The Federal Cybersecurity Workforce:
Background and Congressional Oversight
Issues for the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security
Kathryn A. Francis
Analyst in Government Organization and Management
Wendy Ginsberg
Analyst in American National Government
January 8, 2016
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R44338
The Federal Cybersecurity Workforce: Background and Congressional Oversight Issues
Summary
The federal cybersecurity workforce is responsible for protecting U.S. government systems and
networks against cyber threats and attacks. Federal agencies, however, have reported difficulty in
assessing the size and capabilities of their cybersecurity workforces. DOD and DHS, which play
prominent roles in the nation’s cybersecurity posture, have also noted certain obstacles affecting
the recruitment and retention of qualified cybersecurity professionals to fulfill their departments’
cybersecurity missions.
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is constructing a dataset to catalog all federal
cybersecurity positions in the executive branch. The dataset had not been released to Congress or
the public. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed agencies to
identify their top five cyber talent gaps by December 31, 2015. Congress has also authorized
hiring and pay flexibilities that can be used to fill cybersecurity positions at DOD and DHS. The
flexibilities aim to enhance the recruitment and retention of cybersecurity professionals by
expediting the federal hiring process and providing such professionals with monetary incentives
that are not available to all federal employees. OPM has also established temporary hiring
flexibilities for certain DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions.
Congress, pursuant to its oversight authority, might seek to increase its awareness and knowledge
of these initiatives. OPM is not required to report to Congress on agencies’ progress in coding
their federal cybersecurity positions or in completing the agency’s cybersecurity dataset. Further,
DOD and DHS are not required to report on the use or effectiveness of certain hiring and pay
flexibilities for cybersecurity positions. Congress may find it difficult to identify potential
implementation issues, such as (1) conflicting efforts to define and identify the federal
cybersecurity workforce, (2) discrepancies between the intended and actual use of hiring and pay
flexibilities, and (3) measuring the overall effectiveness of the flexibilities.
Congress could consider enhancing its oversight of executive branch initiatives to define and
identify federal cybersecurity positions by (1) requiring OPM to notify Congress of its progress
on completing the cybersecurity dataset, and (2) directing the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to evaluate the operation and effectiveness of the cybersecurity workforce dataset upon its
completion. Congress could also enhance its oversight of the implementation of hiring and pay
flexibilities for DOD and DHS by (1) conforming reporting requirements among the three laws
governing hiring and pay flexibilities, (2) requiring additional reporting on the use of certain
flexibilities, (3) directing DOD and DHS, or GAO, to evaluate the effectiveness of the hiring and
pay flexibilities, and (4) requiring DOD and DHS human resources staff to receive training on the
structure and operation of the flexibilities.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background on the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce .................................................................... 2
Defining the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce ........................................................................ 2
Challenges to Developing and Maintaining the Workforce ...................................................... 3
Executive Branch Efforts to Define and Identify the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce ................ 4
The National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework ................................................................. 4
Cybersecurity Data Codes ......................................................................................................... 5
Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Dataset................................................................................. 6
Cybersecurity Workforce Skills Gap Assessments .................................................................... 6
Efforts to Define and Identify the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Through Legislation ............ 7
Selected Hiring and Pay Flexibilities Applicable to DOD and DHS Cybersecurity
Positions ....................................................................................................................................... 9
Selected Hiring and Pay Flexibilities Authorized by Statute .................................................. 10
Selected OPM-Issued Hiring Flexibilities ................................................................................ 11
Key Functions of Hiring and Pay Flexibilities ........................................................................ 12
Hiring Flexibilities: Excepted Service Designation .......................................................... 12
Pay Flexibilities: Additional Compensation ..................................................................... 13
Analysis of Selected Statutory Provisions for Hiring and Pay Flexibilities ............................ 15
Probationary Period .......................................................................................................... 15
Implementation Plan ......................................................................................................... 16
Reporting Requirements ................................................................................................... 16
Congressional Oversight Issues ..................................................................................................... 16
Identifying and Defining the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce ............................................. 16
Potential Conflicting Efforts to Assess the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce ................. 17
Utility of Hiring and Pay Flexibilities .............................................................................. 17
Issues Related to Hiring and Pay Flexibilities for DOD and DHS Cybersecurity
Positions ............................................................................................................................... 17
Lack of Data on Use of Certain Cybersecurity Hiring Flexibilities at DOD and
DHS ............................................................................................................................... 18
Effectiveness of Hiring and Pay Flexibilities.................................................................... 19
Training on Structure and Use of Flexibilities .................................................................. 19
Oversight Policy Options .............................................................................................................. 19
1. Notification of Progress on OPM Cybersecurity Dataset ................................................... 20
2. GAO Evaluation of OPM Cybersecurity Dataset................................................................ 20
3. Conform Reporting Requirements for DOD and DHS Flexibilities ................................... 20
4. Additional Data on DOD Flexibilities ................................................................................. 21
5. Additional Data on OPM-Issued Flexibilities ..................................................................... 21
6. Training for DOD and DHS Staff on Flexibilities .............................................................. 21
7. Report on the Effectiveness of Hiring and Pay Flexibilities ............................................... 22
Figures
Figure 1. The National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework ........................................................ 5
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Figure 2. Timeline for Building and Using OPM’s Cybersecurity Dataset ..................................... 7
Tables
Table 1. Comparison of Laws and OPM/OMB Efforts to Identify, Code, and Assess
Federal Cybersecurity Positions ................................................................................................... 8
Table 2. Statutory Authorities Governing Selected Hiring and Pay Flexibilities Applicable
to DOD and DHS Cybersecurity Positions ................................................................................ 10
Table 3. OPM-Issued Hiring Flexibilities for Cybersecurity Positions ......................................... 12
Appendixes
Appendix A. Side-by-Side Analysis of Selected Provisions from Statutory Authorities for
DOD Intelligence, DHS Cybersecurity, and DOD Positions at the U.S. Cyber
Command ................................................................................................................................... 23
Appendix B. Reporting Requirements .......................................................................................... 25
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 26
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Introduction
Cybersecurity refers to a broad set of concepts for which there is no standard definition—it often
varies by the entity employing it. DHS, for example, has defined cybersecurity as “the activity or
process, ability or capability, or state whereby information and communications systems and the
information contained therein are protected from and/or defended against damage, unauthorized
use or modification, or exploitation.”1 The Committee on National Security Systems has defined
a “cyber attack” as
An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the purpose of
disrupting,
disabling,
destroying,
or
maliciously
controlling
a
computing
environment/infrastructure; or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing controlled
information. 2
Strengthening federal cybersecurity has been a priority for Congress and the executive branch for
several years.3 The focus on cybersecurity has increased since the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) data intrusion was revealed in June 2015, which heightened concerns about
vulnerabilities within the government’s systems and networks.4
All federal agencies have responsibilities for protecting their individual systems and networks
under federal law.5 Some agencies, such as DHS and DOD, possess broader cybersecurity roles
compared to other agencies. DHS has responsibility for protecting unclassified federal civilian
systems and networks and assisting agencies in responding to cyber threats and attacks.6 DHS is
also the lead agency for coordinating with the private sector to protect critical cyber infrastructure
assets.7 DOD is responsible for defending the nation against cyberattacks of “significant
consequence,” as well as conducting military operations in cyberspace.8 DOD is also responsible
for assisting DHS in fulfilling its government-wide cybersecurity roles.9
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (hereafter DHS) “Explore Terms: A Glossary of Common Cybersecurity
Terminology,” at https://niccs.us-cert.gov/glossary. For more information on the definition of cybersecurity, see CRS
Report R43831, Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief, by Eric A. Fischer.
2 Committee on National Security Systems, National Information Assurance Glossary, CNSS Instruction No. 4009,
April 26, 2010, p. 22, at http://www.ncsc.gov/nittf/docs/CNSSI-4009_National_Information_Assurance.pdf.
3 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (hereafter GAO) added “security of federal cyber assets” to its high-risk
list in 1997, and has since added protecting cyber critical infrastructure (2003) and the personally identifiable
information (2015). See GAO, “High Risk List, Ensuring the Security of Federal Information Systems and Cyber
Critical Infrastructure and Protecting the Privacy of Personally Identifiable Information,” February 2015, at
http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/protecting_the_federal_government_information_systems/why_did_study#t=0.
4 For more information on the OPM data intrusion, see CRS Report R44111, Cyber Intrusion into U.S. Office of
Personnel Management: In Brief, coordinated by Kristin Finklea.
5 CRS has compiled a list of laws that govern the federal role in cybersecurity. See CRS Report R42114, Federal Laws
Relating to Cybersecurity: Overview of Major Issues, Current Laws, and Proposed Legislation, by Eric A. Fischer.
6 DHS, “Preventing and Defending Against Cyber Attacks,” October 2011, at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/preventing-and-defending-against-cyber-attacks-october-2011.pdf.
7 Executive Office of the President, “Executive Order—Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” February 12,
2013, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-
cybersecurity; Executive Office of the President, “Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience,” February 12, 2013, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-
directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil.
8 U.S. Department of Defense (hereafter DOD), National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, December
2006, PDF p. 14, at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-023.pdf; DOD, The DOD Cyber
Strategy, April 2015, pp. 4-5 and 25, at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-
(continued...)
