Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Vincent L. Morelli
Section Research Manager
February 22, 2016
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33460
Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Summary
Ukraine entered 2016 two years after the February 2014 collapse of the Kremlin-supported
government of President Viktor Yanukovych. The collapse was brought about by bitter protests
that had erupted in Kyiv’s Maidan Square in late 2013 over a decision by the government to reject
closer relations with the European Union. What followed the turmoil of early 2014 was the
emergence of a pro-Western, pro-reform government and an energized public generally anxious
to lessen Moscow’s influence, committed to addressing the need for serious reform and
determined to draw closer to Europe and the United States.
Despite the changes in government leadership, the political and economic reorientation, and the
emergence of a vibrant civil society dedicated to the implementation of change, Ukraine remains
far from achieving the political and economic stability and internal security sought by the
supporters of the Maidan. In fact, 2016 has already proven to be a very unsettling time for the
current government as frustrations have mounted over the slow pace of political reform and
economic progress. These shortcomings resulted in the resignation of a popular, reform-minded
economy minister and a deputy prosecutor. This was followed by a call by some in the opposition
to replace the current pro-reform prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and a decision by President
Petro Poroshenko to ask for the resignations of Yatsenyuk and Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin.
Shokin did resign, and Yatsenyuk barely survived a vote of no confidence in the Ukrainian
parliament on February 16, 2016.
Contributing to Ukraine’s problems have been Ukraine’s rampant corruption, other shortcomings
in the rule of law, and the reluctance of a small group of old-time oligarchs who refuse to
relinquish power or influence. The confluence of these factors has stifled the implementation of
democratic best practices, hindered strong democratic institution building, and exacerbated long-
standing problems in attracting foreign investment.
In 2014, as the new government in Kyiv, led by President Poroshenko and Prime Minister
Yatsenyuk, sought international financial assistance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
estimated Ukraine could require some $40 billion to address the needs of the country. Since then,
the IMF and Ukraine have agreed on a loan package of close to $22 billion over four years, some
$6.7 billion of which has been disbursed. The European Union (EU) has committed over €11
billion (about $15.5 billion) in aid for Ukraine and is considering further assistance. In January
2016, a new free trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine went into effect, potentially
opening new opportunities for Ukraine’s economic development.
According to the Department of State, the United States has committed over $550 million in
assistance to Ukraine since the emergence of the new, pro-reform government, in addition to two
$1 billion loan guarantees to help the new government carry out political and economic reforms
and bolster the capabilities of its security sector, including its army. With continued progress on
economic reforms and as conditions warrant, the Obama Administration could ask for a third loan
guarantee of up to $1 billion in 2017. U.S. economic and technical experts advise almost a dozen
Ukrainian ministries and localities. The U.S. has provided some $69 million in humanitarian
support to help displaced Ukrainians through international relief organizations and local
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Ukraine’s problems, however, are not solely political and economic. Russia responded to the
change of government in Kyiv by seizing Ukraine’s Crimea region and annexing it on March 18,
2014. In April 2014, armed pro-Russian separatists seized parts of the Donbas region of eastern
Ukraine aided by personnel, weaponry, and leadership from Russia. A cease-fire agreement was
signed in Minsk, Belarus, in late 2014 by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany.
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Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Minsk-2, which took effect in February 2015, outlined a 12-point plan to end the conflict. One
year later in February 2016, however, Crimea is still in Russian hands, approximately 7% of
Ukrainian territory remains under control of the separatists and Russia, and most of the provisions
of the Minsk-2 agreement have yet to be implemented. The Russia-supported conflict in the
eastern part of the country has added an additional element of instability that has kept the
government distracted from solving its internal problems. The prospects for a long-term political
settlement of the crisis in eastern Ukraine remain remote, and the term “frozen conflict” is being
heard more and more.
The United States strongly condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its incursion into
eastern Ukraine and, along with the European Union, imposed sanctions against Russian
individuals and key firms initially for seizing Crimea. These sanctions have continued and have
been enhanced in response to Russia’s continued aggression and activity in eastern Ukraine.
Congressional action has focused on providing assistance to the new Ukrainian government and
supporting sanctions against Russia for its occupation of Crimea and efforts to destabilize
Ukraine. In April 2014, President Obama signed H.R. 4152 into law, authorizing aid to help
Ukraine carry out reforms; authorized security assistance to Ukraine and other Central and
Eastern European countries; and required the President to impose visa bans and asset seizures
against persons in Ukraine and Russia who were responsible for violence or undermining the
peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine. The President also signed
S. 2183, a related bill requiring Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty and Voice of America to
increase broadcasting in eastern Ukraine, Crimea, and Moldova.
In December 2014, President Obama signed H.R. 5859, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act. The
measure authorized the President to impose sanctions on Russian defense, energy, and other firms
and foreign persons; authorized increased military and economic assistance for Ukraine;
authorized funding for U.S. Russian-language broadcasting in the region; and offered support for
Russian civil society and democracy organizations. The legislation also urged the Administration
to provide weapons to the Ukraine military, but the Obama Administration rejected the idea,
viewing it as risking a further escalation of the conflict.
This report provides an overview of the situation in Ukraine.
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Contents
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Ukraine’s Current Political Situation ............................................................................................... 3
Ongoing Challenges .................................................................................................................. 4
Current Economic Situation ............................................................................................................ 6
Energy Issues ...................................................................................................................... 7
Foreign Policy ................................................................................................................................. 8
Relations with the European Union .......................................................................................... 9
Relations with Russia .................................................................................................................... 10
Conflict in Eastern Ukraine ...................................................................................................... 11
A Second Attempt at a Ceasefire ...................................................................................... 14
EU and U.S. Sanctions ............................................................................................................ 15
Relations with the United States .................................................................................................... 16
U.S. Aid to Ukraine ........................................................................................................... 17
Congressional Response to Ukraine Crisis .................................................................................... 18
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 19
Figures
Figure 1. Ukraine ............................................................................................................................. 1
Figure 2. Separatists Areas in Ukraine .......................................................................................... 12
Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. Sanctions on Russia ............................................................................................. 21
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 22
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Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Figure 1. Ukraine
Sources: Map created by CRS. Map information generated by Hannah Fischer using data from the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency (2016), Department of State (2015), Esri (2014), and DeLorme (2014).
Background
Ukraine, comparable in size and population to France, is a large, important, European state. It
occupies the sensitive position between Russia and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
member states Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Because many Russian politicians, as
well as ordinary citizens, have never been fully reconciled to Ukraine’s independence from the
Soviet Union in 1991, there was strong support for the annexation of Crimea and a continuing
belief that the country belongs in Russia’s political and economic orbit. It has been reported that
in 2008, Russian President Putin told U.S. President George W. Bush that Ukraine was not a state
and that while the western part of the country may belong to Eastern Europe, eastern Ukraine was
Russia’s.1 On the other hand, the U.S. and European view (particularly in Central and Eastern
Europe) is that a strong, independent Ukraine is an important part of building a Europe whole,
free, and at peace.
Since Ukraine achieved independence in 1991, Ukraine’s political scene has been dominated by
“oligarchs” (powerful, politically well-connected businessmen, mainly based in eastern and
southern Ukraine), which had divided up the country’s economic assets among themselves and
regularly manipulated the government budget for their own profit. President Viktor Yanukovych,
1 Stephen Blank, “Perspectives on Russian Foreign Policy,” Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, September
2012.
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who was elected in February 2010, drew his main support from oligarchs from the Donets Basin
(Donbas) region of eastern Ukraine. His government was criticized for high-levels of corruption,
in part committed by Yanukovych’s own family and close associates. U.S. and European Union
(EU) officials expressed strong concern over the government’s human rights record, especially
the targeting of opposition leaders for selective prosecution.
Many observers had believed that, despite growing dissatisfaction with the Yanukovych
government beginning in 2013, there was little likelihood of public unrest in Ukraine, given the
failure of the government that emerged after the 2004/2005 pro-democracy “Orange” revolution
as well as widespread disillusionment with the political class as a whole. However, in November
2013, the Yanukovych government, under pressure from Moscow, made a last-minute decision to
not sign an association agreement with the European Union that would have aligned Ukraine
more toward Europe, at least in the areas of economics and trade. The decision sparked anti-
government demonstrations in Kyiv’s central Maidan Nezalezhnosti, or Independence Square.
