Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
June 30, 2016
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43926


link to page 77 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Summary
Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country’s
political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was
characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. In 2013, Raúl began his second and final five-
year term, which is scheduled to end in February 2018, when he would be 86 years of age. Castro
has implemented a number of market-oriented economic policy changes over the past several
years. An April 2016 Cuban Communist Party congress endorsed the current gradual pace of
Cuban economic reform. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the
political system. While the government has released most long-term political prisoners, short-
term detentions and harassment have increased significantly over the past several years, reflecting
a change of tactics in repressing dissent.
U.S. Policy
Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of
legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. U.S. policy over
the years has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions, while a second
policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S.
government-sponsored broadcasting and support for human rights and democracy projects.
In December 2014, President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba,
moving away from a sanctions-based policy toward one of engagement and a normalization of
relations. The President maintained that the United States would continue to raise concerns about
democracy and human rights in Cuba, but he emphasized that the United States could do more
through engagement than isolation. The policy change included talks to restore diplomatic
relations (relations were reestablished in July 2015); a review of Cuba’s designation as a state
sponsor of international terrorism (Cuba’s designation was rescinded in May 2015); and an
increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. In order to implement this
third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations four times
(most recently in March 2016) in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications,
and financial services. The overall embargo, however, remains in place, and can only be lifted
with congressional action or if certain conditions in Cuba are met, including that a democratically
elected government is in place. With the goal of advancing the normalization process, President
Obama visited Cuba in March 2016, the first visit of a U.S. President to Cuba in almost 90 years.
Legislative Activity
The Obama Administration’s shift in Cuba policy has spurred strong interest in Congress. Some
Members lauded the initiative as in the best interest of the United States and a better way to
support change in Cuba, while others criticized the President for not obtaining more concessions
from Cuba to advance human rights and protect U.S. interests. In the 114th Congress, numerous
legislative initiatives have been introduced on both sides of the policy debate.
In 2015, several FY2016 House appropriations bills—H.R. 2577, H.R. 2578, H.R. 2772, H.R.
2995, and H.R. 3128—had Cuba provisions that would have blocked some of the
Administration’s policy changes and introduced new economic sanctions. In contrast, a Senate
appropriations bill, S. 1910, had provisions that would have eased sanctions on agricultural
exports, travel, and shipping. (See Appendix B.) Ultimately, none of these provisions were
included in the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure, P.L. 114-113. That measure funds Cuba
democracy programs and Cuba broadcasting, includes provisions regarding U.S. diplomatic
facilities in Cuba (similar to provisions in S. 1705/H.R. 4127), and prohibits FY2016 funding for
Congressional Research Service

link to page 75 link to page 82 link to page 89 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

the closure of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, similar to the FY2016 defense
authorization measure, P.L. 114-92. (See Appendix A.)
To date in 2016, two FY2017 House appropriations measures (Commerce, H.R. 5393, and
Financial Services, H.R. 5485) have provisions that would block some of the Cuba policy
changes and introduce new sanctions, and one FY2017 Senate appropriations measure (Financial
Services, S. 3067) has provisions lifting certain sanctions, including restrictions on travel and
financing for agricultural exports. Two proposed House amendments to H.R. 5485 would ease
restrictions on Cuba travel and on financing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. In addition, the
Senate version of the FY2017 State Department and foreign operations bill, S. 3117, would fund
U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba and additional personnel costs and would fully fund the $15
million request for democracy programs; in contrast, a draft House Appropriations bill
(unnumbered) would prohibit assistance for expanding the U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba and
provide $30 for democracy programs.
With regard to the U.S. Naval Station, the FY2017 House and Senate military construction
appropriations bills, H.R. 4974/H.R. 2577, and the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2017, H.R. 4909/S. 2943, have provisions prohibiting FY2017 funding for the station’s
closure. H.R. 4909/ S. 2943 also have provisions restricting U.S. military interaction with the
Cuban military. In addition, H.R. 4909 has a provision preventing the return of the naval station
to Cuba without congressional action (identical to H.R. 4678, reported in April). For details on
legislative action in 2016, see Appendix C.
Several other bills introduced in the 114th Congress would lift or ease sanctions: H.R. 274, H.R.
403, and H.R. 735 (overall embargo); H.R. 634, H.R. 664, and S. 299 (travel); H.R. 635
(agricultural and medical exports and travel); S. 491 and S. 1543/H.R. 3238 (some embargo
restrictions); S. 1049 (financing of agricultural sales); S. 1389/H.R. 3055 (telecommunications);
H.R. 3306 (energy resources and technologies); H.R. 3687 (agricultural exports and investment);
and S. 2990 (foreign carriers traveling to or from Cuba). Other bills would increase restrictions on
engagement with Cuba: S. 1388/H.R. 2466 (travel and trade); S. 1489/ H.R. 2937 (Cuban military
and intelligence); and H.R. 4772 (flights). For more on these on other bills and resolutions, see
Appendix D.

Congressional Research Service

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Contents
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Cuba’s Political and Economic Environment .................................................................................. 5
Brief Historical Background ..................................................................................................... 5
Political Conditions ................................................................................................................... 6
April 2016 Communist Party Congress .............................................................................. 8
Human Rights ..................................................................................................................... 9
Economic Conditions .............................................................................................................. 13
Cuba’s Foreign Relations ........................................................................................................ 17
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba .............................................................................................................. 21
Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations .................................................................................... 21
Obama Administration Policy ................................................................................................. 24
President Obama Unveils a New Policy Approach Toward Cuba .................................... 25
Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations ......................................................................... 26
Review of Cuba’s Designation as a State Sponsor of International Terrorism ................. 27
Increase in Travel, Commerce, and the Flow of Information ........................................... 27
Embargo Remains in Place ............................................................................................... 29
Additional Engagement .................................................................................................... 30
March 2016 Presidential Visit ........................................................................................... 31
Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy ................................................................................... 33
Selected Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations ....................................................................................... 34
Diplomatic and Military Engagement ..................................................................................... 34
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances .................................................................................. 36
U.S. Exports and Sanctions ..................................................................................................... 40
State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation ................................................................................. 46
Trademark Sanction ................................................................................................................ 50
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights ....................................................... 53
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba ............................................................ 54
Radio and TV Martí ................................................................................................................ 56
Migration Issues ...................................................................................................................... 59
Anti-Drug Cooperation ........................................................................................................... 65
U.S. Property Claims ............................................................................................................... 67
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 68

Figures
Figure 1. Provincial Map of Cuba ................................................................................................... 4
Figure 2. Cuba: Real GDP Growth (percentage), 2005-2015........................................................ 15
Figure 3. U.S. Exports to Cuba, 2001-2015 .................................................................................. 41
Figure 4. Maritime Interdictions of Cubans by the U.S. Coast Guard, FY2002-FY2015 ............ 60
Figure 5. Cuban Migration, from Ecuador to the United States .................................................... 63

Congressional Research Service

link to page 93 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Tables
Table 1. Undocumented Cuban Migrants, FY2010-FY2016 ......................................................... 62

Appendixes
Appendix A. Enacted Measures in the 114th Congress .................................................................. 70
Appendix B. Other Legislative Action in 2015 ............................................................................. 72
Appendix C. Legislative Action in 2016 ....................................................................................... 77
Appendix D. Additional Bills and Resolutions in the 114th Congress ........................................... 84

Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 88
Congressional Research Service

link to page 39 link to page 58 link to page 82 link to page 41 link to page 45 link to page 82 link to page 39 link to page 39 link to page 41 link to page 41 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Recent Developments
On June 29, 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2017 State
Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill, S. 3117 (S.Rept. 114-
290),
with several Cuba provisions. These provisions included $15 million for democracy
programs in Cuba (fully funding the Administration’s request), with not less than $3 million of
that to support free enterprise and private business organizations and people-to-people
educational and cultural activities, and funding for the operation of, and infrastructure and
security improvements to, U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba and for costs associated with
additional diplomatic personnel in Cuba. In contrast, on June 22, 2016, the House Appropriations
Committee released its draft version of the bill (unnumbered) with several Cuba provisions,
including a prohibition on assistance for expanding the U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba and $30
million for democracy promotion for Cuba. (See “Diplomatic and Military Engagement” and
“U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights,” below. For more on the bill, see
Appendix C.)
On June 21, 2016, the House Rules Committee made in order for consideration two Cuba
amendments to H.R. 5485, the FY2017 Financial Services appropriations bill. The amendments
(listed as amendments 24 and 47 in H.Rept. 114-639) would ease sanctions by prohibiting
funding for the implementation and enforcement of existing sanctions related to financing for
U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba and to travel. In contrast, as reported by the House Appropriations
Committee on June 15, H.R. 5485 has four Cuba-related provisions that would block some of the
Administration’s Cuba policy changes and introduce new sanctions related to people-to-people
travel, commerce, transactions involving the Cuban military, and trademarks. In its statement of
policy on the bill, the Administration strongly objected to all four provisions, maintaining they
undermine the President’s policy on Cuba. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its
version of the bill, S. 3067, on June 16, with four Cuba-related provisions that would ease several
Cuba-related sanctions related to financing for agricultural exports, travel, telecommunications,
and foreign carriers traveling to or from Cuba. (See “Restrictions on Travel and Remittances,”
“U.S. Exports and Sanctions,” and Appendix C, below. Also see CRS Insight IN10514,
Financing U.S. Agricultural Exports to Cuba, by Mark A. McMinimy.)
On June 14, 2016, the Senate passed (85-13) S. 2943, the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for FY2017, with provisions that would prohibit funds for the closure of the U.S. Naval
Station at Guantánamo Bay (Section 1030) and restrict U.S. military interaction with the Cuban
military (Section 1204). The House had approved its version of the NDAA, H.R. 4909, on May
18, also with provisions that would prohibit funds for the closure of the U.S. Naval Station at
Guantánamo Bay (Section 1035) and restrict U.S. military interaction with the Cuban military
(Section 1259B). Another provision in H.R. 4909 (Section 1099B) would prevent the return of the
naval station to Cuba without congressional action. In its statement of policy on S. 2943, the
Administration strongly objected to restrictions on U.S.-Cuban military-to-military interactions,
maintaining that such engagement is in the U.S. national security interest. (See “Diplomatic and
Military Engagement,
” below. Also see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1586, House Approves
Measure to Prevent Return of GTMO to Cuba without Congress’s Say So
, by
Jennifer K. Elsea.)
On June 10, 2016, the Department of Transportation announced that six U.S. airlines—American,
Frontier, JetBlue, Silver Airways, Southwest, and Sun Country—were authorized to provide air
service from Miami, Fort Lauderdale, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Minneapolis-St. Paul for up to
90 daily flights to nine Cuban cites other than Havana. (See “Restrictions on Travel and
Remittances,
” below.)
Congressional Research Service
1

link to page 14 link to page 82 link to page 41 link to page 41 link to page 13 link to page 13 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

On June 6, 2016, the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation
(CCDHRN) reported that there were at least 724 short-term detentions for political reasons in
May, bringing the total of such detentions for the first five months of the year to 6,075. (See
“Human Rights,” below.)
On May 19, 2016, the House and Senate approved FY2017 military construction appropriations
bills, H.R. 4974 and H.R. 2577, respectively, with provisions that would prohibit FY2017 funding
to carry out the closure of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay. The House subsequently
approved the conference report to H.R. 2577 (H.Rept. 114-640) on June 23, with the funding
provision in Section 130. (See Appendix C.)
On May 1, 2016, the Carnival cruise ship company began direct cruises to Cuba from the United
States. The Cuban government had announced on April 22 that it was changing its policy to allow
Cuban citizens to enter and exit the country by cruise ship and merchant vessel. Earlier in April,
controversy erupted when it became known that the Cuban government was not going to allow
those born in Cuba to be passengers on cruise ships sailing to Cuba. Protests ensued against the
Carnival cruise ship company, which resulted in Carnival reversing its position and announcing
that it would not begin its cruises until there was a change in Cuba’s policy. (See “Restrictions on
Travel and Remittances,” b
elow.)
On April 16-19, 2016, the Cuban Communist Party held its seventh party congress. No new
economic changes were unveiled, but Raúl Castro did propose age limits for assuming top party
and government positions. Nevertheless, Castro (84 years old) and José Ramon Machado Venture
(85 years old) were reelected as first and second secretary of the party. (See “April 2016
Communist Party Congress” be
low.)
Introduction
Political and economic developments in Cuba and U.S. policy toward the island nation, located
just 90 miles from the United States, have been significant congressional concerns for many
years. Especially since the end of the Cold War, Congress has played an active role in shaping
U.S. policy toward Cuba, first with the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992
(P.L. 102-484, Title XVII) and then with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114). Both measures strengthened U.S. economic sanctions
on Cuba that had first been imposed in the early 1960s but also provided roadmaps for a
normalization of relations dependent upon significant political and economic changes in Cuba. A
decade ago, Congress partially modified its sanctions-based policy toward Cuba when it enacted
the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title
IX) allowing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.
Over the past decade, much of the debate in Congress over U.S. policy has focused on U.S.
sanctions, especially over U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba. In 2009, Congress took legislative
action in an appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) to ease restrictions on family travel and travel for
the marketing of agricultural exports, marking the first congressional action easing Cuba
sanctions in almost a decade. The Obama Administration took further action in April 2009 by
lifting all restrictions on family travel and on cash remittances by family members to their
relatives in Cuba. In January 2011, the Administration announced the further easing of restrictions
on educational and religious travel to Cuba and on non-family remittances. In December 2014,
just after the adjournment of the 113th Congress, President Obama announced a major shift in
U.S. policy toward Cuba, moving away from a sanctions-based policy aimed at isolating Cuba to
a policy of engagement and a normalization of relations.
Congressional Research Service
2

link to page 75 link to page 77 link to page 82 link to page 89 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

This report is divided into three major sections analyzing Cuba’s political and economic
environment, U.S. policy, and selected issues in U.S.-Cuban relations. Legislative initiatives in
the 114th Congress are noted throughout the report, and four appendixes provide a listing of
enacted measures (Appendix A), bills receiving some action in 2015 (Appendix B), bills seeing
action in 2016 (Appendix C), and additional bills and resolution this Congress (Appendix D).
For more on Cuba from CRS, see
 CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: President Obama’s New Policy Approach, by
Mark P. Sullivan;
 CRS Insight IN10466, President Obama’s Historic Visit to Cuba, by Mark P.
Sullivan;
 CRS Insight IN10369, Pope Francis in Cuba, by Mark P. Sullivan;
 CRS Insight IN10312, Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations with Cuba, by
Mark P. Sullivan and Alex Tiersky;
 CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the
Normalization of Relations, by Dianne E. Rennack and Mark P. Sullivan;
 CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by
Mark P. Sullivan;
 CRS Insight IN10514, Financing U.S. Agricultural Exports to Cuba, by Mark A.
McMinimy;
 CRS Report R44119, U.S. Agricultural Trade with Cuba: Current Limitations
and Future Prospects, by Mark A. McMinimy;
 CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1586, House Approves Measure to Prevent Return of
GTMO to Cuba without Congress’s Say So, by Jennifer K. Elsea;
 CRS Report R44137, Naval Station Guantanamo Bay: History and Legal Issues
Regarding Its Lease Agreements, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Daniel H. Else;
 CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1405, Can Creditors Enforce Terrorism Judgments
Against Cuba?, by Jennifer K. Elsea; and
 CRS Insight IN10204, U.S. Policy on Cuban Migration, by Andorra Bruno and
Ruth Ellen Wasem (available upon request).
Congressional Research Service
3



Figure 1. Provincial Map of Cuba

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Notes: This map shows 15 provinces and the special municipality of Isla de la Juventud. See a current interactive provincial map of Cuba, showing municipalities and
other information, from Juventud Rebelde (Cuba), available at http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/multimedia/graficos/nueva-division-politico-administrativa/.
CRS-4

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Cuba’s Political and Economic Environment
Brief Historical Background1
Cuba became an independent nation in 1902. From its discovery by Columbus in 1492 until the
Spanish-American War in 1898, Cuba was a Spanish colony. In the 19th century, the country
became a major sugar producer, with slaves
from Africa arriving in increasing numbers to
Cuba at a Glance
work the sugar plantations. The drive for
Population: 11.38 mil ion (2014)
independence from Spain grew stronger in
Area: 109,884 sq. km, slightly smaller than Pennsylvania
the second half of the 19th century, but it only
GDP: $77.15 bil ion (2013, current U.S. $)
came about after the United States entered the
Per Capita Income: $5,890 (2011, current U.S. $)
conflict when the USS Maine sank in Havana
Key Trading Partners: Exports (2014): Venezuela,
Harbor after an explosion of undetermined
42.6%; Canada, 10.8%; the Netherlands, 9.6%; China,
origin. In the aftermath of the Spanish-
6.2%. Imports (2014): Venezuela, 39.8%; China, 10.2%,
American War, the United States ruled Cuba
Spain, 7.9%; Brazil, 4.5%; Mexico, 3.4%; Canada, 3.1%
for four years until Cuba was granted its
Life Expectancy: 79 years (2013)
independence in 1902. Nevertheless, the
Literacy (adult): 99.8% (2012)
United States still retained the right to
Legislature: National Assembly of Peoples Power, 612
intervene in Cuba to preserve Cuban
members
independence and maintain stability in
Sources: World Bank; National Office of Statistics and
accordance with the Platt Amendment2 that
Information (ONEI), Republic of Cuba; U.N. Development
Programme.
became part of the Cuban Constitution of
1901. The United States subsequently
intervened militarily three times between 1906 and 1921 to restore order, but in 1934, the Platt
Amendment was repealed.
Cuba’s political system as an independent nation was often dominated by authoritarian figures.
Gerardo Machado (1925-1933), who served two terms as president, became increasingly
dictatorial until he was ousted by the military. A short-lived reformist government gave way to a
series of governments that were dominated behind the scenes by military leader Fulgencio Batista
until he was elected president in 1940. Batista was voted out of office in 1944 and was followed
by two successive presidents in a democratic era that ultimately became characterized by
corruption and increasing political violence. Batista seized power in a bloodless coup in 1952,
and his rule progressed into a brutal dictatorship. This fueled popular unrest and set the stage for
Fidel Castro’s rise to power.
Castro led an unsuccessful attack on military barracks in Santiago, Cuba, on July 26, 1953. He
was jailed, but subsequently freed and went into exile in Mexico, where he formed the 26th of
July Movement. Castro returned to Cuba in 1956 with the goal of overthrowing the Batista
dictatorship. His revolutionary movement was based in the Sierra Maestra mountains in eastern

1 Portions of this background are drawn from U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Cuba,” April 28, 2011. For
further background, see Rex A. Hudson, ed., Cuba, A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2002); “Country Profile: Cuba,” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September
2006, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Cuba.pdf; Leslie Bethell, ed., Cuba, A Short History
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971).
2 U.S. Senator Orville Platt introduced an amendment to an army appropriation bill that was approved by both houses
and enacted into law in 1901.
Congressional Research Service
5

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Cuba and joined with other resistance groups seeking Batista’s ouster. Batista ultimately fled the
country on January 1, 1959, leading to more than 45 years of rule under Fidel Castro until he
stepped down from power provisionally in July 2006 because of poor health.
While Castro had promised a return to democratic constitutional rule when he first took power, he
instead moved to consolidate his rule, repress dissent, and imprison or execute thousands of
opponents. Under the new revolutionary government, Castro’s supporters gradually displaced
members of less radical groups. Castro moved toward close relations with the Soviet Union while
relations with the United States deteriorated rapidly as the Cuban government expropriated U.S.
properties. In April 1961, Castro declared that the Cuban revolution was socialist, and in
December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. Over the next 30 years, Cuba
was a close ally of the Soviet Union and depended on it for significant assistance until the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. In 1976, however, the Cuban government enacted
a new Constitution setting forth the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) as the leading force in state
and society, with power centered in a Political Bureau headed by Fidel Castro. Cuba’s
Constitution also outlined national, provincial, and local governmental structures. Since then,
legislative authority has been vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power that meets twice
annually for brief periods. When the Assembly is not in session, a Council of State, elected by the
Assembly, acts on its behalf. According to Cuba’s Constitution, the president of the Council of
State is the country’s head of state and government. Executive power in Cuba is vested in a
Council of Ministers, also headed by the country’s head of state and government, that is, the
president of the Council of State.
Fidel Castro served as head of state and government through his position as president of the
Council of State from 1976 until February 2008. While he had provisionally stepped down from
power in July 2006 because of poor health, Fidel still officially retained his position as head of
state and government. National Assembly elections were held in January 2008, and Fidel Castro
was once again among the candidates elected to the 614-member legislative body. (As in the past,
voters were offered a single slate of candidates.) On February 24, 2008, the new Assembly was
scheduled to select from among its ranks the members of the Council of State and its president.
Many observers had speculated that because of his poor health, Fidel would choose not to be
reelected as president of the Council of State, which would confirm his official departure from
heading the Cuban government. Statements from Castro himself in December 2007 hinted at his
potential retirement. That proved true on February 19, 2008, when Fidel announced that he would
not accept the position as president of the Council of State, essentially confirming his departure as
titular head of the Cuban government.
Political Conditions
After Fidel stepped down from power, Cuba’s political succession from Fidel to Raúl Castro was
characterized by considerable stability. After two and a half years of provisionally serving as
president, Raúl Castro officially became Cuba’s president in February 2008, when Cuba’s
legislature selected him as president of the 31-member Council of State.3 While Raúl Castro
began implementing economic reforms in 2008, there has been no change to his government’s

3 For more on Cuba’s political succession, see CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl
Castro
, by Mark P. Sullivan. For background discussion of potential Cuban political scenarios envisioned in the
aftermath of Fidel Castro’s stepping down from power in 2006, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political
Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches
, by Mark P. Sullivan.
Congressional Research Service
6

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

tight control over the political system, and few observers expect such changes to occur with the
government backed up by a strong security apparatus.
The Cuban Communist Party (PCC) held its sixth congress in April 2011. While the party
concentrated on making changes to Cuba’s economic model, some political changes also
occurred. As expected, Raúl became first secretary of the PCC, officially replacing his brother
Fidel. Most significantly, Raúl proposed two five-year term limits for top positions in the party
and in the government, calling for systematic rejuvenation, a change that was confirmed by a
January 2012 national PCC conference. Also at the 2012 conference, the PCC approved a
resolution by which its Central Committee would be allowed to replace up to 20% of its 115
members within its five-year mandate.4
In February 2013, Cuba held elections for over 600 members of the National Assembly of
People’s Power, the national legislature, as well as over 1,600 provincial government
representatives, both for five-year terms. Under Cuba’s one-party system, the overwhelming
majority of officials elected are PCC members. Critics maintain that elections in Cuba are a sham
and entirely controlled by the PCC. The new National Assembly selected Raúl Castro for a
second five-year term as president of the Council of State (Cuba’s head of government). In
conformity with the new two-term limit for top officials, Castro indicated that this would be his
last term, which means that he would serve until February 2018, when he would be 86 years old.
Most significantly, a much younger official, Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez (currently age 55),
was selected to serve as first vice president of the Council of State, replacing 82-year José Ramón
Machado, part of the older generation of so-called históricos of the 1959 Cuban revolution. The
position of first vice president is significant because, according to the Cuban Constitution, the
person holding the office is the official successor to the president. Prior to his appointment, Díaz-
Canel—an engineer by training—was serving as one of the Council of State’s six other vice
presidents. His appointment as the official constitutional successor to Castro represents a move
toward bringing about generational change in Cuba’s political system. Díaz-Canel became a
member of the Politburo in 2003 and also held top PCC positions in the provinces of Villa Clara
and Holguín. He became education minister in 2009 until he was tapped to be a vice president of
the Council of State. Díaz-Canel has been described in media reports as an experienced manager
with good relations with the military and as someone that worked his way up through the party.5
Some Cuba watchers maintain that Díaz-Canel is still very much in the shadow of Raúl, and has
not yet taken on a prominent role, and contend that the Cuban military is perhaps the most
important institution to watch as the transition to a post-Castro government unfolds.6 Under Raúl,
who served as defense minister from the beginning of the Cuban revolution until 2008, the Cuban
military has played an increasing role in government, with several military officers and confidants
of Raúl serving as ministers.
Speaking on the 60th anniversary of the start of the Cuban revolution on July 26, 2013, President
Castro asserted that a generational transfer of power had already begun, stating that “there is a

4 Juan O. Tamayo, “Cuban Communists OK Term Limits for Party and Government Officials,” Miami Herald, January
29, 2012, and “Cuba’s Communists Meet to Update Party, Not Much Buzz on Street,” Miami Herald, January 28,
2012; Patricia Grogg, “Cuba: Party Aims for Efficient, Inclusive Socialism,” Inter Press Service, February 1, 2012.
5 Damien Cave and Victoria Burnett, “As Castro Era Drifts to Close, a New Face Steps in at No. 2,” New York Times,
February 28, 2013; Marc Frank, “Castro Successor Lacks Charisma But Is Experienced Manager,” Reuters, February
26, 2013.
6 Tracy Wilkinson, “New Face Waits in Cuba,” Los Angeles Times, February 7, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
7

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

slow and orderly transfer of the leadership of the revolution to the new generations.”7 In October
2015, however, Castro stayed with the historical leadership when, after the resignation of 76-
year-old Minister of the Interior (MININT) General Abelardo Colomé Ibarra because of health
reasons, he replaced Colomé with 77-year-old MININT First Vice Minister General Carlos
Fernández Gondín. In September 2015, the Council of State had given Fernández the honorific
title of Hero of the Republic because of his role fighting in Angola.
April 2016 Communist Party Congress
The PCC’s seventh party congress was held April 16-19, 2016. Few details were made public
ahead of the congress, prompting criticism over the lack of information and consultation
compared with the 2011 party congress.8 While some observers expected there to be a preview of
forthcoming economic changes, no new reform measures were announced. Raúl Castro noted,
however, that Cuba must reestablish a single currency as soon as possible in order to resolve
wage and other economic distortions. Castro reported that just 21% of the more than 300
economic guidelines adopted at the 2011 party congress had been implemented. He said that for
the 2016-2021 period, 268 guidelines were being proposed for updating the country’s economic
model, including 193 modified since the 2011 party congress, 31 the same, and 44 new
guidelines.9 Castro reasserted that Cuba would move forward updating its economic model
“without haste, but without pause.” The slow pace of Cuba’s economic reform process, however,
demonstrates the government’s extreme cautiousness in taking economic actions could have
negative social or political consequences.
Castro also proposed 60 as the maximum age to join the Central Committee and 70 as the
maximum age to assume a leadership position in the party and in state and government
institutions and mass organizations. He noted that these changes would be implemented through
future reforms to the constitution and that there would be a five-year period of transition for the
introduction of these age limits for top positions. In contrast, on the last day of the congress,
Castro (currently 84) and José Ramón Machado Ventura (85) were reelected as first and second
secretaries of the PCC. Both will continue to serve on the 17-member Political Bureau
(Politburo)—10 other Politburo members will continue to serve on the ruling body, while five
new members, including three women, were elected, bringing the total number of women to
four.10 The membership of the Central Committee grew from 116 to 142, with 55 new members
younger than 60 years old.11 While Castro reiterated his intention to step down as President in
February 2018, it remains unclear if he will also step down as first secretary of the party at the
same time.

7 Marc Frank, “Cuba’s Raúl Castro Promises Succession Has Started,” Reuters, July 26, 2013.
8 “Party Congress Less Than a Month Away,” Granma, March 30, 2016; “Andrea Rodriguez and Michael
Weissenstein, “Unusual Dissent Erupts Inside Cuban Communist Party,” World Politics Review, March 30, 2016; and
“Cuba Politics: Uncertainty Surrounds Upcoming PCC Congress,” EIU ViewsWire, April 8, 2016.
9 Raúl Castro Ruz, “Full Text of Central Report: The development of the national economy, along with the struggle for
peace, and our ideological resolve, constitute the Party’s principal missions,” Granma, April 18, 2016, available at
http://en.granma.cu/cuba/2016-04-18/the-development-of-the-national-economy-along-with-the-struggle-for-peace-
and-our-ideological-resolve-constitute-the-partys-principal-missions.
10 “Raúl Present New Politburo of the CC of the PCC,” Cubadebate, April 19, 2016.
11 William M. Leogrande, “Updating the Party: Cuba’s New (and Not So New) Leaders,” Huffington Post, April 23,
2016.
Congressional Research Service
8

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Human Rights
The Cuban government has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply
restricting freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights since
the early years of the Cuban revolution. The government has continued to harass members of
human rights and other dissident organizations. These include the Ladies in White (Damas de
Blanco
), currently led by Berta Soler, formed in 2003 by the female relatives of the so-called
“group of 75” dissidents arrested that year; and the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU), led by
José Daniel Ferrer García, established in 2011 by several dissident groups with the goal of
fighting peacefully for civil liberties and human rights. Two Cuban political prisoners conducting
hunger strikes have died in recent years, Orlando Zapata Tamayo in February 2010 and Wilman
Villar Mendoza in January 2012. Tamayo died after an 85-day hunger strike that he had initiated
to protest inhumane conditions in Cuba’s prisons. Villar Mendoza died following a 50-day hunger
strike after he was convicted of “contempt” of authority and sentenced to four years in prison.
While the human rights situation in Cuba remains poor, the country has made some advances in
recent years. In 2008, Cuba lifted a ban on Cubans staying in hotels that previously had been
restricted to foreign tourists in a policy that had been pejoratively referred to as “tourist
apartheid.” In recent years, as the government has enacted limited economic reforms, it has been
much more open to debate on economic issues. In January 2013, Cuba took the significant step of
eliminating its long-standing policy of requiring an exit permit and letter of invitation for Cubans
to travel abroad. The change has allowed prominent dissidents and human rights activists to travel
abroad and return to Cuba, although those Cubans subject to ongoing legal proceedings, including
political prisoners who have been released on parole, have faced restrictions on traveling
abroad.12 (Ahead of President Obama’s March 2016 trip to Cuba, the Cuban government granted
seven dissidents on parole one-time permission to travel outside the country but reportedly
continued to deny four others such permission.)13
Political Prisoners. The Cuban government has released a number of political prisoners in recent
years. With the intercession of the Cuban Catholic Church, the Cuban government released some
125 political prisoners in 2010 and 2011, including the remaining members of the “group of 75”
that were still in prison. In the aftermath of the December 2014 shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba,
the Cuban government released another 53 political prisoners (although as noted below, six were
rearrested in 2015).14
Among the 53 released were five jailed dissidents whom Amnesty International (AI) had named
as prisoners of conscience in 201315 as well as several other dissidents whose cases AI was
following. Two of the five prisoners of conscience, Emilio Planas Robert and Iván Fernández
Depestre, had been imprisoned since September 2012 and July 2013, respectively, and had been
convicted of “dangerousness” (a preemptive measure defined as the special proclivity of a person
to commit crimes). The other three “prisoners of conscience,” brothers Alexeis, Django, and

12 U.S. Department of State, “Cuban Compliance with the Migration Accords (April 2015 to October 2015),” report to
Congress, November 3, 2015.
13 “Cuba Allows Seven Dissidents to Travel Abroad Ahead of Obama Visit,” Reuters News, February 24, 2016.
14 The list of 53 prisoners reportedly had been drawn up by the Obama Administration and included those jailed for
having peacefully exercised their rights of freedom of expression and assembly. David Adams, Matt Spetalnick, and
Lesley Wroughton, “How Prisoners Names Were Drawn Up in U.S.-Cuba Secret Talks,” Reuters News, January 12,
2015.
15 AI defines prisoners of conscience as those jailed because of their political, religious, or other conscientiously held
beliefs, ethnic origin, sex, color, language, national or social origin, economic status, birth, sexual orientation, or other
status, provided they have neither used nor advocated violence.
Congressional Research Service
9

