U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces:
Background, Developments, and Issues
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
November 3, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33640
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues
Summary
Even though the United States plans to reduce the number of warheads deployed on its long-
range missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms of the New START Treaty, it also plans to
develop new delivery systems for deployment over the next 20-30 years. The 114th Congress will
continue to review these programs, and the funding requested for them, during the annual
authorization and appropriations process.
During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for
nuclear weapons. The longer-range systems, which included long-range missiles based on U.S.
territory, long-range missiles based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet
targets from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At
the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these
delivery vehicles. That number has declined to less than 1,600 warheads today, and is slated to
decline to 1,550 warheads by 2018, after the New START Treaty completes implementation.
At the present time, the U.S. land-based ballistic missile force (ICBMs) consists of 450
Minuteman III ICBMs, each deployed with one warhead. The fleet will decline to 400 deployed
missiles, while retaining all 450 launchers, to meet the terms of the New START Treaty. The Air
Force is also modernizing the Minuteman missiles, replacing and upgrading their rocket motors,
guidance systems, and other components, so that they can remain in the force through 2030. It
plans to replace the missiles with a new Ground-based Strategic Deterrent around 2030.
The U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleet currently consists of 14 Trident submarines; each
carries 24 Trident II (D-5) missiles. The Navy converted 4 of the original 18 Trident submarines
to carry non-nuclear cruise missiles. The remaining carry around 1,000 warheads in total; that
number will decline as the United States implements the New START Treaty. The Navy has
shifted the basing of the submarines, so that nine are deployed in the Pacific Ocean and five are in
the Atlantic, to better cover targets in and around Asia. It also has undertaken efforts to extend the
life of the missiles and warheads so that they and the submarines can remain in the fleet past
2020. It is designing a new submarine and will replace the existing fleet beginning in 2031.
The U.S. fleet of heavy bombers includes 20 B-2 bombers and 76 B-52 bombers. The B-1
bomber is no longer equipped for nuclear missions. The fleet will decline to around 60 aircraft in
coming years, as the United States implements New START. The Air Force has also begun to
retire the nuclear-armed cruise missiles carried by B-52 bombers, leaving only about half the B-
52 fleet equipped to carry nuclear weapons. The Air Force plans to procure both a new long-range
bomber and a new cruise missile during the 2020s. DOE is also modifying and extending the life
of the B61 bomb carried on B-2 bombers and fighter aircraft.
The Obama Administration completed a review of the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force,
and a review of U.S. nuclear employment policy, in June 2013. This review has advised the force
structure that the United States will deploy under the New START Treaty. It is currently
implementing the New START Treaty, with the reductions due to be completed by 2018.
Congress will review the Administration’s plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the
annual authorization and appropriations process, and as it assesses U.S. plans under New START
and the costs of these plans in the current fiscal environment. This report will be updated as
needed.
Congressional Research Service
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background: The Strategic Triad ..................................................................................................... 2
Force Structure and Size During the Cold War ......................................................................... 2
Force Structure and Size After the Cold War ............................................................................ 4
Current and Future Force Structure and Size ............................................................................ 7
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles: Recent Reductions and Current Modernization
Programs....................................................................................................................................... 9
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) ............................................................................. 9
Peacekeeper (MX) .............................................................................................................. 9
Minuteman III ..................................................................................................................... 9
Minuteman Modernization Programs ............................................................................... 12
Future Programs ................................................................................................................ 15
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles .................................................................................. 18
The SSGN Program .......................................................................................................... 18
The Backfit Program ......................................................................................................... 19
Basing Changes ................................................................................................................. 20
Warhead Loadings ............................................................................................................ 20
Modernization Plans and Programs .................................................................................. 21
The Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) Program ............................................................. 23
Bombers .................................................................................................................................. 26
B-1 Bomber ....................................................................................................................... 26
B-2 Bomber ....................................................................................................................... 27
B-52 Bomber ..................................................................................................................... 28
Future Bomber Plans......................................................................................................... 32
Sustaining the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise............................................................................ 35
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 38
Force Size ................................................................................................................................ 38
Force Structure ........................................................................................................................ 39
The Cost of Nuclear Weapons ................................................................................................. 42
Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 1960-1990 ................................................................... 3
Figure 2. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: 1991-2015 ....................................................................... 5
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under START I and START II .......................................... 6
Table 2. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces under New START ............................................................ 8
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 44
Congressional Research Service
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues
Congressional Research Service
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues
Introduction
During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for
nuclear weapons, including short-range missiles and artillery for use on the battlefield, medium-
range missiles and aircraft that could strike targets beyond the theater of battle, short- and
medium-range systems based on surface ships, long-range missiles based on U.S. territory and
submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United
States. The short- and medium-range systems are considered non-strategic nuclear weapons and
have been referred to as battlefield, tactical, and theater nuclear weapons.1 The long-range
missiles and heavy bombers are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
In 1990, as the Cold War was drawing to a close and the Soviet Union was entering its final year,
the United States had more than 12,000 nuclear warheads deployed on 1,875 strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles.2 As of July 1, 2009, according to the counting rules in the original Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the United States had reduced to 5,916 nuclear warheads on
1,188 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.3 Under the terms of the 2002 Strategic Offensive
Reduction Treaty (known as the Moscow Treaty) between the United States and Russia, this
number was to decline to no more than 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
by the end of 2012. The State Department reported that the United States has already reached that
level, with only 1,968 operationally deployed strategic warheads in December 2009.4 The New
START Treaty, signed by President Obama and President Medvedev on April 8, 2010, reduces
those forces further, to no more than 1,550 warheads on deployed launchers and heavy bombers.5
According to the March 1, 2014, data exchange under that treaty, the United States now has 1,585
warheads on 778 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.6
Although these numbers do not count the same categories of nuclear weapons, they indicate that
the number of deployed warheads on U.S. strategic nuclear forces has declined significantly in
the two decades following the end of the Cold War. Yet, nuclear weapons continue to play a key
role in U.S. national security strategy, and the United States does not, at this time, plan to either
eliminate its nuclear weapons or abandon the strategy of nuclear deterrence that has served as a
core concept in U.S. national security strategy for more than 60 years. In a speech in Prague on
April 5, 2009, President Obama highlighted “America’s commitment to seek the peace and
security of a world without nuclear weapons.” But he recognized that this goal would not be
1 For a detailed review of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons see, CRS Report RL32572, Nonstrategic Nuclear
Weapons, by Amy F. Woolf.
2 Natural Resources Defense Council. Table of U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Loadings. Archive of Nuclear Data.
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab1.asp The same source indicates that the Soviet Union, in 1990, had just over
11,000 warheads on 2,332 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
3 Russia, by the same accounting, had 3,909 warheads on 814 delivery vehicles. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau
of Verification, Compliance and Inspection. Fact Sheet. START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Weapons.
October 1, 2009. Washington, DC.
4 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Promoting Disarmament,
Washington, DC, April 27, 2010, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141497.pdf.
5 The parties are to meet this limit within seven years of entry-into-force, which could occur in early 2011. For more
information on the New START Treaty, see CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key
Provisions, by Amy F. Woolf.
6 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START
Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Forces, Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, April 1, 2014,
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/224236.htm.
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U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues
reached quickly, and probably not in his lifetime.7 And, even though the President pledged to
reduce the roles and numbers of U.S. nuclear forces, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review noted that
“the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons
exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.”8 Moreover, in the
2010 NPR and in the June 2013 Report on the Nuclear Employment Guidance of the United
States,9 the Administration indicated that the United States will pursue programs that will allow it
to modernize and adjust its strategic forces so that they remain capable in coming years.
This report reviews the ongoing programs that will affect the expected size and shape of the U.S.
strategic nuclear force structure. It begins with an overview of this force structure during the Cold
War, and summarizes the reductions and changes that have occurred since 1991. It then offers
details about each category of delivery vehicle—land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers—focusing on their
current deployments and ongoing and planned modernization programs. The report concludes
with a discussion of issues related to decisions about the future size and shape of the U.S.
strategic nuclear force.
Background: The Strategic Triad
Force Structure and Size During the Cold War
Since the early 1960s the United States has maintained a “triad” of strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles. The United States first developed these three types of nuclear delivery vehicles, in large
part, because each of the military services wanted to play a role in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
However, during the 1960s and 1970s, analysts developed a more reasoned rationale for the
nuclear “triad.” They argued that these different basing modes had complementary strengths and
weaknesses. They would enhance deterrence and discourage a Soviet first strike because they
complicated Soviet attack planning and ensured the survivability of a significant portion of the
U.S. force in the event of a Soviet first strike.10 The different characteristics might also strengthen
the credibility of U.S. targeting strategy. For example, ICBMs eventually had the accuracy and
prompt responsiveness needed to attack hardened targets such as Soviet command posts and
ICBM silos, SLBMs had the survivability needed to complicate Soviet efforts to launch a
disarming first strike and to retaliate if such an attack were attempted,11 and heavy bombers could
be dispersed quickly and launched to enhance their survivability, and they could be recalled to
their bases if a crisis did not escalate into conflict.
According to unclassified estimates, the number of delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and
nuclear-capable bombers) in the U.S. force structure grew steadily through the mid-1960s, with
the greatest number of delivery vehicles, 2,268, deployed in 1967.12 The number then held
7 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5,
2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.
8 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, April 6, 2010, p. 15.
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.
9 http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonUSNuclearEmploymentStrategy_Section491.pdf.
10 U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1989, by Frank Carlucci, Secretary of Defense.
February 18, 1988. Washington, 1988. p. 54.
11 In the early 1990s, SLBMs also acquired the accuracy needed to attack many hardened sites in the former Soviet
Union.
12 Natural Resources Defense Council. Table of U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Loadings. Archive of Nuclear Data.
(continued...)
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relatively steady through 1990, at between 1,875 and 2,200 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.
The number of warheads carried on these delivery vehicles increased sharply through 1975, then,
after a brief pause, again rose sharply in the early 1980s, peaking at around 13,600 warheads in
1987. Figure 1 displays the increases in delivery vehicles and warheads between 1960, when the
United States first began to deploy ICBMs, and 1990, the year before the United States and
Soviet Union signed the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
Figure 1. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 1960-1990
16000
14000
12000
10000
er
8000
mb
Nu
6000
4000
2000
0
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90
Year
Launchers
Warheads
Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, Archive of Nuclear Data.
The sharp increase in warheads in the early 1970s reflects the deployment of ICBMs and SLBMs
with multiple warheads, known as MIRVs (multiple independent reentry vehicles). In particular,
the United States began to deploy the Minuteman III ICBM, with 3 warheads on each missile, in
1970, and the Poseidon SLBM, which could carry 10 warheads on each missile, in 1971.13 The
increase in warheads in the mid-1980s reflects the deployment of the Peacekeeper (MX) ICBM,
which carried 10 warheads on each missile.
In 1990, before it concluded the START Treaty with the Soviet Union, the United States deployed
a total of around 12,304 warheads on its ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The ICBM force
consisted of single-warhead Minuteman II missiles, 3-warhead Minuteman III missiles, and 10-
warhead Peacekeeper (MX) missiles, for a total force of 2,450 warheads on 1,000 missiles. The
submarine force included Poseidon submarines with Poseidon C-3 and Trident I (C-4) missiles,
and the Ohio-class Trident submarines with Trident I, and some Trident II (D-5) missiles. The
total force consisted of 5,216 warheads on around 600 missiles.14 The bomber force centered on
(...continued)
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab1.asp.
13 GlobalSecurity.org LGM Minuteman III History and Poseidon C-3 History. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/
systems/lgm-30_3-hist.htm and http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/c-3.htm.
14 The older Poseidon submarines were in the process of being retired, and the number of missiles and warheads in the
submarine fleet dropped quickly in the early 1990s, to around 2,688 warheads on 336 missiles by 1993. See Natural
Resources Defense Council. Table of U.S. Strategic Offensive Force Loadings. Archive of Nuclear Data.
(continued...)
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94 B-52H bombers and 96 B-1 bombers, along with many of the older B-52G bombers and 2 of
the new (at the time) B-2 bombers. This force of 260 bombers could carry over 4,648 weapons.
Force Structure and Size After the Cold War
During the 1990s, the United States reduced the numbers and types of weapons in its strategic
nuclear arsenal, both as a part of its modernization process and in response to the limits in the
1991 START Treaty. The United States continued to maintain a triad of strategic nuclear forces,
however, with warheads deployed on ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. According to the
Department of Defense, this mix of forces not only offered the United States a range of
capabilities and flexibility in nuclear planning and complicated an adversary’s attack planning,
but also hedged against unexpected problems in any single delivery system. This latter issue
became more of a concern in this time period, as the United States retired many of the different
types of warheads and missiles that it had deployed over the years, reducing the redundancy in its
force.
The 1991 START Treaty limited the United States to a maximum of 6,000 total warheads, and
4,900 warheads on ballistic missiles, deployed on up to 1,600 strategic offensive delivery
vehicles. However, the treaty did not count the actual number of warheads deployed on each type
of ballistic missile or bomber. Instead, it used “counting rules” to determine how many warheads
would count against the treaty’s limits. For ICBMs and SLBMs, this number usually equaled the
actual number of warheads deployed on the missile. Bombers, however, used a different system.
Bombers that were not equipped to carry air-launched cruise missiles (the B-1 and B-2 bombers)
counted as one warhead; bombers equipped to carry air-launched cruise missiles (B-52 bombers)
could carry 20 missiles, but would only count as 10 warheads against the treaty limits. These
rules have led to differing estimates of the numbers of warheads on U.S. strategic nuclear forces
during the 1990s; some estimates count only those warheads that count against the treaty while
others count all the warheads that could be carried by the deployed delivery systems.
According to the data from the Natural Resources Defense Council, the United States reduced its
nuclear weapons from 9,300 warheads on 1,239 delivery vehicles in 1991 to 6,196 warheads on
1,064 delivery vehicles when it completed the implementation of START in 2001. By 2009, the
United States had reduced its forces to approximately 2,200 warheads on around 850 delivery
vehicles. According to the State Department, as of December 2009, the United States had 1,968
operationally deployed warheads on its strategic offensive nuclear forces.15 NRDC estimated that
these numbers held steady in 2010, prior to New START’s entry into force, then began to decline
again, falling to around 1,900 warheads on around 850 delivery vehicles by early 2015, as the United
States began to implement New START (this total includes weapons that the State Department does
not count in the New START force).16 These numbers appear in Figure 2.
(...continued)
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab1.asp.
15 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, The Legacy of START and
Related U.S. Policies, Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, July 16, 2009, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/126119.htm.
16 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March
2015. http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/107.full.pdf+html.
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Figure 2. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: 1991-2015
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
r
e
b
5000
m
u
4000
Launchers
N
3000
Warheads
2000
1000
0
91
93
95
97
99
01
03
05
07
09
12
14
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Year
Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, Archive of Nuclear Data, Bul etin of Atomic Scientists, Nuclear
Notebook.
During the 1990s, the United States continued to add to its Trident fleet, reaching a total of 18
submarines. It retired all of its remaining Poseidon submarines and all of the single-warhead
Minuteman II missiles. It continued to deploy B-2 bombers, reaching a total of 21, and removed
some of the older B-52G bombers from the nuclear fleet. Consequently, in 2001, its warheads were
deployed on 18 Trident submarines with 24 missiles on each submarine and 6 or 8 warheads on each
missile; 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, with up to 3 warheads on each missile; 50 Peacekeeper (MX)
missiles, with 10 warheads on each missile; 94 B-52H bombers, with up to 20 cruise missiles on
each bomber; and 21 B-2 bombers with up to 16 bombs on each aircraft.
The United States and Russia signed a second START Treaty in early 1993. Under this treaty, the
United States would have had to reduce its strategic offensive nuclear weapons to between 3,000
and 3,500 accountable warheads. In 1994, the Department of Defense decided that, to meet this
limit, it would deploy a force of 500 Minuteman III ICBMs with 1 warhead on each missile, 14
Trident submarines with 24 missiles on each submarine and 5 warheads on each missile, 76 B-52
bombers, and 21 B-2 bombers. The Air Force was to eliminate 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs and
reorient the B-1 bombers to non-nuclear missions; the Navy would retire 4 Trident submarines (it
later decided to convert these submarines to carry conventional weapons).
The START II Treaty never entered into force, and Congress prevented the Clinton
Administration from reducing U.S. forces unilaterally to START II limits. Nevertheless, the Navy
and Air Force continued to plan for the forces described above, and eventually implemented those
changes. Table 1 displays the forces the United States had deployed in 2001, after completing the
START I reductions. It also includes those that it would have deployed under START II, in
accordance with the 1994 decisions.
