Changes in the Arctic:
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke, Coordinator
Specialist in Naval Affairs
September 4, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41153
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has
heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of
Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. On January 21, 2015,
President Obama issued an executive order for enhancing coordination of national efforts in the
Arctic. The United States assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council on April 24, 2015, and
will serve in that capacity for two years.
Record low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy
attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within
decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to
mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the
region, and national security.
The five Arctic coastal states—the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of
which Greenland is a territory)—are in the process of preparing Arctic territorial claims for
submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The Russian claim to the
enormous underwater Lomonosov Ridge, if accepted, would reportedly grant Russia nearly one-
half of the Arctic area. There are also four other unresolved Arctic territorial disputes.
The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on
two trans-Arctic sea routes—the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Current
international guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters are being updated.
Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more exploration
for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to
onshore exploration activities. Increased oil and gas exploration and tourism (cruise ships) in the
Arctic increase the risk of pollution in the region. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will
be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies have yet to be
developed.
Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic. The United States is currently meeting with other
countries regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks. Changes in the Arctic could affect
threatened and endangered species. Under the Endangered Species Act, the polar bear was listed
as threatened on May 15, 2008. Arctic climate change is also expected to affect the economies,
health, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples.
Two of the Coast Guard’s three polar icebreakers—Polar Star and Polar Sea—have exceeded
their intended 30-year service lives, and Polar Sea is not operational. On May 12, 2011,
representatives from the member states of the Arctic Council signed an agreement on cooperation
on search and rescue in the Arctic.
Although there is significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly
being viewed by some observers as a potential emerging security issue. Some of the Arctic
coastal states, particularly Russia, have announced an intention or taken actions to enhance their
military presences in the high north. U.S. military forces, particularly the Navy and Coast Guard,
have begun to pay more attention to the region in their planning and operations.
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Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Definitions of the Arctic ............................................................................................................ 1
Arctic Circle Definition and Resulting Arctic Countries .................................................... 1
Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 .......................................... 2
Other Definitions ................................................................................................................ 2
U.S. Arctic Research ................................................................................................................. 4
Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984, As Amended ......................................... 4
FY2016 NSF Budget Request for Arctic Research ............................................................. 5
Major U.S. Policy Documents Relating to the Arctic ............................................................... 6
January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) .............................................. 6
May 2010 National Security Strategy ................................................................................. 7
May 2013 National Strategy for Arctic Region .................................................................. 7
January 2014 Implementation Plan for National Strategy for Arctic Region ..................... 8
January 2015 Executive Order for Enhancing Coordination of Arctic Efforts ................... 9
U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic ............................................................................... 11
U.S. Chairmanship of Arctic Council in 2015-2017 ................................................................ 11
The Arctic and the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ..................................... 13
Background to UNCLOS .................................................................................................. 13
Part VI of UNCLOS and Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf ............................ 13
U.S. Activities As a Non-Party to UNCLOS .................................................................... 14
Senate Arctic Caucus ............................................................................................................... 15
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 15
Climate Change and Loss of Arctic Sea Ice ............................................................................ 15
Territorial Claims and Sovereignty Issues............................................................................... 18
Commercial Sea Transportation .............................................................................................. 20
Background ....................................................................................................................... 20
Regulation of Arctic Shipping .......................................................................................... 23
Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration .......................................................................................... 25
Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration .................................................................................... 25
Extent of the Continental Margin ...................................................................................... 29
Minerals ............................................................................................................................ 30
Oil Pollution and Pollution Response ..................................................................................... 31
Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change ..................................................................... 31
Response and Cleanup Challenges in the Arctic Region .................................................. 33
Fisheries .................................................................................................................................. 35
Protected Species .................................................................................................................... 36
Indigenous People Living in the Arctic ................................................................................... 37
Background ....................................................................................................................... 38
Effects of Climate Change ................................................................................................ 40
Polar Icebreaking .................................................................................................................... 42
Search and Rescue ................................................................................................................... 43
General .............................................................................................................................. 43
Coast Guard Statements .................................................................................................... 44
State Department Statement .............................................................................................. 45
Arctic Council Agreement on Arctic Search and Rescue (May 2011) .............................. 46
Geopolitical Environment ....................................................................................................... 49
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Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Multilateral Political Cooperation ..................................................................................... 50
Security Issues .................................................................................................................. 57
U.S. Military Forces and Operations ....................................................................................... 62
DOD in General ................................................................................................................ 63
Navy and Coast Guard in General .................................................................................... 74
Navy .................................................................................................................................. 74
Coast Guard ...................................................................................................................... 79
Potential Oversight Questions Relating to Arctic Policy and Strategy ................................... 83
January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) ............................................ 83
May 2013 Arctic Strategy and January 2014 Implementation Plan .................................. 85
CRS Reports on Specific Arctic-Related Issues ............................................................................ 85
Figures
Figure 1. Arctic Area of Alaska as Defined by ARPA ..................................................................... 3
Figure 2. Entire Arctic Area as Defined by ARPA .......................................................................... 4
Figure 3. Arctic Sea Ice Extent in September 2008, Compared with Prospective Shipping
Routes and Oil and Gas Resources............................................................................................. 17
Figure 4. Illustrative Map of Arctic SAR Areas in Arctic SAR Agreement .................................. 48
Tables
Table 1. Ship Casualties in Arctic Circle Waters, 2005-2014 ........................................................ 43
Appendixes
Appendix A. Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373) ............... 87
Appendix B. P.L. 101-609 of 1990, Amending Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of
1984 ............................................................................................................................................ 94
Appendix C. January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) ................................... 96
Appendix D. May 2013 National Strategy for Arctic Region ..................................................... 104
Contacts
Author Contact Information ......................................................................................................... 110
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Introduction
The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has
heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. Issues such as Arctic sovereignty
claims; commercial shipping through the Arctic; Arctic oil, gas, and mineral exploration;
endangered Arctic species; and increased military operations in the Arctic could cause the region
in coming years to become an arena of international cooperation or competition.
