Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance
with International Obligations
Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation
October 19, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40094
Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations
Summary
The U.N. Security Council has required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic
Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment
program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the
Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has continued to defy
the council’s demands by continuing work on its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water
reactor program. Iran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional Protocol. Tehran has limited and
reversed some aspects of these programs’ progress since the government began implementing a
November 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions
regarding Tehran’s nuclear program. Most of these questions have essentially been resolved, but
the agency still has questions regarding “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear
programme.” The IAEA has reported for some time that it has not been able to make progress on
these matters.
This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for
the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events
warrant.
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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ............................................................................................................................... 1
Iran and the IAEA ..................................................................................................................... 4
Potential Noncompliance Since September 2005 ............................................................... 6
Iran and the U.N. Security Council ........................................................................................... 8
Authority for IAEA and U.N. Security Council Actions ................................................................. 9
IAEA Statute ............................................................................................................................. 9
U.N. Charter and the Security Council ................................................................................... 10
Has Iran Violated the NPT? ............................................................................................................ 11
Appendixes
Appendix A. Iranian Noncompliance with Its IAEA Safeguards Agreement................................ 14
Appendix B. IAEA Special Inspections ........................................................................................ 16
Appendix C. Extended Remarks by William Foster Regarding Possible NPT Article II
Violations ................................................................................................................................... 17
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 18
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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations
Introduction
Iran ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires
non-nuclear-weapon states-parties1 to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards; Tehran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in
1974.2 In 2002, the agency began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine
nuclear activities; the IAEA ultimately reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran’s
safeguards agreement. The agency has not stated definitively that Iran has pursued nuclear
weapons, but has also not yet been able to conclude that the country’s nuclear program is
exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA continues to investigate the program.
Following more than three years of investigation, the IAEA Board of Governors referred the
matter to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. Since then, the council has adopted six
resolutions requiring Iran to take steps to alleviate international concerns about its nuclear
program. This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal
basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council.
For more detailed information about Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s
Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr. For more information about the July 2015 Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action concerning Iran’s nuclear program, see CRS Report R43333, Iran
Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr.
Background
Iran’s nuclear program has generated widespread concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear
weapons. Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the
main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium
hexafluoride gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such
centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power
reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material
used in nuclear weapons. HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear reactors. Iran
also has a uranium conversion facility, which converts uranium oxide into several compounds,
including uranium hexafluoride. Tehran claims that it wants to produce LEU for its current and
future power reactors.
Iran’s construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of concern.
Although Tehran says that the reactor, which Iran is building at Arak, is intended for the
production of medical isotopes, it is a proliferation concern because the reactor’s spent fuel will
contain plutonium well-suited for use in nuclear weapons. In order to be used in nuclear weapons,
however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure called “reprocessing.”
Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.
Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify the outstanding questions
regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.3 Most of these questions, which had contributed to
suspicions that Iran had been pursuing a nuclear weapons program, have essentially been
1 The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967. These states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.
2 INFCIRC/214, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf.
3 The text is available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf.
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resolved. Then-IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, however, told the IAEA board June
2, 2008, that there is “one remaining major [unresolved] issue,” which concerns questions
regarding “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”4 Until recently, the IAEA
agency had not made any substantive progress on these matters.
Tehran has questioned the authenticity of some of the evidence underlying the agency’s concerns
and maintains that it has not done any work on nuclear weapons.5 Iran has also expressed concern
to the IAEA that resolving some of these issues would require agency inspectors to have “access
to sensitive information related to its conventional military and missile related activities.” The
IAEA, according to a September 2008 report from ElBaradei, has stated its willingness to discuss
with Iran
modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in
the documentation are not nuclear related, as Iran asserts, while protecting sensitive
information related to its conventional military activities.6
Indeed, the agency had made several specific proposals, but Tehran did not provide the requested
information.7
The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on November 18, 2011, stating that “it is
essential” for Iran and the IAEA “to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of all
outstanding substantive issues.” IAEA and Iranian officials met 10 times between January 2012
and May 2013 to discuss what the agency has termed a “structured approach to the clarification of
all outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme.”8 However, during an October 2013
meeting, IAEA officials and their Iranian counterparts decided to adopt a “new approach” to
resolving these issues. Since then, Iran has provided the IAEA with information about several of
the outstanding issues.
Iran agreed in May 2014 to provide information to the IAEA by August 25, 2014, about five
additional issues, including alleged Iranian research on high explosives and “studies made and/or
papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated modelling and calculations
and their alleged application to compressed materials.” However, according to a May 29, 2015,
report from current IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano, Tehran had not provided sufficient
information on these latter two activities, which are possible indicators of nuclear weapons
development. Iranian officials did, however, provide the agency with “information in relation to
one of these measures” during March and April 2015 meetings.9 Iran has provided the IAEA with
information about the other three issues.10
4 Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, June 2, 2008.
