Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
September 10, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33546


Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Summary
This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in U.S.-Jordanian
relations. It provides a brief discussion of Jordan’s government and economy and of its
cooperation with U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East, including the promotion of Arab-
Israeli peace.
Several issues are likely to figure in decisions by Congress and the Administration on future aid
to and cooperation with Jordan. These include Jordan’s continued involvement in attempting to
promote Israeli-Palestinian peace and the stability of the Jordanian regime, particularly in light of
ongoing conflicts in neighboring Syria and Iraq. U.S. officials may also consider potential threats
to Jordan from the Islamic State organization (also known as ISIS or ISIL).
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have
cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. Jordan’s small size
and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various
Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan address serious vulnerabilities, both
internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of more powerful neighbors, but has also
given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial
relations with one another.
The United States has provided Jordan with economic and military aid since 1951 and 1957,
respectively. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2015 amounted to approximately $15.83 billion.
On February 3, 2015, the Obama Administration and the Jordanian government signed a
nonbinding, three-year memorandum of understanding (MOU), in which the United States
pledges to provide the kingdom with $1 billion annually in total U.S. foreign assistance, subject
to the approval of Congress, from FY2015 through FY2017.
P.L. 113-235, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2015, provides
“not less than $1,000,000,000” in total U.S. foreign assistance for Jordan in FY2015. The act (in
Section 7034) also reauthorizes loan guarantees to Jordan. It also permits the Secretary of
Defense to provide Jordan with Defense Department Operation and Maintenance (O&M) OCO
funds to “reimburse the government of Jordan in such amounts as the Secretary of Defense may
determine to maintain the ability of the Jordanian armed forces to maintain security along the
border between Jordan and Syria.”
H.R. 907 (passed by the House on July 7, 2015), The United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation
Act of 2015, if enacted, would amend foreign assistance legislation to accelerate arms exports to
Jordan and, among other things, authorize the Secretary of State to sign an assistance and
cooperation MOU with Jordan (the MOU was signed in February 2015). S. 1789, the United
States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act of 2015, is the Senate companion bill to H.R. 907. It was
introduced in the Senate in July 2015.
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Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Regional Issues ................................................................................................................................ 1
Jordan’s Role in Combatting the Islamic State ......................................................................... 1
Jordan’s Support for Syrian Rebels ........................................................................................... 3
Syrian Refugees in Jordan ......................................................................................................... 4
Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians ............................................................................................ 5
Israeli-Jordanian Cooperation ................................................................................................... 7
Water Sharing ...................................................................................................................... 7
Israeli Natural Gas Exports to Jordan ................................................................................. 7
Israeli-Jordanian Military Cooperation ............................................................................... 7
Country Background ....................................................................................................................... 8
The Hashemite Royal Family ............................................................................................. 9
Political System and Key Institutions ................................................................................. 9
Political Opposition and the Fracturing of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood ................ 11
The Economy .......................................................................................................................... 13
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan ................................................................................................. 14
Three-Year MOU on U.S. Foreign Aid to Jordan ............................................................. 14
Economic Assistance ............................................................................................................... 15
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) ........................................................................... 15
Loan Guarantees ............................................................................................................... 16
Military Assistance .................................................................................................................. 16

Figures
Figure 1. Select Members of the Jordanian Royal Family ............................................................. 11
Figure 2. IRI Poll on Jordanian Public Opinion ............................................................................ 12
Figure 3. GDP Growth and Male/Female Unemployment in Jordan ............................................ 14

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan, FY2012-FY2016 Request ........................................ 15
Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis .................................................... 18

Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 19

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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Overview
Successive administrations have recognized Jordan as a key partner in pursuing various U.S.
national security interests in the Middle East, such as countering terrorism and promoting Arab-
Israeli peace. Over the past year, U.S.-Jordanian cooperation has increased due to the kingdom’s
participation in the international coalition against the Islamic State organization (IS/ISIS/ISIL).
The Islamic State’s presence in neighboring Syria and Iraq presents significant security concerns
for Jordan. U.S. Ambassador to Jordan Alice G. Wells said in May 2015 that “For the first time in
over 40 years Jordanian soldiers and pilots are prosecuting a war – side by side with the United
States and 61 coalition partners – to defend Jordan.”1
Many analysts believe that expanded U.S.-Jordanian cooperation against the Islamic State may to
some extent increase Jordan’s vulnerability to the types of threats emanating from Syria and Iraq
that such cooperation is intended to counter. Jordanian officials have voiced concerns regarding a
possible terrorist backlash stemming from Jordan’s participation in coalition air strikes against the
Islamic State. The government also is concerned over its ability to materially provide for the more
than 630,000 United Nations-registered Syrian refugees currently residing in Jordan (there may
be hundreds of thousands more who are unregistered, and more continue to arrive).
Regional Issues
Jordan’s Role in Combatting the Islamic State2
Since U.S. and coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State3 began in August-September 2014
(officially named Operation Inherent Resolve in October 2014), the Jordanian Air Force has
conducted airstrikes against Islamic State militants in Syria. However, its role increased
significantly after the capture and murder of Jordanian pilot Lieutenant Moath al Kasasbeh by the
Islamic State in Syria.4 In the aftermath of Kasasbeh’s immolation, King Abdullah II vowed to
wage a “relentless” war against the Islamic State and “hit them in their own ground.” Jordan
immediately increased the operational tempo of their airstrikes and expanded strikes into Iraq. As
of May 2015, Jordanian planes had flown over 325 sorties against ISIS targets - more than all
other regional coalition partners combined.5 Some other coalition partners, such as the United
Arab Emirates and Bahrain, have based their attack planes in Jordanian air bases.
Additionally, Jordanian officials, many of whom have ties to Sunni tribes in western Iraq, have
offered to train and equip these tribes. However, Iraqi Shia political groups have rejected Jordan’s
offer, calling it a violation of Iraqi national sovereignty. Some Iraqi and Syrian tribes have
directly rejected Jordan’s train-and-equip offers out of apparent distrust.6

