Updated December 6, 2018
U.S.-China Relations
The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC
that operated during the Obama Administration. (All the
or China) lead the world in the size of their economies, their
dialogues met once in 2017, but only the D&SD has so far
defense budgets, and their global greenhouse gas emissions.
convened for a second time.) At the D&SD, both sides
Both nations are permanent members of the United Nations
appeared to seek to lower the temperature of the
Security Council. In 2017, they were each other’s largest
relationship. Stating that “the United States seeks a
trading partners. Many observers consider their bilateral
constructive, results-oriented relationship with China
relationship to be the world’s most consequential.
grounded in fairness, reciprocity, and respect,” Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo said U.S.-China cooperation “remains
Since late 2017, the Administration of President Donald J.
essential on many, many central issues.” He offered North
Trump has framed its policy toward China in terms of
Korea and Iran as examples. Pompeo also sought to
“great power competition,” even as it has sought China’s
reassure China that, “The United States is not pursuing a
cooperation in reining in North Korea’s nuclear and missile
Cold War or containment policy with China.” Secretary of
programs and curbing the flow of a class of deadly
Defense Jim Mattis added that, “competition does not mean
synthetic opioids, fentanyl, from China to the United States.
hostility, nor must it lead to conflict.”
The administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS),
released in December 2017, describes both China and
Those interactions paved the way for a December 1, 2018,
Russia as seeking to “challenge American power, influence,
dinner between President Trump and China’s President Xi
and interests, attempting to erode American security and
Jinping on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Buenos
prosperity.” A summary of the U.S. National Defense
Aires, the two leaders’ first meeting in more than a year.
Strategy released in January 2018 describes China as a
The dinner produced commitments on trade and fentanyl,
“strategic competitor” and charges that it is pursuing a
among other subjects. On December 5, 2018, the bilateral
military modernization program that “seeks Indo-Pacific
relationship was roiled again, however, by the disclosure
regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the
that, on the same day as the Trump-Xi dinner, Canadian
United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”
authorities arrested a top executive of the Chinese
Responding to the NSS, China’s Foreign Ministry urged the
technology giant Huawei at the request of the United States.
United States “to stop deliberately distorting China’s
The executive, who is also the daughter of Huawei’s
strategic intentions, and abandon such outdated concepts as
founder, reportedly faces charges of involvement in
the Cold War mentality and the zero-sum game….”
violations of U.S. Iran sanctions.
The Trump Administration has leveled its strongest
Select Issues in the Relationship
criticism at China’s economic practices, and imposed
several rounds of tariffs on imports from China to pressure
Mass Internment of Muslim Minorities
China to change those practices. In a major October 4,
In the name of preventing terrorism, extremism, and
2018, address on China policy, Vice President Mike Pence
separatism, authorities in China’s Xinjiang region have
charged that China has used “an arsenal of policies
undertaken the mass internment of as many as a million
inconsistent with free and fair trade” to build its
predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities, including
manufacturing base, “at the expense of its competitors—
Uyghurs (also spelt Uighurs). In August 2018, a U.N. panel
especially America.” He asserted that China’s security
said it was “alarmed” by reports of mass detentions and
agencies had “masterminded the wholesale theft of
mass surveillance in Xinjiang. It recommended an end to
American technology—including cutting edge military
extralegal detentions and the immediate release of
blueprints” and that “using that stolen technology, the
detainees. In his October 2018 speech, Vice President
Chinese Communist Party is turning plowshares into
Pence asserted that Uyghurs were being subjected to
swords on a massive scale….” China’s Foreign Ministry
“around-the-clock brainwashing” and that survivors see the
responded, “China’s development is mainly owed to
camps as an effort to “stamp out the Muslim faith.” Chinese
Chinese people’s hard work and its mutually beneficial
authorities describe the camps as “vocational education
cooperation with countries around the world….” It added
institutions” in which “trainees” learn the Chinese language
that China remains “committed to joining hands with the
and job skills and undergo “de-extremization.”
U.S. to work for non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual
respect and win-win cooperation.”
