The European Union (EU): Current Challenges
and Future Prospects in Brief
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
October 27, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R44249
The European Union (EU): Current Challenges and Future Prospects in Brief
Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Evolution of the European Integration Project and Internal Dynamics ........................................... 3
The Past as Prologue ................................................................................................................. 3
Inherent Differences and Persistent Tensions ............................................................................ 4
The Current Political and Economic Context .................................................................................. 5
Simultaneous Challenges................................................................................................................. 7
The Greece Crisis ...................................................................................................................... 7
Migratory Pressures .................................................................................................................. 9
The UK Referendum ............................................................................................................... 10
Russia and Emerging Security Concerns ................................................................................. 11
Possible Scenarios .......................................................................................................................... 11
Implications for the United States ................................................................................................. 12
Figures
Figure 1. The European Union: Member States and Aspirant Countries ........................................ 2
Tables
Table 1. Membership in the EU, Eurozone, and Schengen Area ..................................................... 2
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 13
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Overview
The European Union (EU) is a political and economic partnership that represents a unique form
of cooperation among sovereign states. It is the latest stage in a process of European integration
begun after World War II, initially by six Western European countries, to promote peace and
economic development. Its founders hoped that by pooling sovereignty in certain sectors
(primarily economic ones at first), integration would foster interdependence and make another
war in Europe unthinkable. Today, the EU is composed of 28 member states, including most of
the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (see Figure 1), and is viewed as
a cornerstone of European security, stability, and prosperity.
The EU has been built through a series of binding treaties, and has characteristics of both a
supranational entity (in specified areas, sovereignty is shared and EU institutions hold executive
authority) and an intergovernmental organization (in other areas, cooperation is pursued by
consensus). Over the years, member states have sought to harmonize laws and adopt common
policies on an increasing number of economic, social, and political issues. EU members share a
customs union, a single market (in which goods, people, and capital move freely), a common
trade policy, a common agricultural policy, and a common currency (the euro) that is used by 19
member states (collectively referred to as “the Eurozone”). Twenty-two EU members participate
in the Schengen area of free movement, which allows individuals to travel without passport
checks among most European countries. (See Table 1 for Eurozone and Schengen membership.)
In addition, the EU has taken steps to develop common foreign and security policies, sought to
build common internal security measures, and remains committed to enlargement, especially to
the countries of the Western Balkans.
Various European policymakers and analysts have likened the European integration project to a
bicycle, which must keep going forward to avoid falling over. Currently, however, the EU is
facing several significant internal and external challenges—ranging from the Greek debt crisis
and the upcoming UK referendum on EU membership to migratory pressures and dealing with a
resurgent Russia—that must be confronted amid a complex political and economic backdrop.
Although few analysts view a complete dissolution of the EU as likely, the future shape and
character of the Union are being questioned, especially as two key spokes of the integration
project—the EU’s common currency and the Schengen system—come under considerable
pressure. While many experts maintain that the EU will continue to pedal along and adapt to the
changed scenery, others worry that the European bicycle appears increasingly wobbly.
Successive U.S. administrations and many Members of Congress have strongly supported the
European integration project as a key pillar of the transatlantic relationship. In the aftermath of
World War II, the United States viewed European integration as a way to entrench democratic
systems and free markets, while the creation of NATO was meant to provide collective defense
and security. For decades, the United States and the EU (and its predecessors) have maintained
diplomatic and economic ties. Despite some frictions, the United States and the EU share a
dynamic political partnership on an increasing number of foreign policy issues, and U.S.-EU
trade and investment relations are close and extensive. How the EU evolves in the years ahead is
likely to have significant strategic and economic repercussions for the United States.
This report provides a brief history of the EU and the major simultaneous challenges currently
facing the EU as an institution. It also discusses the potential implications both for the EU itself
and for U.S.-EU relations. For additional information on the EU, see CRS Report RS21372, The
European Union: Questions and Answers.
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The European Union (EU): Current Challenges and Future Prospects in Brief
Figure 1. The European Union: Member States and Aspirant Countries
Source: Delegation of the European Union to the United States, “On the Path to EU Membership: The EU
Enlargement Process,” EU Insight, December 2010. Adapted and updated by CRS. Note: Iceland’s accession
negotiations with the EU have been on hold since May 2013; in March 2015, Iceland requested that it should no
longer be regarded as a candidate country, but did not formally withdraw its application to join the EU.