1 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. And Jordan: An Alliance Against Violent Extremism,” Alice G. Wells, The
Ambassador of the United States to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, World Affairs Council, May 12, 2015.
2 See CRS Insight IN10143, The Islamic State in Syria and Iraq: A Possible Threat to Jordan?, by Jeremy M. Sharp .
3 For additional background, see CRS Report R43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M.
Blanchard et al.
4 On February 3, the Islamic State released a video depicting its killing of Jordanian F-16 pilot Kasasbeh, who was
burned alive (reportedly on January 3) while standing inside a cage.
5 op.cit., U.S. Department of State, May 12, 2015.
6 “King of Jordan offers Military Support to Border Tribes,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, July 1, 2015.
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Jordan has been beset by security incidents
along its borders and has suffered
Congress Seeking Expedited Arms Sales
economically from the loss of trade with Iraq
to Jordan
and Syria.9 In April 2015, IS terrorists
On February 4, a day after meeting with King Abdul ah II,
attacked Iraqi troops near the Trebil border
Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee
issued a letter to the Administration seeking to expedite
crossing with Jordan, killing 5 Iraqi troops.
bilateral and third-party arms sales of U.S.-origin
The Islamic State’s presence in Iraq’s Anbar
weaponry to Jordan and to approve technology transfers
province bordering Jordan has dramatically
that would enable the Kingdom to more effectively wage
reduced road trade between the two nations.
war against the Islamic State. The letter states that
According to one report, “the number of
“Specifically, Jordan is seeking to obtain aircraft parts,
additional night vision equipment, and precision
trucks crossing from Jordan into Iraq has
munitions that the King feels he needs to secure his
fallen from about 400 a day in 2012, before
border and robustly execute combat air missions into
ISIS seized territory, to 45 [in 2015].”10 Jordan
Syria. We understand the need to ensure the integrity of
also has experienced a steep drop in tourism as
third party transfers, the protection of critical U.S.
a result of international concern over possible
technologies, and our commitment to the maintenance
of a Qualitative Military Edge (QME) for Israel. However,
future IS terrorist attacks against the kingdom.
Jordan’s situation and the cohesiveness of the coalition
In the first few months of 2015, visits to Petra,
demands we move with speed to ensure they receive the
Jordan’s main tourist attraction, are down 50%
military materiel they require for ongoing operations
compared to the previous year.11
against ISIL.” 7 Since February 2015, the Defense Security

Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has notified Congress of
Although many Jordanians support their
three major arms sales to Jordan, including a possible
country’s role in the coalition to defeat the
sale of Unitary Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems.8
Islamic State,12 the kingdom is home to
several areas where manifestations of anti-government sentiment are high, economic prospects
are poor, and sympathy for political Islam appears to be prevalent. Many Jordanians have tribal or
kinship ties with Sunni communities in Iraq and Syria, whose sense of persecution, including at
the hands of Iranian-supported governments and groups, has driven support for the Islamic State
and other extremist groups. In order to crack down on IS recruitment in Jordan, the government
has used existing anti-terrorism laws against Islamic State sympathizers. According to one report,
“Some 300 people are currently in custody in Jordan for alleged IS sympathies, including 130
who have been sentenced....About half are in detention for expressing support for IS ideas on
social media.”13 Some international non-governmental organizations, such as Human Rights
Watch, have criticized the Jordanian authorities for suppressing freedom of the press, and

7 Senate Armed Services Committee Members Call for Urgent Support to Jordan in Fight Against ISIL, February 4,
2015. Available at http://www.reed.senate.gov/news/releases/senate-armed-services-committee-members-call-for-
urgent-support-to-jordan-in-fight-against-isil.
8 Notifications are available online at: [http://www.dsca.mil/tags/jordan]
9 In order to improve Jordan’s border security, the kingdom has used U.S. military assistance to finance the Jordan
Border Security Program (JBSP). The Department of State, the Department of Defense’s Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, and various U.S. contactors such as DRS Technologies and Raytheon have worked together to integrate
surveillance, WMD detection, and interdiction along specific stretches of Jordan’s borders with Syria and Iraq.
According to one U.S. official, “the JBSP is already providing the Jordanians better visibility of their border, which has
resulted in increased interdictions of drugs, weapons, and personnel smuggling.” See, Statement of Eric Rosenbach
Assistant Secretary, Defense For Homeland Defense & Global Security Department of Defense, Committee on House
Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 25, 2015.
10 “Truck Drivers Steer a Perilous Path between Jordan and Iraq; Anbar Province: Transit Route,” Financial Times,
April 15, 2015.
11 “New Initiative aims to reverse prolonged Slump in Tourism,” Economist Intelligence Unit, April 22, 2015.
12 See, International Republican Institute, “Survey of Jordan Public Opinion,” February 25-March 1, 2015.
13 “Jordan tries to stem IS-style Extremism in Schools, Mosques,” Associated Press, August 7, 2015.
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particularly critical statements about the military’s involvement in the campaign against the
Islamic State.
As coalition strikes against IS targets have extended into their second year, there has been some
concern expressed in international circles that Jordan may not have the military capabilities to
wage an expanded and long-term counter-insurgency operation against the Islamic State without
significant Arab and Western assistance. Jordan has approximately 75 to 85 combat-capable
aircraft, including at least 60 F-16s, but might lack significant stockpiles of precision-guided
munitions for its jetfighters.14
Jordan may be seeking to acquire unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for its operations in Iraq and
Syria. In early February 2015, Congressman Duncan Hunter reportedly wrote a letter to President
Obama suggesting that the Administration permit the export of the Predator XP to Jordan.15 On
March 9, 23 lawmakers reportedly wrote the President asking that the Jordanian Air Force be
permitted to utilize U.S. Air Force-owned MQ-1 Predator UAV assets without transferring actual
UAV ownership to Jordan.16 Congressman Hunter reportedly wrote another letter to the President
in May 2015 suggesting that the Chinese government was in talks with the Jordanian government
over the possible acquisition of “weaponized unmanned systems.”17 In August 2015, some press
accounts suggested that Israel may be providing Jordan with Israeli-built UAVs such as the Heron
TP.18 Israel also may have provided Jordan with Bell/Cobra helicopters it had retired from
service.
U.S. Troops in Jordan
According to the President’s last War Powers Resolution Report to Congress, “at the request of the Government of
Jordan, U.S. Armed Forces elements, including Patriot missile systems, fighter aircraft, and related support, command,
control, and communications personnel and systems, are deployed to Jordan to support the security of Jordan and
promote regional stability. The total number of U.S. forces in Jordan is approximately 2,200 U.S. military personnel.
These forces wil remain in Jordan, in ful coordination with the Government of Jordan, until the security situation
becomes such that they are no longer needed.”19 Although precise details of the U.S. military presence in Jordan may
be classified, American soldiers support the deployment of a contingent of U.S. F-16s and operate a Patriot missile
battery near Jordan’s northern border with Syria. With the increased presence of U.S. and foreign troops in Jordan,
some policymakers may be concerned over the safety of U.S. personnel working/residing in the kingdom. In February
2015, the U.S. Embassy in Amman warned that “high-end malls” in Jordan's capital could be attacked by unnamed
militants, presumably tied or sympathetic to the Islamic State. The State Department lifted that advisory warning in
April 2015.
Jordan’s Support for Syrian Rebels
According to one report, Jordan provides a “staging ground for rebels and their foreign backers
on Syria’s southern front.” 20 One broad coalition of Syrian rebel groups, known as the “Southern