5 Iran signed a joint statement with the IAEA on November 11, 2013, describing a “Framework for Cooperation.”
According to the statement, Iran and the IAEA agreed to “strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring
the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through the resolution of all outstanding issues that have
not already been resolved by the IAEA.”
6 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2008/38, September 15, 2008.
7 See, for example, GOV/2012/23, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2012/gov2012-
23.pdf.
8 A September 2012 IAEA Board of Governors resolution reiterated the board’s support for the Agency’s negotiations
with Tehran, and stated that “Iranian cooperation with IAEA requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues
is essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme.”
9 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
(continued...)
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The July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) states that Tehran will “complete” a
series of steps set out in an Iran-IAEA “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present
Outstanding Issues.” According to Amano, this road map “sets out a process, under the November
2013 Framework for Cooperation, to enable the Agency, with the cooperation of Iran, to make an
assessment of issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” Iran
completed the first step of this process by providing the IAEA on August 15 with the
government’s “explanation in writing and related documents ... for the clarification of past and
present outstanding issues” regarding the country’s nuclear program. The IAEA submitted
questions on September 8 about “ambiguities” regarding this information; Iran has evidently
responded.11 According to the road map, Amano is to present a report to the IAEA Board of
Governors by December 15, 2015, which contains the agency’s “final assessment on the
resolution” of the aforementioned outstanding issues.
Several U.N. Security Council Resolutions require Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA’s
investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its
construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its
IAEA safeguards agreement.12 Resolution 1929, which the council adopted in June 2010, contains
these requirements and also requires Tehran to refrain from “any activity related to ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Iran
will not suspend its enrichment program. Tehran has signed, but not ratified, its Additional
Protocol. Iran has also continued its extensive ballistic missile program. Resolution 1929 also
requires Iran to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its subsidiary arrangement, but Iran has not
yet done so. (See “Potential Noncompliance Since September 2005.”)
An August 27, 2015, report from Amano indicates that Iran has not complied with the
resolutions.13 However, although Iran has continued work on its uranium enrichment program and
heavy-water reactor program, Tehran has limited and reversed some aspects of these programs’
progress since the government began implementing a November 24, 2013, Joint Plan of Action
between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
collectively known as the “P5+1.”14 Moreover, pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action and its
November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran has provided some information to the IAEA
required by the modified Code 3.1. Resolution 2231, which the UN Security Council adopted on
July 20, 2015, states that all of the previous resolutions’ requirements will be terminated when the
council receives a report from the IAEA stating that Iran has implemented the nuclear-related
measures by Implementation Day, as described by the JCPOA.
(...continued)
Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2015/34, May 29, 2015.
10 Iran maintains that the documents related to high-explosives testing are “fabricated” and has stated that it has
“provided explanations on ... open source scientific publications” related to the second issue. (Explanatory Note by the
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA on the report of the Director General on the
Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran [GOV/2015/15 dated 19 February 2015], March 10,
2015).
11 “IAEA Statement on Iran,” September 9, 2015; “IAEA Statement on Iran,” October 15, 2015.
12 Iran has a plant for producing heavy water.
13 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2015/50, August 27, 2015.
14 For more information about the Joint Plan of Action, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth
Katzman and Paul K. Kerr.
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Iran and the IAEA
As noted, Iran is a party to the NPT and has concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement.
Such agreements are designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material from
peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses, as well as to detect undeclared nuclear activities and
material.15 Safeguards include agency inspections and monitoring of declared nuclear facilities.
Although comprehensive safeguards agreements give the IAEA the authority “to verify the
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the tools available to it to do so, under such
agreements, are limited,” according to the agency.16
As a practical matter, the IAEA’s ability to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as well as obtain
information, in a particular country pursuant to that government’s comprehensive safeguards
agreement is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the government.17
Additional Protocols to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements increase the agency’s ability
to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the IAEA’s authority to
inspect certain nuclear-related facilities and demand information from member states.18 Iran
signed such a protocol in December 2003 and agreed to implement the agreement pending
ratification. Tehran stopped adhering to its Additional Protocol in 2006.19
The IAEA’s authority to investigate nuclear-weapons-related activity is limited. Then Director-
General ElBaradei explained in a 2005 interview that the IAEA does not have “an all-
encompassing mandate to look for every computer study on weaponization. Our mandate is to
make sure that all nuclear materials in a country are declared to us.”20 Similarly, a February 2006
report from ElBaradei to the IAEA board stated that “absent some nexus to nuclear material the
agency’s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is
limited.”21 There is no requirement that there be any nexus to nuclear material in order for the
IAEA to request access to a facility, but there are disagreements among IAEA member-states
regarding the extent of the agency’s rights to access locations where there is no reason to suspect
the presence of nuclear material. Such disagreements could play a role if the IAEA Board is
required to consider a request for special inspections in Iran or another country (see Appendix
B). Therefore, the closer the connection between nuclear material and the location in question, the
more likely the Board would be to approve such an inspection.