Table 1. Membership in the EU, Eurozone, and Schengen Area
EU Member
Eurozone Schengen
EU Member
Eurozone Schengen
Austria
x
x
Italy
x
x
Belgium
x
x
Latvia
x
x
Bulgaria
Lithuania
x
x
Croatia
Luxembourg
x
x
Cyprus
x
Malta
x
x
Czech Rep.
x
Netherlands
x
x
Denmark
x
Poland
x
Estonia
x
x
Portugal
x
x
Finland
x
x
Romania
France
x
x
Slovakia
x
x
Germany
x
x
Slovenia
x
x
Greece
x
x
Spain
x
x
Hungary
x
Sweden
x
Ireland
x
UK
Note: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland also participate in Schengen.
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The European Union (EU): Current Challenges and Future Prospects in Brief
Evolution of the European Integration Project and
Internal Dynamics
The Past as Prologue
In the aftermath of World War II, leaders in Western Europe were anxious to secure long-term
peace and stability in Europe and to create a favorable environment for economic growth and
recovery. In 1951, six countries—Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—decided to establish the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), which is regarded as the first step in the European integration project. The ECSC was
envisioned as a single market in which sovereignty over coal and steel would be pooled and
production controlled by an independent supranational authority. In embarking on this plan, the
six founders hoped to greatly diminish the chances of another catastrophic conflict in Europe by
binding their economies together, controlling the raw materials of war, and promoting political
reconciliation (especially between France and Germany). The ECSC began operations in 1952;
over the next five years, coal and steel trade among the six members increased 129%.1
In light of the ECSC’s success, in 1957, the six ECSC countries signed two new treaties in Rome:
one treaty established the European Economic Community (EEC) to develop common economic
policies and merge the separate national markets into a single market in which goods, people,
capital, and services could move freely; the other created a European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM) to ensure the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These two treaties,
commonly referred to as the “Treaties of Rome,” came into force in 1958. In 1967, the ECSC, the
EEC, and EURATOM collectively became known as the European Community (EC).
The EC first added new members in 1973, with the entry of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and
Denmark. Greece joined in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. The Single European
Act modified the EC treaties in 1987 to facilitate the creation of the single market. At the
beginning of 1993, the near completion of the single market brought about the mostly free
movement of goods, people, capital, and services within the EC.
On November 1, 1993, the Treaty on European Union (also known as the Maastricht Treaty) went
into effect, encompassing the EC and establishing the modern-day European Union. The EU was
intended as a significant step on the path toward not only greater economic integration but also
closer political cooperation. The Maastricht Treaty contained provisions that resulted in the
creation of the Eurozone, in which participants share a common currency, a common central bank
(the European Central Bank, or ECB), and a common monetary policy (there is no common fiscal
policy, however, and member states retain control over national spending and taxation, subject to
certain conditions designed to maintain budgetary discipline).
The Maastricht Treaty also set out a blueprint for greater coordination on foreign policy and
internal security issues. Since the mid-1990s, EU member states have worked to forge a Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP),
and sought to establish common policies in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). In the
late 1990s, the Schengen Agreement of 1985—which established the framework for eliminating
border controls among participating states—became EU law.
1 Delegation of the European Union to the United States, The European Union: A Guide for Americans, 2015.
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The European Union (EU): Current Challenges and Future Prospects in Brief
With the end of the Cold War, the EU pursued further enlargement. Austria, Finland, and Sweden
joined in 1995. Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe was an especially key priority viewed
as fulfilling a historic pledge to further the integration of the continent by peaceful means and
promote stability and prosperity throughout Europe. In 2004, eight formerly communist countries
(the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia)
acceded to the EU, along with Cyprus and Malta. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007. Croatia
became the EU’s newest member on July 1, 2013.
How Is the EU Governed?
EU member states work together to set policy and promote their col ective interests through several common
institutions. Decisionmaking processes and the role played by the EU institutions vary depending on the subject under
consideration. For most economic and social issues, EU member states have largely pooled their national sovereignty,
and EU decisionmaking has a supranational quality. Decisions in other areas, such as foreign policy, require the
unanimous approval of all 28 member states. The EU’s institutions do not correspond exactly to the traditional
branches of government or division of power in representative democracies. Rather, they reflect the EU’s dual
supranational and intergovernmental character:
The European Council acts as a strategic guide and driving force for EU policy. It is composed of the Heads of State
or Government of the EU’s 28 member states, the European Council President (currently Donald Tusk), and the
President of the European Commission; it meets several times a year in what are often termed “EU summits.” The
European Council President organizes the Council’s work, seeks to ensure policy continuity, and facilitates consensus.
The European Commission is essentially the EU’s executive and upholds the common interest of the EU as a
whole. It implements and manages EU decisions and common policies, ensures that the provisions of the EU’s treaties
and rules are carried out properly, and has the sole right of legislative initiative in most policy areas. It is composed of
28 Commissioners, one from each country; each Commissioner holds a distinct portfolio (e.g., agriculture, trade, EU
enlargement). One Commissioner serves as Commission President (currently Jean-Claude Juncker).