The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial political,
economic, energy, environmental, and other interests in the region. Decisions that Congress, the
executive branch, foreign governments, international organizations, and commercial firms make
on Arctic-related issues could significantly affect these interests.
This report provides an overview of Arctic-related issues for Congress, and refers readers to more
in-depth CRS reports on specific Arctic-related issues. Congressional readers with questions
about an issue discussed in this report should contact the author or authors of the section
discussing that issue. The authors are identified by footnote at the start of each section.
This report does not track legislation on specific Arctic-related issues. For tracking of legislative
activity, see the CRS reports relating to specific Arctic-related issues that are listed at the end of
this report, just prior to Appendix A.
Background1
Definitions of the Arctic
There are multiple definitions of the Arctic that result in differing descriptions of the land and sea
areas encompassed by the term. Policy discussions of the Arctic can employ varying definitions
of the region, and readers should bear in mind that the definition used in one discussion may
differ from that used in another. This CRS report does not rely on any one definition.
Arctic Circle Definition and Resulting Arctic Countries
The most common and basic definition of the Arctic defines the region as the land and sea area
north of the Arctic Circle (a circle of latitude at about 66.34o North). For surface locations within
this zone, the sun is generally above the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per year (at
the summer solstice) and below the horizon for 24 continuous hours at least once per year (at the
winter solstice).
The Arctic Circle definition includes the northernmost third or so of Alaska, as well as the
Chukchi Sea, which separates that part of Alaska from Russia, and U.S. territorial and Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) waters north of Alaska. It does not include the lower two-thirds or so of
Alaska or the Bering Sea, which separates that lower part of the state from Russia.
Eight countries have territory north of the Arctic Circle: the United States (Alaska), Canada,
Russia, Norway, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland, a member country of the Kingdom of
Denmark), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.2 These eight countries are often referred to as the Arctic
1 Except for the subsection on the Arctic and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, this section was prepared by
Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
2 On November 25, 2008, voters in Greenland approved a referendum for greater autonomy that some observers view
(continued...)
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countries, and they are the member states of the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum
established in 1996.3 A subset of the eight Arctic countries are the five countries that are
considered Arctic coastal states: the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (by
virtue of Greenland).
Definition in Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984
Section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July
31, 1984)4 defines the Arctic as follows:
As used in this title, the term “Arctic” means all United States and foreign territory north
of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the boundary formed
by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers [in Alaska]; all contiguous seas,
including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian
chain.
This definition, which is codified at 15 U.S.C. 4111,5 includes certain parts of Alaska below the
Arctic Circle, including the Aleutian Islands and portions of central and western mainland Alaska,
such as the Seward Peninsula and the Yukon Delta.
Figure 1 below shows the Arctic area of Alaska as defined by ARPA; Figure 2 shows the entire
Arctic area as defined by ARPA.
Other Definitions
Other definitions of the Arctic are based on factors such as average temperature, the northern tree
line, the extent of permafrost on land, the extent of sea ice on the ocean, or jurisdictional or
administrative boundaries.6 A definition based on a climate-related factor could circumscribe
differing areas over time as a result of climate change.
The 10o C isotherm definition of the Arctic defines the region as the land and sea area in the
northern hemisphere where the average temperature for the warmest month (July) is below 10o
Celsius, or 50o Fahrenheit. This definition results in an irregularly shaped Arctic region that
excludes some land and sea areas north of the Arctic Circle but includes some land and sea areas
south of the Arctic Circle. This definition currently excludes all of Finland and Sweden, as well as
some of Alaska above the Arctic Circle, while including virtually all of the Bering Sea and
Alaska’s Aleutian Islands.7
(...continued)
as a step toward eventual independence from Denmark. (Alan Cowell, “Greenland Vote Favors Independence,” New
York Times, November 26, 2008.)
3 For more on the Arctic Council see “The Arctic Council” in “Geopolitical Environment”. See also http://www.arctic-
council.org/.
4 Title II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
5 As codified, the definition reads, “As used in this chapter.... ”
6 For discussions and (in some cases) maps, see Susan Joy Hassol, Impacts of a Warming Arctic [Executive Summary].
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 4, available at http://amap.no/acia/; Oran R. Yong and Niels
Einarsson, Arctic Human Development Report, Stefansson Arctic Institute, Akureyri, Iceland, 2004, pp. 17-18,
available at http://www.svs.is/AHDR/AHDR%20chapters/English%20version/Chapters%20PDF.htm; and Hugo
Ahlenius, editor in chief et al. Vital Arctic Graphics, People and Global Heritage on Our Last Wild Shores,
UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Arendal, Norway, p. 6, available at http://www.grida.no/publications/vg/arctic/.
7 A map showing the line that results from 10o isotherm definition is available at https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/reference_maps/pdf/arctic.pdf.
