquire dollars for any transaction involving Iran. This ban remained in effect under the JCPOA
implementation, and Iran argued that these U.S. restrictions deter European and other banks from
reentering the Iran market, as discussed later in this report.
Recent Developments
Then-Treasury Secretary Lew in March and April 2016 suggested the Obama Administration was
considering licensing transactions by foreign (non-Iranian) clearinghouses to acquire dollars that
might facilitate transactions with Iran, without providing Iran with dollars directly.31 However,
doing so was not required by the JCPOA and the Administration declined to take that step.
Instead, the Obama Administration encouraged bankers to reenter the Iran market without fear of
being sanctioned. The Trump Administration has not, at any time, expressed support for allowing
Iran greater access to dollars. The reimposition of U.S. sanctions has further reduced the
willingness and ability of foreign firms to use dollars in transactions with Iran.
Punishments/Fines Implemented against Some Banks.
The Department of the Treasury and other U.S. authorities has announced financial settlements
(forfeiture of assets and imposition of fines) with various banks that have helped Iran (and other
countries such as Sudan, Syria, and Cuba) access the U.S. financial system. The settlement dollar
amounts were reportedly determined, at least in part, by the dollar value, number, and duration of
illicit transactions conducted, and the strength of the evidence collected by the accusing U.S.
regulators,32 but is not known from published sources how final settlement amounts compare to
the amounts sought by U.S. regulators. (As noted above, the FY2016 Consolidated Appropriation

30 For text of the OFAC ruling barring U-Turn transactions, see https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/
Documents/fr73_66541.pdf.
31 See Katherine Bauer. “Potential U.S. Clarification of Financial Sanctions Regulations.” April 5, 2016.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/potential-u.s.-clarification-of-financial-sanctions-regulations.
32 Analyst conversations with U.S. banking and sanctions experts. 2010-2015.
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(P.L. 114-113) provides for use of the proceeds of the settlements above to pay compensation to
victims of Iranian terrorism.)
(1) In 2004, UBS paid a $100 million settlement for the unauthorized movement of U.S. dollars
to Iran and other sanctioned countries; (2) in December 2005, Dutch bank ABN Amro paid an
$80 million settlement for failing to fully report the processing of financial transactions involving
Iran’s Bank Melli; (3) in December 2009, Credit Suisse paid a $536 million settlement for illicitly
processing Iranian transactions with U.S. banks;33 (4) in June 2012, Dutch bank ING paid a $619
million settlement for concealing the movement of billions of dollars through the U.S. financial
system on behalf of Iranian and Cuban clients;34 (5) in August 2012, Standard Chartered paid a
$340 million settlement to New York State regulators for allegations that it had processed
transactions on behalf of Iran;35 (6) in January 2014, Luxembourg-based Clearstream Banking
paid $152 million for helping Iran evade U.S. banking restrictions; (7) in January 2014, the Bank
of Moscow paid a $9.5 million settlement for illicitly allowing Bank Melli to access the U.S.
financial system;36 and (8) in June 2014, BNP Paribas pled guilty to helping Iran (and Sudan and
Cuba) violate U.S. sanctions and forfeited $8.9 billion and paid $140 million in fines.37
CISADA: Sanctioning Foreign Banks That Conduct Transactions
with Sanctioned Iranian Entities
Status: Remained in force after JCPOA, but Iranian banks “delisted.” Delisted
banks will be “re-listed” as of November 5, 2018.
Section 104 of CISADA requires the Secretary of the Treasury to forbid U.S. banks from opening
new “correspondent accounts” or “payable-through accounts” (or force the cancellation of
existing such accounts) for38
 any foreign bank that transactions business with an entity that is sanctioned by
Executive Order 13224 or 13382 (terrorism and proliferation activities,
respectively). These orders are discussed above. A full list of such entities is at
the end of this report, and entities “delisted” are in italics.
 any foreign bank determined to have facilitated Iran’s efforts to acquire WMD or
delivery systems or provide support to groups named as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs) by the United States.
 any foreign bank that facilitates “the activities of” an entity designated under by
U.N. Security Council resolutions that sanction Iran.
 any foreign bank that transacts business with the IRGC or any of its affiliates
designated under any U.S. Iran-related executive order.
 any foreign bank that does business with Iran’s energy, shipping, and
shipbuilding sectors, including with NIOC, NITC, and IRISL. (This provision

33 http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/credit-suisse-agrees-forfeit-536-million-connection-violations-international-
emergency.
34 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/business/ing-bank-to-pay-619-million-over-sanctions-violations.html?_r=0.
35 Jessica Silver-Greenberg, “Regulator Says Bank Helped Iran Hide Deals,” New York Times, August 7, 2012.
36 Rick Gladstone. “U.S. Announces Actions to Enforce Iran Sanctions.” New York Times, April 29, 2014.
37 http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/01/us-bnp-paribas-settlement-sentencing-idUSKBN0NM41K20150501.
38 Foreign banks that do not have operations in the United States typically establish correspondent accounts or payable-
through accounts with U.S. banks as a means of accessing the U.S. financial system.
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was contained in Section 1244(d) of the Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation
Act, IFCA, discussed below, but did not specifically amend CISADA. The
provision was waived to implement the JCPOA.
One additional intent of the provision was to reduce the ability of Iran’s pivotal import-export
community (referred to in Iran as the “bazaar merchants” or “bazaaris”) from obtaining “letters
of credit” (trade financing) to buy or sell goods. The Department of the Treasury has authority to
determine what constitutes a “significant” financial transaction.
Waiver and Termination
Under Section 401(a) of CISADA, the Section 104 sanctions provisions would terminate 30 days after the
President certifies to Congress that Iran (1) has met the requirements for removal from the terrorism list, AND
(2) has ceased pursuit, acquisition, or development of, and verifiably dismantled its nuclear weapons and other
WMD programs.
The Secretary of the Treasury may waive sanctions under Section 104, with the waiver taking effect 30 days after
the Secretary determines that a waiver is necessary to the national interest and submits a report to Congress
describing the reason for that determination.
As noted, Section 104 was not waived to implement the JCPOA, but many entities with which transactions would
have triggered sanctions under Section 104 have been “delisted” in accordance with the JCPOA. These entities
are to be relisted as Special y Designated Nationals (SDNs) and therefore subject to secondary sanctioning by
November 5, 2018.
Implementation of Section 104: Sanctions Imposed
On July 31, 2012, the United States sanctioned the Bank of Kunlun in China and the Elaf Islamic
Bank in Iraq under Section 104 of CISADA. On May 17, 2013, the Department of the Treasury
lifted sanctions on Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq, asserting that the bank had reduced its exposure to
the Iranian financial sector and stopped providing services to the Export Development Bank of
Iran.
Iran Designated a Money-Laundering Jurisdiction/FATF
Status: Central Bank Remained Designated Under this Section during JCPOA
On November 21, 2011, the Obama Administration identified Iran as a “jurisdiction of primary
money laundering concern”39 under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act (31 U.S.C. 5318A), based
on a determination that Iran’s financial system, including the Central Bank, constitutes a threat to
governments or financial institutions that do business with Iran’s banks. The designation imposed
additional requirements on U.S. banks to ensure against improper Iranian access to the U.S.
financial system.
The Administration justified the designation as implementation of recommendations of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—a multilateral standard-setting body for anti-money
laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). The FATF characterizes Iran as
a high-risk and noncooperative jurisdiction with respect to AMF/CFT issues.40 On June 24, 2016,
the FATF welcomed an “Action Plan” filed by Iran to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies
and decided to suspend, for one year, “countermeasures”—mostly voluntary recommendations of

39 http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1367.aspx.
40 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-statement-
february-2016.html.
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increased due diligence with respect to Iran transactions—pending an assessment of Iran’s
implementation of its Action Plan. The FATF continued the suspension of countermeasures in
June and November 2017, and February 2018,41 but Iran remained blacklisted because of its
refusal to implement anti-terrorism financing measures, such as accession to the Convention for
the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism. Iranian bodies, including its Supreme National
Security Committee and its Majles (parliament) sought in May 2018 to condition that accession
on its not applying to Iran’s support for groups Iran supports, such as Hezbollah and Hamas,
which Iran does not consider to be terrorist groups.42 On October 19, 2018, the FATF stated that
Iran had only acted on 9 out of 10 of its guidelines, and that Iran’s Majles had not completed
legislation to adopt international standards. The FATF continued to suspend countermeasures and
gave Iran until February 2019 to fully accede to all FATF guidelines.
On October 12, 2018, one week prior to the FATF meeting discussed above, the Treasury
Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) issued a warning to U.S. banks to
guard against likely Iranian efforts to evade U.S. financial sanctions. Earlier, in January 1, 2013,
OFAC issued an Advisory to highlight Iran’s use of hawalas (traditional informal banking and
money exchanges) in the Middle East and South Asia region to circumvent U.S. financial
sanctions. Because the involvement of an Iranian client is often opaque, banks have sometimes
inadvertently processed hawala transactions involving Iranians.
Use of the SWIFT System
Section 220 of the ITRSHRA required reports on electronic payments systems, such as the
Brussels-based SWIFT (Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications), that do
business with Iran. That law also authorizes—but neither it or any other U.S. law or Executive
Order mandates—sanctions against SWIFT or against electronic payments systems per se. Still,
as noted, many transactions with Iran are subject to U.S. sanctions, no matter the payment
mechanism.
Cross-Cutting Secondary Sanctions: The Iran
Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA)
Status: Waived to implement JCPOA; will go back into effect as specified.
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239, signed January 2,
2013)—Subtitle D, “The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act” (IFCA) sanctions a wide
swath of Iran’s economy. (Its provisions on Iran’s human rights record are discussed elsewhere.)
 Section 1244 of IFCA mandates the blocking of U.S.-based property of any entity
(Iranian or non-Iranian) that provides goods, services, or other support to any
Iranian entity designated by the Treasury Department as a “specially designated
national” (SDN). The tables at the end of this report show that hundreds of
Iranian entities are designated as SDNs under various Executive Orders. The

41 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-statement-june-
2017.html.
42 Katherine Bauer. “Pushing Iran to Take Steps against Terrorist Financing.” Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, February 20, 2018.
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Iranian entities designated for civilian economic activity were “delisted” to
implement the JCPOA, but will be relisted on November 5, 2018.
 Section 1247 of IFCA prohibits from operating in the United States any bank that
knowingly facilitates a financial transaction on behalf of an Iranian SDN. This
provision is, to some extent, duplicative of Section 104 of CISADA (see above).
Several sections of IFCA impose ISA sanctions on entities determined to have engaged in
specified transactions below. (The provisions apply ISA sanctions but do not amend ISA.)
 Energy, Shipbuilding, and Shipping Sector. Section 1244 mandates five out of 12
ISA sanctions on entities that provide goods or services to Iran’s energy,
shipbuilding, and shipping sectors, or to port operations there—or which provide
insurance for such transactions. The sanctions do not apply when such
transactions involved purchases of Iranian oil by countries that have exemptions
under P.L. 112-81, or to the purchase of natural gas from Iran. This section goes
back into effect after a 180-day wind-down period (by November 4, 2018).
 Dealings in Precious Metals. Section 1245 imposes five out of 12 ISA sanctions
on entities that provide precious metals to Iran (including gold) or semifinished
metals or software for integrating industrial processes. The section affected
foreign firms that transferred these items or other precious metals to Iran in
exchange for oil or any other product. There is no exception to this sanction for
countries exempted under P.L. 112-81. This section went back into effect after a
90-day wind-down period (August 6, 2018).
 Insurance for Related Activities. Section 1246 imposes five out of 12 ISA
sanctions on entities that provide underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance
for any transactions sanctioned under any Executive Order on Iran, ISA,
CISADA, the Iran Threat Reduction Act, INKSNA, other IFCA provisions, or
any other Iran sanction, as well as to any Iranian SDN. (There is no exception for
countries exempted under P.L. 112-81.) This provision goes back into effect after
a 180-day wind-down period (by November 4, 2018).
 Exception for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Section 1244(f) of IFCA provides a
sanctions exemption for transactions that provide reconstruction assistance for or
further the economic development of Afghanistan.
 Basij-Related Industrial Designations. On October 16, 2018, OFAC designated
as terrorism-related entities several Iranian industrial companies on the grounds
that they provide the Basij security force with revenue to support its operations in
the Middle East. The industrial firms—which were not previously designated and
would not anyway be “re-listed” as of November 5—were Technotar Engineering
Company; Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company; Iran’s Zinc Mines
Development Company and several related zinc producers; and Esfahan
Mobarakeh Steel Company, the largest steel producer in the Middle East. The
designations mean that foreign firms that transact business with these Iranian
industrial firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions under IFCA.
Implementation
On August 29, 2014, the State Department sanctioned UAE-based Goldentex FZE in accordance
with IFCA for providing support to Iran’s shipping sector. It was “delisted” from sanctions on
Implementation Day of the JCPOA.
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Waiver and Termination
Sections 1244 and 1245 of IFCA provide for a waiver of sanctions for 180 days, renewable for 180-day periods, if
such a waiver is determined to be vital to U.S. national security. These sections were waived in order to
implement the JPA. In addition, Section 5(a)(7) of ISA was waived to allow for certain transactions with NIOC and
NITC. Sections 1244(i), 1245(g), 1246(e), and 1247(f) of IFCA were waived to implement the JCPOA on January
18, 2017, and that waiver was last renewed on January 12, 2018. IFCA goes back into ful effect as specified above.
Executive Order 13608 on Sanctions Evasion
Executive Order 13608 of May 1, 2012, gives the Department of the Treasury the ability to
identify and sanction (cutting them off from the U.S. market) foreign persons who help Iran (or
Syria) evade U.S. and multilateral sanctions.
Several persons and entities have been designated for sanctions, as shown in the tables at the end
of the report.
Sanctions on Iran’s Cyber and Transnational
Criminal Activities
Status: All in Force during JCPOA Period
The Trump Administration appears to be making increasing use of executive orders issued during
the Obama Administration to sanction Iranian entities determined to be engaged in malicious
cyberactivities or in transnational crime. Iranian entities have attacked, or attempted to attack,
using cyberactivity, infrastructure in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. Iran’s ability
to conduct cyberattacks appears to be growing. Separately, the Justice Department has prosecuted
Iranian entities for such activity. The section below discusses Executive Order 13694 on
malicious cyberactivities and Executive Order 13581 on transnational crime.
Executive Order 13694 (April 1, 2015)
Executive Order 13694 blocks U.S.-based property of foreign entities determined to have
engaged in cyber-enabled activities that (1) harm or compromise the provision of services by
computers or computer networks supporting in the critical infrastructure sector; (2) compromise
critical infrastructure; (3) disrupt computers or computer networks; or (4) cause misappropriation
of funds, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or financial information for financial advantage or
gain.
Executive Order 13581 (July 25, 2011)
Executive Order 13581 blocks the U.S.-based property of entities determined (1) to be a foreign
person that constitutes a significant transnational criminal organization; (2) to have materially
assisted any person sanctioned under this order; or (3) to be owned or controlled by or to have
acted on behalf of a person sanctioned under the order.
Implementation
Iran-related entities sanctioned under the Orders are listed in the tables at the end of this report.
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Divestment/State-Level Sanctions
Some U.S. laws require or call for divestment of shares of firms that conduct certain transactions
with Iran. A divestment-promotion provision was contained in CISADA, providing a “safe
harbor” for investment managers who sell shares of firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector at
levels that would trigger U.S. sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act. As noted above, Section
219 of the ITRSHRA of 2012 requires companies to reports to the Securities and Exchange
Commission whether they or any corporate affiliate has engaged in any transactions with Iran that
could trigger sanctions under ISA, CISADA, and E.O 13382 and 13224.
Implementation: Numerous states have adopted laws, regulations, and policies to divest from—or
avoid state government business with—foreign companies that conduct certain transactions with
Iran. The JCPOA requires the United States to work with state and local governments to ensure
that state-level sanctions do not conflict with the sanctions relief provided by the federal
government under the JCPOA. Most states that have adopted Iran sanctions continue to enforce
those measures.
Sanctions and Sanctions Exemptions to Support
Democratic Change/Civil Society in Iran
Post-JCPOA Status: Virtually All Sanctions in This Section Remain in Effect.
No Entities “Delisted.”43
A trend in U.S. policy and legislation since the June 12, 2009, election-related uprising in Iran has
been to support the ability of the domestic opposition in Iran to communicate and to sanction
Iranian officials that commit human rights abuses. Sanctions on the IRGC represent one facet of
that trend because the IRGC is key suppressive instrument. Individuals and entities designated
under the executive orders and provisions discussed below are listed in the tables at the end of
this report. For those provisions that ban visas to enter the United States, the State Department
interprets the provisions to apply to all members of the designated entity.44
Expanding Internet and Communications Freedoms
Some laws and Administration action focus on expanding internet freedom in Iran or preventing
the Iranian government from using the internet to identify opponents. Subtitle D of the FY2010
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84), called the “VOICE” (Victims of Iranian Censorship)
Act, contained several provisions to increase U.S. broadcasting to Iran and to identify (in a report
to be submitted 180 days after enactment) companies that are selling Iran technology equipment
that it can use to suppress or monitor the internet usage of Iranians. The act authorized funds to
document Iranian human rights abuses since the June 2009 Iranian presidential election. Section
1241 required an Administration report by January 31, 2010, on U.S. enforcement of sanctions
against Iran and the effect of those sanctions on Iran.

43 Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628 which have to do primarily with Iran’s energy sector, were revoked,
but the remaining sections, which concern human rights issues, remain in place.
44 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Sanctions Iranian Security Forces for Human
Rights Abuses, June 9, 2011.
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Countering Censorship of the Internet: CISADA, E.O. 13606, and E.O. 13628
 Section 106 of CISADA prohibits U.S. government contracts with foreign
companies that sell technology that Iran could use to monitor or control Iranian
usage of the internet. The provisions were directed, in part, against Nokia
(Finland) and Siemens (Germany) for reportedly selling internet monitoring and
censorship technology to Iran in 2008.45 The provision was derived from the
Reduce Iranian Cyber-Suppression Act (111th Congress, S. 1475 and H.R. 3284).
 On April 23, 2012, President Obama issued an executive order (13606)
sanctioning persons who commit “Grave Human Rights Abuses by the
Governments of Iran and Syria via Information Technology (GHRAVITY).” The
order blocks the U.S.-based property and essentially bars U.S. entry and bans any
U.S. trade with persons and entities listed in an Annex and persons or entities
subsequently determined to be (1) operating any technology that allows the
Iranian (or Syrian) government to disrupt, monitor, or track computer usage by
citizens of those countries or assisting the two governments in such disruptions or
monitoring; or (2) selling to Iran (or Syria) any technology that enables those
governments to carry out such actions.
 Section 403 of the ITRSHRA sanctions (visa ban, U.S.-based property blocked)
persons/firms determined to have engaged in censorship in Iran, limited access to
media, or—for example, a foreign satellite service provider—supported Iranian
government jamming or frequency manipulation. On October 9, 2012, the
President issued Executive Order 13628 implementing Section 403 by blocking
the property of persons/firms determined to have committed the censorship,
limited free expression, or assisted in jamming communications. The order also
specifies the sanctions authorities of the Department of State and of the Treasury.
Laws and Actions to Promote Internet Communications by Iranians
 On March 8, 2010, OFAC amended the Iran Transactions Regulations to allow
for a general license for providing free mass market software to Iranians. The
ruling incorporated major features of the Iran Digital Empowerment Act (H.R.
4301 in the 111th Congress). The OFAC determination required a waiver of the
provision of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (Section 1606 waiver
provision) discussed above.
 Section 103(b)(2) of CISADA exempts from the U.S. export ban on Iran
equipment to help Iranians communicate and use the internet.
 On March 20, 2012, the Department of the Treasury amended U.S.-Iran trade
regulations to permit several additional types of software and information
technology products to be exported to Iran under general license, provided the
products were available at no cost to the user.46 The items included personal
communications, personal data storage, browsers, plug-ins, document readers,
and free mobile applications related to personal communications.
 On May 30, 2013, the Department of the Treasury amended the trade regulations
further to allow for the sale, on a cash basis (no financing), to Iran of equipment

45 Christopher Rhoads, “Iran’s Web Spying Aided by Western Technology,” Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2009.
46 Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Interpretive Guidance and Statement of Licensing Policy on Internet Freedom in Iran,
March 20, 2012.
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that Iranians can use to communicate (e.g., cellphones, laptops, satellite internet,
website hosting, and related products and services).
Measures to Sanction Human Rights Abuses and
Promote the Opposition
Some legislation has sought to sanction regime officials involved in suppressing the domestic
opposition in Iran or in human rights abuses more generally. Much of this legislation centers on
amendments to Section 105 of CISADA.
 Sanctions against Iranian Human Rights Abusers. Section 105 of CISADA bans
travel and freezes the U.S.-based assets of those Iranians determined to be human
rights abusers. On September 29, 2010, pursuant to Section 105, President
Obama issued Executive Order 13553 providing for CISADA sanctions against
Iranians determined to be responsible for or complicit in post-2009 Iran election
human rights abuses. Those sanctioned under the provisions are listed in the
tables at the end of this report.
 Section 105 terminates if the President certifies to Congress that Iran has (1)
unconditionally released all political prisoners detained in the aftermath of the
June 2009 uprising; (2) ceased its practices of violence, unlawful detention,
torture, and abuse of citizens who were engaged in peaceful protest; (3) fully
investigated abuses of political activists that occurred after the uprising; and (4)
committed to and is making progress toward establishing an independent
judiciary and respecting human rights.
 Sanctions on Sales of Anti-Riot Equipment. Section 402 of the ITRSHRA
amended Section 105 by adding provisions that sanction (visa ban, U.S. property
blocked) any person or company that sells the Iranian government goods or
technologies that it can use to commit human rights abuses against its people.
Such goods include firearms, rubber bullets, police batons, chemical or pepper
sprays, stun grenades, tear gas, water cannons, and like goods. In addition, ISA
sanctions are to be imposed on any person determined to be selling such
equipment to the IRGC.
 Sanctions against Iranian Government Broadcasters/IRIB. Section 1248 of IFCA
(Subtitle D of P.L. 112-239) mandates inclusion of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Broadcasting (IRIB), the state broadcasting umbrella group, as a human rights
abuser. IRIB was designated as an SDN on February 6, 2013, under E.O. 13628
for limiting free expression in Iran. On February 14, 2014, the State Department
waived IFCA sanctions under Sections 1244, 1246, or 1247, on any entity that
provides satellite connectivity services to IRIB. The waiver has been renewed
each year since.
 Sanctions against Iranian Profiteers. Section 1249 of IFCA amends Section 105
by imposing sanctions on any person determined to have engaged in corruption
or to have diverted or misappropriated humanitarian goods or funds for such
goods for the Iranian people. The measure is intended to sanction Iranian
profiteers who are, for example, using official connections to corner the market
for vital medicines. This provision, which remains in forces, essentially codifies a
similar provision of Executive Order 13645.
 The Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L.
115-44) Provision. Section 106 authorizes (but does not require) the imposition
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of the same sanctions as those prescribed in E.O. 13553 on persons responsible
for extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights against Iranians who seek to expose illegal activity by
officials or to defend or promote human rights and freedoms in Iran. The persons
to be sanctioned are those named in a report provided 90 days after CAATSA
enactment (by October 31, 2017) and annually thereafter. The provision is similar
to E.O. 13553 but, in contrast, applies broadly to Iranian human rights abuses and
is not limited to abuses connected to suppressing the June 2009 uprising in Iran.
Additional designations of Iranian human rights abusers under E.O. 13533 were
made subsequent to the enactment of CAATSA and the October 31, 2017,
CAATSA report deadline.
 Separate Visa Bans. On July 8, 2011, the State Department imposed visa
restrictions on 50 Iranian officials for participating in political repression in Iran,
but it did not name those banned on the grounds that visa records are
confidential. The action was taken under the authorities of Section 212(a)(3)(C)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which renders inadmissible to the United
States a foreign person whose activities could have serious consequences for the
United States. On May 30, 2013, the State Department announced it had imposed
visa restrictions on an additional 60 Iranian officials on similar grounds.47
 High Level Iranian Visits. There are certain exemptions in the case of high level
Iranian visits to attend U.N. meetings in New York. The U.N. Participation Act
(P.L. 79-264) provides for U.S. participation in the United Nations and as host
nation of U.N. headquarters in New York, and visas are routinely issued to heads
of state and their aides attending these meetings. In September 2012, the State
Department refused visas for 20 members of Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s
traveling party on the grounds of past involvement in terrorism or human rights
abuses. Still, in line with U.S. obligations under the act, then-President
Ahmadinejad was allowed to fly to the United States on Iran Air, even though
Iran Air was at the time a U.S.-sanctioned entity, and his plane reportedly was
allowed to park at Andrews Air Force base.
U.N. Sanctions
U.N. sanctions on Iran, enacted by the Security Council under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter,48 applied to all U.N. member states. During 2006-2008, three U.N. Security
Council resolutions—1737, 1747, and 1803—imposed sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure. Resolution 1929, adopted on June 9, 2010,
was key for its assertion that major sectors of the Iranian economy support Iran’s nuclear
program—giving U.N. member states authorization to sanction civilian sectors of Iran’s
economy. It also imposed strict limitations on Iran’s development of ballistic missiles and imports
and exports of arms.