The Council of the European Union (or the Council of Ministers) represents the member states. It enacts
legislation, usually based on proposals put forward by the Commission and agreed to (in most cases) by the European
Parliament. In a few sensitive areas, such as foreign policy, the Council of Ministers holds sole decisionmaking
authority. It consists of ministers from the 28 national governments; different ministers participate in Council
meetings depending on the subject (e.g., foreign ministers would meet to discuss the Middle East, agriculture ministers
to discuss farm subsidies). The Presidency of the Council (often termed the “EU Presidency”) rotates among the
member states every six months (Luxembourg currently holds the EU Presidency).
The European Parliament (EP) represents the citizens of the EU. The EP shares responsibility for enacting most
EU legislation with the Council of Ministers and decides on the allocation of the EU’s budget jointly with the Council.
It consists of 751 members who are directly elected in the member states for five-year terms. Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) caucus according to political affiliation, rather than nationality; one MEP is elected as EP
President (currently Martin Schulz).
Inherent Differences and Persistent Tensions
The European integration project has long been viewed as a way for participating countries to
magnify their political and economic clout (i.e., the sum is greater than the parts). European
publics have historically been favorably inclined toward the EU, with many citizens valuing the
freedom to easily travel, work, and live throughout Europe. Nevertheless, tensions have always
existed within the EU between those member states that seek an “ever closer union” through
greater integration and those that prefer to keep the EU on a more intergovernmental footing in
order to better guard their national sovereignty. As a result, some EU countries have “opted out”
of certain aspects of integration, including the Eurozone and the Schengen area.
In addition, different histories and geography often influence member states’ policy preferences.
The EU’s enlargement to the east has brought in many members with recent memories of Soviet
domination, which may make some of them more wary of EU ties with Russia. Meanwhile,
southern EU countries that border the Mediterranean may have greater political and economic
interests in North Africa than EU members located farther north.
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Questions have also existed for years on whether EU “deepening” (i.e., further integration) is
compatible with EU “widening” (i.e., further enlargement). In the 1990s and 2000s, the EU
engaged in several efforts to reform its institutions, simplify often cumbersome decisionmaking
processes, and thereby allow a bigger EU to function more effectively. These efforts culminated
with the entrance into force of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (which also sought to enhance the EU’s
global role and increase democratic accountability within the EU). Nevertheless, some critics
charge that EU decisionmaking processes remain extremely complex, lack transparency, and are
still too slow and unwieldy. Others note that differences in viewpoint are inevitable among 28
countries and that decisions thus take time in what remains a largely consensus-based institution.
While the EU maintains that the enlargement door remains open to any European country that
fulfills the political and economic criteria for membership, some European leaders and publics
worry about the implications of additional EU expansion on the EU’s institutional capacities, its
finances, and its overall identity. This is especially true with respect to large, culturally distinct
countries, such as Turkey, or the poorer countries of “wider Europe” (usually considered to
include Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) that may harbor EU aspirations in
the longer term. Some observers suggest that should the EU ultimately enlarge to encompass an
even wider array of countries, further integration in the economic and financial fields may be
unlikely, and forging a common foreign policy could become more difficult. Others contend that
EU enlargement is already reaching its limits, both geographically and in terms of public
enthusiasm for further expansion.
The Current Political and Economic Context
A number of political and economic factors are contributing to the current uncertainty
surrounding the future of the EU project. To varying degrees, they are also challenging the
legitimacy and structure of the EU and its institutions. These factors include:
Ongoing Economic Difficulties. The 2008-2009 global recession and the
Eurozone debt crisis significantly affected European economies, decreasing
growth and increasing unemployment in many EU countries, and posing a risk to
the European banking system. Some EU governments imposed unpopular
austerity measures in an effort to rein in budget deficits and public debt. In order
to stem the Eurozone crisis, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus required
European and international financial assistance. Despite some signs of recovery,
many EU countries continue to struggle with sluggish growth, high
unemployment (especially among young people), and dissatisfied publics.
Economic disparities within the EU have also generated tensions and contributed
to policy divisions among member states. Greece, for example, has bristled at
perceived “diktats” for more austerity from economically strong Germany. Some
Central and Eastern European members have objected to contributing financial
assistance to Greece, as well as to doing more to help manage the migratory
flows, in part because of their relatively less affluent economic positions within
the EU. Many observers suggest that more robust economic growth could help
ease some challenges currently facing the EU.