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Vianco Vargas Martín, were members of UNPACU. They were detained in late 2012 and
convicted in June 2014 after a summary trial in which they were charged with “public disorder.”16
Three other dissidents whose cases were followed by AI were released from prison on December
9, 2014—Ladies in White member Sonia Garro Alfonso; her husband, Ramón Alejandro Muñoz
González; and a neighbor, Eugenio Hernández. They had been held since March 2012.17
In 2015, the Cuban government released two additional political prisoners named as prisoners of
conscience by Amnesty International. Ciro Alexis Casonova Pérez, who had been placed under
house arrest in June 2014 after demonstrating in the streets, was convicted in December 2014 of
public disorder and sentenced to one year in prison. In April 2015, AI declared Casonova Pérez a
prisoner of conscience, and he was ultimately released in June 2015.18
Danilo Maldonado Machado (known as El Sexto), a graffiti artist, was unconditionally released
from prison on October 20, 2015, after almost 10 months in prison. Although he was never
formally charged, Maldonado reportedly was accused of “aggravated contempt” for painting the
names Fidel and Raúl on two pigs that he intended to release in Havana’s Central Park as part of
an art show. Maldonado, who had attended Miami Dade College in 2014 on a scholarship
program, went on a hunger strike on September 8, 2015, and only ended it on October 1, after a
government official had promised that he would be released within 15 days. AI declared
Maldonado a prisoner of conscience in late September and issued a strong criticism of the Cuban
government when the Cuban government failed to release him by October 15 as promised.
Maldonado resumed his hunger strike on October 16 and ultimately was released from prison on
October 20. Upon his release, AI issued a statement maintaining that “this long awaited positive
move must open the door for much needed political reform in Cuba, where people are routinely
harassed, arrested and thrown in jail on spurious charges for speaking their minds.”19 With
Maldonado’s release, AI currently does not have any other declared prisoners of conscience in
Cuba.
As noted above, 6 of the 53 political prisoners released in December 2014 at the time of the
improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations were rearrested in 2015. One of the prisoners, Vladimir
Morera Bacallao, detained in April 2015 for hanging a sign outside his home in protest of
municipal elections, began a hunger strike in early October 2015 that endured more than 80 days.
The U.S. State Department expressed concern about his deteriorating physical condition on
December 29, 2015.20 A day later, Morera Bacallao reportedly gave up his hunger strike.21
Going beyond AI’s narrow definition of prisoners of conscience, the Cuban government has held
a larger number of political prisoners, generally defined as a person imprisoned for his or her
political activities. In March 2016, the Havana-based Cuban Commission for Human Rights and
National Reconciliation (CCDHRN) estimated that the Cuban government held 77 people
imprisoned for political motives (up from 60 in June 2015), 1 under house arrest, and 11 others

16 AI, “Prisoners of Conscience Released in Cuba,” January 9, 2015.
17 AI, “Government Critics Under House Arrest,” December 15, 2014.
18 AI, “Political Dissident Must Be Released,” April 2, 2015; “El Régimen Excarcela al Opositor Ciro Alexis Casanova
Pérez,” Diario de Cuba, June 11, 2015.
19 AI, “Cuba: Prisoner of Conscience on Hunger Strike,” September 29, 2015; “Cuba: Authorities Fail to Release Artist
as Promised,” October 16, 2015; “Cuban Prisoner of Conscience Released,” October 21, 2015; “Cuba: Release of
Graffiti Artist Must Herald New Approach to Dissent,” October 20, 2015.
20 U.S. Department of State, daily press briefing, December 29, 2015. James Rosen, “Rep. Mario Díaz-Balart, Obama
Administration Demand Release of Cuban Prisoners,” Miami Herald, December 29, 2015.
21 “Vladimir Morera Bacallao Depone la Huelga de Hambre,” 14ymedio.com, January 4, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
10

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

released from prison but still on parole—for a total of 89 convicted for political reasons. (This
was the list that CCDHRN President Elizardo Sánchez provided to President Obama during his
visit to Cuba.) Ahead of President Obama’s March 2016 trip, the Cuban government granted 7 of
these 11 individuals on parole one-time permission to travel abroad. CCDHRN’s report includes
those convicted on such charges as hijacking, terrorism, sabotage, other acts of violence, and
espionage, as well as dozens of opposition activists, a number of whom are members of
UNPACU.22
The State Department’s human rights report on Cuba covering 2015 stated that it was difficult to
determine an accurate number of political prisoners because of the Cuban government’s lack of
transparency, its systematic violation of due process rights, and its continued denial of access to
Cuban jails to independent monitors. The report noted, however, that two independent
organizations estimated that there were 60 to 70 political prisoners.23
Short-Term Detentions. Short-term detentions for political reasons have increased significantly
over the past several years, a reflection of the government’s change of tactics in repressing dissent
away from long-term imprisonment. The CCDHRN reports that there were at least 2,074 such
detentions in 2010, 4,123 in 2011, 6,602 in 2012, and 6,424 in 2013. For 2014, the group reported
that there were at least 8,899 such detentions, almost 39% higher than the previous year.
In 2015, the CCDHRN reported at least 8,616 short-term detentions, with 1,447 alone in
November.24 According to Amnesty International, many of those detained in November were held
between 1 and 30 hours, and some reported excessive use of force by police during detention.25
More than 300 human rights activists reportedly were temporarily detained nationwide on
October 11, 2015, in a crackdown against a dissident campaign dubbed Todos Marchamos (We’re
All Marching) carried out by the Forum for Rights and Freedoms, which brings together a
number of human rights and dissident groups. The campaign supports the peaceful weekly
Sunday marches of the Ladies in White, and calls for the release of all political prisoners and
respect for human rights. Most of the detentions reportedly were in Havana and in the province of
Santiago in eastern Cuba, and many of those detained were UNPACU members.26
In the first five months of 2016, the CCDHRN reports that there were at least 6,075 short-term
arbitrary detentions for political reasons, with 1,380 in April and 724 in May.27 In March 2016,
there were 1,416 detentions, including almost 500 during President Obama’s visit; the group also
documented 76 instances of physical aggression on the part of government against peaceful
protestors.28
Bloggers and Civil Society Groups. Over the past several years, numerous independent Cuban
blogs have been established that are often critical of the Cuban government. Cuban blogger Yoani
Sánchez has received considerable international attention since 2007 for her website, Generación

22 Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional (CCDHRN), “Lista Parcial de Condenados o
Procesados por Motivos Políticos,” March 21, 2016; Reinaldo Escobar, “La Lista de Presos Políticos,” 14ymedio.com,
March 24, 2016.
23 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015, April 13, 2016.
24 CCDHRN, “Cuba: Algunos Actos de Represion Politica en el Mes de Octubre de Diciembre,” January 4, 2016.
25 AI, “Cuba: Human Rights Day Crackdown on Dissidents Likely After Month of Mass Arrests,” December 10, 2015.
26 UNPACU, “Listado de Más de 300 Activistas de Derechos Humanos Detenidios en Cuba Ayer Domingo,” October
12, 2015.
27 CCDHRN, “Cuba: Algunos Actos de Represion Politica en el Mes de Mayo de 2016,” June 6, 2016; and “Comisión
de Derechos Humanos Denunica 724 Arresto Políticos en Mayo,” 14ymedio.com, June 6, 2016.
28 CCDHRN, “Cuba: Algunos Actos de Represion Politica en el Mes de Marzo de 2016,” April 4, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
11

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Y, which includes commentary critical of the Cuban government. In May 2014, Sánchez launched
an independent digital newspaper in Cuba, 14 y medio, available on the Internet, distributed
through a variety of methods in Cuba, including CDs, USB flash drives, and DVDs.29
The Catholic Church, which, as noted above, played a prominent role in the release of political
prisoners in 2010 and 2011, has been active in broadening the debate on social and economic
issues through its publications Palabra Nueva (New Word) and Espacio Laical (Space for
Laity).30 The Church has also played an increasing role in providing social services, including
soup kitchens, services for the elderly and other vulnerable groups, after-school programs, job
training, and even college coursework. In 2014, the two former editors of Espacio Laical,
Roberto Veiga and Lenier Gonzalez, launched an online forum known as Cuba Posible.31
Estado de SATS, a forum founded in 2010 by human rights activist Antonio Rodiles, has had the
goal of encouraging open debate on cultural, social, and political issues.32 The group has hosted
numerous events and human rights activities over the years, but has also been the target of
government harassment. In November 2012, Rodiles was arrested and held for 19 days on
charges with “resisting authority,” but he was released after Amnesty International issued an
urgent appeal on his case. In early July 2015, Rodiles was severely beaten for attempting to
participate in the weekly protest march of the Ladies in White.33
Trafficking in Persons. The State Department released its 2015 Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
Report
on July 27, 2015, and for the first time since the report has been issued, Cuba was
upgraded from Tier 3 to Tier 2 Watchlist status. Tier 3 status refers to countries whose
governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards for combatting trafficking and are
not making significant efforts to do so. In contrast, Tier 2 Watchlist status refers to countries
whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards but are making significant
efforts yet still have some specific problems (an increasing number of victims or failure to
provide evidence of increasing anti-trafficking efforts) or whose governments have made
commitments to take additional anti-trafficking steps over the next year.
The State Department maintained that Cuba was upgraded because of its progress in addressing
and prosecuting sex trafficking, including the provision of services to sex trafficking victims, and
its continued efforts to address sex tourism and the demand for commercial sex. The State
Department also recognized commitments that the Cuban government has made to reform its
laws to become compliant with the U.N. Palermo protocol (the 2000 United Nations Trafficking
in Persons Protocol) and its willingness to welcome the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
trafficking in persons to Cuba.34 In its 2014 TIP report, the State Department noted that for the
first time Cuba reported concrete action against sex trafficking and that the Cuban government

29 Sánchez’s website, which has links to numerous other independent blogs and websites, is available at
http://generacionyen.wordpress.com/, and her online digital newspaper is available at http://www.14ymedio.com/.
30 See http://www.palabranueva.net/newPage/index.php and http://www.espaciolaical.org/.
31 Marc Frank, “Cuba’s Catholic Church May Restrict Rare Forum for Open Debate,” Reuters, June 16, 2014; Daniel
Trotta and Rosa Tania Valdés, “Cuban Editors, Pressured to Leave Magazine, Announce New Venture,” Reuters, July
1, 2014. The Cuba Posible website is available at http://cubaposible.net/.
32 See the group’s website at http://www.estadodesats.com/.
33 Nora Games Torres, “Cuban Dissidents Report Being Attacked by Government Security Forces,” Miami Herald,
July 6, 2015.
34 U.S. Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Sarah
Sewall on the 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report, Special Briefing, July 27, 2015; U.S. Department of State, 2015
Trafficking in Persons Report, July 27, 2015, Cuba section available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/
2015/243423.htm.
Congressional Research Service
12

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

maintained that it would be amending its criminal code to ensure conformity with the 2000
United Nations Trafficking in Persons Protocol. (For additional background, see CRS Report
RL33200, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, by Clare Ribando Seelke.)
Human Rights Reporting on Cuba
Amnesty International (AI), Cuba, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/cuba/.
Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation (Comisión Cubana de Derechos
Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional, CCDHRN)
, the independent Havana-based human rights organization
produces a monthly report on short-term detentions for political reasons.
CCDHRN, “Cuba: Algunos Actos de Represion Politica en el Mes de Mayo de 2016,” June 6, 2016, available at
http://www.14ymedio.com/nacional/OVERVIEW-MAYO_CYMFIL20160608_0001.pdf.
CCDHRN, “Lista Parcial de Condenados o Procesados por Motivos Políticos,” March 21, 2016, available at
http://www.14ymedio.com/nacional/Lista-Presos-Politicos-marzo_CYMFIL20160324_0001.pdf.
14ymedio.com, independent digital newspaper, based in Havana available at http://www.14ymedio.com/.
Human Rights Watch (HRW), http://www.hrw.org/en/americas/cuba.
HRW’s 2015 World Report maintains that “the Cuban government continues to repress individuals and groups
who criticize the government or call for basic human rights,” available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/wr2015_web.pdf
(pp. 181-186).
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 2014, May 7, 2015, Chapter IV has a section
on Cuba, available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2014/docs-en/Annual2014-chap4Cuba.pdf.
U.S. Department of State
, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2015, April 13, 2016, available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=253005.
Economic Conditions
Cuba’s economy is largely state-controlled, with the government owning most means of
production and employing a majority of the workforce. Key sectors of the economy that generate
foreign exchange include the export of professional services (largely medical personnel to
Venezuela); tourism, which has grown significantly since the mid-1990s, with 3.5 million tourists
visiting Cuba in 2015; nickel mining, with the Canadian mining company Sherritt International
involved in a joint investment project; and a biotechnology and pharmaceutical sector that
supplies the domestic health care system and has fostered a significant export industry.
Remittances from relatives living abroad, especially from the United States, have also become an
important source of hard currency, amounting to some $2 billion annually. The once-dominant
sugar industry has declined significantly over the past 20 years; in 1990, Cuba produced 8.4
million tons of sugar, while in 2015 it produced 1.9 million tons.35
Cuba is highly dependent on Venezuela for its oil needs. In 2000, the two countries signed a
preferential oil agreement that provides Cuba with some 100,000 barrels of oil per day, about
two-thirds of its consumption. Cuba’s goal of becoming a net oil exporter with the development
of its offshore deepwater oil reserves was set back significantly in 2012, when the drilling of
three exploratory oil wells was unsuccessful. The setback in Cuba’s offshore oil development
combined with political and economic difficulties in Venezuela have raised concerns among
Cuban officials about the security of the support received from Venezuela. Cuba is increasingly

35 Information and statistics were drawn from several sources: U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Cuba,”
July 21, 2015; Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información, “Turismo Internacional Indicadores Seleccionados,
Enero-Diciembre 2015, March 2016. Marc Frank, “Cuba Produces Best Sugar Harvest in 11 Years,” Reuters, May 29,
2015.
Congressional Research Service
13

link to page 20 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

focusing on the need to diversify its trading partners and to seek alternative energy suppliers in
the case of a cutback or cutoff of Venezuelan oil.36
Over the years, Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in health and
education. According to the United Nations Development Program’s 2014 Human Development
Report, Cuba is ranked 44 out of 187 countries worldwide and is characterized as having “very
high human development,” with life expectancy in Cuba in 2013 at 79.3 years and adult literacy
estimated at almost 100%.
In terms of economic growth, Cuba experienced severe economic deterioration from 1989 to
1993, with an estimated decline in gross domestic product ranging from 35% to 50% when the
Soviet Union collapsed and Russian financial assistance to Cuba practically ended. Since then,
however, there has been considerable improvement. From 1994 to 2000, as Cuba moved forward
with some limited market-oriented economic reforms, economic growth averaged 3.7% annually.
Economic growth was especially strong in the 2004-2007 period, registering an impressive 11%
and 12%, respectively, in 2005 and 2006 (see Figure 2). The economy benefitted from the growth
of the tourism, nickel, and oil sectors and support from Venezuela and China in terms of
investment commitments and credit lines. However, the economy was hard hit by several
hurricanes and storms in 2008 and the global financial crisis in 2009, with the government having
to implement austerity measures. As a result, economic growth slowed significantly. Growth
improved modestly from 2010-2014, averaging 2.4% annually during the period, although growth
was just 1% in 2014 because of Cuba’s challenges in shifting from a centrally planned to a more
decentralized economy.
Stronger growth of 4% returned in 2015, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and
looking ahead, the EIU forecasts GDP growth of 3.8% in 2016 and averaging over 4% in the
2016-2020 period, although this assumes that U.S. sanctions will be lifted during that period.37
The Cuban government is forecasting 2% growth in 2016 because of lower export revenues.38
Some economists maintain that Cuba needs a growth rate of at least 5% to 7% in order to develop
the economy and create new jobs—increasing internal savings and attracting foreign investment
reportedly are keys to achieving such growth rates.39
The government of Raúl Castro has implemented a number of economic policy changes, but there
has been some disappointment that more far-reaching reforms have not been forthcoming. As
noted above, the government employs a majority of the labor force, almost 80%, but it has been
allowing more private sector activities. In 2010, the government opened up a wide range of
activities for self-employment and small businesses. There are now almost 200 categories of work
allowed, and the number of self-employed has risen from some 156,000 at the end of 2010 to
some 500,000 at the end of 2014 out of a workforce of over 5 million.40

36 For example, see “Cuba, Economy, Seeking New Partners,” Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report,
May 2013.
37 “Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), June 2016.
38 Marc Frank, “Cuba See GDP Growth Slowing to 2 Pct in 2016, Down from 4 Pct,” Reuters, December 29, 2015.
39 Marc Frank, “Factbox—Key Political Risks to Watch in Cuba,” Reuters News, May 13, 2013.
40 Andrea Rodriguez and Anne Marie Garcia, “2 Years into Cuba’s Free Market Experiment, Small Entrepreneurs
Struggle to Stay Afloat,” Associated Press, December 27, 2013; U.S. Department of State, “President Obama’s New
Cuba Policy Looks Forward, Not Back,” U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker,
and Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew, op-ed, Miami Herald, December 20, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
14


Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Figure 2. Cuba: Real GDP Growth (percentage), 2005-2015

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Data Tool, 2016.
Analysts contend, however, that the government needs to do more to support the development of
the private sector, including an expansion of authorized activities to include more white-collar
occupations and state support for credit to support small businesses. A major challenge for the
development of the private sector is the lack of money in circulation. Most Cubans do not make
enough money to support the development of small businesses; those private sector activities
catering to tourists and foreign diplomats have fared better than those serving the Cuban market.
Among Cuba’s significant economic challenges are low wages (whereby workers cannot satisfy
basic human needs) and the related problem of how to unify Cuba’s two official currencies
circulating in the country.41 Most people are paid in Cuban pesos (CUPs), and the minimum
monthly wage in Cuba is 225 pesos (U.S. $9),42 but for increasing amounts of consumer goods,
convertible pesos (CUCs) are used. (For personal transactions, the exchange rate for the two
currencies is CUP24/CUC1.) Cubans with access to foreign remittances or who work in jobs that
give them access to convertible pesos are far better off than those Cubans who do not have such
access.
In October 2013, the Cuban government announced that it would move toward ending its dual-
currency system and move toward monetary unification, but the action has been delayed for some
time. In March 2014, the government had provided insight about how monetary unification would
move forward when it published instructions for when the CUC is removed from circulation; no
date was provided, but it was referred to as “day zero.” Currency reform is ultimately expected to
lead to productivity gains and improve the business climate, but an adjustment would create
winners and losers.43 As noted above, Raúl Castro noted the urgency of moving toward a single
currency as soon as possible to resolve economic distortions.

41 For more on Cuba’s currency problem, see “Replacing Cuba’s Dual Currency System: What Are the Issues That
Really Matter?” Latin American Economy & Business, July 2013.
42 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015, Cuba,” April 13, 2016.
43 “Cuba: Exchange Rate Unification Approaching,” Latin America Regional Report: Caribbean & Central America,
March 2014.
Congressional Research Service
15

link to page 22 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

A significant reform effort under Raúl Castro has focused on the agricultural sector, a vital issue
because Cuba reportedly imports some 70-80% of its food needs according to the World Food
Programme.44 In an effort to boost food production, the government has turned over idle land to
farmers and given farmers more control over how to use their land and what supplies to buy.
Despite these and other efforts, overall food production has been significantly below targets.
In March 2014, Cuba approved a new foreign investment law with the goal of attracting needed
foreign capital to the country. The law cuts taxes on profits by half, to 15%, and exempts
companies from paying taxes for the first eight years of operation. Employment or labor taxes are
also eliminated, although companies still must hire labor through state-run companies, with
agreed-upon wages. A fast-track procedure for small projects reportedly will streamline the
approval process, and the government has agreed to improve the transparency and time of the
approval process for larger investments.45 It remains to be seen to what extent the new law will
attract investment. Over the past several years, Cuba has closed a number of joint ventures with
foreign companies and has arrested several executives of foreign companies reportedly for
corrupt practices. According to some observers, investors will want evidence, not just legislation,
that the government is prepared to allow foreign investors to make a profit in Cuba.46
In October 2014, the Cuban government issued a list of some 246 projects in which it was
seeking some $8.7 billion in investment in such sectors as energy, tourism, agriculture, and
industry.47 Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment Rodrigo Malmierca reportedly
maintained in November 2015 that 40 of these projects were in “advanced negotiations” and that
Cuba has signed 36 foreign investment projects since the 2014 investment law was approved, but
did not indicate the value of these projects. In November 2015, Malmierca announced a list of
326 projects in which it is seeking $8.2 billion in foreign investment, including new opportunities
in health care, tourism, transportation, construction, agriculture, and renewable energy.48
On December 12, 2015, Cuba reached a Paris Club arrangement with a group of 14 creditor
countries to forgive $8.5 billion out of $11.1 billion of debt owed, including late interest. Pursuant
to the agreement, Cuba will pay $2.6 billion over a period of 18 years. The creditor countries
include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.49 The agreement resolves an outstanding
economic challenge for the Cuban government and could make it easier for Cuba to gain access
to credit and attract investment.50 (In 2014, Russia wrote off 90% of Cuba’s $32 billion Soviet-era
debt. See “Cuba’s Foreign Relations” below.)
As noted above, no new economic measures emanated from the PCC’s seventh party congress
held April 16-19, 2016. After the party congress, press articles reported that one of Cuba’s leading
advocates for economic reforms, Omar Everleny Pérez, was dismissed from his position at the

44 “Cuba, Current issues and what the World Food Programme is doing,” World Food Programme, available at
https://www.wfp.org/countries/cuba.
45 “Cuba Approves New Foreign Investment Law,” Latin American Regional Report: Caribbean & Central America,
April 2014; “What’s Changed in Cuba’s New Foreign Investment Law,” Reuters News, March 29, 2014.
46 Marc Frank, “Cuba Plans Big Tax Breaks to Lure Foreign Investors,” Reuters News, March 26, 2014; and Daniel
Trotta, “Cuba’s Past Raises Skepticism About New Foreign Investment Law,” Reuters News, March 31, 2014.
47 “Cuba Seeks $8.7 Bn in Foreign Investment,” EFE News Service, November 4, 2014.
48 “Cuba Seeks $8.2 Billion in Foreign Investment for 326 Projects,” Reuters News, November 3, 2015.
49 Paris Club, “The Group of Creditors of Cuba and the Republic of Cuba Agree to Clearance of All Arrears,” press
release, December 12, 2015.
50 “Cuba Seals ‘Historic’ Debt Pact with Paris Club,” Agence France Press, December 14, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
16

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy, spreading concern about the Cuban government’s
retrenchment from its commitment to reform.51
A number of Cuba’s economists are pressing for the government to enact more far-reaching
reforms and embrace competition for key parts of the economy and state-run enterprises. They
criticize the government’s continued reliance on central planning and its monopoly on foreign
trade.52 Cuba’s economic potential, according to one analysis, is held back by several factors,
including the lack of political will; dilapidated infrastructure; a transportation sector in need of
repair and modernization; an inefficient and poorly resourced construction sector; and a
government bureaucracy that suffers from morale problems, a weak decision-making process, and
a lack of familiarity with international practice.53
For Additional Reading on the Cuban Economy
Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, annual proceedings, available at http://www.ascecuba.org/
publications/annual-proceedings/.

Brookings Institution, web page on Cuba, http://www.brookings.edu/research/topics/cuba;
Richard E. Feinberg and Ted Piccone, eds., Cuba’s Economic Change in Comparative Perspective, November 2014,
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/11/cuba-economic-change-comparative-perspective;
Ted Piccone and Harold Trinkunas, The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: The Beginning of the End? June 2014, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/06/16-cuba-venezuela-alliance-piccone-trinkunas;
Philip Peters, Cuba’s New Real Estate Market, February 2014, available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/
reports/2014/02/21-cuba-real-estate-market-peters; a
nd
Richard Feinberg, Soft Landing in Cuba? Emerging Entrepreneurs and Middle Classes, November 2013, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/11/cuba-entrepreneurs-middle-classes-feinberg.
The Cuban Economy, La Economia Cubana, website maintained by Arch Ritter, from Carlton University,
Ottawa, Canada, available at http://thecubaneconomy.com/.
Revista Temas (Havana), links to the Cuban journal’s articles on economy and politics, in Spanish available at
http://temas.cult.cu/.
Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información, República de Cuba (Cuba’s National Office of Statistics and
Information), available at http://www.one.cu/.
Cuba’s Foreign Relations
During the Cold War, Cuba had extensive relations with and support from the Soviet Union, with
billions of dollars in annual subsidies to sustain the Cuban economy. This subsidy system helped
fund an activist foreign policy and support for guerrilla movements and revolutionary
governments abroad in Latin America and Africa. With an end to the Cold War, the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, and the loss of Soviet financial support, Cuba was forced to abandon its
revolutionary activities abroad. As its economy reeled from the loss of Soviet support, Cuba was
forced to open up its economy and economic relations with countries worldwide. In 2014, Cuba’s
leading trading partners in terms of Cuban exports were Venezuela (almost 43%), Canada, the

51 Andrea Rodriguez, “Renowned Cuban Pro-Reform Economist Fired as Chill Set In,” World Politics Review, April
21, 2016.
52 Marc Frank, “As Cuban Economy Stagnates, Economists Press for Deeper Reforms,” Reuters News, October 24,
2014.
53 Fulton Armstrong, “Cuba’s Limited Absorptive Capacity Will Slow Normalization,” Center for Latin American &
Latino Studies, Cuba Initiative, American University, October 20, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
17

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Netherlands, and China, while the leading sources of Cuba’s imports were Venezuela (almost
40%), China, Spain, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, Italy, the United States, Argentina, and Germany.54
Russia. Relations with Russia, which had diminished significantly in the aftermath of the Cold
War, have been strengthened somewhat over the past several years. In 2008, then-Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev visited Havana, while Raúl Castro visited Russia in 2009 and again
in 2012. Current Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Cuba in July 2014 on his way to attend
the BRICS55 summit in Brazil. Just before arriving in Cuba, Putin signed into law an agreement
writing off 90% of Cuba’s $32 billion Soviet-era debt, with some $3.5 billion to be paid back by
Cuba over a 10-year period that would fund Russian investment projects in Cuba.56 In the
aftermath of Putin’s trip, there were press reports alleging that Russia would reopen its signals
intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba, which had closed in 2002, but President Putin denied
reports that his government would reopen the facility.57
While trade relations between Russia and Cuba are not significant, two Russian energy
companies have been involved in oil exploration in Cuba, and a third announced its involvement
in 2014. Gazprom had been in a partnership with the Malaysian state oil company, Petronas, that
conducted unsuccessful deepwater oil drilling off Cuba’s western coast in 2012. The Russian oil
company Zarubezhneft began drilling in Cuba’s shallow coastal waters east of Havana in
December 2012, but stopped work in April 2013 because of disappointing results. During
President Putin’s July 2014 visit to Cuba, Russian energy companies Rosneft and Zarubezhneft
signed an agreement with Cuba’s state oil company CubaPetroleo (Cupet) for the development of
an offshore exploration block, and Rosneft agreed to cooperate with Cuba in studying ways to
optimize existing production at mature fields.58 Some energy analysts are skeptical about the
prospects for the offshore project given the unsuccessful attempts by foreign oil companies
drilling wells in Cuba’s deepwaters.
In January 2015, as U.S.-Cuba normalization talks were beginning in Havana, a Russian
intelligence ship docked in Havana. U.S. officials downplayed the arrival of the ship, maintaining
that it was legal and not out of the ordinary.59 Russian officials publicly welcomed the
improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations, although the change in U.S. policy could be viewed as a
potential setback for Russian overtures in the region.
China. Relations with China have also strengthened in recent years. During the Cold War, the
two countries did not have close relations because of Sino-Soviet tensions, but bilateral relations
have grown close in recent years, with Chinese trade and investment in Cuba increasing. Chinese
President Hu Jintao visited Cuba in 2004 and again in 2008, while Chinese Vice President Xi
Jinping visited Cuba in June 2011 and again in July 2014, this time as China’s president, after
attending the BRICS summit in Brazil. Raúl Castro had also visited China in 2012 on a four-day

54 Statistics drawn from Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información, República de Cuba, Anuario Estadístico de
Cuba 2014, Capítulo 8: Sector Externo, Edición 2015.
55 The BRICS is an association of five major emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
56 That agreement had been discussed in a 2013 visit by now Prime Minister Medvedev to Cuba, and had been
announced in December 2013. Anna Andrianova and Bill Faries, “Russia Forgives $32B of Debt, Wants to Do
Business in Cuba,” Bloomberg News, July 13, 2014; Marc Frank, “Russia Signs Deal to Forgive $29 Billion of Cuba’s
Soviet-Era Debt–Diplomats,” Reuters, December 9, 2013; “Castro Declares He Had a Good Visit with Russia’s
Medvedev,” Agence France Presse, February 23, 2013.
57 “Putin Denies Russia to Reopen Soviet-Era Spy Post in Cuba,” Reuters News, July 17, 2014.
58 “Russia Cements Energy Ties with Latin America,” Oil Daily, July 15, 2014.
59 “Russian Spy Ship Arrives in Havana Ahead of U.S.-Cuba Talks,” Radio Free Europe Documents and Publications,
January 21, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
18

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

visit, in which the two countries reportedly signed cooperation agreements focusing on trade and
investment issues. During Xi Jinping’s 2014 visit, the two countries reportedly signed 29 trade,
debt, credit, and other agreements. While in Cuba, the Chinese president said that “China and
Cuba being socialist countries, we are closely united by the same missions, ideals, and
struggles.”60
European Union. The European Union (EU) and Cuba held seven rounds of talks—two in 2014,
four in 2015, and one on March 3-4, 2016—on a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement
covering political, trade, and development issues. Ultimately, an agreement was reached after the
last round of talks and initialed by Cuba and the EU in Havana on March 11, 2016.61 In 1996, the
EU adopted a Common Position on Cuba, stating that the objective of EU relations with Cuba
included encouraging “a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms.” The position also stipulated that full EU economic cooperation with
Cuba would depend upon improvements in human rights and political freedom.62 The new
cooperation agreement, which has to be officially approved by EU governments, would replace
the 1996 Common Position. It includes political dialogue and a framework to deepen relations in
a number of areas, including trade.
Venezuela and Other Latin American Countries. For some 15 years, Venezuela has been a
significant source of support for Cuba. Dating back to 2000 under populist President Hugo
Chávez, Venezuela began providing subsidized oil (some 100,000 barrels per day) and
investment. For its part, Cuba has sent thousands of medical personnel to Venezuela. In the
aftermath of Chávez’s death in March 2013, Venezuela’s mounting economic challenges since
mid-2014 because of the rapid decline in oil prices, and the defeat of the ruling party in
Venezuela’s December 2015 legislative elections, Cuba may be concerned about the future of
Venezuelan financial support.
With El Salvador’s restoration of relations with Cuba in June 2009, all Latin American nations
now have official diplomatic relations with Cuba. Cuba has increasingly become more engaged in
Latin America beyond the already close relations with Venezuela. Cuba is a member of the
Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), a Venezuelan-led integration and cooperation
scheme founded in 2004. In August 2013, Cuba began deploying thousands of doctors to Brazil in
a program aimed at providing doctors to rural areas of Brazil, with Cuba earning some $225
million a year for supplying the medical personnel.63 Brazil also has been a major investor in the
development of the port of Mariel west of Havana. Since 2012, Cuba has hosted peace talks
between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.64 In early
November 2015, Raúl Castro visited Mexico on a trip designed to warm relations and increase
economic linkages.
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Cuba became a full member
of the Rio Group of Latin American and Caribbean nations in November 2008, and a member of
the succeeding CELAC that was officially established in December 2011 to boost regional

60 Marc Frank, “Chinese President Ends Regional Tour in Cradle of Cuban Revolution,” Reuters News, July 23, 2014.
61 European Union, External Action, “EU Relations with Cuba” available at http://eeas.europa.eu/cuba/index_en.htm.
62 European Union, Official Journal of the European Commission, “Common Position of 2 December 1996, Defined by
the Council on the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on Cuba,” (96/697/CFSP), December 2, 1996.
63 Anthony Boadle, “Cuban Doctors Tend to Brazil’s Poor, Giving Rousseff a Boost,” Reuters News, December 1,
2013.
64 For background on the talks, see CRS Insight IN10372, Colombian Peace Talks Breakthrough: A Possible End-
Game?
, by June S. Beittel.
Congressional Research Service
19

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

cooperation, but without the participation of the United States or Canada. In January 2013, Raúl
Castro assumed the presidency of the organization for one year, and Cuba hosted the group’s
second summit in January 2014 in Havana, attended by leaders from across the hemisphere as
well as United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. The Secretary General reportedly raised
human rights issues with Cuban officials, including the subject of Cuba’s ratification of U.N.
human rights accords and “arbitrary detentions” by the Cuban government.65
Summits of the Americas. Cuba had expressed interest in attending the sixth Summit of the
Americas in April 2012 in Cartagena, Colombia, but ultimately was not invited to attend. The
United States and Canada expressed opposition to Cuba’s participation. Previous summits were
limited to the hemisphere’s 34 democratically elected leaders, and the Organization of American
States (OAS) (in which Cuba does not participate) has played a key role in summit
implementation and follow-up activities. Several Latin American nations vowed not to attend the
seventh Summit of the Americas to be held in Panama on April 10-11, 2015, unless Cuba was
allowed to participate, and as a result, Panama announced in August 2014 that it would invite
Cuba to attend. Cuba’s participation was a looming challenge for the Obama Administration, but
in December 2014, when President Obama announced a new policy approach toward Cuba, he
said that the United States was prepared to have Cuba participate in the summit. Cuba ultimately
participated in the summit in Panama, with a historic sidelines meeting between President Obama
and President Raúl Castro. (For more on the summit, see CRS Report R43952, Seventh Summit of
the Americas: In Brief
, by Peter J. Meyer.)
OAS. Cuba was excluded from participation in the OAS in 1962 because of its identification with
Marxism-Leninism, but in 2009, the OAS overturned the 1962 resolution in a move that could
eventually lead to Cuba’s reentry into the regional organization in accordance with the practices,
purposes, and principles of the OAS. While the Cuban government welcomed the OAS vote to
overturn the 1962 resolution, it asserted that it would not return to the OAS.66
International Organizations. Cuba is an active participant in international forums, including the
United Nations and the controversial United Nations Human Rights Council. Since 1991, the
U.N. General Assembly has approved a resolution each year criticizing the U.S. economic
embargo and urging the United States to lift it. The most recent vote calling for the United States
to lift the embargo occurred on October 27, 2015, with 191 votes in favor and 2 (Israel and the
United States) against.67 Leading up to the vote, there had been speculation that the United States
would abstain.
Cuba also has received support over the years from the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
both of which have offices in Havana. The U.N. has played a significant role in providing relief
and recovery from Hurricane Sandy that struck in October 2012. Among other international
organizations, Cuba was a founding member of the World Trade Organization, but it is not a
member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or the Inter-American
Development Bank. In January 2016, the executive president of the Development Bank of Latin
America (CAF) stated in an interview that the bank was in the process of looking at a way for

65 “UN Chief Pushes Cuba on ‘Arbitrary Detentions,’” Agence France Presse, January 28, 2014.
66 For further background, see section on “Cuba and the OAS” in archived CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the
111th Congress
, by Mark P. Sullivan; also see CRS Report R42639, Organization of American States: Background and
Issues for Congress
, by Peter J. Meyer.
67 U.N. General Assembly, 70th Session, Resolution No. A/RES/70/5, “Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial
and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States of America Against Cuba,” October 27, 2015, available at
http://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/70.
Congressional Research Service
20

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Cuba to become a member; the CAF’s current membership includes 17 Latin American and
Caribbean countries as well as Spain and Portugal.68
Compliance with U.N. Sanctions on North Korea. In July 2013, the discovery of a weapons
shipment aboard a North Korean ship that had left Cuba on its way back to North Korea raised
questions about the nature of Cuban-North Korean relations and about Cuba’s compliance with
U.N. sanctions against North Korea. Panama had detained the North Korean ship as it prepared to
enter the Panama Canal due to suspicion that the ship was carrying illicit narcotics; instead, the
ship was found to be carrying military weapons. The U.N. Security Council’s Panel of Experts for
North Korea visited Panama in August 2013 and issued a report on the incident in March 2014.
The Panel of Experts concluded that both the shipment and the transaction between Cuba and
North Korea were violations of U.N. sanctions banning weapons transfers to North Korea.69 In
July 2014, the U.N. Security Council imposed sanctions on the operator of the North Korean ship,
and the company is now subject to an international asset freeze.70 U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Samantha Power described the North Korean ship incident as a “cynical, outrageous and
illegal attempt by Cuba and North Korea to circumvent United Nations sanctions.”71
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations72
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a
repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the Soviet
Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by such
events and actions as U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in
the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United
States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba;
Cuban support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in
Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United
States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were
interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantánamo and Panama; and the 1996 shootdown by
Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes operated by the Cuban-American group Brothers to
the Rescue, which resulted in the deaths of four U.S. crew members.