15 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. (Available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/6570/IAEA-Safeguards-
Glossary-2001-Edition). Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153,
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf. According to Amano’s May
2013 report, the IAEA Board of Governors “has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992,” that this
model agreement “authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from
declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness).”
16 The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SG/
documents/safeg_system.pdf.
17 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary.
18 Additional Protocols for an individual IAEA member state are based on the agency’s Model Additional Protocol
(INFCIRC/540), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf.
19 Iran announced that it would stop implementing the protocol two days after the IAEA Board of governors adopted a
resolution in February 2006 that referred Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement to the U.N.
Security Council.
20 “Tackling the Nuclear Dilemma: An Interview with IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei,” February 4, 2005,
available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/ElBaradei.
21 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2006/15, February 27, 2006.
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The current public controversy over Iran’s nuclear program began in August 2002, when the
National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group, revealed information
during a press conference (some of which later proved to be accurate) that Tehran had built
nuclear-related facilities that it had not revealed to the IAEA. The United States had been aware
of at least some of these activities, according to knowledgeable former officials.22 Prior to the
NCRI’s revelations, the IAEA had expressed concerns that Iran had not been providing the
agency with all relevant information about its nuclear programs, but had never found Tehran in
violation of its safeguards agreement.
In fall 2002, the IAEA began to investigate Iran’s nuclear activities at the sites named by the
NCRI; inspectors visited the sites the following February. Adopting its first resolution on the
matter in September 2003, the IAEA board called on Tehran to increase its cooperation with the
agency’s investigation, suspend its uranium enrichment activities, and “unconditionally sign,
ratify and fully implement” an Additional Protocol.23
In October 2003, Iran concluded a voluntary agreement with France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom, collectively known as the “E3,” to suspend its enrichment activities, sign and
implement an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, and comply fully with the
IAEA’s investigation.24 As a result, the agency’s board decided to refrain from referring the matter
to the U.N. Security Council. As noted, Tehran signed this Additional Protocol in December 2003,
but has never ratified it.
Ultimately, the IAEA’s investigation, as well as information Iran provided after the October 2003
agreement, revealed that Iran had engaged in a variety of clandestine nuclear-related activities,
some of which violated the country’s safeguards agreement (see Appendix A). After October
2003, Iran continued some of its enrichment-related activities, but Tehran and the E3 agreed in
November 2004 to a more detailed suspension agreement.25 However, Iran resumed uranium
conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who
had been elected two months earlier.
On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2005/77)26
that, for the first time, found Iran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement.
The board, however, did not refer Iran to the Security Council, choosing instead to give Tehran
additional time to comply with the board’s demands. The resolution urged Iran
to implement transparency measures including access to individuals,
documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military
owned workshops, and research and development locations;
to re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity;
to reconsider the construction of the research reactor moderated by heavy water;
22 Gary Samore, former Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls on the National Security Council,
personal communication June 5, 2008; then-Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, “DCI Remarks on Iraq’s
WMD Programs,” February 5, 2004, available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2004/
tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html.
23 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003.
24 The text of the agreement is available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/
statement_iran21102003.shtml.
25 The text of the agreement is available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf.
26 Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf.
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to ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol; and
to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol.
No international legal obligations required Tehran to take these steps. But ElBaradei’s September
2008 report asserted that, without Iranian implementation of such “transparency measures,” the
IAEA would “not be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities in Iran.”
Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges
at Natanz. The next month, the IAEA Board of Governors referred Iran’s case to the U.N.
Security Council.27 Tehran announced shortly after that it would stop implementing its Additional
Protocol. (For details, see “Iran and the U.N. Security Council” below.)
Potential Noncompliance Since September 2005
Iran further scaled back its cooperation with the IAEA in March 2007, when the government told
the agency that it would stop complying with a portion of the subsidiary arrangements for its
IAEA safeguards agreement.28 That provision (called the modified code 3.1), to which Iran agreed
in February 2003, requires Tehran to provide design information for new nuclear facilities “as
soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a facility has been taken,
whichever is earlier.” Since March 2007, Iran has argued that it is only obligated to adhere to the
previous notification provisions of its subsidiary arrangements, which required Tehran to provide
design information for a new facility 180 days before introducing nuclear material into it.29
This decision constituted the basis for Iran’s stated rationale for its refusal since 2007 to provide
the IAEA with some information concerning its nuclear program. For example, Tehran had
refused to provide updated design information for the heavy-water reactor under construction at
Arak.30 As part of the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action, Iran submitted this information to the
IAEA on February 12, 2014.31
Similarly, Tehran had refused to provide the IAEA with design information for a reactor that Iran
intends to construct at Darkhovin. Although Iran provided the agency with preliminary design
27 For details on the IAEA’s authority to refer noncompliance cases to the Security Council, see “Iran and the U.N.
Security Council.”