Rise of Anti-EU or “Euroskeptic” Political Parties. Over the last several years,
many EU countries have seen a rise in support for populist, nationalistic, anti-
establishment political parties. They are often termed “euroskeptic” because
many have been fueled by worries that too much national sovereignty has been
relinquished to Brussels. Although not a completely new phenomenon in the EU,
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their popularity has been increasing largely in response to Europe’s economic
stagnation, austerity measures, and the Eurozone crisis. For some voters, how the
Eurozone crisis has been handled has renewed long-standing concerns about the
EU’s “democratic deficit”—a sense that ordinary citizens have little say over
decisions taken in far-away Brussels. Growing fears about immigration and
globalization have also contributed to increased support for such parties.
Euroskeptic parties, however, are not monolithic. Most are on the far right of the
political spectrum, but a few are on the left or far left. Also, the degree of
euroskepticism varies widely among them, and they hold a range of views on the
future of the EU. While some advocate for EU reforms and a looser EU in which
member states would retain greater sovereignty, others call for an end to the
Eurozone or even to the EU itself.
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands,
Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the UK are among those EU countries with
increasingly successful populist, and to at least some extent, euroskeptic parties.
In Finland, a moderately euroskeptic party is part of the coalition government,
while a nationalist party with a relatively euroskeptic approach won a majority in
Poland’s parliamentary elections in October 2015 and will lead the next
government. A range of euroskeptic parties also did well in the 2014 European
Parliament elections, winning up to 25% of the 751 seats.
In some EU members, euroskeptic parties pose challenges to the generally pro-
European establishment parties. They have put pressure on mainstream leaders to
embrace some of their positions (such as curtailing EU integration, slowing EU
enlargement, or tightening immigration policies) in order to protect their own
national bases of support. Some analysts worry that should more euroskeptic
parties—especially hardline ones in key EU member states—gain enough
support to enter or even lead their national governments, they could potentially
stop or reverse at least some aspects of European integration.2
Lack of Strong Leadership and Strategic Vision. Historically, the development
of the EU has largely been driven forward by several key countries acting as an
“engine.” French and German leadership was essential to establishing the
common currency, while Britain and France were instrumental in forging EU
common foreign and security policies. Many analysts suggest, however, that a
strong EU “engine” has been lacking over the last few years. Although German
Chancellor Angela Merkel has played a central role in responding to the
Eurozone crisis, Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the steady influx of migrants
and refugees, critics view her as being too hesitant and tactical in many instances,
rather than acting as a leader of Europe writ large. Meanwhile, others argue that
too much power in the EU now resides with Germany alone, in part because both
French President François Hollande and UK Prime Minister David Cameron
have been largely constrained by domestic politics and economic preoccupations.
Some observers also assert that European leaders do not have a robust or shared
strategic vision for the EU. Those of this view point to what they consider to be
ad hoc, piecemeal responses that eschew hard decisions about further integration
2 “Turning Right,” Economist, January 4, 2014; Steven Erlanger, “Rise of Far-Right Party in Denmark Reflects
Europe’s Unease,” New York Times, June 19, 2015; “Poland Tries Populism,” Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2015.
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or fail to address issues with an eye to ensuring a strong, stable, united,
economically vibrant EU in the long term. Many analysts have raised particular
worries about the apparent divergence between Germany and France over how to
manage the Greece crisis and what this could portend for the future of the
Eurozone and the EU more broadly.3
Increased Acrimony and Decreased Solidarity. Observers contend that the
crises over Greece and migration, in particular, have produced a high degree of
acrimony and a lack of trust among EU member states. Moreover, these crises
threaten the core EU principle of solidarity. While horse-trading and protecting
national interests have always been part of EU politicking, analysts assert that
narrow national agendas are increasingly taking priority over European-wide
solutions. Some commentators have also begun to question the commitment of
some European leaders and publics to the EU project in light of demographic and
generational changes; for younger Europeans, World War II and even the Cold
War are the stuff of history, and some may not share the same conviction as
previous generations about the need for a strong and united EU.4
Simultaneous Challenges
Against this political and economic backdrop, the EU is grappling with several major challenges.
Many observers contend that the breadth and difficulty of these multiple issues are
unprecedented. How the EU responds may have lasting implications not only for the EU itself,
but also for its role as an international actor and as a key U.S. strategic and economic partner.
The Greece Crisis5
The onset of the Greek debt crisis in late 2009 and its subsequent contagion to other Eurozone
members sparked concerns about the fundamental structure and viability of the Eurozone, the
EU’s flagship integration project. Over the last five years, the situation in most Eurozone
countries has largely stabilized, and the EU has taken steps to strengthen the Eurozone’s
architecture and improve fiscal discipline among member states. Greece’s economy and banking
system, however, remain in severe distress.