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The federal cybersecurity workforce plays an integral role in maintaining and improving the
government’s cybersecurity. Cybersecurity professionals10 are responsible for designing and
building secure information networks and systems, identifying and addressing vulnerabilities
within those networks and systems, and collecting and analyzing data necessary to respond to
cyber attacks efficiently and effectively, among other things. Federal stakeholders and researchers
have stated that robust federal cybersecurity is not possible without cybersecurity professionals.11
Developing and maintaining a robust federal cybersecurity workforce, however, has been an
ongoing challenge. The Chief Human Capital Officers Council Working Group found skills gaps
in cybersecurity positions (and other positions) government-wide, which prompted the Obama
Administration to create a Cross-Agency Priority (CAP) to reduce those gaps by half by the end
of FY2013.12 According to a January 2015 GAO report, however, efforts to close these
cybersecurity gaps were at an “early stage of maturity.”13
This report examines congressional oversight of two strategies undertaken by Congress and the
executive branch to strengthen the federal cybersecurity workforce: (1) initiatives to define and
identify the federal cybersecurity workforce, and (2) hiring and pay flexibilities applicable to
cybersecurity positions at DOD and DHS. This report focuses on DOD and DHS because of their
key roles in federal cybersecurity and because the majority of hiring and pay flexibilities for
cybersecurity professionals authorized by Congress apply to DOD and DHS.
Background on the Federal Cybersecurity
Workforce
Defining the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce
Cybersecurity functions are embedded within a wide range of federal positions that span more
than 100 federal occupational series (see the text box below for a definition of occupational
series).14 The specific cybersecurity functions undertaken within an occupation series often vary
by agency. For example, one DHS position in the 2210 occupation series that performs
cybersecurity functions is responsible for identifying vulnerabilities and weaknesses within IT
(...continued)
strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf. Examples of attacks of significant consequence
include those that can result in the loss of life or serious economic impact to the United States.
9 Ibid. For more information on DOD’s cybersecurity responsibilities, see CRS Report R43848, Cyber Operations in
DOD Policy and Plans: Issues for Congress, by Catherine A. Theohary.
10 The terms “cybersecurity professional” and “cybersecurity employee” are used interchangeably in this report.
11 See, for example, GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiative Need Better Planning and Coordination,
November 2011, p. 3, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586494.pdf.
12 GAO, “High Risk List, Strategic Human Capital Management,” at
http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/strategic_human_management/why_did_study#t=1; Executive Office of the President,
“Cross-Agency Priority Goal, Closing Skills Gaps, FY2013 Q4 update,” pp. 1-2, at
http://goals.performance.gov/content/closing-skills-gaps. The CAP goal included other mission-critical occupations
identified as facing skills gaps, such as acquisition and economist positions.
13 GAO, Federal Workforce, OPM and Agencies Need to Strengthen Efforts to Identify and Close Mission-Critical
Skills Gaps, GAO-15-223, January 2015, p. 15, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668202.pdf.
14OPM, “A Strategic Perspective on the Federal Cybersecurity Work Function,” November 2014, p. 10, at
https://www.fbcinc.com/e/nice/ncec/presentations/NICE2014_Antone.pdf.
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systems and developing procedures to defend against unauthorized access to the systems.15 A
different DHS position in the 2210 occupation series that performs cybersecurity functions, in
contrast, is responsible for evaluating and responding to cyber incidents.16
OPM Occupational Series
An occupation series includes groups of federal positions that perform similar work and require similar qualifications.
For example, the Information Technology (IT) Management occupation series (2210) includes positions that “manage,
supervise, lead, administer, develop, deliver, and support information technology systems and services” and require
knowledge of IT principles, concepts, and methods.17 A 2011 GAO report on the federal cybersecurity workforce
identified several occupational series that typically undertake cybersecurity responsibilities, including (but not limited
to) information technology management, general engineering, and intelligence.18
The full range of federal positions that undertake cybersecurity responsibilities is challenging to
assess. Researchers have found that agencies have experienced difficulty in accurately defining
and measuring their cybersecurity workforces.19 For example, a 2011 GAO report found wide
disparities in counts of DOD cybersecurity employees—88,159 employees reported by GAO,
compared to 18,955 reported by OPM. The GAO report partly attributed these inconsistent counts
to the lack of a standard definition of a cybersecurity employee.20
Challenges to Developing and Maintaining the Workforce
Federal stakeholders and researchers have reported ongoing challenges to developing and
maintaining a robust federal cybersecurity workforce. Commonly reported challenges are listed
below and include government-wide and agency-specific concerns:
demand outstripping supply for cybersecurity professionals in the federal
government and difficulty filling vacant cybersecurity positions;21
skills gaps in cybersecurity positions;22 and
15 The vacancy announcement for the position is closed, but as of January 8, 2016, could still be viewed at
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/PrintPreview/412242100.
16The vacancy announcement for the position is closed, but as of January 8, 2016, could still be viewed at
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/PrintPreview/412534800.
17 OPM, “Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families,” May 2009, pp. 120-121, at https://www.opm.gov/policy-
data-oversight/classification-qualifications/classifying-general-schedule-positions/occupationalhandbook.pdf.
18 GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiatives Need Better Planning and Coordination, GAO-12-8, November 29,
2011, p. 14.
19 See, for example, ibid., pp. 12-13 and 15.
20 Ibid., p. 13 and 15. The OPM count was conducted in 2010, whereas the GAO count was conducted in 2011. It is
unclear if the OPM statistic included contractors. Research has indicated that contractors perform a notable proportion
of cybersecurity work for agencies. For example, data from an OMB report indicated that approximately 33% of “IT
Security” FTEs at agencies were contractors. For more information, see OMB, Report to Congress on Implementation
of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, March 2013, p. 55, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/egov_docs/fy12_fisma.pdf.
21 RAND Corporation, “Shortage of Cybersecurity Professionals Poses Risk to National Security,” June 18, 2014, at
http://www.rand.org/news/press/2014/06/18.html. Partnership for Public Service, Cyber In-Security II, Closing the
Federal Talent Gap, April 2015, pp. 1 and 10. GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiatives Need Better Planning
and Coordination, GAO-12-8, November 29, 2011, pp. 20-21. RAND indicated that demand will likely be met over
time due to an increased number of cybersecurity training and education programs. The GAO report notes that some
agencies were able to fill needed cybersecurity positions, while others experienced challenges to filling such positions.
22 GAO, Federal Workforce: OPM and Agencies Need to Strengthen Efforts to Identify and Close Mission-Critical
Skills Gaps, GAO-15-223, January 30, 2015, pp. 2 and 15.
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agency strategic workforce plans that do not specifically address cybersecurity
workforce needs.23
DOD and DHS have reported recruitment and retention challenges for their cybersecurity
workforces, including an inadequate number of qualified cybersecurity professionals.24 DOD and
DHS have partly attributed these challenges to the following factors:
Federal hiring process – DOD noted that the length and complexity of the
hiring process may deter cybersecurity professionals from pursuing federal
careers.25
General Schedule (GS) pay system – DHS and other agencies believed that the
GS system placed them at a competitive disadvantage for attracting cyber talent,
noting that other agencies using non-GS systems were able to pay cybersecurity
professionals higher salaries.26
Federal security clearance process – DOD and DHS cited the amount of time
required to obtain security clearances for new employees as a barrier to filling
cybersecurity positions.27
Executive Branch Efforts to Define and Identify the
Federal Cybersecurity Workforce
The executive branch has several initiatives to define and identify the federal cybersecurity
workforce: (1) the national cybersecurity workforce framework, (2) cybersecurity data codes, and
(3) a federal cybersecurity workforce dataset. Laws aiming to define and identify the workforce
mandate the use of these initiatives.
The National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework
In November 2011, the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), within the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), released the national cybersecurity
workforce framework.28 The framework provides a consistent way to define and describe
23 GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiatives Need Better Planning and Coordination, GAO-12-8, November 29,
2011, pp. 8-11.
24 Ibid., p. 21; GAO, Defense Department Cyber Efforts, DOD Faces Challenges In Its Cyber Activities, GAO-11-75,
July 2011, pp. 8-9, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321818.pdf; GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiatives
Need Better Planning and Coordination, GAO-12-8, November 29, 2011, p. 21; GAO, DHS Is Generally Filling
Mission-Critical Positions, But Could Better Track Costs of Coordinated Recruiting Efforts, GAO-13-742, September
2013, p. 24, at http://gao.gov/assets/660/657902.pdf; Homeland Security Advisory Council, CyberSkills Task Force
Report, Fall 2012, p. 5, at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSAC%20CyberSkills%20Report%20-
%20Final.pdf.
25 GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiatives Need Better Planning and Coordination, GAO-12-8, November 29,
2011, pp. 21-22.
26 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
27 Ibid. pp. 24-25; GAO, DHS Is Generally Filling Mission-Critical Positions, But Could Better Track Costs of
Coordinated Recruiting Efforts, GAO-13-742, September 2013, p. 24. For more information on the federal security
clearance process, see CRS Report R43216, Security Clearance Process: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by
Michelle D. Christensen and Frederick M. Kaiser.
28 National Institute of Standards and Technology (hereafter NIST), “NICE Issues Cybersecurity Workforce
Framework for Public Comment,” November 8, 2011, at http://www.nist.gov/itl/cyberwork-110811.cfm.
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cybersecurity work at any public or private organization, including federal agencies.29 The
framework classifies and categorizes cybersecurity work under specialty areas, which are grouped
into seven categories (Figure 1 illustrates these specialty areas and categories).30 Within each
specialty area, the framework defines standard duties and competencies for cybersecurity
professionals, as well as job titles that typically involve such duties.
