Navy Irregular Warfare and
Counterterrorism Operations:
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
November 6, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22373
Navy Role in Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism
Summary
The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of irregular warfare (IW) and
counterterrorism (CT) activities. Among the most readily visible of the Navy’s recent IW
operations have been those carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Many of the Navy’s contributions to IW operations around the world are made by Navy
individual augmentees (IAs)—individual Navy sailors assigned to various Department of Defense
(DOD) operations.
The May 1-2, 2011, U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed Osama bin Laden
reportedly was carried out by a team of 23 Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an
acronym standing for Sea, Air, and Land). The SEALs reportedly belonged to an elite unit known
unofficially as Seal Team 6 and officially as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group
(DEVGRU).
The Navy established the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) informally in October
2005 and formally in January 2006. NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a
number of Navy organizations that have a role in IW operations. The Navy established the Navy
Irregular Warfare Office in July 2008, published a vision statement for irregular warfare in
January 2010, and established “a community of interest” to develop and advance ideas,
collaboration, and advocacy related to IW in December 2010.
The Navy’s riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine capabilities of the Navy’s SEALs
and relieve Marines who had been conducting maritime security operations in ports and
waterways in Iraq.
The Global Maritime Partnership is a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of
cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces,
for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats.
The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships,
such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to
waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions,
particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries and for increasing
the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations.
The Navy’s IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress,
including how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Strategic and Budgetary Context............................................................................................... 1
Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations .................................................................................. 1
Note on Terminology .......................................................................................................... 1
Navy IW Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq ..................................................................... 1
Navy IW Operations Elsewhere .......................................................................................... 2
Navy Individual Augmentees (IAs) .................................................................................... 3
November 2011 Navy Testimony ....................................................................................... 3
2012 RAND Corporation Report ........................................................................................ 3
Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations .................................................................................. 3
In General ........................................................................................................................... 3
May 1-2, 2011, U.S. Military Operation That Killed Osama Bin Laden ............................ 5
Detention of Terrorist Suspects on U.S. Navy Ships .......................................................... 6
Navy Initiatives to Improve Its IW and CT Capabilities ........................................................... 7
Navy Irregular Warfare Office ............................................................................................ 7
2010 Navy Vision Statement for Countering Irregular Challenges .................................... 8
Navy Community of Interest for Countering Irregular Challenges .................................... 8
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) ............................................................... 8
Global Maritime Partnership ............................................................................................... 9
Partnership Stations .......................................................................................................... 10
Coastal Riverine Force ...................................................................................................... 10
Other Organizational Initiatives ........................................................................................ 12
FY2016 Funding Request ....................................................................................................... 12
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress ........................................................................................ 15
Potential Impact of Continuing Resolution (CR) for FY2016 ................................................ 15
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 15
Degree of Emphasis on IW and CT in Future Navy Budgets ................................................. 16
Additional Oversight Questions .............................................................................................. 16
Legislative Activity for FY2016 .................................................................................................... 17
FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1735/S. 1376) ........................................ 17
House ................................................................................................................................ 17
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 17
Conference (Version Vetoed) ............................................................................................ 20
FY2016 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2685/S. 1558) ......................................................... 21
House ................................................................................................................................ 21
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 21
Appendixes
Appendix A. November 2011 Navy Testimony on Navy IW Activities ........................................ 22
Appendix B. 2012 RAND Corporation Report Findings and Recommendations ......................... 26
Appendix C. Detention of Terrorist Suspects on U.S. Navy Ships ............................................... 28
Appendix D. 2010 Navy Irregular Warfare Vision Statement ....................................................... 33
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Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 41
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Navy Role in Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism
Introduction
This report provides background information and potential issues for Congress on the Navy’s
irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) operations. The Navy’s IW and CT activities
pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including how much emphasis to place
on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets. Congress’s decisions regarding Navy IW and CT
operations can affect Navy operations and funding requirements, and the implementation of the
nation’s overall IW and CT strategies.
Background
Strategic and Budgetary Context
For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which Navy IW and CT operations may
be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations
Note on Terminology
The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) report on the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),
like DOD’s report on the 2010 QDR, avoids the term irregular warfare and instead uses terms
such as counterinsurgency and stability operations. The Navy sometimes uses the phrase
confronting irregular challenges (CIC) instead of the term irregular warfare. For purposes of
convenience, this report continues to use the term irregular warfare and the abbreviation IW.
Navy IW Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
Among the most readily visible of the Navy’s IW (and CT) operations in recent years have been
those carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in Afghanistan and (in earlier years) Iraq.
Regarding its operations in the Middle East, the Department of the Navy (DON) states the
following in its FY2015 budget highlights book:
FY 2014 continues supporting Navy and Marine Corps operations in Afghanistan. Today
the Marine Corps has a declining force of ~8,000 Marines in the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) with 3,900 in Afghanistan, reflecting the continuing responsible drawdown
of forces in Afghanistan.
Beyond the Marines participating in counterinsurgency, security cooperation, and civil-
military operations in Afghanistan and throughout CENTCOM, on any given day there
are approximately 6,000 Sailors ashore and another 10,000 afloat throughout
CENTCOM. These Sailors are conducting, maritime infrastructure protection, explosive
ordnance disposal/(Counter-IED), combat construction engineering, cargo handling,
combat logistics, maritime security, customs inspections, detainee operations, civil
affairs, base operations and other forward presence activities. In collaboration with the
U.S. Coast Guard, the Navy also conducts critical port operations and maritime
interception operations. Included in our globally sourced forces are Individual
Augmentees (IAs) serving in a variety of joint or coalition billets, either in the training
pipeline or on station. As these operations unfold, the size and type of naval forces
committed to them will likely evolve, thereby producing changes to the overall posture of
naval forces. For the foreseeable future, the demand for naval presence in the theater
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remains high as we uphold our commitments to allies and partner states. The maintenance
of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and U.S. interests in this dynamic region
will depend on naval presence and the ability to strike violent extremist groups when
necessary. Long after the significant land component of the operation is reduced, naval
forces will remain forward.1
DON also states that the
versatility and lethality [of U.S. naval forces] can be applied across the spectrum of
operations, from destroying terrorist base camps and protecting friendly forces involved
in sustained counterinsurgency or stability operations, to defeating enemy anti-access
defenses in support of amphibious operations. We have focused this strategic capability
intensely in Afghanistan in an effort to counter the increasing threat of a well-armed anti-
Coalition militia including Taliban, al-Qa’ida, criminal gangs, narco-terrorists, and any
other antigovernment elements that threaten the peace and stability of Afghanistan. Our
efforts to deter or defeat aggression and improve overall security and counter violent
extremism and terrorist networks advance the interests of the U.S. and the security of the
region.2
DON also states that
The Navy’s RC [reserve component] fulfills the preponderance of the Department’s
adversary and intratheater logistics requirements. The Navy RC helicopter footprint in the
CENTCOM Area of Responsibility has been continuous since 2003, supporting special
operations ground-force missions, psychological operations, and medical and casualty
evacuations.3
Navy IW Operations Elsewhere
In addition to participating in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Navy IW
operations also include the following:
security force assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy ships
exercise and work with foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces,
so as to improve their abilities to conduct maritime security operations;
civic assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy units, including
Navy hospital ships, expeditionary medical teams, fleet surgical teams, and naval
construction units provide medical and construction services in foreign countries
as a complement to other U.S. diplomatic and development activities in those
countries;
disaster relief operations, of which Navy forces have performed several in
recent years; and
counter-piracy operations.4
1 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2014, pp. 7-1 and 7-2.
2 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2014, pp. 7-2 and 7-3.
3 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2014, p. 3-18.
4 For more on counter-piracy operations, see CRS Report R40528, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, by Lauren Ploch
Blanchard et al.
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Navy Individual Augmentees (IAs)
Many of the Navy’s contributions to IW operations around the world are made by Navy
individual augmentees (IAs)—individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations. DON
states that:
Navy IAs are providing combat support and combat service support for Army and Marine
Corps personnel in Afghanistan. As IAs they are fulfilling vital roles by serving in
traditional Navy roles such as USMC support, maritime and port security, cargo
handling, airlift support, Seabee units, and as a member of joint task force/Combatant
Commanders staffs. Non-traditional roles include detainee operations, custom inspections
teams, and civil affairs.5
November 2011 Navy Testimony
The Navy outlined its IW activities in its prepared statement for a November 3, 2011, hearing on
the services’ IW activities before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee. For the text of the Navy’s prepared statement, see Appendix
A.
2012 RAND Corporation Report
A 2012 report on maritime irregular warfare from RAND Corporation, a research firm, provides
additional background information on U.S. maritime irregular warfare operations, both recent and
historical.6 The report also made a series of findings and recommendations relating to U.S.
maritime irregular warfare; for a summary of these findings and recommendations, see Appendix
B.
Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations
In General
Navy CT operations include the following:
Operations by Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an acronym
standing for Sea, Air, and Land), that are directed against terrorists;7
Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist training camps and
facilities, such as those reportedly conducted in Somalia on March 3 and May 1,
2008,8 and those conducted in 1998 in response to the 1998 terrorist bombings of
U.S. embassies in East Africa;9
5 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2014, p. 7-3.
6 Molly Dunigan et al., Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica (CA), 2012, 111 pp.
7 For an account of a series of missions reportedly conducted by SEALS over a six-week period in November and
December 2003 to plant cameras in Somalia for the purpose of conducting surveillance on terrorists, see Sean D.
Naylor, “Hunting Down Terrorists,” Army Times, November 7, 2011: 22.
8 Edmund Sanders, “U.S. Missile Strike in Somalia Kills 6,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2008; Stephanie
McCrummen and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Airstrike Kills Somali Accused of Links to Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post,
May 2, 2008: A12; Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Qaeda Leader Reported Killed In Somalia,” New York Times,
May 2, 2008.
9 For an article on the 1998 strikes, see Pamela Hess, “Report: 1998 Strike Built bin Laden-Taliban Tie,”
(continued...)