47 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/210102.htm.
48 Security Council resolutions that reference Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter represent actions taken with respect to
threats to international peace and acts of aggression. Article 41 of that Chapter, in general, provides for enforcement of
the resolution in question through economic and diplomatic sanctions, but not through military action.
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Resolution 2231 and U.N. Sanctions Eased
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015
 endorsed the JCPOA and superseded all prior Iran-related resolutions as of
Implementation Day (January 16, 2016).
 lifted all U.N. sanctions discussed above. The Resolution did not continue the
mandate of the “the panel of experts” and the panel ended its operations.
 “calls on” Iran not to develop ballistic missiles “designed to be capable” of
delivering a nuclear weapon for a maximum of eight years from Adoption Day
(October 18, 2015). The restriction expires on October 18, 2023. And, 2231 is far
less restrictive on Iran’s missile program than is Resolution 1929. No specific
sanctions are mandated in the Resolution if Iran conducted missile tests
inconsistent with the Resolution. The JCPOA did not impose any specific
missile-related requirements.
 requires Security Council approval for Iran to export arms or to purchase any
arms (major combat systems named in the Resolution) for a maximum of five
years from Adoption Day (until October 18, 2020). The JCPOA does not impose
arms requirements.
No change to the status of Resolution 2231 is anticipated as a consequence of the May 8, 2018,
U.S. announcement that it will cease participating in the JCPOA.
Iran Compliance Status
U.N. and International Atomic Energy Agency reports since the JCPOA began implementation
have stated that Iran is complying with its nuclear obligations under the JCPOA. That assessment
was corroborated by U.S. intelligence leaders in January 29, 2019 testimony before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence.49
U.N. reports on Iranian compliance with Resolution 223150 have noted assertions by several U.N.
Security Council members, including the United States, that Iranian missile tests have been
inconsistent with the Resolution. U.S. officials have called some of Iran’s launches of its
Khorramshahr missile as violations of the Resolution. The reports required by Resolution 2231,
as well as those required by other Resolutions pertaining to various regional crises, such as that in
Yemen, also note apparent violations of the Resolution 2231 restrictions on Iran’s exportation of
arms. The Security Council is responsible for prescribing penalties on Iran for violations, and no
U.N. Security Council actions have been taken against Iran for these violations to date.
U.N. List of Sanctioned Entities
Under Paragraph 6(c) of Annex B of Resolution 2231, entities sanctioned by the previous Iran-
related Resolutions would continue to be sanctioned for up to eight years from Adoption Day
(until October 2023). An attachment to the Annex listed 36 entities for which this restriction
would no longer apply (entities “delisted”) as of Implementation Day. Most of the entities

49 https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressional-testimonies/item/1947-statement-for-the-record-worldwide-
threat-assessment-of-the-us-intelligence-community
50 The report is reprinted in, Iran Watch, at http://www.iranwatch.org/library/multilateral-organizations/united-nations/
un-secretary-general/third-report-secretary-general-implementation-security-council-resolution-2231.
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immediately delisted were persons and entities connected to permitted aspects of Iran’s nuclear
program and its civilian economy. According to press reports, two entities not on the attachment
list, Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International PLC, also were delisted on Implementation Day
by separate Security Council action.51 Paragraph 6(c) provides for the Security Council to be able
to delist a listed entity at any time, as well as to add new entities to the sanctions list. Delisted
entities are in italics in the table of U.N.-listed sanctioned entities at the end of the report.
Table 2. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program
(1737, 1747, 1803, 1929, and 2231)
Resolution 1737 required Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, to suspend construction of the heavy-water
reactor at Arak, ratify the “Additional Protocol” to Iran’s IAEA Safeguards Agreement. (1737) No longer
applicable.
Assets frozen of Iranian persons and entities named in annexes to the resolutions, and countries required to ban
the travel of named Iranians. (Initial list in Resolution 1737, and additional designations in subsequent resolutions).
Transfer to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual use items to Iran prohibited, except for use in light-water reactors
(1737 and 1747). Resolution 2231 delegates to a Joint Commission the authority to approve Iran’s applications to
purchase dual-use items.
Resolution 1747 prohibited Iran from exporting arms. Resolution 2231 requires Iran to obtain Security Council
approval to export arms for a maximum of five years.
Resolution 1929 prohibited Iran from investing abroad in uranium mining, related nuclear technologies or nuclear
capable ballistic missile technology, and prohibits Iran from developing, including testing, nuclear-capable ballistic
missiles.
1929 mandated that countries not export major combat systems to Iran, but did not bar sales of missiles that are
not on the U.N. Registry of Conventional Arms. Resolution 2231 makes arms sales to Iran and exportation of
arms from Iran subject to approval by the U.N. Security Council, for a maximum of five years from Adoption Day
(until October 2020).
1929 called for restraint on transactions with Iranian banks, particularly Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. Not
applicable under Resolution 2231.
Resolution called for “Vigilance” (but not a ban) on making international lending to Iran and providing trade credits
and other financing. Not applicable under Resolution 2231.
Resolution 1929 called on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines—or by any ships in national or international waters—if there are indications they carry cargo
banned for carriage to Iran. Searches in international waters would require concurrence of the country where the
ship is registered. Resolution 2231 requires U.N. member states to continue to enforce all remaining restrictions
on shipment of banned items to Iran.
A Sanctions Committee, composed of the 15 members of the Security Council, monitored implementation of all
Iran sanctions and col ected and disseminated information on Iranian violations and other entities involved in
banned activities. A “panel of experts” was empowered by 1929 to assist the U.N. sanctions committee in
implementing the resolution and previous Iran resolutions, and to suggest ways of more effective implementation.
Source: Text of U.N. Security Council resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, 1929, and 2231. http://www.un.org.

51 http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-signed-secret-document-to-lift-u-n-sanctions-on-iranian-banks-1475193723.
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Sanctions Application under Nuclear Agreements
The following sections discuss sanctions relief provided under the November 2013 interim
nuclear agreement (JPA) and, particularly, the JCPOA. Later sections discuss the degree to which
Iran is receiving the expected benefits of sanctions relief.
Sanctions Eased by the JPA
U.S. officials said that the JPA provided “limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible” easing of
international sanctions. Under the JPA (in effect January 20, 2014-January 16, 2016)52
 Iran’s oil customers were not required reduce their oil purchases from Iran
because waivers were issued for Section 1245(d)(1) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2012 (P.L. 112-81) and Section 1244c(1) of IFCA. The
Obama Administration also stated it would not impose sanctions on foreign
banks under Executive Orders 13622, 13645, and 13382 and related regulations.
Waivers of ITRSHRA and ISA provisions were issued to permit transactions with
NIOC. The European Union amended its regulations to allow shipping insurers to
provide insurance for ships carrying oil from Iran.53
 A waiver of Section 1245(d)(1) of IFCA allowed Iran to receive directly $700
million per month in hard currency from oil sales and $65 million per month to
make tuition payments for Iranian students abroad (paid directly to the
educational institutions).
 Executive Orders 13622 and 13645 and several provisions of U.S.-Iran trade
regulations were suspended, and several sections of IFCA were waived to enable
Iran to sell petrochemicals and trade in gold and other precious metals, and to
conduct transactions with foreign firms involved in Iran’s automotive
manufacturing sector.
 Executive Order 13382 provisions and certain provisions of U.S.-Iran trade
regulations were suspended for equipment sales to Iran Air. The United States
licensed some safety-related repairs and inspections for certain Iranian airlines
and issued a new “Statement of Licensing Policy” to enable U.S. aircraft
manufacturers to sell equipment to Iranian airlines.
 The JPA required that the P5+1 “not impose new nuclear-related sanctions ... to
the extent permissible within their political systems.”54
Sanctions Easing under the JCPOA and U.S. Re-imposition
Under the JCPOA, sanctions relief occurred at Implementation Day (January 16, 2016), following
IAEA certification that Iran had completed stipulated core nuclear tasks. U.S. secondary sanctions
were waived or terminated, but most sanctions on direct U.S.-Iran trade. The secondary sanctions
eased included55 (1) sanctions that limited Iran’s exportation of oil and sanction foreign sales to

52 The Administration sanctions suspensions and waivers are detailed at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/220049.htm.
53 Daniel Fineren, “Iran Nuclear Deal Shipping Insurance Element May Help Oil Sales,” Reuters, November 24, 2013.
54 White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of
Iran’s Nuclear Program,” November 23, 2013.
55 http://iranmatters.belfercenter.org/blog/translation-iranian-factsheet-nuclear-negotiations; and author conversations
with a wide range of Administration officials, think tank, and other experts, in Washington, DC, 2015.
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Iran of gasoline and energy sector equipment, and which limit foreign investment in Iran’s energy
sector; (2) financial sector sanctions; and (3) sanctions on Iran’s auto sector and trading in the
rial. The EU lifted its ban on purchases of oil and gas from Iran; and Iranian banks were
readmitted to the SWIFT electronic payments system. All U.N. sanctions were lifted.
All of the U.S. sanctions that were eased will go back into effect on November 4, 2018, in
accordance with the May 8, 2018, announcement that the United States will cease participating in
the JCPOA. The Administration has stated that the purpose of re-imposing the sanctions is to
deny Iran the revenue with which to conduct regional malign activities and advance its missile,
nuclear, and conventional weapons programs.
Some sanctions went back into effect on August 7, 2018, after a 90-day wind-down period. These
include U.S. sanctions on
 the purchase or acquisition of U.S. bank notes by Iran;
 Iran’s trade in gold and other precious metals;
 transactions in the Iranian rial;
 activities relating to Iran’s issuing of sovereign debt;
 transactions with Iran in graphite, aluminum, steel, coal, and industrial software;
 importation of Iranian luxury goods to the United States; and
 the sale of passenger aircraft to Iran, as well as licenses for the sale to Iran of
foreign-made aircraft with substantial U.S. content.
The sanctions that go back into effect on November 4 (effective November 5) affect
 petroleum-related transactions with Iran. U.S. officials have said they will “work
with” Iran’s oil customers but the objective is that their purchases be “as close to
zero as possible” by November 4;
 port operators and energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors; and
 transactions by foreign banks with Iran’s Central Banks (including the provision
that restricts Iran’s access to hard currency held in banks abroad).
U.S. Laws Waived and Executive Orders Terminated, and Re-imposition56
The JCPOA-related suspension of U.S. sanctions required issuing waivers of the laws below.
These waivers were issued on January 16, 2016, and the Obama Administration and Trump
Administration renewed all waivers by their prescribed date until the May 8 U.S. announcement
of its exit from the JCPOA. Treasury and State Department documents issued on May 8 state that
the waivers are all being revoked, rendering post-May 8 waiver expiration deadlines moot. All the
provisions discussed below will go back into effect on November 5, 2018.
 Iran Sanctions Act. The blanket energy/economic-related provisions of the ISA of
P.L. 104-172, as amended. (Section 4(c)(1)(A) waiver provision.) The WMD-
related provision of ISA was not waived. The existing six-month waiver of ISA
was last renewed on January 12, 2018, and was to expire on July 12, 2018.
 FY2012 NDAA. Section 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2012 (P.L. 112-81) imposes sanctions on foreign banks of countries that do

56 http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/full-text-iran-deal-120080.html.
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not reduce Iran oil imports. The latest 120-day waiver was issued by the Trump
Administration on January 12, 2018, and was to expire on May 12, 2018.
 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act. Sections 212 and 213 (the
economy-related provisions) of Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights
Act (P.L. 112-158) provisions. The human rights-related provisions of the law
were not waived. The existing six-month waiver period was renewed on January
12, 2018, and was to expire on July 12, 2018.
 Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act. Sections 1244, 1245, 1246, and
1247 of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (Subtitle D of P.L. 112-
239). The latest 180-day waiver period was renewed on January 12, 2018, and
was to expire on July 11, 2018.
 The core provision of CISADA (P.L. 111-195) that sanctions foreign banks was
not waived, but most listed Iranian banks were “delisted” to implement the
JCPOA, thereby making this CISADA provision largely moot. The
Administration will be relisting all delisted Iranian banks on November 5, 2018.
 Executive Orders: 13574, 13590, 13622, 13645, and Sections 5-7 and 15 of
Executive Order 13628 were revoked outright by Executive Order 13716.57 The
Orders were reinstated on August 6, 2018, in the issuing of a new Executive
Order, 13846.
 The United States “delisted” for sanctions the specified Iranian economic entities
and personalities listed in Attachment III of the JCPOA, including the National
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), various Iranian banks, and many energy and
shipping-related institutions. That step enabled foreign companies/banks to
resume transactions with those entities without risking being penalized by the
United States. The tables at the end of the report depict in italics those entities
delisted. Entities that were to be delisted on “Transition Day” (October 2023) are
in bold type. The Administration relisted these entities for secondary sanctions,
with selected exceptions (such as the Atomic Energy Agency Organization of
Iran and 23 of its subsidiaries), on November 5, 2018.
 The JCPOA required the U.S. Administration, by “Transition Day,” to request
that Congress lift virtually all of the sanctions that were suspended under the
JCPOA. No outcome of such a request is mandated. The JCPOA requires all U.N.
sanctions to terminate after 10 years of adoption (“Termination Day”). The U.S.-
related provisions are rendered moot by the U.S. exit from the JCPOA.
U.S. Sanctions that Remained in Place during JCPOA
The JCPOA did not commit the United States to suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism or
human rights abuses, on foreign arms sales to Iran or sales of proliferation-sensitive technology
such as ballistic missile technology, or on U.S.-Iran direct trade (with the selected exceptions of
the latter discussed above). The sanctions below remained in place during JCPOA
implementation and remain in effect now:
 E.O. 12959, the ban on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran;

57 For more information on these Executive Orders and their provisions, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by
Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by
Dianne E. Rennack.
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 E.O. 13224 sanctioning terrorism entities, any sanctions related to Iran’s
designation as a state sponsor or terrorism, and any other terrorism-related
sanctions. The JCPOA does not commit the United States to revoke Iran’s
placement on the terrorism list;
 E.O. 13382 sanctioning entities for proliferation;
 the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act;
 the Iran-North Korea-Syria Non-Proliferation Act (INKSNA);58
 the section of ISA that sanctions provision to Iran of WMD-and arms related
technology to Iran;
 Executive Orders E.O. 13438 on Iran’s interference in Iraq and E.O. 13572 on
repression in Syria;
 Executive Orders (E.O. 13606 and 13628) and the provisions of CISADA,
ITRSHRA, and IFCA that pertain to human rights or democratic change in Iran;
 sanctions under various executive orders on the IRGC, military, proliferation-
related, and human rights- and terrorism-related entities, which were not
“delisted” from sanctions;
 Treasury Department regulations barring Iran from access to the U.S. financial
system. Foreign banks can pay Iran in dollars out of their existing dollar supply,
and the Treasury Department revised its guidance in October 2016 to stress that
such transactions are permitted.59
Other Mechanisms to “Snap-Back” Sanctions on Iran
Sanctions might have been reimposed by congressional action in accordance with President
Trump’s withholding of certification of Iranian compliance with the JCPOA. Such certification
under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17), was withheld in October
2017 and January and April of 2018. Congress had the opportunity to act on legislation, under
expedited procedures, to reimpose sanctions that were suspended. Congress did not take such
action.60
Additionally, the JCPOA (paragraph 36 and 37) contains a mechanism for the “snap back” of
U.N. sanctions if Iran does not satisfactorily resolve a compliance dispute. According to the
JCPOA (and Resolution 2231), the United States (or any veto-wielding member of the U.N.
Security Council) would be able to block a U.N. Security Council resolution that would continue
the lifting of U.N. sanctions despite Iran’s refusal to resolve the dispute. In that case “... the
provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the U.N.
Security Council decides otherwise.” There are no indications that the Administration plans to try
to snap back U.N. sanctions under this process.

58 The JCPA does commit the United States to terminate sanctions with respect to some entities designated for
sanctions under INKSNA.
59 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/jcpoa_faqs.pdf.
60 For more information on this option, see CRS Report R44942, U.S. Decision to Cease Implementing the Iran
Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Valerie Heitshusen.
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link to page 63 Iran Sanctions

International Implementation and Compliance61
During 2010-2016, converging international views on Iran produced global consensus to pressure
Iran through sanctions. In addition to asserting that the international community needed to ensure
that Iran did not develop a nuclear weapon, some countries joined the sanctions regime to head
off unwanted U.S. or other military action against Iran. Some countries cooperated in order to
preserve their close relationships with the United States. This section assesses international
cooperation and compliance with U.S. sanctions, and cooperation with U.S. sanctions re-imposed
as a consequence of the May 8, 2018, U.S. exit from the JCPOA. All the JCPOA parties publicly
opposed the U.S. decision to exit the JCPOA and have sought to keep their companies engaged in
the Iran market in order to continue to provide the JCPOA’s economic benefits to Iran.
A comparison between U.S., U.N., and EU sanctions against Iran is contained in Table 3 below.
Broader issues of Iran’s relations with the countries discussed in this section can be found in CRS
Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman.
European Union (EU)
After the passage of Resolution 1929 in June 2010, European Union (EU) sanctions on Iran
became nearly as extensive as those of the United States—a contrast from most of the 1990s,
when the EU countries refused to join the 1995 U.S. trade and investment ban on Iran and (along
with Japanese creditors) rescheduled $16 billion in Iranian debt bilaterally. In July 2002, Iran
tapped international capital markets for the first time since the Islamic revolution, selling $500
million in bonds to European banks and, during 2002-2005, there were negotiations between the
EU and Iran on a “Trade and Cooperation Agreement” (TCA) that would have lowered the tariffs
or increased quotas for Iranian exports to the EU countries.62
Under the JCPOA, EU sanctions, most of which were imposed in 2012, were lifted, including the
following:
 the ban on oil and gas imports from Iran. EU oil imports from Iran subsequently
returned nearly to the 2011 levels of about 600,000 barrels per day.
 a ban on insurance for shipping oil or petrochemicals from Iran and a freeze on
the assets of several Iranian firms involved in shipping.
 a ban on trade with Iran in gold, precious metals, diamonds, and petrochemicals.
 a freeze of the assets of Iran’s Central Bank (although transactions had been
permitted for approved civilian trade).
 a ban on transactions between European and all Iranian banks (in place unless
specifically authorized) and on short-term export credits, guarantees, and
insurance.
 a ban on exports to Iran of graphite, semi-finished metals such as aluminum and
steel, industrial software, shipbuilding technology, oil storage capabilities, and
flagging or classification services for Iranian tankers and cargo vessels.

61 Note: CRS has no mandate or capability to “judge” compliance of any country with U.S. or other sanctions against
Iran. This section is intended to analyze some major trends in third country cooperation with U.S. sanctions.
62 During the active period of talks, which began in December 2002, there were working groups focused not only on the
TCA terms and proliferation issues but also on Iran’s human rights record, Iran’s efforts to derail the Middle East peace
process, Iranian-sponsored terrorism, counter-narcotics, refugees, migration issues, and the Iranian opposition PMOI.
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 The cutoff of 14 EU-sanctioned Iranian banks from the Brussels-based SWIFT
electronic payments system was lifted, and the Iranian banks resumed accessing
the system in February 2016.
 A large number of entities were “delisted” from sanctions by the EU on
Implementation Day. The entities had been sanctioned by EU Council decisions
and regulations over the years. EU diplomats have indicated they will not relist
any delisted entities in cooperation with the U.S. exit from the JCPOA.
The following EU sanctions remained in place:
 an embargo on sales to Iran of arms, missile technology, other proliferation-
sensitive items, and gear for internal repression.
 a ban on 84 Iranian persons and one entity—all designated for human rights
abuses or supporting terrorism—from visiting EU countries, and the freeze on
their EU-based assets.
U.S. JCPOA Exit-Driven Divestment
EU diplomats have said that none of the EU sanctions will be reimposed by EU governments in
concert with the U.S. exit from the JCPOA, and European diplomats have indicated that they
intend to try to protect their economic relations with Iran despite the U.S. pullout from the
JCPOA. However, to avoid risk to their position in the large U.S. market, more than 100
companies—mostly in Europe—have announced they are leaving Iran. Press reports indicate that
European exports to Iran have fallen as well, including German exports down about 4% in the
first eight months of 2018. In some cases, European companies have stopped doing business with
Iran after being threatened with U.S. sanctions by U.S. diplomats.63 And, as noted in the table
above, only two EU countries were still buying Iranian oil at the end of 2018—and their
purchases were lower than earlier in the year—suggesting that European refiners are trying to
avoid any risk of U.S. sanctions. Italy and Greece were given SRE sanctions exemptions on
November 5, 2018.
Some of the post-2016 European investments in/transactions with Iran that have bee unwound
include the following:64
 Renault and Citroen of France have suspended their post-JCPOA $1 billion
investments in a joint venture (with two Iranian firms) to boost Renault’s car
production capacity in Iran to 350,000 cars per year.
 Scania of Sweden established a factory in Iran to supply the country with 1,350
buses, but it is not clear what its status is in light of reimposed U.S. sanctions.
 German industrial giant Siemens signed an agreement in March 2016 with
Iranian firm Mapna to transfer technology to produce gas turbines in Iran, and
other contracts to upgrade Iran’s railways. Siemens said subsequent to the U.S.
JCPOA exit that it would pursue no new Iranian business. Italy’s Danieli
industrial conglomerate and Gruppo Ventura also exited the Iran market.
 On August 6, 2018, Daimler (manufacturer of Mercedes Benz autos) announced
it was suspending its activities in Iran. Volkswagen followed suit one month later.

63 https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/us-puts-squeeze-on-european-firms-doing-business-with-
iran
64 “Iran Nuclear Deal: The EU’s Billion-Dollar Deals at Risk,” BBC News, May 11, 2018.
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 In July 2018, at U.S. request, and even though U.S. financial sanctions do not
resume effect until November 4, 2018, Germany’s central bank (Deutsche
Bundesbank) introduced a rule change that will block Iran’s planned withdrawal
of $400 million in cash from the Europaische-Iranische Handlesbank (EIH). EIH
is reportedly at least partly owned by Iran and has often partnered on transactions
with the Bundesbank. (EIH was “de-listed” from sanctions by the United States
to implement the JCPOA, but will be relisted as of November 5, 2018.)65
 Norway’s Saga Energy (Norway is not in the EU) signed a $3 billion deal to
build solar power plants in Iran.
 Italy’s FS signed a $1.4 billion agreement to build a high speed railway between
Qom and Arak.
 On energy issues: Total SA has said it would exit a nearly $5 billion energy
investment in South Pars gas field, and it is likely to transfer its stake to its joint
venture partner, China National Petroleum Corporation. As noted above,
European countries have reduced their purchases of Iranian oil as of August 2018
as several European oil refiners have announced cuts in purchases of Iranian oil,
including ENI and Saras SpA of Italy; Royal Dutch Shell of the Netherlands;
Repsol and Cepsa of Spain; and Hellenic Petroleum of Greece. OMV of Austria
announced it would halt energy development work.
 Several banks have announced since the U.S. JCPOA exit a cessation of
transactions with Iran: DZ Bank and Allianz of Germany; Oberbank of Austria;
and Banque Wormser Freres of France.
 Hapag-Lloyd of Germany and Denmark’s AP Moller-Maersk have ceased
shipping services to Iran.
 Germany telecommunications firm Deutsche Telekom announced in September
2018 that it would end its business in Iran.
 Although air service is not subject to U.S. sanctions per se, Air France and
British Air announced in September 2018 that they would cease service to Iran
due to lack of demand.
 One project, the Rhum gas field in the North Sea that is partly owned by Iranian
Oil Company (a subsidiary of NIOC), has been able to continue operating. In part
because the field supplies about 5% of Britain’s demand for natural gas, in
October 2018, the Trump Administration renewed the license of BP and Serica
Energy to continue providing goods and services to the field, despite the Iranian
involvement in the project.66
European Counter-efforts/Special Purpose Vehicle/INSTEX
The EU countries, in an attempt to persuade Iran to continue to adhere to the JCPOA, have
undertaken several steps that run counter to the Trump Administration’s re-imposition of Iran
sanctions. On August 6, 2018, a 1996 EU “blocking statute” took effect which seeks to protect
EU firms from re-imposed U.S. sanctions. In September 2018, EU countries announced small
amounts of development assistance to Iran, apparently in order to demonstrate that the EU is
making good faith efforts to provide Iran the economic benefits of the JCPOA. With the blocking
statute and aid widely assessed as unlikely to satisfy Iran, EU countries sought to design a

65 Germany’s Central Bank Imposes Rule to Stop Cash Delivery to Tehran. Jerusalem Post, August 6, 2018.
66 “U.S. Grants BP, Serica Lic4ense to Run Iran-Owned North Sea Field.” Reuters, October 9, 2018.
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mechanism under which EU countries could continue to trade with Iran with relative immunity
from U.S. sanctions. On September 25, 2018, Germany, France, and Britain, joined by Russia and
China, as well as Iran, endorsed the creation of a “special purpose vehicle”(SPV) —an entity that
would facilitate trade without utilizing dollar-denominated transactions with Iran, and without
exposure to the U.S. market, and thereby presumably not be subject to U.S. sanctions. Secretary
of State Michael Pompeo denounced the plan as counterproductive, and likely to “solidify[] Iran’s
ranking as the No. 1 state sponsor of terrorism.” In a joint statement, France, Britain, and
Germany announced the formal registration of the SPV, formally termed the Instrument for
Supporting Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). It is to be based in France, with German governance,
and financial support from the three governments. It will initially focus on the sectors most
esstenial to Iran, including medicines, medical devices, and food, and perhaps eventually provide
a platform for non-European countries to trade with Iran in oil and other products.67
Some experts assessed the new vehicle as unlikely to succeed because its personnel and
operations could be made subject to additional U.S. sanctions or sanctions designations. U.S.
officials reacted to the INSTEX announcement by stating that it likely will not impinge on U.S.
efforts to exert maximum economic pressure on Iran. Amid reported agitation among Iran regime
hardliners to exit the JCPOA because of the failure of the EU to prevent harm to the Iranian
economy, Iranian officials indicated the announcement represented a positive first step.
EU Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Proliferation Actions
While attempting to preserve civilian economic engagement with Iran, the European countries
have sought to support U.S. efforts to counter Iran’s terrorism and proliferation activities. In
January 2019, the EU added Iran’s intelligence service (MOIS) and an intelligence official to its
terrorism-related sanctions list in response to allegations of Iranian terrorism plotting in Europe.
Germany followed that move by denying landing rights to Iran’s Mahan Air, which the United
States has designated as a terrorism supporting entity.
SWIFT Electronic Payments System
The management of the Brussels-based Swift electronic payments system has sought to balance
financial risks with the policies of the EU governments. In March 2012, SWIFT acceded to an EU
request to expel sanctioned Iranian banks.68 Some Iranian banks were still able to conduct
electronic transactions with the European Central Bank via the “Target II” system. EU diplomats
indicated they would not comply with U.S. requests to ask SWIFT to expel Iranian banks again,
and no EU request to SWIFT to again expel sanctioned Iranian banks was made. However,
SWIFT is run by an independent board and seeks to avoid risk of U.S. penalties. In late 2018, the
system again disconnected the Iranian banks that were “relisted” for U.S. sanctions as of
November 5, 2018.
China and Russia
Russia and China, two permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, historically have
imposed only those sanctions required by Security Council resolutions. Both countries’
governments, which are parties to the JCPOA, have said they will not cooperate with reimposed
U.S. secondary sanctions. Many observers expect that, because companies in both countries have