Smaller protests occurred in other Ukrainian cities, mainly in opposition strongholds in western
and central Ukraine. Observers noted that when government security forces took forceful actions
against the demonstrators, public reaction shifted from just protesting against Ukraine’s failure to
sign the association agreement to the government’s lack of respect for the basic human dignity of
Ukraine’s citizens.
In February 2014, when the Yanukovych government embarked on its most violent crackdown
against the Maidan, resulting in over 100 persons being killed, it quickly sealed its own demise.
The death toll likely caused support in the government-controlled Ukrainian Rada (parliament)
for the crackdown, and ultimately for the regime, to collapse. On February 20, 2014 the Rada
approved a resolution calling for the withdrawal of the Interior Ministry and military forces from
Kyiv to their bases. As protestors began occupying government buildings and as the situation in
the streets became more chaotic, Yanukoyvch and many of his supporters in the government and
parliament fled to Russia. After Yanukovych fled Ukraine, the Ukrainian parliament, now
composed mainly of opposition deputies, rapidly passed sweeping measures. The parliament
deposed Yanukovych as president on February 22 for abandoning his duties. The parliament
restored the provisions of the 2004 Ukrainian constitution, eliminating changes made by
Yanukovych to strengthen the presidency and ordered new presidential elections to be held on
May 25, 2014. On February 27, 2013, the Ukrainian parliament approved a new, interim
government, headed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk, a former prime minister. Despite the rapid changes
and formation of a new government, many Maidan protestors viewed the new government
skeptically, suspecting that they were nearly as opportunistic and corrupt as the Yanukovych
regime.
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Ukraine’s Current Political Situation2
On May 25, 2014, Ukraine held a
Ukraine: Basic Facts
presidential election. The winner, Petro
Poroshenko, a pro
Area: Land area approximately 315,028 sq. mi.; slightly
-Western billionaire,
smaller than Texas. Capital: Kyiv
took 54.7% of the vote. Voter turnout for
Ukraine as a whole was around 60%. The
Population: approximately 44.4 mil ion (CIA, The World
Factbook, July 2015 est.).
lowest turnout was in the Donetsk and
Ethnicity: 78% Ukrainian; Russian: 17%
Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine, the
Languages: Ukrainian is the official language and first
stronghold of former President
language of 67% of the population. Russian is spoken by 29%.
Yanukovych and where pro-Russia
Religion: 67% Orthodox Christian
separatist gunmen seized polling places
Gross Domestic Product: $371 bil ion; per capita GDP is
and used threats, kidnappings, and other
$8,700 (CIA,The World Factbook, 2014 est.).
forms of intimidation to stop the vote.
Political Leaders: President: Petro Poroshenko (since 2014);
In October 2014, Ukraine held a national
Prime Minister: Viktor Yatsenyuk (since 2014); Foreign Minister:
election for the 450
Pavlo Klimkin; Defense Minister: Sepan Poltoral; Parliament
-seat Rada. The main
Chairman Volodymyr Groysman
victors were the Petro Poroshenko Bloc
with 132 seats and the People’s Front, led
by outgoing Prime Minister Viktor Yatsenyuk, with 82 seats. Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk
subsequently formed a coalition of pro-West parties that included the Samopomich (Self
Reliance), the populist Radical party, and the Fatherland party. This gave the incoming
government a 288-seat majority.
The Opposition Bloc, composed of supporters of the Yanukovych regime, won 29 seats. Far-right
groups, often held up by Russian propaganda as neo-Nazis gangs dominant in Ukraine, did very
poorly. One group, Svoboda, won only six seats, while another, Right Sector, won only one. Due
to the inability to hold elections in districts threatened by Russian-backed sympathizers, several
of the 450 seats in the parliament remain unfilled.
The overall result was a victory for forces in favor of closer ties with the EU and the United
States. On December 2, 2014, the incoming parliament approved a new government again led by
Yatsenyuk, who returned as prime minister. Representatives of the leading political groups were
all included in the government. With the Poroshenko/Yatsenyuk coalition commanding the
majority of seats, many believed the government would be able not only to adopt much needed
reform legislation but would be in a strong position to garner the 300 votes needed pass
amendments to the Ukrainian constitution in order to strengthen democracy and rule of law.
Prime Minister Yatsenyuk maintained that Ukraine’s main goal was to adopt European standards,
with the ultimate objective of European Union membership for Ukraine. He had consistently
reiterated that a key focus of his government would be to fight corruption, including by reducing
government regulation and the size of the bureaucracy along with minimizing the influence of
certain elements of Ukraine’s society. He stated that the government would cut the number of
taxes it collects and would devolve more budgetary power to local authorities.
In an important symbolic move, Natalie Jaresko, a U.S. citizen and former State Department
official who has lived in Ukraine for over two decades, was named Ukraine’s finance minister. A
Lithuanian citizen was appointed the economy minister. The former president of Georgia, Mikhel
Saakashvili, was appointed mayor of Odessa, and the health minister is also from Georgia. These
2 Some of the information in this report appeared in previous versions of CRS33460 written by Steven Woehrel.
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moves may have been meant to signal that the new government was dedicated to moving the
country toward the West and that these key figures were not from what many Ukrainians believe
was the country’s morally compromised political elite.
Ongoing Challenges
Since taking office, President Poroshenko has launched several political, economic, and judicial
reform initiatives designed to reassure the population that the changes they demanded would be
implemented. The record to date has been mixed. In testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in October 2015, Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland stated that the
government is setting up an Anti-Corruption Bureau that will investigate corruption among
government officials. New anti-corruption laws were passed last year, including stricter
provisions against bribery and conflicts of interest, and will require annual disclosures of income
by public officials. With U.S., EU, and UK help, new local prosecutors are being hired, old ones
are tested and retrained, and all will now submit to periodic performance evaluations to root out
corruption and malfeasance.3
On the other hand, some reforms have been slow. According to Secretary Nuland, much difficult
work remains to clean up endemic corruption throughout government and society, at every level;
to stabilize the economy; break the hold of corrupt state enterprises and oligarchs; and reform the
justice system. She also noted that currently only 5% of the Ukrainian population completely
trusted the judiciary. Secretary Nuland stated, “like Ukraine’s police force, the Prosecutor
General’s Office (PGO) has to be reinvented as an institution that serves the citizens of Ukraine,
rather than ripping them off.” For the secretary, that means the PGO “must investigate and
successfully prosecute corruption and asset recovery cases – including locking up dirty personnel
in the PGO itself.” And, the newly created Inspector General’s Office within Ukraine’s
prosecution service must be able to work independently and effectively, without political or
judicial interference.4 Nuland’s comments were given renewed importance when on February 14,
2016, the reform-minded deputy prosecutor resigned, complaining that his efforts to address
government corruption had been consistently stymied by his own prosecutor general, Viktor
Shokin, as well as other government officials. This led to the February 16 resignation of Shokin
after President Poroshenko complained that Shokin was taking too long to clean up corruption
even within the PGO itself.
Others have also observed that it has been very difficult to keep the reform progress moving
forward. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), dismantling ingrained structures of
corruption will continue to meet with considerable resistance from organized business-political-
criminal networks, including some that are still influential in the pro-Western government.5 A
recent example of the difficulties some reformers in the government are experiencing in moving
the process forward was the resignation in early February 2016 of the economy minister, Aivaras
Abromavicius, who complained of political interference from advisors to the president and
members of the Rada and accused some of the political elites of systematically blocking much-
needed reforms and interfering in the fight against corruption.
There were other signs of potential trouble ahead for the governing coalition. In August 2015, the
first reading of a controversial constitutional amendment on administrative decentralization for
3 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
October 8, 2015.
4 Ibid.
5 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report on Ukraine, January 18, 2016.
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the Donbas region was passed by the Rada, but not with the 300 votes necessary to amend the
constitution. According to some, the debate opened up serious splits within the governing
coalition.6 Such tensions inside the Rada appear to have made it harder for the decentralization
law to muster the 300 votes needed for its inclusion in the constitution as required by the Minsk-2
agreement (see below). Poroshenko has found himself in the middle of a struggle between those,
including the EU and United States, who want to move forward toward a settlement of the
conflict in the east at all costs and those more hardline elements in the country who do not want
to make any further concessions to Russia or the separatists until they take significant steps to end
the conflict and reunify Ukraine.
In September 2015, the Radical Party quit the governing coalition over the decentralization issue.