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surveillance by Navy ships and aircraft of suspected terrorists overseas;
maritime intercept operations (MIO) aimed at identifying and intercepting
terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at sea, or potentially threatening ships
or aircraft that are in or approaching U.S. territorial waters—an activity that
includes Navy participation in the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI);10
protection of forward-deployed Navy ships, an activity that was intensified
following the terrorist attack on the Navy Aegis destroyer Cole (DDG-67) in
October 2000 in the port of Aden, Yemen;11
protection of domestic and overseas Navy bases and facilities;
working with the Coast Guard to build maritime domain awareness (or MDA,
meaning a real-time understanding of activities on the world’s oceans), and
engaging with the U.S. Coast Guard to use the National Strategy for Maritime
Security to more rapidly develop capabilities for Homeland Security, particularly
in the area of MDA;
assisting the Coast Guard in port-security operations;12
developing Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) as part of Joint
Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA); and
operations by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), for which
combating terrorism is a core mission area.13
(...continued)
NavyTimes.com (Associated Press), August 22, 2008.
10 For more on the PSI, see CRS Report RL34327, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
11 For a discussion of the attack on the Cole, see CRS Report RS20721, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Raphael F. Perl and Ronald O'Rourke. A September 13, 2014, press report states:
The first ever attack by the newly-announced Indian Subcontinent branch of Al Qaeda went really,
really, poorly. The attack launched last Saturday [September 13] in Pakistan seems to have targeted
the wrong ship.
Fighters of the Islamic terror group branch that was unveiled two weeks ago had planned to storm
an American aircraft carrier at a Karachi port, but found a Pakistani Navy ship in its place, The
Telegraph reports. The attackers suffered heavy casualties as the Pakistani Navy easily
overpowered their attempt. Three of the al-Qaeda fighters were killed and seven were arrested
according to Pakistani officials. Two Pakistani Naval guards were wounded.
(Andrew Hart, “New Al Qaeda Branch Attacks Wrong Ship,” Huffington Post
(www.huffingtonpost.com), September 13, 2014.)
12 See, for example, Emelie Rutherford, “Navy’s Maritime Domain Awareness System ‘Up And Running’,” Defense
Daily, September 4, 2008; and Dan Taylor, “New Network Allows Navy To Track Thousands of Ships Worldwide,”
Inside the Navy, September 8, 2008. For more on the Coast Guard and port security, see CRS Report RL33383,
Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and Maritime Security, by John Frittelli and Jennifer E. Lake, and
CRS Report RL33787, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities, by Paul W. Parfomak
and John Frittelli.
13 NCIS states on its website that “the NCIS mission is to investigate and defeat criminal, foreign, and terrorist
intelligence threats to the United States Navy and Marine Corps, wherever they operate: ashore, afloat, or in
cyberspace,” and that combating terrorism is a core mission area for NCIS. Regarding this mission, the website states
that
Protecting the naval forces from violent extremist organizations and individuals is one of NCIS’
highest priorities. As the primary law enforcement and counterintelligence component for the naval
(continued...)
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DON states that
While forward, acting as the lead element of our defense-in-depth, naval forces will be
positioned for increased roles in combating terrorism.... Expanded Maritime Interdiction
Operations are authorized by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense to
intercept vessels identified to be transporting terrorists and/or terrorist-related materiel
that poses an imminent threat to the United States and its allies.....
We have done small, precise attacks against terrorist cells and missile attacks against
extremist sanctuaries.14
DON also states that
Our defense efforts are aimed at countering violent extremists and destabilizing threats,
as well as upholding our commitments to allies and partner states. These armed
adversaries such as terrorists, insurgents, and separatist militias are a principal challenge
to U.S. interests in East Africa.15
An April 8, 2013, press report about U.S. counterterrorism operations stated, regarding one
particular operation, that
The uncertainties were evident nine months into Mr. Obama’s first term, when
intelligence agencies tracked down Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a suspect in the attacks on
two American embassies in East Africa in 1998.
The original plan had been to fire long-range missiles to hit Mr. Nabhan and others as
they drove in a convoy from Mogadishu, Somalia, to the seaside town of Baraawe. But
that plan was scrubbed at the last minute, and instead a Navy SEALs16 team helicoptered
from a ship and strafed Mr. Nabhan’s convoy, killing him and three others. The SEALs
landed to collect DNA samples to confirm the identities of the dead.17
May 1-2, 2011, U.S. Military Operation That Killed Osama Bin Laden
The May 1-2, 2011, U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed Osama bin
Laden—reportedly called Operation Neptune’s Spear—reportedly was carried out by a team of 23
Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an acronym standing for Sea, Air, and Land).
The SEALs reportedly belonged to an elite unit known unofficially as Seal Team 6 and officially
as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU).18 The SEALs reportedly were
(...continued)
services, NCIS is focused on countering threats to the physical security of Sailors, Marines, and
Department of the Navy (DON) civilian personnel and on preventing terrorist attacks against
installations and ships.
NCIS is responsible for detecting, deterring, and disrupting terrorism worldwide through a wide
array of offensive and defensive capabilities. Offensive operations aim at identifying and
interdicting terrorist activities. In defensive operations, NCIS supports key DON leaders with
protective services and performs physical security assessments of military installations and related
facilities—including ports, airfields, and exercise areas to which naval expeditionary forces deploy.
(Source: http://www.ncis.navy.mil/CoreMissions/CT/Pages/default.aspx, accessed on November
29, 2011.)
14 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2014, p. 7-2.
15 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2013, p. 7-4.
16 The Navy’s special operations forces are known as SEALs; SEAL is an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land.
17 Scott Shane, “Targeted Killing Comes To Define War On Terror,” New York Times, April 8, 2013: 1.
18 See, for example, Sean D. Naylor, “SEAL Team 6 by the Numbers,” Foreign Policy, July 27, 2015.
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flown to and from Abbottabad by Army special operations helicopters. Bin Laden’s body
reportedly was flown by a U.S. military helicopter from Abbottabad to a base in Afghanistan, and
from there by a Marine Corps V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft to the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson (CVN-70),
which was operating at the time in the Northern Arabian Sea. A few hours later, bin Laden’s body
reportedly was buried at sea from the ship. Differing accounts have been published regarding
certain details of the operation.19
Press reports in July 2010 stated that U.S. forces in Afghanistan included at that time a special
unit called Task Force 373, composed of Navy SEALs and Army Delta Force personnel, whose
mission is “the deactivation of top Taliban and terrorists by either killing or capturing them.”20
A July 2015 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report21 and a separate CRS report22
provide additional background information on the SEALs. Another CRS report provides further
discussion of the operation that killed Osama bin Laden.23
Detention of Terrorist Suspects on U.S. Navy Ships
An August 16, 2015, press report stated:
After a suspected militant was captured last year to face charges for the deadly 2012
attacks on Americans in Benghazi, Libya, he was brought to the U.S. aboard a Navy
transport ship on a 13-day trip that his lawyers say could have taken 13 hours by plane.
Ahmed Abu Khattala faced days of questioning aboard the USS New York from separate
teams of American interrogators, part of a two-step process designed to obtain both
national security intelligence and evidence usable in a criminal prosecution.
The case, still in its early stages, is focusing attention on an interrogation strategy that the
Obama administration has used in just a few recent terrorism investigations and
prosecutions. Abu Khattala's lawyers already have signaled a challenge to the process,
setting the stage for a rare court clash over a tactic that has riled civil liberties groups but
is seen by the government as a vital and appropriate tool in prosecuting suspected
terrorists captured overseas.
"I think they view it as important to show that terrorists can be prosecuted in U.S. courts,
and this is an attempt to find a compromise between using people they capture as
intelligence assets and prosecuting them in U.S. courts," said David Deitch, a former
Justice Department terrorism prosecutor. "It's a very hard balance to strike — and may
not be possible."
19 See, for example, Nicholas Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden,” The New Yorker, August 8, 2011, accessed online
August 10, 2011 at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/08/110808fa_fact_schmidle; Peter Bergen, “The
Last Days Of Osama Bin Laden,” Time, May 7, 2012; Mark Bowden, “The Hunt For ‘Geronimo,’” Vanity Fair,
November 2012: 144; Chuck Pfarrer, SEAL Target Geronimo: The Inside Story of the Mission to Kill Osama bin Laden
(St. Martin’s Press, 2011), 240 pp.; Mark Owen (pseudonym) and Kevin Maurer, No Easy Day: The Firsthand Account
of the Mission That Killed Osama Bin Laden (Dutton Adult, 2012), 336 pp.; Peter Bergen, “Who Really Killed Bin
Laden,” CNN.com, March 26, 2013.
20 Matthias et al., “US Elite Unit Could Create Political Fallout For Berlin,” Spiegel (Germany), July 26, 2010. See also
C. J. Chivers et al., “Inside the Fog Of War: Reports From The Ground In Afghanistan,” New York Times, July 26,
2010: 1.
21 Government Accountability Office, Special Operations Forces[:] Opportunities Exist to Improve Transparency of
Funding and Assess Potential to Lessen Some Deployments, GAO-15-571, July 2015, Appendix III (pp. 45-47).
22 CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew
Feickert.
23 CRS Report R41809, Osama bin Laden’s Death: Implications and Considerations, coordinated by John W. Rollins.
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The administration has turned to questioning in international waters as an alternative to
past practices in which suspects were sent to the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, or secret CIA prisons. The process ordinarily begins with questioning from a
specialized team of interrogators who collect intelligence that can inform government
decisions, such as for drone strikes, but cannot be used in court. Then a team of FBI
investigators starts from scratch, advising the detainee of his Miranda rights, such as the
right to remain silent, and gathering statements that prosecutors can present as evidence
in a trial.
Some legal experts expect the hybrid interrogation technique to survive legal challenges.
But defense lawyers are concerned that such prolonged detention can be used to wrangle
a confession or amounts to an end-run around the government's obligation to promptly
place a suspect before a judge.
"Basically by holding the suspects on a ship and delaying their presentment in federal
court, they're able to get a leg up in interrogations," said Seton Hall University law
professor Jonathan Hafetz, who has handled terrorism cases.