In the first half of 2015, prospects grew that Greece might exit the Eurozone (dubbed “Grexit”) as
the Greek government—led by the leftist, anti-austerity Syriza party—sought further financial
assistance from Greece’s Eurozone creditors. While Greece asserted a desire to remain in the
Eurozone, it also stressed the need for debt relief and an easing of austerity. Negotiations
foundered, however. In late June, the Greek government closed the banks and imposed capital
controls. On July 5, Greek voters rejected Eurozone calls for further austerity in a public
referendum, seemingly increasing the likelihood of “Grexit.” A deal was finally reached a week
later in which the Syriza-led government acceded to Eurozone demands for more austerity and
3 François Heisbourg, “The End of an Affair for France and Germany,” Financial Times, July 15, 2015; Judy Dempsey,
“Refugees Could Break Europe’s Comfort Zone,” CarnegieEurope.eu, September 24, 2015.
4 Katya Adler, “EU Solidarity Damaged by Splits on Migrants and Greece,” BBC News, June 16, 2015; Rem
Korteweg, “The Four Horsemen Circling the European Council Summit,” Centre for European Reform, June 24, 2015;
Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Europe’s Civil War,” Project-Syndicate.org, July 21, 2015.
5 Also see CRS Report R44155, The Greek Debt Crisis: Overview and Implications for the United States, coordinated
by Rebecca M. Nelson.
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economic reforms in exchange for a new financial assistance package, thus enabling Greece to
stay in the Eurozone. Nevertheless, Greece faces an uncertain road toward economic recovery
and the threat of “Grexit” may still loom in the longer term.
From its start in late 2009, the Eurozone crisis generated tensions among member states over the
proper balance between imposing austerity measures versus stimulating growth, and whether
greater EU fiscal integration was necessary. The fraught negotiations with Greece since early
2015, however, produced an even higher degree of acrimony within the EU and raised serious
questions about EU solidarity. While France (and Italy) emphasized the political importance of
maintaining the integrity of the Eurozone, Germany (and others such as the Netherlands, Finland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia) stressed the need to adhere to Eurozone fiscal rules. Many countries that
backed Germany’s hardline position during the negotiations with Greece also did so because they
did not want to embolden other struggling Eurozone governments or anti-austerity, euroskeptic
opposition parties by making concessions to Greek demands.
Experts suggest the differing views between France and Germany in particular reflected divisions
that date back to the founding of the Eurozone. While Germany had always insisted that the
Eurozone be anchored in a culture of tight monetary policy and fiscal discipline, France had long
pushed for more flexibility and greater political discretion over its management. At the same time,
German and French leaders were strongly united behind the idea that “the single currency should
first and foremost serve as a means toward the greater aim of European political integration.”6
Many analysts are now questioning whether France and Germany continue to share this vision,
and some point to the crisis as an indication that EU members, including Germany, are now
prioritizing national interests over the European project to a greater extent than in the past.
Throughout the crisis, most EU leaders consistently maintained that they also wanted to keep
Greece in the Eurozone. German Chancellor Merkel declared “if the euro fails, Europe fails,”7
reflecting concerns shared by many EU governments that “Grexit” could have wider implications
for the credibility of the entire EU project. Other European officials and experts, however, argued
that “Grexit” would have been (and may still be) the better option for Greece in terms of
restarting its economy, and that a Greek exit would have enabled deeper integration among the
remaining Eurozone members. In early July 2015, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble
proposed a temporary Greek exit from the Eurozone for a five-year period, but this was extremely
controversial because member states viewed it as potentially setting a dangerous precedent by
raising questions about the Eurozone’s irreversible nature; some Eurozone leaders were likely
concerned that a similar fate could befall other countries in financial distress in the future.
Some suggest that given how very close the EU came to “Grexit,” the crisis has undermined the
integrity of the Eurozone. Others contend that EU governments and leaders remain strongly
committed to the common currency and the broader EU project. Many note that the EU has often
evolved out of crisis, and that Eurozone governments may now be more inclined to pursue greater
integration. Both Schäuble and French President Hollande have since called for strengthening the
Eurozone’s economic governance (including by establishing a parliament and a common budget),
but it would likely take many years to agree upon and implement such measures.
6 Shahin Vallée, “How the Greek Deal Could Destroy the Euro,” New York Times, July 27, 2015.
7 As quoted in Andrew Higgins and Alison Smale, “With Loan Deadline Looming, Europe Offers Greece a Last-
Minute Deal,” New York Times, June 29, 2015.