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Table 1. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under START I and START II
Deployed under START I (2001)
Planned for START II
Accountable
Accountable
System
Launchers
Warheadsa
Launchers
Warheads
Minuteman III ICBMs
500
1,200
500
500
Peacekeeper ICBMs
50
500
0
0
Trident I Missiles
168
1,008
0
0
Trident II Missiles
264
2,112
336
1,680
B-52 H Bombers (ALCM)
97
970
76
940
B-52 H Bombers (non-
47
47
0
0
ALCM)
B-1 Bombersb
90
90
0
0
B-2 Bombers
20
20
21
336
Total
1,237
5,948
933
3,456
Source: U.S. State Department and CRS estimates.
a. Under START I, bombers that are not equipped to carry ALCMs count as one warhead, even if they can
carry up 16 nuclear bombs; bombers that are equipped to carry ALCMs count as 10 warheads, even if they
can carry up to 20 ALCMs.
b. Although they stil counted under START I, B-1 bombers are no longer equipped for nuclear missions.
The George W. Bush Administration stated in late 2001 that the United States would reduce its
strategic nuclear forces to 1,700-2,200 “operationally deployed warheads” over the next decade.17
This goal was codified in the 2002 Moscow Treaty. According to the Bush Administration,
operationally deployed warheads were those deployed on missiles and stored near bombers on a
day-to-day basis. They are the warheads that would be available immediately, or in a matter of
days, to meet “immediate and unexpected contingencies.”18 The Administration also indicated
that the United States would retain a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers for the
foreseeable future. It did not, however, offer a rationale for this traditional “triad,” although the
points raised in the past about the differing and complementary capabilities of the systems
probably still pertain. Admiral James Ellis, the former Commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM), highlighted this when he noted in a 2005 interview that the ICBM
force provides responsiveness, the SLBM force provides survivability, and bombers provide
flexibility and recall capability.19
The Bush Administration did not specify how it would reduce the U.S. arsenal from around 6,000
warheads to the lower level of 2,200 operationally deployed warheads, although it did identify
some force structure changes that would account for part of the reductions. Specifically, after
Congress removed its restrictions,20 the United States eliminated the 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs,
17 President Bush announced the U.S. intention to reduce its forces on November 13, 2001, during a summit with
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. The United States and Russia codified these reductions in a Treaty signed in May
2002. See CRS Report RL31448, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, by Amy F. Woolf.
18 U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of
Defense For Policy. February 14, 2002.
19 Hebert, Adam. The Future Missile Force. Air Force Magazine. October 2005.
20 Beginning in FY1996, and continuing through the end of the Clinton Administration, Congress had prohibited the
use of any DOD funds for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, below START I levels, until START II
(continued...)
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reducing by 500 the total number of operationally deployed ICBM warheads. It also continued
with plans to remove four Trident submarines from service, and converted those ships to carry
non-nuclear guided missiles. These submarines would have counted as 476 warheads under the
START Treaty’s rules. These changes reduced U.S. forces to around 5,000 warheads on 950
delivery vehicles in 2006; this reduction appears in Figure 2. The Bush Administration also noted
that two of the Trident submarines remaining in the fleet would be in overhaul at any given time.
The warheads that could be carried on those submarines would not count against the Moscow
Treaty limits because they would not be “operationally deployed.” This would further reduce the
U.S. deployed force by 200 to 400 warheads.
The Bush Administration, through the 2005 Strategic Capabilities Assessment and 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review, announced additional changes in U.S. ICBMs, SLBMs, and
bomber forces; these included the elimination of 50 Minuteman III missiles and several hundred
air-launched cruise missiles. (These are discussed in more detail below.) These changes appeared
to be sufficient to reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads enough to meet the
treaty limit of 2,200 warheads, as the United States announced, in mid-2009, that it had met this
limit. Reaching this level, however, also depends on the number of warheads carried by each of
the remaining Trident and Minuteman missiles.21
Current and Future Force Structure and Size
The Obama Administration indicated in the 2010 NPR that the United States will retain a triad of
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers as the United States reduces its forces to the limits in the
2010 New START Treaty. The NPR indicated that the unique characteristics of each leg of the
triad were important to the goal of maintaining strategic stability at reduced numbers of
warheads:
Each leg of the Triad has advantages that warrant retaining all three legs at this stage of
reductions. Strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and the SLBMs they carry represent
the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear Triad…. Single-warhead ICBMs contribute to
stability, and like SLBMs are not vulnerable to air defenses. Unlike ICBMs and SLBMs,
bombers can be visibly deployed forward, as a signal in crisis to strengthen deterrence of
potential adversaries and assurance of allies and partners.22
Moreover, the NPR noted that “retaining sufficient force structure in each leg to allow the ability
to hedge effectively by shifting weight from one Triad leg to another if necessary due to
unexpected technological problems or operational vulnerabilities.”23
The Administration continues to support the triad, even as reduces U.S. nuclear forces under New
START and considers whether to reduce U.S. nuclear forces further in the coming years. In April
2013, Madelyn Creedon, then the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs,
stated, “The 2010 nuclear posture review concluded that the United States will maintain a triad of
ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear capable heavy bombers. And the president‘s F.Y. ‘14 budget request
(...continued)
entered into force. See, for example, the FY1998 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-85, §1302). Congress lifted this
restriction in the FY2002 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-107, §1031).
21 “U.S. Meets Moscow Nuclear Reduction Commitment Three Years Early,” Global Security Newswire, February 11,
2009.
22 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, April 6, 2010, p. 22.
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.
23 Ibid., p. 20.
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supports modernization of these nuclear forces.”24 Further, in its report on the Nuclear
Employment Strategy of the United States, released in June 2013, DOD states that the United
States will maintain a nuclear triad, because this is the best way to “maintain strategic stability at
reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities.”25
On April 8, 2014, the Obama Administration released a report detailing the force structure that the
United States would deploy under New START.26 It indicated that, although the reductions would
be complete by the treaty deadline of February 5, 2018, most of the reductions would come late in
the treaty implementation period so that the plans could change, if necessary. Table 2 displays
this force structure and compares it with estimates of U.S. operational strategic nuclear forces in
2010. This force structure is consistent with the statements and adjustments the Administration
has made about deploying all Minuteman III missiles with a single warhead, retaining Trident
submarines deployed in two oceans, and converting some number of heavy bombers to
conventional-only missions.
Table 2. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces under New START
(Estimated Current Forces and Potential New START Forces)
Estimated Forces, 2010
Planned Forces Under New START, 2018a
Total
Deployed
Launchers
Warheads
Launchers
Launchers
Warheads
Minuteman III
450
500
454
400
400
Trident
336
1,152
280
240
1,090
B-52
76
300
46
42
42
B-2
18
200
20
18
18
Total
880
2,152
800
700
1,550
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Plan to Implement the Nuclear Force Reductions, Limitations,
and Verification, Washington, DC, April 8, 2014.
a. Under this force the United States wil retain 14 Trident submarines with 2 in overhaul. In accordance
with the terms of New START, the United States wil eliminate 4 launchers on each submarine, so that
each counts as only 20 launchers. The United States wil also retain all 450 Minuteman III launchers,
although only 400 would hold deployed missiles.
24 U.S. Congress, House Armed Forces, Strategic Forces, Hearing on the Proposed Fiscal 2014 Defense Authorization
as it Relates to Atomic Energy Defense Activities, 113th Cong., 1st sess., May 9, 2013.
25 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC, June
2013, p. 5, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/reporttoCongressonUSNuclearEmploymentStrategy_Section491.pdf.
26 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Plan to Implement the Nuclear Force Reductions, Limitations, and
Verification, Washington, DC, April 8, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/documents/New-START-Implementation-
Report.pdf.
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Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles: Recent
Reductions and Current Modernization Programs
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
Peacekeeper (MX)
In the late 1980s, the United States deployed 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, each with 10 warheads, at
silos that had held Minuteman missiles at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. The 1993
START II Treaty would have banned multiple warhead ICBMs, so the United States would have
had to eliminate these missiles while implementing the treaty. Therefore, the Pentagon began
planning for their elimination, and the Air Force added funds to its budget for this purpose in
1994. However, beginning in FY1998, Congress prohibited the Clinton Administration from
spending any money on the deactivation or retirement of these missiles until START II entered
into force. The Bush Administration requested $14 million in FY2002 to begin the missiles’
retirement; Congress lifted the restriction and authorized the funding. The Air Force began to
deactivate the missiles in October 2002, and completed the process, having removed all the
missiles from their silos, in September 2005. The MK21 reentry vehicles and W87 warheads from
these missiles have been placed in storage. As is noted below, the Air Force plans to redeploy
some of these warheads and reentry vehicles on Minuteman III missiles, under the Safety
Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program.
Under the terms of the original, 1991 START Treaty, the United States would have had to
eliminate the Peacekeeper missile silos to remove the warheads on the missiles from
accountability under the treaty limits. However, the Air Force retained the silos as it deactivated
the missiles. Therefore, the warheads that were deployed on the Peacekeeper missiles still
counted under START, even though the missiles were no longer operational, until START expired
in December 2009. The United States did not, however, count any of these warheads under the
limits in the Moscow Treaty. They also will not count under the limits in the New START Treaty,
if the United States eliminates the silos. It will not, however, have to blow up or excavate the
silos, as it would have had to do under the original START Treaty. The new START Treaty
indicates that the parties can use whatever method they choose to eliminate the silos, as long as
they demonstrate that the silos can no longer launch missiles. The Air Force filled the silos with
gravel to eliminate them, and completed the process in February 2015.
Minuteman III
The U.S. Minuteman III ICBMs are located at three Air Force bases—F.E. Warren AFB in
Wyoming, Malmstrom AFB in Montana, and Minot AFB in North Dakota. Each base houses 150
missiles.
Force Structure Changes
In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Pentagon indicated that it planned to
“reduce the number of deployed Minuteman III ballistic missiles from 500 to 450, beginning in
Fiscal Year 2007.”27 The Air Force deactivated the missiles in Malmstrom’s 564th Missile
27 U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington, February 2006. p. 50.
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Squadron, which was known as the “odd squad.”28 This designation reflected that the launch
control facilities for these missiles were built and installed by General Electric, while all other
Minuteman launch control facilities were built by Boeing; as a result, these missiles used a
different communications and launch control system than all the other Minuteman missiles.
According to Air Force Space Command, the drawdown began on July 1, 2007. All of the reentry
vehicles were removed from the missiles in early 2008, the missiles were all removed from their
silos by the end of July 2008, and the squadron was deactivated by the end of August 2008.29
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Cartwright stated that the Air
Force had decided to retire these missiles so that they could serve as test assets for the remaining
force. He noted that the Air Force had to “keep a robust test program all the way through the life
of the program.”30 With the test assets available before this decision, the test program would
begin to run short around 2017 or 2018. The added test assets would support the program through
2025 or longer. This time line, however, raises questions about why the Air Force pressed to
begin retiring the missiles in FY2007, 10 years before it would run out of test assets. Some have
speculated that the elimination of the 50 missiles was intended to reduce the long-term operations
and maintenance costs for the fleet, particularly since the 564th Squadron used different ground
control technologies and training systems than the remainder of the fleet. This option was not
likely, however, to produce budgetary savings in the near term as the added cost of deactivating
the missiles could exceed the reductions in operations and maintenance expenses.31 In addition, to
use these missiles as test assets, the Air Force has had to include them in the modernization
programs described below. This has further limited the budgetary savings.
When the Air Force decided to retire 50 ICBMs at Malmstrom, it indicated that it would retain the
silos and would not destroy or eliminate them. However, with the signing of the New START
Treaty in 2010, these silos added to the U.S. total of nondeployed ICBM launchers. So the Air
Force eliminated them in 2014, by filling them with gravel, so that the United States can comply
with the New START limits by 2018.
In a pattern that has become common over the years, Congress questioned the Administration’s
rationale for the plan to retire 50 Minuteman missiles, indicating that it believed that more
Minuteman silos increased U.S. security and strengthened deterrence. In the FY2007 Defense
Authorization Act (H.R. 5122, §139), Congress stated that DOD could not spend any money to
begin the withdrawal of these missiles from the active force until the Secretary of Defense
submitted a report that addressed a number of issues, including (1) a detailed justification for the
proposal to reduce the force from 500 to 450 missiles; (2) a detailed analysis of the strategic
ramifications of continuing to equip a portion of the force with multiple independent warheads
rather than single warheads; (3) an assessment of the test assets and spares required to maintain a
force of 500 missiles and a force of 450 missiles through 2030; (4) an assessment of whether
halting upgrades to the missiles withdrawn from the deployed force would compromise their
ability to serve as test assets; and (5) a description of the plan for extending the life of the
Minuteman III missile force beyond FY2030. The Secretary of Defense submitted this report to
Congress in late March 2007.
28 Johnson, Peter. Growth Worries Base Boosters. Great Falls Tribune. January 19, 2006.
29 Global Security Newswire. U.S. Deactivates 50 Strategic Missiles. August 4, 2008.
30 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Global Strike Plans and Programs. Testimony of James E.
Cartwright, Commander U.S. Strategic Command. March 29, 2006.
31 Private communication.
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Although the retirement of 50 Minuteman III missiles probably did little to reduce the cost of
maintaining and operating the Minuteman fleet, this program did allow both STRATCOM and the
Air Force to participate in the effort to transform the Pentagon in response to post-Cold War
threats. These missiles may still have a role to play in U.S. national security strategy, but they
may not be needed in the numbers that were required when the United States faced the Soviet
threat.
During 2012 and 2013, Congress sought to prevent the Administration from initiating an
environmental assessment that would advise the possible elimination of up to 50 silos under New
START. In addition, the House Armed Services Committee included a provision in its version of
the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4435, §1634) that would require the Air
Force to retain all 450 ICBM silos, regardless of future force structure requirements, budgets, or
arms control limits, through 2015. The provision states that “it is in the national security interests
of the United States to retain the maximum number of land-based strategic missile silos and their
associated infrastructure to ensure that billions of dollars in prior taxpayer investments for such
silos and infrastructure are not lost through precipitous actions which may be budget-driven,
cyclical, and not in the long-term strategic interests of the United States.” It requires that the
Secretary of Defense “preserve each intercontinental ballistic missile silo ... in warm status that
enables such silo to—(1) remain a fully functioning element of the interconnected and redundant
command and control system of the missile field; and (2) be made fully operational with a
deployed missile.”
In the April 2014 report on its planned force structure under New START, the Obama
Administration indicated that it plans to retain 400 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, within a total
force of 450 deployed and nondeployed launchers. According to Air Force officials, this option is
attractive because it would allow the Air Force to deactivate missiles in silos that have been
damaged by water intrusion, repair those silos, and possibly return missiles to them at a later date
while it repaired additional silos. If it had eliminated some of the empty silos, it would have had
to do so in complete squadrons, regardless of the silos’ conditions, and would not have been able
to empty and repair the most degraded silos.32 Congress has also weighed in on this force
structure, again arguing that U.S. security would benefit from the retention of more operational
ICBM launchers, even if they did not contain operational missiles.
Warhead Plans
Each Minuteman III missile was initially deployed with 3 warheads, for a total of 1,500 warheads
across the force. In 2001, to meet the START limit of 6,000 warheads, the United States removed
2 warheads from each of the 150 Minuteman missiles at F.E. Warren AFB,33 reducing the
Minuteman III force to 1,200 total warheads. In the process, the Air Force also removed and
destroyed the “bulkhead,” the platform on the reentry vehicle, so that, in accordance with START
rules, these missiles can no longer carry three warheads.
Under START II, the United States would have had to download all the Minuteman III missiles to
one warhead each. Although the Bush Administration initially endorsed the plan to download all
Minuteman ICBMs, this plan apparently changed. In an interview with Air Force Magazine in
October 2003, General Robert Smolen indicated that the Air Force would maintain the ability to
32 Gabe Starosta, “On New START, Timing Begins to Limit Force-Structure Alternatives,” InsideDefense.com, May
14, 2013.
33 See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
January/February 2006.