Abu Khattala is facing charges in Washington in the Sept. 11-12, 2012, attack on the U.S.
diplomatic mission in Benghazi that killed U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three
other Americans. Following his June 2014 capture in Libya by U.S. special forces, he
was placed aboard a Navy ship that his lawyers say made its way to the U.S. as slowly as
possible to allow maximum time for interrogation. They say Abu Khattala was
questioned for days by representatives from the High Value Detainee Interrogation
Group, then for another stretch by FBI agents....
One early point of contention in the court case is the onboard interrogation. Abu
Khattala's lawyers submitted court filings this month contending that the government
held him "captive on a military ship — without the protection of and in spite of
constitutional guarantees — for the explicit purpose of illegally interrogating him for
almost two weeks."
Federal prosecutors have yet to respond.
Whatever a judge decides, the case taps into a broader legal debate about the prosecution
of terrorist suspects and presents a rare opportunity for a possible ruling on the
admissibility of statements gathered aboard a military vessel.24
For additional background information on detention of terrorist suspects on U.S. Navy ships, see
Appendix C.
Navy Initiatives to Improve Its IW and CT Capabilities
The Navy in recent years has implemented a number of organizational and program initiatives
intended to improve its IW and CT capabilities and activities, including those discussed below.
Navy Irregular Warfare Office
The Navy in July 2008 established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, which is intended, in the
Navy’s words, to “institutionalize current ad hoc efforts in IW missions of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency and the supporting missions of information operations, intelligence operations,
foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to [CT] and
24 Eric Tucker (Associated Press), “Benghazi Prosecution Focuses Attention on US Interrogation Strategy As Defense
Seeks Dismissal,” U.S. News & World Report, August 15, 2015. See also Spencer S. Hsu, “U.S. Defends Seizure and
Interrogation of Benghazi Terrorism Suspect,” Washington Post, September 2, 2015.
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[counterinsurgency].” The office works closely with U.S. Special Operations Command, and
reports to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for information, plans, and strategy.25
2010 Navy Vision Statement for Countering Irregular Challenges
The Navy in January 2010 published a vision statement for countering irregular challenges, which
states in part:
The U.S. Navy will meet irregular challenges through a flexible, agile, and broad array of
multi-mission capabilities. We will emphasize Cooperative Security as part of a
comprehensive government approach to mitigate the causes of insecurity and instability.
We will operate in and from the maritime domain with joint and international partners to
enhance regional security and stability, and to dissuade, deter, and when necessary, defeat
irregular forces.26
The full text of the vision statement is reproduced in Appendix D.
Navy Community of Interest for Countering Irregular Challenges
The Navy in December 2010 established “a community of interest to develop and advance ideas,
collaboration and advocacy related to confronting irregular challenges (CIC).” The community,
which includes a number of Navy organizations, is to be the Navy’s “standing authority to
facilitate: implementation of the U.S. Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (Vision);
promotion of increased understanding of confronting irregular challenges; and synchronization of
CIC-related initiatives within the navy and with its external partners.”27
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)
The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), headquartered at Naval Amphibious Base,
Little Creek, VA, was established informally in October 2005 and formally on January 13, 2006.
NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy organizations that have a
role in IW operations. Navy functions supported by NECC include the following:
riverine warfare;
maritime civil affairs;
expeditionary training;
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD);
expeditionary intelligence;
naval construction (i.e., the naval construction brigades, aka CBs or “Seabee”);
maritime expeditionary security;
expeditionary diving;
25 Zachary M. Peterson, “New Navy Irregular Warfare Office Works to Address ISR Shortfall,” Inside the Navy,
September 1, 2008.
26 Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges,
January 2010, p. 3.
27 Source: Memorandum dated December 22, 2010, from S. M. Harris, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, on the
subject, “Confronting Irregular Challenges Community of Interest (COI) Charter.” A copy of the memorandum was
posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required). For an article discussing the Navy’s establishment of this
community of interest, see Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Taps Other Services, Elite Forces For Irregular Warfare
Advice,” Inside the Navy, January 17, 2011.
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combat camera;
expeditionary logistics;
guard battalion; and
expeditionary combat readiness.
DON states that:
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) is a global force provider of
expeditionary combat service support and force protection capabilities to joint
warfighting commanders. It is responsible for centrally managing the current and future
readiness, resources, manning, training and equipping of a scalable, self-sustaining,
integrated expeditionary force of active and reserve sailors. Expeditionary sailors are
deployed from around the globe, supporting contingency operations and Combatant
Commanders’ Theater Security Cooperation Plans, providing a forward presence of
waterborne and ashore anti-terrorism force protection; theater security cooperation and
engagement; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.28
DON also states that
The Reserve Component expeditionary forces are integrated with the Active Component
forces to provide a continuum of capabilities unique to the maritime environment within
NECC. Blending the AC and RC brings strength to the force and is an important part of
the Navy’s ability to carry out the Naval Maritime Strategy from blue water into green
and brown water and in direct support of the Joint Force. The Navy Reserve trains and
equips over half of the Sailors supporting NECC missions, including naval construction
and explosive ordnance disposal in the CENTCOM region, as well as maritime
expeditionary security, expeditionary logistics (cargo handling battalions), maritime civil
affairs, expeditionary intelligence, and other mission capabilities seamlessly integrated
with operational forces around the world. In addition, Coastal Riverine Group 2 has taken
on a new armed escort mission for High Value Units (HVU) which has traditionally been
provided by the U.S. Coast Guard. The escort enhances force protection for HVUs while
transiting into and out of CONUS ports during restricted maneuvering.29
On October 1, 2012, the Navy established NECC Pacific (NECC PAC) “to provide administrative
control for Navy expeditionary forces assigned to the Pacific theater.” The new organization, the
Navy says, “formalizes a direct administrative relationship between NECC and Commander, U.S.
Pacific Fleet—a linkage that hasn't existed since NECC’s establishment in 2006.”30
Global Maritime Partnership
The Global Maritime Partnership is a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of
cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces,
for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats. DON states,
“Through partnerships with a growing number of nations, including those in Africa and Latin
America, we will strive for a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity.”31
28 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2014, pp. 3-12 and 3-13.
29 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2014, p. 3-20.
30 Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Public Affairs, “#Warfighting: Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
Pacific Established,” Navy News Service, October 3, 2012, accessed October 18, 2012, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/
display.asp?story_id=69947.
31 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2014, p. 7-1. For more on the
Navy’s contribution to multinational antipiracy operations near the Horn of Africa, see CRS Report R40528, Piracy off
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Partnership Stations
The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships,
such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to
waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions,
particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries, and for increasing
the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations. The SPS and APS
can be viewed as specific measures for promoting the above-discussed global maritime
partnership. A July 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report discussed the APS.32
Coastal Riverine Force
The Navy in May 2006 reestablished its riverine force by standing up Riverine Group 1 at Naval
Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA (now part of Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort
Story, or JEBLC-FS). Riverine Group 1 included three active-duty riverine squadrons of 12 boats
each that were established in 2006-2007. Operations of the squadrons from 2006 to 2011 included
multiple deployments to Iraq for the purpose, among other things, of relieving Marines who until
2006 had been conducting maritime security operations in Iraqi ports and waterways.
On June 1, 2012, the Navy merged the riverine force and the Maritime Expeditionary Security
Force (MESF) to create Coastal Riverine Force (CORIVFOR). The Navy states that CORIVFOR
“performs core maritime expeditionary security missions in the green and brown waters, bridging
the gap between traditional Navy blue water operations and land-based forces, providing port and
harbor security for vital waterways and protection of high value assets and maritime
infrastructure.”33 The Navy stated that CORIVFOR was scheduled to reach initial operating
capability (IOC) in October 2012 and full operational capability (FOC) in October 2014, and that
“all current and scheduled routine deployments will continue as normal.”34
A July 14, 2014, news report states:
In 2012, the Navy merged Riverine Forces and Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces
to form the Coastal Riverine Force. There are currently seven squadrons. Squadrons 1, 3
and 11 are home ported on the west coast and Squadrons 2, 4, 8 and 10 are home ported
on the east coast. The force currently consists of both active and reserve service members
who man and operate more than 100 boats, ranging from rubber combat raiding crafts to
53-foot command boats that can carry up to 26 personnel.35
A November 1, 2012, press report stated:
(...continued)
the Horn of Africa, by Lauren Ploch Blanchard et al.
32 Government Accountability Office, Defense Management[:]Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency
Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa, GAO-10-794, July 2010, 63 pp.
33 Kay Savarese, “NECC Establishes Coast Riverine Force,” Navy News Service, June 1, 2012, accessed June 27, 2012,
at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=67545. See also Corinne Reilly, “New Navy Command To
Incorporate Riverines,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, May 16, 2012; Megan Eckstein, “Coastal Riverine Force Expanding
Its Reach Following June 1 Merger,” Inside the Navy, June 11, 2012; and Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy
Reorganizes Post-War Riverine Forces,” Defense News, May 7, 2012: 4.
34 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command Public Affairs, “NECC Announces Formation of Coastal Riverine Force,”
Navy News Service, May 14, 2012, accessed May 15, 2012, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=
67167.
35 Dominique J. Shelton, “Coast Riverine Force: The Brown Water Navy,” Navy News Service, July 14, 2014.
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In Iraq, Riverine forces became a quick reaction force—capable of search-and-seizure,
insertion or extraction—on swift, agile boats with heavy-caliber weaponry. Between
March 2007 and October 2011, the Riverines carried out more than 2,000 missions,
trained Iraqi River Police, screened detainees and discovered weapons caches while
flying 667 unmanned aerial vehicle hours.
Army and Navy river units were dismantled after the Vietnam War ended in 1975 and the
Riverines’s future was in limbo when the Iraq war wound down last year. The Navy,
however, has decided it has an enduring need for these quick and lethal small boat
fighters....
The Navy has decided to merge the more offensive Riverine Group 1 and the more
defensive Maritime Expeditionary Security Force to form the Coastal Riverine Force.
The hybrid command is designed to operate in rivers, coastal waterways and possibly
even in open ocean, bridging the gap between land-based forces and the Navy ships that
operate off the coast.
The 5,000-strong force should be up and running initially this month, a Navy statement
said, although it is not expected to be fully merged and operational for two years.