In January 2016, the leadership of the Self Reliance Party called for a no-confidence vote against
Prime Minister Yatsenyuk, threatening to leave the coalition if the vote was not held. The same
day, parliament chairman Volodymyr Groysman announced that the legislature would conduct a
review of the work of the cabinet beginning February 16, which could precede a vote of no
confidence on the Yatsenyuk government. At that point, questions arose as to whether the prime
minister could retain his position as his detractors began to accuse him of treating some of the
wealthy oligarchs, whom Yatsenyuk vowed to reform, with deference. Some believed that
changes would have to be made in the government in order to retain any semblance of stability.7
On February 15, President Poroshenko asked for Yatsenyuk’s resignation over the slow pace of
reform and because he felt the prime minister no longer enjoyed the support of the government
coalition or the Rada. However, on February 16, Yatsenyuk barely survived a vote of no
confidence in the Rada when only 194 of the required 226 Members of Parliament voted against
him. The outcome of the vote has further complicated the political environment because while
Poroshenko argued that change may be necessary to reassure the public, a majority in the Rada,
including many in Poroshenko’s own political bloc, refused to support the ouster of Yatsenyuk.
After the vote, Yatsenyuk noted that while he would not step down, he would consider replacing
some of his cabinet.
For some Ukraine observers, the recent shift among the various political leaders has triggered fear
among reformers that Ukraine might repeat the failure of the earlier Orange Revolution, the
leaders of which, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and President Victor Yushchenko, quarreled
bitterly after attaining power. Their mutual hostility paralyzed the government, alienated voters,
and delivered the presidency to Victor Yanukovich in 2010.8 For these observers, history may be
about to repeat itself.
Despite the recognized progress made in some areas of reform, opinion polls have shown that
public skepticism remains high regarding the Poroshenko/Yatsenyuk government’s commitment
to make a serious impact in fighting the country’s deeply ingrained, crippling problem with
corruption and to adopt other legislation seen necessary to move Ukraine forward. As evidence of
what appears to be a growing trend of disenchantment, some point to the October 2015 local
elections held throughout the country where Yatsenyuk’s People’s Front did not even participate
because polls indicated that the party had experienced a significant decline in support in some
regions of the country. And, in a public opinion poll conducted in November 2015 for the
6 Ibid.
7 “Ukraine: What Happens in the East Starts in Kiev,” Stratfor, February 4, 2016.
8 Elizabeth Pond, “Gunfight at the Ukraine Corral,” Institute for International Strategic Studies, February 4, 2016.
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International Republican Institute, only 27% of those polled expressed a favorable view toward
President Poroshenko, and only 12% looked favorably on Prime Minister Yatsenyuk.9
Whether a revamped government under the continued leadership of Yatsenyuk or a new
government, led by a new, consensus prime minister, can be formed quickly, thus avoiding a snap
general election, it is unclear just how much success in addressing corruption can be achieved. In
the interim, a new level of disenchantment on the part of an already skeptical public could spell
trouble for Poroshenko.
Current Economic Situation
After Russia proper, the Ukrainian republic was the most important economic component of the
former Soviet Union, producing about four times the output of the next-ranking republic. Its
fertile soil generated more than one-fourth of Soviet agricultural output.10 (According to the U.S.
Department of State, this remains the case as Ukraine exported a record 33.5 million tons of grain
in 2014.11) In addition, Ukraine’s diversified heavy industry, concentrated in the eastern portion
of the country, supplied equipment and raw materials to industrial facilities and mining sites
within Ukraine and Russia.
Although its economy was in decline in 2013, some believe Ukraine’s primary economic
challenges are not all self-inflicted. Many are the result of Russia’s aggressive actions against
Ukraine. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 seized 4% of Ukraine’s GDP.
Subsequently, Russia’s support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, a region that accounted for 10%
of the country’s GDP in 2013, resulted in the region’s production plummeting by 70%, costing
Ukraine some 7% of its 2013 GDP.
Since 2013, Russian trade sanctions have slashed Ukraine’s exports to Russia by 70%—
accounting for a drop of 18% in Ukraine’s total exports. Last year alone, Ukraine’s exports to
Russia—which included machinery, steel, agricultural goods, and chemicals—fell by half.
Logistical issues, the lack of commercial links, and the specialization of some products meant that
Ukrainian goods could not be redirected in the short term away from the Russian market to other
markets, particularly in Europe. It is estimated that the loss of the Russia market likely resulted in
a 6% decline in Ukraine’s GDP. In addition, with Russia’s aggression in Ukraine still unsettled,
few want to invest in what could become an extended war zone. As a consequence, Ukraine’s net
foreign direct investment, which was slightly over 3% of GDP before the start of hostilities, has
evaporated.12
Since 2014, some good news has been noted. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s
(EIU’s) most recent assessment,13 during 2015 signs of financial and economic stabilization
began to appear as a result of a series of measures, including a new $17.5-billion program loan
approved by the IMF in March 2015, a steep rise in interest rates that helped to support the
hryvnya (Ukraine’s currency). In August 2015, the government announced that a deal on the
restructuring of up to $18 billion of Ukraine’s public debt had been reached with private creditors.
In December 2015, the IMF tweaked its rules regarding lending to countries in arrears to other
9 Public opinion survey of residents of Ukraine conducted between November 19-30, 2015, by the Rating Group of
Ukraine for the International Republican Institute.
10 CIA, The Word Factbook, January 5, 2016.
11 Secretary Nuland’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 2015.
12 Anders Aslund, “Russia’s War on Ukraine’s Economy,” July 9, 2015.
13 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report on Ukraine, January 18, 2016.
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states, allowing Ukraine to continue to receive IMF funding even though the government has thus
far refused to repay a $3 billion bond, issued by the previous government and held by Russia.
In December 2015, the Rada adopted a 2016 budget that included changes to the tax code. The
approved budget would attempt to reduce the budget deficit target to 3.7% of GDP, down slightly
from the 2015 target of 4.3% of GDP. According to the EIU, this is in line with the government’s
commitments made as part of its April 2014 IMF loan of $17 billion. Passage of the budget will
allow the IMF to continue to lend money to Ukraine. Other commitments made to the IMF
included maintaining a flexible exchange rate for its currency, increasing household gas prices to
56% of the import price and heating prices to about 40% of the import price in 2014. The IMF
also wanted a commitment to make rapid progress on reforms, including further energy price
increases, bank restructuring, governance reforms of state-owned enterprises, and legal changes
to implement anti-corruption and judicial reforms.14 In February 2016, IMF Director Lagarde
warned Prime Minister Yatsenyuk that reforms were taking too long and that continued IMF
support for Ukraine was in jeopardy unless the pace of reforms was increased.
The budget debate in the Rada was difficult as many parliamentarians noted that the fiscal
austerity focus of the budget, the ongoing conflict in the east, and recession have all contributed
to a downturn in living standards, leading to a rapid decline in public support for the government.
In late December 2015, the central bank of Poland announced that it would establish a
zloty/hryvnya currency swap line with the National Bank of Ukraine. The main purpose of the
initiative was to strengthen Ukraine’s financial system, stabilizing the hryvnya and promoting an
increase in bilateral trade between the two countries.
As noted above, when the free-trade agreement with the EU went into effect in January 2016,
Russia suspended its own free-trade deal with Ukraine and banned imports of Ukrainian food—to
which Ukraine has responded in kind. In the short term, any positive impact of the EU free-trade
deal could be offset by Russia’s countermeasures. In 2016, the EIU expects a weak economic
recovery, owing to the effect of Russia’s trade bans and still high domestic political risk, which
could dampen the recovery. The EIU forecasts a growth of around 1% in 2016.15 On January 25,
2016, the Ukrainian Central Bank issued its own revised forecast, estimating that growth would
only reach 1.1% in 2016.
Energy Issues
Energy has long been a key factor in Ukraine’s relations with Russia as Ukraine has historically
been heavily dependent on Russia for its energy supplies. In 2012, 63% of Ukraine’s natural gas
consumption came from Russia, as well as nearly three-quarters of its oil and other liquid fuels.16
However, Ukraine’s vulnerability to Russian pressure has been mitigated by the fact that the main
oil and natural gas pipelines to Central and Western Europe transit its territory. In 2014, about
40% of Russian natural gas destined for Europe transited Ukraine. Past Russian efforts to greatly
increase gas prices for Ukraine provoked a crisis that resulted in a cutoff of Russian gas to
Western Europe for several days in January 2006. A second gas crisis occurred in January 2009,
resulting in a gas cutoff of nearly three weeks.
