Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In
Brief
Jim Zanotti
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
November 13, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R44000
Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
U.S.-Turkey Relations and Turkish Foreign Policy ......................................................................... 1
U.S.-Turkey Coordination Against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq ........................................... 3
Overview ................................................................................................................................... 3
Complications Involving the Kurds .......................................................................................... 4
Looking Ahead .......................................................................................................................... 6
Domestic Politics and Stability ....................................................................................................... 7
2015 Elections and Questions Regarding Continued AKP Rule ............................................... 8
Recent Resumption of Turkey-PKK Violence and Future Prospects ...................................... 10
Turkey’s Strategic Orientation: Past, Present, Future ..................................................................... 11
Figures
Figure 1. Turkey: Map and Basic Facts ........................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Syria: Areas of Kurdish Control ....................................................................................... 5
Figure 3. Turkish Election Results .................................................................................................. 8
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 12
Congressional Research Service
Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief
Introduction
Several Turkish foreign and domestic policy issues have significant relevance for U.S. interests,
and Congress plays an active role in shaping and overseeing U.S. relations with Turkey.
This report provides information and analysis relevant for Congress on the following:
Assessments of U.S.-Turkey relations, Turkish foreign policy, and Turkey’s
strategic orientation.
Turkish efforts to cooperate with the United States against the Islamic State (IS,
also known as Daesh, ISIS, and ISIL) in Syria and Iraq.
Key issues regarding Turkey’s domestic politics. These include controversies and
questions involving Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the ruling
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP) following
the AKP’s November 2015 electoral victory, and the Turkish government’s
renewed hostilities (since July) with the longtime Kurdish nationalist insurgent
group PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party or Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane).
For additional information and analysis, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
U.S.-Turkey Relations and Turkish Foreign Policy
There have been many situations in which the United States and Turkey have made common
cause during their decades-long alliance in NATO, but their strategic cooperation also has a
history of complications. This is based largely on divergences in how the two countries’ leaders
have assessed their respective interests given different geographical positions, threat perceptions,
and roles in regional and global political and security architectures. Domestic politics in both
countries have also played a role. Yet, both countries have continued to affirm the importance of
an enduring strategic relationship. A number of policy differences have arisen in the past few
years. It remains unclear whether these differences are mainly the latest manifestations of
structural tension, or whether they signal a more substantive change in the bilateral relationship.
Since the mid-2000s, President (formerly Prime Minister) Erdogan and Prime Minister (formerly
Foreign Minister) Ahmet Davutoglu have consistently articulated an ambitious foreign policy
vision. This vision—aspects of which Davutoglu has expressed at times through phrases such as
“strategic depth” or “zero problems with neighbors”—draws upon Turkey’s historical, cultural,
and religious knowledge of and ties with other regional actors, as well as its soft power appeal.1
Erdogan, Davutoglu, and other Turkish leaders often indicate to the United States and other
countries that Turkey’s unique regional status as a Muslim-majority democracy with a robust
economy and membership in NATO can positively influence surrounding geographical areas both
politically and economically.
Turkey has become a more influential actor in the Middle East in the past decade, having sought
to leverage the regional status discussed above. However, recent foreign and domestic policy
developments may have rendered Turkey less potent or desirable than once generally supposed as
1 See, e.g., Ahmet Davutoglu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring,” International
Policy and Leadership Institute and Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Turkey Policy Brief
Series, 2012 – Third Edition.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief
a shaper of regional outcomes, a model for neighboring countries, and a facilitator of U.S.
interests.2 Still, it remains a key regional power that shares linkages and characteristics with the
West that may distinguish it from other potentially region-shaping Muslim-majority powers such
as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Therefore, working with Turkey is likely to remain relevant for
the advancement of U.S. interests in the volatile region.3 This may be especially true if there are
significant changes in U.S. relations with Iran that affect the larger regional context of widespread
instability and complex alignments among various states and non-state actors. Nevertheless,
engagement with Turkey—critical as it might be on specific issues—is unlikely to overshadow
other aspects of a U.S. multilateral approach to addressing problems in the region.