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Migratory Pressures8
The EU is experiencing what many consider to be its worst migration and refugee crisis since
World War II as people increasingly flee conflict and poverty, primarily in the Middle East,
Africa, and Afghanistan, but also in South Asia and some Western Balkans countries. Various
estimates suggest that 700,000 migrants and refugees have sought to enter the EU so far this year.
Italy and Greece are major arrival and transit points for individuals crossing the Mediterranean
Sea. Land routes include those via Turkey and the Balkans. Many individuals arriving in Greece
subsequently attempt to cross the Western Balkans in an effort to reach Schengen “gateway”
countries such as Hungary and Slovenia. From there, they seek to travel onward to northern EU
member states where they believe they are more likely to receive asylum and better welfare
benefits.
As European governments struggle to cope with the flows of people, the EU has been widely
criticized for lacking a coherent migration and asylum policy. Forging common EU measures has
long been difficult because of national sovereignty concerns and sensitivities about minorities,
integration, and identity. As a result, policies continue to vary widely across the EU. Germany
and Sweden have accepted tens of thousands of migrants and refugees, but Hungary has built
razor-wire fences along its borders with Serbia and Croatia—effectively sealing them to stop the
influxes—and enacted new, more stringent border control laws.
The ongoing crisis has created deep divisions within the EU and strained EU solidarity. In April
2015, the rising death toll in the Mediterranean prompted a raft of new EU initiatives in which
emphasis was placed on saving lives and stopping human smugglers. Nevertheless, “frontline”
states such as Italy and Greece argue that they remain overburdened because, under the EU’s
“Dublin regulation,” the first EU country an asylum-seeker enters is usually responsible for
examining that individual’s application. Other EU members charge that some “frontline”
authorities are not registering people properly and essentially allowing many to seek asylum
elsewhere. Hungary contends that generous asylum policies in Germany and Sweden serve as
“pull” factors. Some EU governments reportedly viewed Germany’s announcement in late August
2015 that it would no longer apply the Dublin regulation to Syrian asylum-seekers as unilaterally
upending agreed EU asylum procedures and failing to consider the implications for the wider EU.
Efforts to establish mandatory redistribution systems, in which each EU member would be
obliged to accept a certain number of asylum-seekers and refugees, have been extremely
controversial. In July 2015, the EU reached political agreement on two voluntary programs to
relocate just under 40,000 asylum-seekers from Italy and Greece and to resettle 20,000 refugees
from outside the EU. Not all EU countries, however, will participate. In September 2015, EU
governments approved a mandatory distribution plan to relocate 120,000 additional asylum-
seekers from Italy and Greece throughout the EU. This outcome, however, was achieved using
the EU’s qualified majority voting system rather than consensus: Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Romania voted against the plan and Finland abstained. Adopting a proposal on
such a sensitive issue directly related to member states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity by
qualified majority is largely unprecedented in the EU, and many observers viewed the need to
hold the vote as further indication of the profound cleavages within the bloc.9
8 Also see CRS In Focus IF10259, Europe’s Migration and Refugee Crisis, by Kristin Archick and Rhoda Margesson.
9 Steven Erlanger and James Kanter, “Plan on Migrants Strain the Limits of Europe’s Unity,” New York Times,
September 22, 2015; Henry Foy and Stefan Wagstyl, “Eastern EU States Fight Migrant Diktat,” Financial Times,
September 23, 2015.
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Countries in Central and Eastern Europe have been particularly vocal opponents to mandatory
redistribution. Some have expressed fears that the recent influxes of migrants and refugees, many
of whom are Muslim, could significantly alter Europe’s primarily Christian identity. Meanwhile,
Germany is increasingly frustrated with those unwilling to help share the burden and has
tightened its own asylum rules and scaled back some benefits. Governments in both Western and
Central Europe also fear that accepting more asylum-seekers and refugees could increase support
for anti-EU, anti-immigrant political parties and stoke societal tensions and xenophobia.
Germany, Sweden, and other EU countries have seen an increase in the number of violent
incidents against migrants and refugees over the past few months.