14 “IDEX 2015: Jordan seeks UAVs for Missions against the Islamic State,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 24,
2015.
15 “Rep. Hunter to Obama: Send Jordan the Predator XP,” Defense News, February 6, 2015.
16 “Lawmakers Push White House to Lend Drones to Jordan,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2015.
17 Available at https://admin.govexec.com/media/obamahunter514.pdf Also, see “China May Be Selling Armed Drones
to Jordan,” DefenseOne, May 15, 2015.
18 “Israel to supply Jordan with UAVs to combat the Islamic State,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 17, 2015.
19Letter from the President—Six Month Consolidated War Powers Resolution Report, The White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, June 11, 2015.
20 “Warily, Jordan Assists Rebels in Syrian War,” New York Times, April 10, 2014.
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Front,” reportedly has direct ties to the Jordan-based Military Operations Center (MOC), which,
according to press reports, coordinates some rebel operations in Syria and is staffed by foreign
and Jordanian officials.21 Southern Front fighters may generally be ideologically moderate,22 but
at times have fought alongside Islamist groups against Asad regime forces.23 The Jordanian
government may back efforts to support rebel groups within the Southern Front in hopes of
ensuring that a group friendly to the kingdom lies between it and the Asad regime and/or
extremist Syrian groups. According to one report, Jordan may be considering the establishment of
a “buffer zone” that would be manned by fighters from the Southern Front. 24 The Southern Front
has scored significant gains against Asad regime forces; nevertheless, as of September 2015 it has
yet to seize key southern Syrian population centers such as Dera’a city (62 miles south of
Damascus) and military installations such as Suwayda Air Base. The Southern Front also has to
deal with competing groups more radical or Islamist in nature, such as the Syrian affiliate of Al
Qaeda, Jabhat al Nusra, and fighters affiliated with the Jaysh al Fateh (Army of Victory) initiative
to improve rebel coordination.
Overall, the long-term goals of Jordanian policy toward the Syrian civil war are unclear. If Jordan
is directly aiding rebel groups in southern Syria, such intervention may have limited defensive
goals. Jordan has concerns not just about the Asad regime, but about the growing strength of other
radical groups inside Syria, which could threaten Jordan’s borders.
Jordan has to juggle the seemingly incompatible agendas of its partners and benefactors, such as
the United States and Saudi Arabia. Some accounts of reported covert assistance suggest that
decisions taken in Jordan, “balance the interests of the main players: Saudi Arabia provides
funding and pushes for greater rebel support; Jordan manages the border and urges caution; and
the United States supervises, maintaining a veto on weapon shipments.”25
Syrian Refugees in Jordan
The continued inflow of Syrian refugees is placing tremendous strains on the Jordanian
government. The United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees in August 2015
estimated that there were 630,224 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan, increasing the country's
population by 10%. Jordanian border authorities at times have blocked some refugees from
entering the kingdom and forcibly deported others due to security concerns and/or the strains the
refugee population has placed on the country’s northern provinces. Rents have nearly tripled in
border towns such as Mafraq and Ramtha, making housing unaffordable for many Jordanians.
Jordan’s hospitals, schools, sanitation and water systems are under similar strain. Some Jordanian
observers are writing articles openly questioning the wisdom of continuing to accept Syrian
refugees and warning that resource, budget, and demographic pressures may disrupt life in the
kingdom for a decade or more. A USAID report published in January 2014 on the fiscal impact of
Syrian refugees on Jordanian government operations concluded that for 2014, providing public
services for Syrian refugees would cost approximately 2.4% of Jordan’s Gross Domestic

21 According to the Financial Times, this operation helps to “co-ordinate some operations and is manned by the US,
European states and regional powers such as Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The MOC sends
weapons and distributes monthly salaries - about $50 per fighter - to several Southern Front groups.” See, “A Fight for
Credibility” Financial Times, June 24, 2015.
22 The Southern Front claims it is the only legitimate representative of Free Syrian Army (FSA) in southern Syria.
23 “In Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra Complicates U.S. Strategy,” Stratfor, August 4, 2015.
24 “Jordan to set up Buffer Zone in Southern Syria,” Financial Times, June 29, 2015.
25 “Warily, Jordan Assists Rebels in Syrian War,” New York Times, April 10, 2014
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Product.26According to the U.S. State Department, since large-scale U.S. aid to Syrian refugees
began in FY2012, the United States has allocated more than $624 million in multilateral
humanitarian assistance to help Jordan cope with the Syrian refugee crisis.27
Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians
The Jordanian government has long described efforts to secure a lasting end to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict as one of its highest priorities. Although Jordan joined other neighboring Arab
states in a series of military conflicts against Israel between 1948 and 1973, the late King Hussein
(ruled 1952-1999) apparently concluded in the early 1990’s that peace with Israel was in Jordan’s
strategic interests due to Israel’s conventional military superiority, the development of an
independent Palestinian national movement that threatened both Jordanian and Israeli security,
and the need for Jordan to regain Western support after it backed Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
politically in the first Gulf War.28 Consequently, in 1994 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty,29
and King Abdullah II has used his country’s semi-cordial official relationship with Israel to
improve Jordan’s standing with Western governments and international financial institutions, on
which it relies heavily for external support and aid.