Turkey’s NATO membership and economic interdependence with Europe appear to have
contributed to important Turkish decisions to rely on, and partner with, sources of Western
strength. However, as Turkey has prospered, its economic success has taken place alongside
efforts to seek greater overall self-reliance and independence in foreign policy.
Figure 1. Turkey: Map and Basic Facts
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2015
2 See, e.g., Blaise Misztal, et al., “Elections in Turkey: Foreign Policy Reset Unlikely Under President Erdogan,” The
American Interest, August 7, 2014.
3 See, e.g., M. Hakan Yavuz and Mujeeb R. Khan, “Turkey Treads a Positive Path,” New York Times, February 12,
2015.
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estimates unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, Global Economic Outlook; Turkish
Statistical Institute; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook.
Turkish leaders sometimes express concern that U.S. expectations of Turkish cooperation
regarding Syria and Iraq are insufficiently sensitive to Turkey’s domestic pressures and security
vulnerabilities. Turkey faces the significant burden of hosting refugees from both Syria and Iraq;
more than 1.9 million Syrian refugees have entered Turkey since 2011, and they are particularly
concentrated in its southeast and its main urban centers. Erdogan (first as prime minister and now
as president) and President Obama reportedly have had less direct interaction since 2013, perhaps
owing to differences over both foreign policy and the Turkish government’s handling of domestic
affairs.4 Additionally, as discussed further below, developments since 2014 regarding the Syrian
Kurds’ control of territory and military capabilities have led to some U.S.-Turkey differences. Yet,
as described below, Turkey is partnering with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition in a
number of ways.
U.S.-Turkey Coordination Against the Islamic State
in Syria and Iraq
Overview
In late July 2015, Turkish officials confirmed that they would allow the United States and other
members of the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization to use Turkish territory
and airspace for anti-IS airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, significantly easing the logistical burdens of
coalition operations.5 The Obama Administration and Turkish officials agreed to these
arrangements as part of a larger plan to coordinate U.S.-Turkey action to counter the Islamic
State. Turkish officials had previously limited Turkey-based coalition operations to surveillance
flights, reportedly as a means of insisting on a “safe zone” in Syria and seeking U.S. support for
more aggressive efforts to oust the Iranian-backed Syrian government.
Past Turkish insistence on these measures appear to have resembled pleas that Turkish leaders
made similar pleas following the 1991 Gulf War for help in preventing refugee burdens.6 In that
case, the United States established a humanitarian safe zone with ground forces and then patrolled
a no-fly zone in northern Iraq.7 In November 4, 2015, testimony before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Anne Patterson said that the
establishment of a safe zone
…is a hugely complex and resource-intensive issue. And the administration has looked at
this over and over and over again, and there is no option on the table, nor recommended
by the Department of Defense, that does not require a massive, massive amount of air
support that would then detract from the effort against ISIL. We continue to look at this.
We continue to study this. But there is no viable option on the table at this time.
4 Soner Cagaptay, “The Fragile Thaw in U.S.-Turkey Relations,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
PolicyWatch 2402, April 7, 2015.
5 Chris Kozak, “Turkey Expands Campaign Against ISIS and the PKK,” Institute for the Study of War, July 25, 2015.
6 Morton Abramowitz, “Remembering Turgut Ozal: Some Personal Recollections,” Insight Turkey, vol. 15, no. 2,
2013, pp. 42-43.
7 For information on some of those operations, see Gordon W. Rudd, Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi
Kurds in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, 1991, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2004, available at
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/humanitarian_intervention/CMH_70-78.pdf.
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U.S. airstrikes from Turkey commenced in August 2015 via drone aircraft, which have since been
joined at Turkish bases by manned fighter and support aircraft,9 along with accompanying
personnel deployments.
Turkey also took its first open, direct
Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Targets and Threats
military action against the Islamic State
to U.S. Citizens
in Syria during that late July timeframe.