Without more coordinated EU policies, the crisis could threaten the Schengen system, which
largely depends on confidence in the security of the bloc’s external borders. This concept is being
severely tested by the steady influxes of migrants and refugees. Several Schengen countries
(including Germany, Austria, and Slovakia) have instituted temporary border controls and many
others have stepped up border security. EU officials assert they remain firmly committed to the
Schengen system, but analysts worry that temporary border controls could become permanent, at
least on a de facto basis.10
The UK Referendum
The United Kingdom has long been considered one of the most euroskeptic members of the EU,
with many British leaders and citizens cautious of ceding too much sovereignty to Brussels. As a
result, the UK does not participate in the Eurozone or the Schengen free movement area, and may
choose those justice and home affairs policies in which it wishes to participate. In light of the
ongoing challenges facing the EU, Prime Minister Cameron has come under increasing political
pressure from hardline euroskeptics, both within his own Conservative Party and outside of it, to
reconsider the UK’s relationship with the EU. In response, the Cameron government intends to
renegotiate the UK’s membership conditions with the EU and to hold an “in-or-out” public
referendum by the end of 2017 at the latest (and possibly as early as mid-2016). With current
polls indicating an almost even split among voters on staying in or leaving the EU, a British exit
from the EU (a so-called “Brexit”) is a distinct possibility.11
While Prime Minister Cameron supports continued EU membership for the UK, much will
depend on what, if any, concessions he can obtain from his EU partners, both on EU-wide
reforms and specific provisions for the UK. In June 2015, Cameron outlined four broad goals: (1)
exempting the UK from the principle of “ever closer union”; (2) making the EU’s single market
more competitive; (3) protecting the UK and the single market from steps taken to strengthen the
Eurozone, especially those aimed at deepening EU fiscal integration; and (4) curbing welfare
benefits for EU nationals who move to the UK. However, the UK government has not yet
presented concrete demands to the EU, and some news reports indicate that they remain in flux.
Although EU leaders assert that the UK belongs in the EU, negotiations are expected to be
complicated. Observers also point out that Cameron must be able to sell any eventual deal to
euroskeptic politicians and voters, who may not be satisfied with only modest reforms.12
10 Anthony Faiola and Robert Samuels, “As Human Flood Continues, Germany Slaps Controls on Border with
Austria,” Washington Post, September 13, 2015; Andrew Higgins and James Kanter, “More Border Controls as Europe
Stalls on Migrant Quotas,” New York Times, September 14, 2015.
11 YouGov, “EU Referendum: Brexit Ahead by 2,” September 28, 2015.
12 Andrew Rettman, “British PM Outlines Minimalist EU Membership,” EUObserver.com, June 26, 2015; Ian Traynor,
“EU Referendum: Brussels Tells Evasive Cameron to Spell Out Agenda for Talks,” Guardian, October 12, 2015. For
(continued...)
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The European Union (EU): Current Challenges and Future Prospects in Brief
Many analysts argue that a possible “Brexit” could seriously undermine the EU project. Given the
UK’s foreign policy clout and defense capabilities, “Brexit” could diminish the EU’s role and
influence as an international actor. Some argue that a “yes” vote could give Cameron and future
British leaders a freer hand in supporting EU initiatives, increase the UK’s weight within the EU,
and restore the UK as a key player in the EU. Others suggest that should “Brexit” come to pass, it
is also feasible that the EU would emerge as a more like-minded bloc, able to pursue deeper
integration without UK opposition.
Russia and Emerging Security Concerns
Over the past year and a half, the EU has struggled with how best to address the ongoing conflict
in Ukraine, a resurgent Russia, and changes in Europe’s security environment. The EU has sought
both to engage Russia in promoting a political solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine and to
pressure Russia into stopping its support for separatist forces by imposing several rounds of
sanctions, including on the financial, energy, and defense sectors of the Russian economy.
Crafting common EU policies has been arduous given different national histories and economic
relations with Russia among the EU’s 28 member states. While the EU currently remains
politically united on maintaining sectoral sanctions on Russia at least until the end of 2015, some
question how long this consensus will hold.
Beyond the conflict in Ukraine, some fundamental differences exist among EU governments
about how to best manage Russia in the longer term. Some still hope that Russia can be a partner
for the EU, arguing that Russia is too big to isolate or ignore and that ultimately, Europe’s
stability and security depends on forging a cooperative relationship with Russia. Many EU
countries also have extensive commercial ties with Russia (including Germany and Italy) and
depend on Russia to help meet their oil and gas needs. Other member states, such as Poland and
the Baltic countries, are more wary of Russia and urge a less conciliatory approach. Russia’s
recent military intervention in Syria’s civil war (on behalf of the Syrian government of President
Bashar al Asad) has also raised concerns in the EU and could influence the policy debate.13
The development of EU common foreign and security policies has often been constrained by the
need to reach consensus among all member states. A politically fragmented EU, still dominated
by internal preoccupations and potentially without the UK—traditionally a strong supporter of
enhancing the EU’s role as an international actor—may find it more difficult to forge common
and coherent responses to new security challenges, both within Europe and beyond. These may
include not only a more militarily assertive Russia but also the ongoing conflict in Syria,
instability in North Africa, and countering terrorism and the foreign fighter phenomenon.
Commentators also note that austerity measures have exacerbated the already existing downward
trend in European defense spending in a number of EU countries.