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Figure 1. Arctic Area of Alaska as Defined by ARPA
Source: U.S. Arctic Research Commission (http://www.arctic.gov/maps/ARPA_Alaska_only_150dpi.jpg,
accessed on December 23, 2011).
The definition of the Arctic adopted by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
(AMAP)—a working group of the Arctic Council—“essentially includes the terrestrial and
marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66°32’ N), and north of 62° N in Asia and 60° N in North
America, modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, and parts
of the North Atlantic, including the Labrador Sea.”8 The AMAP website includes a map showing
the Arctic Circle, 10o C isotherm, tree line, and AMAP definitions of the Arctic.9
Some observers use the term “high north” as a way of referring to the Arctic. Some observers
make a distinction between the “high Arctic”—meaning, in general, the colder portions of the
Arctic that are closer to the North Pole—and other areas of the Arctic that are generally less cold
and further away from the North Pole, which are sometimes described as the low Arctic or the
subarctic.
8 Discussion entitled “Geographical Coverage,” available at http://www.amap.no/ (click on “About AMAP” and then
the tab “Geographical coverage.”)
9 Discussion entitled “Geographical Coverage,” available at http://www.amap.no/ (click on “About AMAP” and then
the tab “Geographical coverage.”)
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Figure 2. Entire Arctic Area as Defined by ARPA
Source: U.S. Arctic Research Commission (http://www.arctic.gov/maps/ARPA_Polar_150dpi.jpg, accessed on
December 23, 2011).
U.S. Arctic Research
Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984, As Amended
The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31, 1984)10
“provide[s] for a comprehensive national policy dealing with national research needs and
objectives in the Arctic.”11 The act, among other things
made a series of findings concerning the importance of the Arctic and Arctic
research;
established the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC) to promote Arctic
research and recommend Arctic research policy;
10 Title II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
11 These words are taken from the official title of P.L. 98-373. (Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 is the short title
of Title I of P.L. 98-373.) The remainder of P.L. 98-373’s official title relates to Title II of the act, the short title of
which is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.)
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designated the National Science Foundation (NSF) as the lead federal agency for
implementing Arctic research policy;
established the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) to
develop a national Arctic research policy and a five-year plan to implement that
policy, and designated the NSF representative on the IARPC as its chairperson;12
and
defined the term “Arctic” for purposes of the act.
The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 was amended by P.L. 101-609 of November 16,
1990. For the texts of the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 and P.L. 101-609, see
Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively.
FY2016 NSF Budget Request for Arctic Research
NSF—the lead federal agency for implementing Arctic research policy (see “Arctic Research and
Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984, As Amended”)—carries out Arctic research activities through its
Division of Polar Programs (PLR), which is part of its Directorate for Geosciences (GEO). NSF
is requesting a total of $449.51 million for PLR for FY2016 (an increase of 3.0% over the
estimated FY2015 level), including $130.95 million for research in both the Arctic and Antarctic
(an increase of 4.4% over the estimated FY2015 level) and $40.27 million for Arctic research
support and logistics (an increase of 4.2% over the estimated FY2015 level).13
NSF states in its FY2016 overview of GEO that
As the primary U.S. supporter of fundamental research in the polar regions, GEO
provides interagency leadership for U.S. polar activities. In the Arctic, NSF helps
coordinate research planning as directed by the Arctic Research Policy Act of 1984. The
NSF Director chairs the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee created for this
purpose, which is now a component of the President’s National Science and Technology
Council (NSTC).14
NSF states in its FY2016 overview of PLR that
The Division of Polar Programs (PLR) is the primary U.S. supporter of, and has NSF
interagency leadership responsibilities for, fundamental research in the polar regions.
Arctic Sciences supports research in social, earth systems, and a broad range of natural
sciences; its Research Support & Logistics program responds to research by assisting
researchers with access to the Arctic and the planning and sharing of results with local
Arctic communities....
PLR’s FY 2016 Request reflects three key priorities: (1) maintaining strong disciplinary
programs that provide a basis for investments in cross-disciplinary science programs; (2)
focusing basic research on cross-foundation (e.g., INFEWS)15 and interagency priorities;
and (3) supporting and improving the efficiency of critical facilities that enable research
in both polar regions.... For the Arctic, shared cross-directorate basic research objectives,
the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee’s (IARPC) Arctic Research Plan: FY
12 The IARPC currently includes more than a dozen federal agencies, departments, and offices. Additional information
on the IARPC is available at http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/arctic/iarpc/start.jsp.
13 National Science Foundation, FY 2016 Budget Request to Congress, February 2, 2015, p. GEO-16 (pdf page 140 of
518). Accessed March 17, 2015, at http://www.nsf.gov/about/budget/fy2016/pdf/fy2016budget.pdf.
14 National Science Foundation, FY 2016 Budget Request to Congress, February 2, 2015, p. GEO-1 (pdf page 125 of
518).
15 INFEWS is an acronym for Innovations at the Nexus of Food, Energy, and Water Systems.
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Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
2013-2017,16 and the National Ocean Policy Implementation Strategy17 inform science
investment priorities.