It will be broken up into two groups. Coastal Riverine Group 1 will be based at Imperial
Beach, Calif., with a squadron at the Naval Amphibious Base in San Diego. Coastal
Riverine Group 2 will have its headquarters in Portsmouth, Va., with additional
squadrons in Bahrain, Rhode Island and Florida.
Each squadron will feature a headquarters element and four distinct companies, three of
which will handle security operations, to include protecting ships and shore facilities,
carrying out search-and seizure-operations and providing security for aircraft.
The fourth, Delta company, will specialize in traditional Riverine duties, such as
insertions and extractions, boardings on rivers and other inland waters, intelligence
collection and more offensive combat operations, said Capt. James Hamblet, Coastal
Riverine Group 2’s commander.
The new force will focus primarily in the Navy’s 5th Fleet area of operations, which
includes the Persian Gulf and waterways, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command skipper
Rear Adm. Michael Tillotson said at the establishment ceremony for Coastal Riverine
Group 2 in June. But, he expects that focus to shift to the Pacific over time.
“We will work with partners along the areas known as Oceana, which includes Indonesia,
Papua New Guinea and Malaysia; we'll work in the areas and help build relationships
with those countries in order to provide security in those areas,” Tillotson said. “The
challenges are out there.”
The force features a mix of maritime expeditionary security and Riverine gear and
apparatus, with plans to obtain more advanced craft in the future. The Coastal Riverines
now operate 113 boats, ranging from rubber combat raiding crafts to 53-foot command
boats that can carry up to 26 personnel. The force has 2,657 active and 2,507 Reserve
personnel, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command spokeswoman Barbara Wilcox wrote
to Stars and Stripes.
The force’s future is the MK-VI patrol boat, which will allow Coastal Riverine sailors the
ability to operate farther off the coast and will improve boarding capabilities as it is
brought into service, Hamblet said. The 78-foot boat is capable of speeds in excess 30
knots with twin diesel engines and water jets. It has a range of 600 nautical miles.36
A January 18, 2013, Navy news report stated:
36 Matthew M. Burke, “Reviving the Roverines,” Stars and Stripes, November 1, 2012: 1.
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Sailors, former Riverines, and family members attended a disestablishment ceremony for
Naval Expeditionary Combat Command’s Riverine Squadron (RIVRON) 3 at Naval
Weapons Station Yorktown, Jan. 17.
The disestablishment marks the merger of offensive Riverine forces with defensive
Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces to form the Coastal Riverine Force
(CORIVFOR), formally established June 1[, 2012]....
CORIVFOR’s primary mission is to conduct maritime security operations across all
phases of military operations by defending high value assets, critical maritime
infrastructure, ports and harbors, both inland and on coastal waterways, and when
commanded, conduct offensive combat operations.
The budget-initiated merger moved portions of the force to San Diego as part of the
National Defense Strategy’s rebalance to the Pacific, which will bring Riverine capability
to the West coast for the first time since 1974, according to Capt. Eric B. Moss,
commander of Coastal Riverine Group 1, formerly Maritime Expeditionary Security
Group 1.
“The Riverine forces will do what they’ve always done, which is continuing to hone their
skills and work in brown water and green water areas,” said Moss. “There is no
abatement of requirements. We continue to get missions and are sourced to meet those
requirements. We’re doing the same with less.”
The merge cuts the former seven active Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF)
squadrons and three active RIVRONs down to three active Coastal Riverine squadrons
and four reserve squadrons.
“This is a reduction in capacity, but not in capability,” said Moss. “I would say this is a
very affordable force. We are light, expeditionary, and bring a lot capability in small
packages. We are familiar with disaggregated operations, so immediately we give the
combatant commander a tailor-able and scalable force.”...
Commissioned July 6, 2007, RIVRON 3 served two deployments in Iraq, fulfilling a total
of 502 combat missions, 268 water security operations and countless U.S./Iraq tactical
convoy operations.37
Other Organizational Initiatives
Other Navy initiatives in recent years for supporting IW and CT operations include establishing a
reserve civil affairs battalion, a Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community consisting of
officers with specialized knowledge of foreign countries and regions, a maritime interception
operation (MIO) intelligence exploitation pilot program, and an intelligence data-mining
capability at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).
FY2016 Funding Request
Navy officials state that, under the Navy’s proposed FY2016 budget,
We will have the capacity to conduct widely distributed CT/IW missions. This mission
requires Special Operations Forces, Navy Expeditionary Combat capabilities such as
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Combined Explosive Exploitation Cells (CEXC),
Intelligence Exploitation Teams (IET), and a variety of platforms that can accommodate
adaptive force packages. PB-16 procures a third MLP/AFSB [Mobile Landing
37 Shannon M. Smith, “RIVRON 3 Disestablishes at Naval Weapon Station Yorktown,” Navy News Service, January
18, 2013.
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Platform/Afloat Forward Staging Base ship] in FY 2017 for delivery in FY 2020, and
funds an enhanced SOF capability on all three AFSBs, which provides more robust
medical facilities, improved C4I, and increased accommodation for aircraft, and other
SOF-specific equipment. PB-16 also procures ten MQ-8C Fire Scout systems for
deployments aboard LCS, which are fundamentally multi-mission.38
DOD’s proposed FY2016 defense budget requests, among other things, $32.521 million for
underwater systems for the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in the Procurement,
Defense-Wide appropriation account, compared to $25.459 million for this line item in FY2015
and $15.439 million in FY2014. DOD states that
The Underwater Systems line item procures dry and wet combat submersibles and
modifications and field changes to the Dry Deck Shelter (DDS). Acquisition procurement
programs of record that will continue are the Shallow Water Combat Submersible
(SWCS) program and modifications to the current DDS. SWCS is the next generation
free-flooding combat submersible that transports Special Operations Forces (SOF)
personnel and their combat equipment in hostile waters for a variety of missions. SOF
units require specialized underwater systems that improve their warfighting capability
and survivability in harsh operating environments. The Dry Combat Submersibles (DCS)
will provide the capability to insert and extract SOF and/or payloads into denied areas
from strategic distances. The program is structured to minimize technical, cost, and
schedule risks by leveraging commercial technologies, procedures and classing methods
to achieve an affordable DCS. Other examples of underwater systems and maritime
equipment include, but may not be limited to underwater navigation, diving equipment,
and underwater propulsion systems.
Systems and equipment are used in the conduct of infiltration/extraction, reconnaissance,
beach obstacle clearance, and other missions. The capabilities of submersible systems
and unique equipment provides small, highly trained forces the ability to successfully
engage the enemy and conduct operations associated with SOF maritime missions....
Justification:
1. DDS. The DDS is a certified diving system that attaches to modified host submarines.
Program provides certification, field changes, and modifications for the DDS.
FY 2016 PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION: Procures minor modification efforts and field
changes to the current class of six DDS's that are in service with the US Navy. Funding
continues engineering design, fabrication, assembly, acceptance, and testing for field
change kits. Includes changes for relocation of equipment inside the DDS hangar to
accommodate SWCS, also includes field changes for items such as camera replacements,
gauge replacements, mechanical quieting, lighting upgrades, and other general field
changes to support deficiency resolution.
2. SWCS (previously Block 1). The SWCS is the replacement for the SEAL Delivery
Vehicle. SWCS is the next generation free-flooding combat submersible that transports
SOF personnel and their combat equipment in hostile waters for a variety of missions.
Procurement funds the replacement system and provides government furnished
equipment (GFE) such as satellite communications antennas, batteries, docking sonar and
radios.
FY 2016 PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION: Purchases two SWCS vehicles, batteries,
trailers, government furnished equipment (GFE), initial spares, and detachment
deployment packages (DDPs).
38 Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House Subcommittee on
Defense, Committee on Appropriations, on FY 2016 Department of the Navy Posture, February 26, 2015, pp. 10-11.
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3. Dry Combatant Submersible (DCS). The DCS craft provides SOF with a diver lock-in
and lock-out capability; that transports personnel and their combat equipment in hostile
waters for a variety of missions.39
An August 20, 2014, blog post states:
The U.S. Navy is hard at work developing new underwater transports for its elite
commandos. The SEALs expect the new craft—and improvements to large submarine
“motherships” that will carry them—to be ready by the end of the decade.
SEALs have ridden in small submersibles to sneak into hostile territory for decades. For
instance, the special operators reportedly used the vehicles to slip into Somalia and spy
on terrorists in 2003.
Now the sailing branch is looking to buy two new kinds of mini-subs. While details are
understandably scarce, the main difference between the two concepts appears to be the
maximum range.
The Shallow Water Combat Submersible will haul six or more naval commandos across
relatively short distances near the surface. The SWCS, which weighs approximately
10,000 pounds, will replace older Mark 8 Seal Delivery Vehicles, or SDVs.
The other sub, called the Dry Combat Submersible, will carry six individuals much
farther and at greater depths. The most recent DCS prototype weighs almost 40,000
pounds and can travel up to 60 nautical miles while 190 feet below the waves.
Commandos could get further into enemy territory or start out a safer distance away with
this new vehicle. SEALs could also use this added range to escape any potential pursuers.
Both new miniature craft will also be fully enclosed. The current SDVs are open to water
and the passengers must wear full scuba gear—seen in the picture above.
In addition, the DCS appears to pick up where a previous craft, called the Advanced
SEAL Delivery System, left off. The Pentagon canceled that project in 2006 because of
significant cost overruns.
But the Navy continued experimenting with the sole ASDS prototype for two more years.
The whole effort finally came to a halt when the mini-sub was destroyed in an accidental
fire.
Special Operations Command hopes to have the SWCS ready to go by 2017. SOCOM’s
plan is to get the DCS in service by the end of the following year.
Underwater motherships
SOCOM and the sailing branch also want bigger submarines to carry these new mini-
subs closer to their targets. For decades now, attack and missile submarines have worked
as motherships for the SEALs.
Eight Ohio- and Virginia-class subs currently are set up to carry the special Dry-Deck
Shelter used to launch SDVs, according to a presentation at the Special Operations Forces
Industry Conference in May.
The DDS units protect the specialized mini-subs inside an enclosed space. Individual
divers also can come and go from the DDS airlocks.
The first-in-class USS Ohio—and her sisters Michigan, Florida and Georgia—carried
ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads during the Cold War. The Navy had expected to
39 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 President's Budget Submission, United States Special Operations
Command Defense Wide Justification Book Volume 1 of 1 Procurement, Defense-Wide, February 2015, pp. 137-138.