Figure 1. The National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework
(as illustrated by the Partnership for Public Service)
Source: The figure is excerpted from Partnership for Public Service, Cyber In-Security II, Closing the Federal Talent
Gap, April 2015, p. 8.
Cybersecurity Data Codes
In October 2012, OPM, in coordination with NIST, published a coding structure for federal
cybersecurity positions based on the national cybersecurity workforce framework.31 The structure
assigns unique numeric codes to each of the seven categories and specialty areas within the
framework and three new categories not included in the framework: (1) Cybersecurity
Program/Project Management; (2) Cybersecurity Supervision, Management, and Leadership; and
(3) Not Applicable.32 The codes are intended to allow OPM and agencies to identify and
29 DHS, National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (hereafter NICCS), “National Cybersecurity
Workforce Framework,” at https://niccs.us-cert.gov/training/national-cybersecurity-workforce-framework. The
framework was developed in collaboration with other federal agencies and private sector representatives.
30 DHS, NICCS, “National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework,” at https://niccs.us-cert.gov/training/tc/framework.
31 OPM, “The Use and Usefulness of the Cybersecurity Data Element,” December 6, 2012, PDF p. 2, at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/documents/december2012presentations/dec2012_cybersec_data_element.pdf.
32 OPM, The Guide to Data Standards, Part A: Human Resources, November 15, 2014, PDF pp. 104-110, at
http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/data-policy-guidance/reporting-guidance/part-
a-human-resources.pdf. The guide includes procedures on how to properly assign the data codes to federal positions.
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categorize all federal cybersecurity positions,33 thereby laying the groundwork for a consistent
government-wide count of the federal cybersecurity workforce.
Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Dataset
In June 2013, OPM launched an initiative to build and use a comprehensive dataset of existing
and future executive branch cybersecurity positions.34 The initiative, known as the Special
Cybersecurity Workforce Project, was created to support the FY2013 Cross-Agency Priority
(CAP) goal to close cybersecurity workforce skills gaps.35 The project includes three phases:
1. build a dataset of all federal cybersecurity positions,
2. assess the accuracy of data contained therein, and
3. use the dataset to identify and address needs of the federal cybersecurity
workforce.36
To support construction of the dataset, OPM directed agencies to assign OPM cybersecurity data
codes to their positions. As of November 2015, roughly 95% of all federal positions (not just
cybersecurity positions), and 96% of positions in the 2210 occupation series, had been assigned
an OPM cybersecurity data code.37 The OPM dataset, as well as a government-wide count of the
federal cybersecurity workforce, however, has not been released to the public. OPM staff did not
indicate when the dataset would be available on OPM’s online workforce data portal, noting that
the release date will depend on the accuracy of the data.38
Cybersecurity Workforce Skills Gap Assessments
On October 30, 2015, OMB issued the Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP).39
The CSIP directs agencies to, among other things, complete the following activities to identify
skills gaps in the federal cybersecurity workforce:
1. All agencies—identify their top five cyber talent gaps using OPM’s cybersecurity
dataset.40
2. OPM, DHS, and OMB—issue a report that maps “the entire cyber workforce
landscape across all agencies using the NICE national cybersecurity workforce
framework and identify cyber talent gaps and recommendations for closing
them.”41
33 Ibid., PDF p. 104.
34 OPM, memorandum from Elaine Kaplan, OPM Acting Director, to the heads of executive departments and agencies,
“Special Cybersecurity Workforce Project,” July 8, 2013, at https://www.chcoc.gov/content/special-cybersecurity-
workforce-project.
35Ibid.
36 OPM, “A Strategic Perspective on the Federal Cybersecurity Work Function,” November 2014, pp. 4 and 6.
37 Information provided to CRS from OPM staff via email on November 17, 2015.
38 Ibid.
39 U.S. Office of Management and Budget (hereafter OMB), memorandum from Shaun Donovan, Director of OMB,
and Tony Scott, Federal Chief Information Officer, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
“Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP) for the Federal Civilian Government,” M-16-04, October 30,
2015, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2016/m-16-04.pdf.
40 Ibid., p. 18.
41 Ibid., p. 19.
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Figure 2, below, includes key activities for OPM’s cybersecurity dataset initiative and related
CSIP activities. OPM has completed Phase 1, anticipates completing Phase 2 by March 31, 2016,
and anticipates beginning Phase 3 during the “latter part of FY2016.”42 These CSIP activities may
accelerate planned implementation of Phase 3, as they require agencies to use the dataset for
workforce planning purposes.
Figure 2. Timeline for Building and Using OPM’s Cybersecurity Dataset
Source: CRS analysis of OPM Special Cybersecurity Workforce Project documents and OMB’s Cybersecurity
Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP); information provided to CRS from OPM staff via email on July 28,
2015, and November 17, 2015.
Notes: The graphic includes certain activities from the CSIP, which are not part of OPM’s original goals for the
dataset initiative. The graphic is not exhaustive and may not capture the ful range of activities for each phase.
Efforts to Define and Identify the Federal
Cybersecurity Workforce Through Legislation
Two laws include provisions that aim to define and identify federal cybersecurity positions:
3. The Border Patrol Pay Agent Reform Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-277)43
4. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113)44
42 Information provided to CRS from OPM staff via email on November 17, 2015.
43 Enacted on December 18, 2014.
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The laws codify, and in some ways enhance, OPM’s ongoing efforts to define and code federal
cybersecurity positions since 2013. The laws also enhance OMB’s efforts to assess agencies’
cybersecurity workforce capabilities. Broadly, the laws require all agencies to (1) assign data
codes to all cybersecurity positions according to the national cybersecurity workforce framework;
(2) conduct critical needs assessments for identified cyber positions; and (3) submit progress
reports on completing these tasks. Table 1, below, compares efforts to define, identify, and assess
federal cybersecurity positions between the laws and the OPM/OMB directives described above.
Table 1. Comparison of Laws and OPM/OMB Efforts to Identify, Code, and Assess
Federal Cybersecurity Positions
P.L. 114-113, Division
OPM directive
P.L. 113-277, Sec. 4
OMB directive
N,
Requirement
(Jul 2013)
(Dec 2014)
(Oct 2015)
Title III (Dec 2015)
Identification &
Agencies to assign
DHS to assign OPM
Agencies to
Agencies to assign OPM
coding
OPM
cybersecurity data
participate in OPM’s
cybersecurity data codes,
cybersecurity data
codes to all
cybersecurity dataset in coordination with NIST,
codes to all
cybersecurity
project and report all to all cybersecurity
cybersecurity
positions no later than cybersecurity
positions no later than one
positions by
nine months after the
positions to OPM by
year after the
December 31,
date of enactment
December 31, 2015.
establishment of code
2015.
(September 2015).
assignment procedures.
Baseline skills
No requirement.
No requirement.
No requirement.
Provide baseline skills
assessment
assessments of agencies’
cybersecurity workforces,
including (1) the
percentage of
cybersecurity employees
who possess appropriate
industry-recognized
certifications for their
positions, (2) the level of
preparedness of
cybersecurity employees
without credentials to
acquire them, and (3) a
strategy for mitigating gaps
within these two areas.
(...continued)
44 Enacted on December 18, 2015. The workforce provisions were included in Division N of Title III within the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, titled the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015. The
Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015 originated in S. 2007 (114th Congress), which was
introduced by Senator Bennett on August 6, 2015. Language from S. 2007 was subsequently included in Title III of the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (S. 754), which passed the Senate by a roll call vote of 74-21 on
October 27, 2015. An amended version of S. 754 was included in Title III of Division N of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2016.
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P.L. 114-113, Division
OPM directive
P.L. 113-277, Sec. 4
OMB directive
N,
Requirement
(Jul 2013)
(Dec 2014)
(Oct 2015)
Title III (Dec 2015)
Skil s gap
No requirement.
DHS to, no later than
Agencies to identify
Agencies to, no later than
assessments
18 months after
the five cybersecurity one year after the
enactment and annually
specialty areas facing
assignment of cybersecurity
until 2021, identify
the largest talent
codes and annually until
cybersecurity areas of
gaps by December
2022, identify
critical need in its
31, 2015.
cybersecurity areas of
workforce, including
critical need in their
those that face acute
workforces, including
and emerging skil
those that face acute and
shortages.
emerging skil shortages.
Oversight
OPM to periodically DHS to submit formal
No requirement.
Agencies to submit formal
monitor agencies’
progress reports to
progress reports to
progress in
Congress on (1)
Congress on identifying
identifying and
identifying and coding
and coding cybersecurity
coding
cybersecurity
positions.
cybersecurity
positions, and (2)
OPM to submit a formal
positions.
identifying
progress report on
cybersecurity areas of
identifying cybersecurity
critical need.
areas of critical need.
GAO to submit a
GAO to submit a report
report to Congress
to Congress on the status
on the status of their
of implementation of the
implementation of the
law no later than three
law no later than
years after the date of
three years after the
enactment.
date of enactment.
Source: CRS analysis of P.L. 113-277, P.L. 114-113, OPM Special Cybersecurity Workforce project documents,
and OMB’s Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan.