Since the outbreak of conflict in Syria, there have been two
In late August, the first joint U.S.-
terrorist attacks against U.S. installations in Turkey. On
Turkey airstrikes against IS targets in
November 1, 2013, a suicide bomber kil ed himself and a Turkish
Syria reportedly took place.
security guard outside the U.S. embassy in Ankara. On August
10, 2015, two female militants attacked the U.S. consulate in
Congress and other U.S. policymakers,
Istanbul without inflicting casualties and were apprehended by
along with many international actors,
Turkish authorities. Both attacks have been attributed to the
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), a U.S.-
have shown significant concern about
designated terrorist organization with anti-U.S. and anti-NATO
the use of Turkish territory by various
views and some historical links to the Syrian government.
groups and individuals involved in
On September 3, 2015, the State Department issued a travel
Syria’s conflict—including foreign
warning authorizing the voluntary departure of government
fighters from around the world—for
family members “out of an abundance of caution fol owing the
transit, safe haven, and smuggling.
commencement of military operations [as described below in
relation to the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq] out of Incirlik Air
Most sources and U.S. officials
Base.” The Defense Department said that the military would pay
acknowledge that Turkey has
for the departure of families of servicemembers who choose to
introduced or bolstered existing anti-IS
leave.8
initiatives over the past year, in
The travel warning also announced specific travel restrictions for
response to international pressure10 and
U.S. government employees in southeastern Turkey, and strongly
growing Turkish official recognition of
recommended that U.S. citizens avoid (1) areas in close
proximity to the Syrian border and (2) demonstrations and large
threats posed to Turkish security by the
gatherings.
Islamic State and other jihadists. Such
initiatives are aimed at (1) preventing potential foreign fighters from entering Turkey, (2)
preventing those who enter Turkey from traveling to Syria, and (3) curbing illicit oil smuggling
used to finance jihadist activities.11
Complications Involving the Kurds
Many observers speculate that Turkey’s increased coordination with the United States is aimed at
gaining greater influence over the unfolding geopolitical, ethnic, and sectarian struggle along the
Turkey-Syria frontier.12 Shortly after Turkey commenced military strikes against the Islamic State
in Syria in late July, Turkey resumed hostilities with the PKK. Since a fall 2014 crisis in the
Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane, a number of analysts have speculated that Turkey is more
8 David Francis, “U.S. Officials Authorize Families of American Personnel Near Key Turkish Air Base to Leave,”
foreignpolicy.com, September 3, 2015.
9 Susan Fraser, “U.S. Deploys 6 F-15 Fighter Jets to Turkish Air Base,” Associated Press, November 6, 2015; Nicholas
de Larrinaga, “USAF deploys A-10s to Incerlik for Syria strikes,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 22, 2015; Search-
and-rescue aircraft (helicopters and transport planes) have been deployed to a base in the southeastern Turkish city of
Diyarbakir. “US sends search-and-rescue aircraft, crew to Turkey,” Associated Press, September 30, 2015.
10 U.N. Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178 (passed in August and September 2014, respectively) call upon
member states to curtail flows of weapons, financing, and fighters to various terrorist groups.
11 For information on oil smuggling from Syria into Turkey, see CRS Report R43980, Islamic State Financing and U.S.
Policy Approaches, by Carla E. Humud, Robert Pirog, and Liana W. Rosen.
12 Liz Sly and Karen DeYoung, “Turkey agrees to allow U.S. military to use its base to attack Islamic State,”
Washington Post, July 23, 2015.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief
concerned about containing Kurdish political aspirations (with their potential cross-border
implications) than countering Islamist extremism at and within its borders.13 Turkey is reportedly
worried about recent gains by the People’s Protection Units (Kurdish acronym YPG), a militia
dominated by the Syrian Kurdish group known as the Democratic Union Party (Kurdish acronym
PYD),14 as well as about U.S.-PYD/YPG coordination. The PYD is closely affiliated with the
PKK. Recent YPG gains raise the possibility of PKK-affiliated control over most of Syria’s
northern border (see Figure 2 below).15 In September 2015, Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu
said:
By mounting operations against [IS] and the PKK at the same time, we also prevented the
PKK from legitimizing itself. Until the PYD changes its stance, we will continue to see it
in the same way that we see the PKK.16
Although the United States has considered the PKK to be a terrorist group since 1997, it does not
apply this characterization to the Syrian Kurdish PYD/YPG. A State Department deputy
spokesperson said in an October 20, 2014, daily press briefing that “the PYD is a different group
than the PKK legally, under United States law.” In a September 21, 2015, daily press briefing, the
State Department spokesperson said that the United States does not consider the YPG to be a
terrorist organization, and that despite Turkish concerns about the group, a coalition of the willing
does not “have to agree on every issue.”