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retire the decades-old ships, but instead spent billions of dollars modifying them for new
roles. Today they carry Tomahawk cruise missiles and SEALs.
The Virginias—Hawaii, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina and the future
North Dakota—are newer. The Navy designed these attack submarines from the keel up
to perform a variety of missions.
SOCOM projects that nine submersible motherships—including North Carolina as a
backup—will be available by the end of the year.
The Navy has a pool of six shelters to share between the subs. SOCOM expects the DDS
to still be in service in 2050.
But prototype DCS mini-subs cannot fit inside the current shelter design. As a result, a
modernization program will stretch the DDS units by 50 inches, according to SOCOM’s
briefing.
The project will also try to make it easier to launch undersea vehicles and get them back
into the confines of the metal enclosure. Right now, divers must manually open and close
the outside hatch to get the SDVs out.
Crews then have to drive the craft back into the shelter without any extra help at the end
of a mission—underwater and likely in near-total darkness. The sailing branch wants to
automate this process.
With any luck, the SEALs will have their new undersea chariots and the motherships to
carry them ready before 2020.40
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress
Potential Impact of Continuing Resolution (CR) for FY2016
Overview
One issue for Congress concerns the potential impact on Navy IW and CT operations of an
extended continuing resolution (CR) or a full-year CR for FY2016. Extended or full-year CRs
can lead to challenges in program execution because they typically prohibit the following:
new program starts (“new starts”), meaning the initiation of new program efforts
that did not exist in the prior year;
an increase in procurement quantity for a program compared to that program’s
procurement quantity in the prior year; and
the signing of new multiyear procurement (MYP) contracts.41
In addition, the Navy’s shipbuilding account, known formally as the Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account, is written in the annual DOD appropriations act
not just with a total appropriated amount for the entire account (like other DOD acquisition
accounts), but also with specific appropriated amounts at the line-item level. As a consequence,
under a CR (which is typically based on the prior year’s appropriations act), SCN funding is
40 Joe Trevithick, “U.S. Navy SEALs Are Getting New Mini-Subs,” Real Clear Defense (www.realcleardefense.com),
August 20, 2014.
41 For more on MYP contracts, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in
Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Moshe Schwartz.
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managed not at the account level (like it is under a CR for other DOD acquisition accounts), but
at the line-item level. For the SCN account—uniquely among DOD acquisition accounts—this
can lead to line-by-line misalignments (excesses and shortfalls) in funding for SCN-funded
programs, compared to the amounts those programs received in the prior year. The shortfalls in
particular can lead to program-execution challenges under an extended or full-year CR.
In addition to the above impacts, a CR might also require the agency (in this case, the Navy) to
divide a contract action into multiple actions, which can increase the total cost of the effort by
reducing economies of scale and increasing administrative costs.
The potential impacts described above can be avoided or mitigated if the CR includes special
provisions (called anomalies) for exempting individual programs or groups of programs from the
general provisions of the CR, or if the CR includes expanded authorities for DOD for
reprogramming and transferring funds.
Degree of Emphasis on IW and CT in Future Navy Budgets
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is how much emphasis to place on IW and CT
activities in future Navy budgets, particularly in the context of potential constraints on future
DOD budgets. Supporters of placing continued or increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in
future Navy budgets could cite continued threats to U.S. interests from terrorist organizations and
Navy-unique IW and CT capabilities that need to be supported as part of an effective overall U.S.
IW or CT effort. Supporters of placing a reduced emphasis on emphasis on IW and CT activities
in future Navy budgets could cite the end of major U.S. military operations in Iraq, the winding
down of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, and the need to fund programs for conventional
Navy warfighting capabilities for countering improved Chinese military capabilities. Potential
oversight questions for Congress include the following:
To what degree can or should Navy IW and CT activities be used to reduce the
burden on other services for conducting such activities?
Is the Navy striking an appropriate balance between IW and CT activities and
other Navy concerns, such as preparing for a potential future challenge from
improved Chinese maritime military forces?42
Additional Oversight Questions
In addition to the issues discussed above, the Navy’s IW and CT activities pose some additional
potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following:
How many Navy personnel globally are involved in IW and CT activities, and
where are they located? How much funding is the Navy expending each year on
such activities?
Is the Navy adequately managing its individual augmentee (IA) program?43
Is the Navy devoting sufficient attention and resources to riverine warfare?44
42 For additional discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S.
Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
43 For a discussion of the Navy’s management of the IA program, see Andrew Scutro, “Fleet Forces Takes Charge of
IA Program,” NavyTimes.com, July 7, 2008.
44 For an article that discusses this question from a critical perspective, see Daniel A. Hancock, “The Navy’s Not
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Is the Navy adequately coordinating its IW and CT activities and initiatives with
other organizations, such as the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the
Coast Guard?
Are the Navy’s recent IW and CT organizational changes appropriate? What
other Navy organizational changes might be needed?
Legislative Activity for FY2016
DOD submitted its proposed FY2016 budget to Congress on February 2, 2015. The budget
requests, among other things, $32.521 million for underwater systems for the Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) as line item 55 in the Procurement, Defense-Wide (PDW) appropriation
account.
FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1735/S. 1376)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 114-102 of May 5, 2015) on H.R.
1735, recommends approving DOD’s FY2016 request for underwater systems for SOCOM in the
PDW appropriation account (page 443, line 055).
Section 225 of H.R. 1735 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 225. Briefing on shallow water combat submersible program.
(a) In general.—Not later than the first article delivery date of the shallow water combat
submersible program of the United States Special Operations Command, the Secretary of
Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on such
program.
(b) Elements.—The briefing required under subsection (a) shall include the following
elements:
(1) An updated acquisition strategy, schedule, and costs for the shallow water combat
submersible program.
(2) Major milestones for the program during the period beginning with the delivery of
additional articles and ending on the full operational capability date.
(3) Performance of contractors and subcontractors under the program.
(4) Integration with dry deck shelter and other diving technologies.
(5) Any other element the Secretary or the Commander of the United States Special
Operations Command determine appropriate.
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 114-49 of May 19, 2015) on S.
1376, recommends approving DOD’s FY2016 request for underwater systems for SOCOM in the
PDW appropriation account (page 384, line 55).
(...continued)
Serious About Riverine Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2008: 14-19.
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Section 218 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 218. Limitation on availability of funds for development of the Shallow Water
Combat Submersible.
(a) Limitation.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated in this Act or otherwise
made available for fiscal year 2016 for Special Operations Command for development of
the Shallow Water Combat Submersible, not more than 25 percent may be obligated or
expended until the date that is 15 days after the later of the date on which—
(1) the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics designates
a civilian official responsible for oversight and assistance to Special Operations
Command for all undersea mobility programs; and
(2) the Under Secretary, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, submits to the congressional defense
committees the report described in subsection (b).
(b) Report described.—The report described in this subsection is a report on the Shallow
Water Combat Submersible that includes the following:
(1) An analysis of the reasons for cost and schedule overruns associated with the Shallow
Water Combat Submersible program.
(2) A revised timeline for initial and full operational capability of the Shallow Water
Combat Submersible.
(3) The projected cost to meet the total unit acquisition objective.
(4) A plan to prevent, identify, and mitigate any additional cost and schedule overruns.
(5) A description of such opportunities as may be to recover cost or schedule.
(6) A description of such lessons as the Under Secretary may have learned from the
Shallow Water Combat Submersible program that could be applied to future undersea
mobility acquisition programs.
(7) Such other matters as the Under Secretary considers appropriate.
Regarding Section 218, S.Rept. 114-49 states:
Limitation on availability of funds for development of the Shallow Water Combat
Submersible (sec. 218)
The committee remains concerned about cost and schedule overruns associated with U.S.
Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) undersea mobility acquisition programs
generally and, specifically, the Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS) program.
According to the Government Accountability Office, approximately $677.5 million was
expended to develop and procure the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) to fill
SOCOM’s requirement for a dry combat submersible for special operations personnel,
more than $600.0 million over original budget projections. The ASDS program suffered
from ineffective contract oversight, technical challenges, and reliability and performance
issues. Unfortunately, the SWCS program has experienced many of the same deficiencies
as its predecessor.
In June 2014, the SWCS program was re-baselined as a result of significant cost and
schedule overruns. Less than a year after this re-baselining, the SWCS program is again
19 percent over budget and 21 percent behind schedule (as of January 2015). Overall, the
committee understands the engineering and management development phase of the
program is approximately 126 percent over budget and more than a year behind schedule.
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The committee has sought to encourage better acquisition oversight of the SWCS
program through various legislative provisions and report language in past National
Defense Authorization Acts. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239) directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC) to provide a report to the
congressional defense committees on cost and schedule overruns associated with the
SWCS program and efforts to correct such deficiencies. The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113–66) also clarified that the
SOCOM Acquisition Executive is subordinate to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) for acquisition matters and
directed the USD AT&L and ASD SOLIC to improve oversight of SOCOM acquisition
programs—particularly those special operations-peculiar platforms, like SWCS, that are
at greatest risk of incurring delays and additional costs. Lastly, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81) directed increased oversight
of SOCOM undersea acquisition programs by the USD AT&L, but exempted the SWCS
program from such requirements at the request of SOCOM due to perceived program
stability and low technological risk at the time.
Given the concerns outlined above, the committee recommends a provision that would
prohibit the expenditure of more than 25 percent of the funds available for the SWCS
program for fiscal year 2016 until the USD (AT&L) designates a civilian official within
his office responsible for providing oversight and assistance to SOCOM for all undersea
mobility programs and, in coordination with the ASD SOLIC, provides the congressional
defense committees a report on the SWCS program outlining:
(1) An analysis of the reasons for cost and schedule overruns associated with the SWCS
program;
(2) The revised timeline for SWCS initial and full operational capability;
(3) The projected cost to meet the basis of issue requirement;
(4) A plan to prevent, identify, and mitigate any additional cost and schedule overruns;
(5) Any opportunities to recover cost or schedule;
(6) Any lessons learned from the SWCS program that could be applied to future undersea
mobility acquisition programs; and
(7) Any other matters the Under Secretary deems relevant. (Pages 49-50)
S.Rept. 114-49 also states:
Navy maritime security barriers
Given the continued terrorist threat to U.S. military personnel and installations, the
committee believes the department must seek to continually improve force protection
measures. Security at Navy shipyards and bases depends not only on land-based security
measures, but also on effective maritime barriers. As we tragically observed in the 2000
attack on the USS Cole, an attack against a U.S. vessel in port can result in a significant
loss of American life.