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deploy these 500 missiles with up to 800 warheads.34 Although some analysts interpreted this
statement to mean that the Minuteman ICBMs would carry 800 warheads on a day-to-day basis, it
seems more likely that this was a reference to the Air Force intent to maintain the ability to reload
warheads, and reconstitute the force, if circumstances changed.35 The 2001 NPR had indicated
that the United States would maintain the flexibility to do this. However, in testimony before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, General Cartwright also indicated that some Minuteman
missiles might carry more than one warhead. Specifically, when discussing the reduction from
500 to 450 missiles, he said, “this is not a reduction in the number of warheads deployed. They
will just merely be re-distributed on the missiles.”36 Major General Deppe confirmed that the Air
Force would retain some Minuteman III missiles with more than one warhead when he noted, in a
speech in mid-April 2007, that the remaining 450 Minuteman III missiles could be deployed with
one, two, or three warheads.37
In the 2010 NPR, the Obama Administration indicated that, under the New START Treaty, all of
the U.S. Minuteman III missiles will carry only one warhead. It indicated that this configuration
would “enhance the stability of the nuclear balance by reducing incentives for either side to strike
first.”38 The Air Force completed the downloading process, leaving all Minuteman III missiles
with a single warhead, on June 16, 2014.39 Unlike under START, the United States did not have to
alter the front end of the missile or remove the old bulkhead. As a result, the United States could
restore warheads to its ICBM force if the international security environment changed. Moreover,
this plan could have changed, if, in an effort to reduce the cost of the ICBM force under New
START, the Administration had decided to reduce the number of Minuteman III missiles further
in the coming years. Reports indicate that the Pentagon may have reviewed such an option as a
part of its NPR implementation study, but, as the report released on April 8, 2014, indicated, it did
not decide to pursue this approach. As a result, under New START, each of the 400 deployed
Minuteman III missiles will carry a single warhead.
Minuteman Modernization Programs
Over the past 15 years, the Air Force pursued several programs that are designed to improve the
accuracy and reliability of the Minuteman fleet and to “support the operational capability of the
Minuteman ICBM through 2030.” According to some estimates, this effort will likely cost $6
billion-$7 billion.40 This section describes several of the key programs in this effort.
34 Hebert, Adam. The Future Missile Force. Air Force Magazine. October 2005.
35 See, for example, Jeffrey Lewis. STRATCOM Hearts MIRV. ArmsControlWonk.com, January 30, 2006.
36 See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Global Strike Plans and Programs. Testimony of James
E. Cartwright, Commander U.S. Strategic Command. March 29, 2006.
37 Sirak, Michael. Air Force Prepared To Draaw Down Minuteman III Fleet by 50 Missiles. Defense Daily. April 17,
2007.
38 Single-warhead ICBMs are considered to be stabilizing because it would take two attacking warheads to destroy the
silo. If each side has approximately the same number of warheads, than an attack on a single warhead missile would
cost more warheads than it would kill, and, therefore, would not be considered to be lucrative.
39 Jenn Rowell, “Last Malmstron ICBM Reconfigured Under Treaty,” Great Falls Tribune, June 18, 2014.
40 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
January/February 2006.
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Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP)
The program began in 1998 and has been replacing the propellant, the solid rocket fuel, in the
Minuteman motors to extend the life of the rocket motors. A consortium led by Northrup
Grumman poured the new fuel into the first and second stages and remanufactured the third
stages of the missiles. According to the Air Force, as of early August, 2007, 325 missiles, or 72%
of the fleet, had completed the PRP program; this number increased to around 80% by mid-2008.
The Air Force purchased the final 56 booster sets, for a total of 601, with its funding in FY2008.
Funding in FY2009 supported the assembly of the remaining boosters. The Air Force completed
the PRP program in 2013.41 In the FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364) and the
FY2007 Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-289), the 109th Congress indicated that it would
not support efforts to end this program early. However, in its budget request for FY2010, the Air
Force indicated that FY2009 was the last year for funding for the program, as the program was
nearing completion.
Guidance Replacement Program (GRP)
The Guidance Replacement Program has extended the service life of the Minuteman missiles’
guidance set, and improved the maintainability and reliability of guidance sets. It replaced aging
parts with more modern and reliable technologies, while maintaining the accuracy of the
missiles.42 Flight testing for the new system began in 1998, and, at the time, it exceeded its
operational requirements. Production began in 2000, and the Air Force purchased 652 of the new
guidance units. Press reports indicate that the system had some problems with accuracy during its
testing program.43 The Air Force eventually identified and corrected the problems in 2002 and
2003. According to the Air Force, 425 Minuteman III missiles were upgraded with the new
guidance packages as of early August 2007. The Air Force had been taking delivery of 5 to7 new
guidance units each month, for a total of 652 units. Boeing reported that it had delivered the final
guidance set in early February 2009. The Air Force did not request any additional funding for this
program in FY2010. However, it did request $1.2 million in FY2011 and $0.6 million in FY2012
to complete the program. It has not requested additional funding in subsequent years.
Propulsion System Rocket Engine Program (PSRE)
According to the Air Force, the Propulsion System Rocket Engine (PSRE) program is designed to
rebuild and replace Minuteman post-boost propulsion system components that were produced in
the 1970s. The Air Force has been replacing, rather than repairing this system because original
replacement parts, materials, and components are no longer available. This program is designed
to reduce the life-cycle costs of the Minuteman missiles and maintain their reliability through
2020. The Air Force plans to purchase a total of 574 units for this program. Through FY2009, the
Air Force had purchased 441 units, at a cost of $128 million. It requested an additional $26.2
million to purchase another 96 units in FY2010 and $21.5 million to purchase 37 units in
FY2011. This would complete the purchase of the units. As a result, the budget for FY2012 does
not support the purchase of any additional units, but does include $26.1 million for continuing
41 Sirak, Michael. Minuteman Fleet has Life Beyond 2020, Says Senior Air Force Space Official. Defense Daily. June
14, 2006.
42 LGM Minuteman III Modernization. Globalsecurity.org.
43 Donnelly, John M. Air Force Defends Spending Half A Billion on Iffy ICBMs. Defense Week. September 10, 2001.
p. 1.
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work installing the units. The FY2013 budget request contained $10.8 million for the same
purpose. The Air Force has not requested additional funding in subsequent years.
Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Service Life Extension Program
The REACT targeting system was first installed in Minuteman launch control centers in the mid-
1990s. This technology allowed for a significant reduction in the amount of time it would take to
retarget the missiles, automated routine functions to reduce the workload for the crews, and
replaced obsolete equipment.44 In 2006, the Air Force began to deploy a modernized version of
this system to extend its service life and to update the command and control capability of the
launch control centers. This program will allow for more rapid retargeting of ICBMs, a capability
identified in the Nuclear Posture Review as essential to the future nuclear force. The Air Force
completed this effort in late 2006.
Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV)
As was noted above, under the SERV program, the Air Force plans to deploy MK21/W-87 reentry
vehicles removed from Peacekeeper ICBMs on the Minuteman missiles, replacing the older
MK12/W62 and MK12A/W78 reentry vehicles. To do this, the Air Force must modify the
software, change the mounting on the missile, and change the support equipment. According to
Air Force Space Command, the SERV program conducted three flight tests in 2005 and cancelled
a fourth test because the first three were so successful.45 The Air Force installed 20 of the kits for
the new reentry vehicles on the Minuteman missiles at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in 2006. The
process began at Malmstrom in July 2007 and at Minot in July 2008. As of early August 2007, 47
missiles had been modified. The Air Force purchase an additional 111 modification kits in
FY2009, for a total of 570 kits. This was the last year that it planned to request funding for the
program. It completed the installation process by 2012.
This program will likely ensure the reliability and effectiveness of the Minuteman III missiles
throughout their planned deployments. The W-87 warheads entered the U.S. arsenal in 1986 and
were refurbished in 2005. This process extended their service life past 2025.46
Solid Rocket Motor Warm Line Program
In the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, Congress approved a new program known as the
Solid Rocket Motor Warm Line Program. According to Air Force budget documents, this program
was intended to “sustain and maintain the unique manufacturing and engineering infrastructure
necessary to preserve the Minuteman III solid rocket motor production capability” by providing
funding to maintain a low rate of production of motors each year.47 The program received $42.9
million in FY2010 and produced motors for four Minuteman ICBMs. DOD requested $44.2
million to produce motors for three additional ICBMs in FY2011. The budget request for FY2012
includes an additional $34 million to complete work on the motors purchased in prior years. The
FY2013 budget did not contain any additional funding for this program area, although the Air
44 LGM Minuteman III Modernization. Globalsecurity.org.
45 Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz, Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command. Transcript of Speech to the National
Defense University Breakfast. June 13, 2006.
46 Tom Collina, Fact Sheet: U.S. Nuclear Modernization, Arms Control Association, Washington, DC, January 5, 2009,
http://www.armscontrol.org/USNuclearModernization.
47 http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100128-067.pdf.
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Force continues to support the solid rocket motor production base with work funded through its
Dem/Val program (described below).
ICBM Fuze Modernization
According to DOD budget documents, the ICBM fuze modernization program will replace the
current MK21 fuze to “meet warfighter requirements and maintain current capability through
2030.” This program is needed because the current fuzes have long exceeded their original 10-
year life span and the Strategic Command (STRATCOM) does not have enough fuzes available to
meet its requirements. According to DOD, this program element will procures 693 modernized
fuzes for the Minuteman fleet. It has requested $13.7 million for this program in FY2016, and
expects to spend around $65 million through 2020. This will purchase the first 6 new fuzes.
Eventually, the program is expected to cost $830 million to purchase the full 693 units.
ICBM Dem/Val Program
The Air Force is also funding, through its RDT&E budget, a number of programs under the
ICBM Dem/Val (demonstration and validation) title that will allow it to mature technologies that
might support both the existing Minuteman fleet and the future ICBM program (known as the
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent.). Congress appropriated $72.9 million for these programs in
FY2014 and $30.9 million in FY2015. DOD has requested an additional $39.8 million for
FY2016.
The projects funded through the Dem/Val program area include ICBM guidance applications,
ICBM propulsion applications, reentry vehicle applications, and command and control
applications. In the area of guidance applications, DOD is seeking to “identify, develop, analyze,
and evaluate advanced strategic guidance technologies, such as a new solid-state guidance
system, for the ICBM fleet.”48 This new system would increase the accuracy of the ICBM force
and allow the missiles to destroy hardened targets with a single warhead. In the area of propulsion
applications, DOD is, among other things, “exploring improvements and/or alternatives to current
propulsion systems.” This program area is specifically seeking to support the solid rocket motor
research and development industrial base, so that it will have the capacity to support the ICBM
force when the Air Force begins the procurement of its new ground-based strategic deterrent. In
the area of reentry vehicle applications, DOD is seeking to both support reentry systems beyond
their original design life and develop and test advanced technologies to meet future requirements.
The area of command and control applications “evaluates and develops assured, survivable, and
secure communications and battlespace awareness.” It is focusing on both skills and technologies
needed to meet current and future requirements.
DOD budget documents indicate that, beginning in FY2017, DOD will move the efforts funded
through the Dem/Val program into the new program element for the ground-based strategic
deterrent. Hence, although these projects are designed to support both the Minuteman force and
the future force, they will likely begin to focus more specifically on the needs of the new missile.
Future Programs
In 2002, the Air Force began to explore its options for a new missile to replace the Minuteman III,
with the intent to begin deploying a new missile in 2018. It reportedly produced a “mission needs
48 Elaine Grossman, “Key Targeting Tech for Future U.S. Nuclear Missile has Gone Unfunded,” Nextgov.com, August
19, 2014.
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statement” at that time, and then began an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) in 2004.49 In June
2006, General Frank Klotz indicated that, after completing the AOA, Air Force Space Command
had decided to recommend “an evolutionary approach to the replacement of the Minuteman III
capability,”50 which would continue to modernize the components of the existing missiles rather
than begin from scratch to develop and produce new missiles. He indicated that Space Command
supported this approach because it would be less costly than designing a new system “from
scratch.”
With this plan in place, the Air Force began examining the investments that might be needed to
sustain the Minuteman force through 2030. According to General Robert Kehler, then
Commander-in-Chief of STRATCOM, the missile should be viable throughout that time.51 In
addition, according to DOD officials, flight tests and surveillance programs should provide the
Air Force with “better estimates for component age-out and system end-of-life timelines.”52
At the same time, the Air Force has begun to consider what a follow-on system to the Minuteman
III might look like for the timeframe after 2030. The Air Force began a capabilities-based
assessment of its land-based deterrent in early 2011 and began a new Analysis of Alternatives
(AOA) for the ICBM force in 2012 with completion expected in mid-2014.53 According to the Air
Force, it requested $2.6 million to begin the study in the FY2012 budget. The FY2013 budget
request included $11.7 million for a new project area known as Ground-based Strategic
Deterrence (GBSD). According to the Air Force, this effort, which was previously funded under
Long-Range Planning, included funding to begin the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA). The
FY2014 budget request included $9.4 million to continue this study.
In early January 2013, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center issued a “Broad Agency
Announcement (BAA)” seeking white papers for concepts “that address modernization or
replacement of the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad.” The papers produced as a part of this
study served as an early evaluation of alternatives for the future of the ICBM force, and may have
helped select those concepts that will be included in the formal Analysis of Alternatives.
According to the BAA, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center created five possible paths for
further analysis. These include one that would continue to use the current Minuteman III baseline
until 2075 without seeking to close gaps in the missiles’ capabilities, one that would incorporate
incremental changes into the current Minuteman III system to close gaps in capabilities, one that
would design a new, fixed ICBM system to replace the Minuteman III, one that would design a
new mobile ICBM system, and one that would design a new tunnel-based system.
Some analysts have expressed surprise at the possibility that the Air Force would consider
deploying a new ICBM on mobile launchers or in tunnels. During the Cold War, the Air Force
49 Selinger, Mark. Minuteman Replacement Study Expected to Begin Soon. Aerospace Daily and Defense Report. June
25, 2004.
50 Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz, Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command. Transcript of Speech to the National
Defense University Breakfast. June 13, 2006.
51 Jason Simpson, “Kehler: Air Force Investigating Minuteman III Follow-On System,” Inside the Air Force, October
8, 2009. See, also, Jason Simpson, “Testers See no Problems With Minuteman III Missiles Lasting to 2030,” Inside the
Air Force, September 4, 2009.
52 See the prepared statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense Madelyn Creedon, U.S. Congress, House Armed
Forces, Strategic Forces, Hearing on the Proposed Fiscal 2014 Defense Authorization as it Relates to Atomic Energy
Defense Activities. 113th Cong., 1st sess., May 9. 2013.
53 U.S. Department of Defense, November 2010 Update to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010, New
START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans, Washington, DC, November 17, 2010, p. 11.
http://www.lasg.org/CMRR/Sect1251_update_17Nov2010.pdf.
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considered these types of deployment concepts as a way to increase the survivability of the ICBM
force when faced with possibility of an attack with hundreds, or thousands, of Soviet warheads.
Even during the Cold War, these concepts proved to be very expensive and impractical, and they
were dropped from consideration after the demise of the Soviet Union and in the face of deep
reductions in the numbers of U.S. and Russian warheads. Some analysts see the Air Force’s
possible renewed interest in these concepts as a step backward; they argue that the United States
should consider retiring its ICBM force, and should not consider new, expensive schemes to
increase the missiles’ capabilities. Others, however, note that the presence of these concepts in the
study does not mean that the Air Force will move in this direction. They note that the 2010 NPR
mentioned the possibility of mobile basing for ICBMs as a way to increase warning and decision
time, so it should not be a surprise to see requests for further study. However, the cost and
complexity of mobile ICBM basing may again eliminate these concepts from further
consideration.
According to press reports, this AOA has been completed and was briefed to industry officials in
July 2014. The Air Force has reportedly decided to pursue a “hybrid” plan for the next generation
ICBM. It would maintain the basic design of the missile, the current communications system, and
the existing launch silos, but would replace the rocket motors, guidance sets, post-boost vehicles,
and reentry systems. In other words, the Air Force would deploy a new missile in its existing
Minuteman infrastructure. Reports also indicate that, although this missile would be deployed in
fixed silos, the design would allow the missiles to be deployed on mobile launchers sometime in
the future.54
The Air Force has requested $75 million for this program in FY2016, but expects to spend $945
million through FY2020. According to press reports, the Air Force expects the program to cost a
total of $62.3 billion, in then-year dollars, over 30 years. This includes $48.5 billion for the
acquisition of 642 missiles, $6.9 billion for command and control systems, and $6.9 billion to
renovate the launch control centers.55 The 642 missiles would support testing and deployment of a
force of 400 missiles.
According to DOD budget documents, the Air Force is seeking to deliver “an integrated flight
system” beginning in FY2027, with booster production beginning in FY2026. Press reports
indicate that the system would reach its initial operational capacity, with nine missiles on alert, by
2029 and would complete the deployment with 400 missiles on alert in 2036.56 The Air Force,
however, plans to install new command and control systems in all 450 existing launch silos by
2037.