Selected Hiring and Pay Flexibilities Applicable to
DOD and DHS Cybersecurity Positions
Congress has authorized hiring and pay flexibilities for DOD and DHS to enhance the recruitment
and retention of cybersecurity professionals. OPM has also provided similar, but distinct, hiring
flexibilities for certain DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions. The text box, below, provides a
brief background on hiring and pay flexibilities.45 The subsections below discuss
selected hiring and pay flexibilities authorized by statute;
selected OPM-issued hiring flexibilities;
key functions of selected hiring and pay flexibilities; and
an analysis of selected statutory provisions on hiring and pay flexibilities.
45 This section does not discuss all hiring and pay flexibilities that can be used to fill federal cybersecurity positions.
For a list of additional hiring and pay flexibilities applicable to federal cybersecurity positions, see OPM, memorandum
from Mike Reinhold, Associate Director for Employee Services and Chief Human Capital Officer, “Cybersecurity
Hiring, Pay, and Leave Flexibilities,” November 23, 2015, at https://www.chcoc.gov/content/cybersecurity-hiring-pay-
and-leave-flexibilities. The list does not include flexibilities that have been authorized by statute.
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Hiring and Pay Flexibilities Defined
Hiring flexibilities – Hiring flexibilities generally exempt agencies from certain competitive hiring requirements in
the federal hiring process and allow for tailored recruitment. Hiring flexibilities aim to reduce time-to-hire and may
allow agencies to better recruit qualified individuals that best meet their needs. Examples of hiring flexibilities include
direct-hire authority and excepted service appointment authorities.46 Hiring flexibilities can be government-wide or
agency-specific for one position or a group of positions. They can be issued by OPM or authorized by Congress.
Pay flexibilities – Pay flexibilities provide employees with additional compensation in order to enhance the
recruitment and retention of top talent to the federal government. In general, pay flexibilities can either permanently
increase or temporarily supplement an employee’s base pay. They can also be performance or non-performance
based. Examples of flexibilities that increase base pay include critical position pay authority and Quality Step Increases
under the General Schedule (GS). Examples of flexibilities that supplement base pay include recruitment, relocation,
and retention incentives and performance-based cash awards.47 Similar to hiring flexibilities, pay flexibilities can apply
to one position or a group of positions. Some pay flexibilities are issued by OPM, while others are authorized by
Congress. Several OPM-issued pay flexibilities can be used at an agency’s discretion, though some must be approved
by OPM or OMB prior to use.
Selected Hiring and Pay Flexibilities Authorized by Statute
Congress enacted three laws that authorize hiring and pay flexibilities applicable to cybersecurity
positions at DOD and DHS:
P.L. 104-201, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1997
P.L. 113-277, the Border Patrol Pay Agent Reform Act of 2014
P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016
The flexibilities were first established in P.L. 104-201 for DOD intelligence positions, although
they have been used to fill positions that perform cybersecurity functions. For example, the
Department of the Army used the flexibilities to fill a “Senior Intelligence Advisor, Cyber”
position.48 The hiring flexibilities authorized in P.L. 104-201 were used to justify establishing
nearly identical flexibilities for cybersecurity positions at DOD and DHS. Table 2, below, briefly
describes the coverage and legislative background of the three laws.
Table 2. Statutory Authorities Governing Selected Hiring and Pay Flexibilities
Applicable to DOD and DHS Cybersecurity Positions
Feature
P.L. 104-201, Sec. 1632
P.L. 113-277, Sec. 3
P.L. 114-92, Sec. 1107
General
Authorizes the Secretary of
Authorizes the Secretary of
Authorizes the Secretary of
authority
Defense to (1) establish
Homeland Security to (1)
Defense to (1) establish
defense intelligence
establish cybersecurity
positions at and in support of
positions in the excepted
positions in the excepted
the U.S. Cyber Command in the
service, and (2) fix the rates
service, and (2) fix the rates of
excepted service, and (2) fix the
of pay for such positions.
pay for such positions.
rates of pay for such positions.
46 For a list of certain hiring flexibilities, see OPM, Human Resources Flexibilities and Authorities in the Federal
Government, August 2013, pp. 17-18, at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/reference-
materials/handbooks/humanresourcesflexibilitiesauthorities.pdf.
47 For a list of pay flexibilities, see ibid., pp. 41-47 and 56-57.
48 The vacancy announcement is closed, but as of January 8, 2016, could still be viewed at
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/420013200.
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Feature
P.L. 104-201, Sec. 1632
P.L. 113-277, Sec. 3
P.L. 114-92, Sec. 1107
Coverage
DOD intelligence positions.
DHS cybersecurity positions.
DOD cybersecurity positions
within and in support of the U.S.
Cyber Command.
Enactment date September 23, 1996
December 18, 2014
November 25, 2015
U.S. Code
10 U.S.C. §1601-1607
6 U.S.C. §147
N/A
citation
Legislative
First proposed in the Senate
First proposed in the DHS
First proposed in the Senate
background
version of the NDAA for
Cybersecurity Workforce
version of the NDAA for
FY1995 (S. 1745, 104th
Recruitment and Retention
FY2016 (S. 1376, 114th
Congress). Amended
Act of 2014 (S. 2354, 113th
Congress). Language from S.
language from S. 1745
Congress). Language from S.
1376 incorporated into P.L. 114-
incorporated into P.L. 104-
2354 incorporated into P.L.
92.
201.
113-277.
References to
N/A
A Senate Committee on
A Senate Committee on Armed
flexibilities in
Homeland Security and
Services report accompanying S.
P.L. 104-201
Governmental Affairs report
1376 noted that the flexibilities
accompanying S. 2354 noted
proposed therein were modeled
that flexibilities in P.L. 104-201
after the flexibilities in P.L. 104-
have enabled DOD to “build
201 and are “a very important
and maintain a strong
factor in attracting and retaining
cybersecurity workforce” and
the high caliber of personnel
that similar flexibilities were
that are critical to the execution
“needed by DHS to address
of the cyber warfare mission of
the ever-growing cyber threat
the department [DOD].”
to our national and economic
security.”
Source: CRS analysis of the laws cited in the table.
a. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, DHS Cybersecurity
Workforce Recruitment and Retention Act of 2014, report to accompany S. 2354, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept.
113-207 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), pp. 2-3.
b. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016, report
to accompany S. 1376, 114th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 114-49 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2015), pp. 219-220.
Selected OPM-Issued Hiring Flexibilities
OPM has also issued temporary hiring flexibilities for a limited number of cybersecurity positions
at DOD and DHS.49 The positions must require unique cybersecurity skills and knowledge that
are explicitly specified in the flexibilities. The DOD flexibility must be used to fill positions
within certain occupational series, while the DHS flexibility does not include such limitations.
The DHS flexibility appears to be an interim recruiting solution for cybersecurity professionals
until the regulations governing the hiring and pay flexibilities under P.L. 113-277 become
effective. Table 3, below, summarizes key features of the flexibilities.
49 OPM, “Excepted Service,” 80 Federal Register 12045, March 5, 2015, at
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/03/05/2015-05185/excepted-service; OPM, “Excepted Service,” 80
Federal Register 69726, November 10, 2015, at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/11/10/2015-
28566/excepted-service.
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Table 3. OPM-Issued Hiring Flexibilities for Cybersecurity Positions
Feature
DOD Cybersecurity Positions
DHS Cybersecurity Positions
Number of
Up to 3,000.
Up to 1,000.
positions
Coverage
Positions that require unique cybersecurity skills and knowledge to perform: (1) cyber risk
and strategic analysis, (2) incident handling and malware/vulnerability analysis, (3) program
management, (4) distributed control systems security, (5) cyber incident response, (6) cyber
exercise facilitation and management, (7) cyber vulnerability detection and assessment, (8)
network and systems engineering, (9) enterprise architecture, (10) investigation, (11)
investigative analysis, and (12) cyber-related infrastructure inter-dependency analysis.
Occupational series
Department-wide: Security (GS-0080),
Not specified.
computer engineers (GS-0854), electronic
engineers (GS-0855), computer scientists
(GS-1550), operations research (GS-1515),
criminal investigators (GS-1811),
telecommunications (GS-0391), IT specialists
(GS-2210).
U.S. Cyber Command: Administrative and
program series (GS-0301).
Applicable grades
GS-9 to GS-15
Appointment type
Permanent, time-limited, or temporary.
Not specified.
Expiration date
December 31, 2015
June 30, 2016, or until the regulations
(date upon which
governing hiring and pay flexibilities
hires must be
authorized under P.L. 113-277 become
completed)
effective (whichever comes first).
Source: OPM, “Excepted Service,” 80 Federal Register 12045, March 5, 2015, at
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/03/05/2015-05185/excepted-service; OPM, “Excepted Service,” 80
Federal Register 69726, November 10, 2015, at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/11/10/2015-
28566/excepted-service.
Notes: The DHS authority also includes “intelligence analysis” as a required skil .
Key Functions of Hiring and Pay Flexibilities
The aforementioned hiring and pay flexibilities aim, respectively, to enhance the recruitment and
retention of cybersecurity professionals at DOD and DHS by (1) designating cybersecurity
positions as within the excepted service, and (2) allowing for additional compensation for
cybersecurity professionals. The OPM-issued flexibilities do not explicitly authorize the use of
the pay flexibilities.