As with most GEO divisions, PLR funds both research and the necessary research
support in the form of logistics and infrastructure. The research budget is approximately
30 percent of the total division budget. Of this amount for research, 50 percent is
available for new grants each year. The supporting logistics and infrastructure budget is
70 percent of the overall budget.18
Regarding its FY2016 request for $40.27 million for Arctic research support and logistics within
PLR, NSF states:
This program provides support for Arctic researchers, including airplanes, helicopters,
access to icebreakers, and field camps for approximately 150 projects in remote sites in
Alaska, Canada, Arctic Scandinavia, Russia, and the Arctic Ocean. Summit Station on
the Greenland ice cap operates as a year-round international site for a variety of
atmospheric and geophysical measurements. An increase of $1.63 million, to a total of
$40.27 million, enables increased use of marine platforms, such as the newly available
Sikuliaq, for oceanographic research.19
Major U.S. Policy Documents Relating to the Arctic
January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25)
On January 12, 2009, the George W. Bush Administration released a presidential directive
establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic region. The directive, dated January 9, 2009, was
issued as National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25
(NSPD 66/HSPD 25). The directive was the result of an interagency review, and it superseded for
the Arctic (but not the Antarctic) a 1994 presidential directive on Arctic and Antarctic policy. The
directive, among other things,
states that the United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling
interests in the region;
sets forth a six-element overall U.S. policy for the region;
describes U.S. national security and homeland security interests in the Arctic; and
discusses a number of issues as they relate to the Arctic, including international
governance; the extended continental shelf and boundary issues; promotion of
international scientific cooperation; maritime transportation; economic issues,
including energy; and environmental protection and conservation of natural
resources.
16 The passage at this point contains a footnote that provides the following Internet address:
www.nsf.gov/od/opp/arctic/iarpc/arc_res_plan_index.jsp.
17 The passage at this point contains a footnote that provides the following Internet address:
www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/oceans/implementationplan.
18 National Science Foundation, FY 2016 Budget Request to Congress, February 2, 2015, pp. GEO-16 and GEO-17 (pdf
pages 140-141 of 518).
19 National Science Foundation, FY 2016 Budget Request to Congress, February 2, 2015, p. GEO-17 (pdf page 141 of
518).
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The Obama Administration has not issued a new directive superseding NSPD 66/HSPD 25; it is
currently operating under the Bush Administration’s policy directive.20 For the text of NSPD
66/HSPD 25, see Appendix C.
May 2010 National Security Strategy
In May 2010, the Obama Administration released a national security strategy document that
states:
The United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic
region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment,
responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific
research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues.21
May 2013 National Strategy for Arctic Region
On May 10, 2013, the Obama Administration released a document entitled National Strategy for
the Arctic Region.22 The document appears to supplement rather than supersede the January 2009
Arctic policy directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) discussed above.23 The executive summary of
National Strategy for the Arctic Region begins by quoting the above statement from the May
2010 national security strategy document, and then states:
The National Strategy for the Arctic Region sets forth the United States Government’s
strategic priorities for the Arctic region. This strategy is intended to position the United
States to respond effectively to challenges and emerging opportunities arising from
significant increases in Arctic activity due to the diminishment of sea ice and the
emergence of a new Arctic environment. It defines U.S. national security interests in the
Arctic region and identifies prioritized lines of effort, building upon existing initiatives
by Federal, state, local, and tribal authorities, the private sector, and international
partners, and aims to focus efforts where opportunities exist and action is needed. It is
designed to meet the reality of a changing Arctic environment, while we simultaneously
pursue our global objective of combating the climatic changes that are driving these
environmental conditions. Our strategy is built on three lines of effort:
1. Advance United States Security Interests – We will enable our vessels and aircraft
to operate, consistent with international law, through, under, and over the airspace and
waters of the Arctic, support lawful commerce, achieve a greater awareness of activity in
the region, and intelligently evolve our Arctic infrastructure and capabilities, including
ice-capable platforms as needed. U.S. security in the Arctic encompasses a broad
spectrum of activities, ranging from those supporting safe commercial and scientific
operations to national defense.
20 CRS communication with State Department official, October 8, 2010.
21 National Security Strategy, Washington, May 2010, p. 50. The quoted sentence constitutes the entirety of the
document’s comments specifically on the Arctic. It is the final sentence of a section on “sustain[ing] broad cooperation
on key global challenges” that includes longer discussions on climate change, peacekeeping and armed conflict,
pandemics and infectious disease, transnational criminal threats and threats to governance, and safeguarding the global
commons.
22 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 2013, 11 pp.; accessed May 14, 2013, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf. The document includes a cover letter from President Obama dated May
10, 2013.
23 National Strategy for the Arctic Region states on page 6 that the “lines of effort” it describes are to be undertaken
“[t]o meet the challenges and opportunities in the Arctic region, and in furtherance of established Arctic Region
Policy,” at which point there is a footnote referencing the January 2009 Arctic policy directive.
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2. Pursue Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship – We will continue to protect the
Arctic environment and conserve its resources; establish and institutionalize an integrated
Arctic management framework; chart the Arctic region; and employ scientific research
and traditional knowledge to increase understanding of the Arctic.
3. Strengthen International Cooperation – Working through bilateral relationships and
multilateral bodies, including the Arctic Council, we will pursue arrangements that
advance collective interests, promote shared Arctic state prosperity, protect the Arctic
environment, and enhance regional security, and we will work toward U.S. accession to
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Law of the Sea Convention).
Our approach will be informed by the following guiding principles:
• Safeguard Peace and Stability – Seek to maintain and preserve the Arctic region as an
area free of conflict, acting in concert with allies, partners, and other interested parties.
Support and preserve: international legal principles of freedom of navigation and
overflight and other uses of the sea and airspace related to these freedoms, unimpeded
lawful commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes for all nations.