67 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-the-new-mechanism-to-facilitate-trade-with-iran
68 Avi Jorish, “Despite Sanctions, Iran’s Money Flow Continues,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2013.
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limited U.S. exposure and are strongly influenced by their governments, much of Iran’s trade and
economic engagement will shift to China and Russia from EU countries and Japan and South
Korea.69
Russia
Increasingly close politically primarily on the issue of the conflict in Syria, Iran and Russia have
discussed expanding energy and trade cooperation. The two countries reportedly agreed on broad
energy development deals during President Putin’s visit to Tehran in late October 2017, with an
estimated investment value of up to $30 billion,70 although implementation remains uncertain. In
December 2018, Iran signed a free trade deal with the Russia-led “Eurasian Economic Union,”
suggesting Russian intent not to abide by reimposed U.S. sanctions on Iran.
In April 2015, Russia lifted its own restriction on delivering the S-300 air defense system that it
sold Iran in 2007 but refused to deliver after Resolution 1929 was adopted—even though that
Resolution technically did not bar supply of that defensive system. In April 2016, Russia began
delivering the five S-300 batteries. Iran’s Defense Minister visited Russia in February 2016 to
discuss a possible purchase of major combat systems—a sale that would require an unlikely
approval of the U.N. Security Council. Alternatively, the two countries might complete the sale
without such approval, presumably calculating a limited penalty for doing so. There has been no
announcement that such sales have been concluded, to date.
China
China is a major factor in the effectiveness of any sanctions regime on Iran because China is
Iran’s largest oil customer. During 2012-2016, China was instrumental in reducing Iran’s total oil
exports because it complied with U.S. sanctions by cutting its buys of oil from Iran to about
435,000 barrels per day from its 2011 average of nearly 600,000 barrels per day. At that time, the
State Department asserted that, because China was the largest buyer of Iranian oil, percentage
cuts by China had a large impact in reducing Iran’s oil sales by volume and China merited a
Section 1245 (P.L. 112-81) “significant reductions exception” (SRE). After sanctions were lifted
in early 2016, China increased its purchases of Iranian oil to levels that sometimes exceeded those
of 2011. Several Chinese energy firms that invested in Iran’s energy sector put those projects on
hold in 2012, but resumed or considered resuming work in earnest, subject to energy market
considerations, after sanctions were eased in 2016. Chinese firms might also take over some
investments in Iran’s energy sector that EU firms will abandon in order to avoid the risk of
reimposed U.S. sanctions. Some reports indicate that China asked its refiners to cut imports of
Iranian oil as the November 4, 2018, reimposition of U.S. energy sanctions approached, and
China appears to have reduced its oil imports from Iran (see chart). The Administration gave
China a SRE sanctions exception on November 5, in part to recognize import reductions but also
possibly to avoid further complicating U.S. relations with China.
Sanctions on Iran’s energy sector have complicated Iran-China banking and trade relations.
During 2012-2016, China settled much of its trade balance with Iran with goods rather than hard
currency. Doing so was highly favorable to China financially. Press reports indicated that Iran’s
automotive sector—the largest industrial sector aside from the energy sector—obtained a
significant proportion of its parts from China, and subsidiaries of two China-based companies,

69 “Iran’s Door to the West is Slamming Shut, and That Leaves China,” Bloomberg News, May 10, 2018.
70 https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-visits-tehran-talks-syria-nuclear-deal-133507932.html.
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Geelran and Chery, produce cars in Iran. Iran’s auto production fell about 60% during 2011-2013
because of sanctions, but recovered somewhat after the JPA went into effect.71 Iran’s auto parts
imports increased as Iran was able to obtain at least some trade financing. Iran and China also
have a separate escrow account to pay for China’s infrastructure projects in Iran, such as the long
Niayesh Tunnel, funded by about $20 billion of Iran’s hard currency reserves. However,
suggesting that settling their trade balance has again complicated Iran-China banking relations,
China’s Kunlun Bank—an affiliate of China’s energy company CNPC and which was sanctioned
under CISADA in 2012 as the main channel for money flows between the two countries—
reportedly stopped accepting Euro and then China currency-denominated payments from Iran in
November 2018.72 Existing Iranian accounts at the bank presumably can still be used to pay for
Iranian imports from China.
In the days after JCPOA Implementation Day, China’s President Xi Jinping visited Iran and other
Middle East countries, and stated that Iran is a vital link in an effort to extend its economic
influence westward through its “One Belt, One Road” initiative. Chinese firms and entrepreneurs
are integrating Iran into this vision by modernizing Iran’s rail and other infrastructure,
particularly where that infrastructure links to that of neighboring countries, including the
Sultanate of Oman, funded by loans from China.73 Iran’s place in this initiative offers China’s
government and firms further incentive to avoid cooperating with reimposed U.S. sanctions.
In April 2018, the Commerce Department (Bureau of Industry and Security, BIS, which
administers Export Administration Regulations) issued a denial of export privileges action against
China-based ZTE Corporation and its affiliates. The action was taken on the grounds that ZTE
did not uphold the terms of March 2017 settlement agreement with BIS over ZTE’s shipment of
prohibited U.S. telecommunications technology to Iran (and North Korea).
Japan/Korean Peninsula/Other East Asia
During 2010-2016, in part in deference to their alliances with the United States, Japan and South
Korea enforced sanctions on Iran similar to those imposed by the United States and the EU. Both
countries cut imports of Iranian oil sharply after 2011. Banks in the two countries were the
repositories of a large part of the approximately $115 billion in foreign exchange that Iran held
abroad—a balance that represents payments for oil shipments. Since 2016, both countries
continued to import Iranian oil at about half of 2011 volumes, and Iran has been able to access
funds in banks in both countries.
Japan exports to Iran significant amounts of chemical and rubber products, as well as consumer
electronics. South Korean firms have been active in energy infrastructure construction in Iran,
and its exports to Iran are mainly iron, steel, consumer electronics, and appliances.
Both countries—and their companies—have historically been unwilling to undertake transactions
with Iran that could violate U.S. sanctions, and firms in both countries have said they will comply
with reimposed U.S. sanctions. In part to avoid economic disruption, both countries have asked
the Trump Administration for some exceptions to U.S. sanctions. For example, South Korea
depends heavily on Iranian exports of condensates (a petroleum product sometimes considered as

71 Nahid Kalbasi.”Have International Sanctions Crippled Iran’s Auto Industry?” Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, June 3, 2015.
72 “As U.S. Sanctions Loom, China’s Bank of Kunlun to Stop Receiving Iran Payments – Sources.” Reuters, October
23, 2018.
73 Thomas Erdbrink. “China’s Push to Link East and West Puts Iran at ‘Center of Everything.’” New York Times, July
25, 2017.
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crude oil), and has asked to be able to import condensates from Iran at existing levels. Both
countries reduced their Iranian oil purchases to zero in October 2018 and both countries received
SRE sanctions exceptions.
The following firms have announced their postures following the U.S. exit from the JCPOA:
 Daelim of South Korea terminated a $2 billion contract to expand an Iranian oil
refinery. In late October, Hyundai cancelled a $500 million contract to build a
petrochemical plant in Iran, citing “financing difficulties.”
 Car companies Mazda and Toyota of Japan and Hyundai of South Korea have
suspended joint ventures to produce cars in Iran.
 Among oil importers, Hanwha Total Petrochemical of South Korea and Fuji Oil
and JXTG of Japan have said they are considering ending purchases of crude oil
from Iran.74
 Among banks, South Korea’s Woori Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea have
partly suspended transactions with Iran. Nomura Holdings of Japan has taken a
similar position.
 The South Korean conglomerate POSCO withdrew from a 2016 deal to build a
steel plant in Iran’s free trade zone at the port of Chahbahar.
North Korea
North Korea, like Iran, has been subject to significant international sanctions. North Korea has
never pledged to abide by international sanctions against Iran, and it reportedly cooperates with
Iran on a wide range of WMD-related ventures, particularly the development of ballistic missiles.
A portion of the oil that China buys from Iran (and from other suppliers) is reportedly sent to
North Korea, but it is not known if North Korea buys any Iranian oil directly. The potential for
North Korea to try to buy Iranian oil illicitly increased in the wake of the adoption in September
2017 of U.N. Security Council sanctions that limit North Korea’s importation of oil, but there are
no publicly known indications that it is doing so. While serving as Iran’s president in 1989, the
current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, visited North Korea. North Korea’s titular
head of state Kim Yong Nam attended President Rouhani’s second inauguration in August 2017,
and during his visit signed various technical cooperation agreements of unspecified scope.75
Taiwan
Taiwan has generally been a small buyer of Iranian oil. It resumed imports of Iranian oil after
sanctions were eased in 2016. In the wake of the May 8, 2018, U.S. exit from the JCPOA, a
Taiwan refiner, Formosa Petrochemical Corp, said it is considering ending imports of Iran’s oil.
Taiwan bought no Iranian oil in September or October 2018 and was given an SRE sanctions
exemption on November 5.

74 “Some Top Oil Buyers Are Thinking about Shunning Iran Oil.” Bloomberg News, June 27, 2018.
75 https://www.thedailybeast.com/north-koreas-deadly-partnership-with-iran.
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South Asia
India
During 2011-2016, India, citing U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iran, generally cooperated
with multilateral efforts to use sanctions to achieve a nuclear agreement with Iran. Its private
sector assessed Iran as a “controversial market”—a term used by many international firms to
describe markets that entail reputational and financial risks. India’s central bank ceased using a
Tehran-based regional body, the Asian Clearing Union, to handle transactions with Iran, and the
two countries agree to settle half of India’s oil buys from Iran in India’s currency, the rupee. Iran
used the rupee accounts to buy India’s wheat, pharmaceuticals, rice, sugar, soybeans, auto parts,
and other products.
India reduced its imports of Iranian oil substantially after 2011, lowering purchases to 6% of its
oil imports by 2013, from over 16% in 2008, in the process incurring significant costs to retrofit
refineries that were handling Iranian crude. However, since sanctions were eased, India’s oil
imports from Iran increased to as much as 800,000 bpd in July 2018—well above 2011 levels.
Indian firms ended or slowed work on investments in Iranian oil and gas fields during 2012-2016,
but reportedly resumed work after sanctions were lifted. After international sanctions were lifted,
India reportedly also paid Iran the $6.5 billion it owed for oil purchased during 2012-2016.76
The degree to which Indian firms and the government of India are cooperating with reimposed
U.S. sanctions is not certain. Indian leaders assert that Iran did not violate the JCPOA and
sanctions should not be reimposed on it.77 In June 2018, the two countries again agreed to use
rupee accounts for their bilateral trade. Nonetheless, major Indian refiners Reliance Ltd. and
Indian Oil Corp—citing a decision by the State Bank of India to cease transactions with Iran—
announced that they would cut oil buys from Iran. India’s purchases of Iranian oil fell from July
to October 2018, totaling about 350,000 barrels per day in October—still a substantial amount—
but apparently enough of a reduction to earn India an SRE sanctions exception on November 5.78
India reduced its purchases from Iran further for all of November 2018, but it might buy more oil
from Iran after receiving its SRE, which applies for six months from November 5, 2018.
In 2015, India and Iran agreed that India would help develop Iran’s Chahbahar port that would
enable India to trade with Afghanistan unimpeded by Pakistan. With sanctions lifted, the project
no longer entails risk to Indian firms involved. In May 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi visited Iran and signed an agreement to invest $500 million to develop the port and related
infrastructure. Construction at the port is proceeding. During a late June 2018 visit to India, U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said that “We know the port has to happen and
the United States is going to work with India to do that.”79 This suggested the Administration
might use the “Afghanistan reconstruction” exception under Section 1244(f) of IFCA to allow for
firms to continue developing it.

76 “India Seeks to Pay $6.5 Billion to Iran for Oil Imports.” Economic Times of India. May 16, 2016.
77 CRS conversations with Indian officials and U.S. experts on India. 2017-18.
78 The Hill. Thehill.com September 14, 2018.
79 “U.S. Envoy Haley tells Modi Important to Cut Imports of Iranian Oil.” Reuters, June 27, 2018.
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Pakistan
One test of Pakistan’s compliance with sanctions was a pipeline project that would carry Iranian
gas to Pakistan—a project that U.S. officials on several occasions stated would be subject to ISA
sanctions. Despite that threat, agreement on the $7 billion project was finalized on June 12, 2010,
and construction was formally inaugurated in a ceremony attended by the Presidents of both
countries on March 11, 2013. In line with an agreed completion date of mid-2014, Iran reportedly
completed the pipeline on its side of the border. China’s announcement in April 2015 of a
$3 billion investment in the project seemed to remove financial hurdles to the line’s completion,
and the JCPOA removed sanctions impediments to the project.80 However, during President
Hassan Rouhani’s visit to Pakistan in March 2016, Pakistan still did not commit to complete the
line, and observers note that there are few indications of progress on the project. In 2009, India
dissociated itself from the project over concerns about the security of the pipeline, the location at
which the gas would be transferred to India, pricing of the gas, and tariffs.
Turkey/South Caucasus
Iran has substantial economic relations with Turkey and the countries of the South Caucasus.
Turkey
Turkey buys about 40% of its oil from Iran, and bought about 6% of its total gas imports from
Iran in 2017. Turkey did reduce purchases of oil from Iran during 2012-2016, but its purchases
returned to 2011 levels after sanctions on Iran were eased in 2016. Turkey also is Iran’s main gas
customer via a pipeline built in 1997, which at first was used for a swap arrangement under which
gas from Turkmenistan was exported to Turkey. Turkey’s leaders have said that the country will
not cooperate with reimposed U.S. sanctions, but its oil import volumes from Iran have remained
about 33% below what they were before the U.S. pullout from the JCPOA in May 2018. Turkey
received an SRE sanctions exemption on November 5.
Direct Iranian gas exports to Turkey through the line began in 2001 (with additional such exports
through a second pipeline built in 2013), but no ISA sanctions were imposed on the grounds that
the gas supplies were crucial to Turkey’s energy security. Prior to the October 2012 EU ban on
gas purchases from Iran, this pipeline was a conduit for Iranian gas exports to Europe (primarily
Bulgaria and Greece).
Pre-JCPOA, in response to press reports that Turkey’s Halkbank was settling Turkey’s payments
to Iran for energy with gold, U.S. officials testified on May 15, 2013, that the gold going from
Turkey to Iran consists mainly of Iranian private citizens’ purchases of Turkish gold to hedge
against the value of the rial. A U.S. criminal case involved a dual Turkish-Iranian gold dealer,
Reza Zarrab, arrested in the United States in 2016 for allegedly violating U.S. sanctions
prohibiting helping Iran deal in precious metals.
Among past cases of possible Turkish violations of Iran sanctions, on November 7, 2016, the U.S.
Attorney for New York’s Southern District indicted several individuals for using money services
businesses in Turkey and in the UAE for conspiring to conceal from U.S. banks transactions on
behalf of and for the benefit of sanctioned Iranian entities, including Mahan Air.81 On January 6,

80 Asia Times, March 21, 2014, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-02-210314.html.
81 https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-united-states-attorney-announces-superseding-indictment-charging-
turkish-and.
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2014, the Commerce Department blocked a Turkey-based firm (3K Aviation Consulting and
Logistics) from reexporting two U.S.-made jet engines to Iran’s Pouya Airline.82
Caucasus and Caspian Sea
The rich energy reserves of the Caspian Sea create challenges for U.S. efforts to deny Iran
financial resources. The Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations cited potential ISA
sanctions to deter oil pipeline routes involving Iran—thereby successfully promoting an the
alternate route from Azerbaijan (Baku) to Turkey (Ceyhan), which became operational in 2005.
Section 6 of Executive Order 13622 exempts from sanctions any pipelines that bring gas from
Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey.
Agreements reached in 2018 between Russia and the Caspian Sea states on the legal division of
the sea could spawn new energy development in the Caspian. Iran’s energy firms will
undoubtedly become partners in joint ventures to develop the Caspian’s resources, and Iran’s
involvement in such projects will require the Administration to determine whether to impose
sanctions.
Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan—even though that country is inhabited mostly by Shiite
Muslims—are hindered by substantial political and ideological differences. Iran and Azerbaijan
have in recent years tried to downplay these differences for joint economic benefit, and they have
been discussing joint energy and infrastructure projects among themselves and with other powers,
including Russia.
Iran and Armenia—Azerbaijan’s adversary—have long enjoyed extensive economic relations:
Armenia is Iran’s largest direct gas customer, after Turkey. In May 2009, Iran and Armenia
inaugurated a natural gas pipeline between the two, built by Gazprom of Russia. No
determination of ISA sanctions was issued. Armenia has said its banking controls are strong and
that Iran is unable to process transactions illicitly through Armenia’s banks.83 However, observers
in the South Caucasus assert that Iran is using Armenian banks operating in the Armenia-occupied
Nagorno-Karabakh territory to circumvent international financial sanctions.84
Persian Gulf States and Iraq85
The Persian Gulf countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar,
Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman) are oil exporters and close allies of the United States. As Iranian oil
exports decreased after 2012, the Gulf states supplied the global oil market with additional oil.
Since the U.S. exit from the JCPOA, U.S. officials have said that they are working with Gulf oil
exporters to make sure the oil market is well supplied as U.S. officials work to reduce Iranian oil
exports. However, largely in order not to antagonize Iran, the Gulf countries maintained relatively
normal trade with Iran. Some Gulf-based shipping companies, such as United Arab Shipping
Company reportedly continued to pay port loading fees to such sanctioned IRGC-controlled port
operators as Tidewater, despite the imposition of sanctions on that company.86

82 “US Acts to Block Turkish Firm from Sending GE Engines to Iran,” Reuters, January 6, 2014.
83 Louis Charbonneau, “Iran Looks to Armenia to Skirt Banking Sanctions,” Reuters, August 21, 2012.
84 Information provided to the author by regional observers. October 2013.
85 The CRS Report RL32048, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options, by Kenneth Katzman, discusses the
relations between Iran and other Middle Eastern states.
86 Mark Wallace, “Closing U.S. Ports to Iran-Tainted Shipping. Op-ed,” Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2013.
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The UAE has been particularly closely watched by U.S. officials because of the large presence of
Iranian firms there. Several UAE-based firms have been sanctioned for efforts to evade sanctions,
as noted in the tables at the end of the report. U.S. officials praised the UAE’s March 1, 2012, ban
on transactions with Iran by Dubai-based Noor Islamic Bank, which Iran reportedly used to
process oil payments. Some Iranian gas condensates (120,000 barrels per day) were imported by
Emirates National Oil Company (ENOC) and refined mostly into jet fuel. Subsequent to the May
8, 2018, U.S. exit from the JCPOA, ENOC officials said they are trying to find alternative
supplies of the hydrocarbon products it buys from Iran.87
Iran and several of the Gulf states have had discussions on various energy and related projects,
but few have materialized because of broad regional disputes between Iran and the Gulf states.
Kuwait and Iran have held talks on the construction of a 350-mile pipeline that would bring
Iranian gas to Kuwait, but the project does not appear to be materializing. Bahrain’s discussions
of purchasing Iranian gas have floundered over sharp political differences.88 Qatar and Iran share
the large gas field in the Gulf waters between them, and their economic relations have become
closer in light of the isolation of Qatar by three of its GCC neighbors, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and
Bahrain. The only GCC state that has moved forward with economic joint ventures with Iran is
Oman, particularly in the development of Oman’s priority project to expand its port at Al Duqm
port, which Oman and Iran envision as a major hub for regional trade. In September 2015, the
two countries also recommitted to a gas pipeline joint venture.
Omani banks, some of which operate in Iran, were used to implement some of the financial
arrangements of the JPA and JCPOA.89 As a consequence, a total of $5.7 billion in Iranian funds
had built up in Oman’s Bank Muscat by the time of implementation of the JCPOA in January
2016. In its efforts to easily access these funds, Iran obtained from the Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department a February 2016 special license to convert the funds
(held as Omani rials) to dollars as a means of easily converting the funds into Euros. Iran
ultimately used a different mechanism to access the funds as hard currency, but the special license
issuance resulted in a May 2018 review by the majority of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigation to assess whether that license was consistent with U.S. regulations barring Iran
access to the U.S. financial system.90
Iraq
Iraq’s attempts to remain close to its influential neighbor, Iran, have complicated Iraq’s efforts to
rebuild its economy yet avoid running afoul of the United States and U.S. sanctions on Iran. As
noted above, in 2012, the United States sanctioned an Iraqi bank that was a key channel for Iraqi
payments to Iran, but lifted those sanctions when the bank reduced that business. Iraq presented
the United States with a sanctions-related dilemma in July 2013, when it signed an agreement
with Iran to buy 850 million cubic feet per day of natural gas through a joint pipeline that enters

87 Some Top Oil Buyers Are Thinking about Shunning Iran Oil, op. cit.
88 http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=NDQ0OTY1NTU4; http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?
nn=8901181055.
89 Omani banks had a waiver from U.S. sanctions laws to permit transferring those funds to Iran’s Central Bank, in
accordance with Section 1245(d)(5) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112-81). For
text of the waiver, see a June 17, 2015, letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield to
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, containing text of the “determination of waiver.”
90 “Obama Misled Congress, Tried and Failed to Give Iran Secret Access to US Banks Before the Deal.” Business
Insider, June 6, 2018; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate. Majority Report. “Review of U.S.
Treasury Department’s License to Convert Iranian Assets Using the U.S. Financial System.” May 2018.
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Iraq at Diyala province and would supply several power plants. No sanctions were imposed on
the arrangement, which was agreed while applicable sanctions were in effect. In May 2015, the
Treasury Department sanctioned Iraq’s Al Naser Airlines for helping Mahan Air (sanctioned
entity) acquire nine aircraft.91
The Trump Administration reportedly is seeking to accommodate Iraq’s need for Iranian
electricity supplies and other economic interactions. As of October 2018, Iraq reportedly has
discontinued crude oil swaps with Iran—about 50,000 barrels per day—in which Iranian oil
flowed to the Kirkuk refinery and Iran supplied oil to Iraq’s terminals in the Persian Gulf. Iraq did
not receive an SRE sanctions exception on November 5, 2018. On the other hand, the
Administration reportedly has given Iraq permission—renewable at 45-day intervals—to buy the
Iranian natural gas that runs Iraq’s power plants. The limited “waiver” reportedly will provide
time for Iraq to line up alternative supplies and equipment to generate electricity.92 U.S. sanctions
laws do not apply to the purchase of natural gas, and no U.S. law provides for a waiver lasting
exactly 45 days, so presumably the U.S. permission represents, rather than a legal determination,
an understanding that the United States will refrain from sanctioning Iraqi banks or payment
mechanisms for Iranian gas.
Iran is supplying advisers and weapons to help Iraq try to defeat Islamic State forces. The Iranian
support to the Iraqi government has not been sanctioned, even though Iranian arms exports
remain prohibited by Resolution 2231.
Syria and Lebanon
Iran has extensive economic relations with both Syria and Lebanon, countries where Iran asserts
that core interests are at stake. The compliance of Syrian or Lebanese banks and other institutions
with international sanctions against Iran was limited even during 2012-2015. Iran reportedly uses
banks in Lebanon to skirt financial sanctions, according to a wide range of observers, and these
banks are among the conduits for Iran to provide financial assistance to Hezbollah as well as to
the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad. In January 2017, Iran and Syria signed a series
of economic agreements giving Iranian firms increased access to Syria’s mining, agriculture, and
telecommunications sectors, as well as management of a Syrian port.93
Africa and Latin America
During the presidency of Ahmadinejad, Iran looked to several Latin American and African
countries to try to circumvent international sanctions. For the most part, however, Iran’s trade and
other business dealings with these regions are apparently too modest to weaken the effect of
international sanctions significantly.
World Bank and WTO
The united approach to sanctions on Iran during 2010-2016 carried over to international lending
to Iran. The United States representative to international financial institutions is required to vote
against international lending, but that vote, although weighted, is not sufficient to block
international lending. No new loans have been approved to Iran since 2005, including several

91 Eli Lak, “Iran Sanctions Collapsing Already,” Bloomberg News, May 11, 2015.
92 U.S. Grants Iraq Sanctions Relief in Bid to Boost Business Deals. Wall Street Journal, December 21, 2018.
93 Iran Signs Phone, Gas Deals with Syria. Agence France Presse, January 17, 2017.
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environmental projects under the Bank’s “Global Environmental Facility” (GEF). The initiative
slated more than $7.5 million in loans for Iran to dispose of harmful chemicals.94 The 2016 lifting
of sanctions increased international support for new international lending to Iran, but the U.S. exit
from the JCPOA will likely lead to differences between the United States and other lenders over
extending any new loans to Iran.
Earlier, in 1993, the United States voted its 16.5% share of the World Bank against loans to Iran
of $460 million for electricity, health, and irrigation projects, but the loans were approved. To
block that lending, the FY1994-FY1996 foreign aid appropriations (P.L. 103-87, P.L. 103-306,
and P.L. 104-107) cut the amount appropriated for the U.S. contribution to the bank by the
amount of those loans, contributing to a temporary halt in new bank lending to Iran. But, in May
2000, the United States’ allies outvoted the United States to approve $232 million in loans for
health and sewage projects. During April 2003-May 2005, a total of $725 million in loans were
approved for environmental management, housing reform, water and sanitation projects, and land
management projects, in addition to $400 million in loans for earthquake relief.
WTO Accession
An issue related to sanctions is Iran’s request to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Iran
began accession talks in 2006 after the George W. Bush Administration dropped its objection to
Iran’s application as part of an effort to incentivize Iran to reach an interim nuclear agreement.
The lifting of sanctions presumably paves the way for talks to accelerate, but the accession
process generally takes many years. Accession generally takes place by consensus of existing
WTO members. Iran’s accession might be complicated by the requirement that existing members
trade with other members; as noted above, the U.S. ban on trade with Iran remains in force. The
Trump Administration does not advocate Iran’s admission to that convention.
Table 3. Comparison Between U.S., U.N., and EU and Allied Country Sanctions
(Prior to Implementation Day)
EU and Other Allied
U.S. Sanctions
U.N. Sanctions
Countries
General Observation: Most
As of 2010, U.N. sanctions were
EU closely aligned its sanctions
sweeping sanctions on Iran of
intended to give countries
tightening with that of the United
virtually any country in the world
justification to cooperate with U.S.
States. Most EU sanctions lifted in
secondary sanctions.
accordance with the JCPOA,
Post-JCPOA: Resolution 2231 is the
although some sanctions on arms,
only operative Resolution on Iran.
dual-use items, and human rights
remain.
Japan, South Korean, and China
sanctions also became extensive
but were almost entirely lifted in
concert with the JCPOA.
Ban on U.S. Trade with,
U.N. sanctions did not at any time
No comprehensive EU ban on
Investment in, and Financing
ban civilian trade with Iran or
trade in civilian goods with Iran
for Iran: Executive Order 12959
general civilian sector investment in
was imposed at any time.
bans (with limited exceptions) U.S.
Iran.
Japan and South Korea did not ban
firms from exporting to Iran,
normal civilian trade with Iran.
importing from Iran, or investing in
Iran.