Hiring Flexibilities: Excepted Service Designation
The hiring flexibilities described above allow covered DOD and DHS positions to be placed in
the excepted service (see text box below for an explanation). As a result, DOD and DHS are not
subject to the competitive hiring requirements in Title 5 of the United States Code that are placed
on other agencies for covered positions. Rather, the authorized agencies can use alternative (and
often agency-developed) recruitment, assessment, and selection methods for the positions that are
sometimes seen as more flexible and efficient than regular competitive hiring procedures. These
alternative hiring procedures are intended to allow for streamlined and tailored recruitment,
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which could expedite the hiring process. For example, DOD and DHS may waive public notice
requirements, including posting job announcements on USAJobs.gov, for covered positions.50
This exception might allow the departments to reduce the number of applications to review and
hire from a narrower group of individuals, thereby accelerating the hiring process.
The Excepted Service
The federal workforce includes the competitive service, excepted service, and Senior Executive Service. The
competitive service includes the majority of executive branch positions, and includes positions that are open to all
applicants and require a competitive process to acquire the position. The Senior Executive Service (SES) consists of
executive management positions that oversee activities in approximately 75 agencies. The excepted service includes
positions that are not in the competitive service or the SES.51
According to OPM, excepted service designations are provided “to fil special jobs or to fil any job in unusual or
special circumstances,” thereby enabling “agencies to hire when it is not feasible or not practical to use traditional
competitive hiring procedures.”52 Individuals that meet an excepted service position’s eligibility and minimum
qualification requirements do not have to compete with other applicants. Excepted service designations can be issued
by OPM or authorized by Congress. Flexibilities authorized by statute are distinct from OPM-issued flexibilities and
can be implemented without OPM approval. Their structure and functions might differ.
Pay Flexibilities: Additional Compensation
The laws described above provide DOD and DHS with the opportunity to offer cybersecurity
professionals additional compensation that is not typically available to all federal employees. The
flexibilities seek to increase DOD’s and DHS’s abilities to compete for top cybersecurity talent. A
report accompanying the DHS Cybersecurity Workforce Recruitment and Retention Act of 2014,
for example, asserted that the pay flexibilities for DOD intelligence positions provide DOD with
“significant latitude in setting pay and benefits [for cybersecurity positions], adding on regional
or other adjustments to pay, and offering further specific financial incentives.”53
Fixed Rates of Pay
The laws for DOD and DHS authorize the departments to fix salaries for positions covered under
their respective workforce flexibilities at rates of comparable DOD positions and fill such
positions without regard to the classification and compensation requirements in any other law.54
Using these flexibilities, the departments can establish alternative pay systems outside of the GS
system and develop their own criteria for setting and adjusting salaries for positions within that
system.55 According to a 2011 GAO report on the federal cybersecurity workforce, characteristics
50 Public notice requirements specified in 5 U.S.C. §3327, 5 U.S.C. §3330, and 5 C.F.R. Part 330, Subpart A only apply
to competitive service positions.
51 5 U.S.C. §2103; OPM, “Hiring Authorities, Competitive Hiring, Overview,” at http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
oversight/hiring-authorities/competitive-hiring/#url=Overview; and OPM, “Hiring Authorities, Excepted Service,” at
http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/hiring-authorities/excepted-service/.
52 OPM, “Hiring Authorities, Excepted Service”; 5 C.F.R. Part 213.
53 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, DHS Cybersecurity Workforce
Recruitment and Retention Act of 2014, report to accompany S. 2354, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 113-207
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), p. 2.
54 10 U.S.C. §1601(b); 10 U.S.C. §1602(a); 6 U.S.C. §147(b)(2)(A); 6 U.S.C. §147(b)(1)(B); P.L. 114-92, sec.1107.
55 Use of alternative personnel systems can be authorized by OPM or Congress. For more information on alternative
personnel systems authorized by OPM, see OPM, “Alternative Personnel Systems, About APS,” at
http://archive.opm.gov/aps/about/index.aspx; and OPM, “Alternative Personnel Systems, Frequently Asked Questions,”
at http://archive.opm.gov/aps/about/faq/index.aspx.
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of certain non-GS systems can allow agencies to offer employees higher salaries compared to
their GS system-bound counterparts.56 As stated earlier, agencies have argued that non-GS
systems can increase an agency’s ability to attract and retain cybersecurity professionals.57
Additional Monetary Incentives
Individuals filling DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions through the flexibilities authorized by
statute are eligible for additional monetary incentives.58 These incentives can include one-time
cash payments or base pay increases and can be performance or non-performance based. In many
cases, these incentives can be given to all federal employees.59 For example, regarding non-
performance based flexibilities, all agencies have the discretion to provide recruitment incentives
for positions that would be difficult to fill in the absence of such an incentive.60 Agencies also
have the discretion to provide performance-based cash awards to employees for work that
“contributes to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations.”61
Some monetary incentives authorized under the DOD and DHS laws, however, are only available
to employees covered under the laws and can allow these employees—including cybersecurity
professionals—to earn higher base salaries (exclusive of locality-pay adjustments) than their GS
counterparts. For example, cybersecurity employees covered under the Defense Civilian
Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) can receive awards that cause their base salaries to
exceed the maximum pay rate of their position’s grade, while GS employees cannot (the text box
below provides an example). DCIPS62 is a DOD-specific, alternative personnel management
system that encompasses DOD intelligence positions covered under P.L. 104-201 and includes a
General Grade (GG) salary structure that aligns with the GS system’s 15-grade structure.63
Higher Salaries for Cybersecurity Employees: GS and DCIPS
The scenarios below demonstrate how awards that increase base pay can allow cybersecurity employees covered
under DCIPS to earn higher annual salaries compared to their GS counterparts. For the purposes of these scenarios,
a base pay increase is defined as a two-step increase within a position’s grade (e.g., GS-7, Step 1 to GS-7, Step 3).
GS – A federal employee is currently in a GS-15, Step 10 position—the maximum step of the highest grade. The
employee receives the highest possible performance rating (“outstanding” or equivalent). The employee is not eligible
for a two-step base pay increase within a GS grade, as the employee’s base salary cannot exceed the maximum step of
the GS-15 grade.64 The employee’s salary remains at the GS-15, step 10 level.65 If the employee does not receive a
cash award (i.e., bonus), the performance level achieved may not be recognized.
56 For a list of these characteristics, see Table 7 in GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital, Initiatives Need Better
Planning and Coordination, GAO-12-8, November 29, 2011, p. 30.
57Ibid., pp. 29-31.
58 10 U.S.C. §1603; 6 U.S.C. §147(b)(3); P.L. 114-92, sec. 1107. The incentives cannot exceed the amounts authorized
for comparable Title 5 positions.
59 For more information on monetary incentives that can be accessed by all agencies, see OPM, Human Resources
Flexibilities and Authorities in the Federal Government, August 2013, pp. 41-47 and 56-57.
60 Ibid., p. 41; 5 U.S.C. §5753; 5 C.F.R. Part 575, Subpart A.
61 OPM, Human Resources Flexibilities and Authorities in the Federal Government, August 2013, p. 56; 5 U.S.C.
§4503; 5 C.F.R. §451.104(a)(1).
62 For more information on DCIPS, see DOD, “Defense Civilian Personnel Intelligence System,” at
http://dcips.dtic.mil/.
63 DOD, “Department of Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) GG Grade Ranges for 2016, PDF p.
1, at http://dcips.dtic.mil/documents/DCIPS_Pay_Rates-2016.pdf.
64 A two-step base-pay increase within a GS grade is known as a Quality Step Increase (QSI). Employees at the top of
their grade level (step 10) are not eligible for QSIs. For more information on QSIs, see 5 U.S.C. §5336, 5 C.F.R. Part
(continued...)
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DCIPS – A federal employee is currently in a GG-15, Step 10 position—the maximum step of the highest grade.66
The employee has been in the GG-15 grade for at least three consecutive performance periods and has received the
highest possible performance rating (“outstanding,” or a performance rating that places the employee in the top 10%
among his or her peers for those three periods). The employee is eligible for a two-step base-pay increase within the
GG-15 grade, as DCIPS allows employees to exceed the maximum step of the GG-15 grade upon receiving a
performance award.67 The employee’s base salary increases to a level that exceeds the GS-15, Step 10 base
maximum.68
Analysis of Selected Statutory Provisions for Hiring and Pay
Flexibilities
This section includes an analysis of selected provisions from the three laws authorizing hiring and
pay flexibilities for DOD intelligence positions (P.L. 104-201), DHS cybersecurity positions (P.L.
113-277), and DOD cybersecurity positions affiliated with the U.S. Cyber Command (P.L. 114-
92). The analysis highlights key structural differences between the selected provisions. Appendix
A includes a side-by-side analysis of key provisions in each of the laws.
Probationary Period
New employees hired into DOD or DHS cybersecurity positions are subject to a three-year
probationary period.69 While no similar extended probationary period is statutorily required for
DOD intelligence personnel, DOD has instituted a two-year “trial period” for many of these
positions.70 In addition, existing DOD and DHS cybersecurity employees that are scheduled to be
converted to the excepted service have the right to refuse moving to the excepted service. The law
governing DOD intelligence positions contains no similar language. Employees in the excepted
service cannot apply for career and career-conditional federal jobs (i.e., jobs that are not open to
all U.S. citizens) and therefore might be less inclined to accepted the conversion.71
(...continued)
531, Subpart E; and OPM, “Fact Sheet, Quality Step Increase,” at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-
leave/pay-administration/fact-sheets/quality-step-increase/.
65 The GS-15, Step 10 salary rates vary by locality. For a list of 2016 GS pay rates, see OPM, “2016 General Schedule
(GS) Locality Pay Tables,” at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/2016/general-
schedule/.