28 According to the 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary, subsidiary arrangements describe the “technical and
administrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied.”
29 During a November 2011 session of the Non-Aligned Movement, Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh, then Iran’s
Permanent Representative to the IAEA, characterized the modified Code 3.1 as “merely a suggestion” by the IAEA
Board of Governors. See “Iran Provides 20 Answers to Clarify Ambiguities about Its Nuclear Program,” Tehran Times,
November 9,2011. Available at http://www.tehrantimes.com/politics/4362-iran-provides-20-answers-to-clarify-
ambiguities-about-its-nuclear-program.
30 This lack of information was “having an increasingly adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to effectively verify the
design of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach,” according to a May 22, 2013, report from
Amano (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2013/27, May 22, 2013). A November 2013 report
from Amano explains that the IAEA “needs updated design information as early as possible in order ... to ensure that
all possible diversion paths are identified, and appropriate safeguards measures and customized safeguards equipment
are put in place.” (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council
Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2013/56, November 14, 2013. Iran
has concluded “a safeguards approach for the reactor” (Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programme in Relation to the Joint
Plan of Action, Report by the Director General, GOV/INF/2015/8, April 20, 2015).
31 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2014/10, February 20, 2014.
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information about the Darkhovin reactor in a September 22, 2009, letter, the IAEA has requested
Tehran to “provide additional clarifications” of the information, according to a November 2009
report.32 Amano reported in September 2010 that Iran has “has provided only limited design
information with respect to” the reactor.33 Iran has also argued, based on its March 2007 decision,
that its failure to notify the IAEA before September 2009 that it has been constructing a gas-
centrifuge uranium enrichment facility, called the Fordow facility, near the city of Qom was
consistent with Tehran’s safeguards obligations. Exactly when Iran decided to construct the
facility is unclear. Amano reported in May 2012 that the IAEA has requested information from
Iran regarding the Fordow construction decision. But Tehran, according to Amano’s February
2015 report, has not yet provided all of this information.
Both the 2007 decision, which the IAEA has asked Iran to “reconsider,” and Tehran’s refusal to
provide the design information appear to be inconsistent with the government’s safeguards
obligations. Although Article 39 of Iran’s safeguards agreement states that the subsidiary
arrangements “may be extended or changed by agreement between” Iran and the IAEA, the
agreement does not provide for a unilateral modification or suspension of any portion of those
arrangements.34 Moreover, the IAEA legal adviser explained in a March 2009 statement35 that
Tehran’s failure to provide design information for the reactors is “inconsistent with” Iran’s
obligations under its subsidiary arrangements. The adviser, however, added that “it is difficult to
conclude that” Tehran’s refusal to provide the information “in itself constitutes non-compliance
with, or a breach of” Iran’s safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, a November 2009 report from
ElBaradei described Tehran’s failures both to notify the agency of the decision to begin
constructing the Fordow facility, as well as to provide the relevant design information in a timely
fashion, as “inconsistent with” Iran’s safeguards obligations. The report similarly described Iran’s
delay in providing design information for the Darkhovin reactor.
Iran may also have violated its safeguards agreement if it has made decisions to construct new
nuclear facilities without informing the IAEA. The agency is investigating whether Iran has made
such decisions. For example, the IAEA has also asked the government for information about
Iranian statements that the government is planning to construct new uranium enrichment
facilities, is designing a nuclear reactor similar to a research reactor located in Tehran, is
producing fuel for four new research reactors, and is planning to construct additional nuclear
power reactors. Pursuant to its November 2013 agreement with the IAEA, Iran has provided at
least some of this information to the agency.
Iran’s March 2007 decision also formed the basis for Tehran’s refusal until August 2009 to allow
IAEA inspectors to verify design information for the Arak reactor. This action also appeared to be
inconsistent with Tehran’s safeguards agreement. Article 48 of that agreement states that the
IAEA “may send inspectors to facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency”;
in fact, the agency has a “continuing right” to do so, according to a November 2008 report from
ElBaradei.36 Moreover, the legal adviser’s statement characterized Iran’s refusal to allow IAEA
32 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2008/59, November 19, 2008.
33 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2010/46, September 6, 2010.