94 Barbara Slavin, “Obama Administration Holds Up Environmental Grants to Iran,” Al Monitor, June 23, 2014.
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EU and Other Allied
U.S. Sanctions
U.N. Sanctions
Countries
Sanctions on Foreign Firms
No U.N. equivalent existed.
With certain exceptions, the EU
that Do Business with Iran’s
However, Resolution 1929 “not[es]
banned almost all dealings with
Energy Sector: The Iran Sanctions the potential connection between
Iran’s energy sector after 2011.
Act, P.L. 104-172, and subsequent
Iran’s revenues derived from its
These sanctions now lifted.
laws and executive orders,
energy sector and the funding of
Japanese and South Korean
discussed throughout the report,
Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear
measures banned new energy
mandate sanctions on virtually any
activities.” This wording was
projects in Iran and called for
type of transaction with/in Iran’s
interpreted as providing U.N.
restraint on ongoing projects.
energy sector.
support for countries to ban their
South Korea in December 2011
companies from dealing with Iran’s
cautioned its firms not to sell
energy sector.
energy or petrochemical
equipment to Iran. Both cut oil
purchases from Iran sharply. These
sanctions now lifted.
Ban on Foreign Assistance:
No U.N. equivalent
EU measures of July 27, 2010,
U.S. foreign assistance to Iran—
banned grants, aid, and
other than purely humanitarian
concessional loans to Iran. Also
aid—is banned under §620A of the
prohibited financing of enterprises
Foreign Assistance Act, which bans
involved in Iran’s energy sector.
U.S. assistance to countries on the
These sanctions now lifted.
U.S. list of “state sponsors of
Japan and South Korea measures
terrorism.” Iran is also routinely
did not specifically ban aid or
denied direct U.S. foreign aid under
lending to Iran.
the annual foreign operations
appropriations acts (most recently
in §7007 of division H of P.L. 111-8).
Ban on Arms Exports to Iran:
As per Resolution 1929 (paragraph
EU sanctions include a
Iran is ineligible for U.S. arms
8), as superseded by Resolution
comprehensive ban on sale to Iran
exports under several laws, as
2231, Security Council approval is
of all types of military equipment,
discussed in the report.
required to sell Iran major weapons
not just major combat systems.
systems.
Arms embargo remains post-
JCPOA.
No similar Japan and South Korean
measures announced, but neither
has exported arms to Iran.
Restriction on Exports to Iran
U.N. resolutions on Iran banned the
EU banned the sales of dual use
of “Dual Use Items”:
export of many dual-use items to
items to Iran, including ballistic
Primarily under §6(j) of the Export
Iran. Resolution 2231 sets up a
missile technology, in line with
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72) and
procurement network for the P5+1
U.N. resolutions. These
§38 of the Arms Export Control
to approve of all purchases for Iran’s restrictions generally remain post-
Act, there is a denial of license
ongoing nuclear program.
JCPOA.
applications to sell Iran goods that
Japan and S. Korea have announced
could have military applications.
ful adherence to strict export
control regimes when evaluating
sales to Iran. These restrictions
generally remain post-JCPOA.
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EU and Other Allied
U.S. Sanctions
U.N. Sanctions
Countries
Sanctions Against Lending to
Resolution 1747 (oper. paragraph 7)
The July 27, 2010, measures
Iran:
requested, but did not mandate, that prohibited EU members from
Under §1621 of the International
countries and international financial
providing grants, aid, and
Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-
institutions refrain from making
concessional loans to Iran,
118), U.S. representatives to
grants or loans to Iran, except for
including through international
international financial institutions,
development and humanitarian
financial institutions. Sanctions
such as the World Bank, are
purposes. (No longer applicable.)
lifted post-JCPOA.
required to vote against loans to
Japan and South Korea banned
Iran by those institutions.
medium- and long-term trade
financing and financing guarantees.
Short-term credit was stil allowed.
These sanctions now lifted.
Sanctions Against the Sale of
Resolution 1737 (oper. paragraph
The EU measures imposed July 27,
Weapons of Mass Destruction-
12) imposed a worldwide freeze on
2010, commit the EU to freezing
Related Technology to Iran:
the assets and property of Iranian
the assets of WMD-related entities
Several laws and regulations provide WMD-related entities named in an
named in the U.N. resolutions, as
for sanctions against entities, Iranian
Annex to the Resolution. Each
well as numerous other named
or otherwise, that are determined
subsequent resolution expanded the
Iranian entities. Most of these
to be involved in or supplying Iran’s
list of Iranian entities subject to
restrictions remain.
WMD programs (asset freezing, ban these sanctions.
Japan and South Korea froze assets
on transaction with the entity).
of U.N.-sanctioned entities. Most
of these restrictions have been
lifted.
Ban on Transactions with
No direct equivalent, but Resolution No direct equivalent, but many of
Terrorism Supporting Entities:
1747 (oper. paragraph 5) bans Iran
the Iranian entities named as
Executive Order 13224 bans
from exporting any arms. Resolution blocked by the EU, Japan, and
transactions with entities
2231 continues that restriction for a
South Korea overlap or
determined by the Administration
maximum of five years.
complement Iranian entities named
to be supporting international
as terrorism supporting by the
terrorism. Numerous entities,
United States.
including some of Iranian origin,
Japan and S. Korea did not impose
have been designated.
specific terrorism sanctions on
Iran.
Human Rights Sanctions:
No U.N. sanctions were imposed on EU sanctions include 87 named
CISADA provides for a prohibition
Iran for terrorism or human rights
Iranians subject to a ban on travel
on travel to the U.S., blocking of
abuses.
to the EU countries. The EU also
U.S.-based property, and ban on
retains a ban on providing
transactions with Iranians
equipment that can be used for
determined to be involved in
internal repression.
serious human rights abuses against
Japan and South Korea have
Iranians since the June 12, 2009,
announced bans on named Iranians
presidential election there, or with
involved in WMD programs.
persons selling Iran equipment to
commit such abuses.
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EU and Other Allied
U.S. Sanctions
U.N. Sanctions
Countries
Restrictions on Iranian
Resolution 1803 and 1929 authorize
The EU measures announced July
Shipping:
countries to inspect cargoes carried
27, 2010, bans Iran Air Cargo from
Under Executive Order 13382, the
by Iran Air and Islamic Republic of
access to EU airports. The
U.S. Department of the Treasury
Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)—or any
measures also freeze the EU-based
has named Islamic Republic of Iran
ships in national or international
assets of IRISL and its affiliates.
Shipping Lines and several affiliated
waters—if there is an indication that Insurance and reinsurance for
entities as entities whose U.S.-based the shipments include goods whose
Iranian firms are banned. These
property is to be frozen.
export to Iran is banned.
sanctions now lifted.
These resolutions no longer apply.
Japan and South Korean measures
took similar action against IRISL
and Iran Air. Sanctions now lifted.
Banking Sanctions:
No direct equivalent
The EU froze Iran Central Bank
During 2006-2011, several Iranian
However, two Iranian banks were
assets January 23, 2012, and
banks have been named as
named as sanctioned entities under
banned all transactions with Iranian
proliferation or terrorism
the U.N. Security Council
banks unless authorized on
supporting entities under Executive
resolutions. U.N. restrictions on
October 15, 2012.
Orders 13382 and 13224,
Iranian banking now lifted.
Brussels-based SWIFT expelled
respectively (see Table 4 at end of
sanctioned Iranian banks from the
report).
electronic payment transfer
CISADA prohibits banking
system. This restriction has been
relationships with U.S. banks for any
lifted.
foreign bank that conducts
Japan and South Korea took similar
transactions with Iran’s
measures South Korea imposed
Revolutionary Guard or with Iranian
the 40,000 Euro threshhold
entities sanctioned under the
requiring authorization. Japan and
various U.N. resolutions.
S. Korea froze the assets of 15
FY2012 Defense Authorization (P.L.
Iranian banks; South Korea
112-81) prevents U.S. accounts with
targeted Bank Mellat for freeze.
foreign banks that process
These sanctions now lifted.
transactions with Iran’s Central
Bank (with specified exemptions).
Ballistic Missiles: U.S.
Resolution 1929 (paragraph 9)
EU measures on July 27, 2010,
proliferations laws provide for
prohibited Iran from undertaking
required adherence to this
sanctions against foreign entities
“any activity” related to ballistic
provision of Resolution 1929. EU
that help Iran with its nuclear and
missiles capable of delivering a
has retained ban on providing
ballistic missile programs.
nuclear weapon. Resolution 2231
ballistic missile technology to Iran
calls on Iran not to develop or
in post-JCPOA period.
launch ballistic missiles designed to
be capable of carrying a nuclear
weapon.
Effectiveness of Sanctions on Iranian Behavior
It can be argued that the question “are sanctions on Iran ‘working’?” should be assessed based on
an analysis of the goals of the sanctions. The following sections try to assess the effectiveness of
Iran sanctions according to a number of criteria.
Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program and Strategic Capabilities
The sanctions regime of 2011-2015 is widely credited with increasing Iran’s willingness to accept
restraints on its nuclear program, at least for a long period of time, as stipulated in the JCPOA.
Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran in June 2013 in part because of his stated
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commitment to achieving an easing of sanctions and ending Iran’s international isolation—a
commitment that would undoubtedly require accepting such restraints. Still, as to the long-term
effects of sanctions, the intelligence community assesses that it “does not know” whether Iran
plans to eventually develop a nuclear weapon.95
It remains uncertain whether Iran will remain in the JCPOA despite the U.S. exit from it.96 There
are no indications that Iranian leaders will answer the Trump Administration call for negotiations
on a new agreement that would cover not only Iran’s nuclear program but also its missile program
and its regional malign activities. Both President Trump and President Rouhani have publicly said
they would accept bilateral talks without conditions, but both leaders generally indicate that the
other’s demands are too extensive to make such a meeting productive.
There is little evidence that even the strict sanctions of 2011-2016 slowed Iran’s nuclear program
or its missile program. And, even though U.S. and EU sanctions remain on Iran’s missile
programs, U.S. intelligence officials have testified that Iran continues to expand the scale, reach,
and sophistication of its ballistic missile arsenal. Still, some U.S. officials have asserted that
Iran’s nuclear and missile programs might have advanced faster were sanctions not imposed.97
Sanctions have apparently prevented Iran from buying significant amounts of major combat
systems since the early 1990s. Iran has been able to acquire defensive systems; Russia delivered
the S-300 air defense system in April 2016. However, Iran’s indigenous arms industry has grown
over the past two decades and Iran might have acquired some systems from foreign suppliers
such as North Korea that do not abide by U.N. restrictions.98 U.S. intelligence directors testified
in February 2018 that Iran is fielding increasingly lethal weapons systems, including more
advanced naval mines and ballistic missiles, small but capable submarines, armed UAVs
(unmanned aerial vehicles), coastal defense cruise missile batteries, attack craft, and anti-ship
ballistic missiles.99
Effects on Iran’s Regional Influence
Strict sanctions during 2012-2016, and U.N. restrictions and U.S. sanctions against Iran’s
exportation of weaponry, did not prevent Iran from supplying arms, including missiles, to its
regional allies, such as the Asad regime in Syria, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, Lebanese
Hezbollah, or Shiite militia groups in Iraq. Iran apparently is able to manufacture domestically the
weaponry it suppliers to such entities, and sanctions do not appear to be an effective tool to limit
such Iranian efforts. Nor did sanctions prevent Iran from sending thousands of IRGC advisers to
help the Asad regime in Syria beginning in 2013.
Iran has remained engaged in these regional conflicts since sanctions were eased in early 2016. In
his May 8, 2018, announcement of withdrawal from the JCPOA, President Donald Trump stated
that Iran’s defense budget had increased 40% since Implementation Day, but it is not clear that
the extra defense funds contributed to any expansion of Iran’s regional activities. The President

95 “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.” Testimony before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence. May 11, 2017. This language was not contained in the 2018 version of the testimony.
96 This possibility is examined in detail in: CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit, by Paul K.
Kerr and Kenneth Katzman and CRS In Focus IF10916, Iran: Efforts to Preserve Economic Benefits of the Nuclear
Deal, by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Kenneth Katzman, and Derek E. Mix.
97 Speech by National Security Adviser Tom Donilon at the Brookings Institution, November 22, 2011.
98 Department of Defense, Annual Report of Military Power of Iran, April 2012.
99 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 13, 2018.
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stated on August 6, 2018, the day that many U.S. sanctions were reimposed on Iran, that “Since
the deal [JCPOA] was reached, Iran’s aggression has only increased. The regime has used the
windfall of newly accessible funds it received under the JCPOA to build nuclear-capable missiles,
fund terrorism, and fuel conflict across the Middle East and beyond.... The reimposition of
nuclear-related sanctions through today’s actions further intensifies pressure on Tehran to change
its conduct.”100 However, there are no indications that the reimposition of U.S. sanctions has
caused any Iranian regional retrenchment, to date.
In terms of congressional oversight, a provision of the FY2016 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L.
114-113) requires an Administration report to Congress on how Iran has used the financial
benefits of sanctions relief. And, a provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L.
114-17) requires that a semiannual report on Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA include
information on any Iranian use of funds to support acts of terrorism.
Political Effects
No U.S. Administration, including the Trump Administration, has asserted that sanctions on Iran
are intended to bring about the change of Iran’s regime, although some experts assert that this
might be a desired U.S. goal in the 2018 re-imposition of U.S. sanctions. But, the support of
Iranians seeking reintegration with the international community and sanctions relief helped propel
the relatively moderate Rouhani to election victories in both 2013 and 2017. Many Iranians
cheered the finalization of the JCPOA on July 15, 2015, undoubtedly contributing to Supreme
Leader Khamene’i’s acceptance of the deal.
Still, the IRGC and other hardliners control domestic security and the judiciary, and these factions
have criticized Rouhani’s compromises, particularly following the U.S. exit from the JCPOA.
The security forces have continued to arrest U.S. and dual nationals and to prosecute Rouhani
allies on various charges. In July 2018, the IRGC and Iran’s parliament (Majles) called for
cabinet changes to address economic mismanagement and, in September 2018, the Majles
compelled Rouhani to be questioned about the economic situation.101 In July 2018, Rouhani
replaced Iran’s Central Bank governor as an apparent gesture to indicate responsiveness to
economic concerns expressed by members of Iran’s political establishment. Still, there does not
appear to be an imminent threat to Rouhani’s grip on his office.
Some assert that the sanctions relief of the JCPOA played a role in the widespread unrest that
erupted in Iran in late December 2017-January 2018 by feeding unrealized public expectations of
better economic conditions. Others note that the unrest illustrates that sanctions relief of the
JCPOA did not yield the domestic stability that Iran’s regime expected to achieve. The U.S.
pullout from the JCPOA on May 8 has begun to cause economic effects, discussed below, that led
to protests in the Tehran bazaar in late June 2018, subsequent demonstrations in several cities, and
labor strikes and unrest beginning in summer 2018 and continuing, although sporadically.
However, the level of unrest in Iran does not appear sufficient to threaten the regime.
Economic Effects
Sanctions took a substantial toll on Iran’s economy, and sanctions relief caused Iran’s economy to
rebound, although perhaps not to the extent that Iranians expected. Assessing the effects of the

100 Statement from the President on the Reimposition of United States Sanctions with Respect to Iran. August 6, 2018.
101 https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-rouhani-irgc-demands/29413585.html.
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U.S. exit from the JCPOA will likely require time for most economic indicators to be accurately
measured.
 GDP and Employment Trends. Then-Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew told a
Washington, DC, research institute in April 2015 that Iran’s gross domestic
product (GDP) was 15%-20% smaller than it would have been had sanctions not
been imposed.102 The unemployment rate rose to about 20% by 2014, and many
additional Iranians were working but unpaid or partially paid. In 2015, Iran’s
GDP was about $400 billion at the official exchange rate ($1.4 trillion if assessed
on a purchasing power parity [PPP] basis). IMF and outside economists report
that Iran achieved about 7% growth during March 2016-March 2017,103 and a
similar 7% growth rate was achieved for the March 2017-March 2018 period.
Iran’s parliament researchers have forecast that Iran’s economy could decline by
as much as 5%—a significant recession—during March 2019-March 2020.104
 Oil Exports. As noted in Table 1, 2010-2016 sanctions reduced Iran’s crude oil
sales about 60% from the 2.5 mbd level of 2011, causing Iran to lose over $160
billion in oil revenues during that time. Iran earned $120 billion from oil sales in
2011; but only about $35 billion in 2013, 2014, and 2015. The JPA capped Iran’s
crude oil exports at about 1.1 mbd.105 The JCPOA sanctions relief enabled Iran to
increase its oil export volumes to nearly 2011 levels. As shown in the table, the
2018 reimposition of U.S. sanctions has driven Iran’s oil exports to about 1 mbd
as of December 1, 2018. It is possible that Iran’s customers that have received
SRE exceptions will increase purchases in coming months. Iran has been
exempted from an attempt by OPEC to increase oil prices by imposing
production cuts on most of the cartel’s members.
 Banking. Global banks were slow to reenter the Iran market after the 2016 easing
of sanctions because of (1) reported concerns that the United States might still
sanction such transactions under remaining sanctions provisions; (2) a lack of
transparency in Iran’s financial sector; (3) lingering concerns over past financial
penalties for processing Iran-related transactions in the U.S. financial system (see
above); and (4) extra costs and procedures caused by the inability to process Iran-
related transactions through the U.S. financial system and/or easily use dollars in
Iran-related transactions. Those banks that did reenter the Iran market have, as a
consequence of the U.S. exit from the JCPOA, stopped, limited, or are
considering stopping their transactions with Iran.
 Shipping Insurance. Iran was able after 2016 to obtain shipping insurance as a
result of waivers given to numerous insurers, as discussed above. However, as of
August 7, 2018, U.S.-based shipping reinsurers no longer have active U.S.
waivers to participate in the insurance market for Iranian shipping, harming
Iran’s ability to obtain shipping insurance.
 Hard Currency Accessibility. The 2011-2015 sanctions regime prevented Iran
from accessing the hard currency it was being paid for its oil. By January 2016,

102 Department of the Treasury. Remarks of Secretary Jacob J. Lew at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
30th Anniversary Gala. April 29, 2015.
103 “Foreign Investors Flock to Iran as U.S. Firms Watch on the Sidelines.” Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2017.
104 Forecast Says Sharp Drop in Iran’s Economic Growth Rate. Radio Farda, September 2, 2018.
105 “Why Higher Iran Oil Exports Are Not Roiling Nuclear Deal,” Reuters, June 13, 2014.
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the total of Iranian hard currency reserves held in foreign banks stood at about
$115 billion,106 and Iranian officials stated in February 2016 that they had gained
access to the funds. Iran regained access to the SWIFT electronic payments
system in early 2016, enabling Iran to move money internationally. Of this
amount, about $60 billion is owed to creditors such as China ($20 billion) or to
repay nonperforming loans extended to Iranian energy companies working in the
Caspian and other areas in Iran’s immediate neighborhood. Iran has kept most of
its available reserves abroad for cash management purposes and to pay for
imports, but Iran’s foreign exchange reserves will again be restricted by foreign
banks as U.S. sanctions go back into effect, making it likely that Iran will try to
repatriate funds before the wind-down period ends on November 4, 2018.
 Currency Decline. Sanctions caused the value of the rial on unofficial markets to
decline about 56% from January 2012 until January 2014. The election of
Rouhani and the JPA agreement in 2013 caused the rial to stabilize at about
35,000 to the dollar. However, as U.S. sanctions were reimposed in 2018, the
value of the rial to collapsed to about 95,000 to the dollar by August 2018, and to
nearly 150,000 to one by the November 5, 2018, reimposition of all U.S.
sanctions. The downturn caused unrest in the Tehran bazaar as merchants were
unable to import goods or properly price merchandise. The government
responded by banning the importation of about 1,400 different goods in order to
preserve its supply of hard currency. The value of the rial later recovered
somewhat to about 100,000 to one at the beginning of 2019.
 Inflation. The drop in value of the currency caused inflation to accelerate during
2011-2013. The estimated actual inflation rate was between 50% and 70% (a
higher figure than that acknowledged by Iran’s Central Bank). The sanctions
relief of the JPA reduced the inflation rate to about 15% and inflation slowed to
the single digits by June 2016, meeting the Central Bank’s stated goal.107
However, in 2017, the inflation rate reportedly increased back to double digits,
and turmoil surrounding the possible U.S. exit from the JCPOA caused inflation
to increase to about 15% by late June 2018. It increased significantly, to nearly
40%, by the end of 2018 as U.S. sanctions went back into effect.108
 Industrial/Auto Production and Sales. Iran’s light-medium manufacturing sector
has been expanding in recent years, but is dependent on imported parts. Sanctions
complicated obtaining trade credit and created difficulties for Iranian
manufacturers, who had to prepay for imported parts often through circuitous
mechanisms. Iran’s production of automobiles fell by about 60% from 2011 to
2013. Press reports say that the auto sector, and manufacturing overall,
rebounded since sanctions were lifted, but is declining again in light of the
announced divestments by French auto makers following the U.S. exit from the
JCPOA. Researchers at Iran’s parliament estimated in September 2018 that auto
production could decline 45% by March 2019, and other industrial production
might drop by 5%.109

106 CRS conversation with Department of the Treasury officials. July 2015.
107 “A Year after Iran Deal, Oil Flows but the Money’s Stuck.” op. cit.
108 https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi.
109 Radio Farda, op.cit.
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 U.S.-Iran Trade. U.S.-Iran trade remains negligible. In 2015, the last full year
before JCPOA implementation, the United States sold $281 million in goods to
Iran and imported $10 million worth of Iranian products. The slight relaxation of
the U.S. import ban stemming from the JCPOA likely accounts for the significant
increase in imports from Iran in 2016 to $86 million. U.S. imports from Iran were
about $63 million in 2017. However, U.S. exports to Iran remained low for all of
2016 and 2017 ($172 million and $137 million, respectively).
Iran’s Economic Coping Strategies
Iran had some success mitigating the economic effect of sanctions, and which will likely be used
to try to cope with reimposed U.S. sanctions.
Promoting a Broader Range of Exports. Over the past 10 years, Iran has promoted sales of nonoil
products such as minerals, cement, urea fertilizer, and other agricultural and basic industrial
goods. Such “nonoil” exports now generate much of the revenue that funds Iran’s imports.110
Oil Products/Condensate Sales. Iran has increased sales of oil products such as petrochemicals
and condensates, earning about $4.7 billion in revenue from that source by 2016.111 Condensates
are not generally included in figures for Iran’s export of crude oil.
Reallocation of Investment Funds and Import Substitution. Sanctions compelled some Iranian
manufacturers to increase domestic production of some goods as substitutes for imports. This
trend was hailed by Iranian economists and Supreme Leader Khamene’i, who has long
maintained that Iran should build a “resistance economy” less dependent on imports and foreign
investment.
Partial Privatization/IRGC in the Economy. Over the past few years, portions of Iran’s state-
owned enterprises have been transferred to the control of quasi-governmental or partially private
entities. Some of them are incorporated as holding companies, foundations, or investment groups.
Based on data from the Iranian Privatization Organization, there are about 120 such entities that
account for a significant proportion of Iran’s GDP.112 Rouhani has sought to push the IRGC out
of Iran’s economy through divestment, to the extent possible. However, a substantial part of the
economy remains controlled by government-linked conglomerates, including the IRGC. Although
estimates vary widely, the IRGC’s corporate affiliates are commonly assessed as controlling at
least 20% of Iran’s economy, although there is little available information on the degree of IRGC-
affiliated ownership stakes.113
Subsidy Reductions. In 2007, the Ahmadinejad government began trying to wean the population
off of generous subsidies by compensating families with cash payments of about $40 per month.
Gasoline prices were raised to levels similar to those in other regional countries, and far above the
subsidized price of 40 cents per gallon. Rouhani has continued to reduce subsidies, including by
raising gasoline and staple food prices further and limiting the cash payments to only those
families who could claim financial hardship. Rouhani also has improved collections of taxes and
of price increases for electricity and natural gas utilities.114

110 Testimony of Patrick Clawson before the Senate Banking Committee. January 21, 2015.
111 “Iran Reaps Less Cash from Eased Sanctions Than Predicted,” op. cit.
112 Kevan Harris, “Iran’s Political Economy Under and After the Sanctions,” Washington Post blogs, April 23, 2015.
113 https://www.thenational.ae/world/us-sanctions-on-revolutionary-guards-causes-iran-investment-rethink-1.733028.
114 Patrick Clawson testimony, January 21, 2015, op. cit.
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Import Restrictions/Currency Controls. To conserve hard currency, Iran has at times reduced the
supply of hard currency to importers of luxury goods, such as cars or cellphones, in order to
maintain hard currency supplies to importers of essential goods. These restrictions eased after
sanctions were lifted in 2016 but have been reimposed in 2018 to deal with economic unrest and
the falling value of the rial.
Effect on Energy Sector Long-Term Development
The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) was enacted in large part to reduce Iran’s oil and gas production
capacity over the longer term by denying Iran the outside technology and investment to maintain
or increase production. U.S. officials estimated in 2011 that Iran had lost $60 billion in
investment in the sector as numerous major firms pulled out of Iran. Iran says it needs $130
billion-$145 billion in new investment by 2020 to keep oil production capacity from falling.115
Further development of the large South Pars gas field alone requires $100 billion.116
During 2012-2016, there was little development activity at Iran’s various oil and gas development
sites, as energy firms sought to avoid sanctions (see Table 4). Some work abandoned by foreign
investors was assumed by domestic companies, particularly those linked to the IRGC. However,
the Iranian firms are not as technically capable as the international firms that have withdrawn.
The lifting of sanctions in 2016 lured at least some foreign investors back into the sector,
encouraged by Iran’s more generous investment terms under a concept called the “Iran Petroleum
Contract.” That contract gives investing companies the rights to a set percentage of Iran’s oil
reserves for 20-25 years.117 Iran signed a number of new agreements with international energy
firms since mid-2016 but, as noted in the tables and other information above, major energy firms
have begun to divest in response to the U.S. exit from the JCPOA.
Sanctions relief also opened opportunities for Iran to resume developing its gas sector. Iran has
used its gas development primarily to reinject into its oil fields rather than to export. Iran exports
about 3.6 trillion cubic feet of gas, primarily to Turkey and Armenia. Sanctions have rendered
Iran unable to develop a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export business. However, it was reported in
March 2017 that the Philippine National Oil Company is seeking to build a 2-million-ton LNG
plant in Iran, suggesting that patent issues do not necessarily preclude Iran from pursuing LNG.