While the Air Force appears committed to pursuing the development of a new ground-based
strategic deterrent, there is growing recognition among analysts that fiscal constraints may alter
this approach. As is noted below, all three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad are currently slated for
modernization in the next 10 to 20 years. Each of these programs is likely to stress the budgets
and financial capabilities of the services. Nevertheless, the Air Force has sought to allocate more
funds to its nuclear missions, both to address personnel and operational issues that have come up
in recent years and to pursue its modernization programs. According to the Secretary of the Air
Force, Deborah Lee James, the nuclear capabilities of the Air Force are a national asset, so added
54 Elaine Grossman, “Key Targeting Tech for Future U.S. Nuclear Missile has Gone Unfunded,” Nextgov.com, August
19, 2014.
55 Kingston Reif, “Air Force Drafts Plan for Follow-on ICBM,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2015.
56 Brian Bradley, “GBSD Scheduled to Reach IOC in FY'29,” Nuclear Security and Deterrence Monitor, August 7,
2015.
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funding could come not only from the Air Force budget but also from the broader Pentagon
budget.57
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
The U.S. fleet of ballistic missile submarines consists of 14 Trident (Ohio-class) submarines, each
equipped to carry 24 Trident missiles. With 2 submarines in overhaul, the operational fleet of 12
submarines currently carries around 1,100 warheads. Under the New START Treaty, each of the
submarines will be modified so that they can carry only 20 missiles. The four empty launch tubes
will be modified so that they cannot launch missiles; this will remove them from accountability
under New START. As a result, the 14 submarines will count as a total of 280 deployed and
nondeployed launchers, with 240 deployed launchers counting on the 12 operational submarines.
The Navy plans to begin the process of reducing the number of launchers on each submarine in
FY2015.
By the early 1990s, the United States had completed the deployment of 18 Trident ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs). Each of these submarines was equipped to carry 24 Trident
missiles, and each missile could carry up to 8 warheads (either W-76 warheads or the larger W-88
warheads on the Trident II missile). The Navy initially deployed eight of these submarines at
Bangor, WA, and all eight were equipped with the older Trident I missile. It then deployed 10
submarines, all equipped with the Trident II missile, at Kings Bay, GA. During the 1994 Nuclear
Posture Review, the Clinton Administration decided that the United States would reduce the size
of its Trident fleet to 14 submarines, and that 4 of the older submarines would be “backfit” to
carry the Trident II missile.
The Bush Administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review endorsed the plan to backfit four of the
Trident submarines so that all would carry Trident II missiles. It also indicated that, instead of
retiring the remaining four submarines, the Navy would convert them to carry conventional
weapons, and designated them “guided missile” submarines (SSGNs). The 2010 NPR also
endorsed a force of 14 Trident submarines, although it noted that it might reduce that force to 12
submarines in the latter half of this decade. As was noted above, each submarine will deploy with
only 20 missiles to meet the reductions in New START. As a result, the U.S. ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) force may continue to consist of 14 Trident submarines, with 2 in overhaul,
through New START implementation.
The SSGN Program
The Navy converted four Trident submarines (the USS Ohio, USS Michigan, USS Florida, and
USS Georgia) to carry conventional cruise missiles and other conventional weapons. Reports
indicate that the conversion process took approximately $1 billion and two years for each of the
four submarines. The SSGNs can each carry 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles, along with up to 100
special forces troops and their mini-submarines.58
The first two submarines scheduled for this conversion were removed from the nuclear fleet in
early 2003. They were slated to receive their engineering overhaul, then to begin the conversion
57 James Drew, “Air Force Wants OSD to Allocate More Funds for Nuclear Enterprise,” Inside the Air Force, August
1, 2014.
58Connolly, Allison. For Four Subs, Its Good-bye Ballistic Missiles, Hello SEALs. Norfolk Virginia Pilot. December
18, 2004.
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process in 2004.59 The first to complete the process, the USS Ohio returned to service as an
SSGN in January 200660 and achieved operational status on November 1, 2007. According to the
Navy, the Georgia was scheduled for deployment in March 2008, and the other submarines were
scheduled to reach that status later in the year.61 According to Admiral Stephen Johnson, the
Director of the Navy’s Strategic Submarine Program (SSP), all four of the submarines had
returned to service by mid-2008, and two were forward-deployed on routine patrols. According to
the Navy, these submarines are likely to remain in service through the mid-2020s.
The Backfit Program
As was noted above, both the 1994 and 2001 Nuclear Posture Reviews confirmed that the Navy
would backfit four Trident submarines so that they could carry the newer Trident II (D-5) missile.
This process not only allowed the Navy to replace the aging C-4 missiles, it also equipped the
fleet with a missile that has improved accuracy and a larger payload. With its greater range, it
would allow the submarines to operate in a larger area and cover a greater range of targets. These
characteristics were valued when the system was designed and the United States sought to
enhance its ability to deter the Soviet Union. The Bush Administration believed that the range,
payload, and flexibility of the Trident submarines and D-5 missiles remained relevant in an era
when the United States may seek to deter or defeat a wider range of adversaries. The Obama
Administration has emphasized that, by providing the United States with a secure second strike
capability, these submarines enhance strategic stability.
Four of the eight Trident submarines based in Bangor, WA (USS Alaska, USS Nevada, USS
Henry M. Jackson, and USS Alabama) were a part of the backfit program. The Alaska and
Nevada both began the process in 2001; the Alaska completed its backfit and rejoined the fleet in
March 2002 and the Nevada did the same in August 2002. During the process, the submarines
underwent a pre-planned engineered refueling overhaul, which accomplishes a number of
maintenance objectives, including refueling of the reactor, repairing and upgrading some
equipment, replacing obsolete equipment, repairing or upgrading the ballistic missile systems,
and other minor alterations.62 The submarines also are fit with the Trident II missiles and the
operating systems that are unique to these missiles. According to the Navy, both of these efforts
came in ahead of schedule and under budget. The Henry M. Jackson and Alabama were
completed their engineering overhaul and backfit in FY2006 and reentered the fleet in 2007 and
2008.
The last of the Trident I (C-4) missiles was removed from the fleet in October 2004, when the
USS Alabama off-loaded its missiles and began the overhaul and backfit process. All the Trident
submarines currently in the U.S. fleet now carry the Trident II missile.63
59 Ohio Class SSGN Tactical Trident. GlobalSecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ssgn-
726.htm.
60 First Trident Submarine Converted. Associated Press. January 10, 2006.
61 U.S. Congress. Senate. Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. Fiscal Year 2008 Strategic
Forces Program Budget. Hearing. Prepared statement of Mr. Brian R. Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Strategic Capabilities, p. 6. March 28, 2007. See also, Guided Missile Submarine Ohio Ready for Deployment. Inside
the Navy, November 5, 2007.
62 SSBN-726 Ohio-Class FBM Submarines, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/ssbn-726-
recent.htm.
63 Morris, Jefferson. Older Trident Missiles to be Phased out by Fall, Admiral Says. Aerospace Daily and Defense
Report, June 17, 2005.
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Basing Changes
When the Navy first decided, in the mid-1990s, to maintain a Trident fleet with 14 submarines, it
planned to “balance” the fleet by deploying 7 Trident submarines at each of the 2 Trident bases.
The Navy would have transferred three submarines from Kings Bay to Bangor, after four of the
submarines from Bangor were removed from the ballistic missile fleet, for a balance of seven
submarines at each base. However, these plans changed after the Bush Administration’s Nuclear
Posture Review. The Navy has transferred five submarines to Bangor, “balancing” the fleet by
basing nine submarines at Bangor and five submarines at Kings Bay. Because two submarines
would be in overhaul at any given time, this basing plan means that seven submarines would be
operational at Bangor and five would be operational at Kings Bay.
According to unclassified reports, the Navy began moving Trident submarines from Kings Bay to
Bangor in 2002, and transferred the fifth submarine in September 2005.64 This change in basing
pattern apparently reflected changes in the international security environment, with fewer targets
within range of submarines operating in the Atlantic, and a greater number of targets within range
of submarines operating in the Pacific. In particular, the shift allows the United States to improve
its coverage of targets in China and North Korea.65 Further, as the United States modifies its
nuclear targeting objectives it could alter the patrol routes for the submarines operating in both
oceans, so that a greater number of emerging targets would be within range of the submarines in a
short amount of time.
Warhead Loadings
The Trident II (D-5) missiles can be equipped to carry up to eight warheads each. Under the terms
of the original START Treaty, which was in force from 1994 to 2009, the United States could
remove warheads from Trident missiles, and reduce the number listed in the database, a process
known as downloading, to comply with the treaty’s limit of 6,000 warheads. The United States
took advantage of this provision, reducing to six warheads per missile on the eight Trident
submarines based at Bangor, WA.66
During the George W. Bush Administration, the Navy further reduced the number of warheads on
the Trident submarines so that the United States could reduce its forces to the 2,200 deployed
warheads permitted under the 2002 Moscow Treaty. The United States did not have to reach this
limit until 2012, but it had done so by 2009.
The United States may to continue to reduce the total numbers of warheads carried on its Trident
missiles under the New START Treaty. Unlike START, which attributed the same number of
warheads to each missile of a given type, regardless of whether some of the missiles carried fewer
warheads, the United States can deploy different numbers of warheads on different missiles, and
count only the actual warheads deployed on the force. This will allow each missile to be tailored
to meet the mission assigned to that missile. The United States does not need to indicate how
many warheads are deployed on each missile at all times; it must simply report the total number
of operationally deployed warheads on all of its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The parties
64 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
January/February 2006.
65 Ibid.
66 Even though four of these submarines are being converted to SSGNs, they still count under the START Treaty
because they still have SLBM launch tubes. Each of those tubes count as six warheads. See U.S. Department of State.
Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. START Aggregate Number of Strategic Offensive Arms.
April 1, 2006.
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will, however, have opportunities to confirm that actual number on a specific missile, with
random, short-notice inspections. Moreover, the United States will not have to alter the platforms
in the missiles, so it could restore warheads to its Trident missiles if circumstances changed.
Modernization Plans and Programs
The Navy initially planned to keep Trident submarines in service for 30 years, but then extended
that time period to 42 years. This extension reflects the judgment that ballistic missiles
submarines would have operated with less demanding missions than attack submarines, and
could, therefore, be expected to have a much longer operating life than the expected 30-year life
of attack submarines. Therefore, since 1998, the Navy has assumed that each Trident submarine
would have an expected operating lifetime of at least 42 years, with two 20-year operating cycles
separated by a 2-year refueling overhaul.67 With this schedule, the submarines will begin to retire
from the fleet in 2027. The Navy has also pursued a number of programs to ensure that it has
enough missiles to support this extended life for the submarines.
Trident Missile Production and Life Extension
The Navy purchased 437 Trident II (D-5) missiles through FY2008, and planned to purchase an
additional 24 missiles per year through FY2012, for a total force of 533 missiles. It continued to
produce rocket motors, at a rate of around one per month, and to procure alternation kits (known
as SPALTs) needed to meet the extended service life of the submarine. Although the Navy plans
to deploy its submarines with only 240 ballistic missiles under New START, it needs the greater
number of missiles to support the fleet throughout the their life-cycle. In addition, around 50 of
the Trident missiles are available for use by Great Britain in its Trident submarines. The
remainder would support the missile’s test program throughout the life of the Trident system.
The Navy is also pursuing a life extension program for the Trident II missiles, so that they will
remain capable and reliable throughout the 42-year life of the Trident submarines. As a result, the
funding for the Trident II missile supported the purchase of additional solid rocket motors other
critical components required to support the missile throughout its service life.
The Navy allocated $5.5 billion to the Trident II missile program in FY2008 and FY2009. This
funding supported the purchase of an additional 36 Trident II missiles. The Navy spent $1.05
billion on Trident II modifications in FY2010 and requested $1.1 billion in FY2011. In FY2010,
$294 million was allocated to the purchase of 24 new missiles, $154.4 million was allocated to
missile support costs, and $597.7 million was allocated to the Trident II Life Extension program.
In FY2011, the Navy requested $294.9 million for the purchase of 24 new missiles, $156.9
million to missile support costs, and $655.4 million to the Trident II Life Extension Program. The
FY2012 budget included $1.3 billion for Trident II missile program. Within this total, $191
million was allocated to the purchase of 24 additional new missiles, $137.8 million was allocated
to missile support costs, and $980 million was allocated to the Trident II Life Extension Program.
This was the last year during which the Navy sought to purchase new Trident II missiles. The
FY2013 budget requested $1.2 billion for the Trident II missile program. This total included $524
million for program production and support costs, and $700.5 million for the Trident II life
extension program. The Navy requested $1.14 billion for this program area in FY2014. According
to the Navy’s budget documents, this allowed it to continue to purchase components, such as the
alteration kits for the guidance and missile electronics systems and solid rocket motors for these
67 SSBN Ohio-Class FBM Submarines. GlobalSecurity.org.
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missiles. It requested $1.17 billion for FY2015 and an additional $1.1 billion for FY2016.
According to DOD budget documents, the Navy plans to spend $5.8 billion on Trident II
modifications through 2020.
W76 Warhead Life Extension
The overwhelming majority of Trident missiles are deployed with the MK4/W76 warhead, which,
according to unclassified estimates, has a yield of 100 kilotons.68 It is currently undergoing a life
extension program (LEP) that is designed to enhance its capabilities. According to some reports,
the Navy had initially planned to apply this program to around 25% of the W76 warheads, but has
increased that plan to cover more than 60% of the stockpile. According to recent estimates, the
Department of energy has delivered more than half of the planned units of the new W76
warheads, and will complete production in 2019.69 The LEP is intended to add 30 years to the
warhead life “by refurbishing the nuclear explosive package, the arming, firing, and fusing
system, the gas transfer system, and associated cables, elastomers, valves, pads, cushions, foam
supports, telemetries, and other miscellaneous parts.” The FY2016 budget request for the
Department of Energy includes $244 million for the W76 LEP.
Several questions came up during the life extension program. For example, some weapons
experts questioned whether the warhead’s design is reliable enough to ensure that the warheads
will explode at its intended yield.70 In addition, in June 2006, an inspector general’s report from
the Department of Energy questioned the management practices at the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), which is responsible for the LEP, arguing that management problems
had led to delays and created cost overruns in the program. This raised questions about whether
NNSA would be able to meet the September 2007 delivery date for the warhead,71 and, when
combined with other technical issues, delayed the delivery of the first W76 warhead until August
2008. The Navy accepted the first refurbished warhead into the stockpile in August 2009.72
W88 ALT 370 Program
While most Trident II missiles carry W76 warheads, a portion of the fleet carries the W88
warhead. This warhead, the last to be added to the U.S. nuclear stockpile, entered the force in the
late 1980s. According to DOE, this warhead is also in need of work to address concerns with its
safety and reliability. In particular, according to recent testimony, the W88 warhead is in the
“development engineering phase for Alteration (ALT) 370 to replace the aging arming, fuzing,
and firing components.” This program is scheduled to produce its first production unit (FPU) in
2019.73 This program received $169.5 million in FY2014 and $165.4 million in FY2015. In
August 2014, the Nuclear Weapons Council also decided to address potential problems with the
warhead’s conventional high explosive during the ALT 370 program. While NNSA has requested
68 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. March 2015,
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/107.full.pdf+html.
69 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2013,” March/April 2013, p. 81.
70 Fleck, John. Flaws Seen in Sub-Launched Nuclear Warhead. Albuquerque Journal. July 8, 2004.
71 Costa, Keith J. IG: Project Weaknesses put W-76 Warhead Refurbishment Plan at Risk. InsideDefense.Com, June 8,
2006.
72 “Navy Receives First Refurbished W-76 Warheads,” Global Security Newswire, November 6, 2009.
73 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, President Obama’s Fiscal
2016 Budget Request for the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Programs and Strategy, Hearing, 114th Cong., 1st sess.,
March 4, 2014. Prepared statement of the Nuclear Weapons Council, p. 4.