The committee understands that the maritime barriers on many Naval bases and shipyards
may utilize dated technology that may not provide the best available protection.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees no later than March 31, 2016. That report should: (1)
assess the force protection capability of maritime barriers used by the Navy; (2) assess
the force protection capability of maritime barriers that are currently available on the
commercial market; (3) describe whether additional force protection capability could be
achieved by employing new maritime barriers; (4) estimate acquisition costs for the
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alternative maritime barriers currently available on the commercial market; (5) compare
the operating and support costs of current barriers with the projected operating and
support costs of maritime barriers available on the commercial market; and (6) evaluate
whether any potential increase in force protection capability, as well as potential reduced
operating and support costs, would be worth the costs of deploying that capability. In
assessing potential differences in force protection capability, the Secretary should
examine such factors as the estimated stopping power and stopping distance of the
respective maritime barriers. (page 38)
Conference (Version Vetoed)
The conference report (H.Rept. 114-270 of September 29, 2015) on H.R. 1735 (which was agreed
to by the House and Senate on October 1 and 7, 2015, respectively, and vetoed by the President
on October 22, 2015) recommends approving DOD’s FY2016 request for underwater systems for
SOCOM in the PDW appropriation account (page 932, line 055).
Section 220 of H.R. 1735 states:
SEC. 220. Limitation on availability of funds for development of the shallow water
combat submersible.
(a) Limitation.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise
made available for fiscal year 2016 for the development of the shallow water combat
submersible of the United States Special Operations Command, not more than 50 percent
may be obligated or expended until a period of 15 days elapses following the later of the
date on which—
(1) the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics designates
a civilian official to be responsible for oversight of and assistance to the United States
Special Operations Command for all undersea mobility programs; and
(2) the Under Secretary, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and the Commander of the United States
Special Operations Command, submits to the congressional defense committees the
report described in subsection (b).
(b) Report described.—The report described in this subsection is a report on the shallow
water combat submersible program that includes the following:
(1) An analysis of the reasons for cost and schedule overruns associated with the
program, including with respect to the performance of contractors and subcontractors.
(2) A revised timeline for initial and full operational capability of the shallow water
combat submersible.
(3) A description of the challenges associated with the integration with dry deck shelter
and other diving technologies.
(4) The projected cost to meet the total unit acquisition objective.
(5) A plan to prevent, identify, and mitigate any additional cost and schedule overruns.
(6) A description of any opportunities to recover cost or schedule overruns.
(7) A description of any lessons that the Under Secretary may have learned from the
shallow water combat submersible program that could be applied to future undersea
mobility acquisition programs.
(8) Any other matters that the Under Secretary considers appropriate.
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FY2016 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2685/S. 1558)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 114-139 of June 5, 2015) on H.R.
2685, recommends approving DOD’s FY2016 request for underwater systems for SOCOM in the
PDW appropriation account (page 200, line 55).
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 114-63 of June 11, 2015) on S. 1558,
recommends reducing by $3.5 million DOD’s FY2016 request for underwater systems for
SOCOM in the PDW appropriation account, with the reduction being for “Restoring acquisition
accountability: Unit cost growth (SWCS)” (page 144, line 55).
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Appendix A. November 2011 Navy Testimony on
Navy IW Activities
This appendix presents the text of the Navy’s prepared statement for a November 3, 2011, hearing
before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee on the IW activities of the military services. The text of the statement, by Rear
Admiral Sinclair Harris, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, is as follows:
Chairman Thornberry, Congressman Langevin, and distinguished members of the House
Armed Services Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, it is an honor for me
to be here with you today to address the U.S. Navy’s efforts to institutionalize and
develop proficiency in irregular warfare mission areas. These efforts are vital to our
national interests and, as part of a comprehensive approach for meeting complex global
challenges, remain relevant in a time of uncertainty and constant change. To meet these
challenges Admiral Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, recently provided his Sailing
Directions to our Navy emphasizing the mission to deter aggression and, if deterrence
fails, to win our Nation’s wars. Today, the Navy is engaged around the world conducting
preventive activities that stabilize, strengthen, and secure our partners and allies
providing regional deterrence against state and non-state actors, while at the same time
fighting, and winning, our Nation’s wars. We expect the demand for these activities to
increase in the future security environment as a capacity constrained Navy seeks to
maintain access and presence. Emphasis on increased training and education will enable
our continued readiness to effectively meet global demand.
As demand for our Navy continues to grow, we continue to leverage our Maritime
Strategy with our partners, the Marine Corps and Coast Guard. The maritime domain
supports 90% of the world’s trade and provides offshore options to help friends in need,
and to confront and defeat aggression far from our shores as part of a defense in depth
approach to secure our homeland. CNO’s Sailing Directions, coupled with an enduring
Maritime Strategy, underscore the Navy’s focus on multi-mission platforms and highly
trained Sailors that conduct activities across the operational spectrum. Key tenets of the
force are readiness to fight and win today while building the ability to win tomorrow; to
provide offshore options to deter, influence, and win; and to harness the teamwork, talent
and imagination of our diverse force. While the Maritime Strategy spans the spectrum of
warfare, the Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (CIC), released in
January 2010, addresses mission areas of irregular warfare as well as maritime activities
to prevent, limit, and interdict irregular threats and their influence on regional stability
through, insurgency, crime, and violent extremism.
The CIC Vision is derived from our Maritime Strategy with the intention to implement
steps towards increasing the Navy’s proficiency in supporting direct and indirect
approaches that dissuade and defeat irregular actors who exploit uncontrolled or
ungoverned spaces in order to employ informational, economic, technological, and
kinetic means against civilian populations to achieve their objectives. The CIC Vision is
guiding the alignment of organizations, investments, innovation, procedures, doctrine,
and training needed to mainstream CIC capabilities within the Fleet. These efforts are
focused on outcomes of increased effectiveness in stabilizing and strengthening regions,
enhancing regional awareness, increasing regional maritime partner capacity, and
expanding coordination and interoperability with joint, interagency, and international
partners. These outcomes support promoting regional security and stability and
advancing the rule of law allowing good governance and promoting prosperity by helping
partners better protect their people and resources. In addition to preventive activities, the
Vision guides efforts to inhibit the spread of violent extremism and illicit, terrorist, and
insurgent activities. To achieve these outcomes, the Navy is actively reorienting doctrine
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and operational approaches, rebalancing investments and developmental efforts, and
refining operations and partnerships to better support a comprehensive approach to U.S.
efforts. These efforts will provide a Navy capable of confronting irregular challenges
through a broad array of multi-mission capabilities and a force proficient in the CIC
missions of security force assistance, maritime security, stability operations, information
dominance,
and
force
application
necessary
to
support
counterinsurgency,
counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense missions.
In line with its strategy for confronting irregular challenges the Navy has leveraged key
force providers, such as the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, and established
Maritime Partnership Stations, and Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations
Centers to meet the demands and missions consistent with its strategy and vision. The
evolution of intelligence and strike capabilities has enabled the Navy to meet urgent
Combatant Commander requirements for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
operations and highlighted further opportunities for the Navy as an important joint
partner. While these operational organizations and activities deliver Navy capabilities in
theater, the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, established by the CNO in July 2008, has
guided the implementation and institutionalization of the CIC Vision. The Navy Irregular
Warfare Office, working closely with USSOCOM, other Combatant Commanders,
Services, interagency and international partners, has rapidly identified and deployed
Navy capabilities to today’s fight, and is institutionalizing confronting irregular
challenges concepts in the Navy’s planning, investment, and capability development.
The Navy Irregular Warfare Office operates under three primary imperatives consistent
with the Maritime Strategy, CNO’s Sailing Directions, and the Navy’s Vision for
Confronting Irregular Challenges. They provide integration and institutionalization in
CIC mission areas and are; (1) improve the level of understanding concerning the
maritime contribution to the joint force; (2) increase proficiency of the whole of Navy to
confront irregular challenges; and (3) drive maritime and special operations forces to
seamless integration in addressing irregular challenges. These three imperatives focus the
Navy’s implementation efforts and mainstream the concept that preventing wars is as
important as winning them. Our Navy must be ready to transition seamlessly between
operational environments, with the capability and training inherent in the Fleet.
Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 directs the services to “improve DoD
proficiency for irregular warfare, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations”
and directs reporting to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually. Navy efforts
to institutionalize and provide proficiency in confronting irregular challenges, includes
proficiency in irregular warfare missions along with missions of maritime security
operations and information dominance, a key enabler for CIC. Currently, the Navy
leverages its access and persistent presence to both better understand and respond to
irregular challenges and is actively evolving its proficiency to prevent and counter
irregular threats while maintaining its ability to conduct the full spectrum of naval
warfare. Its access, presence, and emphasis on maritime partnerships enable broader
government efforts to address underlying conditions of instability that enhance regional
security. Through its mix of multi-mission capabilities, the Navy provides political
leaders with a range of offshore options for limiting regional conflict through assurance,
deterrence, escalation and de-escalation, gaining and maintaining access, and rapid crisis
response. In addition to its inherent ability to protect the maritime commons, its
effectiveness in building maritime partner capability and capacity contributes to
achieving partner security and economic objectives. Operating in and from the maritime
domain with joint and international partners, the Navy is enhancing regional security
while dissuading, deterring, and when necessary, defeating irregular threats.
The Navy acknowledges the complexity of the future security environment and continues
to explore balanced approaches. Following are the Navy’s current focus areas:
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Fleet-SOF Integration: Navy’s afloat basing support to special operations forces has
extended their reach into denied or semi-permissive areas enabling highly successful
counterterrorism missions. Navy provides inherent combat capabilities, multi-mission
ships and submarines collecting mission critical information, approval for 1052 support
billets for Naval Special Warfare, two dedicated HCS squadrons, and shipboard
controlled UAV orbits supporting counterterrorism operations. The Navy is aligned to
improve this integration through pre-deployment training, mission rehearsals,
improvements to fleet bandwidth allocation, shipboard C4I enhancements, and C2
relationships needed to prosecute time sensitive targets.