115 Khajehpour presentation at CSIS, op. cit.
116 “Iran Faces Steep Climb to Join Gas Superpowers by 2017,” International Oil Daily, April 29, 2014.
117 Thomas Erdbrink. “New Iran Battle Brews over Foreign Oil Titans.” New York Times, February 1, 2016.
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Table 4. Post-1999 Major Investments in Iran’s Energy Sector
Company(ies)/Status
Output/
Date
Field/Project
(If Known)
Value
Goal
Feb. 1999
Doroud (oil)
Total (France)/ENI (Italy)
$1 bil ion
205,000 bpd
Total and ENI exempted from sanctions
because of pledge to exit Iran
Apr. 1999
Balal (oil)
Total/ Bow Valley
$300 mil ion
40,000 bpd
Dec./May
Initial development completed in 2004
(Canada)/ENI
2016
Dec. 2016: Thailand PTTEP signed agreement
Thailand PTTEP
with NIOC to study further development.

May 2016: KOGAS signed a memorandum of
KOGAS (South Korea)
understanding (MoU) to assess the field.
Nov. 1999
Soroush and Nowruz (oil)
Royal Dutch Shell
$800 mil ion
190,000 bpd
Royal Dutch exempted from sanctions because
(Netherlands)/Japex (Japan)
of pledge to exit Iran market
Apr. 2000
Anaran bloc (oil)
Lukoil (Russia) and Statoil
$105 mil ion
65,000
Lukoil and Statoil invested in 2000 but
(Norway)
abandoned work in 2009. As of Dec. 2016,
Lukoil reportedly is considering returning to
the project.
Jul. 2000
South Pars Phases 4 and 5 (gas)
ENI
$1.9 bil ion
2 bil ion cu.
On stream as of 2005. ENI exempted from
ft./day (cfd)
sanctions based on pledge to exit Iran market
Mar. 2001
Caspian Sea oil exploration—construction
GVA Consultants (Sweden)
$225 mil ion
NA
of submersible dril ing rig for Iranian partner
Jun. 2001
Darkhovin (oil)
ENI
$1 bil ion
100,000 bpd
ENI exited in 2013 and doing so enabled the
Field in production
firm to be exempted from U.S. sanctions
May 2002
Masjid-e-Soleyman (oil)
Sheer Energy
$80 mil ion
25,000 bpd
(Canada)/CNPC (China))/
Naftgaran Engineering (Iran)
Sept. 2002
South Pars Phases 9 and 10 (gas)
GS Engineering and
$1.6 bil ion
2 bil ion cfd
On stream as of early 2009
Construction Corp. (South
Korea)
Oct. 2002
South Pars Phases 6, 7, and 8
Statoil (Norway)
$750 mil ion
3 bil ion cfd
Field began producing late 2008; operational
control handed to NIOC in 2009. Statoil
exempted from sanctions upon pledge to divest
Jan. 2004
Azadegan (oil)—South and North
Inpex (Japan)
$200 mil ion
260,000 bpd,
Dec. 2016
Oct. 2010: original investor Inpex sold its stake
CNPC (China)
(Inpex stake);
of which
and was exempted from ISA investigation.
China $2.5
80,000 is
Royal Dutch Shell/Petronas
China National Petroleum Corp. took a
bil ion
from N.
(Malaysia)
majority stake in South and North Azadegan
Azadegan.
fields in January 2009. However, in 2014, Iran
cancelled the contracts for for nonperformance
Dec. 2016: Royal Dutch Shell and Petronas
signed a MoU to assess S. Azadegan for possibly
taking the project over.
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Company(ies)/Status
Output/
Date
Field/Project
(If Known)
Value
Goal
Jan. 2004
Tusan Block
Petrobras (Brazil)
$178 mil ion

Oil found in block in Feb. 2009, but not in
commercial quantity, according to the firm.
Oct. 2004
Yadavaran (oil)
Sinopec (China), deal
$2 bil ion
300,000 bpd

In 2014, Iran says Sinopec has “experienced
finalized Dec. 9, 2007

problems with regards to progress” on the
field, which also extends into Iraq.

Dec. 2016
December 2016: Royal Dutch Shell signed MoU
to assess taking over developing the field.
2005
Saveh bloc (oil)
PTT (Thailand)

GAO report, cited below
Jun. 2006
Garmsar bloc (oil)
Sinopec (China)
$20 mil ion

Deal finalized in June 2009
(“China’s Sinopec signs a deal to develop oil
block in Iran—report,” Forbes, 20 June 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2006/06/20/
afx2829188.html.)
Jul. 2006
Arak Refinery expansion
Sinopec (China); JGC
$959 mil ion
Expansion to
(GAO reports; Fimco FZE Machinery website;
(Japan). Work continued by
(major initial
produce
http://www.fimco.org/index.php?option=
Hyundai Heavy Industries (S. expansion;
250,000 bpd
com_content&task=view&id=70&Itemid=78.)
Korea)
extent of
Hyundai work
unknown)
Sept. 2006
Khorramabad block (oil)
Norsk Hydro and Statoil
$49 mil ion
no estimates
Seismic data gathered, but no production is
(Norway).
planned. (Statoil factsheet, May 2011)
Dec. 2006
North Pars Gas Field (offshore gas).
China National Offshore
$16 bil ion
3.6 bil ion cfd
Includes gas purchases
Oil Co. Work suspended in

2011, but reportedly
resumed in 2016.
Feb. 2007
LNG Tanks at Tombak Port
Daelim (S. Korea)
$320 mil ion
200,000 ton
Contract to build three LNG tanks at Tombak,
capacity
30 miles north of Assaluyeh Port.
(May not constitute “investment” in pre-2010
version of ISA, because that definition did not
specify LNG as “petroleum resource” of Iran.)

Feb. 2007
South Pars Phases 13 and 14
Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol
$4.3 bil ion

Deadline to finalize (May 2009) not met; firms
(Spain)
submitted revised proposals to Iran in
June 2009. State Department said on
September 30, 2010, that Royal Dutch Shell and
Repsol wil not pursue this project any further.
Mar. 2007
Esfahan refinery upgrade
Daelim (S. Korea)

NA
Jul. 2007
S. Pars Phases 22, 23, and 24
Turkish Petroleum
$12. bil ion
2 bil ion cfd
Pipeline to transport Iranian gas to Turkey, and
Company (TPAO)
on to Europe and building three power plants
in Iran. Contract not finalized to date.
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Company(ies)/Status
Output/
Date
Field/Project
(If Known)
Value
Goal
Dec. 2007
Golshan and Ferdowsi onshore and
Petrofield Subsidiary of SKS
$15 bil ion
3.4 bil ion cfd
offshore gas and oil fields and LNG plant
Ventures (Malaysia)
of
Contract modified but reaffirmed December
gas/250,000
2008 (GAO reports; Oil Daily, January 14,
bpd of oil
2008.)
2007
Jofeir Field (oil)
Belarusneft (Belarus) under
$500 mil ion
40,000 bpd
GAO report cited below. Belarusneft, a
contract to Naftiran.
subsidiary of Belneftekhim, sanctioned under
No production to date
ISA on March 29, 2011. Naftiran sanctioned on
September 29, 2010, for this and other
activities.
2008
Dayyer Bloc (Persian Gulf, offshore, oil)
Edison (Italy)
$44 mil ion

GAO reports.
Feb. 2008
PGNiG (Polish Oil and Gas
$2 bil ion

Lavan field (offshore natural gas)
Company, Poland), divested

to Iranian firms in 2011

Mar. 2008
Danan Field (on-shore oil)
Petro Vietnam Exploration

“PVEP Wins Bid to Develop Danan Field.” Iran
and Production Co.
Press TV, March 11, 2008.
(Vietnam)
Apr. 2008
Iran’s Kish Gas Field
Oman (cofinancing of
$7 bil ion
1 bil ion cfd
Includes pipeline from Iran to Oman.
project)
Apr. 2008
Moghan 2 (onshore oil and gas, Ardebil
INA (Croatia), but firm
$40-$140

province)
withdrew in 2014
mil ion

2008
Kermanshah petrochemical plant (new
Uhde (Germany)

300,000
construction)
metric
GAO reports.
tons/yr
Jun. 2008
Resalat Oilfield
Amona (Malaysia). Joined in
$1.5 bil ion
47,000 bpd
Status of work unclear.
June 2009 by CNOOC and
another China firm, COSL.
Jan. 2009
Bushehr Polymer Plants
Sasol (South Africa), but

Capacity is 1
Production of polyethelene at two polymer
firm withdrew in 2014
mil ion tons
plants in Bushehr Province. Product exported
per year.

Mar. 2009
Phase 12 South Pars (gas)—Incl. LNG
Indian firms: Oil and Natural $8 bil ion
20 mil ion
terminal construction and Farsi Block gas
Gas Corp. of India
tonnes of
field/Farzad-B bloc.
(ONGC); Oil India Ltd.,
LNG annually
India Oil Corp. Ltd./minor
by 2012
stakes by Sonanagol
(Angola) and PDVSA
(Venezuela).
Aug. 2009
Abadan refinery
Sinopec
Up to $6

Upgrade and expansion; building a new refinery
bil ion if new
at Hormuz on the Persian Gulf coast.
refinery is
built
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Company(ies)/Status
Output/
Date
Field/Project
(If Known)
Value
Goal
Oct. 2009
South Pars Gas Field—Phases 6-8, Gas
G and S Engineering and
$1.4 bil ion

Sweetening Plant
Construction (South Korea)
CRS conversation with Embassy of S. Korea in
Washington, DC, July 2010.
Contract signed but then abrogated by S.
Korean firm.
Nov. 2009
South Pars Phase 12—Part 2 and Part 3
Daelim (S. Korea)—Part 2;
$4 bil ion ($2

(“Italy, South Korea To Develop South Pars
Tecnimont (Italy)—Part 3
bn each part)
Phase 12.” Press TV [Iran], November 3, 2009,
http://www.presstv.com/pop/Print/?id=110308.)
Feb.
South Pars Phase 11
Total SA (France) and
$4.7 bil ion

2010/July
Project originally awarded to CNPC in 2010,
CNPC (China), with Iran
2017
but CNPC exited the project in October 2012.
Petropars
In July 2017, Total took over the project as
operator, with CNPC as minority partner
(30%). Iran’s Petropars has a 20% stake as well.
In November 2018, Total exited and CNPC
became operator. CNPC exited in December
2018, leaving production status unclear.
2011
Azar Gas Field
Gazprom (Russia)

Iran cancelled Gazprom’s contract due to
Gazprom’s failure to fulfil its commitments.
Dec. 2011
Zagheh Oil Field
Tatneft (Russia)
$1 bil ion
55,000
barrels per
Preliminary deal signed December 2011
day
Jul. 2016
Aban Oil Field
Zarubezhneft (Russia)

Zarubezhneft signed a MoU to assess the field.
Jul. 2016
Paydar Garb Oil Field
Zarubezhneft (Russia)

Zarubezhneft signed a MoU to assess the field.
Nov. 2016
Parsi and Rag E-Sefid
Schlumberger (France)

Schlumberger signed a MoU to assess the fields.
Nov. 2016
South Pars Phase 11
Total SA (France)/CNPC
$4.8 bil ion
1.8 bil ion cu
Total has announced it wil divest in response
(China) and Petropars
ft/day
to U.S. reimposition of sanctions in 2018

Nov. 2016
Sumar Oil Field
PGNiG (Poland)

Polish Oil and Gas Company (PGNiG) signed a
MoU to assess the field for six months.
Nov. 2016
Karanj
Pergas (consortium of 15

International Pergas Consortium signed a MoU
firms from Norway, Britain,
to assess this field.
and Iran)
Dec. 2016
Changuleh Oil Field
Gazprom (Russia), PTTEP

(Thailand), and DNO
Companies signed MoU’s to assess field.
(Norway)
Dec. 2016
Kish Gas Field
Royal Dutch Shell

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Company(ies)/Status
Output/
Date
Field/Project
(If Known)
Value
Goal
Royal Dutch Shell signed MoU to assess the
field
Dec. 2016
Chesmekosh Gas Field
Gazprom (Russia) and

Gazprom signed MoU to assess the field
Petronas (Malaysia)
Mar. 2017
Shadegan Oil Field
Tatneft (Russia)

500,000 bpd
Khuzestan province (southern Iran). Currently
max.
producing about 65,000 bpd.
Sources: Various oil and gas journals, as well as CRS conversations with some U.S. and company officials. Some
information comes from various GAO reports, the latest of which was January 13, 2015 (GAO-15-258R).
Note: CRS has no mandate, authority, or means to determine violations of the Iran Sanctions Act, and no way
to confirm the status of any of the reported investments. The investments are private agreements between Iran
and the firms involved, which are not required to reveal the terms of their arrangements. Reported $20 mil ion+
investments in oil and gas fields, refinery upgrades, and major project leadership are included in this table.
Responsibility for a project to develop Iran’s energy sector is part of ISA investment definition.
Effect on Gasoline Availability and Importation
As the enactment of U.S. sanctions on the sale of gasoline to Iran became increasingly likely in
2010, several suppliers apparently stopped selling gasoline to Iran.118 Others ceased after the
enactment of CISADA. Gasoline deliveries to Iran fell from about 120,000 barrels per day before
CISADA to about 30,000 barrels per day immediately thereafter, although importation later
increased to about 50,000 barrels per day. In 2017, Iranian officials said Iran had become largely
self-sufficient in gasoline production.
Human Rights-Related Effects
It is difficult to draw any direct relationship between sanctions and Iran’s human rights practices.
Recent human rights reports by the State Department and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Iran’s
human rights practices generally assess that there has been some modest improvement in some of
Iran’s practices in recent years, particularly relaxation of enforcement of the public dress code for
women. But the altered policies cannot necessarily be attributed to sanctions relief.
Since at least 2012, foreign firms have generally refrained from selling the Iranian government
equipment to monitor or censor social media use. Such firms include German
telecommunications firm Siemens, Chinese internet infrastructure firm Huawei, and South
African firm MTN Group. In October 2012, Eutelsat, a significant provider of satellite service to
Iran’s state broadcasting establishment, ended that relationship after the EU sanctioned the then
head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Ezzatollah Zarghami. However, the
regime retains the ability to monitor and censor social media use.
Humanitarian Effects
During 2012-2016, sanctions produced significant humanitarian-related effects, particularly in
limiting the population’s ability to obtain expensive Western-made medicines, such as
chemotherapy drugs. Some of the scarcity was caused by banks’ refusal to finance such sales,
even though doing so was not subject to any sanctions. Some observers say the Iranian

118 Information in this section derived from Javier Blas, “Traders Cut Iran Petrol Line,” Financial Times, March 8,
2010.
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government exaggerated reports of medicine shortages to generate opposition to the sanctions.
Other accounts say that Iranians, particularly those with connections to the government, took
advantage of medicine shortages by cornering the import market for key medicines. However,
some of these shortages resurfaced in 2018 following the reimposition of sanctions by the Trump
Administration. For example, reports in 2018 indicated that the reimposition of U.S. sanctions
may be inhibiting the flow of humanitarian goods to the Iranian people and reportedly
contributing to shortages in medicine to treat ailments such as multiple sclerosis and cancer.119
Other reports indicate that Cargill, Bunge, and other global food traders have halted supplying
Iran because of the evaporation of available transactions financing.120 EU officials have called on
the United States to produce a “white list” that would “give clear guidelines about what channels
European banks and companies should follow to conduct legitimate [humanitarian] transactions
with Iran without fear of future penalties.”121
Other reports say that pollution in Tehran and other big cities is made worse by sanctions because
Iran produces gasoline itself with methods that cause more impurities than imported gasoline. As
noted above, Iran’s efforts to deal with environmental hazards and problems might be hindered
by denial of World Bank lending for that purpose.
In the aviation sector, some Iranian pilots complained publicly that U.S. sanctions caused Iran’s
passenger airline fleet to deteriorate to the point of jeopardizing safety. Since the U.S. trade ban
was imposed in 1995, 1,700 passengers and crew of Iranian aircraft have been killed in air
accidents, although it is not clear how many of the crashes, if any, were due to difficultly in
acquiring U.S. spare parts.122
Air Safety
Sanctions relief ameliorated at least some of the humanitarian difficulties discussed above. In the
aviation sector, several sales of passenger aircraft have been announced, and licensed by the
Department of the Treasury, since Implementation Day. However, as noted, the licenses are being
revoked and deliveries will not proceed beyond November 2018.
 In February 2016, Iran Air—which was delisted from U.S. sanctions as of
Implementation Day—announced it would purchase 118 Airbus commercial
aircraft at an estimated value of $27 billion. Airbus received an OFAC license
and three of the aircraft have been delivered. Airbus has said it will not deliver
any more aircraft to Iran because its U.S. Treasury Department license is
revoked.
 In December 2016, Boeing and Iran Air finalized an agreement for Boeing to sell
the airline 80 passenger aircraft and lease 29 others. Boeing received a specific
license for the transaction. The deal has a total estimated value of about $17
billion, with deliveries scheduled to start later in 2018. The Boeing sale is to
include 30 of the 777 model. None have been delivered, and Boeing officials

119 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/fresh-sanctions-on-iran-are-already-choking-off-medicine-
imports-economists-say/2018/11/17/c94ce574-e763-11e8-8449-1ff263609a31_story.html;
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-21/trump-s-sanctions-are-proving-a-bitter-pill-for-iran-s-sick;
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2018/1029/In-Iran-US-sanctions-are-being-felt-with-harsher-
measures-to-come.
120 “Global Traders Halt New Iran Food Deals as U.S. Sanctions Bite.” Reuters, December 21, 2018.
121 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/02/iran-sanctions-us-european-humanitarian-supplies.
122 Thomas Erdbink, “Iran’s Aging Airliner Fleet Seen As Faltering Under U.S. Sanctions,” July 14, 2012.
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have indicated that it will not proceed with deliveries now that the U.S.
government has announced its export license is being revoked.
 In April 2017, Iran’s Aseman Airlines signed a tentative agreement to buy at least
30 Boeing MAX passenger aircraft. No U.S. license for this sale was announced
prior to the U.S. exit from the JCPOA. The airline is owned by Iran’s civil
service pension fund but managed as a private company.
 In June 2017, Airbus agreed to tentative sales of 45 A320 aircraft to Iran’s
Airtour Airline, and of 28 A320 and A330 aircraft to Iran’s Zagros Airlines. No
U.S. license for the sale was announced prior to the U.S. exit from the JCPOA.
 ATR, owned by Airbus and Italy’s Leonardo, sold 20 aircraft to Iran Air. It
delivered eight aircraft by the time of the U.S. JCPOA exit. It reportedly has been
given temporary U.S. Treasury Department licenses to deliver another five after
the August 6, 2018, initial sanctions reimposition in which its U.S. export
licenses were to be revoked.
Post-JCPOA Sanctions Legislation
The JCPOA, its implications, and related Iran issues have been the subject of legislation. The
JCPOA states that as long as Iran fully complies with the JCPOA, the sanctions that were
suspended or lifted shall not be reimposed on other bases (such as terrorism or human rights).
Key Legislation in the 114th Congress
The Obama Administration stated that it would adhere to that provision but that some new
sanctions that seek to limit Iran’s military power, its human rights abuses, or its support for
militant groups might not necessarily violate the JCPOA. During 2015-2016, supporters of the
bills below asserted that they addressed weaknesses of the agreement or unrelated Iran issues, or
increased oversight of the JCPOA.
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17)
The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA, P.L. 114-17) provided for a 30- or 60-
day congressional review period after which Congress could pass legislation to approve or to
disapprove of the JCPOA, or do nothing. No such legislation of disapproval was enacted.
There are several certification and reporting requirements under INARA:
 Material Breach Report. The President must report a potentially significant
Iranian breach of the agreement within 10 days of acquiring credible information
of such. Within another 30 days, the President must determine whether this is a
material breach and whether Iran has cured the breach.
 Certification Report. The President is required to certify, every 90 days, that Iran
is “transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing” the agreement, and that Iran
has not taken any action to advance a nuclear weapons program. The latest
certification was submitted on July 17, 2017, and another one was due on
October 15, 2017. On October 13, 2017, the Administration declined to make that
certification, on the grounds that continued sanctions relief is not appropriate and
proportionate to Iran’s measures to terminate its illicit nuclear program (Section
(d)(6)(iv)(I) of INARA).
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 If a breach is reported, or if the President does not certify compliance, Congress
may initiate within 60 days “expedited consideration” of legislation that would
reimpose any Iran sanctions that the President had suspended through use of
waiver or other authority. That 60-day period is to expire on December 12, 2017.
 Semiannual Report. INARA also requires an Administration report every 180
days on Iran’s nuclear program, including not only Iran’s compliance with its
nuclear commitments but also whether Iranian banks are involved in terrorism
financing; Iran’s ballistic missile advances; and whether Iran continues to support
terrorism.
Visa Restriction
The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 114-113) contained a provision amending the Visa
Waiver Program to require a visa to visit the United States for any person who has visited Iraq,
Syria, or any terrorism list country (Iran and Sudan are the two aside from Syria still listed) in the
previous five years. Iran argued that the provision represented a violation of at least the spirit of
the JCPOA by potentially deterring European businessmen from visiting Iran. The Obama
Administration issued a letter to Iran stating it would implement the provision in such a way as
not to not impinge on sanctions relief, and allowances for Iranian students studying in the United
States were made in the implementing regulations. Another provision of that law requires an
Administration report to Congress on how Iran has used the benefits of sanctions relief.
President Trump has issued and amended executive orders that, in general, prohibit Iranian
citizens (as well as citizens from several other countries) from entering the United States. This
marked a significant additional restriction beyond the FY2016 Consolidated Appropriation.
Iran Sanctions Act Extension
The 114th Congress acted to prevent ISA from expiring in its entirety on December 31, 2016. The
Iran Sanctions Extension Act (H.R. 6297), which extended ISA until December 31, 2026, without
any other changes, passed the House on November 15 by a vote of 419-1 and then passed the
Senate by 99-0. President Obama allowed the bill to become law without signing it (P.L. 114-
277), even though the Administration considered it unnecessary because the President retains
ample authority to reimpose sanctions on Iran. Iranian leaders called the extension a breach of the
JCPOA,123 but the JCPOA’s “Joint Commission” did not determine it breached the JCPOA.
Reporting Requirement on Iran Missile Launches
The conference report on the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 2943, P.L. 114-328)
contained a provision (Section 1226) requiring a quarterly report to Congress on Iran’s missile
launches the imposition of U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran’s ballistic missile launches until
December 31, 2019. The conference report on the FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91) extended that
reporting requirement until December 31, 2022. The report is to include efforts to sanction
entities or individuals that assist those missile launches.