68 Marc Jones, “Interview – Latam Development Bank CAF Sees Cuba Joining in Weeks,” Reuters News, January 15,
2016.
69 United Nations Security Council, notes by the President of the Security Council, report of the panel of experts
established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/1014/147, March 6, 2014, available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/147. The panel found that the “hidden cargo ... amounted to six trailers
associated with surface-to-air missile systems and 25 shipping containers loaded with two disassembled MiG-21
aircraft, 15 engines for MiG-21 aircraft, components for surface-to-air missile systems, ammunition and miscellaneous
arms-related material.” According to the report, the “extraordinary and extensive efforts to conceal the cargo of arms
and related material ... and the contingency instructions ... found onboard the vessel for preparing a false declaration for
entering the Panama Canal ... point to a clear and conscious intention to circumvent the resolutions.”
70 U.N. Security Council, “Security Council Committee Designates Entity Subject to Measures Imposed by Resolution
1718 (2006),” press release, July 28, 2014.
71 Michelle Nichols, “U.N. Blacklists Operator of North Korean Ship Seized in Panama,” Reuters, July 29, 2014.
72 For additional background, see archived CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events
1959-1999
, by Mark P. Sullivan.
Congressional Research Service
21

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Beginning in the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba consisted largely of isolating the island
nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial
transactions. President Kennedy proclaimed an embargo on trade between the United States and
Cuba in February 1962,73 citing Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA),
which authorizes the President “to establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between
the United States and Cuba.”74 At the same time, the Department of the Treasury issued the
Cuban Import Regulations to deny the importation into the United States of all goods imported
from or through Cuba.75 The authority for the embargo was later expanded in March 1962 to
include the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).76
In July 1963, the Department of the Treasury revoked the Cuban Import Regulations and replaced
them with the more comprehensive Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR)—31 C.F.R. Part
515—
under the authority of TWEA and Section 620(a) of the FAA.77 The CACR, which include a
prohibition on most financial transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban government assets in
the United States, remain the main body of Cuba embargo regulations and have been amended
many times over the years to reflect changes in policy. They are administered by the Department
of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and prohibit financial transactions as
well as trade transactions with Cuba. The CACR also require that all exports to Cuba be licensed
by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, under the provisions of the
Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended.78 The Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
are found at 15 C.F.R. Sections 730-774.79
Congress subsequently strengthened sanctions on Cuba with enactment of the Cuban Democracy
Act (CDA) of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Title XVII), the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000 or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX).
 Among its provisions, the CDA prohibits U.S. foreign subsidiaries from engaging
in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any sea-borne
vessel to load or unload freight if it has been involved in trade with Cuba within
the previous 180 days, except pursuant to a Treasury Department license.
 The LIBERTAD Act (P.L. 104-114), enacted in the aftermath of Cuba’s shooting
down of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of
measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba
once it begins the transition to democracy. Most significantly, the law codified
the Cuban embargo, including all restrictions under the CACR. This provision is
noteworthy because of its long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba.
The executive branch is prevented from lifting the economic embargo without
congressional concurrence until certain democratic conditions set forth in the law

73 27 Federal Register 1085, February 7, 1962 (Proclamation 3447, Embargo on All Trade with Cuba, February 3,
1962).
74 In October 1960 under the Eisenhower Administration, exports to Cuba were strictly controlled under the authority
of the Export Control Act of 1949 in response to the expropriation of U.S. properties. This in effect amounted to an
embargo on exports of all products with the exception of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies.
75 27 Federal Register 1116, February 7, 1962.
76 27 Federal Register 2765-2766, March 24, 1962.
77 28 Federal Register 6974-6985, July 9, 1963.
78 31 C.F.R. §515.533.
79 See especially 15 C.F.R. §746.2 on Cuba, which refers to other parts of the EAR.
Congressional Research Service
22

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

are met, although the President retains broad authority to amend the regulations
therein. Another significant sanction in Title III of the law holds any person or
government that traffics in U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government
liable for monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting under provisions of the
law, however, Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have suspended the
implementation of Title III at six-month intervals.
 Although TSRA authorizes U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba, it also
includes prohibitions on U.S. assistance and financing and requires “payment of
cash in advance” or third-country financing for the exports. The act also prohibits
tourist travel to Cuba.
In addition to these acts, Congress enacted numerous other provisions of law over the years that
impose sanctions on Cuba, including restrictions on trade, foreign aid, and support from
international financial institutions. The government of Cuba also was designated by the State
Department as a state sponsor of international terrorism in 1982 under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act and other laws because of its alleged ties to international terrorism.80 (For
additional information, see CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions
Limiting the Normalization of Relations
, by
Dianne E. Rennack and Mark P. Sullivan.)
In addition to sanctions, another component of U.S. policy has consisted of support measures for
the Cuban people. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, medical exports to Cuba
under the terms of the CDA, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-
sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. The enactment of TSRA by the 106th
Congress also led to the United States becoming one of Cuba’s largest suppliers of agricultural
products. Authorization for purposeful travel to Cuba and cash remittances to Cuba have
constituted important means to support the Cuban people, although there has been significant
congressional debate over these issues for many years.
Despite the poor state of U.S.-Cuban relations, there have been several examples of bilateral
cooperation over the years in areas of shared national interest. Three areas that stand out are alien
migrant interdiction (with migration accords negotiated in 1994 and 1995), counternarcotics
cooperation (with increased cooperation dating back to 1999), and cooperation on oil spill
preparedness and prevention (since 2011).

80 Cuba’s designation on the state sponsor of terrorism list has allowed U.S. nationals injured by an act of international
terrorism to file lawsuits against Cuba in the United States for damages. For more information, see CRS Legal Sidebar
WSLG254, Can Victims of Terrorism in the United States Sue Foreign Governments?, by Jennifer K. Elsea; and CRS
Legal Sidebar WSLG1405, Can Creditors Enforce Terrorism Judgments Against Cuba?, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
Congressional Research Service
23

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Obama Administration Policy
During its first six years, the Obama Administration continued the dual-track policy approach
toward Cuba that has been in place for many years. It maintained U.S. economic sanctions and
continued measures to support the Cuban people, such as U.S. government-sponsored radio and
television broadcasting and funding for democracy and human rights projects.
At the same time, however, the Obama Administration initiated a significant shift in policy
toward Cuba beginning in 2009. As part of the policy of reaching out to the Cuban people,
President Obama fulfilled a campaign pledge
by lifting all restrictions on family travel and
Alan Gross Case
remittances. At the April 2009 Summit of the
U.S.-Cuban relations took a turn for the worse in
Americas, President Obama announced that
December 2009 when Alan Gross, an American
“the United States seeks a new beginning
subcontractor working on Cuba democracy projects
funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development
with Cuba.” While recognizing that it would
(USAID), was arrested in Havana. Gross was providing
take time to “overcome decades of mistrust,”
Internet communications equipment to Cuba’s Jewish
the President said “there are critical steps we
community. He was convicted in March 2011 on charges
can take toward a new day.” He stated that he
of acting “against the independence and territorial
was prepared to have his Administration
integrity of the state,” and sentenced to 15 years in
prison. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress
“engage with the Cuban government on a
repeatedly raised the issue with the Cuban government
wide range of issues—from drugs, migration,
and asked for his release. In the aftermath of Gross’s
and economic issues, to human rights, free
conviction, the United States and Cuba continued to
speech, and democratic reform.”81 In the
cooperate on issues of shared national interest, such as
aftermath of the Summit in 2009, there was
antidrug efforts and migration interdiction, but
improvement of relations in other areas became stymied.
some momentum toward improved relations:
Securing his release remained a top U.S. priority until he
in July, the two countries restarted semi-
was ultimately released by the Cuban government on
annual migration talks that had been
December 17, 2014.
suspended by the United States five years
earlier; in September, the two countries held talks on resuming direct mail service.
The Obama Administration introduced new measures in 2011 to further reach out to the Cuban
people through increased purposeful travel (including people-to-people educational travel) and an
easing of restrictions on non-family remittances. Beginning in mid-2013, there was also renewed
engagement with Cuba on several fronts, including direct mail service talks, resumed migration
talks (that had not taken place for 18 months), and air and maritime search and rescue.
In remarks made in November 2013 on policy toward Cuba, President Obama maintained that
“we have to be creative ... we have to be thoughtful ... and we have to continue to update our
policies.” He contended that “the notion that the same policies that we put in place in 1961 would
somehow still be as effective as they are today in the age of the Internet and Google and world
travel doesn’t make sense.”82
Throughout the Obama Administration’s first six years, human rights violations in Cuba remained
a fundamental concern. President Obama and the State Department continued to issue statements
expressing concern about violations as they occurred, including the death of hunger strikers in

81 White House, “Remarks by the President at the Summit of the Americas Opening Ceremony,” April 17, 2009.
82 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President at a DSCC Fundraising Reception,” Miami,
Florida, November 8, 2013, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/08/remarks-president-
dscc-fundraising-reception-0.
Congressional Research Service
24

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

2010 and 2012 and targeted repression against dissidents and human rights activists. As noted
above, securing the release of Alan Gross from prison in Cuba also remained a top U.S. priority.
The State Department maintained that it was using every appropriate channel to press for his
release, including the Vatican.
President Obama Unveils a New Policy Approach Toward Cuba
On December 17, 2014, just after the adjournment of the 113th Congress, President Obama
announced major developments in U.S.-Cuban relations and unveiled a new policy approach
toward Cuba. First, he announced that the Cuban government had released Alan Gross on
humanitarian grounds after five years of imprisonment. The President also announced that, in a
separate action, the Cuban government released “one of the most important intelligence assets
that the United States has ever had in Cuba” in exchange for three Cuban intelligence agents who
had been imprisoned in the United States since 1998. Media reports identified the U.S.
intelligence asset as Rolando Sarraff Trujillo, a cryptographer in Cuba’s Directorate of
Intelligence, who reportedly provided information that helped the FBI dismantle three Cuban spy
networks in the United States.83
Most significantly, in the aftermath of having secured the release of Gross and the U.S.
intelligence asset, President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba, moving
away from a sanctions-based policy aimed at isolating Cuba to a policy of engagement. The
President said that his Administration
will end an outdated approach that, for decades, has failed to advance our interests, and
instead we will begin to normalize relations between our two countries. Through these
changes, we intend to create more opportunities for the American and Cuban people, and
begin a new chapter among the nations of the Americas.
The President maintained that the United States would continue to raise concerns about
democracy and human rights in Cuba but stated that “we can do more to support the Cuban
people and promote our values through engagement.” According to the President, “After all, these
50 years have shown that isolation has not worked. It’s time for a new approach.”84
The President outlined three major steps to move toward normalization: (1) the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) a review of Cuba’s designation by the Department of State as
a state sponsor of international terrorism; and (3) an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of
information to and from Cuba.
When President Obama announced his Cuba policy change, he also indicated that his
Administration was prepared to have Cuba participate in the Summit of the Americas to be held
April 10-11, 2015, in Panama. The White House emphasized that human rights and democracy
would be key themes of the summit and asserted that Cuban civil society must be allowed to
participate with civil society from other countries. Cuba’s potential participation in the summit
had been a policy challenge for the Administration since it had opposed Cuba’s participation in
the 2012 Summit of the Americas in Colombia.
Cuba ultimately participated in the summit in Panama, with President Obama and Cuban
President Raúl Castro holding a historic bilateral meeting in Panama on April 11. President
Obama stated that “there are still going to be deep and significant differences between our two

83 Adam Goldman and Missy Ryan, “Spy Helped Unmask 3 Cuban Spy Networks, U.S. Officials Say,” Washington
Post
, December 18, 2014.
84 White House, “Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes,” December 17, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
25

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

governments,” with the United States continuing to raise concerns around democracy and human
rights and Cuba raising concerns about U.S. policy. He maintained, however, that “what we have
both concluded is that we can disagree with the spirit of respect and civility, and that over time it
is possible for us to turn the page and develop a new relationship in our two countries.” Several
Cuban dissidents attended and participated in the Civil Society and Social Actors Forum,
although there were problems with a reported attack on anti-Castro protestors by Cuban
government supporters just ahead of the summit and efforts by Cuban government supporters to
disrupt an event in which Cuban dissidents were scheduled to speak.85
Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations
As U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated in the early 1960s, relations were severed by the
Eisenhower Administration in January 1961 in response to the Cuban government’s demand to
decrease the number of U.S. Embassy staff within 48 hours. In 1977, under the Carter
Administration, both countries established Interests Sections in each other’s capitals.
In 2015, four rounds of talks were held on reestablishing relations, with the U.S. delegation
headed by Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson and the
Cuban delegation led by Josefina Vidal, director of the North American division of Cuba’s
Ministry of Foreign Relations. The first round took place on January 22, 2015, in Havana, a day
after previously scheduled semi-annual migration talks, and focused on the required steps for the
reestablishment of relations, the opening of embassies, and expectations on how the U.S.
Embassy in Havana would operate.86 Subsequent rounds took place on February 27 in
Washington, DC; March 16 in Havana; and May 21-22, 2015, in Washington, DC. Issues
discussed included staffing numbers, lifting in-country travel restrictions on diplomats,
unimpeded shipments for the diplomatic post, and access to the post by Cubans.87 In other
developments, a U.S. government delegation visited Havana March 24-26, 2015, focusing on the
development of telecommunications and Internet connections between the United States and
Cuba. On March 31, U.S. and Cuban delegations met in Washington, DC, to discuss how they
would proceed on a future human rights dialogue.
Ultimately, on July 1, 2015, President Obama announced that the United States and Cuba agreed
to reestablish diplomatic relations, effective July 20, and to reopen embassies in their respective
capitals on the same day. The President maintained that “this is a historic step forward in our
efforts to normalize relations with the Cuban government and people.”88 On the same day,
Secretary of State Kerry notified Congress, pursuant to section 7015(a) of the Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2015 (Division J, P.L. 113-
235), of the plan to redesignate the U.S. Interests Section in Havana as an embassy. That
provision of law required congressional notification 15 days in advance before closing or opening

85 “U.S. Trouble by Reported Attacks on Protesters in Panama,” Reuters News, April 9, 2015; and Nick Miroff and
Karen DeYoung, “In Havana, Old Habits Die Hard,” Washington Post, April 12, 2015.
86 U.S. Department of State, Roberta Jacobson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Talks to
Re-Establish Diplomatic Relations,” January 22, 2015.
87 According to the State Department, the U.S. Interests Section in Havana has a cap of 51 direct U.S. hires, a cap
previously jointly agreed by the United States and Cuba. The U.S. Interests Section in Havana also employs almost 400
foreign nationals. U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General,
Inspection of U.S. Interests Section Havana, Cuba
, May 2014; U.S. Department of State, “Press Availability with
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs,” February 27, 2015.
88 White House, “Statement by the President on the Re-Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Cuba,” July 1,
2015.
Congressional Research Service
26

link to page 51 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

a mission or post. On July 20, the U.S. and Cuban Interests Sections in Washington, DC, and
Havana, respectively, were converted to embassies. Cuba held a flag-raising ceremony on that
day at its embassy attended by Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez. Secretary of State John
Kerry visited Havana on August 14, 2015, for a flag-raising ceremony at the U.S. Embassy. This
marked the first visit of a U.S. Secretary of State to Cuba since 1945.
Review of Cuba’s Designation as a State Sponsor of International Terrorism
Cuba had been on the list since 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
(EAA) of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. Appendix 2405(j)) and other laws because of its alleged
ties to international terrorism and support for terrorist groups in Latin America. On December 17,
2014, President Obama directed Secretary of State Kerry to review Cuba’s designation “guided
by the facts and the law.” The President stated that “at a time when we are focused on threats
from al Qaeda to ISIL, a nation that meets our conditions and renounces the use of terrorism
should not face this sanction.”
On April 9, 2015, during a trip to Jamaica ahead of the Summit of the Americas in Panama,
President Obama said that the State Department had completed its review and he would soon be
making his decision. That occurred on April 14, when the President transmitted to Congress a
report justifying the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. No
resolutions of disapproval were introduced in Congress to block the rescission, which took place
on May 29, 2015, 45 days after the submission of the report to Congress. (For additional
information, see “State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation,” below.)
Increase in Travel, Commerce, and the Flow of Information
The White House announced a number of policy changes to implement this third step. The
changes build upon previous steps that President Obama took in 2009, when he lifted all
restrictions on family travel and remittances to family members in Cuba, and in 2011, when he
took action to increase purposeful travel to Cuba, such as people-to-people educational trips.
Just as in 2009 and 2011, the President’s new initiative required changes to U.S. embargo
regulations administered by the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control
(CACR; 31 C.F.R. Part 515) and the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security
(EAR; 15 C.F.R. Parts 730-774). Such changes fall within the scope of the President’s
discretionary licensing authority to make changes to the embargo regulations.
The two agencies issued four rounds of amendments to the CACR and the EAR that went into
effect on January 16, 2015; September 21, 2015; January 27, 2016; and March 16, 2016.89
The regulations included changes in the following areas:

89 80 Federal Register 2286-2302, January 16, 2015; 80 Federal Register 56898-56904 and 56915-56926, September
21, 2015; 81 Federal Register 4580-4586, January 27, 2016; and 81 Federal Register 13972-13974 and 13989-13994,
March 16, 2016. For background on the regulatory changes, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Cuba Sanctions,” at
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/cuba.aspx; U.S. Department of the Treasury,
“Frequently Asked Questions Related to Cuba,” at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
Documents/cuba_faqs_new.pdf; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Cuba,” at
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/sanctioned-destinations/cuba; and U.S.
Department of Commerce, “Cuba, Frequently Asked Questions,” at https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-
documents/doc_download/1446-bis-cuba-consolidated-faqs.
Congressional Research Service
27

link to page 41 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Travel and Remittances. The amended Treasury regulations authorize a general
license for the existing 12 categories of authorized travel in the CACR, meaning
that travelers who fall under these categories do not have to apply to the
Department of the Treasury for permission. Travel agents and air and vessel
carriers are also able to provide services for travel to Cuba under a general
license. Authorized travelers will also be permitted to use U.S. credit and debit
cards as U.S. financial institutions offer these services. Donative remittances to
Cuban nationals are authorized without limit; initially the cap was increased from
$500 to $2,000 per quarter in January 2015, and then it was removed altogether
in September 2015. The regulations also authorize without limit remittances for
certain activities related to humanitarian projects, the promotion of civil society,
and the development of private businesses. In March 2016, the CACR were
amended to permit individuals to travel to Cuba for individual, people-to-people
education travel (previously, such trips had to take place under the auspices of an
organization). (Also see “Restrictions on Travel and Remittances,” below.)
Trade and Telecommunications. The Commerce regulations expand
commercial exports to Cuba of certain goods and services to empower Cuba’s
nascent private sector, including authorization for certain building materials for
private residential construction, goods for use by private-sector Cuban
entrepreneurs, and agricultural equipment for small farmers. To implement this
change, Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) created a license
exception in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for “support to the
Cuban people,” authorizing the export without license of such items described
above. This license exception also included the export to Cuba of items for
telecommunications, including access to the Internet, use of Internet services,
infrastructure creation, and upgrades.
The Treasury regulations also revise the definition of “payment of cash in
advance” required by TSRA for authorized trade with Cuba to specify that it
means “cash before transfer of title” for payment. Certain goods and services
produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs (as determined by the State
Department) are eligible to be imported into the United States.90
The Commerce regulations permit the commercial export of certain consumer
communication devices, related software, applications, hardware, and services,
and items for the establishment and update of communications-related systems;
previously such exports were limited to donations. They also permit the export of
items for telecommunications, including access to the Internet, use of Internet
services, infrastructure creation, and upgrades.
An expanded Treasury Department general license authorizes transactions to
provide commercial telecommunications services in Cuba or link third countries
and Cuba. U.S. companies may establish joint ventures with entities in Cuba to
provide telecommunication and Internet-based services and to enter into
licensing agreements related to, and to market, such services. An updated general
license allows for U.S. persons to make payments to a telecommunications
operator located in Cuba for services provided to Cuban individuals.

90 On February 13, 2015, the State Department issued a list of eligible goods and services produced by independent
Cuban entrepreneurs that may be imported. See http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/515582/237471.htm.
Congressional Research Service
28

link to page 45 link to page 45 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

In January 2015, BIS revised the EAR to state a general policy of approval for
license applications to export items to Cuba necessary for the environmental
protection of U.S. and international air quality, waters, and coastlines, including
items related to renewable energy or energy efficiency.
In January 2016, BIS expanded the categories of exports that fall under a
“general policy of approval” license policy to include certain items for civil
aviation and commercial aircraft safety; telecommunications; U.S. news bureaus;
human rights organizations and nongovernmental organizations; and agricultural
commodities (such as insecticides, pesticides, and herbicides) that fall outside the
scope of those allowed under the existing BIS license exception for agricultural
commodities covered by TSRA.
In January 2016, BIS amended the EAR to include a new category of exports for
which licenses will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The new category
includes items exported to state-owned enterprises, agencies, and other
organizations of the Cuban government that provide goods and services for the
use and benefit of the Cuban people. (For more details, see “U.S. Exports and
Sanctions,”
below.)
Banking and Financial Services. The Treasury regulations permit U.S. financial
institutions to open correspondent accounts at Cuban financial institutions to
facilitate the processing of authorized transactions, including payment for U.S.
exports and for travel services. In January 2016, U.S. private export financing
was authorized for all authorized nonagricultural export trade to Cuba. In March
2016, Treasury permitted U.S. banking institutions to authorize U-turn payments
through the U.S. financial system for transactions in which Cuba or a Cuban
national has an interest (whereby funds from a bank outside of the United States
may pass through one or more U.S. financial institutions before being transferred
to a bank outside the United States).
Physical Presence. Companies or entities in the following categories are
authorized to have a physical presence in Cuba, such as an office, retail outlet, or
warehouse: news bureaus; exporters of authorized goods to Cuba; entities
providing mail or parcel transmission services; telecommunication or Internet-
based service providers; entities organizing or conducting certain educational
activities; religious organizations; and carrier and travel service providers. U.S.
exports to establish, operate, or support such a physical presence are authorized
under a license exception.
Embargo Remains in Place
When the President unveiled his policy changes, he acknowledged that he does not have the
authority to lift the embargo because it was codified into law (Section 102(h) of the LIBERTAD
Act). However, the President maintained that he looks forward to engaging Congress in a debate
about lifting the embargo. As noted above, the LIBERTAD Act ties the lifting of the embargo to
conditions in Cuba (including that a democratically elected government is in place). Lifting the
overall economic embargo at this time would require amending or repealing the LIBERTAD Act
as well as other statutes that have provisions impeding normal economic relations with Cuba,
such as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, and the Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. For example, as noted above, TSRA
denies U.S. exporters access to U.S. government support, prohibits U.S. private commercial
financing or credit for agricultural exports, and prohibits tourist travel to Cuba.
Congressional Research Service
29

link to page 64 link to page 70 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Additional Engagement
In addition to the meeting between Presidents Obama and Castro at the April 2015 Summit of the
Americas, the two presidents met again on September 29, 2015, on the sidelines of the U.N.
General Assembly meeting in New York. According to the White House the two discussed
advances in relations and additional steps to deepen bilateral cooperation. President Obama
reportedly underscored that continued economic reforms in Cuba would increase the impact of
changes in U.S. regulations and reiterated support for human rights in Cuba.91
In addition to Secretary Kerry’s travel to Cuba in August 2015 noted above, numerous U.S.
officials have visited Cuba since the change in U.S. policy. These officials have included
Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker on October 6-7, 2015; Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack on
November 11-14, 2015; and Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx on February 16, 2016, to
sign a bilateral arrangement re-establishing scheduled bilateral air service between the United
States and Cuba.
U.S. and Cuban officials have also held three Bilateral Commission meetings, the most recent
on in May 2016, to coordinate efforts to advance the normalization process. These meetings have
included a review of progress on shared priorities, including regulatory issues,
telecommunications, U.S. property claims, environmental protection and cooperation, human
trafficking, human rights, migration, law enforcement, civil aviation, and direct mail.92 At the
May 2016 meeting, continued engagements were planned for the balance of the year.
Among the numerous meetings and agreements that have occurred are the following:
 An inaugural Law Enforcement Dialogue took place on November 9, 2015, in
Washington, DC, focusing on such areas of cooperation as counterterrorism,
counternarcotics, transnational crime, cybercrime, secure travel and trade, and
fugitives.93 Bilateral technical talks on cybercrime and online fraud took place on
February 22-23, 2006, in Havana.
 In the environmental arena, the United States and Cuba signed an
environmental memorandum on November 18, 2015, for the protection of fish
and coral resources.94 On November 24, 2015, both countries signed a joint
statement on environmental cooperation designed to facilitate and guide
cooperation on a range of issues, including coastal and marine protection, the
protection of biodiversity, climate change, disaster risk reduction, and marine
pollution.
 Semi-annual migration talks were held on November 30, 2015, in Washington,
DC. (See “Migration Issues,” below.) On February 1-4, 2016, a bilateral meeting
took place in Miami to discuss human smuggling and fraud prevention.
 U.S. and Cuban officials held a second counternarcotics dialogue in
Washington, DC, on December 1, 2015. (See “Anti-Drug Cooperation,” below.)