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$220.2 million for the W88 ALT 370 program in FY2016, it has indicated that the additional
funding for this program will come from offsets generated by reducing sustainment activities and
the quantities of stored warheads for some other types of warheads. In essence, NNSA “identified
areas where increased risk could be accepted to produce cost-savings within the current
program—without additional funding—and without additional delays to future work.”74
The Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) Program
The Navy is currently conducting development and design work on a new class of ballistic
missile submarines, originally known as the SSBN(X) program, but now known as the Ohio
Replacement Program (ORP). This new submarine will replace the Ohio-class Trident submarines
as they reach the end of their service lives.75 The Trident submarines will begin to retire in 2027,
and the Navy initially indicated that it would need the new submarines to begin to enter the fleet
by 2029, before the number of Trident submarines falls below 12.76 To do this, the Navy would
have had to begin construction of its new submarine by 2019 so that it could begin to enter the
fleet in 2029.77 However, in the FY2013 budget request, the Navy delayed the procurement of the
new class of submarines by two years. As a result, the first new submarine will enter the fleet in
2031 and the number of SSBNs in the fleet is expected to decline to 10 for most of the 2030s.
Costs and Funding
The SSBN(X) program received $497.4 million in research and development funding in the
Navy’s FY2010 budget. The Navy requested an additional $672.3 million in research and
development funding for the program in its FY2011 budget proposal. The FY2012 budget
included $1.07 billion to develop the SSBN(X). It expected to request $927.8 million in FY2013,
with the funding of $29.4 billion between 2011 and 2020. However, with the delay of two years
in the procurement of the first SSBN(X), the Navy budgeted only $565 million for the program in
FY2013. It then budgeted $1.1 billion for FY2014 and $1.2 billion in FY2015. It has requested an
additional $1.39 billion in FY2016, with $971.4 million allocated to submarine development and
$419.3 million allocated to power systems.
The Navy had planned to begin the detailed design for the submarine and to begin advanced
procurement of critical components in FY2015, with the seven-year construction period for the
first submarine beginning in FY2019. This timeline has now been changed, in part to reduce near-
term costs, but also to reduce risks in the program. The Navy will now begin advanced
procurement in FY2017 and begin building the first hull in 2021, rather than 2019. At the same
time, it will continue to support the joint U.S./United Kingdom development of a common missile
compartment, which both nations will use in their new SSBNs.
The Navy initially estimated that each submarine in this program could cost $6 billion to $7
billion in FY2010 dollars. It has worked to redesign the submarine and reduce the costs, with the
plan to hold each submarine to around $4.9 billion, in FY2010 dollars. Officials in the Navy and
analysts outside government have expressed concerns about the cost of this program, and about
74 Ibid.
75 For details on this program, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
76 Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Confronts $80 Billion Cost of New Ballistic Missile Submarines,” Inside Defense,
November 3, 2009.
77 RADM Stephen Johnson, Director, Navy Strategic Programs Office. Speech at the NDU/NDIA Seminar Series, June
23, 2009.
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the effect that these costs may have on the rest of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans. A study by the
Congressional Budget Office indicated that the SSBN(X) program could cost a total of $97-$102
billion, in 2010 dollars, with $10-$15 billion for research and development and $87 billion for the
procurement of 12 submarines.78 A March 2015 GAO report assessing estimated the total
acquisition cost of the SSBN(X) program at about $95.8 billion, in constant FY2015 dollars,
including about $11.8 billion in research and development costs and about $84.0 billion in
procurement costs.79 The Navy has recently indicated that, using then-year dollars rather than
2010 dollars, the program is now estimated to cost $139 billion. It expects the first submarine to
cost $14.5 billion, with $8.8 billion in construction costs and $5.7 billion in non-recurring
engineering work. Subsequent submarines are expected to cost $9.8 billion in then-year dollars,
which is equivalent to $5.2 billion in FY2010 dollars.80
There is widespread agreement, in the Navy, at the Pentagon, and among defense analysts, that
the costs associated with the Ohio Replacement Program could undermine the rest of the Navy’s
shipbuilding budget. At one point, Navy officials estimated that, if the Navy funded this program
through its current, planned shipbuilding budget, it would have to forgo the acquisition of up to
32 other naval vessels. According to Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, unless Congress provides extra
funding, “the production of 12 new ships to replace the Ohio-class submarines could ‘gut’ the
Navy’s shipbuilding budget for more than a decade.”81 In testimony before Congress in February
2015, Navy officials noted that “the Navy continues to need significant increases in our topline
beyond the FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan] … in order to afford the OR [Ohio replacement]
SSBN procurement costs. Absent a significant increase … OR SSBN construction will seriously
impair construction of virtually all other ships in the battle force: attack submarines, destroyers,
and amphibious warfare ships.”82
In response to this growing fiscal pressure, Admiral Richard Breckenridge suggested, in
testimony offered in 2013, that Congress set up an annual $4 billion supplemental fund outside
the Navy’s budget to help support this program.83 Several Members of Congress have supported
this proposal.84 Congress included language in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act
establishing a National Sea-based Deterrence Fund (P.L. 113-291, §1022). According to the
legislation, money placed in the fund will be available for the design, construction, purchase,
78 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2014 Shipbuilding Plan, Washington, DC,
October 2013, p. 24, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44655.
79 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapons Programs, GAO-15-
342SP, March 2015, p. 148.
80 Jason Sherman, “Navy Estimates $14.5B Tab for Lead Ohio-Class Replacement Submarine,” Inside Defense, March
16, 2015.
81 Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Mabus: Ohio-Class Submarine Replacement Could ‘Gut’ Navy Shipbuilding Budget,” National
Defense, September 15, 2014, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=
7c996cd7%2Dcbb4%2D4018%2Dbaf8%2D8825eada7aa2&ID=1601.
82 Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and
Acquisition) and Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and
Resources and Lieutenant General Kenneth J. Glueck, Jr., Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration
& Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Seapower and Projection
Forces Capabilities, February 25, 2015, p. 8.
83 Lee Hudson, “Navy Asks Congress To Set Up Supplemental Fund for SSBN(X),” InsideDefense.com, September 12,
2013.
84 “Some U.S. Lawmakers Eye Funding new Submarines Outside Normal Process,” Global Security Newswire, March
12, 2014. See, also, Lee Hudson, “House Committee Looks to Create Separate Fund for Ohio Replacement,”
InsideDefense.com, May 2, 2014.
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alteration, and conversion of “national sea-based deterrence vessels,” which is a reference to
ballistic missile submarines. The legislation also states that the Secretary of Defense has the
authority to transfer up to $3.5 billion into the fund from unobligated funds in the DOD budget.
Congress did not, however, appropriate increased funding for this effort, and the Secretary of
Defense has not yet identified or transferred any money into this fund. In the FY2016 NDAA,
(H.R. 1735, §1051), Congress expanded the authority to transfer funding. Most experts agree that,
without increased appropriations, this fund may protect the Navy’s shipbuilding budget from the
costs of the Ohio Replacement Program, but that it would require reductions in other programs
within DOD.
Force Posture
As a part of its effort to reduce costs, the Navy is designing the new submarines with only 16
ballistic missile launch tubes. The existing Trident submarines have 24 launch tubes, and each
currently carries 24 missiles, although the Navy plans to reduce this number to 20 missiles on
each submarine as the United States reduces its forces to comply with the New START Treaty.
Congress questioned the Navy on this plan during hearings in April 2011, with some Members
questioning whether the United States would be able to deploy enough warheads if it reduced the
numbers of missiles on each submarine. Admiral Terry Benedict, the Director of the Navy’s
Strategic Systems Program Office, testified that the current international security environment,
along with the Navy’s ability to “upload” warheads onto Trident missiles, convinced him, along
with other Navy and STRATCOM officials, that they could be comfortable with this
configuration.85 However, Congress remained unconvinced. In the FY2012 Defense
Authorization Act, it called for a new study of the plans for the SSBN(X). Congress indicated that
the report should consider the possibility of deploying 10 or 12 submarines with 16 launch tubes
on each and 8 or 10 submarines with 20 launch tubes on each. Moreover, the study was to review
not only the cost of each option, but also the ability of each option to meet the Navy’s at-sea
requirements for the SSBN force and the ability of each option to meet the nation’s nuclear
employment and planning guidance.86
A report published in late 2011 indicated that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
suggested that the Navy reduce the number of SSBNs in the fleet to 10, but increase the number
of launch tubes on each submarine to 20.87 According to the OMB analysis, this could save the
Navy $7 billion over the life of the fleet, by reducing acquisition costs and operating costs. It
would not, however, undermine the submarines’ mission because, with 20 missiles per submarine,
the Navy would still be able to cover the full range of targets assigned to the Trident fleet.
Analysts outside government have offered similar suggestions, noting that the Navy could save
$27 billion over 10 years and $120 billion over the life of the fleet if the Navy built 8, rather than
12 submarines.88 Moreover, according to this analysis, the Navy would be able to deploy the
necessary number of warheads on these submarines, even if it did not increase the number of
launch tubes, by deploying more warheads on each of the Trident missiles on the submarine.
85 Emelie Rutherford, “Navy Defends Plan for Just 16 Missile Tubes on Next Boomer,” Defense Daily, April 7, 2011.
86 Elaine M. Grossman, “U.S. Defense Conference Bill Seeks New Submarine Cost Assessment,” Global Security
Newswire, December 16, 2011.
87 Colin Clark, “OMB Pushes More Tubes, Fewer Boats for Ohio Replacement Subs,” AOL Defense, November 4,
2011, http://defense.aol.com/2011/11/04/omb-pushes-more-tubes-fewer-boats-for-ohio-replacement-subs/.
88 Tom Collina and Kelsey Davenport, “U.S. Must Rethink New Subs, Bombers,” Defense News, October 24, 2011.
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Generally, the number of launch tubes on the submarines should not affect the number of
warheads carried by each submarine or the ability of the fleet to hold a range of potential targets
at risk. Trident missiles can be equipped with 8 warheads each, but, in their current configuration,
with 24 missiles on each submarine, the missiles carry only 4 or 5 warheads each, on average.
This number would drop to 3-4 warheads per missile, on average, as the United States reduced to
the levels in New START. If the new submarines carry only 16 missiles, rather than the 20
planned under New START, then they could deploy with 5-6 warheads per missile. In essence,
the Navy would put the same number of warheads on each submarine, but would just spread them
over a smaller number of missiles.
The Navy has noted that, as the United States reduces its forces to New START levels, the lower
number of missiles per submarine will allow the United States to retain a larger number of
submarines, without exceeding the treaty’s limit of 700 operational delivery vehicles. This will
allow the Navy to maintain a fleet of 12 submarines, and to operate those submarines with
continuous deployments from 2 bases. The Navy has argued that, if it reduces the numbers of
submarines in the fleet, and alters its deployment patterns, it will not be able to meet its
requirements, as these cover more than just the total number of warheads on the fleet or total
number of warheads at sea at any time. Critics outside the government, however, question this
approach, both because a fleet of 12 submarines will cost more to procure and operate than a fleet
of only 8 submarines and because this fleet presumes that the United States must retain its current
pattern of operations for the SSBN fleet for the next 50-60 years.
With 12 submarines in the fleet, the Navy can maintain 4-5 on station at any time, patrolling in
areas where they would need to be to launch their missiles promptly after a presidential order. But
critics question whether this pattern, and the “continuous at-sea” deterrent of 4-5 submarines, will
be necessary in the decades ahead. They note that the United States will be able to maintain a
secure second strike deterrent on the submarines, even if they cannot launch as many warheads
promptly as they can launch today. Others however, continue to support the current operational
patterns, and to argue for a fleet of 12 submarines into the future. For example, Congress, in the
FY2013 Defense Authorization Bill (P.L. 112-239, §130) stated that “the continuous at-sea
deterrence provided by a robust and modern fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
is critical to maintaining nuclear deterrence and assurance and therefore is a central pillar of the
national security of the United States.” The legislation went on to indicate that “a minimum of 12
replacement ballistic missile submarines are necessary to provide continuous at-sea deterrence
over the lifetime of such submarines.... ”
Bombers
B-1 Bomber
The Air Force began to deploy the B-1 bomber in the mid-1980s and eventually deployed a fleet
of 96 aircraft. After several crashes, the Air Force was left with 92 bombers in 2001. It sought to
retire 30 of the aircraft, leaving a force of 62 bombers, but that plan met resistance from
Congress. The B-1 served exclusively as a nuclear delivery vehicle through 1991, carrying short-
range attack missiles and gravity bombs. Because these bombers were not equipped to carry
nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles, each counts as a single delivery vehicle and a single
warhead under START. In 1993, the Air Force began to convert the B-1 bombers to carry
conventional weapons. This process was completed in 1997 and the B-1 bomber is no longer
equipped to carry nuclear weapons. The bomber has contributed to U.S. conventional operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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B-2 Bomber
The Air Force has 20 B-2 bombers, which are based at Whiteman AFB in Missouri.89 The B-2
bomber can carry both B61 and B83 nuclear bombs, but is not equipped to carry cruise missiles.
It can also carry conventional weapons and has participated in U.S. military campaigns from
Bosnia to Iraq. It is designed as a “low observable” aircraft and was intended to improve the U.S.
ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses. It continues to serve as a penetrating bomber, both when
flying conventional missions and when supporting the nuclear deterrent mission. The Air Force
has indicated that it needs significant maintenance and modernization funding to support the
mission.90
Weapons
According to unclassified estimates, the United States has around 475 B-61 and B-83 bombs.91
The B61 contains a number of different versions. The B61-7 serves as a strategic bomb and is
carried by B-2 bombers. The B61-3, 4, and 10 are considered nonstrategic bombs, with lower
yields, and would be delivered by fighter aircraft like the F-16 and F-35. The B61-11, a
modification developed in the 1990s, has a hardened, modified case so that it can penetrate some
hardened targets, although probably not those encased in steel and concrete. The B61-Mod 7,
along with the Mod-3 and Mod-4, and Mod-10 versions, are a part of an ongoing life extension
program (LEP) that will produce a new B61-mod 12 bomb.92 According to the NNSA, the B83,
the largest bomb remaining in the U.S. arsenal, is likely to be retired around 2025, after the
completion of the B61 LEP.
Congress has raised numerous questions about the need for and the costs of the B61 life extension
program. For example, in the FY2010 Energy and Water Appropriations Bills, Congress reduced
funding for this program and limited the available funding to modifications of the bombs’ non-
nuclear components. These restrictions were reportedly designed to slow the program until the
Administration reported, through the Nuclear Posture review, on its future plans for U.S. nuclear
weapons programs.93
The Obama Administration strongly supported the life extension program for the B-61 bomb in
the Nuclear Posture Review. The report indicated that “the Administration will fully fund the full
scope LEP study and follow-on activities for the B-61 bomb ... to ensure first production begins
in FY2017.” The NPR noted that the life extension program for the B-61 bomb, which would
include enhancing safety, security, and use control, would also support U.S. extended deterrence
goals by allowing the United States to retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear
weapons on B-2 bombers and tactical fighter-bombers.94 In the years since the NPR, however, the
89 A B-2 bomber crashed on take-off from Anderson Air Force Base on Guam in late February 2008, reducing the
number of deployed bombers from 21 to 20.
90 For details on the ongoing programs supporting this bomber and the B-52 bomber, see CRS Report R43049, U.S. Air
Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
91 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. March 2015.
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/107.full.pdf+html.
92 For a description of ongoing work in the B61 LEP program, see Kevin Robinson-Avila, “Overhauling the nation’s
nuclear arsenal: Sandia National Labs achieves B61 milestone,” Albuquerque Journal, May 18, 2014.
93 Elaine M. Grossman, “Nuclear Bomb Update Effort Slowed by Posture Review, Science Studies,” Global Security
Newswire, January 19, 2010.
94 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, April 6, 2010, p. 27,
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.
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costs for the program have risen sharply and the timeline has slipped. Where DOE initially
claimed that the program would cost around $4 billion, it now estimates the cost to be over $8
billion.95 In addition, it now expects the first unit to be available in 2020, rather than 2017. Some
in Congress have challenged the Administration’s plans for this program, asking whether a less
costly and complicated program might be sufficient. The Administration has claimed, however,
that if it pursued a less complex life extension program now, it would need to initiate a second
program a few years later to complete the remainder of the work. Moreover, the Administration
has noted that, after it completes this program, DOE will be able to retire the much larger B83
bomb and reduce the number of B61 bombs in the U.S. stockpile.
The Air Force is also designing a new tail kit for the B61 bomb. This tail kit would replace the
parachute that the bomb currently uses to slow to its targets, and would improve the accuracy of
the weapon. Some analysts claim that this tail kit would provide the bomb with new capabilities,
and would undermine the Obama Administration’s pledge that it would not develop new military
capabilities as it conducted the warhead life extension programs. Others, however, dispute this
conclusion. They note that the new B61-12 will combine an increase in accuracy with a reduction
in yield, allowing it to accomplish the same mission as the current unguided, but higher yield,
weapon. As a result, the Air Force has argued that the tail kit will allow the modified B61 bombs
to meet operational requirements for the bomber fleet and provide “nuclear assurance to U.S.
allies in Europe.”