123 An Iranian letter to the U.N. Security Council submitted July 20, 2015, indicates Iran’s view that “reintroduction or
reimposition, including through extension, of the sanctions and restrictive measures will constitute significant
nonperformance which would relieve Iran from its commitments in whole or in part.” Iran Letter to the President of the
U.N. Security Council, July 20, 2015, (S/2015/550).
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Other 114th Congress Legislation
Some Iran sanctions legislation in the 114th Congress appeared to be intended to address Iran’s
objectionable behavior, but was not enacted:
 The Iran Policy Oversight Act (S. 2119) and the Iran Terror Finance
Transparency Act (H.R. 3662) contained a provision that would add certification
requirements for the Administration to remove designations of Iranian entities
sanctioned. The House passed the latter bill but then vacated its vote.
 The IRGC Terrorist Designation Act (H.R. 3646 and S. 2094) required a report
on whether the IRGC meets the criteria for designation as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO). The Obama Administration argued that the law that set up
the FTO designations (Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8
U.S.C. 1189]) applies such designations only to groups, rather than armed forces
of a nation-state (which the IRGC is). Bills with similar provisions—H.R. 380, S.
67, and H.R. 478—were introduced in the 115th Congress.
 Prohibiting Assistance to Nuclear Iran Act (H.R. 3273) would prohibit the use of
U.S. funds to provide technical assistance to Iran’s nuclear program. The
provision appeared to conflict with the provision of the JCPOA that calls on the
P5+1 to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation with Iran (Paragraph 32).
 The Justice for Victims of Iranian Terrorism Act (H.R. 3457, S. 2086) would
prohibit the President from waiving U.S. sanctions until Iran completed paying
judgments issued for victims of Iranian or Iran-backed acts of terrorism. The
House passed it on October 1, 2015, by a vote of 251-173, despite Obama
Administration assertions that the bill would contradict the JCPOA.124
 H.R. 3728 would amend ITRSHRA to make mandatory (rather than voluntary)
sanctions related to the use by Iranian banks of electronic bank transfer systems
such as SWIFT.
 The IRGC Sanctions Act (H.R. 4257) would require congressional action to
approve an Administration request to remove a country from the terrorism list
and would require certification that any entity to be “delisted” from sanctions is
not a member, agent, affiliate, or owned by the IRGC.
 The Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act of 2016 (S. 2725) would require that
specified sectors of Iran’s economy (automotive, chemical, computer science,
construction, electronic, energy metallurgy, mining, petrochemical, research, and
telecommunications) be subject to U.S. sanctions, if those sectors are determined
to provide support for Iran’s ballistic missile program. The provision appeared to
violate the JCPOA by reimposing sanctions on major sectors of Iran’s civilian
economy. In the 115th Congress, S. 15 and key sections of S. 227 and H.R. 808
(Iran Nonnuclear Sanctions Act of 2017) mirror S. 2725.
 H.R. 4992, which passed the House on July 14, 2016, by a vote of 246-181, and
the related Countering Iranian Threats Act of 2016 (S. 3267), would, among their
central provisions, require foreign banks and dollar clearinghouses to receive a
U.S. license for any dollar transactions involving Iran. That provision would

124 For more information on the issue of judgments for victims of Iranian terrorism, see CRS Report RL31258, Suits
Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
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appear to represent a new restriction on foreign transactions with Iran, and the
Obama Administration opposed it as a violation of the JCPOA.
 H.R. 5631, the Iran Accountability Act, which passed the House on July 14,
2016, by a vote of 246-179, would remove some waiver authority for certain
provisions of several Iran sanctions laws and would require sanctions on sectors
of Iran’s civilian economy determined to have supported Iran’s ballistic missile
program. The latter provision appeared to contradict the JCPOA.
 H.R. 5119, which passed the House by a vote of 249-176, would prohibit the
U.S. government from buying additional heavy water from Iran and appeared
intended to block additional U.S. purchases similar to one in April 2016 in which
the United States bought 32 metric tons from Iran at a cost of about $8.6 million.
 Several bills and amendments in the 114th Congress sought to block or impede
the sale of the Boeing aircraft to Iran by preventing the licensing, financing, or
Ex-Im Bank loan guarantees for the sale. These included H.R. 5715, H.R. 5711,
and several amendments to the House version of the FY2017 Financial Services
and General Government Appropriations Act (H.R. 5485). That act passed the
House on July 7, 2016, by a vote of 239-185, and H.R. 5711 passed by the House
on November 17, 2016, by a vote of 243-174. The Obama Administration
opposed the measures as a JCPOA violation.
The Trump Administration and Major Iran Sanctions Legislation
Even before the Trump Administration pulled the United States out of the JCPOA, Congress
acted on or considered additional Iran sanctions legislation. Some of the legislation appeared to
avoid violating U.S. JCPOA commitments. Because the Trump Administration has exited the
pact, there is increased potential for the 116th Congress to consider legislation that sanctions those
Iranian economic sectors that could not be sanctioned under the JCPOA.
The following is some of the Iran sanctions legislation enacted or considered in the 115th
Congress.
The Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act of 2017
(CAATSA, P.L. 115-44)
A bill, S. 722, which initially contained only Iran-related sanctions, was reported out by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 25, 2017. After incorporating an amendment adding
sanctions on Russia, the bill was passed by the Senate on June 15, 2017, by a vote of 98-2. A
companion measure, H.R. 3203, was introduced in the House subsequent to the Senate passage of
S. 722, and contained Iran-related provisions virtually identical to the engrossed Senate version of
S. 722. Following a reported agreement among House and Senate leaders, H.R. 3364, with
additional sanctions provisions related to North Korea (and provisions on Iran remaining virtually
unchanged from those of the engrossed S. 722), was introduced and passed both chambers by
overwhelming margins. President Trump signed it into law on August 2, 2017 (P.L. 115-44),
accompanied by a signing statement expressing reservations about the degree to which provisions
pertaining to Russia might conflict with the President’s constitutional authority.
CAATSA’s Iran-related provisions are analyzed above. Overall, CAATSA does not appear to
conflict with the JCPOA insofar as it does not reimpose U.S. secondary sanctions on Iran’s
civilian economic sectors. The JCPOA did not require the United States to refrain from imposing
additional sanctions—as CAATSA does—on Iranian proliferation, human rights abuses,
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terrorism, or the IRGC. Section 108 of CAATSA requires an Administration review of all
designated entities to assess whether such entities are contributing to Iran’s ballistic missile
program or contributing to Iranian support for international terrorism.
Other Legislation in the 115th Congress
 H.R. 1698. The Iran Ballistic Missiles and International Sanctions Enforcement
Act, passed the House on October 26, 2017, by a vote of 423-2. It would amend
the remaining active (not waived) section of ISA (Section 5b) to clarify that
assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile program is included as subject to sanctions.
The provision would apply the sanctions to foreign governments determined to
be assisting Iran’s missile programs, and would apply several ISA sanctions to
foreign entities, including foreign governments, that sell to or import from Iran
the major combat systems banned for sale to Iran in Security Council Resolution
2231. This represents a more specific list of banned items than the “destabilizing
numbers and types” of weaponry the sale to Iran of which can be sanctioned
under ISA and several other U.S. laws discussed above.
 H.R. 1638. On November 14, 2017, the House Financial Services Committee
ordered reported H.R. 1638, the Iranian Leadership Asset Transparency Act,
requiring the Treasury Secretary to report to Congress on the assets and equity
interests held by named Iranian persons including: the Supreme Leader, the
President, various IRGC and other security commanders, and members of various
leadership bodies.
 H.R. 4324. The House Financial Services Committee also ordered reported on
November 14, 2017, the Strengthening Oversight of Iran’s Access to Finance
Act. The bill required Administration reports on whether financing of Iranian
commercial passenger aircraft purchases poses money-laundering or terrorism
risks or benefits Iranian persons involved in Iranian proliferation or terrorism.
Some argued that the bill might affect the willingness of the Treasury Department
to license aircraft sales to Iran, and in so doing the United States to potentially
breach its JCPOA commitment to sell such aircraft to Iran.125
 Following President Trump’s October 13, 2017, statement on Iran, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker and Senator Tom Cotton
released an outline of legislation that would reimpose waived U.S. sanctions if, at
any time—including after JCPOA restrictions expire—Iran breaches JCPOA-
stipulated restrictions. The bill draft, which was not introduced as legislation,
included sanctions triggers based on Iranian missile developments.
 H.R. 5132. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Economic Exclusion Act.
This bill mandated Administration reports on whether specified categories of
entities are owned or controlled by the IRGC, or conduct significant transactions
with the IRGC. The bill would define an entity as owned or controlled by the
IRGC even if the IRGC’s ownership interest is less than 50%—a lower standard
than the usual practice in which ownership is defined as at least 50%. The bill
requires Administration investigation of several specified entities as potentially
owned or controlled by the IRGC, including several telecommunications, mining,
and machinery companies, and requires a report on whether the Iran Airports
Company violates E.O. 13224 by facilitating flight operations by Mahan Air,

125 Author conversations with experts in Washington, DC, November, 2017, and various press reports.
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which is a designated SDN under E.O. 13224. Whereas the bill’s provisions do
not mandate any sanctions on entities characterized within, the bill appears to
establish a process under which the Administration could name as SDNs entities
in Iran’s civilian economic sectors, including civil aviation.
 H.R. 6751. The Banking Transparency for Sanctioned Persons Act of 2018,
would require reporting to Congress on any license given to a bank to provide
financial services to a state sponsor of terrorism.
 H.R. 4591, S. 3431, and H.R. 4238. Several bills would essentially codify
Executive Order 13438 by requiring the blocking of U.S.-based property and
preventing U.S. visas for persons determined to be threatening the stability of
Iraq—legislation apparently directed at Iran’s Shiite militia allies in Iraq. The
latter two bills specifically mention the Iraqi groups As’aib Ahl Al Haq and
Harakat Hizballah Al Nujabi as entities that the Administration should so
sanction. H.R. 4591 passed the House on November 27, 2018.
116th Congress
 As the 116th Congress began to convene in early January 2019, press reports
indicated that several Senators and at least one House Member planned to
introduce legislation to greatly expand U.S. secondary sanctions on Iran’s
financial sector.126 Among the reported provisions were (1) mandatory imposition
of sanctions on the SWIFT electronic payments system if it does not expel
sanctioned Iranian banks from its network; (2) amending IFCA to sanction any
significant transactions with Iran’s financial sector (in addition to energy,
shipping, and shipbuilding sectors in the current law); (3) requiring the Treasury
Department to issue a final rule that would sanction any international transaction
with Iran’s Central Bank; and (4) sanctioning foreign persons that supply or
provide other help to Iran’s efforts to establish a digital currency.
 Several bills similar or virtually identical to those introduced previously have
been introduced, imposing sanctions on Iranian proxies in Iraq and elsewhere.
These bills include: H.R. 361, the Iranian Proxies Terrorist Sanctions Act of
2019, and H.R. 571, the Preventing Destabilization of Iraq Act of 2019.
Other Possible U.S. and International Sanctions127
There are a number of other possible sanctions that might receive consideration—either in a
global or multilateral framework. These possibilities are analyzed in CRS In Focus IF10801,
Possible Additional Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman.

126 https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/01/gop-trump-iran-policy-956660.
127 See CRS In Focus IF10801, Possible Additional Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Table 5. Entities Sanctioned Under U.N. Resolutions and
U.S. Laws and Executive Orders
Persons listed are identified by the positions they held when designated; some have since changed. For
U.S. executive order, names in italics are entities and individuals that were delisted to implement the
JCPOA. Entities in boldface were to be delisted on Transition Day (October 2023). However, all delisted
entities will be relisted on November 5, 2018, and no entities will be delisted.
U.N. Security Council Resolutions
Entities in italics were “delisted” on Implementation Day. Entities in standard font to remain listed until Transition Day
(October 2023), unless removed earlier by Security Council
Entities Sanctioned by Resolution 1737 (resolution no longer active)
- Farayand Technique (centrifuge
- Gen. Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Mouri
- Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
program)
(Malak Ashtar University of Defense
(AEIO)
Technology rector)
- Mesbah Energy Company (Arak supplier)
- Defense Industries Organization
- Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar (AIO
- Mohammad Qanadi, AEIO Vice President
(DIO)
official)
- Behman Asgarpour (Arak manager)
- 7th of Tir (DOI subordinate)
- Reza Gholi Esmaeli (AOI Official)
- Ehsan Monajemi (Natanz construction
- Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
- Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi (Head of
manager)
(SHIG)—missile program
AOI)
- Jafar Mohammadi (Adviser to AEIO)
- Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group
- Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi
- Dawood Agha Jani (Natanz official)
(SBIG)—missile program
(Commander in Chief, IRGC)
- Ali Hajinia Leilabadi (Director of Mesbah
- Fajr Industrial Group—missile
- Gen. Hosein Salimi (Commander,
Energy)
program
IRGC Air Force)

Entities/Persons Added by Resolution 1747 (resolution no longer active)
- Ammunition and Metallurgy
- Brig. Gen. Qasem Soleimani (Qods
- Karaj Nuclear Research Center
Industries Group (controls 7th of Tir)
Force commander)
- Novin Energy Company; Cruise Missile
- Parchin Chemical Industries (branch
- Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (senior
Industry Group
of DIO)
defense scientist)
- Kavoshyar Company (subsidiary of
- Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate
- Mohasen Fakrizadeh-Mahabai
AEIO)
to AIO)
(defense scientist)
- Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah
- Ya Mahdi Industries Group
- Mohsen Hojati (head of Fajr Industrial International PLC (funds AIO and
- Sho’a Aviation (produces IRGC light
Group)
subordinate entities in missile
aircraft for asymmetric warfare)
- Ahmad Derakshandeh (head of Bank
activities) *
- Qods Aeronautics Industries
Sepah)
- Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and
(produces UAV’s, para-gliders for
- Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi
Production Center and Esfahan Nuclear
IRGC asymmetric warfare)
(IRGC ground forces commander)
Technology Center
- Pars Aviation Services Company
- Naser Maleki (head of SHIG); Brig.
- Seyed Jaber Safdari (Natanz manager)
(maintains IRGC Air Force equipment)
Gen. Morteza Reza’i (Deputy
- Amir Rahimi (head of Esfahan nuclear
- Gen. Mohammad Baqr Zolqadr
commander-in-chief, IRGC)
facilities); Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi
(IRGC officer serving as deputy
- Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadiyan
(head of SBIG)
Interior Minister)
(chief of IRGC Joint Staff)
- Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hejazi (Basij
commander)
* Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International were delisted on Implementation Day by a separate decision the Security Council.
They were not named on the Resolution 2231 attachment of entities to be delisted on that day. No information has been
publicized whether Ahmad Derakshandeh, the head of Bank Sepah, was also delisted.
Entities Added by Resolution 1803 (resolution no longer active)
Requires that countries report when the fol owing persons enter or transit their territories:
- Amir Moayyed Alai (centrifuge program management)
- M. Javad Karimi Sabet (head of Novin Energy)
- Mohammad Fedai Ashiani (Natanz complex technician)
- Hamid-Reza Mohajerani (manager at Esfahan uranium
- Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani (senior AEIO official)
conversion facility)
- Haleh Bakhtiar
- Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Naqdi (military official, for
- Morteza Behzad (centrifuge component production)
trying to circumvent U.N. sanctions)
- Houshang Nobari (Natanz)
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- Mohammad Eslami (Defense Industries Training and
- Abbas Rashidi (Natanz)
Research Institute)
- Ghasem Soleymani (Saghand uranium mine)
- Seyyed Hussein Hosseini (AEIO, involved in Arak)
Travel banned for five Iranians sanctioned under Resolutions 1737 and 1747.
Adds entities to the sanctions list:
- Electro Sanam Co.
- Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front co.)
- Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (centrifuge production)
- Industrial Factories of Precision
- Barzaganin Tejaral Tavanmad Saccal
- Joza Industrial Co.
- Jabber Ibn Hayan (AEIO laboratory)
- Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries
- Khorasan Metallurgy Industries
-Tamas Co. (uranium enrichment)
- Niru Battery Manufacturing Co. (Makes batteries for
- Safety Equipment Procurement (AIO front, missiles)
Iranian military and missile systems)

Entities Added by Resolution 1929 (resolution no longer active)
Over 40 entities added; makes mandatory a previously nonbinding travel ban on most named Iranians of previous resolutions.
Adds one individual banned for travel—AEIO head Javad Rahiqi.
- Amin Industrial Complex; Armament
- Malek Ashtar University (subordinate
-Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries (acts
Industries Group
of Defense Technology and Science
on behalf of the DIO)
- Defense Technology and Science
Research Center, above)
-Special Industries Group (DIO
Research Center (owned or control ed - Ministry of Defense Logistics Export
subordinate)
by Ministry of Defense)
(sells Iranian made arms to customers
-Tiz Pars (cover name for SHIG)
- Doostan International Company
worldwide)
-Yazd Metallurgy Industries
- Farasakht Industries
- Mizan Machinery Manufacturing
- Modern Industries Technique
- First East Export Bank, PLC
- Pejman Industrial Services Corp.;
Company
- Kaveh Cutting Tools Company
- Sabalan Company; Sahand Aluminum
- Nuclear Research Center for
- M. Babaie Industries
Parts Industrial Company
Agriculture and Medicine (research
-Shahid Karrazi Industries
- Shahid Sattari Industries
component of the AEIO)
The fol owing Revolutionary Guard affiliated firms (several are subsidiaries of Khatam ol-Anbiya, the main Guard construction
affiliate):
- Fater Institute
- Imensazan Consultant Engineers
- Oriental Oil Kish
- Garaghe Sazendegi Ghaem
Institute
- Rah Sahel
- Gorb Karbala
- Khatam ol-Anbiya
- Rahab Engineering Institute
- Gorb Nooh
- Makin
- Sahel Consultant Engineers
- Hara Company
- Omran Sahel
- Sepanir
- Sepasad Engineering Company
The fol owing entities owned or control ed by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL): Irano Hind Shipping Company;
IRISL Benelux; and South Shipping Line Iran.
Entities Designated Under U.S. Executive Order 13382
(many designations coincide with designations under U.N. resolutions)
Entity
Date Named
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (Iran)
June 2005, September
2007
Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (Iran)
June 2005, February 2009
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). AEOI and 23 subsidaries remain delisted for secondary
June 2005
sanctions under E.O. 13382 but are stil designated as Iran-owned or control ed entities.
Novin Energy Company (Iran) and Mesbah Energy Company (Iran)
January 2006
Four Chinese entities: Beijing Alite Technologies, LIMMT Economic and Trading Company, China
June 2006
Great Wall Industry Corp, and China National Precision Machinery Import/Export Corp.
Sanam Industrial Group (Iran) and Ya Mahdi Industries Group (Iran)
July 2006
Bank Sepah (Iran)
January 2007
Kalaye Electic Company
February 2007
Defense Industries Organization (Iran)
March 2007
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Pars Trash (Iran, nuclear program), Farayand Technique (Iran, nuclear program), Fajr Industries
June 2007
Group (Iran, missile program), Mizan Machine Manufacturing Group (Iran, missile program).
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) (Iran); Korea Mining and Development Corp. (N. Korea).
September 2007
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics; Bank
October 21, 2007
Melli (Iran’s largest bank, widely used by Guard); Bank Melli Iran Zao (Moscow); Melli Bank PC
(U.K.); Bank Kargoshaee; Arian Bank (joint venture between Melli and Bank Saderat). Based in
Afghanistan; Bank Mellat (provides banking services to Iran’s nuclear sector); Mellat Bank SB CJSC
(Armenia). Reportedly has $1.4 bil ion in assets in UAE; Persia International Bank PLC (U.K.); Khatam
ol Anbiya Gharargah Sazendegi Nooh (main IRGC construction and contracting arm, with $7 bil ion
in oil, gas deals); Oriental Oil Kish (Iranian oil exploration firm); Ghorb Karbala; Ghorb Nooh
(synonymous with Khatam ol Anbiya); Sepasad Engineering Company (Guard construction affiliate);
Omran Sahel (Guard construction affiliate); Sahel Consultant Engineering (Guard construction
affiliate); Hara Company; Gharargahe Sazandegi Ghaem
Individuals: Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar (AIO, Iran missile official, see above under Resolution
October 21, 2007
1737); Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi (AIO head, Iran missile program); Reza Gholi Esmaeli (AIO, see
under Resolution 1737); Morteza Reza’i (deputy commander, IRGC). See also Resolution 1747;
Mohammad Hejazi (Basij commander). Also, Resolution 1747; Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC
Joint Staff). Resolution 1747; Hosein Salimi (IRGC Air Force commander). Resolution 1737; Qasem
Soleimani (Qods Force commander). Resolution 1747.
Future Bank (Bahrain-based but allegedly control ed by Bank Melli)
March 12, 2008
Yahya Rahim Safavi (former IRGC Commander in Chief); Mohsen Fakrizadeh-Mahabadi (senior
July 8, 2008
Defense Ministry scientist); Dawood Agha-Jani (head of Natanz enrichment site); Mohsen Hojati
(head of Fajr Industries, involved in missile program); Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (heads Shahid
Bakeri Industrial Group); Naser Maliki (heads Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group); Tamas Company
(involved in uranium enrichment); Shahid Sattari Industries (makes equipment for Shahid Bakeri); 7th
of Tir (involved in developing centrifuge technology); Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group
(partner of 7th of Tir); Parchin Chemical Industries (deals in chemicals used in ballistic missile
programs)
Karaj Nuclear Research Center; Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center (NFRPC); Jabber August 12, 2008
Ibn Hayyan (reports to Atomic Energy Org. of Iran, AEIO); Safety Equipment Procurement
Company; Joza Industrial Company (front company for Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, SHIG)
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and 18 affiliates, including Val Fajr 8; Kazar; Irinvestship;
September 10, 2008
Shipping Computer Services; Iran o Misr Shipping; Iran o Hind; IRISL Marine Services; Iriatal Shipping; South
Shipping; IRISL Multimodal; Oasis; IRISL Europe; IRISL Benelux; IRISL China; Asia Marine Network; CISCO
Shipping; and IRISL Malta
Firms affiliated to the Ministry of Defense, including Armament Industries Group; Farasakht
September 17, 2008
Industries; Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Co.; Iran Communications Industries; Iran
Electronics Industries; and Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI)
Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI). Provides financial services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and
October 22, 2008
Armed Forces Logistics; Banco Internacional de Desarollo, C.A., Venezuelan-based Iranian bank,
sanctioned as an affiliate of the Export Development Bank.
Assa Corporation (alleged front for Bank Melli involved in managing property in New York City on
December 17, 2008
behalf of Iran)
11 Entities Tied to Bank Melli: Bank Melli Iran Investment (BMIIC); Bank Melli Printing and Publishing;
March 3, 2009
Melli Investment Holding; Mehr Cayman Ltd.; Cement Investment and Development; Mazandaran Cement
Co.; Shomal Cement; Mazandaran Textile; Melli Agrochemical; First Persian Equity Fund; BMIIC Intel.
General Trading
IRGC General Rostam Qasemi, head of Khatem ol-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (main IRGC
February 10, 2010
corporate arm) and several entities linked to Khatem ol-Anbiya, including Fater Engineering
Institute, Imensazen Consultant Engineers Institute, Makin Institute, and Rahab Institute
- Post Bank of Iran
June 16, 2010
- IRGC Air Force; IRGC Missile Command
- Rah Sahel and Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering (for ties to Khatem ol-Anibya IRGC construction
affiliate)
- Mohammad Ali Jafari—IRGC Commander-in-Chief since September 2007
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- Mohammad Reza Naqdi—Head of the IRGC’s Basij militia force that suppresses dissent (since
October 2009)
- Ahmad Vahedi—Defense Minister
- Javedan Mehr Toos, Javad Karimi Sabet (procurement brokers or atomic energy managers)
- Naval Defense Missile Industry Group (SAIG, control ed by the Aircraft Industries Org that
manages Iran’s missile programs)
- Five front companies for IRISL: Hafiz Darya Shipping Co.; Soroush Sarzamin Asatir Ship Management
Co.; Safiran Payam Darya; and Hong Kong-based Seibow Limited and Seibow Logistics.
Also identified on June 16 were 27 vessels linked to IRISKL and 71 new names of already designated
IRISL ships.
Several Iranian entities were also designated as owned or control ed by Iran for purposes of the ban
on U.S. trade with Iran.
Europaisch-Iranische Handelsbank (EIH) for providing financial services to Bank Sepah, Mellat, EDBI,
September 7, 2010
and others.
Pearl Energy Company (formed by First East Export Bank, a subsidiary of Bank Mellat, Pearl Energy
November 30, 2010
Services, SA, Ali Afzali (high official of First East Export Bank), IRISL front companies: Ashtead Shipping,
Byfleet Shipping, Cobham Shipping, Dorking Shipping, Effingham Shipping, Farnham Shipping, Gomshall
Shipping, and Horsham Shipping (all located in the Isle of Man).- IRISL and affiliate officials: Mohammad
Hosein Dajmar, Gholamhossein Golpavar, Hassan Jalil Zadeh, and Mohammad Haji Pajand.
Bonyad (foundation) Taavon Sepah, for providing services to the IRGC; Ansar Bank (for providing
December 21, 2010
financial services to the IRGC); Mehr Bank (same justification as above); Moallem Insurance Company
(for providing marine insurance to IRISL, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines)
Bank of Industry and Mine (BIM)
May 17, 2011
Tidewater Middle East Company; Iran Air; Mehr-e Eqtesad Iranian Investment Co.
June 23, 2011
For proscribed nuclear activities, including centrifuge development and heavy water research: By
November 21, 2011
State—Nuclear Reactor Fuels Company; Noor Afzar Gostar Company; Fulmen Group; Yasa Part.
By Treasury—Javad Rahiqi; Modern Industries Technique Company; Iran Centrifuge
Technology Company (TESA); Neka Novin; Parto Sanat; Paya Partov; Simatic
Development Co
Iran Maritime Industrial Company SADRA (owned by IRGC engineering firm Khatem-ol-Anbiya, has
March 28, 2012
offices in Venezuela); Deep Offshore Technology PJS (subsidiary of the above); Malship Shipping
Agency and Modality Ltd (both Malta-based affiliates of IRISL); Seyed Alaeddin Sadat Rasool (IRISL legal
adviser); Ali Ezati (IRISL strategic planning and public affairs manager)
Electronic Components Industries Co. (ECI) and Information Systems Iran (ISIRAN); Advanced
July 12, 2012
Information and Communication Technology Center (AICTC) and Hamid Reza Rabiee (software
engineer for AICTC); Digital Medical Lab (DML) and Value Laboratory (owned or control ed by
Rabiee or AICTC); Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX); Daniel Frosh (Austria) and
International General Resourcing FZE)—person and his UAE-based firm allegedly supply Iran’s
missile industry.
National Iranian Oil Company; Tehran Gostaresh, company owned by Bonyad Taavon Sepah; Imam
November 8, 2012
Hossein University, owned by IRGC; Baghyatol ah Medical Sciences University, owned by IRGC or
providing services to it.
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) chief Fereidoun Abbasi Davani; Seyed Jaber Safdari of December 13, 2012
Novin Energy, a designated affiliate of AEOI; Morteza Ahmadi Behzad, provider of services to AEOI
(centrifuges); Pouya Control—provides goods and services for uranium enrichment; Iran
Pooya—provides materials for manufacture of IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuges; Aria Nikan Marine
Industry—source of goods for Iranian nuclear program; Amir Hossein Rahimyar—procurer for
Iran nuclear program; Mohammad Reza Rezvanianzadeh—involved in various aspects of nuclear
program; Faratech—involved in Iran heavy water reactor project; Neda Industrial Group—
manufacturer of equipment for Natanz enrichment facility; Tarh O Palayesh—designer of
elements of heavy water research reactor; Towlid Abzar Boreshi Iran—manufacturer for
entities affiliated with the nuclear program.
SAD Import Export Company (also designated by U.N. Sanctions Committee a few days earlier for
December 21, 2012
violating Resolution 1747 ban on Iran arms exports, along with Yas Air) for shipping arms and other
goods to Syria’s armed forces; Marine Industries Organization—designated for affiliation with Iran
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics; Mustafa Esbati, for acting on behalf of Marine
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Industries; Chemical Industries and Development of Materials Group—designated as affiliate of
Defense Industries Org.; Doostan International Company—designated for providing services to Iran
Aerospace Industries Org, which oversees Iran missile industries.
Babak Morteza Zanjani—chairmen of Sorinet Group that Iran uses to finance oil sales abroad;
April 11, 2013
International Safe Oil—provides support to NIOC and NICO; Sorinet Commercial Trust Bankers
(Dubai) and First Islamic Investment Bank (Malaysia)—finance NIOC and NICO; Kont Kosmetik and
Kont Investment Bank—control ed by Babak Zanjani; Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd.—owned by
NIOC.
Iranian-Venezuelan Bi-National Bank (IVBB), for activities on behalf of the Export Development Bank of May 9, 2013
Iran that was sanctioned on October 22, 2008 (see above). EDBI was sanctioned for providing
financial services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense. Aluminat, for providing centrifuge components to
Kalaye Electric Co.; Pars Amayesh Sanaat Kish; Pishro Systems Research Company (nuclear
research and development); Taghtiran Kashan Company; and Sambouk Shipping FZC (UAE)
For supporting Iran Air, the IRGC, and NIOC: Aban Air; Ali Mahdavi (part owner of Aban Air); DFS
May 23, 2013
Worldwide; Everex; Bahareh Mirza Hossein Yazdi; Farhad Ali Parvaresh; Petro Green; Hossein Vaziri.
For helping Iran’s nuclear program: Farhad Bujar; Zolal Iran Company; Andisheh Zolal Co.
For helping MODAFL: Reza Mozaffarinia.
Bukovnya AE (Ukraine) for leasing aircraft to Iran Air.
May 31, 2013
Several Iranian firms and persons: Eyvaz Technic Manufacturing Company; The Exploration
December 12, 2013
and Nuclear Raw Materials Company; Maro Sanat Company; Navid Composite Material
Company; Negin Parto Khavar; Neka Novin officials Iradj Mohammadi Kahvarin and
Mahmoud Mohammadi Dayeni; Neka Novin alisaes including Kia Nirou; Qods Aviation
Industries (operated by IRGC, produces UAVs, paragliders, etc); Iran Aviation Industries
Organization; Reza Amidi; Fan Pardazan; Ertebat Gostar Novin.
Ali Canko (Turkey) and Tiva Sanat Group, for procuring IRGC-Navy fast boats; Advance
February 6, 2014
Electrical and Industrial Technologies and Pere Punti (Spain), for procurement for Neka
Novin; Ulrich Wipperman and Deutsche Forfait (Germany), and Deutsche Forfait Americas (U.S.) for
facilitating oil deals for NIOC.
Karl Lee (aka Li Fangwei) and 8 China-based front companies: Sinotech Industry Co. Ltd.; MTTO
April 29, 2014
Industry and Trade Limited; Success Move Ltd.; Sinotech Dalian Carbon and Graphite Manufacturing
Corporation; Dalian Zhongchuang Char-White Co., Ltd.; Karat Industry Co., Ltd.; Dalian Zhenghua
Maoyi Youxian Gongsi; and Tereal Industry and Trade Ltd.
By State: Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (nuclear esearch); Nuclear
April 29, 2014
Science and Technology Research Institute (implements nuclear projects including heavy water
(by both State and
reactor at Arak); Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars: and Mandegar Baspar Kimiya Company (latter
Treasury)
two are involved in procuring carbon fiber for proscribed aspects of Iran’s nuclear program).
By Treasury: Mohammad Javad Imarad and Arman Imanirad (for acting on behalf of
Aluminat, which procures aluminum products for Iran’s nuclear program); Nefertiti Shipping (IRISL’s
agent in Egypt); Sazeh Morakab (provides services to Shahid Hemat Industrial Group, SHIG, and
Iran’s Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Co., HESA); Ali Gholami and Marzieh Bozorg (officials of
Sazeh Morakab). SHIG aliases identified: Sahand Aluminum Parts Co and Ardalan Machineries Co.
11 ballistic missile-related entities: Mabrooka Trading Co LLC (UAE); Hossein Pournaghshband;
January 17, 2016
Chen Mingfu; Anhui Land Group (Hong Kong); Candid General Trading; Rahim Reza Farghadani;