91 White House, “Readout of the President’s Meeting with Cuban President Raul Castro,” September 29, 2015.
92 U.S. Department of State, media note, “United States and Cuba Hold Inaugural Bilateral Commission in Havana,”
September 11, 2015, “United States and Cuba Hold Second Bilateral Commission Meeting in Washington, D.C.,”
November 10, 2015, and “United States and Cuba to Hold Third Bilateral Commission Meeting in Havana, Cuba,”
May 12, 2016.
93 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba Hold Law Enforcement Dialogue in Washington, D.C.,”
November 9, 2015.
94 “U.S., Cuba Reach Historic Agreement on Sea Life,” Chicago Tribune, November 19, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
30

link to page 72 link to page 41 link to page 41 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

 U.S. and Cuban officials held their first talks on claims on December 8, 2015, in
Havana, including claims by U.S. nationals certified by the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission. (See “U.S. Property Claims,” below.)
 On December 11, Cuban and U.S. officials announced they had finalized plans
for a pilot program for direct mail service. The plan will provide for mail flights
several times per week rather than routing mail through a third country. Details
will be finalized in coming weeks, according to the State Department.95
 U.S. and Cuban officials reached a bilateral civil aviation arrangement on
December 16, 2015 (signed in February 2016) that will allow U.S. commercial
airlines to operate regular flights to Cuba. (See “Restrictions on Travel and
Remittances,”
below.)
 On June 8, 2016, the United States and Cuba held the first counterterrorism
technical exchange in Cuba, which included U.S. officials from several
agencies: the State Department, FBI, and Homeland Security (U.S. Customs and
Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland
Security Investigations).
March 2016 Presidential Visit
President Obama traveled to Cuba from March 20 to 22, 2016—the first visit of a U.S. President
since Calvin Coolidge visited in 1928. Before the trip, the White House set forth the goals of the
visit, stating that the President would build on progress toward normalizing relations, including
advancing commercial and people-to-people ties and expressing support for human rights.96
During his visit (which included Secretary of State Kerry, Agriculture Secretary Vilsack, and
Commerce Secretary Pritzker), President Obama announced additional initiatives, including
support for collaboration between the U.S. and Cuban agricultural sectors; Cuban participation in
the Administration’s 100,000 Strong in the Americas Initiative to increase student exchanges; and
new partnerships in health, science, and the environment. The President attended an event with
Cuban entrepreneurs to demonstrate support for the country’s nascent private sector. At the event,
he noted such commercial plans as General Electric selling aviation and energy equipment, the
Alabama-based Cleber company building tractors in Cuba, Starwood and Marriott planning to
operate hotels in joint ventures with Cuba, and Carnival beginning cruise service in May. The
President also attended a baseball game between the Tampa Bay Rays and the Cuban national
team in a significant demonstration of sports diplomacy.97
As a reflection of the momentous shift in his Administration’s policy toward Cuba, President
Obama said during the trip that he had “come here to bury the last remnant of the Cold War in the
Americas.”98 The policy shift on Cuba, which has been lauded throughout Latin America, has

95 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba to Re-Establish Direct Transportation of Mail,” media note,
December 11, 2015.
96 White House, “Statement by the Press Secretary on the President’s Travel to Cuba and Argentina,” February 18,
2016.
97 U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Agriculture Secretary Vilsack Announces Historic Agreements for U.S.-Cuba
Agriculture Sectors,” News Release, March 21, 2016; U.S. Department of State, “New Commitments to President
Obama’s 100,000 Strong in the Americas Initiative,” March 22, 2016; White House, “Remarks by President Obama at
an Entrepreneurship and Opportunity Event,” March 21, 2016; and “Rays Beat Cuba Team with Barack Obama, Raúl
Castro in Attendance,” ESPN.com News Services, March 22, 2016.
98 White House, “Remarks by President Obama to the People of Cuba,” March 22, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
31

link to page 14 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

helped to bolster the image of the United States in the region and solidify the Administration’s
message that it is committed to sustained engagement and partnership in the Americas.
Respect for human rights was a major focus of the visit, and President Obama spoke out strongly
on the issue. Just a day before the President’s arrival, the Cuban government disrupted the weekly
peaceful protest march of the Ladies in White human rights group, again demonstrating the
government’s severe repression of political dissent. In a joint press conference with President
Raúl Castro, President Obama said that the United States would “continue to speak up on behalf
of democracy, including the right of the Cuban people to decide their own future” and to “speak
out on behalf of universal human rights, including freedom of speech, and assembly, and
religion.” In contrast, President Castro became defensive when asked about political prisoners in
Cuba.99
President Obama spoke out most forcefully for advancing human rights during his televised
speech to the Cuban nation. While maintaining that the United States “will not impose our
political or economic system on you,” the President said:
I believe citizens should be free to speak their mind without fear—to organize, and to
criticize their government, and to protest peacefully, and that the rule of law should not
include arbitrary detentions of people who exercise those rights. I believe that every
person should have the freedom to practice their faith peacefully and publicly. And, yes, I
believe voters should be able to choose their governments in free and democratic
elections.
Speaking directly to President Castro, President Obama said:
I am also confident that you need not fear the different voices of the Cuban people—and
their capacity to speak, and assemble, and vote for their leaders. In fact, I’m hopeful for
the future because I trust that the Cuban people will make the right decisions.100
President Obama met for almost two hours with 13 prominent human rights and political
activists, including Berta Soler, leader of the Ladies in White; José Daniel Ferrer, leader of the
Patriotic Union of Cuba; Elizardo Sánchez, president of the Cuban Commission for Human
Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN); and Antonio Rodiles, coordinator of Estado de
Sats, a forum to promote cultural, social, and political debate. The meeting itself signaled
recognition of the activists.101 Another participant, human rights activist and independent
journalist Miriam Leiva, commented that no head of state visiting Cuba had met with prominent
dissidents, “not even the popes.”102 The CCDHRN has worked on human rights issues for more
than 20 years and closely follows the issues of political prisoners and short-term detentions in
Cuba. At the meeting, its president reportedly provided a list of 89 political prisoners, including
11 already released on parole.103 (Also see “Human Rights” above.)
Looking ahead, the extent to which President Obama’s trip will spur the pace of the normalization
process will depend on several factors. These include, as the President acknowledged during the

99 White House, Remarks by President Obama and President Raúl Castro of Cuba in a Joint Press Conference,” March
21, 2016.
100 White House, “Remarks by President Obama to the People of Cuba,” March 22, 2016.
101 Patricia Mazzei and Nora Gamez Torres, “Cuban Dissidents Meet Obama to Air Grievances about Castro – and
About New U.S. Policy,” Miami Herald, March 22, 2016.
102 Frances Robles, “Cuban Dissident Praise ‘Closeness and Trust’ after Meeting with Obama,” New York Times,
March 22, 2016.
103 Reinaldo Escobar, “La Lista de Presos Políticos,” 14ymedio.com, March 24, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
32

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

trip, the extent to which the Cuban government makes progress on human rights issues and the
extent to which Cuba takes advantage of the recent regulatory changes to the U.S. embargo.
Moreover, as President Obama noted, even if the United States lifted the embargo tomorrow,
“Cubans would not realize their potential without change in Cuba.” He pointed to such needed
changes as making it easier to open a business, allowing workers to get jobs directly with
companies that invest in Cuba, eliminating the use of two currencies that separate the types of
salaries that Cubans can earn, and expanding Internet access so that Cubans can connect to the
wider world.
Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objectives of U.S. policy
toward Cuba—to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island—there have
been several schools of thought about how to achieve those objectives. Some have advocated a
policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while
continuing efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred
to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting
the Cuban people and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swift
normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo. Legislative initiatives
introduced over the past decade have reflected these three policy approaches.
Dating back to 2000, there have been efforts in Congress to ease U.S. sanctions, with one or both
houses at times approving amendments to appropriations measures that would have eased U.S.
sanctions on Cuba. Until 2009, these provisions were stripped out of final enacted measures, in
part because of presidential veto threats. In 2009, Congress took action to ease some restrictions
on travel to Cuba, marking the first time that Congress has eased Cuba sanctions since the
approval of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. In light of Fidel
Castro’s departure as head of government and the gradual economic changes being made by Raúl
Castro, some observers had called for a reexamination of U.S. policy toward Cuba. In this new
context, two broad policy approaches were advanced to contend with change in Cuba: an
approach that called for maintaining the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the Cuban government
while providing support to the Cuban people and an approach aimed at influencing the attitudes
of the Cuban government and Cuban society through increased contact and engagement.
The Obama Administration’s December 2014 change of U.S. policy from one of isolation to one
of engagement and moving toward the normalization of relations has highlighted divisions in
Congress over Cuba policy. Some Members of Congress lauded the Administration’s actions as in
the best interests of the United States and a better way to support change in Cuba, while other
Members strongly criticized the President for not obtaining concessions from Cuba to advance
human rights. Some Members vowed to oppose the Administration’s efforts toward
normalization, while others have, as in the past, introduced legislation to normalize relations with
Cuba by lifting the embargo in its entirety or in part easing some aspects of it.
In general, those who advocate easing U.S. sanctions on Cuba make several policy arguments.
They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward Cuba—through increased travel,
trade, and dialogue—then the seeds of reform would be planted, which would stimulate forces for
peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to the United States of avoiding violent
change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the United States. They argue that since
the demise of Cuba’s communist government does not appear imminent, even without Fidel
Castro at the helm, the United States should espouse a more pragmatic approach in trying to bring
about change in Cuba. Supporters of changing policy also point to broad international support for
Congressional Research Service
33

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities for U.S. businesses because of the unilateral
nature of the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of the
embargo. Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be consistent in its
policies with the world’s few remaining communist governments, including China and Vietnam.
On the other side, opponents of lifting U.S. sanctions maintain that the two-track policy of
isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through measures of support, is the best
means for realizing political change in Cuba. They point out that the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth the steps that Cuba needs to take in order for the
United States to normalize relations. They argue that softening U.S. policy without concrete
Cuban reforms would boost the Castro government, politically and economically, and facilitate
the survival of the communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the United
States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba and that
sustained sanctions can work. Opponents of loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that Cuba’s
failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo, are the causes of Cuba’s difficult living
conditions.
Public opinion polls show a majority of Americans support normalizing relations with Cuba,
although the number is more closely split among Cuban Americans.104
Selected Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
For many years, Congress has played an active role in U.S. policy toward Cuba through the
enactment of legislative initiatives and oversight on the numerous issues that comprise policy
toward Cuba. These include U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba, such as restrictions on travel,
remittances, and agricultural and medical exports; terrorism issues, including Cuba’s designation
as a state sponsor of international terrorism; human rights issues, including funding and oversight
of U.S.-government sponsored democracy and human rights projects; funding and oversight for
U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba (Radio and TV Martí); migration issues;
bilateral anti-drug cooperation; and U.S. claims for property confiscated by the Cuban
government.
Diplomatic and Military Engagement
In reaction to the Administration’s Cuba policy changes, some Members have attempted to
restrict operations of the U.S. Embassy in Havana and U.S. military engagement with the Cuban
military through appropriations and defense authorization legislation.
U.S. Embassy Operations. At least two U.S. Senators have said they would put a hold on any
nominee for U.S. ambassador to Cuba, effectively blocking the Senate from voting on a nominee.
The absence of a U.S. ambassador at a U.S. Embassy, however, is not an unusual occurrence,
with the senior ranking State Department official assuming the title of chargé d’affaires ad interim

104 See, for example, Florida International University, Cuban Research Institute, 2014 FIU Cuba Poll, How Cuban
Americans in Miami View U.S. Policies Toward Cuba
, June 17, 2014, available at https://cri.fiu.edu/news/2014/cuban-
americans-favor-more-nuanced-policy/2014-fiu-cuba-poll.pdf; Atlantic Council, Adrienne Arsht Latin American
Center, U.S-Cuba, A New Public Survey Supports Policy Change, February 11, 2014, available at
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/us-cuba-a-new-public-survey-supports-policy-change; Pew
Research Center, “Growing Public Support for U.S. Ties with Cuba – And an End to the Trade Embargo,” July 21,
2015; and Glenn Garvin, “Poll: Cuban-Americans Warming to Obama’s Policies Toward the Island,” Miami Herald,
December 17, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
34

link to page 82 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

and responsibility for the day-to-day functioning of the diplomatic post. With the reestablishment
of relations, the chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Jeffrey DeLaurentis, became chargé
d’affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Havana.
In its FY2016 budget request, the State Department asked for just over $6 million for the Western
Hemisphere Affairs Bureau (WHA) to support expanded operations in Havana, including
increased engagement with Cuban civil society and new demands on staff likely to result from an
increase in visitors to Cuba. The House Appropriations Committee’s FY2016 State Department
and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 2772, had a provision in Section 7045(c)(3) that
would have prohibited funds for the establishment or operation of a U.S. diplomatic presence in
Cuba beyond that which was in existence prior to December 17, 2014, until the President
determined and reported to Congress that the requirements and factors specified in the
LIBERTAD Act (related to democratic conditions in Cuba) had been met. The Senate
Appropriations Committee-approved version of the bill did not include such a provision, and
ultimately the FY2016 omnibus appropriations bill, H.R. 2029, did not include such a provision.
The Administration opposed the provision as interfering with its ability to make the best decisions
consistent with U.S. national security.105
In its FY2017 budget request, the State Department is asking for $3.8 million for WHA to fill
nine additional positions and update aging infrastructure at the U.S. Embassy in Havana.
According to the request, the positions would include a mix of reporting and support positions to
deepen understanding of Cuba’s political, social, and economic environment; oversee
maintenance upgrades; conduct human rights monitoring and advocacy; and strengthen law
enforcement cooperation. The House Appropriations Committee released a draft of the FY2017
State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations measure on June 22, 2016, with a
provision in Section 7045(c)(1) that that would prohibit funding for the establishment or
operation of a U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba beyond what was in place prior to December 17,
2014. In contrast, the Senate Appropriations Committee-reported version of the measure—S.
3117 (S.Rept. 114-290), reported on June 29, 2016—would, in Section 7045(c)(4), fund the
operation of and infrastructure and security improvements to U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba. It
also would fund costs associated with additional diplomatic personnel in Cuba. (See Appendix C
for more details.)
For FY2017, the U.S. Department of Agriculture is requesting $1.5 million for the Foreign
Agricultural Service to establish an overseas post in Cuba. The report to the Senate version of the
FY2017 agriculture appropriations measure (S.Rept. 114-259 to S. 2956) recommends full
funding for the Administration’s request.
Bilateral Military Engagement. Both the House- and Senate-passed versions of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2017 have different provisions that would restrict U.S.
military interaction with the Cuban military, effectively curbing the Administration’s changed
policy toward Cuba. The House bill, H.R. 4909, has a provision in Section 1259B that would
prohibit funds authorized in the act for FY2017 for any bilateral military-to-military contact or
cooperation pending certification from the Secretaries of State and Defense, in consultation with
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), that Cuba has fulfilled numerous conditions
regarding democracy and human rights, outstanding claims and judgements of U.S. nationals,
support to the security forces of Venezuela, cessation of the demand for the return of the U.S.

105 White House, Office of Management and Budget, “Letter to the Chair and Ranking Member of the House
Appropriations Committee with Respect to the FY2016 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Bill,” June 10, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
35

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, U.S. fugitives, and requirement that Cuban military officials
indicted in the United States for the murder of U.S. citizens killed during the 1996 shoot down of
two U.S. civilian planes be brought to justice.
The Senate version of the NDAA, S. 2943, has a provision in Section 1204 prohibiting the use of
any funds by the Secretary of Defense to invite, assist, or otherwise assure the participation of
Cuba in certain joint or multilateral exercises or related security conferences between the United
States and Cuba until the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the DNI, submits to
Congress written assurances regarding most of the same conditions cited above in the House bill.
In its statement of policy on S. 2943, issued June 7, 2016, the Administration strongly objected to
the restrictions on U.S.-Cuban military-to-military interactions, maintaining that the restrictions
“would hamper pragmatic, expert-level coordination between the United States and Cuba on
issues that benefit the United States,” including monthly talks between the commanding officer of
the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay and his Cuban counterpart to share information about
activities on both sides of the fence to reduce the risk of accidental escalation, counternarcotics
exercises and operations, and participation of the Cuban government in security conferences.
According to the Administration, “It is in the U.S. national security interest to maintain flexibility
in U.S. military-to-military engagement with Cuba due to Cuba’s proximity and the many shared
challenges faced by the United States and Cuba.”106
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances107
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component of U.S. efforts to
isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the past 50+ years. Over time
there have been numerous changes to the restrictions and for five years, from 1977 until 1982,
there were no restrictions on travel. Restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba are part of the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), the overall embargo regulations administered by the
Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. Under the George W. Bush
Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba travel increased, and restrictions on
travel and on private remittances to Cuba were tightened.
Under the Obama Administration, Congress took legislative action in March 2009 easing
restrictions on family travel and on travel related to U.S. agricultural and medical sales to Cuba
(P.L. 111-8, Sections 620 and 621 of Division D). In April 2009, the Obama Administration went
further when the President announced that he was lifting all restrictions on family travel as well
as restrictions on cash remittances to family members in Cuba. In January 2011, the Obama
Administration made a series of changes further easing restrictions on travel and remittances to
Cuba. The measures (1) increased purposeful travel to Cuba related to religious, educational, and
journalistic activities, including people-to-people travel exchanges; (2) allowed any U.S. person
to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba (up to $500 per quarter) and made it easier
for religious institutions to send remittances for religious activities; and (3) allowed U.S.
international airports to become eligible to provide services to licensed charter flights to and from
Cuba. In most respects, these new measures were similar to policies that were undertaken by the
Clinton Administration in 1999 but subsequently curtailed by the Bush Administration in 2003
and 2004.

106 White House, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, S. 2943 – National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, June 7, 2016.
107 For more information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
Congressional Research Service
36

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

As noted above, just after the adjournment of the 113th Congress, President Obama announced
major changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba on December 17, 2014. These changes included the
provision for general licenses for the 12 existing categories of travel to Cuba set forth in the
CACR: (1) family visits; (2) official business of the U.S. government, foreign governments, and
certain intergovernmental organizations; (3) journalistic activity; (4) professional research and
professional meetings; (5) educational activities; (6) religious activities; (7) public performances,
clinics, workshops, athletic and other competitions, and exhibitions; (8) support for the Cuban
people; (9) humanitarian projects (now including microfinancing projects); (10) activities of
private foundations or research or educational institutes; (11) exportation, importation, or
transmission of information or information materials; and (12) certain export transactions that
may be considered for authorization under existing regulations and guidelines.
Despite the easing of travel restrictions, travel to Cuba solely for tourist activities remains
prohibited. Section 910(b) of TSRA prohibits travel-related transaction for tourist activities,
which are defined as any activity not expressly authorized in the 12 categories of travel in the
CACR (31 C.F.R. 515.560).
Before the policy change, travelers under several of these categories had to apply for a specific
license from the Department of the Treasury before traveling. Under the new regulations, both
travel agents and airlines are able to provide services for travel to Cuba without the need to obtain
a specific license. U.S. credit and debit cards are permitted for use by authorized travelers to
Cuba, but the State Department advises U.S. travelers to check with their financial institution to
determine whether the institution has established the necessary mechanisms for its issued credit
and debit cards to be used in Cuba.108 Authorized travelers no longer have a per diem limit for
expenditures, as in the past, and can bring back up to $400 worth of goods from Cuba, with no
more than $100 worth of tobacco products and alcohol combined.
In January 2016, the Treasury Department made additional changes to the travel regulations.
Among the changes, authorization for travel and other transactions for transmission of
informational materials now includes professional media or artistic productions in Cuba (movies,
television, music recordings, and creation of artworks). Authorization for travel and other
transactions for professional meetings, public performances, clinics, workshops, athletic and
nonathletic competitions, and exhibitions now includes permission to organize these events, not
just participation.
In March 2016, the Treasury Department again amended the travel regulations to permit travel to
Cuba for individual, people-to-people education provided the traveler engages in a full-time
schedule of educational exchange activities intended to enhance contact with the Cuban people,
support civil society in Cuba, or promote the Cuban people’s independence from Cuban
authorities. Previously, such trips had to take place under the auspices of an organization that
sponsors such travel. According to the Treasury Department, the change is intended to make
authorized educational travel to Cuba more accessible and less expensive for U.S. citizens and
will increase opportunities for direct engagement between Cubans and Americans.109
Regular Air Service. After several rounds of talks in 2015, U.S. and Cuban officials reached a
bilateral arrangement (in a memorandum of understanding, or MOU) on December 16, 2015, that
will permit regularly scheduled air flights as opposed to the current charter flights that operate

108 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Passports & International Travel, “Country Information,
Cuba,” updated October 16, 2015, available at http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/country/cuba.html.
109 U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Public Affairs, “Treasury and Commerce Announce Significant Amendments
to the Cuba Sanctions Regulations Ahead of President Obama’s Historic Trip to Cuba,” March 15, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
37

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

between the two countries.110 Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx traveled to Cuba on
February 16, 2016, to sign the arrangement, providing an opportunity for U.S. carriers to operate
up to a total of 110 daily roundtrip flights between the United States and Cuba, including up to 20
daily roundtrip flights to and from Havana.111
On June 10, 2016, the Department of Transportation (DOT) announced that six U.S. airlines—
American, Frontier, JetBlue, Silver Airways, Southwest, and Sun Country—were authorized to
provide air service from Miami, Fort Lauderdale, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Minneapolis-St.
Paul for up to 90 daily flights to nine Cuban cites other than Havana. The nine Cuban cities are
Camagüey, Cayo Coco, Cayo Largo de Sur, Cienfuegos, Holguín, Manzanillo, Matanzas, Santa
Clara, and Santiago de Cuba. Flights are likely to begin during the fall and winter of 2016-2017.
DOT expects to make a decision sometime this summer on up to 20 roundtrip daily flights to and
from Havana.112
Ferry and Cruise Ship Service. In May 2015, the Department of the Treasury reportedly issued
licenses to several companies to operate ferry services between the United States and Cuba; the
proposed services still require Cuban approval, and Cuban facilities need to be developed to
handle the services.113
With regard to cruise ships, the Carnival cruise ship company began direct cruises to Cuba from
the United States on May 1, 2016. Carnival had announced in March 2016, that it would offer
cruises to Cuba beginning in May. The company had received a Treasury Department license in
July 2015 to operate cruises to Cuba and was waiting for Cuban approval to begin such services.
It uses smaller ship, accommodating about 700 passengers, under its cruise brand Fathom, which
targets people-to-people educational travel.114 Under the embargo regulations, passengers on
cruise ships to Cuba must fall under one of the permissible categories of travel, which does not
include tourist travel.
In early April 2016, controversy ensued over the Carnival cruises when it became known that the
Cuban government was not going to allow those born in Cuba to be passengers on cruise ships
sailing to Cuba. (A Cuban government regulation dating back to the 1990s prohibited Cuban-born
individuals from traveling to and from Cuba by ship.) Protests began against Carnival for
agreeing to the terms of the cruises, and a class action lawsuit was filed in federal court in Miami.
Secretary of State Kerry called on Cuba to change its “policy and to recognize that if they want a
full relationship, a normal relationship, with the United States, they have to live by international
law and not exclusively by their own.”115 Carnival subsequently reversed its policy, maintaining
that it would accept bookings from all travelers and would delay the start of its cruises unless
Cuban authorities allowed cruise ships to operate in the same fashion as air flights. On April 22,
the Cuban government ultimately announced that it was changing its policy to allow the entry and

110 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Cuba Technical Talks Yield Civil Aviation Arrangement,” media note, December
17, 2015.
111 U.S. Department of Transportation, “United States, Cuba Sign Arrangement Restoring Scheduled Air Service, DOT
Launches Process to Award the New Flights,” February 16, 2016.
112 U.S. Department of Transportation, “U.S. Transportation Secretary Foxx Approves U.S. Airlines to Begin
Scheduled Service to Cuba,” June, 10 2016.
113 Victoria Burnett, “U.S. Licenses Ferry Service to Operate Cuba Route,” New York Times, May 6, 2015; José de
Cordoba, “U.S. Permits Ferry Service to Havana,” Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2015.
114 Laura Stevens, “Carnival Gets U.S. Approval to Start Cruises to Cuba,” Dow Jones Newswires, July 7, 2015;
Shivani Vora, “Carnival Will Begin Cruises to Cuba in May,” New York Times, March 23, 2016.
115 Patricia Zengerle, “Update 2-U.S.’ Kerry: Carnival Should Not Bar Cuban-Americans from Cruises to Cuba,”
Reuters News, April 14, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
38

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

exit of Cuban citizens by cruise ship and merchant vessel, an action that allowed Carnival to go
forward with its cruises to Cuba.116 According to the Department of Commerce, other companies,
such as Norwegian Cruise Lines and Royal Caribbean, are also seeking Cuban approval allowing
for their ships to stop in Cuba.117
Remittances. The Obama Administration’s change in policy also lifted the cap on the amount of
remittances that can be sent by any U.S. person to non-family members in Cuba, so-called
donative remittances. Initially the cap was increased from $500 to $2,000 per quarter in January
2015, and then it was removed altogether in September 2015. Authorized travelers may carry an
unlimited amount of remittances to Cuba (initially the cap was increased from $3,000 to $10,000,
and then removed). Remittances to individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) in Cuba are authorized without limit for humanitarian projects; activities of recognized
human rights organizations, independent organizations designed to promote a rapid peaceful
transition to democracy, and of individuals and NGOs that promote independent activity to
strengthen civil society; and the development of private businesses, including small farms.
Pro/Con Arguments. Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban altogether are that it
abridges the rights of ordinary Americans to travel; it hinders efforts to influence conditions in
Cuba and may be aiding the Cuban government by helping restrict the flow of information; and
Americans can travel to other countries with communist or authoritarian governments. Major
arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba travel ban are that more American travel would
support the Cuban government with potentially millions of dollars in hard currency; that there are
legal provisions allowing travel to Cuba for humanitarian purposes that are used by thousands of
Americans each year; and that the President should be free to restrict travel for foreign policy
reasons. With regard to remittances, supporters of the Obama Administration’s recent action argue
that it can help support civil society and the country’s nascent private sector. Those opposed
contend that the Cuban regime benefits from increased remittances by the money it accrues from
taxes on private sector activity as well as fees for the exchange of U.S. dollars.
Legislative Activity. Several legislative initiatives introduced in the 114th Congress would lift
remaining restrictions on travel and remittances. Three bills would lift the overall embargo, H.R.
274
(Rush), H.R. 403 (Rangel), and H.R. 735 (Serrano) including restrictions on travel and
remittances. One bill, H.R. 635 (Rangel), would facilitate the export of U.S. agricultural and
medical exports to Cuba and also lift travel restrictions. Three bills would focus solely on
prohibiting restrictions on travel to Cuba: H.R. 634 (Rangel), H.R. 664 (Sanford), and S. 299
(Flake). In contrast, two other introduced bills, S. 1388 and H.R. 2466, would require the
President to submit a plan for resolving all outstanding claims relating to property confiscated by
the government of Cuba before taking action to ease restrictions on travel to or trade with Cuba. A
Senate amendment, S.Amdt. 3557 (Flake) to H.R. 636, the Federal Aviation Administration
Reauthorization Act, that was filed, but never considered, would have prohibited restrictions on
travel to Cuba and related travel transactions.
Efforts to ease and tighten travel restrictions played out in the FY2016 appropriations process, but
ultimately no such provisions were included in the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L.
114-113). The Senate Appropriations Committee-approved version of the FY2016 Financial
Services appropriation bill, S. 1910, had a provision that would have lifted restrictions on travel

116 “U.S. Cruise Company to Begin Operations in Cuba,” Granma, April 22, 2016; Lizette Alvarez, “Cuba Reverses
Longtime Ban on Sea Travel,” New York Times, April 23, 2016.
117 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Fact Sheet: Economic Development in the Wake of President Obama’s Regulatory
Changes on Exports and Travel to Cuba,” Commerce News, March 21, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
39

link to page 77 link to page 82 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

to Cuba. In contrast, House-passed H.R. 2577, the FY2016 House Transportation, Housing and
Urban Development appropriation bill, had two Cuba provisions that would have affected the
Administration’s efforts to increase travel to and from Cuba by impeding the establishment of
regularly scheduled air service and passenger ferry service. In addition, the House Appropriations
Committee-approved FY2016 Financial Services appropriations bill, H.R. 2995, had a broader
provision that would have prevented people-to-people educational travel. (For more details, see
Appendix B below.)
To date in the FY2017 appropriations process, the House and Senate Appropriations Committee-
reported versions of the Financial Services appropriations measure contain contrasting provisions
on travel. In the House Financial Services appropriations bill, H.R. 5485 (H.Rept. 114-624),
Section 132 would prohibit funding that licenses, facilitates, or otherwise allows people-to-people
travel. The measure would have a significant impact on the expansion of U.S. travel to Cuba that
has occurred in recent years, including the recently begun cruise ship travel to Cuba. Another
provision in the House bill, Section 134, would prohibit funding to approve, license, facilitate,
authorize, or otherwise allow any financial transaction with an entity controlled, in whole or in
part, by the Cuban military or intelligence service or with any officer or immediate family
member thereof. This provision could have a significant effect on U.S. travel to Cuba because the
Cuban military has an important role in hotel and other travel services in Cuba. Notably, on June
21, 2016, the House Rules Committee made in order a potential amendment (Sanford, listed as
amendment 47 in H.Rept. 114-639) that would prohibit funds in the act from being used to
administer or enforce the Cuba embargo regulations or the statutory prohibition on tourist travel
to Cuba in Section 910(b) of TSRA.
In the Senate version of the FY2017 Financial Services appropriations measure, S. 3067 (S.Rept.
114-280), Section 635 would prohibit funding in any act to implement any law, regulation, or
policy that restricts travel to Cuba. The provision would have the effect of lifting all restrictions
on travel to Cuba. Another provision in the Senate bill, Section 637, would prohibit funds in the
act or any act from being used to implement any law, regulation, or policy that prohibits the
provision of technical services otherwise permitted under an international air transportation
agreement in the United States for an aircraft of a foreign carrier that is en route to or from Cuba
based on the restrictions set forth in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. (See Appendix C,
below.)
U.S. Exports and Sanctions118
U.S. commercial medical exports to Cuba have been authorized since the early 1990s pursuant to
the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA; P.L. 102-484, Title XVII), and commercial agricultural
exports have been authorized since 2001 pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000 or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX), but with numerous restrictions and
licensing requirements. For medical exports to Cuba, the CDA requires on-site verification that
the exported item is to be used for the purpose for which it was intended and only for the use and
benefit of the Cuban people. TSRA allows for one-year export licenses for selling agricultural
commodities to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance, foreign assistance, export
assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance such exports. TSRA also denies
exporters access to U.S. private commercial financing or credit; all transactions must be
conducted in cash in advance or with financing from third countries.

118 For additional information, see CRS Insight IN10514, Financing U.S. Agricultural Exports to Cuba and CRS Report
R44119, U.S. Agricultural Trade with Cuba: Current Limitations and Future Prospects, both by Mark A. McMinimy.
Congressional Research Service
40

link to page 46
Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Cuba purchased more than $5.2 billion in U.S. products from 2001 to 2015, largely agricultural
products. For many of those years, the United States was Cuba’s largest supplier of agricultural
products. U.S. exports to Cuba rose from about $7 million in 2001 to a high of $712 million in
2008, far higher than in previous years. This increase was in part because of the rise in food
prices and because of Cuba’s increased food needs in the aftermath of several hurricanes and
tropical storms that severely damaged the country’s agricultural sector. U.S. exports to Cuba
declined considerably from 2009 through 2011, rose again in 2012, and have fallen every year
since then, amounting to just $180 million in 2015, the lowest level since 2002 (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. U.S. Exports to Cuba, 2001-2015

Source: Created by CRS using Commerce Department statistics, as presented by the Global Trade Atlas.
The level of exports in 2015 dropped 40% from the previous year. Looking at the composition of
U.S. exports to Cuba from 2012 to 2015, the leading products were poultry, soybean oilcake,
soybeans, and corn, although corn exports declined considerably in this period. Poultry has been
the leading U.S. export since 2012—accounting for more than 40% of U.S. exports—but the
value of poultry exports declined almost 48% in 2015 from the previous year. According to press
reports, Cuba reportedly suspended U.S. poultry imports in August and September 2015 because
of concerns about the outbreak of bird flu in the United States but resumed purchases in October
2015.119 In the first quarter of 2016, U.S. imports from Cuba continued to fall, amounting to just
$53 million compared to $74 million in the first quarter of 2015, a 28% decline.120
Among the reasons for the overall decline in U.S. exports to Cuba in recent years, analysts cite
Cuba’s shortage of hard currency; financial support from Venezuela; credits and other
arrangements offered by other governments to purchase their countries’ products; Cuba’s
preferences to purchase products from government-controlled entities; and efforts by Cuba to
increase the motivation of U.S. companies, organizations, local and state officials, and Members
of Congress to push for further changes in U.S. sanctions policy toward Cuba.121 Some

119 Marc Frank, “Cuba Resumes U.S. Chicken Imports After Bird Flu Halt–Traders,” Reuters News, October 7, 2015.
120 U.S. Department of Commerce statistics, as presented by the Global Trade Atlas.
121 Juan Tamayo, “Big Drop in U.S. Agricultural Sales to Cuba,” Miami Herald, July 29, 2010; Marc Frank, “U.S.
Food Sales to Cuba Continued Decline in 2011,” Reuters News, February 22, 2012; U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic
Council, Inc. “Economic Eye on Cuba,” May 2016.
Congressional Research Service
41

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

agricultural experts are skeptical as to whether the Obama Administration’s recent changes in
policy will lead to a significant increase in U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba, pointing out that
other countries will still be able to offer better terms to Cuba than the United States because of
restrictions on financing and credit.122
President Obama’s policy changes, as set forth in regulatory changes made to the CACR and
EAR, included several measures designed to facilitate commercial exports to Cuba.
 U.S. financial institutions are permitted to open correspondent accounts at Cuban
financial institutions to facilitate the processing of authorized transactions. (In
July 2015, the Florida-based Stonegate Bank became the first U.S. financial
institution to sign a correspondent agreement with a Cuban bank.)
 U.S. private export financing is permitted for all authorized export trade to Cuba,
except for agricultural good exported pursuant to TSRA.
 The definition of the term “cash in advance” for payment for U.S. exports to
Cuba was revised to specify that it means “cash before transfer of title.” In 2005,
the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) had
clarified that “payment of cash in advance” meant that the payment for the goods
had to be received prior to the shipment of the goods from the port at which they
were loaded in the United States. For FY2010 and FY2011, Congress had
temporarily overturned OFAC’s clarification of the term in omnibus
appropriations legislation (Division C, Section 619 of P.L. 111-117, and
continued by reference in Division B, Section 1101 of P.L. 112-10). The change
means that payment can once again occur before an export shipment is offloaded
in Cuba, rather than before the shipment leaves a U.S. port.
 Commercial exports to Cuba of certain goods and services to empower Cuba’s
nascent private sector are authorized, including for certain building materials for
private residential construction, goods for use by private sector Cuban
entrepreneurs, and agricultural equipment for small farmers.
 Licenses for certain categories of exports are included under a “general policy of
approval.” These categories include exports for civil aviation and commercial
aircraft safety; telecommunications; U.S. news bureaus; human rights
organizations and nongovernmental organizations; environmental protection of
U.S. and international air quality, waters, and coastlines; and agricultural
commodities (such as insecticides, pesticides, and herbicides) that fall outside the
scope of those exports already allowed under TSRA.
 Licenses for exports that will be considered on a case-by-case basis include
certain items exported to state-owned enterprises, agencies, and other
organizations of the Cuban government that provide goods and services for the
use and benefit of the Cuban people. These items include exports for agricultural
production, artistic endeavors, education, food processing, disaster preparedness,
relief and response, public health and sanitation, residential construction and
renovation, public transportation, wholesale and retail distribution for domestic
consumption by the Cuban people, construction of facilities for treating public
water supplies, facilities for supplying electricity or other energy to the Cuban