34 See also GOV/2007/22, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf.
Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed that Code 3.1 “cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally.”
35 Available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/162/Legal_Adviser_Iran.pdf.
36 GOV/2008/59. Security Council Resolution 1929 affirmed this statement.
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inspectors to verify the Arak reactor’s design information as “inconsistent with” Tehran’s
obligations under its safeguards agreement.37 IAEA inspectors visited the reactor facility in
August 2009 to verify design information, according to a report ElBaradei issued the same
month.38 Inspectors have visited the facility several more times, according to reports from
Amano.
In addition to the lapses described above, Iran’s failure to notify the IAEA of its decision to
produce enriched uranium containing a maximum of 20% uranium-235 in time for agency
inspectors to adjust their safeguards procedures may, according to a February 2010 report from
Amano, have violated Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement.39 Article 45 of that agreement requires
that Tehran notify the IAEA “with design information in respect of a modification relevant for
safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when
necessary,” according to Amano’s report, which describes Iran’s enrichment decision as “clearly
relevant for safeguards purposes.”
The IAEA board has neither formally found that any of the Iranian actions described above are in
noncompliance with Tehran’s safeguards agreement, nor referred these issues to the U.N. Security
Council. The IAEA board adopted a resolution on November 27, 2009, that described Iran’s
failure to notify the agency of the Fordow facility as “inconsistent with” the subsidiary
arrangements under Iran’s safeguards agreement, but this statement did not constitute a formal
finding of noncompliance. A September 13, 2012, IAEA board resolution expressed “serious
concern” that Tehran has not complied with the obligations described in IAEA Board of
Governors and U.N. Security Council resolutions, but the September resolution did not contain a
formal finding of noncompliance.40
Iran and the U.N. Security Council
As noted, Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its
centrifuges at Natanz. In response, the IAEA board adopted a resolution (GOV/2006/14)41
February 4, 2006, referring the matter to the Security Council and reiterating its call for Iran to
take the measures specified in the September resolution. Two days later, Tehran announced that it
would stop implementing its Additional Protocol.
On March 29, 2006, the U.N. Security Council President issued a statement, which was not
legally binding, that called on Iran to “take the steps required” by the February IAEA board
resolution. The council subsequently adopted six resolutions concerning Iran’s nuclear program:
1696 (July 2006), 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835
(September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). The second, third, fourth, and sixth resolutions imposed
a variety of restrictions on Iran.
37 Iran stated in an April 2007 letter to the IAEA that, given Tehran’s March 2007 decision regarding the subsidiary
arrangements to its safeguards agreement, such visits were unjustified.
38 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2009/55, August 28, 2009.
39 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2010/10, February 18, 2010.
40 GOV/2012/48.
41 Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf.
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Resolution 1696 was the first to place legally binding Security Council requirements on Iran with
respect to its nuclear program. That resolution made mandatory the IAEA-demanded suspension
and called on Tehran to implement the transparency measures called for by the IAEA board’s
February 2006 resolution. Resolution 1737 reiterated these requirements but expanded the
suspension’s scope to include “work on all heavy water-related projects.” It is worth noting that
the Security Council has acknowledged (in Resolution 1803, for example) Iran’s rights under
Article IV of the NPT, which states that parties to the treaty have “the inalienable right ... to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful Purposes.”42 As noted,
Resolution 1929 also requires Tehran to refrain from “any activity related to ballistic missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and to comply with the modified Code 3.1 of its
subsidiary arrangement.
Resolution 2231, which the UN Security Council adopted on July 20, 2015, states that all of the
previous resolutions’ requirements will be terminated when the council receives a report from the
IAEA stating that Iran has implemented the nuclear-related measures by Implementation Day, as
described by the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Authority for IAEA and U.N. Security Council
Actions
The legal authority for the actions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security
Council is found in both the IAEA Statute and the U.N. Charter. The following sections discuss
the relevant portions of those documents.
IAEA Statute43
Two sections of the IAEA Statute explain what the agency should do if an IAEA member state is
found to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.44 Article III B. 4. of the statute states
that the IAEA is to submit annual reports to the U.N. General Assembly and, “when appropriate,”
to the U.N. Security Council. If “there should arise questions that are within the competence of
the Security Council,” the article adds, the IAEA “shall notify the Security Council, as the organ
bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”
Additionally, Article XII C. states that IAEA inspectors are to report noncompliance issues to the
agency’s Director-General, who is to report the matter to the IAEA Board of Governors. The
board is then to “call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance
which it finds to have occurred,” as well as “report the non-compliance to all members and to the
Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.”