• Make Decisions Using the Best Available Information – Across all lines of effort,
decisions need to be based on the most current science and traditional knowledge.24
• Pursue Innovative Arrangements – Foster partnerships with the state of Alaska,
Arctic states, other international partners, and the private sector to more efficiently
develop, resource, and manage capabilities, where appropriate and feasible, to better
advance our strategic priorities in this austere fiscal environment.
• Consult and Coordinate with Alaska Natives – Engage in a consultation process with
Alaska Natives, recognizing tribal governments’ unique legal relationship with the
United States and providing for meaningful and timely opportunity to inform Federal
policy affecting Alaskan Native communities.25
For the main text of the document, see Appendix D.
January 2014 Implementation Plan for National Strategy for Arctic Region
On January 30, 2014, the Obama Administration released an implementation plan for the May
2013 national strategy for the Arctic region.26 The plan states that it
complements and builds upon existing initiatives by Federal, State, local, and tribal
authorities, the private sector, and international partners, and focuses efforts where
opportunities exist and action is most needed. The Implementation Plan reflects the
reality of a changing Arctic environment and upholds national interests in safety,
security, and environmental protection, and works with international partners to pursue
global objectives of addressing climatic changes.
This Implementation Plan follows the structure and objectives of the Strategy’s three
lines of effort and is consistent with the guiding principles. The lines of effort of the
Strategy and the Implementation Plan are as follows:
24 A footnote in the document at this point states: “Traditional knowledge refers to a body of evolving practical
knowledge based on observations and personal experience of indigenous communities over an extensive,
multigenerational time period. (BOEM Ocean Science, Vol. 9, Issue 2, May/April/June 2012, page 4).”
25 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 2013, pp. 2-3.
26 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, 32 pp. The news release
anouncing the implementation plan is posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/01/30/white-house-releases-
implementation-plan-national-strategy-arctic-region. The document itself is posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/implementation_plan_for_the_national_strategy_for_the_arctic_region_-_fi.... pdf.
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• Advance United States Security Interests
• Pursue Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship
• Strengthen International Cooperation
These lines of effort and guiding principles are meant to be implemented as a coherent
whole.27
The plan also states:
Climate change is already affecting the entire global population, and Alaska residents are
experiencing the impacts in the Arctic. To ensure a cohesive Federal approach,
implementation activities must be aligned with the Executive Order on Preparing the
United States for the Impacts of Climate Change28 while executing the Strategy. In
addition to the guiding principles, the following approaches are important in
implementing the activities across all of the lines of effort:
• Foster Partnerships with Arctic Stakeholders. As outlined in the Strategy, all lines
of effort must involve Arctic partners, particularly the State of Alaska and Alaska Natives
in the Arctic region. Federal agencies, the State of Alaska, tribal communities, local
governments, and academia will work with other nations, industry stakeholders, non-
governmental organizations, and research partners to address emerging challenges and
opportunities in the Arctic environment. The Federal Government should strive to
maintain the free flow of communication and cooperation with the State of Alaska to
support national priorities.
• Coordinate and Integrate Activities across the Federal Government. Multiple
Federal bodies currently have authority for Arctic policy (e.g., the National Ocean
Council (NOC), Arctic Policy Group, and Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee
(IARPC)). The National Security Council Staff will develop an Executive Order through
the interagency process to maximize efficiency, align interagency initiatives, and create
unity of effort among all Federal entities conducting activities in the Arctic.29
The plan outlines about 36 specific initiatives. For each, it presents a brief statement of the
objective, a list of next steps to be taken, a brief statement about measuring progress in achieving
the objective, and the names of the lead and supporting federal agencies to be involved.
January 2015 Executive Order for Enhancing Coordination of Arctic Efforts
On January 21, 2015, President Obama issued an executive order entitled “Enhancing
Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic.” The order states in part:
As the United States assumes the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, it is more
important than ever that we have a coordinated national effort that takes advantage of our
combined expertise and efforts in the Arctic region to promote our shared values and
priorities.
As the Arctic has changed, the number of Federal working groups created to address the
growing strategic importance and accessibility of this critical region has increased.
27 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, p. 1.
28 The passage contains a footnote at this point stating that this executive order was signed by the President on
November 1, 2013. It is Executive Order 13653. The text of the order is posted at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2013-11-06/pdf/2013-26785.pdf and http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/01/executive-order-
preparing-united-states-impacts-climate-change. A fact sheet about it is posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/11/01/fact-sheet-executive-order-climate-preparedness.
29 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, p. 4.
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Although these groups have made significant progress and achieved important
milestones, managing the broad range of interagency activity in the Arctic requires
coordinated planning by the Federal Government, with input by partners and
stakeholders, to facilitate Federal, State, local, and Alaska Native tribal government and
similar Alaska Native organization, as well as private and nonprofit sector, efforts in the
Arctic....
There is established an Arctic Executive Steering Committee (Steering Committee),
which shall provide guidance to executive departments and agencies (agencies) and
enhance coordination of Federal Arctic policies across agencies and offices, and, where
applicable, with State, local, and Alaska Native tribal governments and similar Alaska
Native organizations, academic and research institutions, and the private and nonprofit
sectors....
... the Steering Committee will meet quarterly, or as appropriate, to shape priorities,
establish strategic direction, oversee implementation, and ensure coordination of Federal
activities in the Arctic....