The Air Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) conducted the first
development flight test of the B61-12 LEP in July 2015. The test integrated the new tail kit with
bomb hardware developed by Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories. It did not include
any nuclear materials, but did test the ability of the bomb to integrate with, and deploy from, U.S.
aircraft.96
Congress appropriated $537 million for the B-61 LEP in FY2014 and an additional $643 million
in FY2015. The Obama Administration has requested $643.3 million for FY2016. Funding for the
tail kit program has begun to increase in recent years. Congress appropriated $33 million in
FY2014 and $168.4 million in FY2015. The Air Force has requested an additional $212 million
for FY2016.
B-52 Bomber
The Air Force maintains 76 B-52H nuclear-capable aircraft at two bases, Barksdale, LA, and
Minot, ND.97 The B-52 bomber, which first entered service in 1961, is equipped to carry nuclear
or conventional air-launched cruise missiles and nuclear-armed advanced cruise missiles. The B-
52 bombers can also deliver a wide range of conventional arms, and are currently receiving
numerous upgrades to their communications and electronics systems.
The Air Force has proposed cutting the B-52 fleet on many occasions in the last 15 years. For
example, when the United States identified the force structure that it would deploy under the
START Treaty, it indicated that it would only seek to retain 76 B-52 bombers. Congress, however,
rejected the Clinton Administration’s proposal, and the United States retained the full fleet of
94 aircraft.
95 Jeff Tolleson, “U.S. warheads to get a facelift,” Nature, May 7, 2013.
96 Marina Malenic, “U.S. Completes first B-61 LEP Flight Test,” Janes Defense Weekly, July 8, 2015.
97 A B-52 bomber crashed off the coast of Guam in July 2008.
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The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review called for a significant change to the B-52 fleet, reducing
it from 94 to 56 aircraft. The budget request for FY2007 indicated that the Air Force planned to
retire 18 bombers in FY2007 and 20 in FY2008. At the same time, the QDR called for continuing
improvements to the B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers’ conventional capabilities using the funds that
were saved by the retirement of the 38 aircraft. The Air Force has argued that it can reduce the
number of deployed bombers, without reducing the overall capabilities of the bomber fleet,
because these new weapons have “raised the efficiency” of the bomber platform. At hearings
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General James E. Cartwright, the Commander of
STRATCOM, noted that “the next generation weapons that we’re fielding, these air-launched
cruise missiles, the joint direct attack munitions, et cetera, are much more efficient than they were
in the past.”98 General Cartwright also indicated that, in spite of the reduced size of the fleet, the
Air Force would continue to deploy B-52 bombers at two bases.
During the FY2007 budget cycle, Congress rejected the Pentagon’s proposals for at least part of
the B-52 fleet. The House, in its version of the FY2007 Defense Authorization Bill, prohibited the
Air Force from retiring any of the B-52 aircraft, and mandated that it maintain at least 44 “combat
coded” aircraft until the Air Force began to replace the B-52 with a new bomber of equal or
greater capability. It stated, as a part of its rationale for this rejection, that it appeared the
reduction was based on the reduced need for nuclear-capable bombers and did not take into
consideration a growing need for long-range conventional strike capabilities.99 The Senate agreed
to permit the Air Force to retire 18 B-52 aircraft, but stated that it expected no further reduction in
the size of the force, noting that a further reductions might “prevent our ability to strike the
required conventional target set during times of war.”100 The conference committee (H.R. 5122,
§131) combined these two provisions, allowing the retirement of no more than 18 aircraft after
the submission of a report, and mandating that the Air Force retain at least 44 “combat coded”
aircraft. These restrictions are to remain in place until 2018, or until a new long-range strike
aircraft “with equal or greater capability than the B-52H model aircraft” attained initial
operational capability, if that occurred first. Congress also stated that no funds could be spent to
retire any B-52 aircraft until the Secretary of the Air Force submitted a report to Congress that
described the Air Force plan for the modernization of the B-52, B-1, and B-2 bomber fleets; how
many bombers would be assigned two nuclear and conventional missions if the United States had
to execute “two overlapping ‘swift defeat’ campaigns”; a justification of the cost and projected
savings of any reductions to the B-52H bomber aircraft fleet; and the life expectancy of each
bomber aircraft to remain in the bomber force structure and the capabilities of the bomber force
structure that would be replaced by a new bomber aircraft.
The Air Force indicated that the report on the bomber fleet would be ready in the fall of 2007.
Further, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee, the Air Force indicated that it still
planned to reduce the B-52 fleet to 56 aircraft, with 32 combat coded aircraft included in the fleet.
But, in recognition of the congressional mandate, it was seeking a way to maintain 44 combat
coded aircraft, the minimum set by Congress, within the smaller fleet of 56 aircraft. It also stated
that it planned to store the 20 aircraft it wanted to retire in FY2008 on ramps at Barksdale Air
Force Base; the aircraft would be kept in serviceable condition, but would not receive any
98 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Global Strike Plans and Programs. Testimony of James E.
Cartwright, Commander U.S. Strategic Command. March 29, 2006.
99 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.
H.Rept. 109-452. May 5, 2006. p. 103.
100 U.S. Congress Senate. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. S.Rept. 109-254. May 9, 2006.
p. 94.
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capabilities upgrades.101 Congress once again rejected this proposal. In the FY2008 Defense
Authorization Bill (H.R. 1585, §137), Congress mandated that the Air Force maintain a fleet of
74 B-52 bombers, with no less than 63 in the Primary Aircraft inventory and 11 backup aircraft.
Two additional aircraft would be designated as “attrition reserve.” The conference committee
indicated that the members agreed that a fleet of fewer than 76 aircraft would be insufficient to
meet long-range strike requirements.
The growing interest in long-range strike capabilities, and the continuing addition of precision
conventional weapons to these aircraft, demonstrates that the Pentagon and STRATCOM view
the U.S. bomber fleet as essential to U.S. conventional weapons capabilities. Further, the need for
long-range strike capabilities, rather than an interest in maintaining the nuclear role for
bombers,102 appeared to be driving decisions about the size and structure of the bomber fleet.
There are some indications that, during the discussions on the 2006 QDR, some in the Pentagon
argued that the all the B-52 bombers should be removed from the nuclear mission. Moreover, in
November 2008, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley noted that the role that the bombers
play in nuclear deterrence could be reduced in the future, if the United States and Russia
negotiate further reductions in their nuclear arsenals.
This focus began to shift, however, in 2008. Studies have noted that a lack of attention paid in the
Air Force and, more broadly, in DOD, to the bombers’ nuclear mission seems to be one of the
factors that led to the episode in August 2007, when a B-52 bomber flew from Minot to Barksdale
with six cruise missiles that carried live nuclear warheads.103 As is discussed in more detail below,
the Air Force is pursuing a number of organizational and procedural changes to increase its focus
on the nuclear mission and “reinvigorate” its nuclear enterprise. It has “stood-up” a B-52 bomber
squadron that will focus specifically on the nuclear mission.104 This unit added 10 bombers to the
12 already deployed at Minot. While all the B-52 bomber crews and aircraft will retain their
nuclear roles, this added squadron will participate in a greater number of nuclear exercises and
training missions. The aircraft in the squadron will rotate from other missions, but will remain
designated as the nuclear squadron for full year. The Air Force hopes this construct will improve
not only the operational proficiency of the crews, but also their morale and their confidence in the
value of the nuclear mission.
With this change, Secretary of Defense Gates stated, in April 2009, that the Air Force planned to
retain 76 B-52 bombers. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review determined that the Air Force would
retain nuclear-capable bombers, but it would also convert some B-52s to a conventional-only
role. In the report on the New START force structure issued in April 2014, the Obama
Administration indicated that the United States would retain 42 deployed and 4 nondeployed
nuclear capable B-52 bombers. The remainder of the B-52 bombers would be converted to carry
only conventional weapons. In September 2015, the Air Force announced that it had begun to
convert a portion of the B-52H bomber force from nuclear to conventional-only capability, thus
removing 30 operational bombers from accountability under New START.105
101 U.S. Congress. Senate. Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. Hearing on the Fiscal Year
2008 Strategic Forces Program Budget. Statement of Major General Roger Burg. March 28, 2007. p. 8.
102 Carlo Munoz, “Donley: Role of Nuclear Bomber Fleet Could Be Curtailed,” Inside the Air Force, November 14,
2008.
103 For a detailed review of this incident see, Warrick, Joby and Walter Pincus. The Saga of a Bent Spear. Washington
Post. September 23, 2007.
104 Marcus Weisgerber, “USAF To Activate Rotational Nuclear Bomber Squadron Next Month,” Inside Defense,
September 26, 2008.
105 U.S. Department of Defense, Air Force Global Strike Command, AFGSC Completes First New START Bomber
(continued...)
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Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) Weapons
The B-52 bomber was equipped to carry both the Air-Launched cruise missile (ALCM) and
Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). The ACM reportedly had a modified design with a lower radar
cross-section, making it more “stealthy” than the ALCM. According to Air Force figures, in 2006,
the United States had 1,142 ALCMs and 394 ACMs.106 Although these weapons represented a
majority of the weapons that U.S. bombers could carry on nuclear missions, the Department of
Defense decided to retire many of these missiles. In his statement to the Senate Armed Services
Committee’s Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Major General Roger Burg indicated that this
study had concluded, and the Secretary of Defense had directed, that the Air Force retire all the
Advanced Cruise Missiles, although some could be converted to carry conventional warheads,
and reduce the ALCM fleet to 528 cruise missiles. The excess ALCMs will also be eliminated,
with the remaining missiles consolidated at Minot Air Force Base. With all the ALCMs
consolidated at Minot Air Force Base, the bombers at Barksdale may no longer be included in the
nuclear mission.
The Air Force plans to sustain the ALCM in the fleet through 2030. It is then planning to replace
the ALCM with a new advanced long range standoff (LRSO) cruise missile. It has recently
completed an analysis of alternatives (AOA) for this system. According to DOD, the AOA would
“define the platform requirements, provide cost-sensitive comparisons, validate threats, and
establish measures of effectiveness, and assess candidate systems for eventual procurement and
production” of the new missile.107 The DOD budget request for FY2014 contained $5 million for
the Air Force to begin systems engineering support for the program. The budget also indicated
that the technology development phase would begin in FY2014, and that the funding requests
could reach a total of $1 billion through FY2014.
In the FY2015 budget request, DOD indicated that the plans for the LRSO missile had slipped by
three years. This change was the result of fiscal constraints and the need to fund higher priorities
elsewhere in the nuclear force. As a result, although the Air Force requested only $4.9 million for
this program in FY2015, it indicated that it would spend only $221 million over the next five
years. Congress expressed concerns with this plan in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization
Act (P.L. 113-291, §143), noting that the existing ALCMs were, on average, over 30 years old
and that the capabilities provided by the cruise missile were “critical to maintaining a credible
and effective air-delivery leg of the nuclear triad.” The legislation requested a report on the status
of the current cruise missile and the development of the new LRSO missile.
In its FY2016 budget request, the Air Force added funding for the LRSO to accelerate the
program by two years, seeking now to begin deployments in the mid-2020s. According to recent
testimony, the Air Force has placed a higher priority on this program because the existing ALCM
has been through several life extension programs and is beginning to show reliability problems.
According to Frank Kendall, the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L, this is making AL CM
more difficult to maintain.108 Where the Air Force requested only $3.4 million for this program in
(...continued)
Conversion, September 17, 2015.
106 The Air Force also has 289 ALCMs that have been converted to carry conventional warheads (CALCMs). See
Michael Sirak. DOD Studies Future Role of Nuclear-Armed Cruise Missiles. Defense Daily, March 30, 2006.
107 U.S. Department of Defense, November 2010 Update to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010, New
START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans, Washington, DC, November 17, 2010, p. 12.
http://www.lasg.org/CMRR/Sect1251_update_17Nov2010.pdf.
108 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, President Obama’s
(continued...)
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FY2015, it has requested $36.6 million in FY2016. DOD expects this funding to increase rapidly,
with a request of $133.7 million in FY2017 and a total of nearly $1.8 billion between FY2016
and FY2020. According to press reports, the Air Force plans to buy a total of 1,000-1,100 new
cruise missiles through the LRSO program, with the first missile slated for completion in 2026.109
This total would support the testing program and deployment plans over the life of the missile.
NNSA is also conducting a life-extension program on the W80 warhead to provide a warhead for
the new LRSO. Its plans for the W80-4 warhead had also slipped in the FY2015 budget, with the
Nuclear Weapons Council delaying the first production unit from 2024 until the 2025-2027
timeframe. Congress, in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, mandated that NNSA
deliver the first production unit of this new warhead by 2025 (P.L. 113-291, §3119). In its
FY2016 budget request, NNSA indicated that it had allocated the resources necessary to meet this
requirement, and to align the warhead life extension program with the plan to field the first LRSO
missile in FY2026.
Analysts outside government and several Members of Congress have questioned whether the Air
Force needs to accelerate the LRSO program and whether the United States needs and can afford
to develop and produce a new cruise missile in the coming decade. During recent testimony
before both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Admiral Haney, the Commander
of Strategic Command (STRATCOM), has noted that the LRSO is “important from a deterrence
and warfighting requirement” because it will provide Air Force bombers with a “standoff
capability” now and into the future. He noted that this standoff capability will remain important
because as more countries develop advanced air defenses, those defenses will provide them with
“anti-access/access denial” capabilities. Several Members have asked, however, whether this
capability may be redundant, as the Air Force is also developing a new penetrating bomber and
proceeding with the life extension program for the B61 bomb. Admiral Haney and others have
responded by noting that the capabilities are not redundant, but are complementary, because they
provide the President with more flexibility and more options in the event of a crisis. They also
would complicate an adversary’s efforts to defend against U.S. bomber weapons because the
United States would have two very different means of penetrating air defenses.
Future Bomber Plans
As the preceding discussion noted, the United States currently deploys two types of heavy
bombers—the B-2 and B-52—that can deliver both nuclear and conventional weapons. A third
bomber, the B-1, was initially equipped to deliver nuclear weapons but is now exclusively
dedicated to conventional missions. The Air Force has employed all three aircraft in conventional
conflicts over the past two decades, and all have received upgrades to sustain their capabilities,
but all three are aging and, according to many in the Air Force, may not be sufficient to meet
emerging challenges.
As a result, the Air Force has also begun develop a new strategic bomber. When it began this
effort more than a decade ago, it hoped to introduce the new bomber into the fleet around 2018.
At the time, it was seeking a bomber with not only stealth capabilities and long range, but also
one with “persistence,” one that could “stay airborne and on call for very long periods.”110
(...continued)
Fiscal 2016 Budget Request for the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Programs and Strategy, Hearing, 114th Cong., 1st
sess., March 4, 2014.
109 Kingston Reif, “Air Force Wants 1,000 New Cruise Missiles,” Arms Control Today, May 2015.
110 Christie, Rebecca. Air Force To Step Up New Bomber Search in Next Budget. Wall Street Journal. June 29, 2006.
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However, the start of the study on a new bomber, known as an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA),
was delayed by a dispute over whether the study should stand alone or be merged with another
AOA on prompt global strike (PGS) capabilities, such as hypersonic technologies and missiles.111
General James Cartwright, the former head of STRATCOM, reportedly supported a plan to merge
the two efforts, so that the considerations of capabilities for a new bomber would be measured
alongside other systems, both to balance the force and avoid redundancy across the force.112 On
the other hand, the former Air Force Chief of Staff, General T. Michael Moseley, reportedly
preferred to keep the two studies separate. He argued that a bomber with long-range strike
capabilities must have “persistent, survivable, and penetrating capabilities” while a platform with
PGS capabilities could be a “standoff weapon that is very, very fast.”113 This position reportedly
prevailed, with the Air Force deciding, in May 2006, to keep the two studies separate.114
This dispute revealed wide-ranging differences, within the Air Force and Pentagon, about the
goals for and capabilities that should be sought in a new bomber program.115 The dispute focused,
however, on conventional capabilities; it seemed to be almost a foregone conclusion that nuclear
capabilities, or the need for a bomber leg of the nuclear triad, would not drive the discussion or
analysis. This position remains true today, with the Air Force seeking a new bomber to meet
conventional challenges, and considering delaying the introduction of nuclear capabilities to save
money. But disagreements over the capabilities needed, even for the conventional mission, served
to delay the new bomber program by several years.