In the case of Iran, the September 24, 2005, IAEA board resolution (GOV/2005/77) stated that the
board
found that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT
Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75 [a November 2003 report from then-
42 The treaty text is available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf.
43 The IAEA Statute is not self-executing; the Agency implements safeguards agreements reached with individual
governments. As noted, comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on a model described in INFCIRC 153.
44 The text of the IAEA Statute is available at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html.
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Director General ElBaradei], constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of
the Agency’s Statute;
According to the resolution, the board also found
that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director
General’s report [GOV/2003/75], the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in
the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September
2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is
exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the
competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
ElBaradei issued the report cited by the resolution, GOV/2003/75, in November 2003.45 It
described a variety of Iranian nuclear activities, which are detailed in Appendix A, that violated
Tehran’s safeguards agreement. ElBaradei subsequently reported that Iran has taken corrective
measures to address these safeguards breaches. As noted above, the 2005 resolution called on Iran
to take a variety of actions that Tehran was not legally required to implement.
U.N. Charter and the Security Council
Several articles of the U.N. Charter, which is a treaty, describe the Security Council’s authority to
impose requirements and sanctions on Iran.46 Article 24 confers on the council “primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” The article also states that
the “specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid
down” in several chapters of the charter, including Chapter VII, which describes the actions that
the council may take in response to “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression.”
Chapter VII of the charter contains three articles relevant to the Iran case. Security Council
resolutions that made mandatory the IAEA’s demands concerning Iran’s nuclear program invoked
Chapter VII. Article 39 of that chapter states that the council
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Resolution 1696 invoked Article 40 of Chapter VII “in order to make mandatory the suspension
required by the IAEA.” As noted, that resolution did not impose any sanctions on Iran. Article 40
states that
the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the
measures provided for in Article 39 [of Chapter VII], call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.
Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929, which did impose sanctions, invoked Article 41 of
Chapter VII. According to Article 41, the Security Council
may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to
give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to
apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic
45 Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf.
46 The text of the charter is available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
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relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
As noted, Security Council resolution 1835 did not impose new sanctions, but reaffirmed the
previous resolutions and called on Iran to comply with them.
It is worth noting that Article 25 of the U.N. Charter obligates U.N. members “to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council.” Moreover, Article 103 of the Charter states that
[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement,
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
The IAEA also has an obligation to cooperate with the Security Council, “[b]y virtue of its
Relationship Agreement with the United Nations.”47
Has Iran Violated the NPT?48
Whether Iran has violated the NPT is unclear. The treaty does not contain a mechanism for
determining that a state-party has violated its obligations. Moreover, there does not appear to be a
formal procedure for determining such violations. An NPT Review Conference would, however,
be one venue for NPT states-parties to make such a determination.
The U.N. Security Council has never declared Iran to be in violation of the NPT; neither the
council nor the U.N. General Assembly has a responsibility to adjudicate treaty violations.
However, the lack of a ruling by the council on Iran’s compliance with the NPT has apparently
had little practical effect because, as noted, the council has taken action in response to the IAEA
Board of Governors’ determination that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement.
Iran’s violations of its safeguards agreement appear to constitute violations of Article III, which
requires NPT non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to accept IAEA safeguards, in accordance with
the agency’s statue, “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
Tehran may also have violated provisions of Article II which state that non-nuclear-weapon
states-parties shall not “manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices” or “seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.”
As noted, the IAEA is continuing to investigate evidence of what then-IAEA Director-General
Mohamed ElBaradei described in June 2008 as “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear
programme.” Such activities may indicate that Tehran has violated both Article II provisions
described above. Moreover, a November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that
“until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop
nuclear weapons.”49 This past program could be a violation of Article II, although the estimate
does not provide any detail about the program. Nevertheless, the IAEA has never reported that
Iran has attempted to develop nuclear weapons.
47 GOV/2013/27. The agreement is contained in INFCIRC/11.
48 Portions of this section are based on interviews with U.N. and State Department officials.
49 Available at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf. Subsequent U.S. official statements have
been consistent with the NIE.
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Despite the lack of such an IAEA conclusion, a 2005 State Department report regarding states’
compliance with nonproliferation agreements argued that the country had violated Article II of
the NPT:
The breadth of Iran’s nuclear development efforts, the secrecy and deceptions with which
they have been conducted for nearly 20 years, its redundant and surreptitious
procurement channels, Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its obligations to report to
the IAEA and to apply safeguards to such activities, and the lack of a reasonable
economic justification for this program leads us to conclude that Iran is pursuing an effort
to manufacture nuclear weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in
violation of Article II of the NPT.50
The report also stated that Iran’s “weapons program combines elements” of Tehran’s declared
nuclear activities, as well as suspected “undeclared fuel cycle and other activities that may exist,
including those that may be run solely be the military.”