The Steering Committee, in coordination with the heads of relevant agencies and under
the direction of the Chair, shall:
(a) provide guidance and coordinate efforts to implement the priorities, objectives,
activities, and responsibilities identified in National Security Presidential Directive
66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, Arctic Region Policy, the National
Strategy for the Arctic Region and its Implementation Plan, and related agency plans;
(b) provide guidance on prioritizing Federal activities, consistent with agency authorities,
while the United States is Chair of the Arctic Council, including, where appropriate,
recommendations for resources to use in carrying out those activities; and
(c) establish a working group to provide a report to the Steering Committee by May 1,
2015, that:
(i) identifies potential areas of overlap between and within agencies with respect to
implementation of Arctic policy and strategic priorities and provides recommendations to
increase coordination and reduce any duplication of effort, which may include ways to
increase the effectiveness of existing groups; and
(ii) provides recommendations to address any potential gaps in implementation....
It is in the best interest of the Nation for the Federal Government to maximize
transparency and promote collaboration where possible with the State of Alaska, Alaska
Native tribal governments and similar Alaska Native organizations, and local, private-
sector, and nonprofit-sector stakeholders. To facilitate consultation and partnerships with
the State of Alaska and Alaska Native tribal governments and similar Alaska Native
organizations, the Steering Committee shall:
(a) develop a process to improve coordination and the sharing of information and
knowledge among Federal, State, local, and Alaska Native tribal governments and similar
Alaska Native organizations, and private-sector and nonprofit-sector groups on Arctic
issues;
(b) establish a process to ensure tribal consultation and collaboration, consistent with my
memorandum of November 5, 2009 (Tribal Consultation). This process shall ensure
meaningful consultation and collaboration with Alaska Native tribal governments and
similar Alaska Native organizations in the development of Federal policies that have
Alaska Native implications, as applicable, and provide feedback and recommendations to
the Steering Committee;
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(c) identify an appropriate Federal entity to be the point of contact for Arctic matters with
the State of Alaska and with Alaska Native tribal governments and similar Alaska Native
organizations to support collaboration and communication; and
(d) invite members of State, local, and Alaska Native tribal governments and similar
Alaska Native organizations, and academic and research institutions to consult on issues
or participate in discussions, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law.30
U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic
On July 16, 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry announced the appointment of retired Coast
Guard Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., who served as Commandant of the Coast Guard from May
2010 to May 2014, as the first U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic.31 The duties of this
position involve, among other things, interacting with ambassadors to the Arctic region from
other countries.
U.S. Chairmanship of Arctic Council in 2015-2017
As discussed later in greater detail (see “The Arctic Council” in “Geopolitical Environment”), the
main international forum for cooperation in the high north is the eight-nation Arctic Council, of
which the United States is an active member.32 The Council has a two-year chairmanship that
rotates among the eight member states. The United States assumed the chairmanship on April 24,
2015, and will serve in that capacity for two years—a period that will end in 2017, during the first
year of the administration of the President elected in November 2016. The United States
previously held the chairmanship from 1998 to 2000 and, following the 2015-2017 term, will next
hold it in 2031-2033.
At a March 5, 2015, hearing on Arctic opportunities before the Senate Energy and Natural
Resources Committee, Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., the Special Representative for the Arctic,
testified as follows regarding the U.S. chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015-2017:
The United States will assume the rotating two-year chairmanship of the Arctic Council
in April 2015. We have developed a robust proposed work program for our chairmanship
in line with the priorities laid out in the National Strategy for the Arctic Region and its
subsequent Implementation Plan. We continue to hone the proposed program through
regular meetings with federal interagency counterparts, the State of Alaska, Alaska
Native groups, NGOs and other interested stakeholders. In my capacity as the Special
Representative for the Arctic, I have traveled twice to Alaska to consult with local
experts and residents. I heard positive feedback on our proposed chairmanship program,
as well as concerns about some aspects. The State Department has also received feedback
from numerous stakeholders, mostly supportive. Where we have heard concerns, we are
discussing ways forward. We are also actively consulting with our fellow Arctic Council
members and “Permanent Participants” (representatives of Arctic indigenous groups) so
30 Executive order, “Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic,” January 21, 2015, accessed January 21,
2015, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/21/executive-order-enhancing-coordination-national-
efforts-arctic.
31 See “Retired Admiral Robert Papp to Serve as U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic,” Press Statement, John
Kerry, Secretary of State, Washington, DC, July 16, 2014, accessed July 17, 2014, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/
remarks/2014/07/229317.htm.
32 See also http://www.arctic-council.org/.
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that we can reach agreement on our chairmanship program by the time we assume the
Chairmanship in April. The Council operates on the basis of consensus, so we need the
support of all the Arctic States.
The United States is assuming the chair of the Arctic Council at a critical time. The
Arctic Council has proven itself to be an effective and cooperative forum in which the
eight Arctic States and Permanent Participants can come together to develop effective
ways for managing this relatively pristine region of the world. We would like to continue
strengthening the Arctic Council by moving it toward more practical, on-the-ground
activities that will improve the environment and contribute to sustainable economic
development for the people who live there.