26 USAID, “The Fiscal Impact Of The Syrian Refugee Crisis On Jordan,” January 5, 2014.
27 CRS correspondence with Department of State, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, August 2015.
28 In 1991, Congress suspended the delivery of U.S. economic and military aid to Jordan as a result of its support for
Iraq. See Section 502 of P.L. 102-27, the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Consequences of Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, Veterans Compensation and
Pensions, and Urgent Needs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1991 and For Other Purposes.
29 Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors;
Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the parliament repealed laws
banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to
normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when
the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water
from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year—a little
over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty).
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Nevertheless, the persistence of Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major challenge for
Jordan. The issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population, as more than half of
all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the area now comprising the state of
Israel. There are an estimated 2 million United Nations-registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan,
and, while many no longer regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, they have retained their
refugee status both as a symbolic sign of support for Palestinians living under Israeli occupation
and in hope of being included in any future settlement.32
Furthermore, for King Abdullah II and the
royal Hashemite family, who are of Arab
Holy Sites in Jerusalem30
Bedouin descent and whose legitimacy
Per long-standing arrangements with Israel dating back to
historically derives from the support of tribal
1967 and then subsequently confirmed in their 1994
families from the east bank of the Jordan
bilateral peace treaty, Israel acknowledges a continuing
River, finding a solution to the conflict is
role for Jordan vis-à-vis Jerusalem’s historic Muslim
considered a matter of political survival.
shrines.31 A Jordanian waqf (or Islamic custodial trust)
has long administered the Temple Mount (known by
Although the Palestinians may be less rooted
Muslims as the Haram al Sharif or Noble Sanctuary) and
in Jordan than its East Bank citizens,
its holy sites, and this role is key to bolstering the
addressing their grievances regarding the
religious legitimacy of the Jordanian royal family’s rule.
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is of critical
Successive Jordanian monarchs trace their lineage to the
importance to the monarchy because they
Prophet Muhammad. Disputes over Jerusalem that
appear to circumscribe King Abdul ah II’s role as guardian
constitute a majority of Jordanian citizens and
of the Islamic holy sites create a domestic political
have other grievances about their status within
problem for the King. In November 2014, Jordan recalled
Jordan relative to East Bankers. The royal
its ambassador to Israel in protest after Israel had closed
family and their tribal constituents vehemently
the Mount/Haram to Muslim worshippers. Israel claimed
it temporarily denied access to the Mount/Haram in
reject periodic Israeli calls for the
order to reduce Israeli-Palestinian tensions after the
reunification of the West Bank with Jordan
shooting of an Israeli rabbi known for supporting Jewish
proper33 (dubbed the “Jordanian Option”), a
worship (which is prohibited under a longstanding “status
maneuver that could substantially alter the
quo” arrangement) on the Mount/Haram. Jordan
demographic and political status quo in
returned its ambassador to Israel three months later.
Jordan. King Abdullah II has repeated the
mantra that his father introduced after relinquishing Jordan’s claims to the West Bank: “Jordan is
Jordan and Palestine is Palestine.”

30 For more information on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S.
Relations
, by Jim Zanotti.
31 Article 9, Clause 2 of the peace treaty says that “Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give
high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.” In 2013, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
reaffirmed in a bilateral agreement with Jordan that the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will continue to
serve as the “Custodian of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem,” a title that successive Jordanian monarchs have used since
1924.
32 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) maintains a large
presence in Jordan, including part of its headquarters (the other part is in Gaza City). UNRWA has 7,000 staff in
Jordan, comprising mostly teachers, doctors, and engineers. It operates 172 schools in Jordan (providing education
through 10th grade, then the remainder is provided by the government). According to UNRWA officials, their budget is
$104 million a year. At this point, 83% of all U.N.-registered refugees in Jordan live outside of UNRWA camps.
33 Jordan unilaterally annexed and administered the West Bank from 1948 to 1967, and relinquished its claims to the
West Bank to the PLO in 1988.
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Israeli-Jordanian Cooperation
Water Sharing34
On December 9, 2013, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority signed a regional water
agreement that could pave the way for the Red-Dead Canal, which is a multi-billion dollar project
to address declining water levels in the Dead Sea. The Red-Dead Canal is a decades-old plan to
provide freshwater to water-scarce countries in the surrounding area while simultaneously
restoring the Dead Sea. Under this December 2013 agreement, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian
Authority have agreed to a water swap. Half of the water pumped from the Red Sea is to be
desalinated in a plant to be constructed in Aqaba, Jordan. Some of this water is to then be used in
southern Jordan. The rest is to be sold to Israel for use in the Negev Desert. In return, Israel is to
sell freshwater from the Sea of Galilee to northern Jordan and sell the Palestinian Authority
discounted freshwater produced by existing Israeli desalination plants on the Mediterranean. The
other half of the water pumped from the Red Sea (or possibly the leftover brine from
desalination) is to be channeled to the Dead Sea.
In February 2015, Israel and Jordan signed an agreement establishing a joint agency to administer
the construction of the Red-Dead Canal and an associated desalination plant. The projected cost
of the pipeline and desalination construction is preliminarily estimated at $900 million.
Israeli Natural Gas Exports to Jordan
Jordan depends on oil and gas imports and, since 2011, cut-offs in the supply of Egyptian natural
gas due to unrest in the Sinai have cost the Jordanian government several billion dollars by
compelling it to import more expensive alternatives. As Israel has developed its own natural gas
infrastructure, it has sought export deals with Egypt and Jordan in order to deepen economic ties
with them at a time when they have faced energy shortages due to regional unrest. In September
2014, a preliminary $12 billion agreement was reached for Israel to supply natural gas to Jordan’s
National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) over a 15-year period. Earlier in 2014, Israel
reached a separate 15-year, $500 million deal to supply natural gas to two Jordanian mineral
companies, Arab Potash and Jordan Bromine. These deals are on hold due to ongoing uncertainty
regarding the resolution of antitrust concerns in Israel involving the private consortiums seeking
to export Israeli natural gas.
Israeli-Jordanian Military Cooperation
As previously mentioned, in the summer of 2015, various news stories indicated that Israel and
Jordan had visibly increased bilateral military cooperation, perhaps in response to various
regional threats, such as the Islamic State, Iran, and terrorist groups in the Sinai Peninsula.
According to one report, Israeli tanker aircraft helped refuel Jordanian F-16s on their way to a
U.S.-sponsored joint military exercise.35 Reports published in July 2015 indicate that in 2014,
Israel provided Jordan with 16 AH-1F Cobra Gunship helicopters for border security.36 Israel