Until recently, Russia had long sought control of Ukraine’s natural gas pipelines and storage
facilities. Moscow’s efforts were unsuccessful, even with friendly governments in Kyiv, due to
14 See https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr1550.htm.
15 Op. cit.
16 U.S. Energy Information Agency, Country Brief: Ukraine, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15411.
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Kyiv’s refusal to cede control of one of its key economic assets. In recent years, Russia, in an
attempt to pressure Ukraine over the pipelines, negotiated with several European countries to
build pipelines that would bypass Ukraine. Gazprom (Russia’s state-controlled energy company),
having reached an agreement with Germany, constructed a gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea
(called Nord Stream). Moscow had also proposed a pipeline through the Balkans (called South
Stream) to Western Europe. However, annoyed by EU objections that the project, as planned,
violated EU rules, Russia cancelled the South Stream project in December 2014. Russia then
announced that beginning in 2019, it would no longer ship gas to Europe through Ukraine and
would build a pipeline through Turkey to the Greek border (dubbed Turkish Stream).
Russia has also used gas prices as a tool in its policies toward Ukraine. Russia had raised the
natural gas price for Ukraine from $268 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) while President
Yanukovych was in power to $485 per tcm of gas when Ukraine’s new government took power,
an increase of about 80%. Ukraine refused to pay the increased amount and demanded a new gas
contract with a lower price. Russia responded in June 2014 by cutting off natural gas supplies to
Ukraine for non-payment of debts. (Ukraine continued to allow gas destined for Western Europe
to transit its territory.) In October 2014, the EU brokered a deal between Gazprom and Ukraine on
gas supplies at a lower price through March 2015 in exchange for Ukraine’s repayment of some
of its debts to Gazprom. That agreement was further extended to the end of 2015.
Ukrainian leaders acknowledge that in order to avoid likely future Russian efforts to use energy
supplies as a political weapon, Ukraine would have to sharply reduce its dependence on Russian
gas. In 2015, Ukraine began to import more significant amounts of gas from Poland, Hungary,
and Slovakia by reconfiguring the pipelines to “reverse flow” supplies.
By November 2015, buoyed by lower energy consumption due to the economic slowdown in
Ukraine, greater availability of gas from EU countries, increases in the price of gas to its
consumers, and the fact that the government no longer had to supply the energy-consuming
region of the Donbas, the Ukrainian government ordered Naftogaz, the state-run gas monopoly, to
cease buying gas from Russia. The Ukrainian government’s decision to stop buying gas from
Gazprom is part of a broader trend toward the dismantling of bilateral Russia-Ukraine economic
ties. However, according to the EIU, Ukraine is currently only able to do without Russian gas
because a deep economic contraction has reduced demand.17
In the long term, some believe Ukraine could develop its own shale gas deposits and improve
exploitation of its conventional gas reserves; import liquefied natural gas; or import gas from
Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and elsewhere via pipelines through the EU’s planned Southern Energy
Corridor. Ukraine will also to have to make much greater strides in energy conservation, which
has required a steep and politically unpopular hike in natural gas prices, including for households.
Foreign Policy
Given the significant domestic problems facing the Poroshenko/Yatsenyuk government, the scope
of Ukraine’s foreign policy is focused on a few main foreign policy priorities. These include to
secure international support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including non-
recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea; to reorient its economy as quickly as possible
toward Europe; and to seek continued international assistance to ameliorate the country’s dire
economic situation.
17 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report on Ukraine, December 2015.
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In December 2014, the Ukrainian parliament overwhelmingly renounced Ukraine’s former
neutral, “non-bloc” status and indicated a preference for closer relations with NATO. After taking
office, President Poroshenko requested assistance from NATO for its military. At the September
2014 NATO summit in Wales, the alliance agreed to set up four trust funds to help Ukraine’s
military in such areas as logistics, command and control, military personnel issues (including
wounded soldiers), and cyberdefense.18
Relations with the European Union
Ukraine has been a priority country within the EU’s Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern
Partnership for several years. The EU policy is intended to forge a close relationship that
encompasses political association and economic integration that could prepare Ukraine for
eventual membership in the union. The desire by a least some segments of the Ukrainian public
for stronger relations with the EU and the West fueled the initial protests in late 2013 that
culminated in the collapse of the former Yanukovych regime.
In response to the crisis in Ukraine, in March 2014, the European Commission unveiled an initial
support package of €11 billion (about $15.5 billion) focusing on the comprehensive reform
process initiated by the new government in Ukraine. The package included €1.6 billion (about
$2.2 billion) in macro financial assistance loans to support Ukraine’s government finances. The
EU also agreed to provide some €1.5 billion (about $2.17 billion) in grant aid between 2014 and
2020 to assist Ukraine’s reform efforts. The package includes up to €9 billion (about $11.16
billion) in loans from the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development. The package also included close to €110 million (approximately $112.5
million) aimed at developing the private sector, including small and medium enterprises.
The European Union’s main instrument to promote European values (such as human rights,
fundamental freedoms, rule of law, political dialogue and reform) and deepen economic ties with
Ukraine is the association agreement (AA). The AA includes a free trade agreement with the EU,
formally known as a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA). Although the
DCFTA further opens potentially lucrative EU markets to Ukraine, it also requires Ukraine to
adopt EU legislation and standards and to gradually expose Ukrainian firms to tough competition
from EU imports. Approximation to EU norms could also lead to increased foreign investment in
Ukraine.
The EU and Ukraine signed the parts of Ukraine’s association agreement dealing with political
issues in March 2014, and the parts dealing with economic issues (including the DCFTA) were
signed on June 27. Ratification of the pact was delayed due to Russian threats to block Ukrainian
imports from its markets unless the pact was modified to protect Russia’s interests. The EU and
Ukraine refused to do so, and the European Parliament and the Ukrainian parliament ratified the
accord on September 16, 2014. Moscow responded by closing off the import of selected
Ukrainian products. However, the EU and Ukraine did appear to bow to Russian threats by
agreeing to postpone implementation of the DCFTA until 2016. In the interim, Ukraine was
granted unilateral trade preferences from the EU.
The association agreement with the EU came into effect on January 1, 2016, with the promise of
a gradual improvement in the Ukrainian economy once the trade relationship begins to take hold
18 For more on NATO’s response to the Ukraine crisis, see CRS Report R43478, NATO: Response to the Crisis in
Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe, coordinated by Paul Belkin. See also
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112695.htm.
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and matures. As expected, as soon as the agreement went into force, Russia suspended its own
long-standing free-trade deal with Ukraine and banned imports of Ukrainian food.
In addition to the aid package and the association agreement, the EU established a High Level
Investment Forum/Task Force and created a dedicated Ukraine Support Group, composed of
experts from EU institutions and member states in different sectors to provide advice and support
to the Ukrainian authorities in the mentioned reform sectors.19 The EU also committed to help
modernize Ukraine’s natural gas transit system and to work on reversing the flow of pipelines
through Slovakia so that Ukraine can receive gas from the west. Finally, the EU agreed to
accelerate its Visa Liberalization Action Plan to allow Ukrainians to travel throughout the EU.
Relations with Russia
Ukraine was the center of the first eastern Slavic state, Kyivan Rus, which during the 10th and 11th
centuries had become one of largest and most powerful states in Europe. Kyivan Rus was
eventually incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and subsequently into the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth. During the latter part of the 18th century, most Ukrainian territory
was absorbed by the Russian Empire. Following the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine
achieved a short-lived period of independence (1917-20), but was reconquered and endured
Soviet rule until Ukraine achieved independence in 1991following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Although independent, Russian political and economic influence over Ukraine remained
strong with Moscow determined to ensure that despite any changes in the government in Kyiv,
Ukriane would remain on good terms with Russia.
In some ways, recent Russian perspectives on Ukraine are seen as the culmination of long-
standing Russian resentment of the outcome of the Cold War. In 2005, Russian President
Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union “a major geopolitical disaster.” Russian
leaders have also asserted that nations in the post-Soviet region should remain of privileged
interest to Russia. Part of the justification for that assertion is an alleged right to protect Russian
citizens and “compatriots” (persons deemed to be linked to Russia by language, culture, or
ethnicity).