122 University of Florida, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, “Hot Topic Webinar–The Cuban Factor:
Agricultural Trade with Cuba,” presented by William Messina, Jr., February 4, 2015, available at
http://www.piecenter.com/2015/01/28/hot-topic-webinar-the-cuban-factor-agricultural-trade-with-cuba/.
Congressional Research Service
42

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

people, sports and recreation facilities, and other infrastructure that directly
benefit the Cuban people.
 The commercial export of certain consumer communication devices, related
software, applications, hardware, and services, and items for the establishment
and update of communications-related systems is authorized; previously such
exports were limited to donations. The export of items for telecommunications,
including access to the Internet, use of Internet services, infrastructure creation,
and upgrades, is also authorized.
 Companies exporting authorized goods to Cuba are authorized to have a physical
presence in Cuba, such as an office, retail outlet, or warehouse.
USDA Reports. In a June 2015 report, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Foreign
Agricultural Service noted that “the U.S. share of the Cuban market has slipped dramatically,
from a high of 42% in FY2009 to only 16% in FY2014.”123 The report contends that the recent
decline in U.S. market share in Cuba “is largely attributable to a decrease in bulk commodity
exports from the United States in light of favorable credit terms offered by key competitors.” It
maintains that the United States has lost market share to those countries able to provide export
credits to Cuba. The report concludes that lifting U.S. restrictions on travel and capital flow to
Cuba, and the ability for USDA to conduct market development and credit guarantee programs in
Cuba, would help the United States recapture its market share in Cuba. Another USDA report
published in June 2015 by its Economic Research Service maintained that a more normal
economic relationship between the United States and Cuba would allow “U.S. agricultural
exports to develop commercial ties in Cuba that approximate their business relationship in other
parts of the world” (such as the Dominican Republic) and could “feature a much larger level of
U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.” According to the report, increased U.S. exports could include
such commodities as milk, wheat, rice, and dried beans, and intermediate and consumer-oriented
commodities.124
USITIC Reports. The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) has issued three studies
since 2007 examining the effects of U.S. restrictions on trade with Cuba.125 The agency issued its
third and most recent report on April 18, 2016.126 The Senate Finance Committee initially
requested the report in December 2014 to examine effects of U.S. restrictions on trade and travel
to Cuba on the export of U.S. goods and services. The USITC held a public hearing on June 2,
2015, that featured private sector and academic witnesses as well as a Member of Congress.127 In
August 2015, the committee asked the that study be expanded to include analysis of existing
Cuban non-tariff measures, institutional and infrastructural factors, and other Cuban barriers; the

123 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Foreign Agricultural Service, International Agricultural Trade Report,
“U.S. Agricultural Exports to Cuba Have Substantial Room for Growth,” June 22, 2015, available at
http://www.fas.usda.gov/data/us-agricultural-exports-cuba-have-substantial-room-growth.
124 USDA, Economic Research Service, “U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future,” June 2015,
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1856299/aes87.pdf.
125 The first two reports were: USITC, U.S. Agricultural Sales to Cuba: Certain Economic Effects of U.S. Restrictions,
USITC Publication 3932, July 2007, available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3932.pdf; and USITC, U.S.
Agricultural Sales to Cuba: Certain Economic Effects of U.S. Restrictions, An Update
, Office of Industries Working
Paper, by Jonathan R. Coleman, No. ID-22, June 2009, available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/ID-22.pdf.
126 USITC, “Overview of Cuban Imports of Goods and Services and Effects of U.S. Restrictions,” March 2016,
Publication 4597, released April 18, 2016, available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4597.pdf.
127 USITC, “Overview of Cuban Imports of Goods and Services and Effects of U.S. Restrictions, Available Testimony
from Recent Hearings,” June 2, 2015, available at http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/spotlight/
overview_cuban_imports_goods_and_services_and.htm.
Congressional Research Service
43

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

extent to which these barriers would affect the export of goods and services to Cuba; and the
aggregate effects of Cuban tariff and non-tariff measures on the ability of foreign firms to conduct
business in and with Cuba. According to the findings of the report:
 U.S. restrictions on trade and travel have reportedly shut U.S. suppliers out of a
market in which they could be competitive on price, quality, and proximity. The
most problematic U.S. restrictions cited are the inability to offer credit, travel to
or invest in Cuba, and use funds sourced and administered by the U.S.
government.
 Cuban nontariff measures and other factors may limit U.S. exports to and
investment in Cuba if U.S. restrictions are lifted. These include Cuban
government control of trade and distribution, legal limits on foreign investment
and property ownership, and politically motivated decision making regarding
trade and investment.
 Absent U.S. restrictions, U.S. exports in several sectors would likely increase
somewhat in the short term, with prospects for larger increases in the longer term,
subject to changes in Cuban policy and economic growth. U.S. exports could
increase further if Cuban import barriers were lowered.
 If U.S. restrictions were removed, U.S. agricultural and manufactured exports to
Cuba could increase to almost $1.8 billion, while if both U.S. restrictions were
removed and Cuban barriers lowered, U.S. exports could approach $2.2 million
annually.
Legislative Activity. Several legislative initiatives introduced in the 114th Congress would lift or
ease restrictions on exports to Cuba.
 Three bills—H.R. 274 (Rush), H.R. 403 (Rangel), and H.R. 735 (Serrano)—
would lift the overall embargo, including restrictions on exports to Cuba in the
CDA and TSRA.
 H.R. 635 (Rangel), among its various provisions, has the goal of facilitating the
export of U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba by permanently
redefining the term “payment of cash in advance” to mean that payment is
received before the transfer of title and release and control of the commodity to
the purchaser; authorizing direct transfers between Cuban and U.S. financial
institutions for products exported under the terms of TSRA; establishing an
export promotion program for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba; prohibiting
restriction on travel to Cuba; and repealing the on-site verification requirement
for medical exports to Cuba under the CDA.
S. 491 (Klobuchar) would remove various provisions of law restricting trade and
other relations with Cuba, including certain restrictions in the CDA, the
LIBERTAD Act, and TSRA.
 S. 1049 (Heitkamp) would amend TSRA to allow for the financing of agricultural
commodities to Cuba.
S. 1543 (Moran)/H.R. 3238 (Emmer) would repeal or amend various provisions
of law restricting trade and other relations with Cuba, including certain
restrictions in the CDA, the LIBERTAD Act, and TSRA. The bills would repeal
restrictions on private financing for Cuba in TSRA but continue to prohibit U.S.
government foreign assistance or financial assistance, loans, loan guarantee,
extension of credit, or other financing for export to Cuba, albeit with presidential
Congressional Research Service
44

link to page 77 link to page 82 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

waiver authority for national security or humanitarian reasons. Under the
initiative, the federal government would be prohibited from expending any funds
to promote trade with or develop markets in Cuba, although certain federal
commodity promotion programs would be allowed.
H.R. 3306 (Rush), would authorize the export of energy resources, technologies,
and related services to Cuba.
 H.R. 3687 (Crawford), would permit U.S. government assistance for U.S.
agricultural exports to Cuba as long as the recipient of the assistance is not
controlled by the Cuban government; authorize the financing of sales of
agricultural commodities; and authorize investment for the development of an
agricultural business in Cuba as long as it is not controlled by the Cuban
government or does not traffic in property of U.S. nationals confiscated by the
Cuban government.
In contrast, two other introduced bills, S. 1388 and H.R. 2466, would require the President to
submit a plan for resolving all outstanding claims relating to property confiscated by the
government of Cuba before taking action to ease restrictions on travel to or trade with Cuba.
Efforts to ease or tighten restrictions on U.S. exports to Cuba played out in the FY2016
appropriations process, but ultimately no such provisions were included in the FY2016 omnibus
appropriations measure (P.L. 114-113). S. 1910 (Boozman), the FY2016 Financial Services
appropriations bill, had three provisions easing Cuba sanctions (on financing for U.S. agricultural
sales, travel, and vessels trading with Cuba) that could have affected U.S. exports to Cuba. In
contrast, House-passed H.R. 2578, the FY2016 Commerce, Justice, and Science appropriations
bill, had a provision that would have attempted to prevent additional categories of exports to
Cuba authorized as part of the Administration’s policy change on Cuba. (See Appendix B for
details.)
To date in the FY2017 appropriations process, two House bills (Commerce and Financial
Services) have provisions that would again attempt to impose new sanctions that place
restrictions on U.S. exports to Cuba. A provision in H.R. 5393, the Commerce appropriations bill,
would prohibit funding to facilitate, permit, license, or promote exports to the Cuban military or
intelligence service or to any officer of the Cuban military or intelligence service, or an
immediate family member thereof. A provision in the House Financial Services bill, H.R. 5485,
would prohibit funding to approve, license, facilitate, authorize, or otherwise allow any financial
transaction with an entity controlled, in whole or in part, by the Cuban military or intelligence
service or with any officer or immediate family member thereof. Neither provision would affect
financial transactions for exports permitted under TSRA. Both provisions could significantly
affect the expansion of U.S. exports to Cuba given that the Cuban military, since the 1990s, has
become increasingly involved in Cuba’s economy and in running numerous companies.
In contrast, on June 21, 2016, the House Rules Committee made in order a potential amendment
to H.R. 5485 (Crawford, listed as amendment 24 in H.Rept. 114-639) that would prohibit funds in
the act from being used to implement, administer, or enforce Section 908(b) of TSRA prohibiting
private financing for agricultural sales to Cuba. The FY2017 Senate Financial Services
appropriations bill, S. 3067, also has provisions that would lift restrictions on financing for
agricultural exports to Cuba and on seaborne vessel entry into the United States if the vessel has
been involved in trade with Cuba within the previous 180 days, except pursuant to a DOT license.
(See Appendix C.)
Congressional Research Service
45

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation128
As noted above, in December 2014, President Obama called for the Secretary of State to review
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. As set forth in the three terrorist-list provisions
of law—Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C.
Appendix 2405(j)); Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);
and Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 U.S.C. 2780)—a country’s retention
on the state sponsors of terrorism list may be rescinded by the President in two ways. The first
option is for the President to submit a report to Congress certifying that there has been a
fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government and that the government is
not supporting acts of international terrorism and is providing assurances that it will not support
such acts in the future. The second option is for the President to submit a report to Congress, at
least 45 days in advance, justifying the rescission and certifying that the government has not
provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six months and has
provided assurances that it will not support such acts in the future. President Obama utilized the
second option when submitting his report to Congress on April 14, 2015.
According to the terrorist-list laws, the rescission would take effect 45 days after the report is
submitted to Congress. Of the three terrorist-list statutes, only the AECA has an explicit provision
allowing Congress to block, via the enactment of a joint resolution, a removal of a country on the
list. The law sets forth an expedited procedure process for the joint resolution, which would have
to be approved within the 45-day period. Such a measure would be subject to presidential veto
and require a two-thirds vote in each body to override the veto. No resolutions of disapproval
were introduced in Congress within the 45-day period, and, accordingly, Secretary of State Kerry
rescinded Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism on May 29, 2015.129
Notably, on May 11, 2015, Secretary of State Kerry also dropped Cuba from the annual
determination, pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act and due by May 15 of
each year, identifying countries that are not fully cooperating with United States antiterrorism
efforts. Cuba had been designated annually since that annual determination was established in
1997. Countries currently designated as not cooperating fully on antiterrorism efforts are Eritrea,
North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela.130
Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring international terrorism in 1982
pursuant to Section 6(j) of the EAA because of its alleged ties to international terrorism and
support for terrorist groups in Latin America, and it remained on the list pursuant to the EAA, the
AECA, and the FAA.131 A range of sanctions are imposed on countries on the terrorism list,
including requirements for validated exports licenses (with presumption of denial) for dual-use
goods or technology controlled by the Department of Commerce for national security of foreign
policy reasons (EAA); a ban on arms-related exports and sales (AECA); and prohibitions on most

128 For further background, see CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative
Parameters: In Brief
, by Dianne E. Rennack.
129 Subsequently, on July 22, 2015, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, amended the
Export Administration Regulations to reflect the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. See 80
Federal Register 43314-43320, July 22, 2015.
130 Federal Register, “Determination and Certification Under Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act,” May 27,
2015, p. 30319.
131 Restrictions on terrorism states, defined in the FAA and the AECA, also apply to Cuba. As enacted in 1986, Section
40 of the AECA, made any government of a country subject to Section 6(j) of the EAA also subject to the sanctions
stated in Section 40 of the AECA.
Congressional Research Service
46

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

foreign aid, food aid, or Export-Import Bank or Peace Corps programs (FAA).132 Despite Cuba’s
removal from the terrorism list, the extensive array of economic sanctions imposed on Cuba
imposed pursuant to other provisions of law, including an embargo on most trade and financial
transactions, remain in place.133
Cuba had a long history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin
America and Africa, but in 1992, Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents
abroad was a thing of the past. Cuba’s change in policy was in large part due to the breakup of the
Soviet Union, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in annual subsidies to Cuba and led
to substantial Cuban economic decline.
Administration’s Justification for Removing Cuba from the Terrorism List
In the April 14, 2015, report to Congress, President Obama, following the process set forth in the
three terrorist-list provisions of law cited above, certified that the Cuban government “has not
provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding 6-month period” and “has
provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.”
The memorandum of justification accompanying the report maintained that Cuba has taken steps
in recent years to fully distance itself from international terrorism and to strengthen its
counterterrorism laws. The justification noted that Cuba is a party to 15 international instruments
related to countering terrorism and has deposited its instrument of ratification or accession to
three additional instruments that have not yet entered into force.
The justification stated that in 2013, Cuba committed to work with the multilateral Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) to address its anti-money laundering/counterterrorism finance
(AML/CTF) deficiencies. Since 2012, Cuba has been a member of the Financial Action Task
Force of Latin America (GAFILAT, formerly known as the Financial Action Task Force of South
America), a regional group associated with the FATF. As a member, Cuba committed to adopting
and implementing the 40 recommendations of the FATF pertaining to AML/CTF standards. In
early 2014, Cuba adopted legislation providing for the freezing of assets linked to money
laundering or terrorist financing. In October 2014, the FATF welcomed Cuba’s progress in
improving its regulatory regime to combat money laundering and terrorist financing and
addressing strategic deficiencies that the FATF had identified. As a result, the FATF noted that
Cuba was no longer subject to the FATF’s monitoring and compliance process, but that the
country would continue to work with GAFILAT to strengthen its regulatory regime.134
The justification cited various instances in which Cuba has condemned terrorist attacks around
the world, including the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and the 2015 Charlie Hebdo terrorist
attack in Paris. It noted that in 2010, the Cuban government provided information to the U.S.
government reiterating its commitment to its international obligations regarding both
counterterrorism and nonproliferation, noting instances of information sharing with the United

132 Being on the state sponsor of terrorism list also allows U.S. nationals injured by an act of international terrorism to
file lawsuits for damages against the designated country in the United States. For more information, see CRS Legal
Sidebar WSLG254, Can Victims of Terrorism in the United States Sue Foreign Governments?, by Jennifer K. Elsea;
and CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1405, Can Creditors Enforce Terrorism Judgments Against Cuba?, by Jennifer K.
Elsea.
133 For a listing of the various economic restrictions on Cuba, see CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative
Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations
, by Dianne E. Rennack and Mark P. Sullivan.
134 Financial Action Task Force, “Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-Going Process,” October 24, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
47

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

States regarding planned terrorist attacks, and providing assurances that Cuban territory would
not be used to organize, finance, or carry out terrorist acts.
Most significantly, the justification stated that direct engagement with Cuba permitted the United
States to secure additional assurances, delivered April 3, 2015, of Cuba’s commitment to
renounce international terrorism. According to the justification:
In the assurances, Cuba reiterated its commitment to cooperate in combating terrorism,
rejected and condemned all terrorist acts, methods, and practices in all their forms and
manifestations, and condemned any action intended to encourage, support, finance, or
cover up any terrorist acts. The Government of Cuba further committed to never
supporting any act of international terrorism, and never allowing its territory to be used to
organize, finance, or execute terrorist act against any other country, including the United
States.
Members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in Cuba. For a number of years in its annual
Country Reports on Terrorism, the State Department has discussed Cuba’s provision of safe
haven for members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), both U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).
In the April 2015 justification, the Administration maintained that there was no credible evidence
that Cuba has, within the preceding six months, provided specific material support, services, or
resources, to members of the FARC or members of the National Liberation Army (ELN), another
Colombian FTO, outside of facilitating the peace process between those organizations and the
government of Colombia. The Cuban government has been supporting and hosting peace
negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government since 2012.135 According to the
justification, the Colombian government formally noted to the United States that it believes the
Cuban government has played a constructive process in the peace talks, and that it has no
evidence that Cuba has provided any political or military support in recent years to the FARC or
ELN that has assisted in the planning or execution of terrorist activity in Colombia.
With regard to ETA, the Administration maintained in the justification that the Cuban government
continues to allow approximately two dozen members of ETA to remain in the country, with most
of those entering Cuba following an agreement with the government of Spain. The Administration
maintained that Spain has requested the extradition of two ETA members from Cuba, and that a
bilateral process is underway for the two countries to resolve the matter. Press reports have
identified the two ETA members as José Ángel Urtiaga and José Ignacio Etxarte.136 It maintained
that the Spanish government has conveyed to the United States that it is satisfied with this process
and that it has no objection to the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.
For all three FTOs—the FARC, ELN, and ETA—the Cuban government maintained in its April
2015 assurances to the U.S. government that it would never permit these groups to use Cuban
territory to engage in activities against any country.
U.S. Fugitives from Justice. Another issue that has been mentioned for many years in the State
Department’s annual terrorism report is Cuba’s harboring of fugitives wanted in the United States.
The 2013 terrorism report (issued in April 2014) maintained that Cuba provided such support as
housing, food ration books, and medical care for these individuals.137 This was reiterated in the
Administration’s April 2015 justification to Congress.

135 For background on the peace process, see CRS Report R42982, Peace Talks in Colombia, by June S. Beittel.
136 “Cuba y Madrid Negocian Extradición de Dos Etarras, Dice EEUU,” AP Spanish Worldstream, April 16, 2015.
137 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, April 2014.
Congressional Research Service
48

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba include convicted murderers and numerous hijackers, most of
whom entered Cuba in the 1970s and early 1980s.138 For example, Joanne Chesimard, also known
as Assata Shakur, was added to the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorist list in May 2013. Chesimard was
part of militant group known as the Black Liberation Army. In 1977, she was convicted for the
1973 murder of a New Jersey State Police officer and sentenced to life in prison. Chesimard
escaped from prison in 1979 and, according to the FBI, lived underground before fleeing to Cuba
in 1984.139 Another fugitive, William “Guillermo” Morales, who was a member of the Puerto
Rican militant group known as the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), reportedly has
been in Cuba since 1988 after being imprisoned in Mexico for several years. In 1978, both of his
hands were maimed by a bomb he was making. He was convicted in New York on weapons
charges in 1979 and sentenced to 10 years in prison and 5 years’ probation, but escaped from
prison the same year.140 In addition to Chesimard and other fugitives from the past, a number of
U.S. fugitives from justice wanted for Medicare and other types of insurance fraud reportedly
have fled to Cuba in recent years.141
While the United States and Cuba have an extradition treaty in place dating to 1905, in practice
the treaty has not been utilized. Instead, for more than a decade, Cuba has returned wanted
fugitives to the United States on a case-by-case basis. For example, in 2011, U.S. Marshals
picked up a husband and wife in Cuba who were wanted for a 2010 murder in New Jersey,142
while in April 2013, Cuba returned a Florida couple who had allegedly kidnapped their own
children (who had been in the custody of the mother’s parents) and fled to Havana.143 However,
Cuba has generally refused to render to U.S. justice any fugitive judged by Cuba to be “political,”
such as Chesimard, who they believe could not receive a fair trial in the United States. Moreover,
Cuba in the past has responded to U.S. extradition requests by stating that approval would be
contingent upon the United States returning wanted Cuban criminals from the United States.
These include the return of Luis Posada Carriles, whom Cuba accused of plotting the 1976
bombing of a Cuban jet that killed 73 people.144
The Administration’s April 2015 justification for removing Cuba from the terrorism list maintains
that Cuba agreed to enter into a law enforcement dialogue with the United States that will include
discussions with the goal of resolving outstanding fugitive cases. It asserted that “the strong U.S.
interest in the return of these fugitives will be best served by entering into this dialogue with
Cuba.” (As noted above, an inaugural law enforcement dialogue took place in November 2015.)

138 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, April 30, 2008.
139 FBI, Most Wanted Terrorists, Joanne Deborah Chesimard, poster, at http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/
joanne-deborah-chesimard/view.
140 James Anderson, “Living in Exile, Maimed Guerrilla Maintains Low-Key Profile in Cuba,” Fort Worth Star-
Telegram
, January 16, 2000; Vanessa Bauza, “FBI’s Fugitive Is Cuba’s Political Refugee,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel,
May 26, 2002; Mary Jordan, “Fugitives Sought by U.S. Find a Protector in Cuba,” Washington Post, September 2,
2002, FBI, Wanted by the FBI, William “Guillermo” Morales, poster, at http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/dt/william-
guillermo-morales/view.
141 For example, see the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Florida, “Thirty-Three Defendants Charged in
Staged Automobile Accident Scheme,” press release, May 16, 2013; “Experts: Florida Couple May Not Be Welcome
in Cuba,” Naples Daily News, April 9, 2013; and Jay Weaver, “FBI Struggling to Catch Dozens of Fraud Fugitives
Hiding in Cuba,” Miami Herald, July 16, 2011.
142 George Mast, “Murder Suspects Caught in Cuba,” Courier-Post (New Jersey), September 30, 2011.
143 Paul Haven and Peter Orsi, “Cuba Says It Will Give U.S. Florida Couple Who Allegedly Kidnapped Children,”
Associated Press, April 9, 2013.
144 For more background on Posada, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan
and June S. Beittel.
Congressional Research Service
49

link to page 22 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Pro/Con Arguments. Those supporting the Administration’s decision to remove Cuba from the
state sponsor of terrorism list maintain that retention on the list was anachronistic and a holdover
from the Cold War. They argue that domestic political considerations kept Cuba on the terrorism
list for many years, and that Cuba’s presence on the list has diverted U.S. attention from struggles
against serious terrorist threats. Some supporting the Administration’s decision contend that it
reinforces the President’s broader Cuba policy shift of moving from isolation to engagement, and
could result in increased engagement with Cuba on counterterrorism issues and the long-standing
issue of U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba. Some also maintain that Cuba’s removal from the list
will make it easier for the United States to work with other hemispheric nations on
counterterrorism issues.
Those who oppose removing Cuba from the terrorism list argue that there is enough evidence that
Cuba continues to support terrorism. They point to the government’s hosting of members of
foreign terrorist organizations such as ETA and the FARC and U.S. fugitives from justice. In
particular, some Members contend that Cuba should not come off the terrorist list as long it
continues to harbor U.S. fugitives convicted of violent acts in the United States. They also point
to Cuba’s involvement in an attempted weapons transfer to North Korea in July 2013 in
contravention of U.N. sanctions as evidence (see “Cuba’s Foreign Relations,” above). Some
maintain that the Administration rushed to complete its review of Cuba’s designation as a state
sponsor of terrorism without consulting Congress.
Legislative Activity. In the 114th Congress, before the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state
sponsor of terrorism, H.R. 274 (Rush) had a provision that would have immediately rescinded
any determination of the Secretary of State that Cuba has repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism. As noted above, no resolutions of disapproval were introduced to block
the Administration’s rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. On the issue
of U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba, H.Res. 181 would call for the immediate extradition or
rendering to the United States of convicted felon William Morales and all other fugitives from
justice who are receiving safe harbor in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or confinement for
criminal offenses committed in the United States. H.R. 4772 (Pearce) would prohibit funding to
accept commercial flight plans between the United States and Cuba until Cuba extradites U.S.
fugitives from justice.
Trademark Sanction
For more than 15 years, the United States has imposed a trademark sanction specifically related to
Cuba. A provision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (§211 of Division A, Title II,
P.L. 105-277, signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the United States from accepting
payment for trademark registrations and renewals from Cuban nationals that were used in
connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated, unless the original owner of
the trademark has consented. U.S. officials maintain that the sanction prohibits a general
license145 under the CACR for transactions or payments for such trademarks.146 The provision
also prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such trademarks without the consent of the original

145 A general license provides the authority to engage in a transaction without the need to apply to the Treasury
Department for a license. In contrast, a specific license is a written document issued by the Treasury Department to a
person or entity authorizing a particular transaction in response to a written license application.
146 For example, see testimony of Mary Boney Denison, Commission for Trademarks, U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office before a hearing of the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Internet on “Resolving Issues with Confiscated Property in Cuba, Havana Club Rum and Other Property,” February 11,
2016.
Congressional Research Service
50

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

owner. The measure was enacted because of a dispute between the French spirits company,
Pernod Ricard, and the Bermuda-based Bacardi Limited. Pernod Ricard entered into a joint
venture in 1993 with Cubaexport, a Cuban state company, to produce and export Havana Club
rum. Bacardi maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name because in 1995 it entered
into an agreement for the Havana Club trademark with the Arechabala family, who had originally
produced the rum until its assets and property were confiscated by the Cuban government in
1960. Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana Club in the United States because of the
trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights should the embargo be lifted.
The European Union initiated World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement proceedings
in June 2000, maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS). In January 2002, the WTO ultimately found that the trademark
sanction violated WTO provisions on national treatment and most-favored-nation obligations in
the TRIPS Agreement.147 On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come into
compliance with the WTO ruling through legislative action by January 3, 2003.148 That deadline
was extended several times since no legislative action had been taken to bring Section 211 into
compliance with the WTO ruling. On July 1, 2005, however, in an EU-U.S. understanding, the
EU agreed that it would not request authorization to retaliate at that time, but reserved the right to
do so at a future date, and the United States agreed not to block a future EU request.149
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) did not process Cubaexport’s 10-year renewal of
the Havana Club trademark when it was due in 2006 because the Treasury Department’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) denied the company the specific license that it needed to pay the
fee for renewal of the trademark registration.150 In providing foreign policy guidance to OFAC at
the time, the State Department recommended denial of the license, maintaining that it would be
consistent with “the U.S. approach toward non-recognition of trademark rights associated with
confiscated property” and consistent with U.S. policy to deny resources to the Cuban government
in order to hasten a transition to democracy.151
Almost a decade later, on January 11, 2016, OFAC issued a specific license to Cubaexport,
allowing the company to pay fees for the renewal of the Havana Club trademark registration. In
November 2015, OFAC had requested foreign policy guidance from the State Department for
Cubaexport’s request for a specific license. According to the State Department, in evaluating the
case, it took into account the “landmark shift” in U.S. policy toward Cuba, U.S. foreign policy
with respect to its key allies in Europe, and U.S. policy with regard to trademark rights associated
with confiscated property.152 Two days later, on January 13, 2016, USPTO renewed Cubaexport’s

147 For additional background, see archived CRS Report RL32014, WTO Dispute Settlement: Status of U.S. Compliance
in Pending Cases
, by Jeanne J. Grimmett, and archived CRS Report RS21764, Restricting Trademark Rights of
Cubans: WTO Decision and Congressional Response
, by Margaret Mikyung Lee.
148 “U.S., EU Agree on Deadline for Complying with Section 211 WTO Finding,” Inside U.S. Trade, April 12, 2002.
149 World Trade Organization (WTO), “United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
Understanding Between the European Communities and the United States,” WT/DC176/16, July 1, 2005; WTO,
Dispute Settlement Body, “Minutes of Meeting, Held in the Centre William Rappard on 20 July 2005,”
WT/DSB/M/194, August 26, 2005; and “Japan, EU Suspend WTO Retaliation Against U.S. in Two Cases,” Inside U.S.
Trade
, July 15, 2005.
150 “PTO Cancels Cuban ‘Havana Club’ Mark; Bacardi Set to Sell Rum Under Same Mark,” International Trade Daily,
August 10, 2006.
151 U.S. Department of State, Unclassified Memorandum, (to OFAC from Economic Bureau, Department of State)
Subject: Ropes & Gray LLP (Havana Club) Licensing Case, July 28, 2006.
152 U.S. Department of State, Testimony of Kurt Tong, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, before the House
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, Hearing on “Resolving Issues
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
51

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

trademark registration for Havana Club for the 2006-2016 period. On February 16, 2016, the
agency renewed the trademark registration for 10 additional years until 2026.
State Department and USPTO officials maintain that the renewal of the Havana Club trademark
registration does not resolve the trademark dispute. The State Department notes that there are
pending federal court proceedings in which Bacardi has filed suit against Cubaexport to contest
the Havana Club trademark ownership in the United States and that OFAC’s issuance of a license
permitting USPTO to renew the trademark registration will allow the two parties to proceed
toward adjudication of the case.153
Legislative Activity. In Congress, two different approaches have been advocated for a number of
years to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO ruling. Some want a narrow fix in
which Section 211 would be amended so that it applies to all persons claiming rights in
trademarks confiscated by Cuba, whatever their nationality, instead of being limited to designated
nationals, meaning Cuban nationals. Advocates of this approach argue that it would treat all
holders of U.S. trademarks equally. Others want Section 211 repealed altogether. They argue that
the law endangers more than 5,000 trademarks of more than 400 U.S. companies registered in
Cuba.154
In the 114th Congress, identical bills S. 757 (Nelson) and H.R. 1627 (Issa) would apply the
narrow fix so that the trademark sanction applies to all nationals, while several broader bills have
been introduced with provisions that would repeal Section 211: H.R. 274 (Rush); H.R. 403
(Rangel); H.R. 635 (Rangel); and H.R. 735 (Serrano). The House Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet held a hearing on February 11,
2016, on the trademark issue as well as on the issue of confiscated property.
In the FY2017 appropriations process, two House bills have provisions that would introduce new
sanctions related to Cuba and trademarks.
 The House Commerce appropriations bill, H.R. 5393, has a provision that would
prohibit funds from being used to approve the registration, renewal, or
maintenance of a mark, trade name, or commerce name used in commerce that is
the same or substantially similar to one used in connection with a business or
assets that were confiscated, unless the original owner has expressly consented.
This provision would prohibit the USPTO from spending funds to approve,
maintain, or renew such a trademark.
 The House Financial Services appropriations bill, H.R. 5485, has a provision that
would prohibit funds from being used to authorize a general or specific license
with respect to a mark, trade name, or commerce name used in commerce that is
the same or substantially similar to one used in connection with a business or
assets that were confiscated unless the original owner has expressly consented.
This provision would prohibit Treasury’s OFAC from issuing a general or
specific license for the payment of trademark registration fees. However, with
regard to the Havana Club case, as discussed above, OFAC issued a specific

(...continued)
with Confiscated Property in Cuba, Havana Club Rum and Other Property,” February 11, 2016.
153 Ibid.
154 Statement of William A. Reinsch, National Foreign Trade Council, House Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, Hearing on “Resolving Issues with Confiscated
Property in Cuba, Havana Club Rum and Other Property,” February 11, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
52

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

license in January 2016 for payments related to the renewal of the trademark and
the USPTO subsequently renewed the trademark until 2026. In its statement of
policy on the bill, the Administration strongly objected to the trademark and
other Cuba provisions as undermining the President’s policy on Cuba.
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights
Since 1996, the United States has provided assistance—through the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the State Department, and the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED)—to increase the flow of information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise to
Cuba.
USAID and State Department efforts are largely funded through Economic Support Funds (ESF)
in the annual foreign operations appropriations bill. From FY1996 to FY2015, Congress
appropriated some $284 million in funding for Cuba democracy efforts.155 In recent years, this
included $45.3 million for FY2008 and $20 million in each fiscal year from FY2009 through
FY2012, $19.3 million in FY2013, and $20 million in each of FY2014 and FY2015.
The Administration’s request for FY2016 was $20 million in ESF, and the FY2016 omnibus
appropriations measure, P.L. 114-113, provided that amount in its explanatory statement. The
House Appropriations Committee’s FY2016 State Department and Foreign Operations
appropriations bill, H.R. 2772, would have provided $30 million to promote democracy and civil
society in Cuba and would have provided that no funds could be obligated for business
promotion, economic reform, entrepreneurship, or any other assistance that was not democracy-
building as expressly authorized in the LIBERTAD Act. The report to the bill (H.Rept. 114-154)
would have provided that not less than $8 million would be for NED and that the remaining
assistance would be administrated by the State Department and USAID. The Senate
Appropriations Committee version of the bill, S. 1725, would have provided $15 million in ESF
for Cuba democracy programs, and $5 million in ESF (notwithstanding any other provision of
law) for programs to support private Cuban entrepreneurs, except that no such assistance could be
provided for the Cuban government. None of the directives in the House and Senate bills and
reports were included in the FY2016 omnibus bill.
For FY2017, the Administration is requesting $15 million in ESF for Cuba democracy and human
rights programs, a 25% reduction from FY2016. According to the request, the assistance would
support civil society initiatives that promote democracy, human rights, and fundamental
freedoms, particularly freedoms of expression and association. The programs would “provide
humanitarian assistance to victims of political repression and their families, strengthen
independent civil society, support the Cuban people’s desire to freely determine their future,
reduced their dependence on the Cuban state, and promote the flow of uncensored information to,
from and within the island.”156
The House Appropriations Committee released a draft FY2017 State Department and Foreign
Operations appropriations bill (unnumbered) on June 22, 2016, that would provide $30 million
for democracy promotion for Cuba, double the Administration’s request. The bill would prohibit