Sayyed Javad Musavi; Seyed Mirahmad Nooshin; Sayyed Medhi Farahi (deputy director of the
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics); Seyed Mohammad Hashemi; Mehrdada Akhlaghi
Ketabachi. According to the designations, Musavi (has worked with North Korean officials involved
in that country’s ballistic missile programs.
Two Iranian entities subordinate to SHIG: Shahid Nuri Industries and Shahid Movahed Industries.

Updating of prior IRGC Missile Command designation to include IRGC Al Ghadir Missile Command
(specific IRGC element with operational control of Iran’s missile program).
17 ballistic missile-related Entities. Abdol ah Asgharzadeh Network (for supporting SHIG): Abdol ah
February 3, 2017
Asgharzadeh; Tenny Darian; East Start Company; Ofog Sabze Company; Richard Yue (China);

Cosailing Business Trading Company (China); Jack Qin (China); Ningbo New Century Import and
Export Co. Ltd (China); and Carol Zhou (China). Gulf-Based Rostamian Network (supporting SHIG
and AIO): MKS International; Kambiz Rostamian; Royal Pearl General Trading. Iran-Based Network
Working with Navid Composite and Mabrooka Trading: Ervin Danesh Aryan Company; Mostafa
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Zahedi; Mohammad Magham. Ghodrat Zargair and Zist Tajhiz Pooyesh Company (supporting
Mabrooka Trading): Ghodrat Zargari, and Zist Tajhiz Pooyesh Company.
Ballistic missile-related entities. Rahim Ahmadi (linked to Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group); Morteza
May 17, 2017
Farasatpour (linked to Defense Industries Organization); Matin Sanat Nik Andishan (for supporting

SHIG); and Ruan Ruling and three associated Chinese companies (for supporting Iran’s missile
guidance capabilities): Shanghai Gang Quan Trade Company, Shanghai North Begins International,
and Shanghai North Transway International Trading Company.
12 IRGC/military and ballistic missile entities designated by Treasury and two by State. By Treasury:
July 18, 2017
Rayan Roshd Afzar Company for IRGC drone and censorship equipment, plus three company

officials: Mohsen Parsajam, Seyyed Reza Ghasemi, and Farshad Hekemzadeh; Qeshm Madkandaloo
Cooperative Co., Ramor Group (Turkey) and Resit Tavan of Ramor Group for supplying IRGC-
Navy infrastructure; Emily Liu, Abascience Tech Co. Ltd, Raybeam Optronics Co. Ltd., Raytronic
Corporation Ltd., and Sunway Tech Co. Ltd (all China) for supporting MODAFL subcontractor
Shiraz Electronics Industries. By State: IRGC Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Org and IRGC
Research and Self Sufficiency Jihad Org—both for supporting Iran ballistic missile program.
Missile entities related to Iran Simorgh space launch on July 27: six subordinate entities to Shahid
July 28, 2017
Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG, main Iran missile contractor) involved in making various

components of Iranian missiles: Shaid Karimi Industries; Shahid Rastegar Industries; Shahid Cheraghi
Industries; Shahid Varamini Industries; Shahid Kalhor Industries; and Amir Al Mo’Menin Industries.
Suppliers to Iran’s Naval Defence Missile Industry Group (SAIG): Shahid Alamolhoda Industries;
October 13, 2017
Rastafann Ertebat Engineering Company, Fanamoj. For supporting Iran’s military: Wuhan Sanjiang

Import and Export Company
Five ballistic missile entities (owned or control ed by Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, SBIG) : Shahid
January 4, 2018
Kharrazi Industries; Shahid Sanikhani Industries; Shahid Moghaddam Industries; Shahid Eslami

Research Center; and Shahid Shustari Industries.
Green Wave Telecommunications (Malaysia) and Morteza Razavi (for supporting Fanamoj,
January 12, 2018
designated on October 13, 2017); Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (PANHA) and
Iran Aircraft Industries (SAHA) (for supporting Iran’s military aviation industry); Shi Yuhua (China)
(for selling Iran navigation equipment); Pardazan System Namad Arman (PASNA)(for procuring lead
zirconium tritanate (PZT) for Iranian military undersea and aircraft weaponry); and Bochuang
Ceramic Inc. and Zhu Yuequn (China) for selling Iran PZT.
Sayyed Mohammad Ali Haddadnezhad Tehrani, for supporting the IRGC Research and Self-
May 22, 2018
Sufficiency Jihad Organization (see above), which is improving Houthi missile capabilities
Bank Tejarat (for providing servides to support Bank Sepah); Trade Capital Bank (Belarus); Morteza
November 5, 2018
Ahmadali Behzad (for acting on behalf of Pishro Company.
Iran-Related Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13224 (Terrorism Entities)
Martyr’s Foundation (Bonyad Shahid), a major Iranian foundation (bonyad)—for providing financial
July 25, 2007
support to Hezbol ah and PIJ; Goodwil Charitable Organization, a Martyr’s Foundation office in
Dearborn, Michigan; Al Qard Al Hassan—part of Hezbol ah’s financial infrastructure (and associated
with previously designated Hezbol ah entities Husayn al-Shami, Bayt al-Mal, and Yousser Company
for Finance and Investment); Qasem Aliq—Hezbol ah official, director of Martyr’s Foundation
Lebanon branch, and head of Jihad al-Bina, a previously designated Lebanese construction company
run by Hezbol ah; Ahmad al-Shami—financial liaison between Hezbol ah in Lebanon and Martyf’s
Foundation chapter in Michigan.
IRGC-Qods Force and Bank Saderat (allegedly used to funnel Iranian money to Hezbol ah, Hamas,
October 21, 2007
PIJ, and other Iranian supported terrorist groups)
Al Qaeda Operatives in Iran: Saad bin Laden; Mustafa Hamid; Muhammad Rab’a al-Bahtiyti; Alis Saleh January 16, 2009
Husain.
Qods Force senior officers: Hushang Allahdad, Hossein Musavi,Hasan Mortezavi, and Mohammad
August 3, 2010
Reza Zahedi; Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon, and its director Hesam
Khoshnevis, for supporting Lebanese Hezbol ah; Imam Khomeini Relief Committee Lebanon branch,
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and its director Ali Zuraik, for providing support to Hezbol ah; Razi Musavi, a Syrian based Iranian
official allegedly providing support to Hezbol ah.
Liner Transport Kish (for providing shipping services to transport weapons to Lebanese Hezbol ah)
December 21, 2010
Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force commander); Hamid Abdol ahi (Qods force); Abdul Reza Shahlai
October 11, 2011
(Qods Force); Ali Gholam Shakuri (Qods Force); Manssor Arbabsiar (alleged plotter)
Mahan Air (for transportation services to Qods Force)
October 12, 2011
Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran (MOIS)
February 16, 2012
Five entities/persons for weapons shipments to Syria and an October 2011 shipment to Gambia,
March 27, 2012
intercepted in Nigeria: Yas Air (successor to Pars Air); Behineh Air (Iranian trading company); Ali
Abbas Usman Jega (Nigerian shipping agent); Qods Force officers: Esmail Ghani, Sayyid Ali
Tabatabaei, and Hosein Aghajani.
Mohammad Minai, senior Qods Force member involved in Iraq; Karim Muhsin al-Ghanimi, leader of
November 8, 2012
Kata’ib Hezbol ah (KH) militia in Iraq; Sayiid Salah Hantush al-Maksusi, senior KH member; and
Riyad Jasim al-Hamidawi, Iran based KH member.
Ukraine-Mediterranean Airlines (Um Air, Ukraine) for helping Mahan Air and Iran Air conduct il icit
May 31, 2013
activities; Rodrigue Elias Merhej (owner of Um Air); Kyrgyz Trans Avia (KTA, Kyrgyzstan) for
leasing aircraft to Mahan Air; Lidia Kim, director of KTA; Sirjanco (UAE) for serving as a front for
Mahan Air acquisition of aircraft; Hamid Arabnejad, managing director of Mahan Air.
Several persons/entities in UAE aiding Mahan Air (see above): Blue Sky Aviation FZE; Avia Trust
February 6, 2014
FZE; Hamidreza Malekouti Pour; Pejman Mahmood Kosrayanifard; and Gholamreza Mahmoudi.
Several IRGC-Qods Force offices or facilitators involved in Iran’s efforts in Afghanistan: Sayyed
Kamal Musavi; Alireza Hemmati; Akbar Seyed Alhosseini; and Mahmud Afkhami Rashidi.
One Iran-based Al Qaeda facilitator (supporting movement of Al Qaeda affiliated fightes to Syria):
Olimzhon Adkhamovich Sadikov (aka Jafar al-Uzbeki or Jafar Muidinov).
Meraj Air (for delivering weapons to Syria from Iran); Caspian Air (supports IRGC by transporting
August 29, 2014
personnel and weapons to Syria); Sayyed Jabar Hosseini (manager of Liner Transport Kish which
IRGC uses to support terrorist activities outside Iran); Pioneer Logistics (Turkey, helps Mahan Air
evade sanctions); Asian Aviation Logistics (Thailand, helps Mahan Air evade sanctions). Pouya Air
designated as alias of Yas Air.
Al Naser Airlines (Iraq) for transferring nine aircraft to Mahan Air, which is a 13224 designee: Issam
May 21, 2015
Shamout, a Syrian businessman, and his company Sky Blue Bird Aviation, for the same transaction.
Four U.K.-based and two UAE-based entities for supporting Mahan Air. U.K.: Jeffrey John James
March 24, 2016
Ashfield; Aviation Capital Solutions; Aircraft, Avionics, Parts and Support Ltd (AAPS); John Edward
Meadows (for acting on behalf of AAPS). UAE: Grandeur General Trading FZE and HSI Trading FZE.
Eight Entities. Lebanon-Based IRGC-QF Network: Hasan Dehghan Ebrahimi (IRGC-QF operative in
February 3, 2017
Beirut supporting Hezbol ah); Muhammad Abd-al-Amir Farhat; Yahya al-hajj; Maher Trading and
Construction Company (laundering funds and smuggling goods to Hezbol ah); Reem Phamaceutical;
Mirage for Engineering and Trading; Mirage for Waste Management and Environmental Services. Ali
Sharifi (for procuring aviation spare parts for the IRGC-QF).
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
October 13, 2017
Six entities involved in IRGC-QF counterfeiting: Reza Heidari; Pardazesh Tasvir Rayan Co. (Rayan
November 20, 2017
Printing); ForEnt Technik and Printing Trade Center GmbH (Germany); Mahmoud Seif; Tejarat
Almas Mobin Holding (parent of Rayan Printing).
Nine individuals and entities, disrupted by U.S.-UAE joint action, attempting to acquire dol ars in
May 10, 2018
UAE to provide to the IRGC-QF: Individuals: Mas’ud Nikbakht, Sa’id Najafpur, and Mohammad
Khoda’i, for financial activities on behalf of the IRGC-QF; Mohammadreza Valadzaghard, Meghdad
Amini, and Foad Salehi, for providing material support, including il icit financial assistance, to the
IRGC-QF. Entities: Jahan Aras Kish, a front company involved in transferring and converting funds
for the IRGC-QF, Rashed Exchange, for converting currency for the IRGC-QF, and Khedmati and
Company Joint Partnership, for being owned by Khedmati and Khoda’i.
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Persons and entities providing funds to Hezbol ah on behalf of the IRGC-QF: Central Bank
May 15, 2018
Governor Valiol ah Seif; Aras Habib and his Iraq-based Al Bilad Islamic Bank; and Muhammad Qasir
Four persons for helping the Houthi missile program through the IRGC Aerospace Forces Al
May 22, 2018
Ghadir Missile Command: Mahmud Bagheri Kazemabad; Mohammad Agha Ja’fari; Javad Bordbar Shir
Amin; and Mehdi Azarpisheh (IRGC-QF affiliate)
Twenty-one entities linked to the Basij security force, including firms it owns or controls that
October 16,2018
provide it revenue to send child soldiers to fight in Syria: Bonyad Taavon Basij (economic
conglomerate giving financial support to Basij members); Mehr Eqtesad Bank; Bank Mellat; Mehr
Eqtesad Iranian Investment Company; Tadbirgaran Atiyeh Investment Company; Negin Sahel Royal
Company; Mehr Eqtesad Financial Group; Technotar Engineering Company; Iran Tractor
Manufacturing Company (owned by Mehr Investment and Negin above); Taktar Investment
Company; Iran’s Zinc Mines Development Company; Calcimin (owned by Iran Zinc Mines above);
Bandar Abbas Zinc Production Company; Qeshm Zinc Smelting and Reduction Company; Zanjan
Acid Production Company; Parsian Catalyst Chemical Company; Esfehan’s Mobarakeh Steel
Company (largest steel maker in Middle East and North Africa); Andisheh Mehvaran Investment
Company; Parsian Bank; Sina Bank; and Bahman Group.
IRGC-QF personnel supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan (in conjunction with U.S.-GCC Terrorist
October 23, 2018
Financing Targeting Center): Mohammad Ebrahim Owhadi and Esma’il Razavi

Banks and other Entities newly designated. Many of these entities are also being redesignated under
November 5, 2018
EO13382, but their designations below under 13224 is new. Aircraft and vessels are not included:
(in concert with
Bank Melli; Arian Bank; Bank Kargoshaee; Melli Bank PLC; Tose-E Develoment Company; Behshahr
reimposition of
Industrial Development Corp.; Cement Industry and Development Company; Melli International
JCPOA-related
Building and Industry Company; BMIIC International General Trading LLC; Shomal Cement
sanctions)
Company; Persian Gulf Sabz Karafarinan; Mir Business Bank; Export Development Bank of Iran
(EDBI); EDBIStock Exchange; EDBI Exchange Brokerage; Banco Internacional de Desarrol o, C.A.;
Iran-Venezuela Bi-National Bank; Day Bank and subsidiaries—Atieh Sazan Day; Buali Investment
Company; Tejarat Gostar Fardad; Day Exchange Company; Day Leasing Co.; Day Brokerage Co.;
Tose-e Didar Iran Holding Co.; Royay-e Roz Kish Investment Co; Day E-Commerce; Tose-e Donya
Shahr Kohan Co.; Damavand Power Generation Co,; Omid Bonyan Day Insurance Services; Omran
Va Maskan Abad Day Co.; Day Iranian Financial and Accounting Services Co.; Persian International
Bank PLC; First East Export Bank PLC; Mellat Bank Close Joint-Stock Co.; Bank Tejarat; and Trade
Capital Bank (Belarus).
Four Hezbol ah and IRGC-QF-related individuals who operate in Iraq : Shibl Mushin ‘Ubayd Al-
November 13, 2018
Zaydi; Yusuf Hashim; Adnan Hussein Kawtharani; Muhammad ‘Abd-Al-Hadi Farhat
Individuals involved in a network through which Iran provides oil to Syria’s government and transfer
November 20, 2018
funds to Iranian proxies including Hezbol ah and Hamas: Mohamed Amer Alchwiki (also designated
under E.O. 13582 for providing financial support to the government of Syria); Global Vision Group
(also designated under E.O. 13582); Rasul Sajjad and Hossein Yaghoobi (for assisting the IRGC-QF);
and Muhammad Qasim al-Bazzal (for assisting Hezbol ah).

Also designated under E.O. 13582 as part of the network (but not designated under E.O. 13224):
Promsyrioimport; Andrey Dogaev; Mir Business Bank; and Tadbir Kish Medical and Pharmaceutical
Company
Two Iran-recruited Afghan and Pakistani-staffed militia entities fighting in Syria: Fatemiyoun Division
January 24, 2019
and Zaynabiyoun Brigade. Qeshm Fars Air and Flight Travel LLC – Mahan Air affiliates - for weapons
deliveries into Syria.