34 See, Testimony of Jeremy M. Sharp, Hearing on Water as a Geopolitical Threat, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,
and Emerging Threats, January 16, 2014.
35 “Why Are Jordanian F-16s Suckling Gas From Israeli Tankers On Way To U.S.?” Foxtrot Alpha (blog), August 13,
2015.
36 “Israel gives Jordan Helicopters for Border Security - U.S. source,” Reuters, July 23, 2015.
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recently announced that it would construct a security fence along an 18.6-mile stretch of its
border with Jordan.37
Country Background
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have
cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. Jordan’s small size and
lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab
sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both
internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors, but has also
given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial
relations with one another.
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or semi-desert
territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background. The
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought large numbers of Palestinian refugees to
Jordan, which subsequently unilaterally annexed a small Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan
River known as the West Bank.38 The original “East Bank” Jordanians, though probably no longer
a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s political and military establishments
and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians of Palestinian origin
comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the population and generally tend to gravitate toward the
private sector due to their general exclusion from certain public sector and military positions.39

37 Paul Goldman, “Israel Is Building an Anti-ISIS Fence Along Border With Jordan,” NBC News, July 6, 2015.
38 Though there was very little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained
control of it (including East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War,
and maintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.
39 Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948)
in Jordanian society tends to be a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2004, and it is
unclear whether or not the government maintains such statistics. Over time, intermarriage has made it more difficult to
discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions do persist.
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Jordan in Brief
The Hashemite Royal Family

Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy
Population: 6.4-7.0 mil ion est.
under the prestigious Hashemite family, which
Area: 89,213 sq. km. (34,445 sq. mi., slightly smaller
claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad.
than Indiana)
King Abdullah II (age 53) has ruled the country
Ethnic Groups: Arabs 98%; Circassians 1%;
since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon
Armenians 1%
the death of his father, the late King Hussein, after
Religion: Sunni Muslim 97.2%; Christian 2%
a 47-year reign. Educated largely in Britain and
the United States, King Abdullah II had earlier
Literacy: 95.9% (male 97%, female 94%)
pursued a military career, ultimately serving as
GDP: Per Capita $6,100 (2013 est.), country
commander of Jordan’s Special Operations Forces
comparison to the world: 151
with the rank of Major General. The king’s son
Foreign Exchange Reserves: $15 bil ion (est.
Prince Hussein bin Abdullah (b. 1994) is the
2015)
designated crown prince.40
Youth Unemployment (ages 15-24): 33%
The king appoints a prime minister to head the
External Debt: $11 bil ion (2015)
government and the Council of Ministers
Sources: CIA World Factbook, World Bank, IMF.
(Cabinet).41 On average, Jordanian governments
last no more than 15 months before they are
dissolved by royal decree. This seems to be done in order to bolster the king’s reform credentials
and to distribute patronage among a wide range of elites. The king also appoints all judges and is
commander of the armed forces.
Political System and Key Institutions
The Jordanian constitution (promulgated in 1952) empowers the king with broad executive
powers. According to Article 35, “The King appoints the Prime Minister and may dismiss him or
accept his resignation. He appoints the Ministers; he also dismisses them or accepts their
resignation, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.” The constitution enables the king
to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house elections for two years.42 The
king can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that allows provisional
legislation to be issued by the Cabinet when parliament is not sitting or has been dissolved.43 The
king also can issue royal decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The king
commands the armed forces, declares war, and ratifies treaties. Finally, Article 195 of the

40 In July 2009, King Abdullah II named Prince Hussein (then 15 years old), as crown prince. The position had been
vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half-brother, Prince Hamzah.
41 In March 2013, King Abdullah II consulted with members of the 17th parliament before choosing a prime minister.
Although the King retains the constitutional authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, he has pledged to
reach a consensus with lawmakers before choosing a premier. The Muslim Brotherhood, which boycotted the election
leading to the formation of the current parliament, seeks a parliamentary system of government in which the prime
minister would be chosen by the largest bloc in parliament.
42 The king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “In the event of an emergency of such a serious
nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense
of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law
in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.”
43 New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue
temporary laws.
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Jordanian Penal Code prohibits insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté) with criminal
penalties of one to three years in prison.
Political parties in Jordan are extremely weak, as the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic
Action Front (IAF) is the only well-organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial
interests and are composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe.
Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are
independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other
than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: Civil courts, special courts (some of
which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. In Jordan, state security courts
administered by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery
of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and “security
offenses.” Overall, the king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a
palace-appointed Higher Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers, and
retirements.
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Figure 1. Select Members of the Jordanian Royal Family

Source: Created by CRS. Images derived from various media sources.
Political Opposition and the Fracturing of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood
In Jordan, there is widespread dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and widespread
apathy over the prospects for meaningful democratic reform. Nonetheless, public opinion seems
more concerned with the deteriorating security situation in neighboring Syria and Iraq than in
supporting the domestic political opposition. Moreover, although the Jordanian Muslim
Brotherhood is the strongest opposition group, it is divided44 between reformists and
conservatives, and pro- and anti-monarchical factions. Youth protestors also have become active
in opposition political circles, though these groups tend to be small and divided along secular-
Islamist or even tribal lines.