The areas we are proposing to highlight during the U.S. Chairmanship are:
Arctic Ocean Safety, Security, and Stewardship
Improving Economic and Living Conditions
Addressing the Impacts of Climate Change
Climate-related changes in the Arctic are already profoundly impacting the United States
and the rest of the planet. Reductions in sea ice are positioning the Arctic Ocean to be
increasingly accessible in the short and long terms. The Arctic Ocean is becoming more
navigable as evidenced by an increase in shipping through the Northern Sea Route over
Russia. We have also seen an increase in shipping through the Bering Strait, a potential
future chokepoint for trans-Arctic shipping traffic. In addition, the ice-diminished
maritime environment is attracting resource exploration in areas previously inaccessible.
We plan to prioritize collaborative search and rescue and oil pollution preparedness and
response exercises, ideally within the new Arctic Coast Guard Forum. To ensure that
future maritime development avoids areas of ecological and cultural significance, we will
prioritize the Arctic Council’s on-going development of a network of existing marine
protected areas, and possibly identify new marine protected areas. To address other
challenges in the Arctic Ocean, we are looking to improve international coordination
through a regional seas program similar to regional seas programs in other oceans. In the
coming months we will work closely with domestic and international stakeholders to
determine the specific nature and direction of this initiative.
During the U.S. chairmanship, we will strive to bring tangible benefits to communities
across the Arctic. In particular, we will seek to assist remote Arctic communities with
adapting to the rapid changes that are altering traditional ways of life. The U.S. aims to
increase energy and water security for remote Arctic communities by working toward
better and more secure access to renewable energy sources, improving water and
sanitation access, and reducing dependence on diesel generators while at the same time
reducing emissions of black carbon in the Arctic. The U.S. also plans to continue
advancing suicide intervention and awareness programs to reverse disturbing trends that
disproportionately affect Arctic communities. Suicide rates across the entire Arctic region
are much higher than in most other areas of the world. Men and boys are particularly at
risk.
In addition, as indicated in the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the
Arctic Region, the U.S. hopes to see an Arctic telecommunications infrastructure
assessment that would serve as the basis for the eventual build-out of the
telecommunications infrastructure necessary to support ever-increasing human activity
throughout the Arctic region. Building telecommunications infrastructure across the
Arctic will provide critical support to navigation, offshore development activities, search
and rescue operations, environmental and humanitarian emergencies, and will make
online tools for Arctic communities, such as telemedicine, education, and adaptation,
more accessible and useful.
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Our chairmanship will continue the on-going high-level focus on the impacts of climate
change, especially the drivers of change and the ways and means of addressing on-the-
ground impacts. To minimize the prospect of irreparable long-term harm to the Arctic –
and the globe, as changes in the Arctic reverberate around the world – we need to take
sustained, quantifiable measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and increase
community resilience and preparedness. During the last Administration, the United States
initiated efforts within the Arctic Council to mitigate so-called “short-lived climate
pollutants” such as black carbon and methane that have direct impacts in the Arctic.
During our chairmanship, we will press for full implementation of a new, voluntary
arrangement to be completed by the end of the current chairmanship that will include
development of national black carbon emission inventories, national reporting on
domestic mitigation efforts, and data collection efforts.
Another path forward is to examine key industrial practices, such as oil and gas flaring, to
share best practices, policies and technologies among technical experts, industry and
policymakers. The Department of State aims to lead the Arctic Council through an
assessment of how we can improve emissions estimates of black carbon and other air
pollutants from gas flares. We hope to be joined by other Arctic States in efforts that
build climate resilience into national policies and promote community- and ecosystem-
based climate adaptation. Without the natural sea ice barrier, coastal communities in
Alaska are now battered by storm events that damage the permafrost upon which critical
infrastructure depends, leaving houses and other buildings literally falling into the Bering
Sea. Policymakers and communities need decision-informing tools to enable
prioritization of adaptation efforts and more climate-resilient decision-making.33
The Arctic and the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)34
Background to UNCLOS
In November 1994, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entered
into force. This convention establishes a treaty regime to govern activities on, over, and under the
world’s oceans. It builds on the four 1958 law of the sea conventions and sets forth a framework
for future activities in parts of the oceans that are beyond national jurisdiction.35 The 1982
Convention and its 1994 Agreement relating to Implementation of Part XI of the Convention were
transmitted to the Senate on October 6, 1994.36 In the absence of Senate advice and consent to
adherence, the United States is not a party to the convention and agreement.
Part VI of UNCLOS and Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf
Part VI of the convention, dealing with the Continental Shelf, and Annex II, which established a
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, are most pertinent to the Arctic as it becomes
33 Statement of Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., Special Representative for the Arctic, U.S. Department of State, before the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, March 5, 2015, pp. 4-6. See also briefing entitled “Virtual
Stakeholder Outreach Forum,” December 2, 2014, accessed December 24, 2014, at http://arctic.gov/publications/
presentations/Arctic_Council/US_Chairmanship_for_stakeholders.pdf.
34 This section prepared by Marjorie Ann Browne, Specialist in International Relations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division.
35 The United States is party to the four conventions adopted in 1958: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, Convention on the High Seas, Convention on the Continental Shelf, and Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.