Maritime Partnerships: Establishing enduring maritime partnerships is a long-term
strategy for securing the maritime commons. Legal, jurisdictional, and diplomatic
considerations often complicate efforts to secure the maritime commons, especially from
exploitation by highly adaptive irregular actors. In recognition of these considerations,
the Navy is emphasizing partnership engagements with U.S. and international maritime
forces to strengthen regional security.
Information Sharing Initiatives: In an information dominated environment, initiatives that
link joint warfighters, the technology community, and academia are crucial to rapidly
fielding solutions to emerging irregular challenges. These initiatives are the basis for
longer-term efforts to adapt and improve proficiency of Navy platforms to address
irregular challenges.
Doctrine: Development of Tri-Service (Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) Maritime
Stability Operations doctrine that will enable a more effective response to instability in
the littorals.
Organization: Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, which continues to provide in-
demand capabilities such as Maritime Civil Affairs Teams, Riverine Forces, Maritime
Security Forces, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, and Expeditionary Intelligence
Teams.
Today, the Navy continues to meet planned global operational commitments and respond
to crises as they emerge. Overseas Contingency Operations continue with more than
12,000 active and reserve Sailors serving around the globe and another 15,000 at sea in
Central Command. Navy’s Carrier Strike Groups provide 30 percent of the close air
support for troops on the ground in Afghanistan and our Navy and Marine Corps pilots
fly almost 60% of electronic attack missions. Yet, as our national interests extend beyond
Iraq and Afghanistan, so do the operations of our Navy. Over the last year, more than 50
percent of our Navy has been underway daily; globally present, and persistently engaged.
Last year, our Navy conducted counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and North
Arabian Sea with a coalition of several nations, trained local forces in maritime security
as part of our Global Maritime Partnership initiatives in Europe, South America, Africa
and the Pacific and forces in the Sixth Fleet supported NATO in complex operations in
Libya. Navy responded with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the earthquake
in Haiti, the flooding in Pakistan, and the earthquake and tsunami in Japan; and,
conducted the world’s largest maritime exercise, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), which
brought together 14 nations and more than 20,000 military personnel, to improve
coordination and trust in multi-national operations in the Pacific. Our Sailors continue to
deploy forward throughout the world, projecting US influence, responding to
contingencies, and building international relationships that enable the safe, secure, and
free flow of commerce that underpins our economic prosperity and advances the mission
areas that address irregular challenges.
The future vision of the Navy in meeting the uncertain challenges around the globe
remains a force forward, present, and persistent in areas critical to the national interests of
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the United States. CNO, in previous testimony,45 stated: Our Navy continues to conduct a
high tempo of global operations, which we expect to continue even as forces draw down
in Afghanistan. Global trends in economics, demographics, resources, and climate
change portend an increased demand for maritime presence, power, and influence.
America’s prosperity depends on the seas… and as disruption and disorder persist in our
security environment, maritime activity will evolve and expand. Seapower allows our
nation to maintain U.S. presence and influence globally and, when necessary, project
power without a costly, sizeable, or permanent footprint ashore. We will continue to
maintain a forward-deployed presence around the world to prevent conflict, increase
interoperability with our allies, enhance the maritime security and capacity of our
traditional and emerging partners, confront irregular challenges, and respond to crises.
To continue as a global force in the preventive and responsive mission areas that confront
irregular challenges, including those of irregular warfare, the Navy will be faced with
increasing demand in a fiscally induced capacity constrained environment. Constrained
capacity requires a prioritization of areas requiring persistent presence, to include those
regions of current or forecast instability. Also required is an understanding of the risk
incurred to mission, and to force, if we do not get that priority correct. We must ensure
our Navy remains the finest, best trained, and most ready in the world to sustain key
mission areas that support confronting irregular challenges, and has the ability to face a
highly capable adversary. The Navy looks forward to working with Congress to address
our future challenges and thank you for your support of the Navy’s mission and personnel
at this critical crossroads in U.S. history.46
45 At this point, the statement includes a footnote citing the prepared statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert before the
House Armed Services Committee on July 26, 2011. Greenert became the Chief of Naval Operations on September 23,
2011.
46 Statement of Rear Admiral (Lower Half) Sinclair Harris, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, before the House
Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, November 3, 2011. Italics as in
original.
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Appendix B. 2012 RAND Corporation Report
Findings and Recommendations
This appendix presents findings and recommendations from a 2012 report on maritime regular
warfare by RAND Corporation, a research firm.
Findings
The report made the following findings, among others:
The study’s main findings span the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Several are
specific to MIW, while others have implications both for MIW [maritime irregular
warfare] and for IW operations more broadly.
First, the maritime force is generally considered to play a supportive role to ground
forces in IW and therefore has the potential to be underutilized even in IW operations
conducted in a predominantly maritime environment....
Second, countries that have a prevalent maritime dimension associated with an
insurgency could potentially benefit from the enhancement of civil-military operations
(CMOs) in the maritime arena....
Third, maritime operations in IW can allow the United States to scale its ground
involvement in useful ways....
Fourth, if one assumes that future MIW engagements that entail building a partner’s
capacity will resemble OEF-P [Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines], it is
important to manage strategic expectations based on realistic assessments of the
partner’s capabilities....
Fifth, when building partner capacity, either in MIW or land-based IW, the United States
should make efforts to provide equipment and technology that the partner will be able to
maintain and operate without difficulty....
Sixth, with regard to operational methods, coastal maritime interdiction can play an
instrumental role in setting the conditions for success in IW by cutting the supply lines
that sustain an insurgency....
Seventh, as the [1980s] Nicaragua case illustrates, U.S. partners in MIW may only have
to influence and monitor the sensibilities of a local population, but the legitimacy of U.S.
involvement may be tested in worldwide public opinion....
Finally, international cooperation in confronting MIW adversaries is often necessary,
and the U.S. Navy should make an effort to ensure that it is tactically and operationally
interoperable with partner navies in order to facilitate coordination....47
Recommendations
The report made the following recommendations, among others:
The findings presented here have several direct implications for the U.S. conventional
Navy and Naval Special Warfare Command (NSW). First, U.S. naval forces should
continue to provide U.S. partners with suitable equipment that they will be able to operate
47 Molly Dunigan et al., Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica (CA), 2012, pp. xv-xviii (italics as in original).
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and maintain and should continually strive to increase their interoperability with partner
forces. Second, U.S. naval forces may have to continue or expand training of partner
forces to confront future MIW threats. Third, when conducting MIW, operating from a
sea base offers advantages to NSW. However, due to the costs of such a practice, both
NSW and the conventional Navy must also recognize that decisions regarding when and
where to support sea basing of this sort need to be made carefully. Fourth, in support of
future MIW operations, NSW is likely to have ongoing requirements for maritime
interdiction and containment. Fifth, the United States could benefit from maintaining
operational and tactical capabilities with which to assist its partners in surveillance,
particularly against small submarines and mining threats. Sixth, NSW should consider
increasing its capacity to conduct maritime-based CMOs.
Conventional U.S. naval forces should similarly consider their role in supporting
significant irregular ground operations launched from the sea, as well as their role in
interdiction and containment campaigns. In contrast to those of NSW, conventional U.S.
Navy capabilities to support IW might entail CMOs and related activities to a greater
extent than direct action.48
48 Molly Dunigan et al., Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica (CA), 2012, pp. xix-xx.
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Appendix C. Detention of Terrorist Suspects on U.S.
Navy Ships
This appendix presents additional background information on detention of terrorist suspects on
U.S. Navy ships.
On July 6, 2011, it was reported that
The U.S. military captured a Somali terrorism suspect [named Ahmed Abdulkadir
Warsame] in the Gulf of Aden in April and interrogated him for more than two months
aboard a U.S. Navy ship before flying him this week to New York, where he has been
indicted on federal charges....
Other U.S. officials, interviewed separately, said Warsame and another individual were
apprehended aboard a boat traveling from Yemen to Somalia by the U.S. military’s Joint
Operations Command. The vessel was targeted because the United States had acquired
intelligence that potentially significant operatives were on board, the officials said. Court
documents said the capture took place April 19.
One of the senior administration officials who briefed reporters said that the other suspect
was released “after a very short period of time” after the military “determined that
Warsame was an individual that we were very much interested in for further
interrogation.”
According to court documents, Warsame was interrogated on “all but a daily basis” by
military and civilian intelligence interrogators. During that time, officials in Washington
held a number of meetings to discuss the intelligence being gleaned, Warsame’s status
and what to do with him.
The options, one official said, were to release him, transfer him to a third country, keep
him prisoner aboard the ship, subject him to trial by a military commission or allow a
federal court to try him. The decision to seek a federal indictment, this official said, was
unanimous.
Administration officials have argued that military commission jurisdiction is too narrow
for some terrorism cases - particularly for a charge of material support for terrorist groups
- and the Warsame case appeared to provide an opportunity to try to prove the point.
But some human rights and international law experts criticized what they saw as at least a
partial return to the discredited “black site” prisons the CIA maintained during the Bush
administration....
Warsame was questioned aboard the ship because interrogators “believed that moving
him to another facility would interrupt the process and risk ending the intelligence flow,”
one senior administration official said.
The official said Warsame “at all times was treated in a manner consistent with all
Department of Defense policies” - following the Army Field Manual - and the Geneva
Conventions.
Warsame was not provided access to an attorney during the initial two months of
questioning, officials said. But “thereafter, there was a substantial break from any
questioning of the defendant of four days,” court documents said. “After this break, the
defendant was advised of his Miranda rights” - including his right to legal representation
– “and, after waiving those rights, spoke to law enforcement agents.”
The four-day break and separate questioning were designed to avoid tainting the court
case with information gleaned through un-Mirandized intelligence interrogation, an
overlap that has posed a problem in previous cases. The questioning continued for seven
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days, “and the defendant waived his Miranda rights at the start of each day,” the
documents said....