Moreover, Ukraine has a particularly important place in Russian psychology, according to many
experts. Putin has referred to Ukrainians as “brothers” of the Russian people. Eastern Orthodox
civilization, in which Russians see themselves as the leading force, got its start in Kyvin Rus
when Prince Vladimir converted to Christianity in AD 988. Russians often point out that their
ancestors spilled a great deal of blood to incorporate Crimea and most of the rest of Ukraine into
the Russian Empire, and a great deal more to keep it within the empire (and its successor, the
Soviet Union) through several wars.
Ethnic Russians make up around 17% of Ukraine’s population, according to the 2001 census.
They are concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of the country. They make up
approximately 58% of the population in the Crimea. In addition, many ethnic Ukrainians in the
east and south also tend to be Russian-speaking, are suspicious of Ukrainian nationalism, and
have supported close ties with Russia. Soviet leaders concentrated important heavy industries
(including defense industries) in eastern Ukraine, which tied the region to Russia economically
and fostered what many analysts have viewed as a lingering Soviet-style mindset there. This is
particularly true of the Donbas region, on the border with Russia.
19 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-159_en.htm.
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Until the collapse of the Yanukovych regime in February 2014, Putin preferred using indirect
methods of influence in Ukraine. These included “carrots,” such as lucrative business deals with
Ukrainian politicians and oligarchs, but also “sticks,” such as de facto economic sanctions and
using Russian media (which was and is still popular in Ukraine) to attack uncooperative leaders.
Russia reacted with great hostility to the emergence of a new, more pro-Western leadership in
Ukraine in February 2014 by seizing Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. Starting on February 27,
heavily armed Russian-speaking troops poured into Crimea, seizing airports and other key
installations throughout the peninsula. At the time, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that
the troops were not Russian Federation military forces, but only local Crimean self-defense
forces. On March 16, the Crimean authorities held a referendum on Crimea’s annexation to
Russia. According to Crimean officials, Crimea’s union with Russia was allegedly approved by
96% of those voting, with a turnout of 83%. Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, and
other countries denounced the referendum as illegal and not held in a free or fair manner. Russian
President Vladimir Putin signed a “treaty” with Crimean leaders on March 18, 2014, formally
incorporating Crimea into Russia. In April 2014, Putin suggested that Russian Federation military
forces did in fact invade Crimea.
Since then, the Crimea front has been relatively stable as the reality of its return to Ukraine
continues to fade. Recently, however, an incident involving a disruption in the supply of
electricity from Ukraine to Crimea resulted in recriminations and accusations of sabotage and a
discontinuation of trade between Ukraine and the peninsula.
Conflict in Eastern Ukraine
In addition to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, in March 2014, thousands of pro-Russian protestors
began organized demonstrations in eastern Ukraine, especially in the major cities of Donetsk and
Luhansk in the Donbas region and in Kharkiv. Some demonstrators favored union with Russia,
others only greater autonomy from the government in Kyiv. Demonstrators seized government
buildings. They also faced off against pro-Maidan demonstrators. Unrest in eastern Ukraine took
an even more ominous turn in April 2014, when armed men stormed and occupied key
government buildings and broadcast facilities in Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as in Slovyansk
and more than a dozen other towns in the Donbas region. The government in Kyiv responded
with military force and employed local militias to help push back the separatists.
The Ukrainian government said Russian intelligence agents orchestrated the separatists’ attacks
and released video, photographs, and audio recordings allegedly identifying them. Senior U.S.
officials and NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Philip Breedlove stated that they
believed Russia had played a leading role in the activities of the armed separatist groups in
eastern Ukraine.
On May 11, 2014 the armed separatist forces, in the guise of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”
and the “Luhansk People’s Republic,” held “referendums” on their “sovereignty.” According to
the organizers, the question of independence from Ukraine was approved by 89% of those voting
in Donetsk region, and by 96% in Luhansk region, with a turnout of 75%. No international
observers monitored the vote, and witnesses reported rampant irregularities. The leaders of the
“Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic” declared their entities to be
sovereign states after the vote. The Ukrainian government denounced the referendums as illegal.
After a brief unilateral cease-fire by Ukraine in late June failed to lead to progress on a peace plan
put forward by newly elected Ukrainian President Poroshenko, Ukraine restarted an “anti-terrorist
operation” against the separatist forces. In July and August 2014, Ukraine successfully dislodged
the gunmen from strongholds in Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and other towns, and began to move on
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separatist forces in the key cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. It was during this time that the tragedy
of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 occurred. The plane flying over Ukraine was downed by a
surface-launched missile on July 17, 2014. Accusations flew on both sides as to who fired the
missile, but for some it was clear, and later determined by the Dutch government after it
conducted a lengthy investigation, that the missile was fired by the separatists forces using a
Russian-supplied Buk missile.20
In late August and early September, Russia stepped up its support to the separatists, including by
deploying thousands of Russian troops to fight in Ukraine (a contention that Russia still denies
despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary).21 Although mostly denied by Moscow, Russian
troops and the separatists were apparently supplied with tanks, armored personnel carriers,
artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and other military equipment from Russia. As a result, Ukrainian
forces lost ground and suffered heavy casualties.
Figure 2. Separatists Areas in Ukraine
Sources: Map created by CRS. Map information generated by Hannah Fischer using data from the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency (2016), Department of State (2015), Esri (2014), and DeLorme (2014).
20 “MH17 Ukraine Disaster: Dutch Safety Board Blames Missile,” BBC News, October 15, 2015.
21 For an unofficial translation of the Russian-language original, see, for example, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7de.html#axzz3RXfwD5VC.
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Perhaps fearing further casualties and the loss of more territory, Ukraine agreed to a ceasefire
plan during talks with separatist representatives and Russian officials in Minsk, Belarus, on
September 5, 2014. Among other provisions, the plan (Minsk-1) called for a ceasefire along the
then-current lines of control, an exchange of hostages and/or prisoners, the monitoring of the
cease-fire and of the Russian-Ukrainian border by the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), and the withdrawal of “illegal armed groups, militants, as well as militants
and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine.” The Minsk agreement also called for Ukraine to
adopt a law on amnesty for those involved in the war in the Donbas and other provisions.
The signing of the agreement led to the end of the massive Russian-led offensive on Ukrainian
forces but did not fully end the fighting. Nor were any of the points of the Minsk-1 protocol fully
implemented. Sporadic, sometime intense, fighting continued, resulting in over 1,300 deaths since
the Minsk protocol was signed, and Ukrainian officials indicated that the separatists had seized
over 500 sq. km of Ukrainian territory since the protocol’s signature. In January 2015, President
Poroshenko said Russia had 9,000 troops inside Ukraine, along with hundreds of tanks, armored
fighting vehicles, and artillery pieces.22
In response to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the Donbas region, both the
United States and the European Union initiated a series of sanctions and travel bans against
Russian and Ukrainian personnel who were identified as being part of the destabilization of
Ukraine (see below). Both made the full implementation of the Minsk protocol a precondition for
easing sanctions on Russia.
A particularly violent flare-up of attacks by the pro-Russian separatists against Ukrainian-held
territory in late January 2014 and early February 2015 led the United States and the EU to warn
Russia that it faced possible additional sanctions for its military intervention in Ukraine.
While actively engaged with our allies in Europe in seeking a resolution of the crisis, the
Administration had, for the most part, left the leading role in negotiating such a settlement to
France, Germany, and Ukraine, whose representatives have met with those of Russia and the
rebels in the so-called “Normandy format,” named after the place where the meetings first
occurred in 2014. Nevertheless, President Obama and Administration officials have been in
regular contact with the main figures in the talks, including President Putin, President
Poroshenko, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and President Francois Hollande of France.
22 Some experts believe Russian troop levels in Ukraine are significantly lower. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Douglas
Lute has said Russian troops in Ukraine are mainly intelligence officers serving a command and control function and
Russian servicemen operating highly sophisticated, specialized equipment, such as that used for electronic warfare and
air defense. See http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/04/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-usa-idUSKBN0L81S220150204.
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Minsk-2
A Second Attempt at a Ceasefire
1. Immediate, ful bilateral ceasefire as of February 15.
Recognizing the failure of the Minsk-1
2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides, to be
protocol to end the conflict and begin the
completed within 14 days.
process of achieving a political resolution to
3. Effective monitoring regime for the ceasefire and
the Donbas crisis, the presidents of France,
withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE.
