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Updated September 17, 2018
Prospects for Enhanced U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
Overview
critical reactor components; and other commodities under
U.S. companies have provided proposals to Saudi
Nuclear Regulatory Commission export licensing authority.
authorities in relation to a planned 2018 tender for nuclear
Table 1. Recent Nuclear Cooperation Developments
reactor construction in Saudi Arabia in conjunction with the
kingdom’s
Involving Saudi Arabia
nascent nuclear energy program. In recent years,
Saudi Arabia has entered into agreements concerning
March
Argentine-Saudi joint nuclear R&D venture agreed.
possible civil nuclear cooperation with several countries
2015
Saudi-South Korean mutual nuclear cooperation
(Table 1, right). In July 2017 the Saudi cabinet approved a
agreements signed, including an MOU on building
National Project for Atomic Energy, including plans to
two small reactors for Saudi water desalination.
build large and small nuclear reactors for electricity
production and desalination amid a larger effort to diversify
June 2015
KA CARE officials sign a nuclear energy
the Saudi economy and expand the use of renewable
cooperation agreement with Rosatom (Russia’s
energy. Saudi authorities express hopes of signing contracts
state-run nuclear company).
for reactor construction in 2018. Depending on its nature
Agreements signed with France on cooperation,
and extent, future U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation may
including EPR reactor feasibility studies.
require executive branch authorizations and/or
congressional approval of bilateral agreements. Saudi plans
January
Saudi Arabia and China memorandum of
also are fueling debate in Congress over regional nuclear
2016
understanding signed regarding cooperation in the
proliferation and security dynamics.
possible future construction of a high-temperature
gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) in the kingdom.
Saudi Arabia holds 16% of the world’s proven reserves
October
Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan sign a nuclear
of crude oil, has the world’s fourth-largest reserves of
2016
cooperation agreement focused on nuclear fuel.
natural gas, and is the largest oil consumer in the
March
Agreement signed for Chinese-Saudi feasibility
Middle East, with oil consumption for electricity
2017
study of HTGR construction in Saudi Arabia.
generation projected to increase. Oil and natural gas
generate 40% and nearly 60% of the kingdom’s
March-
KA CARE officials and experts visit China to begin
electricity, respectively. The Saudi Ministry of Energy,
August
HTGR study implementation planning. China
Industry, and Mineral Resources and the King Abdullah
2017
National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the
City for Atomic and Renewable Energy agency (KA
Saudi Geological Survey sign agreements on
CARE) envision generating up to 17.6 gigawatts of
cooperation on uranium exploration.
nuclear energy from as many as 16 reactors by 2040,
December Russia’s Rosatom and KA CARE sign implementing
which could generate 20% of Saudi Arabia’s electricity.
2017
agreement related to small and medium reactors,
personnel and fuel management.
U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation
Source: Official statements and media reports.
In May 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a
So-called “123 agreements” must include the terms,
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which stated the
conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation, as
countries’ intentions to cooperate on a variety of nuclear
well as meet several nonproliferation criteria. The President
activities in the fields of medicine, industry, and electricity
must make a written determination “that the performance of
production. Previous Administrations had explored a civil
the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute
nuclear energy agreement with Saudi Arabia. Trump
an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”
Administration officials have stated that discussions with
The AEA requires Congress to review a 123 agreement for
Saudi Arabia about a nuclear cooperation agreement are
two time periods totaling 90 days of continuous session. If
“underway.” Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
the President has not exempted the agreement from any
bin Abd al Aziz visited the United States in March 2018
requirements of Section 123(a), it becomes effective at the
and consulted with U.S. officials on related issues.
end of the second period unless, during that time, Congress
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Requirements
adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and
the resolution becomes law.
Nuclear cooperation agreements under Section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA, 22 U.S.C.
Separately, the Department of Energy in 2017 expeditiously
2011 et seq), are required for significant nuclear
granted a “Part 810 authorization” for U.S. companies to
cooperation such as the transfer of certain U.S.-origin
engage in discussions, including marketing, with the Saudi
nuclear material subject to licensing for commercial,
government regarding its civil nuclear program (per 10
medical, and industrial purposes; the export of reactors and
C.F.R. 810). Section 57(b)(2) of the AEA allows for limited
cooperation related to the “development or production of
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Prospects for Enhanced U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
any special nuclear material outside of the United States” if
The U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Precedent
that activity has been authorized by the Secretary of Energy
A commitment to forgo enrichment or reprocessing is not
following a determination that it “will not be inimical to the
required for 123 agreements. Still, some 123 agreements
interest of the United States.” A 123 agreement is not
contain provisions designed to discourage national
necessary for such authorizations, which mostly involve
enrichment and reprocessing programs in the Middle East.
unclassified nuclear technology transfer and services, such
The Obama Administration debated requiring parties to
as nuclear reactor designs, nuclear facility operational
forgo enrichment or reprocessing, but ultimately decided to
information and training, and nuclear fuel fabrication. Part
use a case-by-case approach.