Figure 2. Syria: Areas of Kurdish Control
Source: Mike King, New York Review of Books (accessed November 13, 2015).
Notes: All locations are approximate
13 Orhan Coskun and Dasha Afanasieva, “Turkey stages first air strikes on Islamic State in Syria,” Reuters, July 24,
2015.
14 The YPG is formally the military arm of a de facto government established by the PYD and the Kurdish National
Council (KNC). The KNC is aligned with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the dominant faction within the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq led by President Masoud Barzani. Soner Cagaptay and Andrew Tabler,
“The U.S.-PYD-Turkey Puzzle,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 2510, October 25, 2015.
15 Henri J. Barkey, “What’s Behind Turkey’s U-Turn on the Islamic State?,” Woodrow Wilson Center, July 29, 2015.
16 Semih Idiz, “Turkey’s Middle East policy ‘fiasco,’” Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse, September 28, 2015.
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Looking Ahead
The overall trajectory of U.S.-Turkey cooperation in Syria remains unclear. In the summer of
2015, officials from both countries anticipated coordinating air operations to clear a specific area
of northwest Syria of IS forces (roughly between the Afrin and Kobane cantons found in Figure 2
above). However, the following developments appear to have subsequently complicated prospects
for such operations, even as the United States, Turkey, Russia, Iran, and other countries meet
periodically to discuss diplomatic options:
Russia’s growing direct military involvement in Syria (including at least two
instances in October in which Russian aircraft reportedly breached Turkish
airspace) and renewed international diplomacy aimed at addressing the conflict.
The October reconfiguration of the U.S. train-and-equip program toward U.S.
arming of groups in Syria (including an umbrella organization involving the
YPG, various Syrian Arab rebel factions, and some Assyrian Christians), and the
direct insertion of U.S. special forces.17 The Obama Administration announced
the reconfiguration after a few cases in which Syrian anti-IS fighters trained in
Turkey were captured by or provided weapons to other militant groups.
Even if these or other complications do not prevent the United States and Turkey from eventually
moving forward with establishing some sort of patrolled zone, who might secure such an area on
the ground remains unclear. Turkey clearly rejects the notion of permitting Syrian Kurdish forces
(PYD/YPG) to occupy the area. Possible Russian interest in partnering with the YPG against
Sunni Islamist fighters18 could fuel U.S.-Russia competition for Kurdish support that might
isolate Turkey further in its adversarial stance toward the YPG. Meanwhile, media reports
indicate that the United States is unwilling to accept, as patrollers of a zone, the Islamist-led
Syrian opposition forces that Turkey and various Arab Gulf states are reportedly supporting.19
Turkish officials have expressed hopes that an “IS free” zone might create opportunities for
Syrian refugees to return to their home country and to mitigate future refugee flows.20 An
unknown number of refugees living in Turkey—originally from Syria, Iraq, or elsewhere—are
seeking permanent refuge in Europe. Reportedly, some “have been living in Turkey for months,
sometimes years. They complain that Turkey’s failure to grant them full refugee status has made
it a struggle to access basic services and jobs.”21 Crossings over land to Europe are generally
17 According to one U.S. journalist, “Pentagon officials say the Turks should be reassured, because the U.S. will now
have greater oversight of the YPG's 25,000 fighters and can prevent supplies from getting to the PKK, which Turkey
views as a terrorist group.” David Ignatius, “The Syrian Tinderbox,” Washington Post, November 4, 2015.
18 See, e.g., “YPG says it is ready to cooperate with Russia against IS,” Kurdpress, October 1, 2015; “Pro-Hezbollah
daily says party in Syria pact with Russia,” Now, September 23, 2015.
19 See, e.g., Jamie Dettmer, “Russia’s Buildup in Syria May Thwart Idea of Safe Haven,” Voice of America, September
30, 2015.
20 Anne Barnard, et al., “Turkey and U.S. Plan to Create Syria ‘Safe Zone’ Free of ISIS,” New York Times, July 27,
2015.