155 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that Congress appropriated $205 million for Cuba
democracy programs from FY1996 through FY2011. See U.S. GAO, Cuba Democracy Assistance, USAID’s Program
Is Improved, But State Could Better Monitor Its Implementing Partners
, GAO-13-285, January 2013.
156 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2017, Appendix
3, February 26, 2016, p. 406.
Congressional Research Service
53

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

funding for business promotion, economic reform, entrepreneurship, or any other assistance that
is not democracy building authorized by the LIBERTAD Act of 1996.
In contrast, the Senate version of the FY2017 foreign operations appropriations bill, S. 3117
(S.Rept. 114-290), reported June 29, 2016, would recommend fully funding the Administration’s
request of $15 million. However, it also would provide that $3 million be made available for
USAID to support free enterprise and private business organizations and people-to-people
educational and cultural activities.
Generally, as provided in appropriations measures, ESF has to be obligated within two fiscal
years. USAID in the past received the majority of this funding, but the State Department began
receiving a portion in FY2004 and in recent years has been allocated more funding than USAID.
The State Department generally has transferred a portion of the Cuba assistance that it
administers to NED. For FY2014, Congress stipulated that no assistance may be obligated by
USAID for any new programs or activities in Cuba (P.L. 113-76). For FY2015 assistance,
however, USAID is administering $6.25 million of Cuban democracy assistance, whereas the
State Department is administering $13.75 million, with $6.25 million of that transferred to NED.
USAID’s Cuba program has supported a variety of U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations
with the goals of promoting a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, helping develop civil
society, and building solidarity with Cuba’s human rights activists.
NED is not a U.S. government agency but an independent nongovernmental organization that
receives U.S. government funding. Its Cuba program is funded by the organization’s regular
appropriations by Congress as well as by funding from the State Department. Until FY2008,
NED’s democratization assistance for Cuba had been funded largely through the annual
Commerce, Justice, and State (CJS) appropriations measure, but is now funded through the State
Department, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies appropriations measure. According to
information provided by NED on its website, its Cuba funding in recent years has been as
follows: $1.65 million in FY2011; $2.6 million in FY2012; $3.4 million in FY2013; and $3
million in FY2014.157
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued several reports since 2006
examining USAID and State Department democracy programs for Cuba. In 2006, GAO issued a
report examining programs from 1996 through 2005 and concluded that the U.S. program had
significant problems and needed better management and oversight. According to GAO, internal
controls, for both the awarding of Cuba program grants and the oversight of grantees, “do not
provide adequate assurance that the funds are being used properly and that grantees are in
compliance with applicable law and regulations.”158 Investigative news reports on the program
maintained that high shipping costs and lax oversight had diminished its effectiveness.159

157 See information about NED’s 2014 projects in Cuba, available at http://www.ned.org/region/latin-america-and-
caribbean/cuba-2014/.
158 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. Democracy Assistance for Cuba Needs Better Management
and Oversight
, GAO-07-147, November 2006.
159 Oscar Corral, “Federal Program to Help Democracy in Cuba Falls Short of Mark,” Miami Herald, November 14,
2006, and “Is U.S. Aid Reaching Castro Foes?” Miami Herald, November 15, 2006.
Congressional Research Service
54

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

GAO issued a second report in 2008 examining USAID’s Cuba democracy program.160 The report
lauded the steps that USAID had taken since 2006 to address problems with its Cuba program and
improve oversight of the assistance. These included awarding all grants competitively since 2006,
hiring more staff for the program office since January 2008, and contracting for financial services
in April 2008 to enhance oversight of grantees. The GAO report also noted that USAID had
worked to strengthen program oversight through pre-award and follow-up reviews, improving
grantee internal controls and implementation plans, and providing guidance and monitoring about
permitted types of assistance and cost sharing. The 2008 GAO report also maintained, however,
that USAID had not staffed the Cuba program to the level needed for effective grant oversight.
GAO recommended that USAID (1) ensure that its Cuba program office is staffed at the level that
is needed to fully implement planned monitoring activities and (2) periodically assess the Cuba
program’s overall efforts to address and reduce grantee risks, especially regarding internal
controls, procurement practices, expenditures, and compliance with laws and regulations.
In January 2013, GAO issued its third report on Cuba democracy programs.161 The report
concluded that USAID had improved its performance and financial monitoring of implementing
partners’ use of program funds, but found that the State Department’s financial monitoring had
gaps. Both agencies were reported to be taking steps to improve financial monitoring. GAO
recommended that the Secretary of State take two actions to strengthen the agency’s ability to
monitor the use of Cuba democracy program funds: use a risk-based approach for program audits
that considers specific indicators for program partners and obtain sufficient information to
approve implementing partners’ use of subpartners.
In April 2014, an Associated Press investigative report alleged that USAID, as part of its
democracy promotion efforts for Cuba, had established a “Cuban Twitter” known as ZunZuneo, a
communications network designed as a “covert” program “to undermine” Cuba’s communist
government built with “secret shell companies” and financed through foreign banks. According to
the press report, the project, which was used by thousands of Cubans, lasted more than two years
until it ended in 2012.162 USAID, which strongly contested the report, issued a statement and
facts about the ZunZuneo program. It maintained that program was not “covert,” but rather that,
just as in other places where it is not always welcome, the agency maintained a “discreet profile”
on the project to minimize risk to staff and partners and work safely.163 Some Members of
Congress strongly criticized USAID for not providing sufficient information to Congress about
the program when funding was appropriated, while other Members strongly defended the agency
and the program.
In August 2014, the Associated Press reported on another U.S.-funded democracy program for
Cuba in which a USAID contractor sent about a dozen youth from several Latin American
countries (Costa Rica, Peru, and Venezuela) in 2010 and 2011 to Cuba to participate in civic
programs, including an HIV-prevention workshop, with the alleged goal to “identify potential
social-change actors” in Cuba. The AP report alleged that “the assignment was to recruit young

160 U.S. GAO, Foreign Assistance: Continued Efforts Needed to Strengthen USAID’s Oversight of U.S. Democracy
Assistance for Cuba
, GAO-09-165, November 2008.
161 U.S. GAO, Cuba Democracy Assistance, USAID’s Program Is Improved, But State Could Better Monitor Its
Implementing Partners
, GAO-13-285, January 2013.
162 Desmond Butler, Jack Gillum, and Alberto Arce, “U.S. Secretly Created ‘Cuban Twitter’ to Stir Unrest,” Associated
Press, April 3, 2014.
163 USAID, “Statement in Reference to the Associated Press Article on “Cuba Twitter” on April 3, 2014,” press
statement, April 3, 2014; “Eight Facts About ZunZuneo,” April 7, 2014, available at http://blog.usaid.gov/2014/04/
eight-facts-about-zunzuneo/.
Congressional Research Service
55

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Cubans to anti-government activism under the guise of civic programs.”164 USAID responded in a
statement maintaining that the AP report “made sensational claims against aid workers for
supporting civil society programs and striving to give voice to these democratic aspirations.”165
On December 22, 2015, USAID’s Office of Inspector General issued a review report on USAID’s
Cuban Civil Society Support Program that examined both the ZunZuneo and HIV-prevention
programs. The report cited a number of problems with USAID’s management controls of the
program and made a number of recommendations, including that USAID conduct an agency-wide
analysis to determine whether a screening policy is needed to address intelligence and subversion
threats, and if so, develop and implement one.166
Radio and TV Martí
U.S.-government-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba—Radio and TV Martí—
began in 1985 and 1990, respectively. According to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)
FY2017 Congressional Budget Request
, Radio and TV Martí and the Martínoticias.com website
“inform and engage the people of Cuba by providing a reliable and credible source of news and
information.”167 According to the BBG, it is estimated that at least 2.2 million Cubans listen to
Radio Martí every week. The BBG maintains that this estimate is based on a Bendixen and
Amandi International April 2015 poll that showed that 20% of respondents said they had listened
to Radio Martí in the 7 days prior to the interviews. This is far higher than reported in the past for
Radio Martí listenership.168 The BBG’s Office of Cuba Broadcasting has significantly expanded
its distribution through the Internet, mobile phones, and social media to help reach audiences in
Cuba.
Until October 1999, U.S.-government-funded international broadcasting programs had been a
primary function of the United States Information Agency (USIA). When USIA was abolished
and its functions were merged into the Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the BBG
became an independent agency that included such entities as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting
(OCB), which manages Radio and TV Marti. OCB is headquartered in Miami, FL. Legislation in
the 104th Congress (P.L. 104-134) required the relocation of OCB from Washington, DC, to South
Florida. The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998. (For more information, see CRS
Report R43521, U.S. International Broadcasting: Background and Issues for Reform, by
Matthew C. Weed.)
According to the BBG, the OCB uses multiple web domains and anti-censorship tools such as
web-based proxies to reach Internet users in Cuba. Since 2011, the OCB has used SMS
messaging to communicate with audiences in Cuba, allowing OCB to “push” information to

164 Desmond Butler, Jack Gillum, Alberto Arce, and Andrea Rodriguez, “The Big Story, U.S. Sent Latin Youth
Undercover in Anti-Cuba Ploy,” Associated Press, August 4, 2014.
165 USAID, “Statement from USAID Spokesperson Matt Herrick on Cuba Civil Society Story,” August 4, 2014.
166 USAID, Office of Inspector General, Review of USAID’s Cuban Civil Society Support Program,” December 22,
2015, available at https://oig.usaid.gov/node/1936.
167 See the full text of the Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2017 budget request, available at http://www.bbg.gov/
wp-content/media/2011/12/FY-2017-Budget-Submission.pdf.
168 In 2009, for example, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) maintained that the best research
suggested that Radio and TV Martí’s audience was small, with less than 2% of respondents to telephone surveys saying
that they had reported tuning in to either Radio or TV Martí. See U.S. GAO, Broadcasting to Cuba, Actions Are
Needed to Improve Strategy and Operations
, GAO-09-127, January 2009.
Congressional Research Service
56

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

mobile phone users in Cuba in a manner that is difficult to filter. The OCB’s website,
martinoticias.com, began streaming Radio and TV Martí programming 24 hours a day in 2013.
OCB also maintains an interactive social engagement strategy that utilizes a YouTube channel,
Facebook, Twitter, and Google+.
Funding. From FY1984 through FY2015, Congress appropriated about $797 million for
broadcasting to Cuba. In recent years, funding amounted to $28 million in FY2012, $26 million
in FY2013, and almost $27 million in FY2014. The FY2015 request was for $23 million, and
Congress ultimately appropriated $27 million in the FY2015 omnibus appropriations measure
(P.L. 113-235).
For FY2016, the BBG requested $30.3 million for Cuba broadcasting, almost $3.2 million over
the amount appropriated in FY2015. This would have included funds for the OCB and the Voice
of America (VOA) Latin America Division to begin the process of establishing a new de-
federalized Spanish language international media operation that would merge the two entities.
Under the plan, the process would be completed in early FY2017, and the new de-federalized
organization would be fully operational by mid FY-2017 and receive a BBG Grant. Ultimately,
the explanatory statement to the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure, P.L. 114-113, provides
$27.14 million for Cuba broadcasting, almost $3.2 million less than that requested. The
explanatory statement notes that it does not include authority or funds requested for the merger of
OCB and the Latin America Division of VOA by establishing an independent grantee
organization.
The report to the House Appropriations Committee’s FY2016 State Department and Foreign
Operations bill, H.R. 2772 (H.Rept. 114-154), had recommended $28.130 million for Cuba
broadcasting, almost $2.2 million less than the request and $1 million more than that provided in
FY2015. Section 7045(c) of H.R. 2772 would have prohibited implementation of the proposed
restructuring and merger of OCB and VOA’s Latin America Division unless specifically
authorized by a subsequent act of Congress. The report to the Senate Appropriations Committee
version of the bill, S. 1725 (S.Rept. 114-79), recommended $27.130 million for OCB and also did
not support or include authority for the merger of OCB and VOA’s Latin American Division.
For FY2017, the Administration is requesting $27.1 million for the OCB, about the same amount
appropriated in FY2016. The Administration also is requesting authority for the BBG to establish
a new Spanish language, nonfederal media organization that would receive a BBG grant and
perform the functions of the current OCB.169 The House Appropriations Committee released a
draft FY2017 State Department and Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (unnumbered) on
June 22, 2016. The draft bill has a provision that would prohibit the Administration’s request to
establish an independent grantee organization to carry out any and all broadcasting and related
programs to the Latin American and Caribbean region or otherwise substantially alter the
structure of the OCB unless specifically authorized by a subsequent act of Congress. The
prohibition would prohibit the merger of the OCB and the Voice of America Latin America
Division. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the bill on June 29, 2016,
S. 3117 (S.Rept. 114-290), which would provide $27.4 million for the OCB, $300,000 more than
the Administration’s request. The report to the bill stated that the committee did not support the
proposed contractor reduction of $300,000 at the OCB.
Oversight. Both Radio and TV Martí have at times been the focus of controversies, including
questions about adherence to broadcast standards. There have been various attempts over the

169 Broadcasting Board of Governors, “FY2017 Budget Request, Executive Summary,” February 9, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
57

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

years to cut funding for the programs, especially for TV Martí, which has not had much of an
audience because of Cuban jamming efforts. From 1990 through 2008, there were numerous
government studies and audits of the OCB, including investigations by the GAO, by a 1994
congressionally established Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Martí, by the State Department
Office Inspector General (OIG), and by the combined State Department/BBG Office Inspector
General.170
In 2009, GAO issued a report asserting that the best available research suggests that Radio and
TV Martí’s audience is small, and cited telephone surveys since 2003 showing that less than 2%
of respondents reported tuning in to Radio or TV Martí during the past week. With regard to TV
Martí viewership, according to the report, all of the IBB’s telephone surveys since 2003 show that
less than 1% of respondents said that they had watched TV Martí during the past week. According
to the GAO report, the IBB surveys show that there was no increase in reported TV Martí
viewership following the beginning of AeroMartí and DirecTV satellite broadcasting in 2006.The
GAO report also cited concerns with adherence to relevant domestic laws and international
standards, including the domestic dissemination of OCB programming, inappropriate
advertisements during OCB programming, and TV Martí’s interference with Cuban broadcasts.171
In 2010, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority issued a staff report that concluded
that Radio and TV Martí “continue to fail in their efforts to influence Cuban society, politics, and
policy.” The report cited problems with adherence to broadcast standards, audience size, and
Cuban government jamming. Among its recommendations, the report called for the IBB to move
the Office of Cuba Broadcasting back to Washington, DC, and integrate it fully into the Voice of
America.172
In 2011, GAO issued a report examining the extent to which the BBG’s strategic plan for
broadcasting required by the conference report to the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations
measure (H.Rept. 111-366 to H.R. 3288/P.L. 111-117) met the requirements established in the
legislation. GAO found that BBG’s strategic plan lacked key information and only partially
addressed issues raised by Congress, including on estimated audience size and an analysis of
other options for disseminating news and information to Cuba. The report stated that the BBG can
develop and provide more information to Congress, including an analysis of the cost savings

170 See the following reports and audits from 1990 through 2008: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Broadcasts
to Cuba, TV Marti Surveys Are Flawed
, GAO/NSIAD-90-252, August 1990; U.S. GAO, TV Marti, Costs and
Compliance with Broadcast Standards and International Agreements
, GAO/NSIAD-92-199, May 1992; U.S. GAO,
letter to Hon. Howard L. Berman and Hon. John F. Kerry regarding Radio Marti broadcast standards, GAO/NSIAD-93-
126R, February 17, 1993; Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, Report of the Advisory Panel on Radio and TV
Marti
, three volumes, March 1994; U.S. GAO, Radio Marti, Program Review Processes Need Strengthening,
GAO/NSIAD-94-265, September 1994; U.S. GAO, U.S. Information Agency, Issues Related to Reinvention Planning
in the Office of Cuba Broadcasting
, GAO/NSIAD-96-110, May 1996; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Inspector
General, Review of Policies and Procedures for Ensuring that Radio Marti Broadcasts Adhere to Applicable
Requirements
, 99-IB-010, June 1999; U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of
Inspector General, Review of the Effectiveness and Implementation of Office of Cuba Broadcasting’s New Program
Initiatives
, Report No. IBO-A-03-01, January 2003, and Report of Inspection, Office of Cuba Broadcasting, Report No.
ISP-IB 07-35, June 2007; and U.S. GAO, Broadcasting to Cuba, Weaknesses in Contracting Practices Reduced
Visibility into Selected Award Decisions
, GAO-08-764, July 2008.
171 U.S. GAO, Broadcasting to Cuba, Actions Are Needed to Improve Strategy and Operations, GAO-09-127, January
2009.
172 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Cuba: Immediate Action Is Needed to Ensure the
Survivability of Radio and TV Marti
, committee print, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 29, 2010, S.Prt. 111-46
(Washington: GPO, 2010).
Congressional Research Service
58

link to page 65 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

opportunities of sharing resources between Radio and TV Martí and the Voice of America’s Latin
America Division.173
Migration Issues174
Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords in 1994 and 1995 designed to stem the
mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S.
policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift, in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States
with the approval of Cuban officials. In response to Fidel Castro’s threat to unleash another
Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S. resolve not to allow another exodus. Amid escalating
numbers of fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994, President Clinton abruptly changed U.S.
migration policy, under which Cubans attempting to flee their homeland were allowed into the
United States, and announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy would take Cubans rescued at
sea to the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change in policy, Cubans
continued fleeing in large numbers.
As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks that culminated in a
September 9, 1994, bilateral agreement to stem the flow of Cubans fleeing to the United States by
boat. In the agreement, the United States and Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly
Cuban migration to the United States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United
States agreed to ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum
of 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.
In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which the United States
would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantánamo into the United States, but
would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and would
return them to Cuba. The two countries would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also
pledged to ensure that no action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a
consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally. In January 1996, the Department of Defense
announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at Guantánamo had
left the U.S. Naval Station, most having been paroled into the United States.
Maritime Interdictions. Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted
thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to their country. Those Cubans who reach shore are
allowed to apply for permanent resident status in one year, pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act
of 1966 (CAA, P.L. 89-732). In short, most interdictions, even in U.S. coastal waters, result in a
return to Cuba, while those Cubans who touch shore are allowed to stay in the United States. This
so-called “wet foot/dry foot” policy has been criticized by some as encouraging Cubans to risk
their lives in order to make it to the United States and as encouraging alien smuggling. Others
maintain that U.S. policy should welcome those migrants fleeing communist Cuba whether or not
they are able to make it to land.
The number of Cubans interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard rose from 666 in FY2002 to
2,868 in FY2007. In the three subsequent years, maritime interdictions declined significantly to
422 by FY2010 (see Figure 4). Major reasons for the decline were reported to include the U.S.

173 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Broadcasting Board of Governors Should Provide Additional Information
to Congress Regarding Broadcasting to Cuba
, December 13, 2011, available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/
586869.pdf.
174 Also see CRS Insight IN10204, U.S. Policy on Cuban Migration, by Andorra Bruno and Ruth Ellen Wasem
(available upon request); and CRS Report R40566, Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends, by Ruth
Ellen Wasem.
Congressional Research Service
59


Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

economic downturn, more efficient coastal patrolling, and more aggressive prosecution of
migrant smugglers by both the United States and Cuba.175
Figure 4. Maritime Interdictions of Cubans by the U.S. Coast Guard,
FY2002-FY2015

Source: Created by CRS using information provided by the United States Coast Guard, Alien Migrant
Interdiction, “Total Interdictions—Fiscal Year 1982 to Present,” January 19, 2016, at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/
cg531/AMIO/FlowStats/FY.asp.
From FY2011 through FY2015, however, the number of Cubans interdicted by the Coast Guard
increased each year, from 985 in FY2011 to 2,927 in FY2015. So far in FY2016 (as of April 17,
2016), the Coast Guard has interdicted 2,116 Cuban migrants, almost 73% of the total number for
all of FY2015.176
Speculation on the reasons for the increase in interdictions in recent years has included Cuba’s
poor economic and political situation; the Coast Guard’s more efficient methods of interdiction;
and the easing of the economic situation in the United States, making it easier for the payment of
fees to migrant smugglers.177 The U.S. State Department reports that timely and clear
communication between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Guard (TGF) has been a
factor in increasing the rate of migrant interdiction, with the TGF providing more operationally
relevant information than in the past. In the aftermath of the announcement of an improvement in
U.S.-Cuban relations in December 2014, there was a spike in the flow of maritime migrants, but
the increase had subsided by late January 2015. According to the Department of State, the U.S.
Coast Guard responded to the increase by increasing patrols, continuing timely repatriations of
migrants interdicted at sea, and implementing a media campaign to dispel rumors about an

175 Alfonso Chardy and Juan Tamayo, “Exodus of Cubans Slowing,” Miami Herald, October 6, 2010. U.S. Department
of State, “Cuban Compliance with the Migration Accords (April 2012 to October 2012),” report to Congress, October
22, 2012.
176 Information for FY2016 maritime interdiction of Cuban migrants provided to CRS by the U.S. Coast Guard, April
26, 2016.
177 Alfonso Chardy and Juan O. Tamayo, “Illegal Cuban Migration, After Years of Decline, Is Up Again,” Miami
Herald, Miami Herald, October 8, 2011; Alfonso Chardy and Juan O. Tamayo, “Number of Cubans Trying to Enter
U.S. Increases,” Miami Herald, June 17, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
60

link to page 67 link to page 68 Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

alleged change in U.S. migration policy.178 Numbers for all of FY2015, however, show a 40%
increase in migrant interdictions over those in FY2014, and the increase in interdictions has
continued in FY2016. The rise appears to be driven by concerns among Cubans that the favorable
treatment granted to Cuban immigrants will end.
Arrivals of Undocumented Cuban Migrants. According to the State Department, Cubans
continue to favor land-based entry at U.S. ports of entry, especially from Mexico. Over the past
several years, the number of undocumented Cubans entering by land has increased significantly,
with a majority entering through the southwest border.179
According to statistics from the Department of Homeland Security, the number of undocumented
Cubans entering the United States rose from almost 8,170 in FY2010 to 24,812 in FY2014. For
FY2015, more than 41,000 undocumented Cubans entered the United States. (See Table 1.)
Between FY2014 and FY2015, the number of undocumented Cubans entering the United States
increased by about 66%. The numbers have increased further in FY2016, with over 34,000
entering as of April 20, 2016 (almost 84% of the number for all of FY2015), with the majority
entering through the southwest border.
Until recently, many of the Cuban migrants first flew to Ecuador, which until late November 2015
did not require Cubans to have a visa, and then made their way overland and by boat through
Central America and Mexico to the United States (see Figure 5). The trip reportedly costs
between $5,000 and $15,000, but Cubans have resorted to this route because they view it as safer
than attempting to travel by boat directly from Cuba to the United States.180 While this trafficking
route is not new for Cubans, the Cuban government’s relaxation of its exit rules for its citizens in
2013 (discussed below) and concerns that the United States might change its liberal immigration
policy for Cubans have prompted a large increase in the number of Cubans making the overland
journey. In late November 2015, Ecuador changed its policy of not requiring visas for Cubans in
an attempt to stem the flow of Cubans who subsequently seek to travel to the United States. Its
action sparked protests by Cubans at Ecuador’s embassy in Havana, whereupon Ecuador decided
to grant visas to those Cubans who had already purchased air tickets.181
In November 2015, tensions in relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua grew over the issue
of the Cuban migrants transiting the region. On November 10, 2015, Costa Rica broke up an alien
smuggling ring involved in taking unauthorized Cubans through Costa Rica to the Nicaragua
border.182 Costa Rica initially announced that it would not allow Cubans without visas to enter the
country from Panama, but then changed its policy by providing Cubans with temporary visas to
transit through Nicaragua. But on November 15, Nicaragua closed its border with Costa Rica to
the Cubans headed to the United States, resulting in a swelling number of Cubans stranded in
Costa Rica. Costa Rica called for a humanitarian corridor for the Cuban migrants to cross safely,
while Nicaragua accused Costa Rica of “unleashing an invasion of illegal Cuban migrants” on
Nicaragua. The Cuban government criticized U.S. immigration policy for “stimulating irregular
emigration from Cuba toward the United States.”183 Nicaragua echoed Cuba’s position, placing

178 U.S. Department of State, “Cuban Compliance with the Migration Accords,” reports to Congress, May 7, 2014,
November 6, 2014, April 30, 2015, and November 3, 2015.
179 Ibid.
180 Zach Dyer, “As U.S.-Cuba Ties Warm, Cuban Migrants Take Overland Route North,” Christian Science Monitor,
November 18, 2015.
181 “Ecuador Grants Visas to Cubans with Tickets Purchased Before Nov. 26,” Havana Times, November 28, 2015.
182 “Costa Rica Busts Migrant-Trafficking Ring,” Agence France Presse, November 10, 2015.
183 Daniel Trotta, “Cuba Blames U.S. for Migrant Crisis in Central America,” Reuters News, November 17, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
61

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

blame for the wave of migration on the United States for its policy that attracts Cuban
migrants.184
Table 1. Undocumented Cuban Migrants, FY2010-FY2016
(via U.S. ports of entry and between ports of entry)
Between Ports of

Ports of Entry
Entry
Total
FY2010
7,458
712
8,170
FY2011
7,786
959
8,745
FY2012
12,048
606
12,654
FY2013
17,360
624
17,984
FY2014
23,751
1,061
24,812
FY2015
40,119
1,153
41,272
FY2016
33,652
930
34,582

(as of 4/20/16)
(as of 4/18/16)
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Congressional
Affairs, April 26, 2016.
U.S. officials encouraged the countries involved to seek solutions and expressed concern about
the human rights of the migrants, and the United States reportedly pledged up to $1 million
(through the International Organization for Migration) to assist Costa Rica in providing for
almost 8,000 Cuban migrants stranded in the country.185 In late December 2015, however, Central
American representatives meeting in Guatemala agreed to fly the Cubans in Costa Rica to El
Salvador, whereupon the migrants would travel by bus to Guatemala and then to Mexico and
onward to the United States. That program began in January 2016, and direct flights to Mexico
from Costa Rica were later added as well as flights for some 1,300 Cubans stranded in Panama.
Press reports indicate that most of the Cuban migrants in Costa Rica and Panama had departed by
mid-March 2016.186
In April 2016, another wave of Cuban migrants began entering Panama. The Costa Rican
government said that it would reinforce its southern border with Panama to prevent the Cuban
migrants from entering the country, and it criticized U.S. policy as a magnet attracting irregular
Cuban migration.187 Panama, however, reached an agreement with Mexico in early May 2016 to
transfer close to 4,000 Cuban migrants to Mexico by air.188

184 “Emergency Meeting on Cuban Migrant Crisis Ends in Frustration,” Latin News Daily, November 25, 2015.
185 Frances Robles, “U.S. Pays to Feed and Shelter Thousands of Cuban Migrants Stranded in Costa Rica,” New York
Times
, March 5, 2016.
186 “Costa Rica President Sees Off U.S.-Bound Cuban Migrants,” Agence France Presse, March 11, 2016; “Panama
Finishes Transport of Stranded Cubans to Mexico,” EFE News Service, March 12, 2016.
187 “Costa Rican Foreign Minister Blames U.S. for Cuban Migrant Crisis,” BBC Monitoring Americas, April 20, 2016
(text of report from La Nacíon, April 13, 2016).
188 “Panama Ends Sale of Mexico Air Tickets to Stranded Cuban Migrants,” EFE News Service, May 21, 2016;
Catherine E. Shoichet, “Panama Flying Thousands of Cuban Immigrants to U.S.-Mexico Border,” CNN, May 10, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
62


Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Figure 5. Cuban Migration, from Ecuador to the United States

Source: CRS.
Migration Talks. Semi-annual bilateral talks are held on the implementation of the 1994/1995
migration accords, alternating between Havana and Washington, DC. The most recent talks
occurred on November 30, 2015, in Washington, DC. According to a State Department press
release, the discussion included recent trends in migration and human smuggling. The U.S.
delegation expressed concern for the safety of thousands of Cuban migrants transiting through
Central America. Both sides reportedly agreed to expert-level meetings on how both governments
could contribute to combatting smuggling organizations that take advantage of Cuban migrants.
The State Department reiterated in its press statement that the Administration has no plans to alter
current migration policy toward Cuba.189
The Cuban government also issued a press release on the talks, maintaining that its delegation
reiterated its profound concern over the Cuban Adjustment Act and the so-called “wet foot/dry
foot” policy. The delegation contended that U.S. policy encourages illegal, unsafe, and disorderly
migration as well as alien smuggling and Cubans’ irregular entry into the United States from third
countries. It noted that Cubans have become victims of human traffickers and organized crime as
demonstrated by the situation in Costa Rica and other Latin American countries. The delegation
also reiterated its opposition to the “Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program,” with the
purpose of “encouraging Cuban doctors and other health personnel to abandon their missions in
third countries” to migrate to the United States.190 In early January 2016, a White House official

189 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuban Hold Migration Talks,” media note, December 1, 2015.
190 Republic of Cuba, Embassy of Cuba in USA, “Press Release Issued by the Cuban Delegation to the Round of
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
63

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

indicated that the Administration was considering ending the program, with a decision due early
this year. Under the program, which began in 2006, more than 7,000 Cuban medical personnel
working in third countries have been approved for admittance into the United States.191
Cuban Travel Policy Changes. In January 2013, the Cuban government changed its long-
standing policy of requiring an exit permit and a letter of invitation from abroad for Cubans to
travel abroad. Cubans are now able to travel abroad with just an updated passport and a visa
issued by the country of destination, if required. Under the change in policy, Cubans can travel
abroad for up to two years without forgoing their rights as Cuban citizens. The practice of
requiring an exit permit had been extremely unpopular in Cuba, and the government had been
considering doing away with the practice for some time. According to the Department of State,
the Cuban government still requires some individuals, such as high-level government officials,
doctors, lawyers, and technicians, to obtain permission to travel.192 In addition, some dissidents
out on parole or facing court action have not been permitted to travel aboard, although many
prominent dissidents have traveled abroad and returned to Cuba. As noted above, ahead of
President Obama’s visit to Cuba in March 2016, seven dissidents on parole were granted a one-
time permission to travel outside the country.
Effective August 1, 2013, the State Department made nonimmigrant B-2 visas issued to Cubans
for family visits, tourism, medical treatment, or other personal travel valid for five years with
multiple entries. Previously these visas had been restricted to single entry for six months, and an
extensive visa interview backlog had developed at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. State
Department officials maintain that the change increases people-to-people ties and removes
procedural and financial burdens on Cuban travelers.193
Legislative Activity. In light of Cuba’s new travel policy initiated in 2013 making it easier for
Cubans to travel abroad and the Administration’s efforts to normalize relations with Cuba, some
analysts have raised questions as to whether the United States should review its policy toward
Cuban migrants as set forth in the CAA.194 Some argue that the normalization of relations will
make a special immigration policy for Cubans difficult to sustain.195 Some critics of current
policy also argue that the law is being abused by some recent Cuban immigrants receiving U.S.
benefits who travel back and forth between Cuba and the United States regularly.196 Others point