The State Department’s reasoning appears to be based on an interpretation of the NPT which
holds that a wide scope of nuclear activities could constitute violations of Article II. The 2005
report states that assessments regarding Article II compliance “must look at the totality of the
facts, including judgments as to” a state-party’s “purpose in undertaking the nuclear activities in
question.” The report also includes a list of activities which could constitute such
noncompliance.51
The 2005 State Department report cites testimony from then-Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency Director William Foster during a 1968 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.52
Foster stated that “facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a
nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance” with Article II. He gave two
examples: “the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device” and “the
production of components which could only have relevance” to such a device. However, Foster
also noted that a variety of other activities could also violate Article II, adding that the United
States believed it impossible “to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation.”
It is worth noting that the 2005 State Department report’s arguments appear to rely heavily on the
notion that a state’s apparent intentions underlying certain nuclear-related activities can be used to
determine violations of Article II. This interpretation is not shared by all experts.53
The 2005 report “primarily reflected activities from January 2002 through December 2003.”
Whether the State Department assesses that Iran has violated Article II since then is unclear. A
version of the report released in 2010, which primarily reflected activities from January 1, 2004,
through December 31, 2008, states that “the issues underlying” the 2005 report’s conclusion
50 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments, Department of State, August 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52113.pdf.
51 According to the report, such activities can include (1) the presence of undeclared nuclear facilities; (2) procurement
patterns inconsistent with a civil nuclear program (e.g., clandestine procurement networks, possibly including the use
of front companies, false end-use information, and fraudulent documentation); (3) security measures beyond what
would be appropriate for peaceful, civil nuclear installations; (4) a pattern of Article III safeguards violations
suggestive not of mere mistake or incompetence, but of willful violation and/or systematic deception and denial efforts
aimed at concealing nuclear activities from the IAEA; and (5) a nuclear program with little (or no) coherence for
peaceful purposes, but great coherence for weapons purposes.
52 Nonproliferation Treaty, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy [Part 1] July
10-12, 17, 1968; Session 90-2 (1968). The complete statement regarding Article II violations is in Appendix C.
53 Personal communication with Andreas Persbo, Senior Researcher, the Verification Research, Training and
Information Centre.
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regarding Iran’s Article II compliance “remain unresolved.”54 Subsequent versions of the report
reiterate the 2010 report’s assessment.55 As noted, the 2007 NIE assessed that Iran halted its
nuclear weapons program in 2003; subsequent U.S. official statements have consistently
reiterated that Tehran has not yet decided to build nuclear weapons.56
British Foreign Secretary William Hague would not say whether Iran had violated Article II when
asked by a Member of Parliament in March 2012.57
54 Quotations are from Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments, Department of State, July 2010.
55 See, for example, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements
and Commitments, Department of State, July 31, 2014.
56 See, for example, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record, U.S. Intelligence
Community Worldwide Threat Assessment, February 26, 2015.
57 Developments in UK Foreign Policy, House of Commons: Oral Evidence Taken Before the Foreign Affairs
Committee, March 8, 2012.
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Appendix A. Iranian Noncompliance with Its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement
The November 2003 report (GOV/2003/75) from IAEA Director-General ElBaradei to the
agency’s Board of Governors details what the September 2005 board resolution described as
“Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement.”
The report stated that
Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its
obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear
material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such
material has been processed and stored.
The report detailed some of these failures and referenced other failures described in two earlier
reports (GOV/2003/40 and GOV/2003/63) from ElBaradei to the IAEA board.58
According to GOV/2003/40, Iran failed to declare the following activities to the agency:
The importation of natural uranium, and its subsequent transfer for further
processing.
The processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production
and loss of nuclear material, and the production and transfer of resulting waste.
Additionally, Iran failed to
declare the facilities where nuclear material (including the waste) was received,
stored and processed;
provide in a timely manner updated design information for a research reactor
located in Tehran; as well as
provide in a timely manner information on two waste storage sites.
GOV/2003/63 stated that Iran failed to report uranium conversion experiments to the IAEA.
According to GOV/2003/75, Iran failed to report the following activities to the IAEA:
The use of imported natural uranium hexafluoride for the testing of centrifuges,
as well as the subsequent production of enriched and depleted uranium.
The importation of natural uranium metal and its subsequent transfer for use in
laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the
loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer
of resulting waste.
The production of a variety of nuclear compounds from several different
imported nuclear materials, and the production and transfer of resulting wastes.
The production of uranium targets and their irradiation in the Tehran Research
Reactor, the subsequent processing of those targets (including the separation of
plutonium), the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of
unprocessed irradiated targets.
58 Those reports are available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf and
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf.
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Iran also failed to provide the agency with design information for a variety of nuclear-related
facilities, according to the report. These included the following:
A centrifuge testing facility.