21 “Refugees dispersed from Turkey-Greece border in buses,” Agence France Presse, September 20, 2015. According
to the instrument of its accession to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, “the Government of Turkey
maintains the provisions of the declaration made under section B of article 1 of the Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, according to which it applies the Convention only to persons who have
become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe,” http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/international_treaties.php?id_state=226. In 2014, Turkey enacted a Law on Foreigners and
International Protection which—despite the geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention—provides protection and
assistance for asylum-seekers and refugees, regardless of their country of origin. 2015 UNHCR country operations
(continued...)
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closed to refugees and undocumented migrants. Some people have nevertheless found their way
past the official checkpoints on land, while many others try sea routes—especially to nearby
Greek islands—on crowded boats under questionable safety conditions.22
European leaders such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel have opened discussions with
Turkey about the possibility of providing Turkey with humanitarian aid to increase its cooperation
in stemming refugee and migrant flows. As part of such an arrangement, Europeans might show
greater consideration of Turkish aspirations for visa-free travel to European countries, and for
resuming European Union accession negotiations.23 However, some human rights activists have
expressed concern about any arrangement that might result in reduced international scrutiny of
Turkey’s commitment to civil liberties.24
A number of questions surround U.S.-Turkey dealings regarding Syria and Iraq. These include:
To what extent might Russian-Iranian and U.S.-led actions in Syria—potentially
seen by significant segments of Turkey’s population as bolstering anti-Sunni and
pro-Kurdish outcomes—affect Turkey’s willingness to combat the Islamic State?
How can the United States coordinate operations with both Turkey and the
PYD/YPG, and what are the larger implications for the parties and the region?
What effect will U.S.-Turkey dealings have on military and political outcomes in
Syria? Will they make the survival of Bashar al Asad and his regime more or less
likely? Would Turkey benefit from a de facto or formal partition of Syria?
How will developments in the region and in potential destination countries in
Europe affect the situation of Syrian and Iraqi refugees currently in Turkey? To
what extent are refugees likely to remain in Turkey, return to Syria or Iraq, or
resettle in third countries?
Domestic Politics and Stability
Turkish domestic politics feature controversies regarding power, constitutional democracy,
corruption, and civil liberties; renewed Turkey-PKK conflict with the potential to destabilize
significant areas of the country; security concerns regarding Syria and Iraq; and economic
anxieties. The vigorous debate over whether (and, if so, how) President Erdogan exercises
authoritarian control over Turkey’s government and society will likely continue for the
foreseeable future.
It is unclear to what extent non-Turkish actors will play a significant role in resolving unanswered
questions regarding Turkey’s commitment to democracy and limited government, its secular-
religious balance, and its Kurdish question. Erdogan and his supporters periodically resort to
criticism of Western countries in apparent efforts to galvanize domestic political support against
outside influences.25 Moreover, some observers assert that various security-related concerns—
(...continued)
profile – Turkey.
22 Rick Lyman, “Bulgaria Puts Up a New Wall, but This One Keeps People Out,” New York Times, April 6, 2015.
23 Valentina Pop, “EU Readies Migrant Aid for Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, November 13, 2015.
24 Tim Arango, “Merkel Links Turkey’s E.U. Hopes to Stemming Flow of Refugees,” New York Times, October 18,
2015.
25 Mustafa Akyol, “What turned Erdogan against the West?,” Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse, February 3, 2015.
“Congressional Turkish caucus raps Erdogan for Israel comments,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), August 6, 2014.
(continued...)
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such as those involving the Islamic State and refugees—make the United States and the European
Union less likely to try to check Turkish officials’ domestic actions.26
See CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti, for additional
background information and analysis on Turkey’s domestic politics, including the Fethullah
Gulen movement.
2015 Elections and Questions Regarding Continued AKP Rule
On November 1, 2015, the AKP (or AK Party) won back the majority it had lost during elections
five months earlier in June, in which no
party won a majority. The November
Figure 3. Turkish Election Results
result surprised most pollsters and other
observers, but represented a return to
(June and November 2015)
form for the AKP, which had enjoyed
consistent electoral success since first
coming to power in 2002. It also
signaled an end to a long season in
Turkish politics that featured two solid
years of electoral campaigns.