44 “Unprecedented rift splits Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Al Monitor, March 3, 2015.
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In the spring of 2015, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood fractured, leading to disputes over its legal
status. A month after a state security court sentenced the deputy head of the organization to 18
months in prison for criticizing the United Arab Emirates in a Facebook post,45 another
Brotherhood leader attempted to form a new organization that would be legally recognized by the
state. In March 2015, Jordanian authorities licensed this new off-shoot of the Brotherhood, called
the Muslim Brotherhood Association. Its parent organization, which is licensed as a charity and
not an association, expelled the new group from its ranks, leaving Jordan with two competing
Muslim Brotherhood political groups. According to one account, “The new, watered-down
Brotherhood, licensed on March 4, is headed by former senator Abdul Majid Thneibat and
comprised of liberal Brotherhood officials with ties to the government, providing Jordan what
many officials have desired in private - a Brotherhood answerable to the regime that would not
push for widespread reforms.”46 The old and new Brotherhood organizations are now locked in
legal disputes over ownership of assets. Some analysts are concerned that Brotherhood members
who are legally excluded from politics could join more radical organizations that espouse
violence. According to one U.S.-based analyst, “while Amman has tamed its local Brotherhood
chapter, it may have complicated its fight against domestic Islamist militancy in the process.”47
Figure 2. IRI Poll on Jordanian Public Opinion

Source: International Republican Institute, “IRI Pol : Jordanians Optimistic about Direction of the Country even
as Concerns over Terrorism Emerge,” May 27, 2015.

45 “Brotherhood Figure jailed in Jordan for Insulting Ally,” New York Times, February 17, 2015.
46 “Opportunistic move against Muslim Brotherhood exposes Jordan to Risks,” Christian Science Monitor, March 19,
2015
47 “The Implosion of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood,” Washington Institute, PolicyWatch #2422, May 11, 2015.
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The Economy
With few natural resources48 and a small industrial base, Jordan has an economy which is heavily
dependent on external aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker remittances,49 and the service
sector. Among the longstanding problems Jordan faces are poverty (14.4%), corruption, slow
economic growth, and high levels of unemployment (including female unemployment),
nominally around 12.5% but thought by many analysts to be in the 25%-30% range.50 Youth
unemployment is nearly 33%. Corruption51 is pronounced in Jordan. Use of intermediaries,
referred to in Arabic as “Wasta” (connections), is widespread, and many young Jordanians have
grown frustrated by the lack of social and economic mobility that corruption engenders.52 Each
year, thousands of Jordanians go abroad in search of better jobs and opportunities. Like many
poor countries, Jordan suffers from a “brain drain” of its most talented workers, and the
government has struggled to develop incentives to keep its well-educated, highly skilled workers
close to home.53 The government is by far the largest employer, with between one-third and two-
thirds of all workers on the state’s payroll. According to a recent survey by Pew, 73% of
Jordanians have a negative view of economic conditions in their country.54
Renewable and Nuclear Energy in Jordan
Due to the cost of importing oil and natural gas, the government has sought to diversify its energy portfolio by
expanding the amount of power generated by renewable energy sources. According to USAID, in 2014, Jordan spent
approximately 16% of GDP on oil imports, and losses by the National Electric Company accounted for nearly 5% of
GDP.55 By 2020, Jordan hopes that 10% of all energy sources wil come from solar or wind power. The U.S. Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has lent $25 mil ion in financing to help construct a solar power plant
constructed by a subsidiary of U.S.-based SunEdison. Other international (IFC), European (EBRD, FMO, FinnFund),
and Arab lenders (Bahrain) also are providing financing for solar and wind power projects in Jordan. In February 2015,
the government issued its first renewable energy tender, awarding contracts to several international and Jordanian
companies, including Qatar’s Nebras Power, Diamond Generating Europe (a subsidiary of Mitsubishi Corporation),
and Jordan’s Kawar Group. Jordan also signed an agreement with the Russian company Rosatom to build a 2,000
megawatt nuclear power plant in Jordan by 2022. Jordan hopes that nuclear energy wil ultimately provide 40% of the
country’s energy.

48 Jordan possesses substantial reserves of phosphates and potash. No significant oil and gas fields have been
discovered. However, Jordan has one of world’s largest reserves of oil shale. Officials estimate that the country
contains the world’s fourth-largest oil shale reserves.
49 It is estimated that up to 20% of GDP comes from remittances. Nearly 10% of Jordan’s population (600,000 est.)
reside and work in Arab Gulf countries.
50 One factor that exacerbates the unemployment situation in Jordan is the social stigma attached to menial labor jobs.
Referred to as the “culture of shame,” Jordanian tribal traditions look down on certain types of employment such as
construction. In fact, the government estimates that there are approximately 300,000 to 400,000 foreign laborers in
Jordan working as domestic laborers, bricklayers, and other tasks. According to the Jordanian Employment Ministry,
Egyptians make up 68% of foreign workers in Jordan.
51 Jordan was ranked 55 out of 175 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions
Index.
52 In 2006, the Jordanian parliament passed a law establishing an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) which has taken
on several high level investigations in recent years, specifically looking into accusations of graft in a public housing
project (Decent Home for Decent Living) and a water works project (Disi Water Conveyance).
53 According to the World Bank, unemployment rates for the most highly educated Jordanian women may exceed 60%.
See http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/problem-unemployment-middle-east-and-north-africa-explained-three-
charts.
54 Pew Research Center, “Global Publics: Economic Conditions Are Bad,” July 23, 2015.
55 USAID, Congressional Notification #74, Jordan, March 27, 2015.
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According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Jordan’s economy is slowly recovering
from the downturn that spread across the region in 2011. In 2014, GDP grew 3.1%. The
Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that GDP growth will grow 2.5% this year. However,
according to the International Monetary Fund, Jordan needs a growth rate of 6% to absorb new
entrants into its labor force.
Due to perennially subpar economic growth,
high energy/food subsidies, and a bloated
Figure 3. GDP Growth and Male/Female
public sector workforce, Jordan usually runs
Unemployment in Jordan
annual budget deficits (total public debt is
(4-quarter moving average, in percent)
$32 billion) which it partially offsets by
appealing to the international community for
direct budget support. In order to keep Jordan
fiscally stable, the International Monetary
Fund agreed to a three-year, $2 billion loan in
August 2012. As part of the IMF deal, Jordan
is increasing consumer electricity prices. It
already has increased taxes on mobile phones
and contracts. Nevertheless, economists are
closely following Jordan’s overall debt