In May 2007, the Air Force indicated that it had decided that the next generation bomber would
be manned and subsonic, although it would incorporate some stealth characteristics.116 It decided
that it would not pursue supersonic capabilities, or an unmanned option, to contain costs and
maintain the capabilities of the future aircraft. However, on April 6, 2009, in a briefing describing
the FY2010 defense budget, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates delayed the program and
indicated that the Air Force would not proceed until it had “a better understanding of the need, the
requirement and the technology.”117 He suspended the program until DOD completed the QDR
and Nuclear Posture Review.
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, published in February 2010, indicated that the Air Force
was “reviewing options for fielding survivable, long-range surveillance and strike aircraft as part
of a comprehensive, phased plan to modernize the bomber force.”118 The report also noted that
Secretary of Defense Gates ordered a follow-on study to the QDR to determine “what
111 For details on these types of systems, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range
Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
112 Grossman, Elaine M. Cartwright Wants to See Strike Studies Await “Discovery” Process. InsideDefense.Com. April
6, 2006.0
113 Bennet, John T. Internal Squabbles Holding Up Bomber Study, USAF Official Says. InsideDefense.com. April 21,
2006.
114 Matishak, Martin. Long-Range, Prompt Global Strike Studies Will Remain Separate. InsideDefense.com. June 16,
2006.
115 For more details on the proposed bomber, see CRS Report RL34406, Air Force Next-Generation Bomber:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.
116 Sirak, Michael. Air Force Identifies Manned, Subsonic Bomber as Most Promising 2018 Option. Defense Today.
May 2, 2007.
117 U.S. Department of Defense, Briefing by Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Marine Corps Gen. James
Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, April 6, 2009, http://insidedefense.com/
secure/data_extra/html3/dplus2009_0893_3.htm.
118 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC, February 2010, p. 33,
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.
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combination of joint persistent surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision-attack capabilities,
including both penetrating platforms and stand-off weapons, will best support U.S. power
projection operations over the next two to three decades.” Although the study was just beginning,
the DOD budget request for 2011 included $200 million for the new bomber, and DOD
documents indicated that expenditures on the bomber could total $1.74 billion through 2015.119
Secretary Gates indicated that he expected the Air Force to field the next generation bomber in
the late 2020s.120
The update to the 1251 Report, submitted to the Senate before its vote on the New START Treaty
in late 2010, emphasized that the United States would maintain the bomber leg of the strategic
triad and that DOD was committed to modernizing the bomber force. The report noted that the
long-range strike study was not questioning whether the United States would pursue a new heavy
bomber, but “the appropriate type of bomber and the timelines for development, production, and
deployment.”121 The report indicated that this study would advise the President’s budget
submission for FY2012. Air Force officials echoed this, noting that Secretary Gates seemed
inclined to accept the Air Force’s recommendations on the building of a new long-range
bomber.122 Secretary Gates confirmed this approach in January 2011, when he announced the Air
Force would develop a new bomber “using proven technologies,” and that this bomber would be
nuclear-capable.123 The Pentagon requested $197 million in the FY2012 budget on a new bomber.
The budget documents indicate that the bomber will be nuclear-capable, and that the Air Force
was planning to spend $3.7 billion on its development over the next five years.
Air Force officials indicate that they hope to field between 80 and 100 of the new bombers in the
future, with the first to enter service around 2025. It has indicated that it plans to hold the
procurement cost for each bomber to $550 million, with the total cost of the program to reach $36
billion-$56 billion. However, it has recently acknowledged that this cost does not include research
and development funding,124 which, according to some estimates, could amount to between $20
billion and $45 billion if the program follows the trends set by previous bomber programs.125 The
per-unit cost of $550 million would also rise if the Air Force were to buy fewer than the planned
80-100 bombers. As a result, many analysts agree that the final cost of the bomber could reach
$60-$80 billion.
The Air Force expects funding requests for the new bomber to rise sharply over the next five
years. Congress appropriated $259 million for R&D on this aircraft in FY2013, $359.4 million in
FY2014, and $913.7 million in FY2015. The Air Force has requested $1.2 billion for FY2016,
119 Elaine M. Grossman, “Pentagon Eyes More than $800 Million for New Nuclear Cruise Missile,” Global Security
Newswire, March 9, 2010.
120 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Gates Sees New U.S. Bomber Fielded in 2020s,” Reuters, February 2, 2010.
121 U.S. Department of Defense, November 2010 Update to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010, New
START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans, Washington, DC, November 17, 2010, p. 11.
http://www.lasg.org/CMRR/Sect1251_update_17Nov2010.pdf.
122 Emelie Rutherford, “Schwartz Hopeful About Long-Range Strike Funding,” Defense Daily, November 29, 2010.
123 Marcus Weisgerber, “Air Force To Develop New Long-Range, Optionally Manned Bomber,” Inside the Air Force,
January 6, 2011.
124 Aaron Mehta, “USAF General: “Of Course” Bomber Will Be More Than $550M per Copy,” Defense News, March
5, 2014.
125 Jon B. Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis, and Marc Quint, The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad, James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, CA, January 2014, pp. 18-19. http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/
140107_trillion_dollar_nuclear_triad.pdf.
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and plans to spend a total of $13.8 billion between FY2016 and FY2020.126 These requests are
sufficient to keep the bomber program on track but lead to Air Force spending levels that exceed
the levels set by the 2011 Budget Control Act. According to one recent analysis, the Air Force
would likely need to reduce its other acquisition programs to find the “budget headroom” for this
program.127
The Air Force announced on October 27, 2015, that it had awarded the initial contract, which
includes the production of 21 bombers, to Northrup Grumman. Analysts believe this contract is
worth more than $20 billion, but that the total cost of the program could reach $80 billion for 100
aircraft.128 This total includes development costs and the expected cost of $511 million (in 2010
dollars) for each of the 100 bombers. This represents a small reduction from the target cost of
$550 million per bomber.
The Air Force has indicated that a new bomber is essential to its future plans for the conventional
long-range strike mission. It has stated that it is “committed to modernizing bomber capacity and
capabilities to support LRS (long range strike) military options.” It indicated that the new bomber
“must be able to penetrate the increasingly dense anti-access/area denial environments developing
around the world.” The Air Force has, in the past, stated that this bomber will be designed to
deliver nuclear weapons. However, in October 2011, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force indicated
that the new bomber probably would not include nuclear capabilities initially, but would add them
in as the B-2 and B-52 bombers retired from the fleet.
Sustaining the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise
In late August 2007, a B-52 bomber based in Minot, ND, took off on flight to Barksdale Air Force
Base in Louisiana. The bomber carried 12 air-launched cruise missiles that were slated for
retirement at Barksdale. As a result of a series of errors and missteps in the process of removing
the missiles from storage and loading them on the bombers, six of the missiles carried live
nuclear warheads, instead of the dummy warheads that were installed on missiles heading for
retirement. This episode was the first of many that have led to questions about the capabilities
management of the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise. It led to a series of studies and reviews by
the Air Force that identified the source of the episode and identified a number of steps the Air
Force should take to improve its handling of nuclear weapons.129 These studies were followed, in
2014, by additional studies and a number of changes designed to raise morale and the quality of
life for service members in the nuclear enterprise.
In early June 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates requested the resignations of the Secretary
of the Air Force, Michael Wynne, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Michael
Mosely, from their positions, at least in part, due to concerns that shortcomings in the Air Force’s
handling of nuclear weapons “resulted from an erosion of performance standards within the
involved commands and a lack of effective Air Force leadership oversight.”130 Secretary Gates
appointed a task force, led by former Secretary of Defense and Energy James Schlesinger, to
provide “independent advice on the organizational, procedural and policy improvements
126 Tony Cappaccio, “Long-Range Bomber’s Development would Get $12 Billion from U.S.,” Bloomberg News, March
6, 2014.
127 Colin Clark, “LRS-B, Next Boomer May Force Weapons Cuts,” Breaking Defense, September 4, 2014.
128 Doug Cameron, “Northrop Grumman Wins Long-Range Bomber Deal,” Wall Street Journal, October 27, 2015.
129 See, for example, The Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety. Report on the
Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons. February 2008.
130 Nuclear Lapses Trigger Ouster of Top U.S. Air Force Officials. Global Security Newswire. June 6, 2008.
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necessary to ensure that the highest levels of accountability and control are maintained in the
department’s stewardship of nuclear weapons, delivery vehicles, sensitive components and basing
procedures.”131
Several of the studies that reviewed this event concluded that the Air Force leadership had lost its
focus on the nuclear mission as it diverted resources to more pressing missions related to the
ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, the “nuclear enterprise” had been allowed
to atrophy, with evident declines in morale, cohesion, and capability.132 These reports suggested
that the United States restore its focus on the nuclear mission and repair long-standing and often-
identified deficiencies in manpower and training programs for crews that maintain and service
nuclear weapons and operate nuclear-capable bombers. The studies identified a number of
organizational changes to achieve these goals. For example, the Air Force has created a new
Global Strike Command, based at Barksdale Air Force Base, that is responsible for both the
ICBM force and the nuclear-capable bombers. This organization began its operations in early
2009. The Air Force has also established a new headquarters office in the Pentagon that will
monitor and manage the resources and policies dedicated to the nuclear mission. The Air Force
also altered its inspection program and its expectations for achievement during these inspections.
In a study published in April 2011, the Defense Science Board reviewed and evaluated the
changes Air Force had made in its nuclear weapons enterprise.133 The report noted that Air Force
leadership “has taken decisive action to correct deficiencies, reinvigorate, and further strengthen
the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.”134 At the same time, though, the study noted that some of the
“extraordinary measures” taken in response to the earlier lapses could have negative impacts if
they are extended beyond the “period of urgent need.” This problem was particularly evident in
the areas of oversight and inspection. The study reported that there has been “intense attention to
the issue of accountability and control of nuclear weapons-related materials.” But the numerous
and overlapping inspections have become so frequent and invasive that the units may not have the
time or resources to correct deficiencies found during the many inspections. As a result, the task
force concluded that the intense level of inspections and exercises had become counterproductive
by interfering with the normal rhythm of operations at the wings.135
Several incidents that occurred in 2013 and early 2014 have raised new concerns about the
capabilities and morale of ICBM launch officers. For example, press reports from May 2013
noted that the Air Force had removed 17 launch officers from duty at Minot Air Force Base and
had sent them for additional training after they earned low scores on an inspection in March.136 In
August, a missile unit at Malmstrom Air Force Base also received a failing grade on an
inspection. Air Force officials expressed concern about these results, but noted that they remained
131 U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). Department of Defense
Announces Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management. June 12, 2008.
132 See, for example, United States Air Force, Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise, Prepared by the Air
Force Nuclear Task Force, Washington, DC, October 24, 2008, http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-
081024-073.pdf. See also, Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management (the
Schlesinger Commission), Phase I: The Air Force’s Nuclear Mission, Washington, DC September 2008.
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Phase_I_Report_Sept_10.pdf.
133 Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, Independent Assessment of The Air
force Nuclear Enterprise, Washington, DC, April 2011. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/NWS_2010.pdf.
134 Ibid., p. 16.
135 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
136 Robert Burns, “Air Force Sidelines 17 ICBM launch officers: commander cites ‘rot’ within system,” Associated
Press, May 8, 2013.
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confident in the capabilities of Air Force nuclear officers. After the incident in Minot, some saw
the commander’s response, and the remedial action, as a sign of progress in the force, because
problems were identified and corrected on site. Others have noted that unsatisfactory results in
inspections may be the result of higher expectations, and do not necessarily indicate deeper
problems. Others, however, view the low scores on inspections as a symptom of continuing
problems in the force.
Two other incidents in September and October 2013 also raised concerns about the U.S. nuclear
enterprise, even though they did not affect the safety or security of the nuclear force. In
September, Vice Admiral Timothy Giardina, the second-in-command at STRATCOM, was
suspended after an investigation into the use of counterfeit gambling chips. In October, Major
General Michael Carey, the Commander of 20th Air Force, which is responsible for the entire
ICBM fleet, was reassigned following an investigation into “personal misbehavior.”137
In January 2014, press reports indicated that nuclear launch officers at Malmstrom Air Force Base
had been implicated in a drug investigation. While investigating this charge, the Air Force
discovered that 34 of launch officers may have been cheating on their monthly proficiency
exams. In response to this event, Secretary of Defense Hagel ordered an internal review of
nuclear weapons personnel issues and commissioned another outside study of morale and
effectiveness in the nuclear enterprise. As this review has proceeded, the Air Force has questioned
whether some officers in the nuclear force may be experiencing “burnout” and boredom in a
mission that seems connected to an earlier time and whether the tense atmosphere created by the
frequent testing and inspection regimes has created incentives to cheat to produce perfect
scores.138
The Air Force has responded to these problems with plans to increase funding by nearly $8 billion
over the next five years, raise pay levels, introduce new management positions, modify the testing
process, and raise morale among Air Force ICBM officers. Many of these plans are designed to
highlight the high value that Air Force places on the ICBM mission and to convince airmen that
their leaders value their effort and accomplishment. At the same time, though, the changes will
require additional funding, and the Air Force will need to request increases in its budget in an era
of fiscal restraint to follow through on these initiatives.
While the Air Force has worked to increase the level of attention and accountability for its nuclear
weapons after these incidents, other analysts found different lessons in the lapses. Some saw the
decline of the Air Force nuclear enterprise as an inevitable part of the declining role of nuclear
weapons in U.S. national security strategy and argued that the United States should extend the
process by further reducing its nuclear arsenal and removing greater numbers of weapons from
the operational force. For example, some suggested that the evident weaknesses in the Air Force’s
procedures argued for removing nuclear weapons from the whole of the bomber fleet.139 Congress
may address concerns about these issues, and review possible changes in command structures and
security procedures, as it reviews nuclear weapons policies and programs.
137 “Air Force Fires General In Charge Of Nuclear Missiles,” Los Angeles Times, October 11, 2013.
138 R. Jeffrey Smith, “Aiming High: Boredom, Drugs, Low Morale. The millennials of the U.S. nuclear missile corps
are struggling to stay on high alert for a nuclear Armageddon,” Slate, April 2014.
139 Kristensen, Hans. Nuclear Safety and the Saga of the Missing Bent Spear. Federation of the American Scientists.
February 22, 2008. http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/02/nuclear_safety_and_the_saga_ab.php.
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Issues for Congress
This report focuses on the numbers and types of weapons in the U.S. strategic nuclear force
structure. It does not address the broader question of why the United States chooses to deploy
these numbers and types of weapons, or more generally, the role that U.S. nuclear weapons play
in U.S. national security strategy. This question is addressed in other CRS reports.140 However, as
the Obama Administration reviews and possibly revises the plans for U.S. nuclear force structure,
Congress could address broader questions about the relationship between these forces and the role
of nuclear weapons.
Force Size
The Bush Administration argued that, because the United States and Russia were no longer
enemies, the United States would not size or structure its nuclear forces simply to deter the
“Russian threat.” Instead, nuclear weapons would play a broader role in U.S. national security
strategy. The Obama Administration, in contrast, noted that there is a relationship between the
size of the U.S. arsenal and the size of the Russian arsenal. The 2010 NPR states that
Russia’s nuclear force will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how
fast we are prepared to reduce U.S. forces. Because of our improved relations, the need
for strict numerical parity between the two countries is no longer as compelling as it was
during the Cold War. But large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on
both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a
stable, long-term strategic relationship, especially as nuclear forces are significantly
reduced.141
The Bush Administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review determined that the United States
would need to maintain between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed nuclear warheads. The
Bush Administration also indicated that the United States would maintain in storage many of the
warheads removed from deployed forces, and would maintain the capability to restore some of
these warheads to the deployed forces to meet unexpected contingencies. The Obama
Administration concluded, in its NPR, that the United States could reduce its forces to 1,550
deployed warheads, and agreed to do so under the New START Treaty, but it also planned to
retain the capability to restore warheads to its deployed forces. It also plans to retain many
warheads in storage, although it has indicated that the size of the total stockpile could decline as
the United States reduces its deployed forces to the New START limits.142
The Obama Administration has also indicated that the United States may be able to reduce its
numbers of deployed and nondeployed warheads further, but that it should do so in parallel with
Russia. It indicated, in the 2010 NPR, that “large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise
concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to
maintaining a stable, long-term strategic relationship.”143 In June 2013, the Department of
140 See, for example, CRS Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure, by Amy
F. Woolf.
141 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, April 6, 2010, p. 30,
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.