66 DOD, “Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) GG Grade Ranges for 2016,” January 10, 2016,
PDF p. 1.
67 A two-step base-pay increase within a DCIPS grade is known as a Sustained Quality Increase (SQI). Unlike the GS,
employees at the top of their grade level (step 10) are eligible for SQIs. For more information on SQIs, see DOD,
“DOD Civilian Personnel Management System: Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) Awards and
Recognition, DOD Instruction Number 1400.25, Volume 2008, October 4, 2015, pp. 9-11, at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/140025_vol2008.pdf.
68 See, for example: OPM, “Salary Table 2016-GS,” at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-
wages/salary-tables/pdf/2016/GS.pdf; DOD, “Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) GG Grade
Ranges for 2016,” January 10, 2016, PDF p. 1.
69 The standard probationary period for a new federal employee in a competitive service position is one year. See 5
C.F.R. §315.801 and 5 .C.F.R. §315.802.
70 DOD, “DOD Civilian Personnel Management System: Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS)
Awards and Recognition, DOD Instruction Number 1400.25, Volume 2008, October 4, 2015, pp. 13-14. The DCIPS
trial period is similar to the federal probationary period, during which an employee can be removed at will.
71 For more information on career and career-conditional employment, see 5 C.F.R. Part 315, Subpart B.
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Implementation Plan
The laws for DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions require an implementation plan describing
how the hiring and pay flexibilities will be used, while the law for DOD intelligence positions
does not. The content and submission requirements, however, differ between plans. P.L. 114-92
requires DOD to submit an implementation plan to Congress prior to using the flexibilities. The
flexibilities will only become effective 30 days after Congress receives the plan. In addition, the
plan’s content must include “(1) an assessment of the scope of positions covered by the
flexibilities, (2) a plan for using the flexibilities, and (3) an assessment of the anticipated
workforce needs of the U.S. Cyber Command across the future-years’ defense plan.”72 P.L. 113-
277, in contrast, does not require DHS to include specific information in the implementation plan,
nor does it preclude DHS from using the flexibilities therein prior to submitting the plan.
Reporting Requirements
DOD and DHS are required to report annually on the use of hiring and pay flexibilities for
covered cybersecurity positions. The reports’ content requirements are identical and must include
recruitment and retention data—such as the number of hires, separations, and retirements for
covered cybersecurity positions—among other things.73 The report authors and submission
timelines, however, differ. P.L. 113-277 directs DHS to develop the annual report, while P.L. 114-
92 requires OPM, in coordination with DOD, to develop the report. Further, the plan for DHS
flexibilities must be submitted annually for four years after the date of enactment, compared to
annually for five years after the date of enactment under the plan for DOD flexibilities. The law
for DOD intelligence positions does not contain any reporting requirements.
Congressional Oversight Issues
Congress has shown an interest in ensuring that the federal cybersecurity workforce is defined
and identified.74 Congress has also shown an interest in ensuring that hiring and pay flexibilities
for cybersecurity positions at DOD and DHS are properly implemented and achieve their
intended purposes.75 If such interest continues, Congress could enhance its oversight of these
efforts to increase its awareness and knowledge of their implementation. The subsections below
discuss potential issues in the absence of enhanced congressional oversight related to (1)
identifying and defining the federal cybersecurity workforce, and (2) hiring and pay flexibilities
that can be used to fill DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions.
Identifying and Defining the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce
Efforts to define and identify federal cybersecurity workforce positions have largely been
undertaken by OPM. OPM, however, is not currently required to report on its progress in
identifying and coding all federal cybersecurity positions to Congress, nor has it released its
cybersecurity dataset or a government-wide count of the cybersecurity workforce to Congress.
Further, OMB’s CSIP does not require agencies to report identified skills gaps in their
cybersecurity workforces to Congress. Congressional knowledge of the progress of these
72 P.L. 114-92, sec. 1107.
73 A comprehensive list of these content requirements can be found in Appendix B.
74 See, for example, P.L. 114-113, Division N, Title III.
75 See, for example, P.L. 113-277, sec. 3, and P.L. 114-92, sec. 1107.
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evolving efforts, therefore, might be limited or incomplete, which might make it difficult for
Congress to (1) identify potential conflicting efforts between OMB, OPM, and Congress in
assessing the capabilities of the federal cybersecurity workforce, and (2) gauge the utility of
hiring and pay flexibilities for cybersecurity positions.
Potential Conflicting Efforts to Assess the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce
The lack of a requirement for progress reports may make it difficult for Congress to identify or
prevent potentially conflicting efforts to assess the capabilities of the federal cybersecurity
workforce between existing laws and OMB/OPM directives. For example, as stated previously,
P.L. 113-277 first required DHS to identify cybersecurity specialty areas of critical need
(including those facing acute and emerging skills gaps) by June 2015, and the CSIP later required
all agencies to identify the five cybersecurity specialty areas facing the largest talent gaps by
December 31, 2015. OPM was required to issue guidance to help DHS identify its cybersecurity
areas of critical need. OPM then issued new guidance to help agencies identify their top five
cyber talent gaps.76 If OPM’s new guidance differs substantially from the guidance provided to
DHS, the positions DHS originally identified as facing gaps might not align with those identified
using OPM’s new procedures. This might affect DHS’s efforts to address staffing needs.
Utility of Hiring and Pay Flexibilities
Congress’s knowledge of agencies’ cybersecurity workforce capabilities and needs might be
affected by lack of access to OPM’s dataset and lack of formal notification about cybersecurity
skills gaps identified through the CSIP. Consequently, it might be difficult for Congress to
definitively determine the need for or the proper structure of hiring and pay flexibilities to address
those needs. This could lead to the absence of certain hiring and pay flexibilities, authorization of
new flexibilities that are not necessarily needed, or the realization that existing flexibilities do
apply to the specific agency components. For instance, suppose a federal department identifies
cybersecurity skills gaps in one of its major components without a full and accurate count of its
workforce and Congress subsequently authorizes hiring and pay flexibilities to fill those
positions. If the agency, after accurately measuring the size and composition of its workforce,
determines that a different component faces skills gaps, the existing flexibilities would not help to
address such gaps.
Issues Related to Hiring and Pay Flexibilities for DOD and DHS
Cybersecurity Positions
The laws governing flexibilities for DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions require the
departments to report to Congress on their use, while neither the law for DOD intelligence
positions nor the OPM-issued flexibilities do. Further, existing reporting requirements for the
flexibilities do not require the departments to identify challenges to using the flexibilities or to
measure their effectiveness. DOD and DHS have broad discretion to determine the structure and
implementation of statutorily authorized hiring and pay flexibilities, such as what positions the
flexibilities apply to and how they are to be used. This discretion can create the potential for
discrepancies between the intended and actual use of the flexibilities. Were Congress to be
76 OPM, memorandum from Mark Reinhold, Associate Director of Employee Services, to Chief Human Capital
Officers and Chief Information Officers, “Guidance for Identifying Top Five Cyber Talent Gaps,” November 23, 2015,
at https://www.chcoc.gov/content/guidance-identifying-top-five-cyber-talent-gaps. The resource charts are on OMB’s
MAX website and are only accessible by executive branch agency staff.
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interested in identifying and addressing any potential discrepancies, as well as gauging the
flexibilities’ effectiveness in improving the recruitment and retention of cybersecurity
professionals at DOD and DHS, it might need to enhance its oversight by clarifying reporting
requirements.
The subsections below discuss issues related to (1) usage data and its potential impact, (2)
effectiveness measurement, and (3) training with regard to the DOD and DHS hiring and pay
flexibilities.
Lack of Data on Use of Certain Cybersecurity Hiring Flexibilities at DOD and
DHS
The law for DOD intelligence positions, and the OPM-issued hiring flexibilities for certain DOD
and DHS cybersecurity positions, do not require the departments to report, among other things,
(1) the total number of employees hired using the flexibilities,77 (2) the specific types of positions
filled through the flexibilities, or (3) in which components the positions are located. A lack of
data on the use of hiring and pay flexibilities could reduce Congress’s ability to determine how
much they are used and to what effect.
Appropriate Use of Flexibilities
In the absence of data on use of the flexibilities issued by OPM or authorized under the law for
DOD intelligence positions, Congress might find it difficult to ensure that these flexibilities are
being used to fill appropriate positions. For example, at least one cybersecurity workforce expert
expressed concern that DHS may have used a past OPM-issued cybersecurity hiring flexibility to
fill non-cybersecurity positions.78
Maximized Use of Flexibilities
The absence of data may make it difficult for Congress to determine to what extent the
flexibilities are used, and what challenges may inhibit their maximum use. Ultimately, this could
affect future decisions regarding the authorization of additional flexibilities or changes to the
structure of existing flexibilities. For example, suppose that DHS uses the OPM-issued hiring
flexibility to fill 200 cybersecurity positions—20% of the maximum allowed by the flexibility (up
to 1,000 positions). If DHS had no additional positions to fill, additional flexibilities might not be
needed. If DHS encountered implementation challenges that prevented further use of the
flexibility, however, structural changes to the flexibility may be needed. Similarly, suppose that
DHS does not use the pay flexibilities authorized under P.L. 113-277. While the lack of use could
indicate that the flexibilities are not needed, it may also stem from budget constraints.