The run-up to the November election
featured intense controversy over
reports of intimidation of and
government interference with a number
of media outlets,27 as well as over major
terrorist suicide bombings at a largely
Kurdish peace rally in Ankara on
October 10. The bombing, which was
apparently linked to the Islamic State, left more than 100 dead.
The day after the election, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said:
We look forward to working with the newly elected parliament and with the future
government. As a friend and NATO ally, the United States is committed to continuing
our close coordination with Turkey to advance our shared political, security and
prosperity agendas.
We are, however, deeply concerned that media outlets and individual journalists critical
of the government were subject to pressure and intimidation during the campaign,
seemingly in a manner calculated to weaken political opposition. We note that the OSCE
released a statement today highlighting that parliamentary elections in Turkey offered
voters a variety of choices but that the campaign was affected by violence and restrictions
on media freedom. We have both publicly and privately raised our concerns about
freedom of the press, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly in Turkey, and we
(...continued)
An AKP parliamentary leader subsequently sent a written response disputing the letter’s assertions. Eli Lake, “Turkish
Leader Doubles Down on Blaming Israel for Anti-Semitism,” Daily Beast, August 6, 2014.
26 See, e.g., “Turkey’s AK party: Another victory for illiberalism,” Economist, November 4, 2015.
27 See, e.g., “Erdogan’s Formula for Consolidating Clout in Turkey,” New York Times, November 2, 2015.
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continue to urge Turkish authorities to uphold the universal democratic values that are
enshrined in Turkey’s constitution.28
The AKP gained from President Erdogan’s decision to call new elections rather than contemplate
a coalition arrangement based on the June outcome. The AKP’s results improved despite the
multiple internal and external challenges that intensified for Turkey in the months between the
two elections—increased security concerns, a seemingly slowing economy, and issues regarding
civil liberties. Erdogan (officially a nonpartisan actor, but still the AKP’s leading figure) and
Prime Minister Davutoglu appear to have won back votes for the AKP largely based on (1) the
argument (using selective examples from past decades of Turkey’s republican history) that a
majority government would provide greater stability than a coalition, (2) an assertive approach to
combating and criticizing the PKK after the July outbreak of violence that apparently resonated
with Turkish nationalists and conservative Kurds, and (3) reassurances of economic security.29
The Kurdish nationalist-rooted Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi, HDP)
still managed to get the 10% of the vote it needed to maintain its place in Turkey’s parliament,
thereby preventing the AKP from the supermajority it would need (330 parliamentary seats) to
call a constitutional referendum. President Erdogan and his associates frequently proclaim their
interest in holding such a referendum to expand Erdogan’s formal powers. Under Turkey’s 1982
constitution, as amended, most executive power resides with the prime minister. Barring any
midterm changes in leadership, Erdogan, Davutoglu, and the AKP will remain in power until
presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2019.
With post-election Turkey facing a daunting array of challenges, U.S. policymakers and other
observers are focused on the following questions, each of which has implications for the others:
Security Issues: How will AKP’s victory affect Turkey’s approaches to Syria
and Iraq, and to challenges both domestic and foreign regarding Kurds and the
Islamic State? To what extent will Turkish leaders countenance or oppose U.S.
assistance for the PYD/YPG and/or proposals permitting a continued role in
Syria for Bashar al Asad? To what extent will Turkish leaders feel emboldened to
continue objecting to these initiatives and/or to pursue conflict with adversaries?
Domestic Policy: Will Erdogan and Davutoglu seek greater accommodation with
non-AKP constituencies and opposing or independent voices from civil society
now that Turkey’s two-year electoral season has ended, or will they use their
mandate more confrontationally? Specifically, how might they seek to bolster
Erdogan’s powers either via constitutional change or the broad use of Erdogan’s
existing legal prerogatives and his personal control or influence over key
economic, bureaucratic, and media networks?30
28 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Josh Earnest en route Newark, New
Jersey, 11/2/2015. On October 26, 65 Members of Congress signed an October 26 letter to President Obama to
“support and encourage free, open, and fair elections in Turkey.” Text of letter available at
http://rokita.house.gov/sites/rokita.house.gov/files/10-26-2015-Turkey-Free-Open-Fair-Elections.pdf.