(...continued)
Migration Talks Between Cuba and the United States,” November 30, 2015.
191 Jeff Mason and Daniel Trotta, “U.S. Considers Ending Program That Lures Cuban Doctors to Defect,” Reuters,
January 8, 2016.
192 U.S. Department of State, “Cuban Compliance with the Migration Accords (April 2015 to October 2015),” report to
Congress, November 3, 2015.
193 Mimi Whitfield, “U.S. Begins New Multiple-Entry Visa Program for Cuban Visitors,” Miami Herald, August 1,
2013; Marc Frank, “Cubans Welcome New U.S. Visa Policy, Government Largely Silent,” Reuters News, August 2,
2013; and U.S. Department of State, United States Interest Section, Havana, Cuba, “Important Notice: Increase in B-2
Visa Validity,” available at http://havana.usint.gov/visa_appointment_information.html.
194 David Adams and Tom Brown, “Cuban Perks Under Scrutiny in U.S. Immigration Reform,” Reuters News,
February 8, 2013; Stephen Johnson “Recommendations for the New Administration: Interests, Policies, and Challenges
in the Americas,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 21, 2012; and Philip Peters, “Migration
Policy Reform: Cuba Gets Started, U.S. Should Follow,” Lexington Institute, December 2012.
195 Marc R. Rosenblum and Faye Hipsman, “Normalization of Relations with Cuba May Portend Changes to U.S.
Immigration Policy,” Migration Policy Institute, January 13, 2015.
196 Lizette Alvarez, “Law Favoring Cuban Arrivals Is Challenged,” New York Times, February 2, 2015. Also see a
series of investigative reports by the Florida SunSentinel: Sally Kestin, Megan O’Matz, and John Maines, with Trace
Eaton in Cuba, “U.S. Welfare Flows to Cuba,” October 1, 2015; Megan O’Matz, Sally Kestin, and John Maines,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
64

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

to the increasing flow of Cubans into the United States by land and the problems that it has
caused in Central America. U.S. officials have maintained that the Administration has no plans to
change the Cuban Adjustment Act.
In the 114th Congress, H.R. 3818 (Gosnar), would repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act. The bill
would also prohibit any funding to implement, administer, enforce, or carry out the Cuban Family
Reunification Parole Program established in 2007. That program allows certain eligible U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents to apply for parole for their family members in Cuba.197
Another initiative, H.R. 4247 (Curbelo)/S. 2441 (Rubio), introduced December 15, 2015, and
January 12, 2016, respectively, would provide that certain Cuban entrants would be ineligible to
receive refugee/parolee assistance. Finally, H.R. 4847 (Farenthold), introduced March 23, 2016,
would both repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act and make certain Cuban entrants ineligible to
receive refugee/parolee assistance.
Anti-Drug Cooperation
Cuba is not a major producer or consumer of illicit drugs, but its extensive shoreline and
geographic location make it susceptible to narcotics smuggling operations. Drugs that enter the
Cuban market are largely the result of onshore wash-ups from smuggling by high-speed boats
moving drugs from Jamaica to the Bahamas, Haiti, and the United States or by small aircraft from
clandestine airfields in Jamaica. For a number of years, Cuban officials have expressed concerns
over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit and about increased domestic drug use.
The Cuban government has taken a number of measures to deal with the drug problem, including
legislation to stiffen penalties for traffickers, increased training for counternarcotics personnel,
and cooperation with a number of countries on anti-drug efforts. Since 1999, Cuba’s Operation
Hatchet has focused on maritime and air interdiction and the recovery of narcotics washed up on
Cuban shores. Since 2003, Cuba has aggressively pursued an internal enforcement and
investigation program against its incipient drug market with an effective nationwide drug
prevention and awareness campaign.
According to the State Department’s 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR), issued March 2, 2016, Cuba has a number of anti-drug-related agreements in place with
other countries, including 36 bilateral agreements for counterdrug cooperation and 27 policing
cooperation agreements. As reported in the INCSR, Cuba reported seizing 962 kilograms of drugs
(largely marijuana) in the first eight months of 2015 and detected 33 suspected “go-fast” boats on
its southeastern coast.198
Over the years, there have been varying levels of U.S.-Cuban cooperation on anti-drug efforts. In
1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in the seizure of 6.6 tons of cocaine
aboard the Miami-bound Limerick, a Honduran-flag ship. Cuba turned over the cocaine to the
United States and cooperated fully in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of two

(...continued)
“Cuban Retire to Florida – With Help from U.S. Taxpayers,” October 1, 2015; and Megan O’Matz and Sally Kestin,
“Florida Politicians Protect Special Status for Cubans,” October 1, 2015, all available at http://www.sun-sentinel.com/
us-cuba-welfare-benefits/sfl-us-cuba-welfare-benefits-part-1-htmlstory.html.
197 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Cuban Family Reunification
and Family Parole (CFRP) Program, available at http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/cuban-
family-reunification-parole-cfrp-program.
198 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume I: Drug and Chemical
Control, March 2016, section on Cuba, available at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2016/vol1/253255.htm.
Congressional Research Service
65

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

defendants in the case in the United States. Cooperation has increased since 1999, when U.S. and
Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. Cuba
accepted an upgrading of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S.
Coast Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) at
the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official was posted to the U.S. Interests
Section in September 2000, and since that time, coordination has increased.
According to the 2016 INCSR, Cuban authorities and the U.S. Coast Guard share tactical
information related to vessels transiting through Cuban territorial waters suspected of trafficking.
The report noted that Cuba also shares real-time tactical information with the Bahamas, Mexico,
and Jamaica. It reported that such bilateral cooperation has led to multiple interdictions. In August
2015, for example, Cuban cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard led to arrest of three Bahamians
involved in drug trafficking and the seizure of their go-fast boat. As in past years, the State
Department asserted in the INCSR that “Cuba has demonstrated an increased willingness to
apprehend and turnover U.S. fugitives and to assist in U.S. judicial proceedings by providing
documentation, witnesses, and background for cases in U.S. state and federal courts.”
Cuba maintains that it wants to cooperate with the United States to combat drug trafficking and,
on various occasions, has called for a bilateral anti-drug cooperation agreement with the United
States.199 In the 2011 INCSR (issued in March 2011), the State Department acknowledged that
Cuba had presented the U.S. government with a draft bilateral accord for counternarcotics
cooperation that is still under review. According to the State Department, “Structured
appropriately, such an accord could advance the counternarcotics efforts undertaken by both
countries.” This was reiterated in the INCSR for 2012 through 2014. In the 2015 INCSR, the State
Department maintained that the United States and Cuba held technical discussions on
counternarcotics in April 2014 and shared information on trends and enforcement procedures.
In the 2016 INCSR, the State Department noted that the United States and Cuba held bilateral
discussions on law enforcement and counternarcotics cooperation in late 2015 that included
current information on trends and enforcement procedures. This second counternarcotics dialogue
was held at the headquarters of the Drug Enforcement Administration in Washington, DC, on
December 1, 2015, with delegations discussing ways to stop the illegal flow of narcotics and
exploring ways to cooperate on the issue.200 As in the past, the State Department contended in the
2016 INCSR that “enhanced communication and cooperation between the United States,
international partners, and Cuba, particularly in terms of real-time information-sharing, will likely
lead to increased interdictions and disruptions of illegal drug trafficking.”
In April 2016, Cuban security officials toured the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force South
(JIATF-South) based in Key West, FL.201 JIATF-South has responsibility for detecting and
monitoring illicit drug trafficking in the region and for facilitating international and interagency
interdiction efforts.

199 On March 12, 2002, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC,
delivered three diplomatic notes to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana and the State Department in Washington
proposing agreements on drug interdiction, terrorism, and migration issues. See “Statement from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs: Prominent Drug Trafficker Arrested in Our Country,” Information Office, Cuban Interests Section,
March 17, 2002; “Cuba Offers to Sign Anti-Drug Pact,” Miami Herald, April 8, 2006.
200 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba Hold Counter-Narcotics Dialogue,” media note, December 2,
2015.
201 “Cuban Security Officials Toured Key West Drug-War Center,” Miami Herald, May 4, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
66

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

U.S. Property Claims
An issue in the process of normalizing relations is Cuba’s compensation for the expropriation of
thousands of properties of U.S. companies and citizens in Cuba. The Foreign Claim Settlement
Commission (FCSC), an independent agency within the Department of Justice, has certified
5,913 claims for expropriated U.S. properties in Cuba valued at $1.9 billion in two different claim
programs; with accrued interest, the value of the properties would be some $8 billion. In 1972,
the FCSC certified 5,911 claims of U.S. citizens and companies that had their property
confiscated by the Cuban government through April 1967, with 30 U.S. companies accounting for
almost 60% of the claims.202 In 2006, the FCSC certified two additional claims in a second claims
program covering property confiscated after April 1967. Many of the companies that originally
filed claims have been bought and sold numerous times. There are a variety of potential
alternatives for restitution/compensation schemes to resolve the outstanding claims, but resolving
the issue would likely entail considerable negotiation and cooperation between the two
governments.203
While Cuba has maintained that it would negotiate compensation for the U.S. claims, it does not
recognize the FCSC valuation of the claims or accrued interest. Instead, Cuba has emphasized
using declared taxable value as an appraisal basis for expropriated U.S. properties, which would
amount to almost $1 billion, instead of the $1.9 billion certified by the FCSC.204 Moreover, Cuba
has generally maintained that any negotiation should consider losses that Cuba has accrued from
U.S. economic sanctions. Cuba estimates cumulative damages of the U.S. embargo at $121
billion in current prices.205
Several provisions in U.S. law specifically address the issue of compensation for properties
expropriated by the Cuban government.206 Section 620(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 prohibits foreign assistance, a sugar quota authorizing the importation of Cuban sugar into
the United States, or any other benefit under U.S. law until the President determines that the
Cuban government has taken appropriate steps to return properties expropriated by the Cuban
government to U.S. citizens and entities not less than 50% owned by U.S. citizens, or to provide
equitable compensation for the properties. The provision, however, authorizes the President to
waive its restrictions if he deems it necessary in the interest of the United States.

202 “A Road Map for Restructuring Future U.S. Relations with Cuba,” policy paper, Atlantic Council, June 1995,
Appendix D.
203 Matías F. Travieso-Díaz, “Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Expropriated U.S. Property in Post-
Castro Cuba,” in Cuba in Transition, Volume 12, Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 2002.
204 Timothy Ashby, “U.S. Certified Claims Against Cuba: Legal Reality and Likely Settlement Mechanisms,” Inter-
American Law Review
, March 2009.
205 Michelle Nichols, “Cuba’s Castro Slams U.S. Trade Embargo at United Nations,” Reuters News, September 26,
2015; Republic of Cuba, Ministry of Foreign Relations, “On Resolution 69/5 of the United Nations General Assembly
Entitled ‘Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Blockade Imposed by the United States of
America Against Cuba,’” June 2015.
206 Other non-Cuba specific provisions of law relating to the expropriation of properties of U.S. citizens include Section
620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which requires the President to suspend assistance to the government of
any country that has expropriated property owned by U.S. citizens; and Section 12 of the International Development
Association Act and Section 21 of the Inter-American Development Bank Act that require the President to instruct U.S.
executive directors to oppose loans to any state that has nationalized, expropriated, or seized property owned by a U.S.
citizen. For additional information, see CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the
Normalization of Relations
, by Dianne E. Rennack and Mark P. Sullivan.
Congressional Research Service
67

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

The LIBERTAD Act (P.L. 104-114) includes the property claims issue as one of the many factors
that the President needs to consider in determining when a transition government is in power in
Cuba and when a democratically elected government is in power. These determinations are
linked, respectively, to the suspension and termination of the economic embargo on Cuba. For a
transition government, as set forth in Section 205(b)((2) of the law, the President shall take into
account the extent to which the government has made public commitments and is making
demonstrable progress in taking steps to return to U.S. citizens (and entities that are 50% or more
beneficially owned by U.S. citizens) property taken by the Cuban government on or after January
1, 1959, or to provide equitable compensation for such property. A democratically elected
government, as set forth in Section 206 of the law, is one that, among other conditions, has made
demonstrable progress in returning such property or providing full compensation for such
property in accordance with international law standards and practice.
Section 103 of the LIBERTAD Act also prohibits a U.S. person or entity from financing any
transaction that involves confiscated property in Cuba where the claim is owned by a U.S.
national. The sanction may be suspended once the President makes a determination that a
transition government is in power, and shall be terminated when the President makes a
determination that a democratically elected government is in power.
In the 114th Congress, two House hearings have focused on the property claims issue. The House
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing in June
2015, and the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and
the Internet held a hearing in February 2016.207
On December 8, 2015, U.S. and Cuban officials met in Havana for the first meeting on claims
issues, with the U.S. delegation led by Marcy McLeod, the State Department’s Acting Legal
Advisor. According to the State Department, the talks included discussions of the FCSC-certified
claims of U.S. nationals, claims related to unsatisfied U.S. court judgments against Cuba
(reportedly 10 U.S. state and federal judgments totaling about $2 billion), and some claims of the
U.S. government. The Cuban delegation raised the issue of claims against the United States
related to the U.S. embargo.208
Outlook
Although any change to the government’s one-party communist political system appears unlikely,
Cuba is moving toward a post-Castro era. Raúl Castro has said that he would step down from
power once his term of office is over in February 2018. Moreover, generational change in Cuba’s
governmental institutions has already begun. Under Raúl and beyond, the Cuban government is
likely to continue its gradual economic policy changes, moving toward a more mixed economy
with a stronger private sector, although it is uncertain whether the pace of reform will produce
major improvements to the Cuban economy. The Cuban Communist Party’s seventh congress,

207 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Hearing on “The Future of
Property Rights in Cuba,” June 18, 2015, available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-
future-property-rights-cuba, and House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Internet, Hearing on “Resolving Issues with Confiscated Property in Cuba, Havana Club Rum and Other Property,”
February 11, 2016, available at https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/resolving-issues-with-confiscated-property-in-cuba-
havana-club-rum-and-other-property-2/.
208 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba Hold Claims Talks in Havana,” media note, December 7, 2015;
Frances Robles, “Competing Claims in Havana,” New York Times, December 14, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
68

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

held April 16-18, 2016, confirmed that Cuba will continue its gradual pace toward economic
reform.
The Obama Administration’s shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba is opening up engagement with the
Cuban government in a variety of areas. Economic linkages with Cuba will likely increase
because of the policy changes, although to what extent is uncertain given that the overall embargo
and numerous other sanctions against Cuba remain in place. The human rights situation in Cuba
will remain a key U.S. concern. With diverse opinions in Congress over the Administration’s
policy shift, debate over many aspects of U.S. relations with Cuba is continuing in the 114th
Congress, especially on U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba.
Congressional Research Service
69

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Appendix A. Enacted Measures in the 114th
Congress
P.L. 114-92 (S. 1356)
. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. S. 1356 was
originally was introduced and passed in the Senate on May 14, 2015, as a bill amending the
Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform Act of 2014, but the bill, combined with H.Con.Res. 90 (which
directs the Secretary of the Senate to make a technical correction in the enrollment of S. 1356),
became a vehicle for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. The House
approved S. 1356, amended (370-58) November 5, 2015. The Senate agreed (91-3) to the House
amendment of S. 1356 November 10, 2015. The House passed H.Con.Res. 90 November 5;
Senate passed, amended, November 10; House agreed to Senate amendment November 16, 2015.
S. 1356 was signed into law November 25, 2015.
The Joint Explanatory Statement to accompany S. 1356 included the same policy provision
regarding the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, that was in Section 1036 of the final
enrolled version of H.R. 1735 discussed below. The provision prohibits any FY2016 funding for
the Department of Defense to be used to (1) close or abandon the U.S. Naval Station at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; (2) relinquish control of Guantánamo Bay to the Republic of Cuba; or
(3) to implement a material modification to the Treaty Between the United States of America and
Cuba signed at Washington, DC, on May 29, 1934, that constructively closes the U.S. Naval
Station. The provision also requires a report within 180 days from the Secretary of Defense
assessing the military implications of the United States Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
P.L. 114-113 (H.R. 2029). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016. H.R. 2029 originally was
introduced and reported (H.Rept. 114-92) by the House Appropriations Committee as the Military
Construction and Veteran Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 on April 24,
2015. The House passed (255-163) the bill on April 30. The Senate Committee on Appropriations
reported (S.Rept. 114-57) its version of the bill on May 21, and the Senate passed (93-0) the bill
on November 10, 2015. During April 29 House floor consideration, the House approved H.Amdt.
129 by voice vote, which would prohibit the use of funds to carry out the closure or transfer of the
U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The language became Section 515 of the House
bill. The Senate version of the bill did not have a similar provision.
H.R. 2029 subsequently became the vehicle for the FY2016 omnibus appropriations bill. On
December 16, 2015, the House Appropriations Committee released the text of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2016 (House Amendment #1) that provided funding for the 12 annual
appropriations bills through FY2016 and also included, among other bills, the FY2016
intelligence authorization measure (nearly identical to H.R. 4127 described below). On December
18, 2015, the House and Senate completed final action on H.R. 2029, and the President signed the
bill into law.
With regard to Cuba, the omnibus does not contain any of the controversial Cuba policy riders
contained in individual House and Senate appropriation bills (H.R. 2577, H.R. 2578, H.R.
2772/S. 1910, H.R. 2995, and H.R. 3128, discussed below). The omnibus, does, however, have
several Cuba-related provisions (in addition to provisions related to Guantánamo detainees not
covered in this report).
 Division J (Military Construction and Veterans Affairs), Section 13, provides that
no funds in the act may be used to carry out the closure or transfer of the United
States Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
Congressional Research Service
70

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

 Division K (State Department and Foreign Operations), Section 7007, continues
a long-standing provision prohibiting direct funding for the government of Cuba.
Section 7015(f) continues to require that foreign aid for Cuba not be obligated or
expended except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the
Committees on Appropriations. The explanatory statement to the omnibus
measure provides $27.140 million for the Office of Cuba Broadcasting
(compared to the Administration’s request of $30.3 million). It notes that the
agreement does not include authority or funds requested for the merger of the
Office of Cuban Broadcasting and the Latin America Division of Voice of
America by establishing an independent grantee organization. The explanatory
statement also provides $20 million in ESF for democracy programs in Cuba, the
same as the Administration’s request.
 Division M (Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2016), Section 512, requires
that key supervisory positions at U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba are occupied
by U.S. citizens, and also require a report on progress on that issue and on the use
of locally employed staff in U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba. Section 513
provides that each diplomatic facility that is constructed or undergoes a
construction upgrade in Cuba shall include a sensitive compartmented
information facility.

Congressional Research Service
71

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Appendix B. Other Legislative Action in 2015
H.R. 1735 (Thornberry).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. Introduced
April 13, 2015; reported by House Committee on Armed Services, H.Rept. 114-102, May 5,
2015. House passed (269-151) May 15, 2015. Senate passed (71-25), with an amendment, June
18, 2015. Conference report (H.Rept. 114-270) filed September 29, 2015. House agreed (270-
156) to conference October 1, 2015; Senate agreed (70-27) October 7, 2015. President vetoed
measure October 22, 2015.
Section 1036 of the enrolled bill would prohibit any FY2016 funding for the Department of
Defense to be used to (1) close or abandon the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; (2)
relinquish control of Guantánamo Bay to the Republic of Cuba; or (3) to implement a material
modification to the Treaty Between the United States of America and Cuba signed at Washington,
DC, on May 29, 1934, that constructively closes the U.S. Naval Station. Section 1036 would also
require a report within 180 days from the Secretary of Defense assessing the military implications
of United States Naval Station Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
For final action, see P.L. 114-92 (S. 1356) above.
H.R. 2577 (Diaz-Balart). Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016. Introduced and reported (H.Rept. 114-129) by the House
Committee on Appropriations May 27, 2015. House passed (216-210) June 9, 2015. Reported by
the Senate Committee on Appropriations June 25, 2015 (S.Rept. 114-75).
As approved by the House, Section 193 would have provided that no funds in the bill could be
used to facilitate scheduled flights to Cuba if they land or pass through property confiscated by
the Cuban government. The amendment appeared aimed at preventing the introduction of new
regular scheduled air carrier service to Cuba, but it would not have affected air charter service
between the United States and Cuba. Section 414 would have prevented funds in the bill from
being used by the Federal Maritime Administration or the Administrator of the Maritime
Administration to issue a license or certificate for a commercial vessel that docked or anchored
within the previous 180 days within 7 miles of a port or property that was confiscated by the
Cuban government. The provision appeared aimed at impeding licensing for the establishment of
passenger ferry/cruise service to Cuba. During June 4, 2015, House floor consideration, the
House rejected H.Amdt. 404 (Lee) by a vote of 176-247, which would have prohibited the
implementation or enforcement of the Cuba provisions. The Administration’s statement of policy
on the bill said that the Administration strongly objected to the two Cuba provisions “that would
restrict flights and cruise ships from going to Cuba and would place unnecessary restrictions on
options for educational, religious, or other permitted travel to Cuba.”209 The Senate version of the
bill did not have Cuba sanctions provisions. For final action, see P.L. 114-113 (H.R. 2029), the
FY2016 omnibus bill, above.
H.R. 2578 (Culberson). Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2016. Introduced and reported (H.Rept. 114-130) by the House Committee on Appropriations
May 27, 2015. House passed (242-183) June 3, 2015. Reported by the Senate Committee on
Appropriations June 16, 2015 (S.Rept. 114-66).
As approved by the House, Section 540 would have prohibited Commerce Department funds
from being used to facilitate, permit, license, or promote exports to Cuba’s Ministry of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), the Ministry of the Interior (MININT), any subsidiaries

209 White House, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 2577, June 1, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
72

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

of these two ministries, and any officers of these ministries or their immediate family members.
The provision would have affected additional categories of exports to Cuba authorized as part of
the Administration’s policy change on Cuba. It would not have affected the export of agricultural
commodities, medicines, or medical goods permitted under TSRA. During June 3, 2015, House
floor consideration, the House rejected H.Amdt. 308 (Farr), by a vote of 153-273, which would
have struck Section 540 from the bill. The Administration’s statement of policy on the bill said
that the bill included highly objectionable provisions, including nongermane foreign policy
restrictions related to Cuba that prohibit funding “to facilitate, permit, license, or promote exports
to the Cuban military or intelligence service.”210 The Senate version of the bill did not contain
Cuba sanctions provisions. For final action, see P.L. 114-113 (H.R. 2029), the FY2016 omnibus
measure, above.
H.R. 2772 (Granger)/S. 1725 (Graham). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2016. H.R. 2772 introduced and reported (H.Rept. 114-154) by the
House Committee on Appropriations June 15, 2015. S. 1725 introduced and reported (S.Rept.
114-79) by the Senate Appropriations Committee July 9, 2015. Before consideration of the bill by
the full House Appropriations Committee, the Administration wrote a letter to the chair and
ranking Member of the committee on June 10, expressing serious concerns about the legislation.
Among its concerns, the Administration maintained that the bill “includes provisions that would
restrict Administration activities relating to Cuba, including the establishment or operation of a
U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba beyond what was in existence on December 17, 2014,
interfering with the Executive Branch’s ability to make the best decisions consistent with our
national security.”211
Among the Cuba provisions in the House and Senate versions:
 Section 7007 of both the House and Senate versions would continue to prohibit
direct funding for the government of Cuba.
 Section 7015(f) of both the House and Senate versions would continue to require
that foreign aid for Cuba not be obligated or expended except as provided
through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.
 Section 7031(c) of the House bill would not have allowed for a waiver for
restrictions against eligibility for entrance into the United States with respect to
officials of the Cuban government and their immediate family members from
Cuba (including members of the Cuban military and high-level officials of the
Cuban Communist Party) whom the Secretary of State has credible information
have been involved in significant corruption, including corruption related to the
extraction of natural resources or a gross violation of human rights. The report to
the House bill would have directed the Secretary of State, for the purposes of
implementing Section 7031(c) and applying Presidential Proclamation 7750,212 to
consider the confiscation of properties belonging to American companies by
corrupt Cuban officials as having serious adverse effects on international activity

210 White House, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 2578, June 1, 2015.
211 White House, Office of Management and Budget, “Letter to the Chair and Ranking Member of the House
Appropriations Committee with Respect to the FY2016 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Bill,” June 10, 2015.
212 Federal Register, January 14, 2004, “Presidential Proclamation 7750 of January 12, 2004, to Suspend Entry as
Immigrants or Nonimmigrants of Persons Engaged in or Benefitting from Corruption,” January 14, 2004. pp. 2287-
2288.
Congressional Research Service
73

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

of U.S. businesses and on the national interests of the United States. The Senate
bill did not have a similar provision.
 Section 7045(c)(1) of the House bill would have provided $30 million to promote
democracy and civil society in Cuba, $10 million above the Administration’s
request, and would have provided that no funds could be obligated for business
promotion, economic reform, entrepreneurship, or any other assistance that is not
democracy-building as expressly authorized in the LIBERTAD Act. The report to
the House bill would have provided that not less than $8 million of the $30
million shall be for the National Endowment for Democracy; that remaining
funds should be administrated by the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor (DRL), Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA),
and USAID; and that grants exceeding $1 million shall be awarded only to
organizations with experience promoting democracy inside Cuba. Section
7045(c) of the Senate bill would have provided $15 million in ESF for Cuba
democracy programs, and $5 million in ESF (notwithstanding any other
provision of law) for programs to support private Cuban entrepreneurs, except
that no such assistance may be provided for the Cuban government. In addition,
the report to the Senate bill stated that the committee expected a portion of the
$50.5 million to promote Internet freedom in Section 7078 of the bill to be used
to support Internet freedom in Cuba.
 Section 7045(c)(2) of the House bill would prohibit funding to establish an
independent grantee organization to carry out any and all broadcasting and
related programs to the Latin America and Caribbean region, including Cuba, or
substantively alter the structure of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting. The report to
the House bill recommended not less than $28.130 million for the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting, almost $2.2 million less than the Administration’s $30.3 million
request and $1 million more than that provided in FY2015. During House
Appropriations Committee consideration, an amendment offered by
Representative Serrano to shift $5 million from Cuba broadcasting to efforts to
counter Russian media was rejected by a vote of 18-33. The report to the Senate
bill, S. 1725 (S.Rept. 114-79), recommended $27.130 million for OCB, and also
did not support or include authority for the merger of OCB and VOA’s Latin
American Division.
 Section 7045(c)(3) of the House version would have prohibited funds for the
establishment or operation of a U.S. diplomatic presence, including an Embassy,
consulate, or liaison office in Cuba beyond that which was in existence prior to
December 17, 2014, until the President determined and reported to Congress that
the requirements and factors specified in Section 205 of the LIBERTAD Act
(related to Cuba having a transition government) have been met. The
Administration requested just over $6 million for the conversion of the current
U.S. Interests Section in Havana to an Embassy, pending the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations. The Senate version did not have such a provision.
For final action, see P.L. 114-113 (H.R. 2029), the FY2016 omnibus, above.
H.R. 2995 (Crenshaw)/S. 1910 (Boozman). Financial Services and General Government
Appropriations, 2016. H.R. 2995 introduced and reported (H.Rept. 114-194) July 9, 2015. S.
1910
introduced and reported (S.Rept. 114-97) July 30, 2015. The House bill had three Cuba
provisions that would have blocked part of the Administration’s policy shift on Cuba related to
travel and the importation of goods from Cuba, and would have introduced an additional sanction
Congressional Research Service
74

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

on financial transactions with Cuba. In contrast, the Senate bill had three provisions that would
have lifted U.S. sanctions on Cuba related to travel, financing for U.S. agricultural exports, and
shipping.
As introduced, H.R. 2995 had three Cuba provisions that would have blocked some of the
Administration’s policy changes toward Cuba. The House Appropriations Committee approved a
draft bill (30-20) on June 17, 2015. Before its approval, a Lowey amendment offered to remove
various riders, including the Cuba provisions, was rejected by a vote of 19-31. Before
consideration of the bill by the full House Appropriations Committee, the Administration wrote a
letter to the chair and ranking Member of the committee on June 16, maintaining that the
Administration “strongly opposes language in the bill affecting foreign relations with Cuba,
including funding prohibitions on nonacademic educational exchanges.” According to the letter,
“This language would result in a reduction of people-to-people interactions and as such is counter
to the Administration’s policy to increase overall travel and the flow of information and resources
to private Cubans. This provision is an unwarranted restriction on purposeful travel to Cuba.”213
The three Cuba provisions in H.R. 2995 included the following:
 Section 130 would have prohibited funding to approve, license, facilitate,
authorize, or otherwise allow people-to-people educational travel to Cuba.
 Section 131 would have prohibited funding to approve, license, facilitate,
authorize, or otherwise allow the use, purchase, trafficking, or import of property
confiscated by the Cuban government. The provision appeared aimed at
prohibiting the importation of alcohol and tobacco products by authorized U.S.
travelers as accompanied baggage. In January 2015, the Obama Administration’s
new policy included the importation of no more than $100 of tobacco and alcohol
products combined as part of an overall limit of up to $400 worth of goods from
Cuba.
 Section 132 would have prohibited funding to approve, license, facilitate,
authorize, or otherwise allow financial transactions with Cuba’s Ministry of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), the Ministry of the Interior (MININT),
their subsidiaries, and any officers of these ministries or their immediate family
members. The restrictions would not have applied to financial transactions with
respect to exports permitted under TSRA. This provision would have introduced
a new economic sanction that potentially could significantly have impeded U.S.
financial transactions with Cuba given that the Cuban military, since the 1990s,
has become increasingly involved in Cuba’s economy and running numerous
companies.
In contrast, S. 1910 had three Cuba provisions that would have lifted several U.S. sanctions on
financing for U.S. agricultural exports, travel, and shipping. The provisions were approved as
amendments during the Senate Appropriations Committee’s July 23, 2015, markup of the bill.
 Section 638 of the bill would have repealed the prohibition on financing
agricultural sales to Cuba in TSRA, including the requirement that payment for
such products shall be only be payment of cash in advance or financing by third

213 White House, Office of Management and Budget, “Letter to the Chair and Ranking Member of the House
Appropriations Committee with Respect to the FY2016 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations
Bill,” June 16, 2015, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/fy-16-house-
fsgg-letter-rogers.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
75

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

country financial institutions. The provision was added by a Boozman
amendment approved by the full committee by voice vote.
 Section 641 of the bill would have lifted restrictions on travel to Cuba. It would
have prevented any funding “to implement any law, regulation, or policy that
prohibits or otherwise restricts travel, or any transaction incident to travel, to or
from Cuba by any citizen or legal resident of the United States.” The provision
further stated that any such law, regulations, or policy would cease to have any
force or effect on and after the date of the enactment of the act, but would not
limit the authority of the President to restrict travel or any transaction incident to
such travel, if the restriction was important to U.S. national security or to protect
human health or welfare. The provision was added to the bill by a Moran
amendment approved by a vote of 18-12.
 Section 642 of the bill would have repealed a provision in the Cuban Democracy
Act that prohibits a vessel that enters a Cuban port to engage in trade from
loading or unloading any freight in the United States within 180 days after
departing Cuba, except pursuant to a Treasury Department license. The provision
was added to the bill by a Tester amendment approved by voice.
For final action, see P.L. 114-113 (H.R. 2029), the FY2016 omnibus measure, above.
H.R. 3128 (Carter)/S. 1619 (Hoeven). Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2016. Introduced and reported (H.Rept. 114-215) by the House Appropriations Committee July
21, 2015. The full committee had approved the bill on July 14, 2015. Senate Appropriations
Committee reported S. 1619 June 18, 2015 (S.Rept. 114-68). Section 559 of the House bill would
have prohibited funds in the bill from being used to approve, license, facilitate, authorize, or
otherwise allow the trafficking or import or property confiscated by the Cuban government. The
provision appeared in part aimed at prohibiting the importation of alcohol and tobacco products
by authorized U.S. travelers as accompanied baggage. Before consideration of the bill by the full
House Appropriations Committee, the Administration wrote a letter to the committee expressing
concern about “highly problematic ideological riders,” including “a provision that prohibits funds
to be used allow property confiscated by the Cuban government to enter the United States.”214
The Senate bill did not have Cuba sanctions provisions. For final action, see H.R. 2029, the
FY2016 omnibus bill, above.
S. 1705 (Burr)/H.R. 2596 (Nunes)/H.R. 4127 (Nunes). Intelligence Authorization Act for
FY2016. S. 1705 introduced and reported (S.Rept. 114-83) by the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence July 7, 2015. Section 512 would require certain efforts to replace and reduce the
number of locally employed staff serving at U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba. Section 513 would
provide that each diplomatic facility that is constructed or undergoes a construction upgrade in
Cuba shall include a sensitive compartmented information facility. H.R. 2596 introduced June 1,
2015, and passed (247-178) June 16, 2015. The bill did not have similar provisions related to
Cuba found in the Senate bill. H.R. 4127 was introduced November 30, 2015, and passed (364-
58) December 1, 2015. As approved, H.R. 4127 had provisions in sections 512 and 513 that were
similar, although not identical to the Cuba provisions in S. 1705 described above. For final action,
see P.L. 114-113 (H.R. 2029), the FY2016 omnibus, above.