Russia, and Ukraine and Chancellor Angela
4. Launch of dialogue on modalities of local elections in
Merkel of Germany met again in Minsk in
accordance with Ukrainian legislation.
early February 2015 to try to secure a new
5. Pardon and amnesty of figures involved in the conflict.
agreement to stop the fighting. On February
6. Release of all hostages and other il egally detained
12, a cease
people, based on the “all for all” principle.
-fire agreement was signed to take
effect on February 15. The Minsk
7. Safe delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need,
-2 agreement
based on an international mechanism.
entered into force on February 15, 2015 (see
8. Restoration of ful social and economic links with
box).23
affected areas.
As most of the terms of the agreement were
9. Ful Ukrainian control over its border with Russia
similar to those of the original Minsk-1
throughout the conflict zone.
protocol, which failed to secure the peace,
10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed groups, weapons,
some observers expressed skepticism about
and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory.
whether this agreement was any more likely to
11. Constitutional reform in Ukraine with
decentralization as a key element; a new constitution by
be implemented than the previous one.
the end of 2015.
Some expressed concern that the Minsk-2
12. Local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk regions to be
agreement amounted to a step toward
held according OSCE standards.
transforming the occupied parts of Donbas
into a new Transnistria,24 and that the main difference between the Minsk-1 agreements and the
Minsk-2 agreement is that more conditions had been placed on Ukraine. Another point made by
skeptics was the fact that Putin, the architect of the crisis, managed to avoid binding himself
through the agreement. In fact, Minsk-2 contains no obligations whatsoever for Russia, which is
not even mentioned in the agreement. It was not even signed by Putin but by Mikhail Zurabov,
Russia’s ambassador to Ukraine.25
By the beginning of 2016, little had been accomplished in fully implementing the Minsk-2
provisions despite the commitments by both sides to do so. The cease-fire continues to hold,
although sporadic fighting does flare up and Ukrainian soldiers and rebels continue to be killed.
Some of the rebel’s heavy weapons and military personnel supplied by Russia have been
withdrawn from the front lines but have not been removed from Ukraine altogether. And while
President Poroshenko won a hard-fought victory in initially moving legislation to grant more
autonomy for the Donbas called for in the Minsk-2 agreement through the Rada, he does not have
the necessary votes to pass this as an amendment to the constitution and is unlikely to secure
those votes unless major progress is made by the other side. On the other hand, the separatists
appear to have no intention to ensure free and fair elections in the disputed regions, and Russia
seems little inclined to push for a resolution of the conflict even though some observers have
23 For an English-language translation of the Minsk protocol, see http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/osce-
releases-the-12-point-protocol-agreements-reached-between-ukraine-russia-and-separatists-in-minsk-363816.html. For
the Russian-language original, see http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258?download=true.
24 Transnistria is a strip of eastern Moldova that separated from Moldova and is supported by Moscow, including with
some 1,500 Russian military personnel on the ground.
25 Anders Asland, “Minsk-2: President Putin’s Tactical Victory,” RBC Daily, February 13, 2015.
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suggested that Putin may have been moving in that direction—offering his actions in Syria as the
quid pro quo.
Moscow has so far declined to recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” as
independent countries or annex them to Russia. However, Russian official statements and the
Minsk-2 cease-fire agreement view the separatist regimes as legitimate interlocutors for Kyiv in
determining the future of Ukraine. Russia has also made demands on the subject of Ukraine’s
political future. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has called for making Russian the second
official language in Ukraine and for constitutional reforms that would confirm Ukraine’s neutral
status. Moscow has also insisted on the decentralization of Ukraine, under which the various
regions would have wide autonomy in the areas of the economy, finances, culture, language,
education, and external economic and cultural ties with neighboring countries or regions.
Many experts on Russia have speculated that Putin’s key objective in Ukraine has been and
continues to be to weaken and discredit the pro-Western government in Kyiv and Western policy
generally. And, according to some, Moscow’s policy in Ukraine’s east is starting to look more
likely to strengthen the so-called Donetsk (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republics (LNR). For
instance, according to the International Crisis Group, after showing little interest in building
political institutions in the DNR and LNR or enthusiasm for funding social policies, Moscow has
begun in the past four or five months to bankroll pensions, social benefits, and salaries to local
officials and the separatist military, suggesting that the measures are increasingly clear signs
Moscow has decided to transform the crisis into a frozen conflict.26 The outcome would likely at
best amount to a cease-fire in place, with Russia continuing to have control over the Russia-
Ukraine border, given the unlikelihood of an agreement between Kyiv and the separatists on
elections and decentralization. Such an outcome could still provide Moscow with leverage over
Kyiv but might not afford the same opportunity to destabilize Ukraine as continuing the war.
On another note, what has largely disappeared from official Russian rhetoric for now is the
concept of “Novorossiya;” that is, expanding the Russian-controlled area to include most of
eastern and southern Ukraine, perhaps linking Russian-controlled areas in southern Ukraine with
Crimea. This goal may have seemed easily achievable to Putin in mid-2014 when he first used the
term. Since then, however, Ukrainian forces have become somewhat more capable, and it may
appear to Putin than such an objective would now likely require a massive, and perhaps
politically unacceptable, infusion of Russian military forces to realize. There may also be
financial considerations in that Russia does not want to incur major new expenses in the current
economic environment created by falling oil prices and Western sanctions as well as Russian
commitments in Syria. Nevertheless, given Putin’s past unpredictability, such a scenario cannot
be ruled out.
Russia has taken other steps against Ukraine, including imposing trade sanctions against
Ukrainian imports and cutting all gas and coal deliveries to Ukraine. Ukrainian government
computer servers have been hit by sophisticated cyberattacks, which some experts suggest may
have come from Russia.
EU and U.S. Sanctions
The United States and the European Union strongly condemned the Russian military invasion and
annexation of Crimea and Russia’s ongoing efforts to destabilize eastern Ukraine as violations of
international law. Since 2014, the United States, in coordination with the EU and other countries,
26 “Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine,” International Crisis Group Briefing No. 79, February 5, 2016.
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has imposed sanctions against Russia in order to increase the costs to Russia of its aggression,
with the objective of pressing it to implement a genuine political settlement with Ukraine.
On March 17, 2014, the day after Crimean authorities held a referendum on joining Russia, the
European Union imposed a visa ban and an asset freeze on 21 figures from Ukraine and Russia
who played roles in Russia’s seizure of Crimea. In March 2014 after President Putin signed an
agreement with Crimean leaders incorporating the region into Russia, the EU imposed sanctions
on 12 additional Russian figures. By May 2014, the EU had added at least 28 additional names of
Russian officials and two companies based in Crimea.
The EU list included some senior government officials and members of the Russian parliament,
but also fairly low-level figures directly involved in the Crimea operation and efforts to
destabilize Ukraine. In contrast to the United States, the EU has stopped short of sanctioning
Putin’s “inner circle” or key firms associated with them.27
For its part, the United States suspended most bilateral cooperation with Russia. On April 2,
2014, the Administration announced that it was suspending several projects planned under the
aegis of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission as well as some law enforcement
cooperation activities and planned to use that funding for aid instead to Ukraine. The United
States has also placed additional restrictions on defense-related exports to Russia.
In March 2014, the Administration issued an executive order imposing visa bans and asset freezes
against persons who “undermine democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threaten its
peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; and contribute to the
misappropriation of its assets.... ”28 The Administration then issued two additional executive
orders (EO) expanding the scope of the sanctions and announced visa bans and asset freezes
against several senior figures from Russia and the secessionist Crimean government. The EOs
permit the Administration to freeze the assets of persons working in key areas of the Russian
economy, including “financial services, energy, metals and mining, engineering, and defense and
related materiel.”
Observers have noted that sanctions have been crafted to reduce the economic harm to EU
countries, for example by not targeting the sensitive natural gas sector or the sale of dual-use
technologies to civilian firms. Since January 2015, the U.S. and EU have extended the sanctions
on individuals and entities three times. Current key sectoral sanctions are set to expire in June
2016, unless renewed again (for more details on additional sanctions imposed on Russia by the
EU and United States, see Appendix).
Relations with the United States
The United States established diplomatic relations with Ukraine in 1991, following its
independence from the Soviet Union. According to the U.S. Department of State, U.S. policy is
centered on strengthening a democratic, prosperous, and secure Ukraine more closely integrated
into Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures. The U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership,
27 For the sanctions decision and the initial list of names, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:32014D0145&rid=5. For the March 21 additions, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:32014D0151&rid=2. For the April 28 additions, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:32014D0238&rid=1. For the May 12 additions, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=
uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.137.01.0009.01.ENG.