77 Section 301 of the House-passed version of the National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of
2014 (H.R. 3696, 113th Congress) included a provision that would have required DHS to report the total number of
individuals hired under a past OPM-issued cybersecurity hiring flexibility, suggesting that such data are not readily
available to Congress.
78 In May 2014, Alan Paller, an expert on the federal cybersecurity workforce and one of the authors of DHS’s
Cybersecurity Task Force Report, wrote in the SANS.org newsletter that “DHS IT managers hijacked [the hiring
authority] to hire people, without cyber skills, for regular IT roles, bypassing normal hiring rules.” See SANS,
“Newsletters: Newsbites,” Volume XVI – Issue #39, at http://www.sans.org/newsletters/newsbites/xvi/39. SANS is “a
cooperative research and education organization. Its programs now reach more than 165,000 security professionals
around the world.” See SANS, “About,” at http://www.sans.org/about/.
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Utility of Flexibilities for the U.S. Cyber Command
A lack of data on how frequently the flexibilities for DOD intelligence positions are being used to
fill positions affiliated with the U.S. Cyber Command may make it difficult for Congress to gauge
the utility of new flexibilities authorized for Command positions under P.L. 114-92. It appears
that some positions affiliated with the Command are being filled using the existing flexibilities
for DOD intelligence positions. The Departments of the Army and Navy, for example, are using
the flexibilities to fill cybersecurity positions in units that support the Command.79 The
flexibilities, therefore, might not be needed as much or used as often as envisioned if a sizeable
portion of covered positions can be filled using existing flexibilities.
Effectiveness of Hiring and Pay Flexibilities
Existing reporting requirements for the hiring and pay flexibilities measure the use of hiring and
pay flexibilities, but do not necessarily measure their effectiveness. For example, the law for DHS
cybersecurity positions requires the department to detail how it plans to recruit and retain
employees in cybersecurity positions and how it will measure progress in doing so. The laws do
not, however, task DHS and DOD with determining whether and in what ways specific aspects of
the hiring and pay flexibilities improved the departments’ ability to attract and retain qualified
cybersecurity professionals, or whether these professionals have improved the quality and
capacity of the departments’ cybersecurity workforces.
Training on Structure and Use of Flexibilities
The laws governing flexibilities for DOD intelligence, DHS cybersecurity, and DOD
cybersecurity positions at the U.S. Cyber Command do not include provisions to require human
resources staff (including component-level hiring managers and department-level staff in the
Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer) to receive training on the availability, structure, and
operation of cybersecurity hiring and pay flexibilities. Rather, P.L. 113-277 and P.L. 114-92
require DOD and DHS to describe the training provided to supervisors using the flexibilities in
the aforementioned annual reports to Congress.
A lack of staff training might impact effective use of the flexibilities. Untrained hiring managers
and human resources staff might not know about the flexibilities, the positions they apply to, how
to properly implement them, and the positions for which they are most appropriate. For example,
as mentioned earlier, it appears that certain cybersecurity positions affiliated with the U.S. Cyber
Command could be filled under the flexibilities authorized under P.L. 104-201 or P.L. 114-92.
Oversight Policy Options
Pursuant to its oversight authority, Congress could consider several oversight policy options to
enhance its knowledge and awareness of identification and recruitment efforts for the federal
cybersecurity workforce. Seven options are presented in this section, though other policy options
exist. The first two policy options relate to monitoring OPM and OMB initiatives to define and
identify federal cybersecurity positions. The remaining five options relate to monitoring the
79 The vacancy announcements are closed, but as of January 8, 2016, could still be viewed at:
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/423794200 and
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/417782000. The announcements are for vacancies in the U.S. Army
Intelligence and Security Command and U.S. Cyber Fleet Command, which support the U.S. Cyber Command.
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implementation of hiring and pay flexibilities used to fill DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions.
CRS takes no position on the advisability of these and other potential policy options.
This section does not present broader policy options that address the capabilities of the federal
cybersecurity workforce, such as the establishment of additional hiring and pay flexibilities, other
personnel tools that could be used to recruit and retain cybersecurity professionals, and whether
federal cybersecurity professionals are enabling agencies to fulfill their respective missions.
1. Notification of Progress on OPM Cybersecurity Dataset
OPM could be required to notify appropriate congressional committees on the status of the
cybersecurity dataset, including when the dataset is completed and released to the public on
OPM’s online workforce data portal. In exercising its oversight authority, Congress may require
these notifications to occur annually, semi-annually, quarterly, or on any other standard timeline.
OPM could also be required to brief appropriate congressional committees on the structure and
functions of the dataset upon its release. This could include (but not be limited to) the data it
presents, how the data can be used to generate a government-wide count of the cybersecurity
workforce, how it will be kept up to date, and anticipated enhancements and adjustments to be
made.
2. GAO Evaluation of OPM Cybersecurity Dataset
As mentioned previously, P.L. 113-277 and P.L. 114-113 require GAO to submit a report to
Congress describing the status of identifying, coding, and evaluating critical needs of
cybersecurity positions at DHS and executive branch agencies. The laws do not, however,
explicitly require GAO to evaluate OPM’s dataset. In its oversight capacity, Congress could
additionally direct GAO to study the operation and effectiveness of the OPM cybersecurity
dataset one year after it becomes operational. The study could evaluate, whether the dataset and
OPM cybersecurity data codes accomplish the goals listed below. The study could also evaluate
the validity of reported skills gaps in agencies’ cybersecurity positions.
(1) identify positions for which the primary function is cybersecurity;
(2) enable OPM and agencies to determine the baseline capabilities of the workforce,
examine hiring trends, identify skills gaps, and more effectively recruit, hire, train,
develop, and retain an effective cybersecurity workforce;
(3) allow HR professionals to better understand the workforce and what issues need to be
addressed; and
(4) provide a platform for organizations outside of the federal government to similarly
organize their cybersecurity professionals.80
3. Conform Reporting Requirements for DOD and DHS
Flexibilities
Congress could amend existing statues to extend the reporting requirements articulated in the law
for DHS cybersecurity positions—or the law for DOD cybersecurity positions—to DOD
80 OPM, “The Use and Usefulness of the Cybersecurity Data Element,” December 6, 2012, PDF p. 4. These are the
intended goals of the OPM cybersecurity data codes, which align with the goals for OPM’s cybersecurity dataset
initiative.
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intelligence positions. Congress could also add a new reporting provision that requires DOD and
DHS to provide information on any challenges encountered in implementing the flexibilities
under P.L. 104-201, P.L. 114-92, and P.L. 113-277. Reporting requirements enhance
congressional oversight of the hiring and pay flexibilities used for DOD intelligence positions. In
addition, the reporting requirements might allow Congress to compare the use of the DOD and
DHS hiring and pay flexibilities.
4. Additional Data on DOD Flexibilities
Congress could include the metrics listed below in the annual reporting requirements for DOD
intelligence positions (P.L. 104-201) and DOD positions affiliated with the U.S. Cyber Command
(P.L. 114-92). The metrics could provide Congress with greater clarity on the extent to which the
flexibilities under the laws are being used to fill cybersecurity positions. Such clarity might better
position Congress to determine the utility of the flexibilities and the need (or lack thereof) for
additional flexibilities for DOD cybersecurity positions.
For DOD intelligence positions (P.L. 104-201):
1. Total number of covered cybersecurity positions filled using the hiring
flexibilities authorized by P.L. 104-201.
2. Total number of covered cybersecurity positions filled using other hiring
flexibilities.
3. Percentage of filled cybersecurity positions that are affiliated with the U.S. Cyber
Command.
For DOD positions affiliated with the U.S. Cyber Command (P.L. 114-49):
1. Total number of covered cybersecurity positions filled using the hiring
flexibilities authorized by P.L. 114-49.
2. Total number of covered positions filled using other hiring flexibilities.
3. Percentage of covered positions filled through other existing hiring flexibilities.
5. Additional Data on OPM-Issued Flexibilities
DOD and DHS could be required to report their use of OPM-issued hiring flexibilities for
cybersecurity positions. The requirements could include, (1) the number of positions filled using
the flexibility; (2) the pay plan, occupation, series, and grade of the position; (3) the nature of
action of each hire; and (4) any challenges encountered in implementing the flexibilities. Such
data might enhance Congress’s capacity to determine the extent to which these flexibilities are
being, or have been used—and any barriers to maximizing their use. This information could, in
turn, assist Congress in addressing any barriers to using statutorily authorized flexibilities and
determining the utility of additional flexibilities.
6. Training for DOD and DHS Staff on Flexibilities
DOD and DHS could be required to provide training on the proper use and implementation of the
hiring and pay flexibilities for cybersecurity positions to hiring managers and human resources
staff listed below.81 Congress could require the training to include a review of the existing
81 These training requirements could apply to contractors fulfilling the positions listed below.
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authorities that can be applied to cybersecurity positions. Training might allow staff to better
understand when and how to use the flexibilities.
1. Department-level human resources (HR) staff that manage the civilian
workforce
This could include staff within the Office of Chief Human Capital Officer
(CHCO), as well as other HR units that might be involved in civilian workforce
issues.
2. Department and component-level staff that develop implementing guidance
for hiring and pay flexibilities
DHS and DOD often issue implementing guidance for hiring and pay flexibilities
at the department and component levels. It might be useful for staff charged with
issuing implementing guidance to receive training on the structure and functions
of the flexibilities.
3. Component-level supervisors and hiring managers that use, or would use,
the flexibilities
DHS and DOD supervisors and hiring managers that use, or would use, the
flexibilities might also benefit from training.