Trade
Trade issues have dominated the Trump Administration’s
On November 9, 2018, senior officials from the two
China policy, with the White House accusing China of
countries convened a second meeting of the Diplomatic and
having “consistently taken advantage of the American
Security Dialogue (D&SD), one of four high-level
economy with practices that undermine fair and reciprocal
dialogues established in April 2017 to replace dialogues
trade.” In March 2018, the U.S. Trade Representative
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link to page 2 U.S.-China Relations
(USTR) released the findings of an investigation into PRC
After the December 2018 Trump-Xi dinner, China said it
policies related to technology transfer, intellectual property,
had “decided to undertake scheduling of the entire class of
and innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
fentanyl-class substances, and launch the relevant
(P.L. 93-618). The investigation identified four PRC
legislative and regulatory adjustment procedures.”
practices of particular concern: forced technology transfer
requirements, discriminatory licensing requirements, state-
Taiwan and the U.S. “One-China” Policy
directed investments in and acquisitions of U.S. companies
Under the U.S. “one-China” policy, the United States
to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual
maintains only unofficial relations with Taiwan, while
property, and state-directed cyber-theft of U.S. trade
upholding the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8),
secrets. To pressure China to address those issues, the
including provisions requiring U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
United States imposed three rounds of Section 301 tariffs
In his October 2018 speech, Vice President Pence criticized
on imports from the PRC, as shown in Table 1. China’s
the PRC and several Latin American countries for those
retaliatory tariffs hit U.S. farmers particularly hard.
countries’ decisions to switch diplomatic recognition from
Taiwan to the PRC, and lauded Taiwan’s democracy. The
Table 1. Section 301 Tariffs on Imports from the PRC
PRC, which claims sovereignty over Taiwan, has long been
wary of U.S. moves that the PRC sees as introducing
Volume of
Additional tariff
“officiality” into the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Beijing
Date
imports affected
rate
decried the March 2018 enactment of the Taiwan Travel
July 6, 2018
$34 billion
25%
Act (P.L. 115-135), urging the United States to “stop
pursuing any official ties with Taiwan or improving its
August 23, 2018
$16 billion
25%
current relations with Taiwan in any substantive way….”
September 24,
$200 billion
10%
South China Sea
2018
Since 2013, the PRC has built and fortified artificial islands
Source: USTR
on seven sites in the Spratly Island chain in the South China
Sea. In May 2018, the United States disinvited the PRC
The 10% rate on the third tranche of PRC imports was
from the 2018 edition of the U.S.-hosted Rim of the Pacific
slated to rise to 25% on January 1, 2018. When the two
(RIMPAC) maritime exercise over the PRC’s “continued
presidents met in Buenos Aires, however, the White House
militarization” of the sites. To challenge what the United
said President Trump agreed to suspend that tariff increase
States considers excessive maritime claims and to assert the
for 90 days, to allow for negotiations on “structural
U.S. right to fly, sail, and operate wherever international
changes” with respect to the issues at the heart of the
law allows, the U.S. military undertakes both freedom of
Section 301 investigation, as well as services and
navigation operations (FONOPs) and presence operations in
agriculture. The White House also said China agreed to
the sea. China argues that such operations infringe on its
make “very substantial” purchases of U.S. agricultural,
sovereignty and undermine “peace, security, and order.”
energy, and industrial products. China’s readout of the
dinner did not mention negotiations on “structural
Climate Change
changes,” saying only that Chinese economic reforms
China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. In
would “gradually resolve” U.S. concerns.
November 2018, it reported that it was on track to meet
several pledges it made before joining the Paris Agreement
North Korea
in 2015, though questions persist about the accuracy of
The United States and China agree on the goal of
PRC data. Outside its own borders, China may be
denuclearization of North Korea, but have sometimes
contributing to rising emissions. Through its Belt and Road
disagreed on the best path to that goal. Between 2006 and
Initiative, China finances or is otherwise involved in the
2017, China voted for U.N. Security Council resolutions
development of energy and infrastructure projects across
imposing ever-stricter sanctions on North Korea over its
the globe, often in carbon-intensive sectors.
nuclear weapons and missile programs, though it often
sought to weaken the resolutions first. The U.S. government
Select Legislation in the 115th Congress
has broadly credited China with enforcing the resolutions,
The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act
and seeks to persuade China to maintain “maximum
for FY2019 (P.L. 115-232) contains multiple provisions
pressure” on North Korea. At the D&SD meeting, Politburo
related to China. The Better Utilization of Investments
Member Yang Jiechi pledged China would continue to
Leading to Development (BUILD) Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-
enforce the relevant U.N. resolutions “strictly.”
254), aims to help the United States “compete with Chinese
influence in the developing world,” according to a co-
Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Drugs
sponsor. The House-passed Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act
According the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
of 2018 (H.R. 1872) would make certain PRC officials
Prevention, synthetic opioids, primarily fentanyl, accounted
ineligible for U.S. visas if restrictions on foreign travelers
for more than 28,000 U.S. drug overdose deaths in 2017.
entering Tibetan areas remain in effect.
The Drug Enforcement Administration states that illicit
fentanyl and other synthetic opioids are “primarily sourced
Susan V. Lawrence,
from China and Mexico.” At the urging of foreign
Wayne M. Morrison,
governments, China has imposed domestic controls on 25
fentanyl analogues and two fentanyl precursor chemicals.
IF10119
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U.S.-China Relations


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