29 For various analyses, see Yusuf Muftuoglu, “How Erdogan's Dramatic Comeback Happened, and How Far Its
Impact Might Reach,” Huffington Post, November 2, 2015; Mustafa Akyol, “How the AKP dominated yesterday's
election in Turkey,” Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse, November 2, 2015; Tim Arango and Ceylan Yeginsu, “Islamist Party
Gains Majority in Turkish Vote,” New York Times, November 2, 2015; “Second time’s a charm: A huge win for
Turkey’s ruling AK party,” economist.com, November 2, 2015.
30 One U.S.-based analyst claims that Erdogan and his associates control approximately 70 percent of Turkey’s media
outlets. Henri J. Barkey, “Turkey’s Elections, the Syrian Crisis, and the US,” American Interest, November 4, 2015.
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Economy: How will the AKP deliver on its promises of economic security in
light of negative economic trends in Turkey regarding growth, exports, currency
strength, and security-related disruptions to tourism and other key sectors?
Recent Resumption of Turkey-PKK Violence and Future Prospects
As mentioned above, Turkey’s government and the PKK resumed hostilities in July 2015 amid
mutual recrimination, ending a cease-fire that had been in place since March 2013 as part of a
broader Turkey-PKK “peace process.” Subsequently, Turkish authorities have arrested hundreds
of terrorism suspects in southeastern Turkey and Turkey-PKK violence has resulted in hundreds
of casualties.31 A temporary cease-fire to allow for the November 1 elections to take place ended
almost immediately afterwards, with Erdogan vowing to bring about the PKK’s defeat and
disarmament.32
The following is one Turkish journalist’s explanation of key contributing factors to the
resumption of violence:
…the growing strength of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq and the
civil war in Syria have given a boost to Kurdish nationalism and have been advantageous
for the PKK. PKK leadership, aware of the fact that the government was not sincere in
advancing the peace process, was ensuring its readiness during the cease-fire period in
case the process failed.33
Turkey-PKK violence has led Turkish authorities to take emergency measures in hopes of
pacifying conflict in key southeastern urban areas. This has fueled international concerns about
possible human rights abuses.34 In the summer of 2015, Turkish citizens opposed to the PKK
violence launched demonstrations throughout the country. A number of attacks on HDP political
offices, as part of mass demonstrations, took place in apparent reprisal for PKK actions. Some
HDP offices were also attacked prior to the June elections. Theories about who provoked these
reprisals focused on Turkish nationalist groups,35 with some commentators claiming that Erdogan
may have provided partial incitement with public statements conflating the HDP with the PKK.36
The October 10 suicide bombings in Ankara led to renewed nationalistic recriminations and
allegations that the government provided insufficient security for the targeted pro-Kurdish rally.
U.S. officials, while supportive of Turkey’s prerogative to defend itself from attacks, have
advised Turkey to show restraint and proportionality in its actions against the PKK. They also
have expressed desires for the parties to resolve their differences peaceably. Many European
officials have called for an immediate end to violence and resumption of peace talks.37
31 One estimate claims that since June 2015, “more than 150 Turkish security officials and hundreds of PKK fighters
have been killed in the conflict.” Dion Nissenbaum, “Turkish Jets Strike at Kurds,” Wall Street Journal, November 4,
2015.
32 Emre Peker, “Turkish Leader Seeks More Powers,” Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2015.
33 Lale Kemal, “Cease-fire may spoil political game,” Today’s Zaman, September 10, 2015.
34 Statement by the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, “Turkey should ensure immediate access to
Cizre by independent observers,” September 11, 2015.
35 Alex McDonald, “Far-right activists attack HDP offices across Turkey after anti-PKK demos,” Middle East Eye,
September 8, 2015.
36 Emma Sinclair-Webb, “Turkey: media crackdown amid escalating violence,” openDemocracy, September 11, 2015.
37 Many Western European countries have sizeable populations of Turkish Kurdish origin (more than a million Kurds
live in Europe), and the PKK reportedly maintains a presence in some of these countries as well.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief
The future trajectory of Turkey-PKK violence and political negotiation may depend on a number
of factors, including:
Which Kurdish figures and groups (the imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah
Ocalan, various PKK militant leaders, the professedly nonviolent HDP) are most
influential in choosing between armed struggle and political negotiation.