28 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/06/executive-order-blocking-property-certain-persons-
contributing-situation.
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established in 2008, highlights the importance of the bilateral relationship and outlines enhanced
cooperation in the areas of defense, security, economics and trade, energy security, democracy,
and cultural exchanges. The United States has granted Ukraine market economy status giving
Ukraine permanent normal trade relations status. The United States and Ukraine have a bilateral
investment treaty. The U.S.-Ukraine Council on Trade and Investment was established under the
trade and investment cooperation initiative and works to increase commercial and investment
opportunities by identifying and removing impediments to bilateral trade and investment flows.29
According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Ukraine is the 80th largest trading
partner of the United States, with $2.2 billion in total trade in 2014. U.S. exports to Ukraine
include coal, machinery, vehicles, agricultural products, fish and seafood, and aircraft. U.S.
imports from Ukraine include iron and steel, inorganic chemicals, oil, aircraft, and agricultural
products. U.S. foreign direct investment in Ukraine amounted to $931 million in 2013 (latest year
data is available).
Since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine in late 2013, the focus of U.S. efforts has been to
support Ukraine’s efforts to reform and increase its cooperation and integration with the European
Union. The United States, in cooperation with the EU and international financial institutions, is
providing financial and technical assistance to Ukraine.
The United States has also provided non-lethal aid to Ukraine’s security sector, including its
army, but has declined so far to provide weapons to Ukraine, out of concern of escalating the
conflict with Russia and making a political settlement less likely. Nevertheless, President Obama
said in February 2015 that providing defensive weapons to Ukraine was an option the
Administration was continuing to consider if diplomatic efforts fail. In a late 2015 visit to
Ukraine, Vice President Biden, while restating U.S. support for Ukraine, warned that the
government had a window of opportunity to implement systemic changes to deepen reforms in all
aspects of life and at all levels of government but that Ukraine had to seize the moment and press
forward and deliver on the promise of the Maidan.30
U.S. Aid to Ukraine
According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) “Greenbook” website, the
United States obligated over $4 billion in aid to Ukraine from FY1990 through FY2012.31 Since
the crisis that began in late 2013, the United States has committed to provide over $548 million in
assistance to Ukraine, in addition to two $1 billion loan guarantees. With continued progress on
economic reforms and as conditions warrant, the Administration is likely to provide a third loan
guarantee of up to $1 billion, making the total U.S. commitment $3 billion.32 U.S. economic and
technical advisors advise almost a dozen Ukrainian ministries and localities.33
In its FY2017 budget request, the Administration asked for $192.4 million in Economic Support
Funds (ESF) for Ukraine to continue to address corruption, government reform, support for civil
society, and other initiatives. The Administration also requested $15 million in International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding to support justice and law enforcement
29 U.S. Department of State, Country Notes: Ukraine, 2015.
30 Vice President Biden’s meeting with Ukraine President Poroshenko.
31 See https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/.
32 See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9751.aspx.
33 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, Victoria Nuland, before the Senate Foreign
relations Committee, October 2015.
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reform. The request also included $2.9 million in International Military Education and Training
(IMET) funds and $42 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid for Ukraine from the
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account.34
U.S. technical assistance has been aimed at helping Ukraine stabilize its financial sector; carry out
reforms in the agricultural sector; improve the business climate; support constitutional reforms;
bolster civil society to participate and monitor the reform process; and support independent
media.
Assistance is also devoted to helping Ukraine develop laws and regulations to fight corruption,
one of Ukraine’s biggest challenges. Technical assistance is also being used to improve its energy
security, including by enhancing energy efficiency. In addition, the United States aid also
provides humanitarian assistance to Ukraine in cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other international organizations to improve Ukraine’s ability to assist
internally displaced persons (IDP). U.S. aid has been used by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
and Voice of America to produce Russian-language news broadcasts that are aired in Ukraine.
U.S. aid has also gone to helping bolster Ukraine’s security sector. The assistance includes
providing body armor, helmets, vehicles, night and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering
equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats, rations, tents, counter-mortar radars, uniforms, and first
aid equipment and supplies.35
In February 2015, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges announced that a U.S. Army battalion has
been training Ukrainian forces in Poland, including on how to operate against Russian electronic
warfare and how to protect themselves from Russian and rebel artillery.
Some critics have claimed that U.S. military aid had been slow to arrive in Ukraine due to
bureaucratic impediments. Moreover, some Members of Congress have expressed support for
going beyond the non-lethal support given by the United States so far to provide “defensive
weapons” such as man-portable anti-tank weapons. Other suggested assistance includes
additional non-lethal items, such as secure communications equipment, reconnaissance drones,
and radars capable of tracking longer-range heavy artillery, not just mortars.36
Congressional Response to Ukraine Crisis
The U.S. Congress has been an active participant in the effort to address the Ukraine crisis. As
early as January 2014, the Senate passed S.Res. 319. Among other provisions, the resolution
urged the United States and the EU to work together to promote a peaceful resolution of the crisis
that moves Ukraine toward a future in the Euro-Atlantic community; encouraged all parties to
avoid violence and engage in dialogue; and stated that, in the event of further government
violence against peaceful protestors, the President and Congress should consider whether to apply
targeted sanctions, including visa bans and asset freezes, against individuals responsible for
ordering or carrying out the violence. On February 10, 2014, the House passed H.Res. 447 by a
vote of 381-2. The resolution, contained provisions broadly similar to those of S.Res. 319,
including raising the possibility of sanctions against Ukrainian leaders if they use violence against
protestors.
34 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236395.pdf
35 See Congressional Budget Justification Fiscal Year 2017, Department of State, February 9, 2016.
36 For a report by former senior U.S. officials advocating U.S. defensive arms for Ukraine, see
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/UkraineReport_February2015_FINAL.pdf.
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Several other pieces of legislation were adopted by the House and Senate over the period of the
crisis, including urging NATO allies and European Union member states to immediately suspend
military cooperation with Russia; to adopt visa, financial, trade, and other sanctions on senior
Russian and Ukrainian officials and oligarchs complicit in Russia’s intervention and interference
in Ukraine; requiring the U.S. government to assist Ukraine to recover assets stolen by the
previous regime through corruption; requiring Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty and Voice of
American to start a programming “surge” to provide accurate information to eastern Ukraine,
Crimea, and Moldova in order to counteract inflammatory Russian propaganda; authorizing
increased military and economic assistance for Ukraine; and authorizing support for Russian civil
society and democracy organizations.
Perhaps the most important piece of legislation passed near the end of the 113th Congress was the
Ukrainian Freedom Support Act (P.L. 113-272). In it Congress called on the President to increase
the pressure on Russia by targeting Rosoboronexport and Gazprom, and prohibiting Export-
Import Bank programs, government procurement contracts, exports of arms and dual-use goods
and services, access to property, the U.S. banking system, or entry into the United States. The act
also authorized the President to target Russian financial institutions and foreign financial
institutions that engaged in Russia’s defense and energy sectors. At its signing, the President
stated that while he did not intend to make use of the additional authorities, he would continue to
work with international allies to respond to developments in Ukraine.
One issue that sparked significant Congressional debate was whether the United States should
supply defensive weapons to Ukraine. In February 2015, a bipartisan group of 15 Senators sent a
letter to President Obama urging him to act on the authorization provided by the Ukrainian
Freedom Support Act to supply an “immediate infusion of effective defensive military equipment
and financial aid to thwart Putin’s naked aggression. Defensive military assistance—such as anti-
tank weapons, counter-battery radars, armored Humvees, and increased training—are all critical
to ensuring Ukraine has the capabilities to defend its territory and its citizens.”37
Advocates of arming Ukraine stated that sanctions alone were unlikely to stop Russian aggression
and that boosting Ukraine’s defense capabilities were essential to stop further Russian conquest of
Ukrainian territory and to pressure Putin to agree to a genuine peace agreement. Those opposed to
arming Ukraine argued that Putin could use the move as an excuse to escalate the conflict beyond
the desire to respond, thereby increasing the level of violence. Some experts concluded that
escalation could have resulted in a new Cold War, eliminating the possibility for U.S.-Russian
cooperation on key issues elsewhere. Others felt it would also split Western unity on Russia
policy as France and Germany were strongly opposed to arming the Ukrainians.38
Outlook
While the intensity of the fighting between Russian-supported pro-separatists and the Ukrainian
military along the demarcation line has significantly receded, sporadic fighting has occurred, and
fatalities/casualties continue to result. In addition, not all of the rebel-held medium and heavy
military weapons have been completely withdrawn, and there have been periodic reports that
weapons and ammunition continue to cross into eastern Ukraine from Russia. Nevertheless, many
37 See http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-portman-lead-bipartisan-senators-calling-for-
increased-military-assistance-to-ukraine.