burden, which has somewhat improved in
Source: National authorities and IMF estimates.
2015, falling to 80% (net public debt) of
Figure from IMF.
GDP.
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan
The United States has provided economic and military aidto Jordan since 1951 and 1957,
respectively. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2015 amounted to approximately $15.833
billion.
Three-Year MOU on U.S. Foreign Aid to Jordan
On February 3, 2015, the Obama Administration and the Jordanian government signed a
nonbinding, three-year memorandum of understanding (MOU), in which the United States
pledges to provide the kingdom with $1 billion annually in total U.S. foreign assistance, subject
to the approval of Congress, from FY2015 through FY2017. The new MOU followed a previous
five-year agreement in which the United States had pledged to provide a total of $660 million
annually from FY2009 through FY2014. During those five years, Congress actually provided
Jordan with $4.753 billion in total aid, or $1.453 billion ($290.6 million annually) above what
was agreed to in the five-year MOU, including more than $1 billion in FY2014. According to the
Department of State, “The United States and Jordan share a commitment to promoting regional
security and stability, furthering Jordan’s economic development, and advancing social, political,
and economic reform in Jordan. The United States recognizes Jordan’s increased immediate
needs resulting from regional unrest, the efforts Jordan is undertaking at the forefront of the fight
against ISIL and other extremist ideology and terrorism, the influx of refugees from Syria and
Iraq, the disruption of foreign energy supplies, and other unprecedented strains.”56

56 U.S. Department of State, “The United States and Jordan Sign a Memorandum of Understanding on U.S.
Assistance,” Office of the Spokesperson, February 3, 2015.
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Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan, FY2012-FY2016 Request
$ in millions
FY2013 (after
FY2016
Account
FY2012
sequestration)
FY2014
FY2015 Est.
Request
ESF
360.0
347.961
360.0
700.0
360.0
ESF – OCO
100.0
216.443
340.0

277.350
FMF
300.0
284.829
300.0
300.0
300.0
FMF - OCO




50.0
IMET
3.7
3.608
3.58
3.8
3.8
1206/2282



28.2

(DoD)
CTPF (DoD)



76.93

Total
763.7
852.841
1,003.58
1,108.93
991.15
Notes: In FY2013, USAID notified Congress of a $200 mil ion cash transfer to Jordan ($100 mil ion in FY2012
Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $100 mil ion in FY2013 ESF-OCO).
Economic Assistance
The United States provides economic aid to Jordan both as a cash transfer and for USAID
programs in Jordan. The Jordanian government uses cash transfers to service its foreign debt.
Approximately 40% to 60% of Jordan’s ESF allotment may go toward the cash transfer. USAID
programs in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including democracy assistance, water
preservation, and education (particularly building and renovating public schools). In the
democracy sector, U.S. assistance has supported capacity-building programs for the parliament’s
support offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, the Judicial Institute, and the Ministry of Justice.
The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute also have received
U.S. grants to train, among other groups, some Jordanian political parties and members of
parliament. In the water sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to optimizing the
management of scarce water resources, as Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in
the world. USAID is currently subsidizing several waste treatment and water distribution projects
in the Jordanian cities of Amman, Mafraq, Aqaba, and Irbid.
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)
In FY2006, Jordan was listed by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as a Threshold
country in the lower middle-income bracket. On September 12, 2006, the MCC’s board of
directors approved up to $25 million in Threshold Program assistance for Jordan. In September
2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation approved a five-year, $275.1 million compact with
Jordan to increase the supply of water available to households and businesses in the cities of
Amman and Zarqa. The compact also is intended to help improve the efficiency of water delivery,
wastewater collection, and wastewater treatment. If estimates hold true, the clean drinking water
generated as a result of the MCC compact may be enough to supply almost 1 million Jordanian
citizens with freshwater.
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Loan Guarantees
Since 2013, the Obama Administration has provided three loan guarantees to Jordan, totaling
$3.75 billion. 57 These include:
 In September 2013, the United States announced that it was providing its first-
ever loan guarantee to the Kingdom of Jordan. USAID notified Congress of its
intent to obligate up to $120 million in FY2013 ESF-OCO to support a $1.25
billion, 7-year sovereign loan guarantee for Jordan.
 In February 2014, during a visit to the United States by King Abdullah II, the
Obama Administration announced that it would offer Jordan an additional five-
year, $1 billion loan guarantee. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate
$72 million out of the $340 million of FY2014ESF-OCO for Jordan to support
the subsidy costs for the second loan guarantee.
 In June 2015, the Administration provided its third loan guarantee to Jordan of
$1.5 billion. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate $221 million in
FY2015 ESF to support the subsidy costs of the third loan guarantee to Jordan.58
Military Assistance
Foreign Military Financing
U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. U.S. military
assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure and maintain
conventional weapons systems. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Jordan enable its Air
Force to maintain a modest fleet of F-16 fighters and purchase Advanced Medium Range Air-to-
Air Missiles (AMRAAM). FMF grants also provide financing for Jordan’s purchase of U.S.
Blackhawk helicopters in order to enhance Jordan’s border monitoring and counter-terror
capability. In recent years, Jordan also has acquired Javelin missiles, Hellfire missiles, High
Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, and night-vision devices.59
Excess Defense Articles
In 1996, the United States granted Jordan Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status, a designation
that, among other things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training,
and loans of equipment for cooperative research and development.60 Since 2009, Jordan has
received excess U.S. defense equipment valued at approximately $81.69 million.61 In the last five

57 Congress initially authorized additional economic assistance to Jordan in Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013
specified that such assistance should take the form of a loan guarantee. Section 1706 (j) of the same Act also
appropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the initial cost of sovereign loan guarantees. Congress reauthorized loan
guarantees for Jordan in section 7034(r)(1) of P.L. 113-235 (Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
2015).
58 op.cit., Congressional Notification #74.
59 Information provided by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, January 2014.
60 See, Designation Of Jordan As Major Non-Nato Ally, Determination of President of the United States, No. 97–4,
November 12, 1996, 61 F.R. 59809.
61 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Country Information Paper, Jordan. According to the Defense Department, in
December 2013 the United States delivered 35 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPS) to Jordan as
requested by the Jordanian military earlier in 2013.
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