810 authorizations are not subject to congressional review.
Proliferation, Fuel, and Policy Choices
The 123 agreement reached in December 2009 with the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) provides the United States the
Analysts have examined Saudi nuclear plans and proposals
right to terminate nuclear cooperation with that country if it
for decades in light of the kingdom’s economic profile,
“possesses sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or
energy resources, and security dilemmas. Saudi state policy
otherwise engages in activities within its territory relating to
underscores that the kingdom’s nuclear energy pursuits are
enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of nuclear fuel.”
limited to peaceful purposes, but senior officials, including
(For more information, see CRS Report R40344, The
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also have stated in
United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S.
2018 that if Iran pursues or obtains a nuclear weapon, then
Nuclear Cooperation.) An Agreed Minute to that agreement
the kingdom also would work to do so.
states that its terms “shall be no less favorable in scope and
effect than those which may be accorded” to other countries
The most proliferation-sensitive nuclear technology is
in the Middle East. The Minute also explains that, if the
the capability to produce fuel for nuclear reactors,
U.S. government concludes a more-favorable agreement
either by enriching uranium or reprocessing spent
with another regional government, the United States will, at
nuclear fuel to obtain plutonium. Both highly enriched
the UAE’s request, consult with the UAE “regarding the
uranium and plutonium can be used as fuel in some
possibility of amending” the agreement in order to make its
types of nuclear reactors but also are used as fissile
terms equally favorable to the new agreement.
material in nuclear weapons. Low-enriched uranium
Assistant Secretary Ford has said that while the standard
fuel is being considered for reactors in Saudi Arabia.
reached in the U.S.-UAE agreement would be “a preferred
The dual-use nature of enrichment and reprocessing
outcome” for future negotiations, “the international
facilities frequently generates concern that ostensibly
agreement to allow Iran a fissile material production
peaceful facilities may aid nuclear weapons programs.
capability has made it considerably more difficult” to ask
Conversely, a program without such facilities generally
U.S. partners to agree to such restrictions. Neither Saudi nor
poses little proliferation risk, but may pose security
U.S. officials have publicly confirmed whether Riyadh
and/or environmental risks under some circumstances.
would be willing to accept UAE-style restrictions on
enrichment as part of a 123 agreement. In February 2018,
The 2008 U.S.-Saudi MOU, which is a statement of intent
Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir said “we want to
and is not legally binding, described the Saudi
have the same rights as other countries.” In May 2018,
government’s intent “to rely on existing international
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in Senate testimony,
markets for nuclear fuel services as an alternative to the
“we want a gold-standard Section 123 Agreement from
pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing.” Nevertheless,
them, which would not permit them to enrich.” Secretary of
more recent Saudi official statements have suggested that
Energy Rick Perry also told a House committee that if
the country may pursue uranium enrichment. KA CARE
Saudi Arabia does not reach an agreement with the United
has said that it may use indigenous uranium resources for
States, “the message will be clear to the rest of the world
fuel, and, in December 2017, Saudi Energy Minister Khalid
that the kingdom is not as concerned about being leaders
al Falih said, “we intend to localize the entire value chain
when it comes to nonproliferation in the Middle East.”
with nuclear energy... Whatever we do is going to be under
strict compliance with international agreements. But we
General Security Concerns
will not deprive ourselves of accessing our natural
Ongoing threats to the security of critical Saudi
resources and localizing an industry that we intend to be
infrastructure could raise concerns about the security of
with us for the long term.”
future nuclear facilities. The U.S. government describes
terrorist threats in Saudi Arabia as persistent, including
International mechanisms designed to restrict the spread of
ongoing instances of attempted attacks against government
sensitive nuclear technology could complicate Saudi efforts
installations; Saudi forces have disrupted major planned
to identify suitable suppliers of enrichment technology.
attacks. The ongoing conflict in neighboring Yemen has
Saudi Arabia is a state-party to the nuclear Nonproliferation
featured ballistic missile attacks deep into Saudi territory.
Treaty (NPT), and its nuclear facilities, including any Saudi
U.S.-Saudi security cooperation mechanisms are robust and
enrichment or reprocessing facilities, would be required to
remain focused on mitigating these threats and others.
be under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards. IAEA officials completed a nuclear
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
infrastructure review in Saudi Arabia in July 2018. IAEA
Affairs
safeguards present a significant hurdle to the development
of nuclear weapons.
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
IF10799
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Prospects for Enhanced U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10799 · VERSION 7 · UPDATED