Determinations and Sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act
Total SA (France); Gazprom (Russia); and Petronas (Malaysia)—$2 bil ion project to develop South
May 18, 1998
Pars gas field. ISA violation determined but sanctions waived in line with U.S.-EU agreement for EU
to cooperate on antiterrorism and antiproliferation issues and not file a complaint at the WTO.
Then-Secretary of State Albright, in the May 18, 1998, waiver announcement indicated that similar
future such projects by EU firms in Iran would not be sanctioned. (http://www.parstimes.com/law/
albright_southpars.html). Violation determined but sanctions waived.
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Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO), Iran and Switzerland. Sanctioned for activities to develop Iran’s
Sept. 30, 2010
energy sector. Sanctions lifted under JCPOA.
Total (France); Statoil (Norway); ENI (Italy); and Royal Dutch Shell.
Sept. 30, 2010
Exempted under ISA “special rule” for pledging to wind down work on Iran energy fields.
Inpex (Japan)
Nov. 17, 2010
Exempted under the Special rule for divesting its remaining 10% stake in Azadegan oil field.
Belarusneft (Belarus, subsidiary of Belneftekhim) Sanctioned for $500 mil ion contract with NICO
March 29, 2011
(see above) to develop Jofeir oil field. Other subsidiaries of Belneftekhim were sanctioned in 2007
under E.O. 13405 (Belarus sanctions). Sanctions remain.
Petrochemical Commercial Company International (PCCI) of Bailiwick of Jersey and Iran; Royal
May 24, 2011
Oyster Group (UAE); Tanker Pacific (Singapore); Allvale Maritime (Liberia); Societie Anonyme
Monegasque Et Aerienne (SAMAMA, Monaco); Speedy Ship (UAE/Iran); Associated Shipbroking
(Monaco); and Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA, Venezuela).
Sanctioned under CISADA amendment to ISA imposing sanctions for selling gasoline to Iran or
helping Iran import gasoline. Allvale Maritime and SAMAMA determinations were issued on
September 13, 2011, to “clarify” the May 24 determinations that had named Ofer Brothers Group.
The two, as well as Tanker Pacific, are affiliated with a Europe-based trust linked to deceased Ofer
brother Sami Ofer, and not Ofer Brothers Group based in Israel. Firms named subjected primarily
to the financial sanctions provided in ISA. U.S.-based subsidiaries of PDVSA, such as Citgo, were not
sanctioned. Sanctions lifted under JCPOA.
Zhuhai Zhenrong Co. (China); Kuo Oil Pte Ltd. (Singapore); FAL Oil Co. (UAE)
January 12, 2012
Sanctioned for brokering sales or making sales to Iran of gasoline. Sanctions lifted under JCPOA.
Sytrol (Syria), for sales of gasoline to Iran. Sanctions remain.
August 12, 2012
Dr. Dimitris Cambis; Impire Shipping; Kish Protection and Indemnity (Iran); and Bimeh Markasi-
March 14, 2013
Central Insurance of Iran (CII, Iran)
Sanctioned under ISA provision on owning vessels that transport Iranian oil or providing insurance
for the shipments. Treasury sanctions also imposed on eight UAE-based oil traders that concealed
the transactions. Sanctions lifted under JCPOA.
Tanker Pacific; SAMAMA; and Allvale Maritime
April 12, 2013
Sanctions lifted. Special rule applied after “reliable assurances” they will not engage in similar activity in
the future.
Ferland Co. Ltd. (Cyprus and Ukraine)
May 31, 2013
Sanctioned for cooperating with National Iranian Tanker Co. to il icitly sell Iranian crude oil.
Sanctions lifted under JCPOA.
Dettin SPA
August 29, 2014
Sanctioned. Italy-based company sanctioned for providing goods and services to Iran’s
petrochemical industry. Sanctions lifted under JCPOA.
Entities Sanctioned Under the Iran North Korea Syria Nonproliferation Act or Executive Order 12938
for Iran-Specific Violations
The designations are under the Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) unless specified.
These designations expire after two years, unless redesignated
Baltic State Technical University and Glavkosmos, both of Russia.
July 30, 1998
(Both “delisted” in 2010)
D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology of Russia and Moscow Aviation Institute (Both
January 8, 1999
removed on May 21, 2010)
Changgwang Sinyong Corp. (North Korea)
January 2, 2001
Changgwang Sinyong Corp. (North Korea) and Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import-
June 14, 2001
Export (China)
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Three entities from China
January 16, 2002
Armen Sargsian and Lizen Open Joint Stock Co. (Armenia); Cuanta SA and Mikhail Pavlovich Vladov
May 9, 2002
(Moldova); and eight China entities
Norinco (China). For alleged missile technology sale to Iran.
May 2003
Taiwan Foreign Trade General Corporation (Taiwan)
July 4, 2003
Tula Instrument Design Bureau (Russia). For alleged sales of laser-guided artil ery shells to Iran. (Also
September 17, 2003
designated under Executive Order 12938)
13 entities sanctioned including companies from Russia, China, Belarus, Macedonia, North Korea, UAE,
April 1, 2004
and Taiwan.
14 entities from China, North Korea, Belarus, India (two nuclear scientists, Dr. Surendar and Dr. Y.S.R. September 23, 2004
Prasad), Russia, Spain, and Ukraine.
14 entities, mostly from China, for supplying of Iran’s missile program. Designations included North
December 2004 and
Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong and China’s Norinco and Great Wall Industry Corp, have been
January 2005
sanctioned several times previously. Others sanctioned included North Korea’s Paeksan Associated
Corporation, and Taiwan’s Ecoma Enterprise Co.
Nine entities, including those from China (Norinco, Hondu Aviation, Dalian Sunny Industries, Zibo
December 23, 2005
Chemet Equipment); India (Sabero Organicx Chemicals and Sandhya Organic Chemicals); and Austria
(Steyr Mannlicher Gmbh). Sanctions against Dr. Surendar of India (see September 29, 2004) were
ended, presumably because of information exonerating him.
Two Indian chemical companies (Balaji Amines and Prachi Poly Products); two Russian firms
July 28, 2006
(Rosobornexport and aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi); two North Korean entities (Korean Mining and
Industrial Development, and Korea Pugang Trading); and one Cuban entity (Center for Genetic
Engineering and Biotechnology).
Abu Hamadi (Iraq); Aerospace Logistics Services (Mexico); Al Zargaa Optical and Electronics (Sudan);
December 28, 2006
Alexey Safonov (Russia); Arif Durrani (Pakistan)China National Aero Technology Import-Export
(China); China National Electronic Import Export (China); Defense Industries Org. (Iran); Giad
Industrial Complex (Sudan); Iran Electronics Industry (Iran); Kal al-Zuhiry (Iraq); Kolomna Design
Bureau of Machine Building (Russia); NAB Export Co. (Iran); Rosoboronexport (Russia); Sanam
Industrial Group (Iran); Target Airfreight (Malaysia); Tula Design Bureau of Instrument Building (Russia);
Yarmouk Industrial Complex (Sudan) Zibo Chemet Equipment Co. (China)
Rosobornexport, Tula Design, and Komna Design Office of Machine Building, and Alexei Safonov
January 2007 (see
(Russia); Zibo Chemical, China National Aerotechnology, and China National Electrical (China). Korean below for Tula and
Mining and Industrial Development (North Korea) for WMD or advanced weapons sales to Iran (and
Rosoboronexport
Syria).
removal)
14 entities, including Lebanese Hezbol ah. Some were penalized for transactions with Syria. Among the
April 17, 2007
new entities sanctioned for assisting Iran were Shanghai Non-Ferrous Metals Pudong Development
Trade Company (China); Iran’s Defense Industries Organization; Sokkia Company (Singapore);
Challenger Corporation (Malaysia); Target Airfreight (Malaysia); Aerospace Logistics Services (Mexico);
and Arif Durrani (Pakistani national).
China Xinshidai Co.; China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Corp.; Huazhong CNC (China);
October 23, 2008
IRGC; Korea Mining Development Corp. (North Korea); Korea Taesong Trading Co. (NK);
Yolin/Yul in Tech, Inc. (South Korea); Rosoboronexport (Russia sate arms export agency); Sudan
Master Technology; Sudan Technical Center Co; Army Supply Bureau (Syria); R and M International
FZCO (UAE); Venezuelan Military Industries Co. (CAVIM). (Rosoboronexport removed May 21, 2010.)
BelTechExport (Belarus); Dalian Sunny Industries (China); Defense Industries Organization (Iran); Karl
July 14, 2010
Lee; Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG); Shanghai Technical By-Products International (China); Zibo
Chemet Equipment (China)
16 entities: Belarus: Belarusian Optical Mechanical Association; Beltech Export; China: Karl Lee; Dalian
May 23, 2011
Sunny Industries; Dalian Zhongbang Chemical Industries Co.; Xian Junyun Electronic; Iran: Milad Jafari;
DIO; IRISL; Qods Force; SAD Import-Export; SBIG; North Korea: Tangun Trading; Syria: Industrial
Establishment of Defense; Scientific Studies and Research Center; Venezuela: CAVIM.
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Belvneshpromservice (Belarus); Dalian Sunny Industries (China); Defense Industries Organization (Iran); December 20, 2011
Karl Lee (China); SAD Import-Export (Iran); Zibo Chemet Equipment Co. (Iran); F
Al Zargaa Engineering Complex (Sudan); BST Technology and Trade Co. (China); China Precision
February 5, 2013
Machinery Import and Export Co. (China); Dalian Sunny Industries (China); Iran Electronics Industries
(these designations,
(Iran); Karl Lee (China); Marine Industries Organization (Iran); Milad Jafari (Iran); Poly Technologies
and prior designations
(China); Scientific and Industrial Republic Unitary Enterprise (Belarus); SMT Engineering (Sudan); TM
above, have expired)
Services Ltd. (Belarus); Venezuelan Military Industry Co. (CAVIM, Venezuela).
Al Zargaa Engineering Complex (Sudan); Belvneshpromservice (Belarus); HSC Mic NPO
December 19, 2014.
Mashinostroyenia (Russia); Russian Aircraft Corporation (MiG); Giad Heavy Industries Complex
Sanctions stil active.
(Sudan); Sudan Master Technologies (Sudan); Military Industrial Corps. (Sudan); Yarmouk Industrial
Syria designations not
Complex (Sudan); Venezuelan Military Industry Co. (CAVIM, Venezula)
included
BST Technology and Trade Co. (China); Dalian Sunny Industries (China); Li Fang Wei (China); Tianjin
August 28, 2015.
Flourish Chemical Co. (China); Qods Force Commander Qasem Soleimani; IRGC; Rock Chemie (Iran);
Sanctions stil active.
Polestar Trading Co. Ltd. (North Korean entity in China); RyonHap-2 (North Korea) Tula Instrument
Designations that
Design Bureau (Russia); Joint Stock Co. Katod (Russia); JSC Mic NPO Mashinostroyenia (Russia);
applied to Syria or
Rosoboronexport (Russia) Russian Aircraft Corp. MiG (Russia); Sudanese Armed Forces (Sudan); Vega
North Korea not
Aeronautics (Sudan); Yarmouk Complex (Sudan); Hezbol ah; Eliya General Trading (UAE).
included.
Asaib Ahl Haq (Iraqi Shi te militia); Katai’b Hezbol ah (Iraqi militia); IRGC; Shahid Moghadam-Yazd
June 28, 2016
Marine Industries (Iran); Shiraz Electronic Industries (Iran); Hezbol ah; Military Industrial Corp. (Sudan);
Sanctions stil active.
Khartoum Industrial Complex (Sudan); Khartoum Military Industrial Complex (Sudan); Luwero
Industries (Uganda)
11 entities sanctions for transfers of sensitive items to Iran’s ballistic missile program (all China except
March 21, 2017
as specified: Beijing Zhong Ke Electric Co.; Dalian Zenghua Maoyi Youxian Gongsi; Jack Qin; Jack
Wang; Karl Lee; Ningbo New Century Import and Export Co.; Shenzhen Yataida High-Tech Company;
Sinotech Dalian Carbon and Graphite Corp.; Sky Rise Technology (aka Reekay); Saeng Pil Trading
Corp. (North Korea); Mabrooka Trading (UAE)
Entities Designated under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992
(all designations have expired or were lifted)
Mohammad al-Khatib (Jordan); Protech Consultants Private (India)
December 13, 2003
China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Corp. (China); China Machinery and
July 9, 2002
Equipment Import-Export Co. (China); China National Machinery and Equipment Import-Export Co.
(China); China Shipbuilding Trading Co. (China); CMEC Machinery (China); Hans Raj Shiv (India);
Jiangsu Youngli Chemicals and Technology Import-Export Co. (China); Q.C. Chen (China); Wha
Cheong Tai Co. Ltd. (China).
Entities Designated as Threats to Iraqi Stability under Executive Order 13438 (July 17, 2007)
Ahmad Forouzandeh. Commander of the Qods Force Ramazan Headquarters, accused of fomenting
January 8, 2008
sectarian violence in Iraq and of organizing training in Iran for Iraqi Shi te militia fighters; Abu Mustafa
al-Sheibani. Iran based leader of network that funnels Iranian arms to Shi te militias in Iraq; Isma’il al-
Lami (Abu Dura). Shi te militia leader, breakaway from Sadr Mahdi Army, alleged to have committed
mass kidnapings and planned assassination attempts against Iraqi Sunni politicians; Mishan al-Jabburi.
Financier of Sunni insurgents, owner of pro-insurgent Al-Zawra television; Al Zawra Television
Station.
Abdul Reza Shahlai, a deputy commander of the Qods Force; Akram Abbas Al Kabi, leader of Mahdi
September 16, 2008
Army “Special Groups”; Harith Al Dari, Sunnis Islamist leader (Secretary General of the Muslim
Scholars’ Association; Ahmad Hassan Kaka Al Ubaydi, ex-Baathist leader of Sunni insurgents based in
Iraq’s Kirkuk Province; and three person/entities designated for operating Syria-based media that
support Iraqi Sunni insurgents: Al Ray Satellite TV Channel, and Suraqiya for Media and Broadcasting,
owned by Mish’an Al Jabburi (see above), and Raw’a Al Usta (wife of Al Jabburi.
Khata’ib Hezbol ah (pro-Iranian Mahdi splinter group); Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis
July 2, 2009

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Iranians Designated Under Executive Order 13553 on Human Rights Abusers (September 29, 2010)
These persons are named in a semiannual report to Congress, required under CISADA. Virtually all of the persons on this list,
and those listed under Executive order 13628 (below) are designated as human rights abusers by the European Union, whose list
contains 87 individuals, including several province-level prosecutors
Eight persons: IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari; Minister of Interior at time of June 2009
September 29, 2010
elections Sadeq Mahsouli; Minister of Intelligence at time of elections Qolam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei;
Tehran Prosecutor General at time of elections Saeed Mortazavi; Minister of Intelligence Heydar
Moslehi; Former Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar; Deputy National Police Chief Ahmad
Reza Radan; Basij (security militia) Commander at time of elections Hossein Taeb
Two persons: Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Dowlatabadi (appointed August 2009), for indicting
February 23, 2011
large numbers of protesters; Basij forces commander Mohammad Reza Naqdi (headed Basij
intelligence during 2009 protests)
Four entities: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); Basij Resistance Force; Law Enforcement
June 9, 2011
Forces (LEF); LEF Commander Ismail Ahmad Moghadam
Two persons: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hassan Firouzabadi; Deputy IRGC Commander
December 13, 2011
Abdol ah Araghi
One entity: Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran (MOIS)
February 16, 2012
One person: Ashgar Mir-Hejazi for human rights abuses on/after June 12, 2009, and for providing
May 30, 2013
material support to the IRGC and MOIS.
One entity: Abyssec, for training the IRGC in cyber tradecraft and supporting its development of
December 30, 2014
offensive information operations capabilities.
One entity and One person: Tehran Prisons Organization. For severe beating of prisoners at Evin
April 13, 2017
Prison in April 2014; Sohrab Soleimani (brother of IRGC-QF commander) as head of Tehran
Prisoners Organization at the time of the attack above. Heads State Prisons Organization.
Persons and entities designated fol owing repression of December 2017-January 2018 protests:
January 12, 2018
Judiciary head Sadeq Amoli Larijani (highest-ranking Iranian official sanctioned by the United States);
Rajaee Shahr Prison; and Gholmreza Ziaei
Ansar-e Hezbol ah internal security militia designations: Ansar-e Hezbol ah; Ansar leaders Abdolhamid May 30, 3018
Mohtasham; Hossein Allahkaram; and Hamid Ostad. Evin Prison.
Ghavamin Bank (for assisting Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces, LEF)
November 5, 2018
Fatemiyoun Division and Zaynabiyoun Brigade
January 24, 2019

Iranian Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13572 for Repression of the Syrian People
(April 29, 2011)
Revolutionary Guard—Qods Force (IRGC-QF)
April 29, 2011
Qasem Soleimani (Qods Force Commander); Mohsen Chizari (Commander of Qods Force operations
May 18, 2011
and training)
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)
February 16, 2012
Iranian Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13606 (GHRAVITY, April 23, 2012))
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); IRGC (Guard Cyber Defense Command); Law
April 23, 2012
Enforcement Forces; Datak Telecom
IRGC Electronic Warfare and Cyber Defense Organization
January 12, 2018
Hanista Programming Group. For operating technology that monitors or tracks computers
May 30, 2018
Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13608 Targeting Sanctions Evaders (May 1, 2012)
Ferland Company Ltd. for helping NITC deceptively sel Iranian crude oil
May 31, 2013
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Three persons based in the Republic of Georgia: Pourya Nayebi, Houshang Hosseinpour, and Houshang
February 6, 2014
Farsoudeh.
Eight firms owned or controlled by the three: Caucasus Energy (Georgia); Orchidea Gulf Trading (UAE and/or
Turkey); Georgian Business Development (Georgia and/or UAE); Great Business Deals (Georgia and/or UAE);
KSN Foundation (Lichtenstein); New York General Trading (UAE); New York Money Exchange (UAE and/or
Georgia); and European Oil Traders (Switzerland).
Entities Named as Iranian Government Entities Under Executive Order 13599 (February 5, 2012)
Hundreds of entities—many of which are names and numbers of individual ships and aircraft—were designated under this Order
to implement the JCPOA, and removed from the list of SDNs, in order that secondary sanctions not apply. Those entities are in
italics. Others were designated as owned or control ed by the government of Iran before the JCPOA. As of November 5, 2018,
all the entities designated under E.O. 13599 are subject to secondary sanctions.
Two insurance companies: Bimeh Iran Insurance Company (U.K.) Ltd. and Iran Insurance Company.
June 16, 2010
20 Petroleum and Petrochemical Entities: MSP Kala Naft Co. Tehran; Kala Limited; Kala Pension Trust
Limited; National Iranian Oil Company PTE Ltd; Iranian Oil Company (U.K.) Ltd.; NIOC International Affairs
(London) Ltd.; Naftiran Trading Services Co. (NTS) Ltd.; NICO Engineering Ltd.; National Petrochemical
Company; Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company; NPC International Ltd.; Intra Chem Trading Gmbh;
Petrochemical Commercial Company International Ltd.; P.C.C. (Singapore) Private Ltd.; Petrochemical
Commercial Company FZE; Petrochemical Commercial Company (U.K.) Ltd.; PetroIran Development Company
(PEDCO) Ltd.; Petropars Ltd.; Petropars International FZE; Petropars U.K. Ltd.
Central Bank of Iran (aka Bank Markazi)
February 12, 2012
Shipping Companies: Arash Shipping Enterprises Ltd.; Arta Shipping Enterprises Ltd.; Asan Shipping
July 12, 2012
Enterprise Ltd.; Caspian Maritime Ltd.; Danesh Shipping Co. Ltd.; Davar Shipping Co. Ltd.; Dena Tankers FZE;
Good Luck Shipping LLC; Hadi Shipping Company Ltd.; Haraz Shipping Company Ltd.; Hatef Shipping
Company Ltd.; Hirmand Shipping Company Ltd,; Hoda Shipping Company Ltd.; Homa Shipping Company Ltd.;
Honar Shipping Company Ltd.; Mehran Shipping Company Ltd.; Mersad Shipping Company Ltd.; Minab
Shipping Company Ltd.; Pars Petrochemical Shipping Company; Proton Petrochemicals Shipping Ltd; Saman
Shipping Company Ltd.; Sarv Shipping Company Ltd.; Sepid Shipping Company Ltd.; Sima Shipping Company
Ltd.; Sina Shipping Company Ltd.; TC Shipping Company Ltd.
Energy Firms: Petro Suisse Intertrade Company (Switzerland); Hong Kong Intertrade Company (Hong
Kong); Noor Energy (Malaysia); Petro Energy Intertrade (Dubai, UAE) (all four named as front companies
for NIOC, Naftiran Intertrade Company, Ltd (NICO), or NICO Sarl)
58 vessels of National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC)
Banks: Ansar Bank; Future Bank B.S.C; Post Bank of Iran; Dey Bank; Eghtesad Novin Bank; Hekmat Iranian
Bank; Iran Zamin Bank; Islamic Regional Cooperation Bank; Joint Iran-Venezuela Bank; Karafarin Bank;
Mehr Iran Credit Union Bank; Parsian Bank; Pasargad Bank; Saman Bank; Sarmayeh Bank; Tat Bank; Tosee
Taavon Bank; Tourism Bank; Bank-e Shahr; Credit Institution for Development
Entities and persons helping Iran evade oil shipping sanctions: Dimitris Cambis; Impire Shipping Co.; Libra March 14, 2013
Shipping SA; Monsoon Shipping Ltd.; Koning Marine Ltd.; Blue Tanker Shipping SA; Jupiter Seaways Shipping;
Hercules International Ship; Hermis Shipping SA; Garbin Navigation Ltd.; Grace Bay Shipping Inc; Sima
General Trading Co. FZE; Polinex General Trading LLC; Asia Energy General Trading; Synergy General Trading
FZE.
Sambouk Shipping FZC, which is tied to Dr. Dimitris Cambis and his network of front companies.
May 9, 2013
Eight petrochemicals companies: Bandar Imam; Bou Ali Sina; Mobin; Nouri; Pars; Shahid Tondgooyan;
May 31, 2013
Shazand; and Tabriz.
Six individuals including Seyed Nasser Mohammad Seyyedi, director of Sima General Trading who is also
September 6, 2013
associated with NIOC and NICO. The other 5 persons sanctioned manage firms associated with
NIOC and NICO.
Four businesses used by Seyyedi to assist NIOC and NICO front companies: AA Energy FZCO; Petro
Royal FZE; and KASB International LLC (all in UAE); and Swiss Management Services Sarl.
Execution of Imam’s Order (EIKO) and entities under its umbrella, designated for hiding assets on behalf
January 4, 2013
of the government of Iran’s leadership: Tosee e Eqtesad Ayandehsazan Company (TEACO); Tadbir
Economic Development Company (Tadbir Group); Tadbir Investment Company; Modaber; Tadbir
Construction Development Company; Tadbir Energy Development Group; Amin Investment Bank; Pardis
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Investment Company; Mellat Insurance Company; Rey Investment Company; Reyco GmbH; MCS International
GmbH (Mannesman Cylinder Systems); MCS Engineering (Efficient Provider Services GmbH); Golden
Resources Trading Company L.L.C. (GRTC); Cylinder System Ltd. (Cylinder System DDO); One Vision
Investments 5 (Pty) Ltd.; One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd.; Iran and Shargh Company; Iran and Shargh Leasing
Company; Tadbir Brokerage Company; Rafsanjan Cement Company; Rishmak Productive and Exports
Company; Omid Rey Civil and Construction Company; Behsaz Kashane Tehran Construction Company; Royal
Arya Company; Hormuz Oil Refining Company; Ghaed Bassir Petrochemical Products Company; Persia Oil and
Gas Industry Development Company; Pars Oil Company; Commercial Pars Oil Company; Marjan
Petrochemical Company; Ghadir Investment Company; Sadaf Petrochemical Assaluyeh Company; Polynar
Company; Pars MCS; Arman Pajouh Sabzevaran Mining Company; Oil industry Investment Company; Rey
Niru Engineering Company.
Five Iranian banks: Khavarmianeh Bank, Ghavamin Bank, Gharzolhasaneh Bank, Kish International Bank,
August 29, 2014
and Kafolatbank (Tajikistan).
Numerous Iranian aircraft and vessels were designated under this Order, in keeping with the
November 5, 2018
reimposition of U.S. secondary sanctions.

Entities Sanctioned Under Executive Order 13622 for Oil and Petrochemical Purchases from
Iran and Precious Metal Transactions with Iran (July 30, 2012)
All entities were delisted (and are italicized) and the Order was revoked to implement the JCPOA
Jam Petrochemical Company (for purchasing petrochemical products from Iran); Niksima Food and
May 31, 2013
Beverage JLT (for receiving payments on behalf of Jam Petrochemical).
Asia Bank (for delivering from Moscow to Tehran of $13 mil ion in U.S. bank notes paid to
August 29, 2014
representatives of the Iranian government).
Five individuals and one company for helping Iran acquire U.S. banknotes: Hossein Zeidi, Seyed Kamal
December 30, 2014
Yasini, Azizullah Qulandary, Asadollah Seifi, Teymour Ameri, and Belfast General Trading.
Anahita Nasirbeik—Asia Bank official (see above).
Entities Sanctioned under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA, P.L. 112-239)
Goldentex FZE (UAE)
August 29, 2014

Entities Designated as Human Rights Abusers or Limiting Free Expression under Executive Order 13628
(October 9, 2012, E.O pursuant to Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act)
Ali Fazli, deputy commander of the Basij; Reza Taghipour, Minister of Communications and
November 8, 2012
Information Technology; LEF Commander Moghaddam (see above); Center to Investigate Organized
Crime (established by the IRGC to protect the government from cyberattacks; Press Supervisory
Board, established in 1986 to issue licenses to publications and oversee news agencies; Ministry of
Culture and Islamic Guidance; Rasool Jalili, active in assisting the government’s internet censorship
activities; Anm Afzar Goster-e-Sharif, company owned by Jalili, above, to provide web monitoring and
censorship gear; PekyAsa, another company owned by Jalili, to develop telecom software.
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and Ezzatol ah Zarghami (director and head of IRIB);
February 6, 2013
Iranian Cyber Police (filters websites and hacks email accounts of political activists); Iranian
Communications Regulatory Authority (filters internet content); Iran Electronics Industries (producer
of electronic systems and products including those for jamming, eavesdropping
Committee to Determine Instances of Criminal Content for engaging in censorship activities on/after
May 30, 2013
June 12, 2009; Ofogh Saberin Engineering Development Company for providing services to the IRGC
and Ministry of Communications to override Western satellite communications.
Morteza Tamaddon for cutting mobile phone communications and harassing opposition leaders Mir
May 23, 2014
Hosein Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi when Tamaddon was governor-general of Tehran Province in 2009.
Douran Software Technologies, for acting on behalf of the Committee to Determine Instances of
December 30, 2014
Criminal Content (see above).
Two entities that blocked social media sites and websites: Supreme Council for Cyberspace, and
January 12, 2018
National Cyberspace Center
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IRIB Director General Abdulali Ali-Asgari (see above); Abolhassan Firouzabadi (Secretary of the
May 30, 3018
Supreme Council of Cyberspace); and Abdolsamad Khoramabadi (Secreary of the Committee to
Determine Instances of Criminal Conduct, which oversees the censorship of the internet)

Entities Designated under E.O. I3645 on Auto production, Rial Trading, and Precious Stones (June 3, 2013)
All entities were delisted (and are italicized) and the Order was revoked to implement the JCPOA
Five entities/persons supporting NITC: Mid Oil Asia (Singapore); Singa Tankers (Singapore); Siqiriya
December 12, 2012
Maritime (Philippines); Ferland Company Limited (previously designated under other E.O.); Vitaly
Sokolenko (general manager of Ferland).
Three entities/persons for deceptive Iran oil dealings: Saeed Al Aqili (co-owner of Al Aqili Group LLC);
April 29, 2014
Al Aqili Group LLC; Anwar Kamal Nizami (Dubai-based Pakistani facilitator, manages bank relations for
affilates of Al Aqili and Al Aqili Group. Also works for Sima General Trading, sanctioned under E.O.
13599).
Faylaca Petroleum (for obscuring the origin of Iranian sales of gas condensates); Lissome Marine Services
August 29, 2014
LLC and six of its vessels (for supporting NITC with ship-to-ship transfers); Abdelhak Kaddouri
(manages Iranian front companies on behalf of NICO); Mussafer Polat (for obscuring origin of Iran’s gas
condensate sales); Seyedeh Hanje Seyed Nasser Seyyedi (managing director of Faylaca).
Entities Designated under Executive Order 13581 on Transnational Criminal Organizations (July 24, 2011)
Four individuals/entities: Ajily Software Procurement Group, Andisheh Vesal Middle East Company,
July 18, 2017
Mohammed Saeed Ajily, and Mohammed Reza Rezkhah. For stealing engineering software programs
from U.S. and other Western firms and selling them to Iranian military and government entities.
Entities Designated under Executive Order 13694 on Malicious Cyber Activities (April 1, 2015)
Eight individuals/entities: ITSec Team, for 2011-12 distributed denial of services attacks on U.S. banks,
September 14, 2017
acting on behalf of the IRGC; and Ahmad Fathi, Amin Shokohi, and Hamid Firoozi (for working for or
with ITSec). Four persons working for or with Mersad Co, an IRGC-affiliate firm indicted in 2016 for
computer disruption/botnet/malware activities in 2012-13 targeting 24 U.S. financial sector companies:
Sadegh Ahmazadegand; Sina Keissar; Omid Ghaffarinia; and Nader Saedi.
Ten individuals and one entity, for theft of data from U.S. and third-country universities: Mabna
March 23, 2018
Institute, Gholamreza Rafatnejad, Ehsan Mohammadi, Seyed Ali Mirkarimi, Mostafa Sadeghi, Sajjad
Tamasebi, Abdol ah Karima, Abuzr Gohair Moqadam. Roozbeh Sabahi, Mohammed Reza Sabai, Behzad
Mesri.
Ali Khorashadizadeh and Mohammad Ghorbaniyan. For helping exchange bitcoin digital currency into
November 28, 2018
Iranian rials on behalf of Iranian cyber actors involved with a “SamSam” ransomware scheme.
Entities Designated under Executive Order 13846 Reimposing Sanctions (August 6, 2018)
Ayandeh Bank (for materially assisting IRIB).
November 5, 2018

Author Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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Acknowledgments
The author wishes to acknowledge that Sarah Manning, Research Associate, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division contributed research to this report.

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