7. Report on the Effectiveness of Hiring and Pay Flexibilities
The Inspectors General at DOD and DHS could be required to report on how effective the hiring
and pay flexibilities authorized through statute—and the specific features—have been in
recruiting and retaining qualified cybersecurity professionals. For example, the reports could
include an analysis of whether the hiring flexibilities reduced time to hire, and whether the
reduced time to hire attracted qualified cybersecurity professionals to the departments,82 whether
monetary incentives were a primary factor in attracting and retaining cybersecurity professionals
to the federal government, which types of monetary incentives were most effective in doing so
(e.g., performance awards or student loan repayments), and potentially other related matters.
82 For the purposes of this report, time to hire is defined as the total number of days between an applicant job interview
and a conditional job offer.
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Appendix A. Side-by-Side Analysis of Selected
Provisions from Statutory Authorities for DOD
Intelligence, DHS Cybersecurity, and DOD
Positions at the U.S. Cyber Command
DOD Intelligence
DHS Cybersecurity
DOD Cyber Command
Provision
(P.L. 104-201, sec. 1632)
(P.L. 113-277, sec. 3)
(P.L. 114-92, sec. 1107)
Title
Management of Civilian
Cybersecurity Recruitment
U.S. Cyber Command
Intelligence Personnel
and Retention
Recruitment and Retention
Date of enactment
September 23, 1996
December 18, 2014
November 25, 2015
General authority
Authorizes the Secretary of
Authorizes the Secretary of
Authorizes the Secretary of
Defense to (1) establish
Homeland Security to (1)
Defense to (1) establish
defense intelligence positions
establish cybersecurity
positions at and in support
in the excepted service,
positions in the excepted
of the U.S. Cyber Command
including those identified as
service, including those
in the excepted service, and
Defense Intelligence Senior
formerly identified as Senior
(2) appoint qualified
Level and Defense Intelligence
Executive Service (SES) or
individuals to such positions.
Senior Executive Service
Senior Level (SL); and (2)
positions established under 10
appoint qualified individuals
U.S.C. §1606-1607; and (2)
to such positions.
appoint qualified individuals to
such positions.
Covered positions
Civilian intelligence positions
Positions in which
Positions within the U.S.
as an intelligence officer or
individuals perform, manage,
Cyber Command, elements
intelligence employee of a
or supervise cybersecurity
of the Command enterprise
DOD intelligence component.
responsibilities.
relating to cyberspace
operations, and military
branch elements supporting
the Command.
Removal of certain
Authorizes respective Secretaries to fil covered positions without regard to appointment,
legal hiring
number, classification, and compensation requirements in any other law.
requirements
Rates of basic pay
Allows the Secretary to fix
Allows the Secretary to fix
Allows the Secretary to fix
rates of basic pay for covered
rates of basic pay for
rates of basic pay for
positions to rates of
covered positions to rates
covered positions to rates
comparable DOD positions.
for comparable positions in
for comparable positions in
Maximum pay cannot exceed
DOD. Maximum pay rates
DOD (i.e., those that
“established for DOD
are subject to the same
perform, manage, or
employees by law or
limitations imposed on
supervise functions that
regulation.”
comparable DOD positions.
execute DOD’s cyber
mission). Maximum pay rates
are subject to the same
limitations imposed on
comparable DOD positions.
Prevailing rates of
Allows respective Secretaries to, pursuant to 5 U.S.C §5341, fix rates of pay for individuals in a
pay
recognized trade or craft according to their prevailing rates under the Federal Wage System.
Additional
Allows respective Secretaries to provide employees in covered positions with monetary
compensation
benefits, incentives, and allowances that do not exceed amounts for comparable Title 5
positions.
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DOD Intelligence
DHS Cybersecurity
DOD Cyber Command
Provision
(P.L. 104-201, sec. 1632)
(P.L. 113-277, sec. 3)
(P.L. 114-92, sec. 1107)
Probationary
No similar provisions.
Requires a three-year probationary period for covered
period
positions.
Conversion to
No similar provisions.
Employees in competitive service positions that wil be
excepted service
converted to the excepted service may refuse the
conversion.
Implementation
No similar provisions.
Requires the Secretary to
Requires the Secretary to
plan
submit a plan detailing use of submit an implementation
the authorities no later than
plan for the authority to the
120 days after enactment to
congressional defense
the fol owing committees:
committees. The authority
(1) Senate Committee on
would go into effect 30 days
Homeland Security and
after submission of the plan.
Governmental Affairs, (2)
The plan must include
Senate Committee on
information on the plan for
Appropriations, (3) House
using the authority, positions
Committee on Homeland
covered, and anticipated
Security, and (4) the House
workforce needs for the U.S.
Committee on
Cyber Command.
Appropriations.
Required
No requirement to promulgate Requires each Secretary, in coordination with Director of
regulations
regulations. Requires the
OPM, to promulgate regulations to administer the authority.
Secretary to submit any
prescribed regulations to
Congress 60 days before they
become effective.
Reporting
No similar provisions.
Requires the Secretary to,
Requires the Secretary to,
requirements
every year for four years
every year for five years
after enactment, submit an
after enactment, submit an
annual report detailing the
annual report detailing the
use of the authority to the
use of the authority to the
(1) Senate Committee on
(1) Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and
Armed Services, (2) Senate
Governmental Affairs, (2)
Committee on Homeland
Senate Committee on
Security and Government
Appropriations, (3) House
Affairs, (3) Senate
Committee on Homeland
Committee on
Security, and (4) the House
Appropriations, (4) House
Committee on
Committee on Armed
Appropriations.
Services, (5) House
Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform,
and (6) House Committee
on Appropriations.
Source: CRS analysis of the laws cited.
Notes: The table does not include all provisions included in laws cited.
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Appendix B. Reporting Requirements
P.L. 113-277, sec. 3
P.L. 114-92, sec. 1107
‘ (c) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the
‘ (g) ANNUAL REPORT.—(1) Not later than one year
date of enactment of this section, and every year
after the date of the enactment of this section and not
thereafter for 4 years, the Secretary shall submit to the
less frequently than once each year thereafter until the
appropriate committees of Congress a detailed report
date that is five years after the date of the enactment of
that—
this section, the Director of the Office of Personnel
‘ (1) discusses the process used by the Secretary in
Management, in coordination with the Secretary, shall
accepting applications, assessing candidates, ensuring
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
adherence to veterans’ preference, and selecting
detailed report on the administration of this section
applicants for vacancies to be fil ed by an individual for a
during the most recent one-year period.
qualified position;
‘ (2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
‘ (2) describes—
include, for the period covered by the report, the
fol owing:
‘ (A) how the Secretary plans to fulfil the critical need of
the Department to recruit and retain employees in
‘ (A) A discussion of the process used in accepting
qualified positions;
applications, assessing candidates, ensuring adherence to
veterans’ preference, and selecting applicants for
‘ (B) the measures that wil be used to measure progress;
vacancies to be fil ed by an individual for a qualified
and
position.
‘ (C) any actions taken during the reporting period to
‘ (B) A description of the fol owing:
fulfil such critical need;
‘ (i) How the Secretary plans to fulfil the critical need of
‘ (3) discusses how the planning and actions taken under
the Department to recruit and retain employees in
paragraph (2) are integrated into the strategic workforce
qualified positions.
planning of the Department;
‘ (i ) The measures that wil be used to measure progress.
‘ (4) provides metrics on actions occurring during the
‘ (i i) Any actions taken during the reporting period to
reporting period, including—
fulfil such critical need.
‘ (A) the number of employees in qualified positions hired ‘ (C) A discussion of how the planning and actions taken
by occupation and grade and level or pay band;
under subparagraph (B) are integrated into the strategic
‘ (B) the placement of employees in qualified positions by
workforce planning of the Department.
directorate and office within the Department;
‘ (D) The metrics on actions occurring during the
‘ (C) the total number of veterans hired;
reporting period, including the fol owing:
‘ (D) the number of separations of employees in qualified
‘ (i) The number of employees in qualified positions
positions by occupation and grade and level or pay band;
hired, disaggregated by occupation, grade, and level or
‘ (E) the number of retirements of employees in qualified
pay band.
positions by occupation and grade and level or pay band;
‘ (i ) The placement of employees in qualified positions,
and
disaggregated by military department, Defense Agency,
‘ (F) the number and amounts of recruitment, relocation,
or other component within the Department.
and retention incentives paid to employees in qualified
‘ (i i) The total number of veterans hired.
positions by occupation and grade and level or pay band;
‘ (iv) The number of separations of employees in qualified
‘ (5) describes the training provided to supervisors of
positions, disaggregated by occupation and grade and
employees in qualified positions at the Department on
level or pay band.
the use of the new authorities.
‘ (v) The number of retirements of employees in qualified
positions, disaggregated by occupation, grade, and level
or pay band.
‘ (vi) The number and amounts of recruitment,
relocation, and retention incentives paid to employees in
qualified positions, disaggregated by occupation, grade,
and level or pay band.
‘ (E) A description of the training provided to supervisors
of employees in qualified positions at the Department on
the use of the new authorities.
Source: P.L. 113-277 and P.L. 114-92.
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Author Contact Information
Kathryn A. Francis
Wendy Ginsberg
Analyst in Government Organization and
Analyst in American National Government
Management
wginsberg@crs.loc.gov, 7-3933
kfrancis@crs.loc.gov, 7-2351
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