38 See for example http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/02/06-aiding-ukrainian-military-goad-putin-war-
gaddy-hill.
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analysts believe that the resumption of large-scale fighting in eastern Ukraine is not likely in the
short term, at least not until President Putin feels he can turn his attention back to Ukraine once
his objectives in Syria begin to be realized.
On the other hand, the pro-separatist rebels in the Donbas do not seem to be moving forward at
all in implementing their parts of the Minsk-2 agreement. Although elections are supposed to take
place in the disputed territory, it appears unlikely at this time that the pro-separatists will allow a
totally free or fair election. It appears unlikely that pro-Kyiv political candidates will actually be
permitted to campaign in the region nor, does it seem, that the separatists will allow government
officials from Kyiv into the region to help organize the elections, print ballots, and monitor
polling places. And, although President Putin apparently told the Normandy Group that the OSCE
would have total access to the area to monitor the elections, many seem doubtful that the rebels
will allow such access to all voting places or guarantee the election observers safety.
In Kyiv, two challenges face the government. First is the growing discord among the governing
coalition and others, between those who do not want to implement parts of Minsk-2 or
accommodate the separatists at all and those who want to keep the process moving forward as
long as the other side appears willing to do so. The second appears to be the reemergence of
powerful oligarchs, and others with entrenched interests in not seeing too much change,
attempting in subtle ways to derail the reformist agenda. By the beginning of 2016, both
challenges threatened the ability of the Poroshenko/Yatsenyuk government to address other
pressing reforms. This intensified infighting within the government and the Rada and the growing
resistance to reform by some influential figures close to the government resulted in the call for the
resignation of Yatsenyuk as prime minister, including by Poroshenko himself. The failure of the
close vote on a no-confidence motion saved Yatsenyuk for the moment. However, with little
public confidence in his willingness to seriously tackle some of the oligarchs who seem to be the
root cause of much of the corruption, and Poroshenko’s supposed loss of support for the prime
minister, the stage could be set for a potentially significant period of instability and the possible
necessity for a new national election, which could stall important legislation as well as the overall
reform process.
All of this, whether it is the internal political dynamics in Kyiv or the evolution of a “frozen
conflict” in the east, makes it more difficult for the government in Kyiv to address political
reform, corruption, and economic growth. If the current government shows weakness or loses its
base of power and thus its ability to get things done, a new political crisis could arise among the
frustrated general public, which is becoming increasingly skeptical of the ability of any political
figures in Kyiv to significantly address problems facing the country. Any such political crisis
could also result in a slowing of the implementation of Minsk-2 and further movement toward a
“frozen conflict” in the east in which Russia would be able to manipulate the intensity of political
unrest and future fighting in order to further hinder Ukraine’s economic and political
consolidation, as well as its integration with the West.
According to some, the growing political crisis in Kyiv could tempt Moscow to make further
efforts to undermine Kyiv’s efforts to reform the country and pose substantial risks for the
interests of the United States and the EU to promote stability, security and economic development
in Ukraine.39
39 Steven Pifer, “Crisis over Ukraine,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 2015.
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Appendix. U.S. Sanctions on Russia
After an initial round of sanctions imposed on Russia for its annexation of Crimea and military
activity in eastern Ukraine, the United States and the EU continued to add additional travel
freezes, visa restrictions, and economic sanctions on Russia for its failure to cease its support for
the pro-separatists actions in the Donbas regions of eastern Ukraine.
On March 20, 2014, the Administration announced asset freezes on 16 high-ranking Russian
government officials and members of parliament. Four additional persons, all wealthy
businessmen, were sanctioned as members of Putin’s “inner circle.” One bank, Bank Rossiya,
was also sanctioned due to its role as the personal bank of senior Russian officials.40
On April 28, the Administration imposed asset freezes on an additional seven senior Russian
officials. They include Igor Sechin, the president of Rosneft, Russia’s leading oil company, and
former chief of staff to Putin. The Administration also sanctioned 17 entities, including banks and
other businesses. The companies appear to have been chosen due to their links to sanctioned
persons in Putin’s inner circle, such as energy trader Genneddy Timchenko and bankers Arkady
and Boris Rotenberg, or to Bank Rossiya.41 Due to privacy laws, the names of those receiving
visa bans have not been made public, but it is likely that they include those persons under asset
freezes.
On July 16, 2014, the United States imposed sanctions unilaterally on key firms in Russia’s
financial, energy, and military technology sectors—including Gazprombank, Vnesheconombank
(VEB), Novatek, and Rosneft. U.S. firms and persons are barred from dealing in new equity or
loans of greater than 90 days maturity for these companies. On July 27, the Administration
responded by adding Bank of Moscow, VTB Bank, and Russian Agricultural Bank to the list of
companies with restricted access to U.S. capital markets. In addition, the U.S. assets of United
Shipbuilding Company were frozen.
In September 2014, in response to a separatist offensive in Ukraine supported by Russian combat
troops, the United States imposed sanctions against additional key Russian companies, including
Transneft, Lukoil, Gazprom Neft, Rostec, Surgutneftegaz, and Sberbank.42
On December 19, 2014, the President issued an executive order to bar any U.S. person from
participating in new investment in Crimea; imports from and exports to the Crimea region; and
any financing, facilitation, or guarantee of any related transaction by a U.S. person.43
After the Malaysian Airlines tragedy on July 17, 2014, the EU largely matched and even in some
cases went beyond U.S. sanctions. On July 22, EU foreign ministers agreed to expand Ukraine-
related sanctions against Russia by adding individuals and companies to the existing travel ban
and asset freeze list, including some persons in Putin’s inner circle.
40 For a list of Russian figures sanctioned in March, see http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl23331.aspx. For the text of the executive order greatly expanding the scope of sanctions, see
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/20/executive-order-blocking-property-additional-persons-
contributing-situation.
41 For a list of Russian figures sanctioned in April, see http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl2369.aspx.
42 See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20140912.aspx.
43 For more on U.S. sanctions on Russia, see CRS Report IN10048, U.S. Sanctions on Russia in Response to Events in
Ukraine, coordinated by Dianne E. Rennack. For more on the economic impact of sanctions on Russia, see CRS Report
R43895, U.S. Sanctions on Russia: Economic Implications, by Rebecca M. Nelson.
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On July 29, the EU agreed to impose sanctions on Russia’s financial, defense, and energy sectors.
These sanctions were strengthened in September, in response to a massive Russian-supported
offensive in Ukraine. The sanctions barred EU nationals and companies from providing loans to
five major Russian state-owned banks and barred trade in new bonds, equity, or similar financial
instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued by the same banks. The same restrictions
were also extended to three major Russian defense companies and three major energy companies.
The EU banned certain services necessary for deep water oil exploration and production, Arctic
oil exploration or production, and shale oil projects in Russia. The EU has also banned exporting
dual-use goods and technology for military use in Russia. The EU also added new persons to its
travel ban and asset freeze list.
In December 2014, the EU banned or restricted most European investment, trade, and tourism
with Russian-occupied Crimea. As of January 2015, the EU has sanctions on 150 persons and 28
entities. The EU is currently considering additional sanctions in response to Russian support for a
separatist offensive in eastern Ukraine in January and February 2015.
In an announcement published in the U.S. Federal Register on September 2, 2015, the U.S.
Administration said it was adding 29 people to its sanctions list. Some of those added have ties to
Kremlin-linked insiders and companies who were previously sanctioned, including Gennady
Timchenko, a wealthy oil trader believed to be close to President Vladimir Putin.
A total of 33 companies or other entities were cited, including subsidiaries of state-owned oil
giant Rosneft, headed by Putin ally Igor Sechin, and the company that manufactures Kalashnikov
assault rifles.
Author Contact Information
Vincent L. Morelli
Section Research Manager
vmorelli@crs.loc.gov, 7-8051
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