Two laser laboratories and locations where resulting wastes were processed.
Facilities involved in the production of a variety of nuclear compounds.
The Tehran Research Reactor (with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets),
the hot cell facility where the plutonium separation took place, as well as the
relevant waste handling facility.
Additionally, the report cited Iran’s “failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the
implementation of safeguards, through concealment” of its nuclear activities.
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Appendix B. IAEA Special Inspections
As noted, Iran’s obligations under its Additional Protocol to provide access to certain locations
are unclear; Tehran may refuse to grant the IAEA access to certain facilities. In such a case, the
IAEA Director-General could call for a special inspection; the inspection could require approval
from the IAEA Board of Governors. According to the IAEA, an inspection is deemed to be
special when it is in addition to IAEA routine inspections or “involves access to information or
locations” that have not been identified to the IAEA as part of the agency’s implementation of
safeguards in that country.59 Such inspections “are foreseen in all Agency safeguards agreements,
principally as a means for the Agency to resolve unforeseen verification problems,” according to
a 1991 IAEA document.60 Paragraph 73 of the model safeguards agreement, INFCIRC 153, states
that comprehensive safeguards agreements should provide for the IAEA’s ability to “make special
inspections,” subject to certain procedures, if the agency
considers that information made available by the State, including explanations from the
State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency
to fulfill its responsibilities under the Agreement.
According to the 1991 document, a special inspection could be triggered by the IAEA’s receipt of
“plausible information, which is not adequately explained by the State or otherwise resolved” by
other IAEA inspections that the country has “nuclear material in a nuclear activity” outside of
IAEA safeguards, or that the state has an undeclared nuclear facility that it had been required to
report to the agency.
The IAEA Director General “has the authority ... to determine the need for, and to direct the
carrying out of, special inspections,” according to another 1991 IAEA paper.61 In the event that
the IAEA argues for a special inspection in a country, the agency and the government “must hold
immediate consultations,” according to the 1991 paper. Any dispute regarding the inspection
request must be resolved according to dispute settlement provisions described in INFCIRC 153.
However, paragraph 18 of INFCIRC 153 states that
if the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is
essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to
safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action
without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have
been invoked.
If the state refuses the inspection, IAEA Board of Governors can take action according to
paragraph 19 of INFCIRC 153, including reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council.62
59 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. According to that Glossary, special inspections can also be used “to verify the
information contained in special reports.” States with comprehensive safeguards agreements are required to submit a
special report to the IAEA if there is a “loss of nuclear material exceeding specified limits” or if “containment and
surveillance measures have been unexpectedly changed from those specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.”
Subsidiary arrangements describe the “technical and administrative procedures for specifying how the provisions laid
down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied.” The IAEA negotiates changes to such arrangements with the state if
alterations to the country’s nuclear facilities necessitate such changes.
60 GOV/INF/61329, May 29, 1991.
61 GOV/2554, November 12, 1991.
62 Ibid.
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Appendix C. Extended Remarks by William Foster
Regarding Possible NPT Article II Violations
On July 10, 1968, then-Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Foster testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the NPT. In response to a question
regarding the type of nuclear activities prohibited by Article II of the treaty, Foster supplied the
following statement:
Extension of Remarks by Mr. Foster in Response to Question Regarding Nuclear
Explosive Devices
The treaty articles in question are Article II, in which non-nuclear-weapon parties
undertake “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices,” and Article IV, which provides that nothing in the Treaty is to be
interpreted as affecting the right of all Parties to the Treaty “to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…in conformity with Articles
I and II of this Treaty.” In the course of the negotiation of the Treaty, United States
representatives were asked their views on what would constitute the “manufacture” of a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device under Article II of the draft treaty. Our
reply was as follows:
“While the general intent of this provision seems clear, and its application to cases such
as those discussed below should present little difficulty, the United States believe [sic] it
is not possible at this time to formulate a comprehensive definition or interpretation.
There are many hypothetical situations which might be imagined and it is doubtful that
any general definition or interpretation, unrelated to specific fact situations could
satisfactorily deal with all such situations.
“Some general observations can be made with respect to the question of whether or not a
specific activity constitutes prohibited manufacture under the proposed treaty. For
example, facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a
nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of
an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device would be covered by the term
‘manufacture’ as would be the production of components which could only have
relevance to a nuclear explosive device.) Again, while the placing of a particular activity
under safeguards would not, in and of itself, settle the question of whether that activity
was in compliance with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion
of non-compliance.
“It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the
United States would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II.
Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with
a peaceful program would violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded
under Article III. Also clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of
plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic
plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder
reactors under safeguards.”
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Author Contact Information
Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation
pkerr@crs.loc.gov, 7-8693
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