Erdogan’s approach to and influence on Turkish government policy regarding the
Kurdish issue. Most domestic and international observers previously considered
Erdogan to be the only Turkish leader strong enough to deliver a peaceful
solution, but Turkey’s recent turn to military force has led many to question this
assumption.
How the resumption of violence might affect Turkey’s internal stability,
governing institutions, and ability to administer the southeast. Some analysts
express concern about civil conflict, and also question whether the military’s
involvement in this issue could lead to its return to a more prominent role in
Turkish governance.38 Many Kurdish militants, activists, and local leaders in
various parts of southeastern Turkey appear to be pressing for imminent
autonomy.
The extent to which the United States and perhaps European actors might—based
on their view of the issue’s priority—offer incentives to or impose costs on
Turkey and the PKK in efforts to mitigate violence and promote a political
resolution.
Turkey’s Strategic Orientation: Past, Present, Future
Many observers express opinions on the future trend of Turkey’s strategic orientation. Turkey’s
embrace of the United States and NATO during the Cold War came largely as a reaction to post-
World War II actions by the Soviet Union seemingly aimed at moving Turkey and its strategic
control of maritime access points into a Soviet sphere of influence. Turkey’s historically driven
efforts to avoid domination by outside powers—sometimes called the “Sèvres syndrome”39—
resonate in its ongoing attempts to achieve greater military, economic, and political self-
sufficiency and to influence its surrounding environment. Such initiatives could—based on a
number of variables—lead Turkey toward a more independent stance, in which decreased
dependence on the West might come at least partly through dealings with a number of other
regional and global powers.
Whether this could ultimately lead to new dynamics of dependence on or alignment with other
powers has become a subject of speculation. In recent years, Turkey has boosted cooperation in
certain areas with Russia (energy and trade) and China (trade and defense), among other
countries. Some observers assert that domestic developments in Turkey appearing to challenge
Western liberal norms may partially echo those in Russia and in some other countries. These
observations fuel debate regarding how such trends might affect Turkey’s foreign policy
partnerships.40
38 See, e.g., Barcin Yinanc, “New army chief’s faces four challenges to transform Armed Forces,”
hurriyetdailynews.com, August 10, 2015.
39 See, e.g., Nick Danforth, “Forget Sykes-Picot. It’s the Treaty of Sèvres That Explains the Modern Middle East,”
foreignpolicy.com, August 10, 2015.
40 Daniel Dombey, “Putin and Erdogan: not quite kindred spirits,” ft.com, December 2, 2014.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief
A more assertively independent Turkey might still seek to remain within the framework of the
NATO alliance. However, the extent to which strategic and practical coordination with other
NATO members would continue is unclear, especially if Turkey strengthens ties with countries
that challenge U.S. policies globally or regionally. For the time being, Turkey lacks comparable
alternatives to its security and economic ties with the West, with which it shares a more than 60-
year legacy of institutionalized cooperation. Its leaders may therefore be responsive to efforts by
allies and key trading partners to identify priorities relating to this legacy of cooperation. For
example, after Turkey’s initial announcement in September 2013 that it planned to co-produce a
missile defense system with China, it has since reconsidered.41 Also, following Russia’s military
escalation in Syria during the fall of 2015, Turkey has apparently bolstered its cooperation with
the United States and has stated it might be willing to redefine some aspects of its energy
cooperation with Russia.42 However, Turkish leaders’ receptivity to Turkey’s traditional Western
allies could wane over time if they believe that Turkey’s interests and preferred approaches to
issues are not addressed by or reflected in key Western initiatives or institutional frameworks and
processes.
Author Contact Information
Jim Zanotti
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jzanotti@crs.loc.gov, 7-1441
41 Lale Sariibrahimoglu and Nicholas de Larrinaga, “T-Loramids decision nearing, says Turkish procurement chief,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 27, 2015.
42 Daren Butler, “Turkey's Erdogan warns Russia on nuclear project, natural gas – papers,” Reuters, October 8, 2015.
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