U.S. Navy Vice Adm. William H. McRaven alluded to the captures in testimony before a
Senate committee last week in which he lamented the lack of clear plans and legal
approvals for the handling of terrorism suspects seized beyond the war zones of Iraq and
Afghanistan.
At one point in the hearing, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, referred to “the question of the detention of people” and
noted that McRaven had “made reference to a couple, I think, that are on a ship.”
McRaven replied affirmatively, saying, “It depends on the individual case, and I'd be
more than happy to discuss the cases that we've dealt with.”49
Another press report on July 6, 2011, stated:
In a telephone briefing with reporters, senior administration officials said Mr. Warsame
and another person were captured by American forces somewhere “in the Gulf region” on
April 19. Another official separately said the two were picked up on a fishing trawler in
international waters between Yemen and Somalia. That other person was released.
Mr. Warsame was taken to a naval vessel, where he was questioned for the next two
months by military interrogators, the officials said. They said his detention was justified
by the laws of war, but declined to say whether their theory was that the Shabab are
covered by Congress’s authorization to use military force against the perpetrators of the
Sept. 11, 2001, attacks; whether the detention was justified by his interactions with Al
Qaeda’s Yemen branch; or something else.
The officials also said interrogators used only techniques in the Army Field Manual,
which complies with the Geneva Conventions. But they did not deliver a Miranda
warning because they were seeking to gather intelligence, not court evidence. One
official called those sessions “very, very productive,” but declined to say whether his
information contributed to a drone attack in Somalia last month.
After about two months, Mr. Warsame was given a break for several days. Then a
separate group of law enforcement interrogators came in. They delivered a Miranda
warning, but he waived his rights to remain silent and have a lawyer present and
continued to cooperate, the officials said, meaning that his subsequent statements would
likely be admissible in court.
Throughout that period, administration officials were engaged in deliberations about what
to do with Mr. Warsame’s case. Eventually, they “unanimously” decided to prosecute
him in civilian court. If he is convicted of all the charges against him, he would face life
in prison.
Last week, Vice Adm. William H. McRaven, who was until recently in charge of the
military’s Joint Special Operations Command, told a Senate hearing that detainees are
sometimes kept on Navy ships until the Justice Department can build a case against them,
or they are transferred to other countries for detention.
Another senior administration official said Tuesday that such detentions are extremely
rare, and that no other detainees are now being held on a Navy ship.50
A July 7, 2011, press report stated:
49 Karen DeYoung, Greg Miller, and Greg Jaffe, “Terror Suspect Detained On Ship,” Washington Post, July 6, 2011: 6.
50 Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. To Prosecute A Somali Suspect In Civilian Court,” New York Times, July 6,
2011: 1.
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In interrogating a Somali man for months aboard a Navy ship before taking him to New
York this week for a civilian trial on terrorism charges, the Obama administration is
trying out a new approach for dealing with foreign terrorism suspects.
The administration, which was seeking to avoid sending a new prisoner to Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba, drew praise and criticism on Wednesday [July 6] for its decisions involving
the Somali suspect, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, accused of aiding Al Qaeda’s branch
in Yemen and the Shabab, the Somali militant group.51
A July 6, 2011, entry in a blog that reports on naval-related events stated that the U.S. Navy ship
to which Warsame was taken was the amphibious assault ship Boxer (LHD-4).52
An October 24, 2012, press report stated:
Over the past two years, the Obama administration has been secretly developing a new
blueprint for pursuing terrorists, a next-generation targeting list called the “disposition
matrix.”
The matrix contains the names of terrorism suspects arrayed against an accounting of the
resources being marshaled to track them down, including sealed indictments and
clandestine operations. U.S. officials said the database is designed to go beyond existing
kill lists, mapping plans for the “disposition” of suspects beyond the reach of American
drones.
Although the matrix is a work in progress, the effort to create it reflects a reality setting in
among the nation’s counterterrorism ranks: The United States’ conventional wars are
winding down, but the government expects to continue adding names to kill or capture
lists for years....
The database is meant to map out contingencies, creating an operational menu that spells
out each agency’s role in case a suspect surfaces in an unexpected spot. “If he’s in Saudi
Arabia, pick up with the Saudis,” the former official said. “If traveling overseas to al-
Shabaab [in Somalia] we can pick him up by ship. If in Yemen, kill or have the Yemenis
pick him up.”
Officials declined to disclose the identities of suspects on the matrix. They pointed,
however, to the capture last year of alleged al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Abdulkadir
Warsame off the coast of Yemen. Warsame was held for two months aboard a U.S. ship
before being transferred to the custody of the Justice Department and charged in federal
court in New York.
“Warsame was a classic case of ‘What are we going to do with him?’” the former
counterterrorism official said. In such cases, the matrix lays out plans, including which
U.S. naval vessels are in the vicinity and which charges the Justice Department should
prepare.53
An October 6, 2013, press report stated:
An accused operative for Al Qaeda seized by United States commandos in Libya over the
weekend is being interrogated while in military custody on a Navy ship in the
51 Charlie Savage, “U.S. Tests New Approach To Terrorism Cases On Somali Suspect,” New York Times, July 7, 2011:
10. See also Dave Boyer, “Interrogation At Sea Skirts Obama Pledge,” Washington Times, July 7, 2011: 1.
52 See “The STRATCOM [Strategic Communications] Opportunity of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame,” Information
Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), July 6, 2011, accessed online July 6, 2011, at
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/07/stratcom-opportunity-of-ahmed.html.
53 Greg Miller, “The Permanent War, U.S. Set To Keep Kill Likes For Years,” Washington Post, October 24, 2012: 1.
Bracketed material as in original.
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Mediterranean Sea, officials said on Sunday [October 6]. He is expected eventually to be
sent to New York for criminal prosecution.
The fugitive, known as Abu Anas al-Libi, is seen as a potential intelligence gold mine,
possessing perhaps two decades of information about Al Qaeda, from its early days under
Osama bin Laden in Sudan to its more scattered elements today.
The decision to hold Abu Anas and question him for intelligence purposes without a
lawyer present follows a pattern used successfully by the Obama administration with
other terrorist suspects, most prominently in the case of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a
former military commander with the Somali terrorist group Shabab....
“Warsame is the model for this guy,” one American security official said....
Abu Anas is being held aboard the U.S.S. San Antonio, a vessel brought in specifically
for this mission, officials said.54
A June 27, 2014, press report stated:
Right now, a suspected terrorist is sitting in the bowels of a U.S. Navy warship
somewhere between the Mediterranean Sea and Washington, D.C. Ahmed Abu Khattala,
the alleged leader of the September 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, Libya,
is imprisoned aboard the USS New York, likely in a bare cell normally reserved for U.S.
military personnel facing disciplinary action at sea. En route to the United States for more
than a week, he’s being questioned by military and civilian interrogators looking for
critical bits of intelligence before he’s read his Miranda rights, formally arrested, and
transferred to the U.S. District Court in Washington, where he’ll face trial. Meanwhile,
the sailors aboard are going about the daily business of operating an amphibious transport
ship—even as the ship’s mission has been redefined by the new passenger in their midst.
This isn’t the first time the Navy has played such a critical, curious, and largely under-
reported role in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. In 2011, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a
military commander for the Somali terrorist group al-Shabab, was captured aboard a
fishing boat in the Gulf of Aden and detained by the Navy, on the high seas, for two
months. In 2013, Abu Anas al-Libi, the alleged mastermind of the 1998 terrorist attacks
on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was held aboard the USS San Antonio—
an identical ship to the one being used this week. Both men were interrogated at sea
before being flown to the United States to face criminal charges in federal courts....
In many ways, it’s not surprising that the U.S. government has been turning Navy assets
into floating prisons for these dangerous men. Taking the slow route back to the United
States offers interrogators the time and space to gather crucial intelligence from high-
value sources like al-Qaeda-linked operatives. During the two months that Warsame was
at sea, a select team of FBI, CIA, and Defense Department officials, part of the Obama
administration’s High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, questioned the Somali
terrorist on “all but a daily basis.” He was cooperative throughout and some reports
suggest that subsequent U.S. counterterrorism operations, including a drone attack in
Somalia shortly after his capture, were a direct result of intelligence Warsame provided to
authorities. While al-Libi was only detained at sea for about a week—a chronic medical
condition prevented him from being held on a ship for an extended period—reports
suggest that similar intelligence-collection efforts were underway in his case as well.
The U.S. government has also embraced the approach because it has limited options for
holding and interrogating men like Abu Khattala after capture. The Obama administration
54 Benjamin Weiser and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Said to Hold Qaeda Suspect on Navy Ship,” New York Times, October 6,
2013. See also Mark Hosenball and Phil Stewart, “Elite U.S. Team Questions Seized al Qaeda Leader on Navy Ship,”
Reuters.com, October 7, 3013.
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remains committed to ending detention operations at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. While the
facility is still home to almost 150 alleged terrorists, the United States has not sent any
new detainees there since March 2008. Detaining suspected terrorists at other overseas
facilities is likewise not an option. For a time, U.S.-run prisons in Afghanistan were a
possibility. But the detention facility in Parwan is now an Afghan-run prison, and using
facilities in other countries would raise a host of legal, operational, and humanitarian
concerns. Even if U.S. officials were willing to forgo the opportunity to question Abu
Khattala before he’s arraigned in federal court and provided with a lawyer, flying alleged
terrorists to the United States immediately presents its own set of problems. Seemingly
small operational and political considerations about the ways in which the United States
transports terrorists captured abroad have major strategic implications, particularly given
lingering questions about U.S. rendition efforts under the Bush administration. In this
context, the Navy has taken on the role of high-seas prison warden, even as lawyers
continue to debate whether and what international legal rules apply to terrorists captured
abroad and detained, temporarily, on a ship.55
55 Marisa Porges, “America’s Floating Prisons,” The Atlantic (www.theatlantic.com), June 27, 2014. See also “The USS
Guantanamo,” Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2014.
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Appendix D. 2010 Navy Irregular Warfare Vision
Statement
This appendix reproduces the Navy’s January 2010 vision statement for irregular warfare.56
56 Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges,
January 2010, 7 pp. (including the cover page).
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Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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