214 White House, Office of Management and Budget, “Letter to the Chair and Ranking Member of the House
Appropriations Committee with Respect to the Fy2016 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill,” July
13, 2015.
Congressional Research Service
76

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Appendix C. Legislative Action in 2016
H.R. 636
(Tiberi). Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2016. The bill
was originally introduced in the House as the Small Business Tax Relief Act of 2015 on February
2, 2015. House passed February 13, 2015. Senate floor consideration began April 7, 2016, using
the vehicle to reauthorize the Federal Aviation Administration. Senate passed, amended, April 19,
2016. Several potential Senate amendments related to U.S. policy toward Cuba were filed but not
considered. S.Amdt. 3557 (Flake) would have prohibited restrictions on travel to Cuba and travel
transactions. S.Amdt. 3528 (Rubio) and S.Amdt. 3722 (Rubio) introduced April 13, 2016, would
have provided that certain Cuban entrants would be ineligible to receive refugee/parolee
assistance. S.Amdt. 3568 (Collins) would have permitted transit stops in the United States by
foreign air carriers traveling to or from Cuba. S.Amdt. 3725 (Flake) would have authorized air
carriers to provide service between the United States and Cuba for citizens of other countries with
itineraries that begin and end outside the United States. S.Amdt. 3789 (Rubio), S.Amdt. 3790
(Rubio), and S.Amdt. 3791(Rubio) would have added limitations to other amendments, with the
limitations related to the extradition of certain criminals from Cuba and compensation for U.S.
property confiscated by the Cuba government.
H.R. 4678 (Royce). United States Naval Station Guantánamo Bay Preservation Act. The bill
would prohibit modification, abrogation, abandonment, or other related actions with respect to
U.S. jurisdiction and control of the U.S. naval station. Introduced March 3, 2016; Committee on
Foreign Affairs reported by unanimous consent March 15, 2016 (H.Rept. 114-496).
H.R. 4974 (Dent)/S. 2806 (Kirk)/H.R. 2577 (Diaz-Balart). Military Construction, Veterans
Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017.
H.R. 4974 introduced and reported
by the House Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 114-497) April 15, 2016; House passed
(295-129) May 19, 2016. S. 2806 introduced and reported by the Senate Committee on
Appropriations (S.Rept. 114-237) April 18, 2016.
H.R. 2577 was approved by the House in 2015 (see above) as the FY2016 transportation
appropriations measure, but in 2016, the Senate used it as the vehicle for the FY2017
transportation (S. 2844) and military construction (S. 2806) appropriations measures as well as
Zika funding. The Senate approved H.R. 2577 May 19, 2016, with an amendment substituting the
language of S. 2844 and S. 2806, amended, as well as Zika funding. The House agreed to the
Senate amendment, but with its own amendment, on May 26, 2016, which included military
construction appropriations and Zika funding, but not transportation appropriations. Conference
report (H.Rept. 114-640) filed in House June 22, 2016. House agreed (293-171) to the conference
June 23.
Section 130 of the conference report to H.R. 2577 (H.Rept. 114-640) would provide that none of
the funds made available by the act may be used to carry out the closure or realignment of the
United States Naval Station, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
H.R. 4909 (Thornberry)/S. 2943 (McCain). National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017
(NDAA).
H.R. 4909 introduced April 12, 2016; reported by House Committee on Armed Services
(H.Rept. 114-537) May 4, 2016; House passed (277-145) May 18, 2016. S. 2943 introduced and
reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 114-255) May 18, 2016. Senate
passed (85-13) June 14, 2016.
Both bills have provisions (Section 1035 in H.R. 4909 and Section 1030 in S. 2943) that would
prohibit the use of funds in FY2017 for the realignment of forces at or closure of the U.S. Naval
Station at Guantánamo, Bay, Cuba, or the implementation of a modification to a 1934 treaty that
would constructively close the naval station.
Congressional Research Service
77

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

H.R. 4909 also has a provision in Section 1099B that would prohibit modification, abrogation,
abandonment, or other related actions with respect to U.S. jurisdiction and control of the U.S.
Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, without congressional action. That provision was added
by on May 17, 2016, when the House approved by voice vote a group of amendments en bloc
(H.Amdt. 1011), including a Royce amendment (amendment 17 in H.Rept. 114-569) with the
language of the provision. The language is identical to H.R. 4678, cited above, which was
reported out of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in March 2016. (For additional information, see
CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1586, House Approves Measure to Prevent Return of GTMO to Cuba
without Congress’s Say So
, by Jennifer K. Elsea.)
Both bills also have provisions restricting U.S. military interaction with the Cuban military:
 Section 1259B of H.R. 4909 would prohibit funds authorized in the act for
FY2017 for any bilateral military-to-military contact or cooperation between the
Cuban and U.S. governments until the Secretaries of Defense and State, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), certify that Cuba
has fulfilled the numerous conditions (most related to democracy and human
rights) set forth in Sections 205 and 206 Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6065 and 22 U.S.C. 6066) and
resolved all outstanding claims and judgements belonging to U.S. nationals
against the Cuban government, as well as other conditions for Cuba related to
human rights, support to the security forces of Venezuela, cessation of Cuba’s
demand that the United States relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba’s return of U.S. fugitives from justice, and requirement
that Cuban military officials indicted in the United States for the murder of U.S.
citizens killed during the 1996 shoot down of two U.S. civilian planes are
brought to justice. Exceptions are provided for payments for the lease agreement
or other financial transactions necessary for the maintenance and improvements
of the military base at Guantánamo Bay; assistance for democracy-building
efforts in Cuba; and customary and routine financial transactions necessary for
the maintenance, improvements, or regular duties of the U.S. mission in Havana.
The provision was added during House floor consideration on May 18, 2016,
when the House approved by voice vote a group of amendments en bloc
(H.Amdt. 1035), including a DeSantis amendment (amendment 8 in H.Rept. 114-
571)
with the provision’s language.
 Section 1204 of S. 2943 would prohibit the use of any funds by the Secretary of
Defense to invite, assist, or otherwise assure the participation of Cuba in certain
joint or multilateral exercises or related security conferences between the United
States and Cuba until the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the DNI,
submits to Congress written assurances regarding Cuba’s fulfillment of
conditions for Cuba related to human rights, support to the security forces of
Venezuela, cessation of Cuba’s demand that the United States relinquish control
of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, and requirement that Cuban
military officials indicted in the United States for the murder of U.S. citizens
killed during the 1996 shoot down of two U.S. civilian planes are brought to
justice. The provision provides exceptions to the funding prohibition for any joint
or multilateral exercise or operation related to humanitarian assistance or disaster
response. The provision was added to the bill during markup by the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, when an amendment was approved by a 14-12
vote.
Congressional Research Service
78

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

 In its statement of policy on S. 2943, issued June 7, 2016, the Administration
strongly objected to restrictions on U.S.-Cuban military-to-military interactions,
maintaining that the restrictions “would hamper pragmatic, expert-level
coordination between the United States and Cuba on issues that benefit the
United States,” including monthly talks between the commanding officer of the
U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay and his Cuban counterpart to share
information about activities on both sides of the fence to reduce the risk of
accidental escalation, counternarcotics exercises and operations, and participation
of the Cuban government in security conferences. According to the
Administration, “It is in the U.S. national security interest to maintain flexibility
in U.S. military-to-military engagement with Cuba due to Cuba’s proximity and
the many shared challenges faced by the United States and Cuba.”215
In the Senate, four Cuba-related amendments were submitted but ultimately not considered for
inclusion in S. 2943: S.Amdt. 4161 (Rubio) would have amended Section 1204 of the bill and,
among other changes, would have added a provision prohibiting funds from being used to station
personnel or authorize temporary duty for personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Cuba; S.Amdt. 4199
(Rubio) would have prohibited the relinquishment or abandonment of the U.S. Naval Station at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, unless specifically authorized by congressional action; S.Amdt. 4249
(Heitkamp) would have authorized a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to
provide payment of financing terms for sales of agricultural commodities to Cuba; and S.Amdt.
4334 (Udall), among other measures, would have authorized the exportation of consumer
communications devices to Cuba and the provision of telecommunications services to Cuba and
repealed certain sanctions.
H.R. 5054 (Aderholt)/ S. 2956 (Moran). Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017.
H.R. 5054 introduced and
reported (H.Rept. 114-531) by the House Committee on Appropriations April 26, 2016. S. 2956
introduced and reported (S.Rept. 114-259) May 19, 2016. The report to the Senate bill
recommended $1.5 million (as requested by the Administration) for the Foreign Agricultural
Service to establish an overseas post in Cuba. The House bill or report does not address the issue.
H.R. 5393 (Culberson)/S. 2837 (Shelby). Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2017.
S. 2837 introduced and reported (S.Rept. 114-239) by the Senate
Appropriations Committee April 21, 2016. H.R. 5393 introduced and reported (H.Rept. 114-605 )
by the House Appropriations Committee June 7, 2016. The House bill has two Cuba provisions.
 Section 537 would prohibit funds in the act from being used to facilitate, permit,
license, or promote exports to the Cuban military or intelligence service or to any
officer of the Cuban military or intelligence service, or an immediate family
member thereof. It would not affect export of goods permitted under the Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. Similar to a provision
in the House-passed FY2016 Commerce appropriations measure, H.R. 2578, this
provision would introduce a new sanction that would restrict additional
categories of exports to Cuba authorized as part of the Administration’s policy
changes on Cuba. The provision could significantly affect the expansion of U.S.
exports to Cuba given that the Cuban military, since the 1990s, has become
increasingly involved in Cuba’s economy and running numerous companies. The

215 White House, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, S. 2943 – National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, June 7, 2016
Congressional Research Service
79

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Administration’s statement of policy on H.R. 2578 said that the bill included
highly objectionable provisions, including non-germane foreign policy
restrictions to Cuba.
 Section 538 would prohibit funds in the act from being used to approve the
registration or renewal of, or maintenance of, a mark, trade name, or commercial
name, used in commerce that is the same or substantially similar to a mark, trade
name, or commercial name used in connection with a business or assets that were
confiscated unless the original owner has expressly consented. The provision
would introduce a new sanction that would prohibit the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) form approving, maintaining, or renewing such a
trademark. With regard to the Havana Club case, however, the USPTO renewed
the trademark registration in February 2016 until 2026.
H.R. 5485 (Crenshaw)/S. 3067 (Boozman). Financial Services and General Government
Appropriations, 2017.

H.R. 5485 introduced and reported (H.Rept. 114-624) by the House Committee on Appropriations
June 15, 2016, with four Cuba-related provisions. The Administration’s statement of policy on the
bill states that the Administration “strongly objects” to the four provisions, maintaining that they
“would severely undermine the President’s policy on Cuba that aims to improve the lives of the
Cuban people and advance U.S. interests through expanded travel, commerce, and the free flow
of information.”216
 Section 132 would prohibit funds in the bill to approve, license, facilitate,
authorize, or otherwise allow, whether by general or specific license, people-to-
people educational travel to Cuba described in 31 C.F.R. 565(b)(2). In its
statement of policy, the Administration said that the provision “would result in a
reduction of people-to-people interactions on purposeful travel to Cuba and as
such is counter to the Administration’s policy to increased overall travel and the
flow of information and resources to private Cubans.” The Administration stated
that “the provision is an unwarranted restriction on purposeful travel to Cuba by
U.S. citizens.”
 Section 133 would prohibit funding to approve, license, facilitate, authorize, or
otherwise allow the use, purchase, trafficking, or import of property confiscated
by the Cuban government. In its statement of policy, the Administration
maintained that the provision “could severely chill authorized U.S.-Cuba
commerce designed to support the Cuban people.”
 Section 134 would prohibit funding to approve, license, facilitate, authorize, or
otherwise allow any financial transaction with an entity owned or controlled, in
whole or in part, by the Cuban military or intelligence service or with any officer
of the Cuban military or intelligence service, or an immediate family member
thereof, but the restrictions would not apply to financial transactions with respect
to exports permitted under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act of 2000. In its statement of policy, the Administration maintained that the
provision “is overly broad and, as written, could significantly undermine the
ability for U.S. persons to engage in otherwise authorized business in order to
more effectively support the Cuban people.”

216 White House, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 5485 – Financial
Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2017, June 21, 2016
Congressional Research Service
80

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

 Section 135 would prohibit funds to be used to authorize a general license or
approve a specific license under 31 C.F.R. 801 or 31 C.F.R.527 with respect to a
mark, trade name, or commercial name that is the same as or substantially similar
to a mark, trade name, or commercial name that was used in connection with a
business or assets that were confiscated unless the original owner has expressly
consented. The provision would introduce a new sanction that would prohibit the
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) from issuing a
general or specific license to allow for the payment of trademark registration
fees. An existing trademark sanction in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations
measure (§211 of Division A, Title II, P.L. 105-277) prevents the United States
from accepting payment for trademark registrations and renewals from Cuban
nationals that were used in connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were
confiscated, unless the original owner of the trademark has consented. U.S.
officials maintain that sanction prohibits a general license for transactions or
payments for such trademarks. In January 2016, however, OFAC issued a
specific license for payments related to the renewal of the Havana Club
trademark, and the USPTO subsequently renewed the Havana Club trademark for
the 2006-2016 period and then for 10 additional years until 2026.
On June 21, 2016, the House Rules Committee approved a structured rule (H.Rept. 114-639 to
H.Res. 794) for the consideration of H.R. 5485 that made in order two potential Cuba
amendments easing sanctions:
 A Crawford amendment, listed as amendment 24 in H.Rept. 114-639, would
prohibit funds in the act from being used to implement, administer, or enforce
Section 908(b) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000, or TSRA. That provision of law prohibits private financing for U.S.
agricultural sales to Cuba and requires payment to be made either by payment of
cash in advance or by financing by third-country financial institutions.
 A Sanford amendment, listed as amendment 47 in H.Rept. 114-639, would
prohibit funds in the act from being used to administer or enforce 31 C.F.R. Part
515 (the Cuban Assets Control Regulations) or Section 910(b) of TSRA with
respect to any travel or travel-related transaction.
S. 3067 introduced and reported (S.Rept. 114-280) by the Senate Appropriations Committee June
16, 2016, with four Cuba-related provisions.
 Section 634 would amend the Trade Sanctions Reform and Economic
Enhancement Act of 2000 to allow for the financing of agricultural exports to
Cuba. It would also eliminate a provision in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
prohibiting a seaborne vessel entry into the United States if it has been involved
in trade with Cuba within the previous 180 days, except pursuant to a Treasury
Department license.
 Section 635 would prohibit funding in the act or any other act used to implement
any law, regulation, or policy that prohibits or otherwise restricts travel, or any
transaction incident to travel, to or from Cuba by any citizen or legal resident of
the United States.
 Section 636 would prohibit funds in the act from restricting the export of
consumer communication devices and other telecommunications equipment to
Cuba, the provision of telecommunications services to Cuba, or the establishment
of facilities to provide telecommunications connecting Cuba with another
Congressional Research Service
81

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

country; financing any such activity; or entering into, performing, or making or
receiving payments under a contract with any individual or entity in Cuba with
respect to the provision of telecommunications services involving Cuba or
persons in Cuba.
 Section 637 would prohibit funds in the act or any act from being used to
implement any law, regulation, or policy that prohibits the provision of technical
services otherwise permitted under an international air transportation agreement
in the United States for an aircraft of a foreign carrier that is en route to or from
Cuba based on the restrictions set forth in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.
H.R. XXX (draft unnumbered) (Granger). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017/S. 3117 (Graham).
On June 22, 2016, the House
Appropriations Committee released a draft version of the bill. Among the bill’s Cuba provisions
are the following:
 Section 7007 would continue to prohibit direct funding for the government of
Cuba.
 Section 7015(g) would continue to require that foreign aid for Cuba appropriated
in the act not be obligated or expended except as provided through the regular
notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.
 Section 7045(c)(1)(A)(i) would prohibit funding for the establishment or
operation of a U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba beyond what was in place prior
to December 17, 2014, including the hiring of additional staff, unless necessary
for protecting the health, safety, or security of diplomatic personnel or facilities
in Cuba. Section 7045(c)(1)(A)(ii) would prohibit funding for the facilitation of
the establishment of diplomatic mission of Cuba in the United States beyond that
which was in existence prior to December 17, 2014. Section 7045(c)(1)(A)(iii)
would prohibit funding to support locally employed staff in contravention of
Section 515 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2016 (Division M of P.L.
114-113)
, which requires that key supervisory positions at U.S. diplomatic
facilities in Cuba to be occupied by U.S. citizens. Section 7045(c)(1)(B) provides
that the funding limitations in Section 1045(c)(1)(A) shall not apply to
democracy-building efforts for Cuba or if the President determines and reports to
Congress that the Cuban government has met conditions set forth in Section 205
of the LIBERTAD Act of 1996.
 Section 7045(c)(2) would prohibit funding to establish an independent grantee
organization to carry out any and all broadcasting and related programs to the
Latin American and Caribbean region or otherwise substantially alter the
structure of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) unless specifically
authorized by a subsequent act of Congress. The prohibition would prohibit the
merger of the OCB and the Voice of America Latin America Division.
 Section 7045(c)(3) would provide $30 million for democracy promotion for Cuba
to promote and strengthen civil society (double the Administration’s request of
$15 million) but would prohibit funding for business promotion, economic
reform, entrepreneurship, or any other assistance that is not democracy building
authorized by the LIBERTAD Act.
On June 29, 2016, the Senate reported its version, S. 3117 (S.Rept. 114-290). Among the bill’s
Cuba provisions are the following:
Congressional Research Service
82

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

 Section 7045(c)(1) would provide not more than $15 million for democracy
programs for Cuba, fully funding the Administration’s request. Of that amount, as
set forth in Section 7045(c)(2), not less than $3 million would be available for
USAID to support free enterprise and private business organizations and people-
to-people educational and cultural activities. The report to the bill would require
a report from the Secretary of State assessing Internet access in Cuba, including a
description of Internet access and use in both urban and rural areas and an
assessment of the effectiveness of Cuban government efforts to block access to
the Internet.
 Section 7045(c)(4) would fund the operation of, and infrastructure and security
improvements to, U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba, as well as costs associated
with additional diplomatic personnel in Cuba.
 Section 7045(c)(5) would provide that U.S. payments to the Inter-American
Development Bank (up to $2.5 million during FY2017) not be withheld if the
bank awards grants related to assistance to facilitate transparency, private sector
development, and other structural reforms of the Cuban economy.
S.Res. 418 (Collins). Introduced April 12, 2016; reported by Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations without written report April 28, 2016; Senate passed by Unanimous Consent May 10,
2016. The resolution recognizes several women leaders worldwide, including Yoani Sánchez of
Cuba, for their selflessness and dedication to their respective causes.
Congressional Research Service
83

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Appendix D. Additional Bills and Resolutions in
the 114th Congress
H.Res. 181 (King, NY). Among its provisions, the resolution would call for the immediate
extradition or rendering to the United States of convicted felon William Morales and all other
fugitives from justice who are receiving safe harbor in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or
confinement for criminal offenses committed in the United States. Introduced March 26, 2015;
referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.Con.Res. 126 (Walker). The resolution would express the sense of Congress that Cuba should
issue a state of apology and agree to cease human rights violations in order for any embargo or
economic restraints to be lifted. Introduced March 23, 2016; referred to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 274 (Rush). United States-Cuba Normalization Act of 2015. The bill would remove
provisions of law restricting trade and other relations with Cuba; authorize common carriers to
install and repair telecommunications equipment and facilities in Cuba and otherwise provide
telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba; prohibit restrictions on travel
to and from Cuba and on transactions incident to such travel; direct the U.S. Postal Service to
take actions to provide direct mail service to and from Cuba; call on the President to conduct
negotiations with the government of Cuba to settle claims of U.S. nationals for the taking of
property by the Cuban government and for securing the protection of internationally recognized
human rights; extend nondiscriminatory trade treatment to the products of Cuba; prohibit limits
on remittances to Cuba; and rescind the designation of the Cuban government as a state sponsor
of international terrorism. Introduced January 12, 2015; referred to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Judiciary,
Financial Services, Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 403 (Rangel). Free Trade with Cuba Act. The bill would remove provisions of law
restricting trade and other relations with Cuba; authorize common carriers to install and repair
telecommunications equipment and facilities in Cuba and otherwise provide telecommunications
services between the United States and Cuba; prohibit restrictions on travel to and from Cuba and
on transactions incident to such travel; direct the U.S. Postal Service to take actions to provide
direct mail service to and from Cuba; and call on the President to conduct negotiations with the
government of Cuba to settle claims of U.S. nationals for the taking of property by the Cuban
government and for securing the protection of internationally recognized human rights.
Introduced January 16, 2015; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, in addition to the
Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, the Judiciary, Financial Services,
Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 570 (McCollum). Stop Wasting Taxpayer Money on Cuba Broadcasting Act. The bill would
repeal the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act (22 U.S.C. 1465 et seq.) and the Television
Broadcasting to Cuba Act (22 U.S.C. 1464aa et seq.). Introduced January 27, 2015; referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 634 (Rangel). Export Freedom to Cuba Act of 2015. The bill would provide that travel to
and from Cuba by U.S. citizens and residents, and any transactions incident to such travel, shall
not be regulated or prohibited. Introduced February 2, 2015; referred to the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 635 (Rangel). Promoting American Agricultural and Medical Exports to Cuba Act of 2015.
Among its provisions, the bill would permanently redefine the term “payment of cash in advance”
Congressional Research Service
84

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

to mean that payment is received before the transfer of title and release and control of the
commodity to the purchaser; authorize direct transfers between Cuban and U.S. financial
institutions for products exported under the terms of TSRA; establish an export promotion
program for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba; permit nonimmigrant visas for Cuban nationals for
activities related to purchasing U.S. agricultural goods; repeal a trademark sanction related to
Cuba in a FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (§211 of Division A, Title II, P.L. 105-277);
prohibit restrictions on travel to Cuba; and repeal the on-site verification requirement for medical
exports to Cuba under the CDA. Introduced February 2, 2015; referred to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, the Judiciary, Agriculture,
and Financial Services.
H.R. 654 (Jolly)/S. 2559 (Burr). Naval Station Guantánamo Bay Protection Act. Identical bills
would prohibit the modification, termination, abandonment, or transfer of the lease by which the
United States acquired the land and waters containing Naval Station, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,
unless the President notifies Congress before, and after such notification, Congress enacts a law
authorizing that modification, termination, abandonment, or transfer. H.R. 654 introduced
February 2, 2015; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. S. 2559 introduced February 22,
2016; referred to the Committee on Armed Services.
H.R. 664 (Sanford). Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2015. The bill would prohibit the
President from prohibiting or regulating travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens or legal residents,
or any of the transactions incident to such travel, including banking transactions. Introduced
February 2, 2015; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 735 (Serrano). Cuba Reconciliation Act. The bill, among its provisions, would lift the trade
embargo on Cuba. It would remove provisions of law restricting trade and other relations with
Cuba; authorize common carriers to install and repair telecommunications equipment and
facilities in Cuba and otherwise provide telecommunications services between the United States
and Cuba; prohibit restrictions on travel to and from Cuba and on transactions incident to such
travel; and direct the U.S. Postal Service to take actions to provide direct mail service to and from
Cuba. Introduced February 4, 2015; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, in addition to
the Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, the Judiciary,
Oversight and Government Reform, and Agriculture.
H.R. 738 (Serrano). Baseball Diplomacy Act. The bill would waive certain prohibitions with
respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized professional baseball.
Introduced February 4, 2015; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, in addition to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 1782 (Smith, NJ). Cuba Human Rights Act of 2015. Among its provisions, the bill would
express the sense of Congress that the U.S.-Cuba relationship should not be changed, nor should
any federal law or regulation be amended, until the Cuban government ceases violating the
human rights of the Cuban people. Introduced April 14, 2015; referred to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 3306 (Rush). Promote Opportunities With Energy Resources for Cuba Act (or POWER
Cuba Act). Would authorize the export of energy resources, energy technologies, and related
services to Cuba. Introduced July 29, 2015; referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce,
and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 3687 (Crawford). Cuba Agricultural Exports Act. Introduced August 6, 2015; referred to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition, to the Committees on Financial Services and
Agriculture. The bill would amend TSRA to permit U.S. government assistance for agricultural
exports under TSRA, but not if the recipient assistance would be an entity controlled by the
Congressional Research Service
85

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Cuban government; authorize the financing of sales of agricultural commodities; and authorize
investment for the development of an agricultural business in Cuba as long as it is not controlled
by the Cuban government or does not traffic in property of U.S. nationals confiscated by the
Cuban government.
H.R. 3818 (Gosnar). Ending Special National Origin-Based Immigration Programs for Cubans
Act of 2015. Introduced October 23, 2015; referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. The
bill would repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act (P.L. 89-732) and would prohibit any funding to
implement, administer, enforce, or carry out the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program
established in 2007.
H.R. 4247 (Curbelo)/S. 2441 (Rubio). Cuban Immigrant Work Opportunity Act of 2015.
Identical bills would amend the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, and the Immigration and
Nationality Act to make Cuban nationals who enter the United States on or after the enactment of
this act ineligible for refugee/parolee assistance. H.R. 4247 introduced December 15, 2015;
referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce and to the Committee on Ways and
Means. S. 2441 introduced January 12, 2016; referred to the Senate Committee on Finance.
H.R. 4772 (Pearce). Justice Before Commerce Act of 2016. The bill would prohibit the use of
federal funds to accept commercial flight plans between the United States and Cuba until Cuba
extradites fugitives from justice from the United States located in Cuba. Introduced March 17,
2016; referred to the Committee on Transportation, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
H.R. 4847 (Farenthold). Correcting Unfair Benefits for Aliens Act of 2016 or CUBA Act of
2016. The bill would repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act and amend the Refugee Education
Assistance Act of 1980, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, and the Immigration and Nationality Act to make Cuban nationals who enter the United
States on or after the enactment of this act ineligible for refugee/parolee assistance. Introduced
March 23, 2016; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees on
Education and the Workforce and Ways and Means.
S.Res. 26 (Durbin). The resolution would commend Pope Francis for his leadership in helping to
secure the release of Alan Gross and for working with the Governments of the United States and
Cuba to achieve a more positive relationship. Introduced January 13, 2015; referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
S.Res. 226 (Cruz). Expresses the sense of the Senate the street in front of the Cuban Embassy in
Washington, DC, should be designated as “Oswaldo Payá Way” in honor of the Cuban political
and human rights activist. Introduced July 21, 2015; referred to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs.
S. 299 (Flake). Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2015. The bill would prohibit the President
from regulating travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens or legal residents, or any of the
transactions incident to such travel, including banking transactions. Introduced January 29, 2015;
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
S. 491 (Klobuchar). Freedom to Export to Cuba Act of 2015. The bill would repeal or amend
many provisions of law restricting trade and other relations with Cuba, including certain
restrictions in the CDA, the LIBERTAD Act, and TSRA. Introduced February 12, 2015; referred
to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
S. 757 (Nelson)/H.R. 1627 (Issa). No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act. Identical bills
would modify a 1998 prohibition (Section 211 of Division A, Tile II, P.L. 105-277) on recognition
Congressional Research Service
86

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

by U.S. courts of certain rights to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names. The 1998
prohibition or sanction prevents trademark registrations and renewals from Cuban or foreign
nations that were used in connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated,
without the consent of the original owner. The bill would have applied a fix so that the sanction
would have applied to all nationals and would bring the sanction into compliance with a 2002
World Trade Organization dispute settlement ruling. S. 757 introduced March 17, 2015; referred
to Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 1627 introduced March 25, 2015; referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary.
S. 1049 (Heitkamp). Agricultural Export Expansion Act of 2015. The bill would amend TSRA to
allow financing by U.S. persons of sales of agricultural commodities to Cuba. Introduced April
22, 2015; referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
S. 1388 (Vitter)/H.R. 2466 (Rooney). Cuba Normalization Accountability Act of 2015. The bill,
among its provisions, would require the President to submit a plan for resolving all outstanding
claims relating to property confiscated by the government of Cuba before taking action to ease
restrictions on travel to or trade with Cuba. S. 1388 introduced May 19, 2015; referred to the
Committee on Banking, House, and Urban Affairs. H.R. 2466 introduced May 20, 2015; referred
to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
S. 1389 (Udall)/H.R. 3055 (Cramer). Cuba Digital and Telecommunications Advancement Act
of 2015 (Cuba DATA Act). Among its provisions, the bill would authorize exportation of
consumer communications devices to Cuba and the provision of telecommunications services to
Cuba and repeal certain provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996. S. 1389 introduced May 19, 2015; referred
to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. H.R. 3055 introduced July 14, 2015; referred to
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
S. 1489 (Rubio)/H.R. 2937 (Nunes). Cuban Military Transparency Act. Section 4 would prohibit
financial transactions with MINFAR or MININT, any agency or entity controlled by those two
entities or which those entities own more than a 25% share, or senior members of those two
ministries. Section 5 would include, in the State Department rewards program under the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, rewards for information leading to the arrest or
conviction in any country of any individual responsible for or aiding in the February 1996 attack
on the aircraft of U.S. persons in international waters by the Cuban military. Section 6 would
provide that the Attorney General shall seek to coordinate with the International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL) to pursue the location and arrest of U.S. fugitives in Cuba, including
current and former members of the Cuban military. Sections 7 and 8 would require reports to
Congress on the role of MINFAR and MININT in the economy and foreign relationships of Cuba
and on the use of confiscated property by these two entities. S. 1489 introduced June 3, 2015;
referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. H.R. 2937 introduced June 25; referred to
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Financial Services.
S. 1543 (Moran)/H.R. 3238 (Emmer). Cuba Trade Act of 2015. Among its provisions, the bill
would repeal or amend many provisions of law restricting trade and other relations with Cuba,
including in the CDA, the LIBERTAD Act, and TSRA. It would repeal restrictions on private
financing for Cuba in TSRA, but continue to prohibit U.S. government foreign assistance or
financial assistance, loans, loan guarantee, extension of credit, or other financing for export to
Cuba, albeit with presidential waiver authority for national security or humanitarian reasons. The
federal government would be prohibited from expending any funds to promote trade with or
develop markets in Cuba, although certain federal commodity promotion programs would be
allowed. S. 1543 introduced June 10, 2015; referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Congressional Research Service
87

Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress

Urban Affairs. H.R. 3238 introduced July 28, 2015; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Financial Services, and Agriculture.
S. 1999 (Nelson). Caribbean Oil Spill Intervention, Prevention, and Preparedness Act. Introduced
August 5, 2015; referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Among
the bill’s provisions, Section 201 would require the Administrator of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration to develop and apply hydrodynamic modeling of the ocean currents
and meteorological modeling of the Straits of Florida; and amend the National Marine
Sanctuaries Act (16 U.S.C. 1935(b)) to require the Secretary of State to take appropriate action to
negotiate oil pollution prevention and response and protection of the marine resources of the Gulf
of Mexico and Straits of Florida. Section 202 would amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (43 U.S.C. 1337(a)) to require that a bidder for an oil or gas lease that is conducting oil or gas
operations in the territorial sea, on the continental shelf, or within the exclusive economic zone of
Cuba be denied an oil or gas leases unless the bidder submits an oil spill response plan for its
Cuban operations that includes one or more worst-case scenario oil discharge plans, and evidence
that the bidder has sufficient financial and other resources necessary for removal, response costs,
and damages to respond to a worst-case-scenario oil discharge in its Cuba operations or that poses
a substantial threat to enter the marine environment of the United States. Section 204 would
require, not later than 180 days, the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is
operating to carry out an oil spill risk analysis and planning process for the development and
implementation of oil spill response plans in the Straits of Florida and the Gulf of Mexico
originating in waters beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
S. 2990 (Collins). Introduced May 25, 2016; referred to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs. The bill would prohibit the President from preventing foreign air carriers
traveling to or from Cuba from making transit stops in the United States for refueling and other
technical services based on restrictions set forth in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31
C.F.R. Part 515).



Author Contact Information

Mark P. Sullivan

Specialist in Latin American Affairs
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689

Congressional Research Service
88