years, Jordan has received excess U.S. defense articles, including two C-130 aircraft, HAWK
MEI-23E missiles, and cargo trucks.
Defense Department Assistance
As a result of the Syrian civil war and Operation Inherent Resolve against ISIS, the United States
has increased military aid to Jordan and channeled these increases through Defense Department-
managed accounts. Although Jordan still receives the bulk of U.S. military aid from the FMF
account, Congress has authorized defense appropriations to strengthen Jordan’s border security.
Currently, Congress has authorized Jordan to receive funding from three primary accounts: (1)
Section 1206/10 U.S.C. 2282 Authority to Build Partner Capacity,62 (2) the Counterterrorism
Partnerships Fund (CTPF)63, and (3) Department of Defense Operations & Maintenance Funds
(O&M).64 Military aid provided by these accounts is generally coordinated through a joint
Defense Department (DoD)-State Department (DoS) review and approved by the Secretary of
Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.
Recent obligations of DoD aid include:
$76.93 million in FY2015 CTPF - $60.120 million for border security and
$16.810 million for a Quick Response Force
$16.6 million in redirected Section 1206/10 U.S.C. 2282 funds (originally
provided to Yemen between FY2012-FY2014) for AT-802 fixed-wing aircraft
with associated spares, ancillary items, and spare parts for the CASA CN-235
aircraft.
 $11.6 million in FY2015 Section 1206/10 U.S.C. 2282 funds for border guard
forces.







62 Section 1205 of P.L. 113-291, the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, permits the transfer of other
appropriated funds (such as CTPF monies) to conduct programs under 10 U.S.C. 2282 authority.
63 Section 9013 of H.R. 2685, the Department of Defense Appropriations bill for FY2016, states that “The Secretary of
Defense is authorized, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to provide assistance, to the Government of Jordan
for purposes of supporting and enhancing efforts of the armed forces of Jordan and to sustain security along the border
of Jordan with Syria and Iraq: Provided, That up to $600 million of funds appropriated by this Act for the
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund may be used for activities authorized by this section.” CTPF funds for Jordan also
are authorized in Section 1202 of H.R. 1735, the National Defense Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 2016.
64 Section 1207 of P.L. 113-66, the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), originally authorized the
Secretary of Defense to provide up to $150 million in “assistance on a reimbursement basis to the Government of
Jordan for purposes of supporting and maintaining efforts of the armed forces of Jordan to increase security and sustain
increased security along the border between Jordan and Syria.” The FY2015 Omnibus, P.L. 113-235, permits the
Secretary of Defense to provide Jordan with Defense Department Operation and Maintenance (O&M) OCO funds to
“reimburse the government of Jordan in such amounts as the Secretary of Defense may determine to maintain the
ability of the Jordanian armed forces to maintain security along the border between Jordan and Syria.” H.R. 2685, the
Department of Defense Appropriations bill for FY2016, would continue to authorize O&M funds for Jordan, as would
Section 1202 of H.R. 1735, the National Defense Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 2016.
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Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis
($ in millions)
Economic Assistance
Military Assistance
Fiscal Year (FY)
EconSpt
Food
Devel
PeaceCp
FMF
IMET
Totals
1991
35.0a
0
0
0
20.0a
1.3
56.30
1992
30.0b
20.0
0
0
20.0b
.6
70.60
1993c
5.0
30.0
0
0
9.0
.5
44.50
1994d
9.0
15.0
4.0
0
9.0
.8
37.80
1995
7.2
15.0
6.7
0
7.3
1.0
37.20
1996
7.2
21.0
7.9
0
200.0e
1.2
237.30
1997f
112.2
2.6
4.5
1.1
30.0
1.7
152.10
1998f
150.0
0
0
1.2
75.0g
1.6
227.80
1999
150.0
0
0
1.4
70.0g
1.6
223.00
1999 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
100.00
2000
150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.6
228.30
2000 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
150.0
0
200.00h
2001
150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.7
228.40
2002
150.0
0
0
1.6
75.0
2.0
228.60
2002 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
25.0
0
125.00
2003
250.0
0
0
1.0
198.0
2.4
451.40
2003 (Suppl.)
700.0
0
0
0
406.0
0
1,106.00
2004
250.0
0
0
2.3
206.0
2.9
461.20
2004 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
0
0
100.00
2005
250.0
0
0
1.6
206.0
3.0
460.60
2005 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
100.0
0
200.00
2006
247.5
0
0
1.6
207.9
3.0
460.00
2006 (Suppl.)
50.0
0
0
0
0
0
50.00
2007
245.0
0
0
0
206.0
3.1
454.10
2007 (Suppl.)
10.3
0
0
0
45.0
0
55.30i
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Economic Assistance
Military Assistance
Fiscal Year (FY)
EconSpt
Food
Devel
PeaceCp
FMF
IMET
Totals
2008
361.4
0
0
0
298.3
2.9
662.60
2008 (Suppl.)
200.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
250.00
2009
263.5
0
0
0
235.0
3.1
501.60
(150.0 in FY2010
2009 (Suppl.)
150.0
0
0
0
Advanced funding)
0
150.00
2010
363.0
0
0
0
300.0
3.8
666.8
2010 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
150.0
2011
362.0
0
0
0
299.4
3.7
665.1
2012
460.0
0
0
0
300.0
3.7
763.7
2013
564.404
0
0
0
284.829
3.608
852.841
2014
700.0j
0
0
0
300.0
3.588
1,003.588
2015 est.
700.0
0
0
0
300.0
3.888
1,003.888
Notes: These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations, food aid between 1999-2006, or
amounts for de-mining assistance and counter-terrorism assistance.
a. Suspended in April 1991 under P.L. 102-27; released in early 1993.
b. Released in late July 1993.
c. Restrictions on FY1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, September 17, 1993.
d. FY1994 funds released by PD 94-11, January 13, 1994, waiving restrictions under P.L. 103-87.
e. Three components: $30 mil ion (Administration’s original request); $70 mil ion in additional FMF under
FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100 mil ion in special
drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).
f.
These figures include $100 mil ion in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace and
Stability Fund ($100 mil ion in FY1997, $116 mil ion in FY1998).
g. For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 mil ion in drawdown authority.
h. Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001 or FY2002).
i.
Total FY2007 supplemental aid to Jordan was $85.3 mil ion. The above chart does not include $25 mil ion in
NADR funds.
j.
The total $700 mil ion FY2014 ESF appropriation to Jordan was split between enduring ($360 mil ion) and
OCO ($340 mil ion) funds.

Author Contact Information

Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687


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