142 On May 3, 2010, the Obama Administration announced that the United States has 5,113 warheads in its stockpile of
nuclear weapons. This number includes the deployed warheads, active nondeployed warheads and inactive
nondeployed warheads. For more information, see http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-
03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency__FINAL_w_Date.pdf.
143 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, April 6, 2010, p. 30,
(continued...)
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Defense completed a new study, as a follow-up to the NPR, to determine how deeply the United
States might reduce its forces, and how it should deploy the remaining forces. Press reports
indicate the Pentagon reviewed a number of alternatives in this study, with some contemplating
reductions as low as 300 warheads,144 but the Administration concluded that the United States
could reduce U.S. deployed strategic forces by about one-third, to a level of 1,000-1,100
warheads, if it did so along with Russia. They United States would not proceed with unilateral
cuts in the U.S. arsenal.145
Some analysts have questioned why the United States must maintain such a large force of nuclear
weapons. They have questioned whether the United States would attack with such a large number
of weapons if its own national survival were not at risk, and they note that only Russia currently
has the capability to threaten U.S. national survival. They assert that the United States could
likely meet any other potential contingency with a far smaller force of nuclear weapons. Some
have concluded, instead, that the United States could maintain its security with a force of between
500 and 1,000 warheads.146 Others, however, dispute this view and note that the United States has
other potential adversaries, and, even if these nations do not possess thousands of nuclear
warheads, some may expand their nuclear forces or chemical and biological capabilities in the
future. Some have argued that the also needs to assure its allies of its commitment to their
security, and this goal could require a force of significant size, regardless of the number of
potential targets an adversary nation might possess.
Force Structure
When the Bush Administration announced the results of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, it
indicated that the United States would retain a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers for
the foreseeable future. The Obama Administration also offered continuing support for the
retention of the strategic triad. Nevertheless, as the Obama Administration has outlined plans to
modernize and replace the delivery vehicles in all three legs of the strategic triad, many analysts
have begun to question whether the United States can afford to retain the triad and whether it can
retain a robust deterrent without one of the current types of strategic delivery vehicles.147
The Obama Administration indicated, in the 2010 NPR, that the United States would convert
some of its bombers to conventional-only missions. This is consistent with the view, among some
analysts, that, in the future, the bombers may be more important in the conventional mission. As
was noted above, most discussions about the bomber force focus on how many bombers, and
what types of bomber weapons, the United States needs to bolster its conventional long-range
strike capability. There is little, if any, discussion about the role that bombers may play in either
nuclear deterrence, or, if deterrence fails, in the launch of U.S. nuclear weapons. It is not
surprising that some in the Air Force and Pentagon and some outside government have questioned
the continuing need for nuclear-capable bombers.148
(...continued)
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.
144 R. Jeffrey Smith, “Obama Embraces Big Nuke Cuts,” Foreign Policy, February 8, 2013.
145 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC, June
12, 2013, p. 6, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/reporttoCongressonUSNuclearEmploymentStrategy_Section491.pdf.
146 See, for example, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby. What Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations for
Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces. Arms Control Association, Updated October 2007.
147 Mark Thompson, “Nuclear Triad Warfare,” Time Magazine, October 18, 2011.
148 See, for example, Dr. Dana J. Johnson, Dr. Christopher J. Bowie, and Dr. Robert P. Haffa, Triad, Dyad, Monad?
(continued...)
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The Obama Administration has indicated that the United States will retain 400 deployed ICBMs
under the New START Treaty. Each will be equipped with a single warhead. Analysts have often
argued, and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review affirmed, that single-warhead ICBMs bolster crisis
stability, and discourage efforts by an adversary to launch a disarming first strike, because the
cost of the strike, as measured by the number of attacking warheads, would exceed the benefits,
as measured by the number of warheads destroyed. Moreover, these missiles will remain
deployed at three ICBM bases.
Some analysts outside government have called for reductions in or even the elimination of the
U.S. ICBM force. Some have argued that the Air Force could save up to $360 million per year if
it reduced the ICBM force to 300 missiles.149 Others have noted that, under the current financial
pressures, the Air Force may not be able to afford a new ICBM after 2030. Moreover, even if the
financial pressures did not exist, some argue the Air Force should eliminate the ICBM force
because it no longer serves U.S. national security needs. For example, in a study published in
May 2012,150 the Global Zero Organization argued for the elimination of the ICBM force because
it views these missiles as dangerous and destabilizing in the current security environment. It
noted that “ICBMs can only support nuclear wartime operations against Russia” and that current-
generation ICBMs “fired from the existing bases, on their minimum energy trajectories,” have to
overfly Russia and China or fly near Russia to reach targets in potentially adversarial countries. It
contends that, if U.S. missiles fly over or near Russia on their way to more southerly targets in
Iran or Syria, Russia might be confused by ambiguous attack indications and might then launch
its own retaliatory attack against the United States. Second, the report asserted that, because
ICBMs are based in fixed silos that are vulnerable to destruction in an attack, they must depend
heavily upon “launch on warning” to survive and retaliate in some scenarios. As a result,
according to the report, ICBMs exacerbate the risk that the United States might launch its
weapons on false warning.
Analysts who support the continued deployment of U.S. ICBMs disputed many of the assertions
outlined in the Global Zero report. First, they noted that, although each individual ICBM silo may
be vulnerable to destruction if targeted by several incoming warheads, an attack that threatened to
destroy the entire U.S. ICBM force would have to consist of hundreds, if not thousands of
attacking warheads.151 This is because the United States maintains nearly 450 ICBM silos
hardened against nuclear blast, and an attacker would have to target two or three warheads against
each silo to ensure their destruction. Further, because the United States now deploys each
Minuteman missile with only a single warhead, the attacker would have to expend two to three
times as many warheads as he could hope to destroy. This calculation underpins the conclusion,
(...continued)
Shaping the U.S. Nuclear Force for the Future, Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, Washington, DC, November
2009.
149 Daryl G. Kimball, “Defuse the Exploding Costs of Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control Today, December 2012, p. 4.
150 Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure, and Posture,
Global Zero, Washington, DC, May 2012, herein after referred to as the Global Zero Report. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/
6395109/GZ%20US%20Nuclear%20Policy%20Commission%20Report.pdf.
151 See, for example, Senate ICBM Coalition, The Long Pole of the Nuclear Umbrella, A White Paper on the Criticality
of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile to the United States Security, Washington, DC, November 2009. See also, Peter
Huessy, “In Defense of the Nuclear Triad.” Defense One, October 18, 2013, http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/
10/defense-nuclear-triad/72242/?oref=search_Huessy.
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which is widespread among nuclear policy analysts, that single-warhead ICBMs enhance stability
and discourage attack because they are not lucrative targets.152
The Obama Administration has also indicated that it plans to retain 14 Trident submarines until it
begins retiring the Ohio-class SSBNs in the late 2020s. Moreover, the New START Treaty allows
the United States to continue to reduce the warheads on each missile. It also allows the United
States to eliminate some of the launch tubes by simply removing the gas generators that assist in
the launch of the missiles. As a result, the United States will have a significant amount of
flexibility in apportioning warheads among its SSBNs, and will not have to eliminate any
submarines to meet the new START limits. Moreover, the Navy does not plan to alter the basic
structure of its Trident fleet; it will continue to deploy its submarines at two bases, with a portion
of the fleet deployed in the Atlantic Ocean and a portion deployed in the Pacific Ocean. As a
result, with its ability to remain invulnerable to detection and attack, and with the increasing
accuracy and reliability of its missiles and warheads, the Trident fleet will continue to represent
the “backbone” of the U.S. nuclear force.
Some argue that the United States should reduce the size of its SLBM fleet and retain only 8 or
10 submarines. They argue that this reduction now, and the future acquisition of fewer
replacement submarines, could save the Navy $6 billion-$7 billion over the next 10 years.153 They
also note that this change need not reduce the number of operational warheads on SLBMs,
because the United States would deploy each submarine with 24 missiles, rather than the 20
planned under New START, and could increase the number of warheads on each missile.
However, with so few submarines, the United States might have to eliminate one of its submarine
bases, leaving it with submarines based only in the Atlantic or only in the Pacific Ocean. Or the
United States might have to reduce the number of submarines on station, and, therefore, the
number of warheads available to the President promptly, at the start of a conflict. These changes
may not be consistent with current submarine operations and employment plans. President
Obama and the U.S. military may want to consider the implications of these basing, operational,
and policy changes, before deciding whether or not to reduce to 1,000 warheads, as opposed to
choosing the warhead number first then deciding later how to base and operate the remaining
nuclear forces.
Analysts outside government have also questioned the Administration’s plans to replace the air-
launched cruise missile (ALCM) with the new long-range strike missile (LRSO) in the 2020s. As
noted above, some argue that this missile will be redundant, as the Air Force is already planning
to deploy a new penetrating bomber. They note that, during the 1980s, the United States deployed
cruise missiles both to extend the service life of the B-52 bombers, which could no longer
penetrate Soviet air defenses, and to provide a means to attack and destroy those air defenses
prior to follow-on attacks with penetrating bombers.154 But, according to the program’s critics, if
the Air Force deploys 100 new bombers that can penetrate advanced air defenses, it will not need
cruise missiles to destroy those defenses. Moreover, even if the United States does plan to attack
an adversary’s air defenses, it could do so with existing conventional cruise missiles, such as the
extended range version of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) missile.155
152 See, for example, the comments of General Larry Welch, before the NDIA and ROA Congressional Breakfast
Seminar Series, May 25, 2012, http://www.afa.org/hbs/transcripts/5-25-2012%20Gen%20Larry%20Welch%20v2.pdf.
153 Daryl G. Kimball, “Defuse the Exploding Costs of Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control Today, December 2012, p. 4.
154 William J. Perry and Andy Weber, “Mr. President, kill the new cruise missile,” Washington Post, October 15, 2015.
See, also, Tom Nichols, “The 1980s Called. “They Don’t Need Their Cruise Missile Back.” The National Interest,
November, 3, 2015.
155 Hans Kristensen, “LRSO—The Nuclear Cruise Missile Mission,” Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American
(continued...)
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The Air Force has disputed the assertion that the bomber and cruise missile capabilities are
redundant. Air Force officials have noted that the two systems are complementary, with each
providing different capabilities for the United States and different profiles that would complicate
an adversary’s attempts to defend against a U.S. attack.156 Some analysts also note that advanced
air defense systems have proliferated among potential U.S. adversaries, and that these capabilities
“make it harder for our forces to reach their targets.” Deploying both penetrating bombers and
long-range cruise missiles, therefore, will strengthen the U.S. nuclear deterrent.157
The Cost of Nuclear Weapons
When the Obama Administration submitted the 1251 report to the Senate during the New START
ratification process, it indicated that it expected to spend around $210 billion over the next 10
years (2011-2021) to maintain and modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This total, however, did
not include most of the costs of producing and procuring the next generation of submarines,
bombers, and missiles, as these activities would occur after the timeframe contained in the report.
Moreover, it became evident, as Congress reviewed the Administration’s plans to modernize the
nuclear enterprise, that it was difficult, if not impossible, to determine how much the United
States spent each year on nuclear weapons, as the funding was divided between the Department
of Defense and the Department of Energy, and, in many cases, was combined with funding for
other, non-nuclear activities. In other words, the United States does not maintain a single, unified
budget for nuclear weapons and other nuclear activities.
In response to both the growing concerns about the pending costs of nuclear weapons
modernization programs and the confusion about how to calculate the annual costs of the nuclear
enterprise, Congress directed the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to estimate the costs of
U.S. plans for operating, maintaining and modernizing nuclear weapons, the delivery systems,
and the DOE nuclear weapons complex over the next 10 years. CBO issued its report in late
2013.158 It found that the United States was likely to spend $355 billion over the next 10 years on
its nuclear weapons enterprise. This total included $56 billion for command, control,
communications, and early warning activities and $59 billion for additional costs based on
historical cost growth of similar programs. Neither of these categories had been included in the
Administration’s estimate in 2010. When CBO considered the same categories as the
Administration, it estimated 10-year spending of $241 billion, a number close to the estimate
provided by the Administration. CBO updated its estimate in January 2015, and reported that it
calculated that the United States would spend $348 billion between 2015 and 2024; excluding
command and control and cost growth, the total that was comparable to the Administration’s 2010
estimate was now $247 billion.
According to CBO, around $89 billion of its $355 billion total between 2014 and 2023
would go to the modernization programs. As with the Administration’s estimate, the CBO
estimate did not include procurement costs for most of these programs, as these would occur in
(...continued)
Scientists, October 20, 2015. http://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/10/lrso-mission/
156 Bryan Bender, “Air Force Questions Call to Cancel new Nuclear-Armed Cruise Missile,” Politico, October 25,
2015.
157 Mel Deaile and Al Mauroni, “Why We Still Need a Nuclear-Armed Cruise Missile,” War on the Rocks, October 26,
2015. http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/why-we-still-need-a-nuclear-armed-cruise-missile/.
158 Congressional Budget Office, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014-2023, Washington, DC, December
2013, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/12-19-2013-NuclearForces.pdf.
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the later 2020s and 2030s. The CBO study noted, however, that annual spending would increase
from a total of around $18 billion in FY2014 to an average of $29 billion from 2021 to 2023 and
that spending was “likely to continue to grow after 2023 as production begins on replacement
systems.”159 This result indicates that the United States could spend at least $30 billion per year
on the nuclear weapons enterprise as it completes its modernization programs. This estimate is
consistent with others that have been presented by organizations outside government. For
example, in January 2014, analysts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
estimated that the United States might spend $1 trillion, or an average of just over $30 billion per
year, over the next 30 years, to modernize its nuclear enterprise.160 In addition, in a briefing
prepared in May 2013, the Air Force estimated that the investments in nuclear modernization
programs would peak in between 2025 and 2035, at approximately $30 billion per year.161
While there now appears to be a broad base of agreement about the magnitude of the costs that
the United States is likely to incur as it modernizes its nuclear arsenal, there is little agreement
about whether the United States can, or should, proceed with all of these programs. Many
analysts have noted that, with the passage of the Budget Control Act in 2011, the amount of
funding available for defense spending will be nearly $1 trillion lower than expected when the
Obama Administration first outlined the nuclear modernization program. In this environment,
rising costs for nuclear weapons programs are likely to cut into funding for other Pentagon
priorities. As noted above, the Navy addressed this problem when it noted that funding for the
Ohio Replacement program would undermine the rest of the plans in its shipbuilding budget.
Moreover, this problem is not likely to disappear after the Budget Control Act expires in 2021.
Frank Kendall, the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L, noted in a hearing before the Senate
Armed Services Committee that “the funding that we have requested from both departments,
through the 5-year plan that we’ve submitted, is adequate to execute our plan during that period.
After the end of that period, as we start to actually produce the systems I talked about, we’re
going to have an affordability problem that we have to deal with.” He went on to say, “In 2021,
we’re going to start to have a problem finding ways to afford these systems.”162
Others, however, argue that the United States not only can afford to bear the costs of these
systems, but cannot afford the costs of failing to modernize its nuclear arsenal. Admiral Haney,
the Commander of Strategic Command, made this point in a hearing before the House Armed
Services Committee, when he said that “achieving strategic deterrence in the 21st century requires
continued investment in strategic capabilities and renewed multigenerational commitment of
intellectual capital.” He argued that “any cuts to that budget, including those imposed by
sequestration, will hamper our ability to sustain and modernize our military forces.” He noted
that, as the modernization programs progressed, spending on nuclear weapons was likely to rise
from around 2.5%-3% of DOD’s budget to around 5%-6% of that budget in the late 2020s to
2030s. When asked whether the United States could afford to make this investment, he noted that
other nations have been modernizing their forces and continued to pose an “existential threat” to
the United States. He noted that “in order to maintain and sustain its strategic stability, it’s very
159 Ibid., p. 2.
160 Jon B. Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis, and Marc Quint, The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad, James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, CA, January 2014, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/
140107_trillion_dollar_nuclear_triad.pdf.
161 For a copy of General Kowalski’s briefing slides, see http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/
AFGSC-CommandBrief-May2013.pdf.
162 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, President Obama’s
Fiscal 2016 Budget Request for the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Programs and Strategy, Hearing, 114th Cong., 1st
sess., March 4, 2014.
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important that we have that kind of balance” with these nations. And he asked, “Quite frankly, the
question really is, can we afford not to” proceed with the modernization programs.163
Author Contact Information
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
awoolf@crs.loc.gov, 7-2379
163 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, President Obama’s Fiscal
2016 Budget Request on Strategic Forces, Hearing, 114th Cong., 1st sess., February 26, 2015.
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