Possible Scenarios
For many supporters of the European project, the EU has entered “uncharted territory,” and for
the first time in its 60-year history, they worry that at least some aspects of EU integration may be
stopped or reversed. Others contend that there is a chance that the multiple crises currently facing
(...continued)
more information on the UK, see CRS Report RL33105, The United Kingdom: Background and Relations with the
United States, by Derek E. Mix.
13 Geoff Dyer, “Russia Exposes European Divisions on Syria,” Financial Times, September 30, 2015.
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The European Union (EU): Current Challenges and Future Prospects in Brief
the EU could produce some beneficial EU reforms and ultimately transform the bloc into a more
effective and cohesive entity. Possible future scenarios for the EU include:
Muddling Through. The EU would largely continue to function as it currently
does, without any significant treaty changes or decisionmaking reforms, and find
some degree of common solutions to crises such as those posed by Greece’s
economic situation and increasing migratory pressures. The EU would continue
to pursue integration and common policies where possible, with or without the
UK as a member.
Establishing Two Speeds. The EU would become a two-speed entity, consisting
of a strongly integrated group of “core” countries and a group of “periphery”
countries more free to pick and choose those EU policies in which they wish to
participate. Some analysts suggest that a two-speed EU already exists in practice,
with varying membership on a range of EU initiatives, such as the Eurozone,
Schengen, justice and home affairs issues, and defense policy. Others suggest that
a formal two-tier structure could undermine solidarity and create frictions
between “core” and “periphery” member states.
A Looser, More Intergovernmental Configuration. Further EU integration
would essentially be put on hold, and possibly reversed in some areas, with
sovereignty on certain issues reclaimed by national capitals. This may be most
likely should reform-minded euroskeptic parties come into power in more EU
countries and if the UK is successful in its bid to carve out additional EU policy
exemptions. A looser structure may make it easier for the EU to expand
ultimately to include Turkey, the remaining aspirants in the Western Balkans, and
other countries such as Georgia and Ukraine.
A Tighter, More Integrated Configuration. The EU would emerge from its
current challenges more united and integrated. Some suggest such an outcome
could actually be more likely in the event of “Grexit” and/or “Brexit,” leaving a
somewhat smaller EU of member states more aligned on the need for further
political and economic integration. This configuration would likely not
encourage further EU enlargement.
Implications for the United States
Successive Administrations and many Members of Congress have long supported the EU
integration project, viewing it as fostering democratic allies and strong trading partners in Europe.
During the Cold War, the European project was considered essential to helping deter the Soviet
threat. Today, the United States often looks to the EU for partnership on common foreign and
security concerns worldwide, and has supported the development of an EU defense policy as a
way to boost NATO capabilities, given that 22 European countries belong to both NATO and the
EU. The United States and the EU also share a huge, mutually beneficial trade and investment
relationship. Over the years, some U.S. officials and analysts have occasionally expressed
concerns that a potentially stronger, more united EU could rival U.S. power and prestige; such
views, however, have never significantly shaped broad U.S. policy toward the EU.
U.S. policymakers are concerned about the current challenges facing the EU and their strategic
and economic implications not only for the EU itself, but also for the EU’s ability to be a robust
and effective U.S. partner in the years ahead. The Obama Administration has consistently asserted
its opposition to “Grexit” and “Brexit,” viewing both possibilities as significant threats to the
credibility of the EU and to strong U.S.-EU relations. U.S. worries about “Grexit” included
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The European Union (EU): Current Challenges and Future Prospects in Brief
uncertainty about how international financial markets would respond and the potential security
ramifications of an economically destitute Greece cut loose from the Eurozone given Greece’s
frontline role in the migration crisis, its geostrategic position near the Middle East and North
Africa, and the possibility that Greece would be tempted to seek closer relations with Russia.
Many U.S. officials also believe that the EU is a stronger and more reliable partner with the UK
as a member in light of its political and economic clout, its traditionally Atlanticist orientation,
and the fact that U.S. and UK views tend to align on most major foreign policy issues.
Some observers suggest that a politically fragile, economically weak EU could take U.S. attention
and resources away from managing strategic challenges such as the rise of China and continued
instability in the Middle East. Many U.S. officials worry in particular that internal tensions and
preoccupations could prevent the EU from focusing on key U.S. priorities, such as Russian
aggression in Ukraine, the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, the threat posed by the Islamic State
organization, and concluding the proposed U.S.-EU free trade agreement (the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership, or T-TIP). Others contend that despite its current difficulties, the EU
will remain strongly committed to a close and cooperative partnership with the United States.
Author Contact Information
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
karchick@crs.loc.gov, 7-2668
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