36 Treaty Document 103-39.
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more accessible ocean space, bordered by five coastal states.37 The convention gives the coastal
state sovereign jurisdiction over the resources, including oil and gas, of its continental shelf.38
Under Article 76 of the convention, a coastal state with a broad continental margin may establish
a shelf limit beyond 200 nautical miles. This jurisdiction is subject to the submission of the
particulars of the intended limit and supporting scientific and technical data by the coastal state to
the commission for review and recommendation.39 The commission reviews the documentation
and, by a two-thirds majority, approves its recommendations to the submitting state. Coastal
states agree to establish the outer limits of their continental shelf, in accordance with this process
and with their national laws. In instances of disagreement with the commission’s
recommendations, the coastal state may make a revised or new submission. The actions of the
commission “shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of boundaries between States
with opposite or adjacent coasts.”40 The “limits established by a coastal State on the basis of these
recommendations shall be final and binding.”41
U.S. Activities As a Non-Party to UNCLOS
As a non-party to the convention, the United States cannot participate as a member of the
commission; it cannot submit a claim under Article 76. Over the years, however, it has submitted
observations on submissions made by other states, requesting that those observations be made
available online and to the commission. In addition, since 2001, the United States has gathered
and analyzed data to determine the outer limits of its extended continental shelf. Starting in 2007,
this effort became the Extended Continental Shelf Project, directed by an interagency task force
under the lead of the Department of State.42
Some observers have suggested that a separate regime be negotiated to address the changing
circumstances in the Arctic. They maintain that this phenomenon was not envisioned at the time
the Law of the Sea Convention was negotiated. Still others suggest that the Arctic region above a
certain parallel be designated a wilderness area, and they cite as precedent Article 4 of The
Antarctic Treaty, under which any current claims to sovereign territory are frozen and
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a
basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica
or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an
existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present
Treaty is in force.
37 Other relevant provisions of the Convention, applicable depending on the extent of Arctic melting, relate to
navigation, high seas freedoms, fisheries, and exclusive economic zones.
38 The continental shelf is the under-sea extension of a coastal state’s land territory. Article 76 of the Convention
defines the continental shelf, inter alia, as “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its
[coastal state’s] territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin.”
39 A coastal State party has 10 years from the entry into force of the Convention for submission of information on its
proposed limits. In May 2001, the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention decided that for any State for which the
Convention entered into force before May 13, 1999, the date of commencement of the 10-year time period for making
submissions to the commission is May 13, 1999.
40 Annex II, Article 9. Article 83 of the Convention provides that questions relating to these boundary delimitation
disputes shall be resolved by agreement between the States or by the Dispute Settlement options set forth in Part XV of
the Convention.
41 Article 76, para. 8.
42 For more information, see http://www.state.gov/g/oes/continentalshelf/index.htm.
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Supporters of the Law of the Sea Convention maintain that changing circumstances in the Arctic
strengthen their argument that the United States should become a party to the convention. In this
way, they argue, the United States can be best situated to protect and serve its national interests,
under both Article 76 and other parts of the convention.
The Administration’s January 2014 implementation plan for its national strategy for the Arctic
region (see discussion above) includes, as one of its 36 or so initiatives, one entitled “Accede to
the Law of the Sea Convention.” Under this initiative, the State Department and other federal
agencies are to “Continue to seek the Senate’s advice and consent to accede to the Law of the Sea
Convention.” The document states, “The Administration is committed, like the last three
Administrations, to pursuing accession to the Convention on the Law of the Sea and will continue
to place a priority on attaining Senate advice and consent to accession.”43
The Administration’s January 2014 implementation plan for its national strategy for the Arctic
region (see discussion above) includes, as one of its 36 or so initiatives, one entitled “Accede to
the Law of the Sea Convention.” Under this initiative, the State Department and other federal
agencies are to “continue to seek the Senate’s advice and consent to accede to the Law of the Sea
Convention.” The document states that “the Administration is committed, like the last three
Administrations, to pursuing accession to the Convention on the Law of the Sea and will continue
to place a priority on attaining Senate advice and consent to accession.”44
Senate Arctic Caucus
On March 4 and 5, 2015, Senator Lisa Murkowski and Senator Angus King announced the
formation of a Senate Arctic Caucus “to spotlight this region and open up a wider conversation
about the nation’s future in the region as America prepares to accede to the Chair of the Arctic
Council.”45
Issues for Congress
Climate Change and Loss of Arctic Sea Ice46
Record low extents of Arctic sea ice in 2012 and 2007 have focused scientific and policy attention
on climate changes in the high north, and to the implications of projected ice-free47 seasons in the
Arctic within decades. The Arctic has been projected by several scientists to be ice-free in most
43 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, p. 29.
44 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, p. 29.
45 Press release from the office of Senator Angus King, “King, Murkowski Announce U.S. Senate Arctic Caucus,”
March 4, 2015, accessed March 17, 2015, at http://www.king.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/king-murkowski-
announce-us-senate-arctic-caucus. See also press release from the office of Senator Lisa Murkowski, “Senators
Murkowski, King Announce U.S. Senate Arctic Caucus,” March 5, 2015, accessed March 17, 2015, at
http://www.murkowski.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=1ce5edcb-540d-4c43-b264-56bdbb570755,
which includes a similar phrase.
46 This section prepared by Jane Leggett, Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and
Industry Division.
47 In scientific analyses, “ice-free” does not necessarily mean “no ice.” The definition of “ice-free” or sea ice “extent”
or “area” varies across studies. Sea ice “extent” is one common measure, equal to the sum of the area of grid cells that
have ice concentration of less than a set percentage—frequently 15%. For more information, see the National Snow and
Ice Data Center, http://nsidc.org/seaice/data/terminology.html.
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late summers as soon as the 2030s.48 This opens opportunities for transport through the Northwest
Passage and the Northern Sea Route, extraction of potential oil and gas resources, and expanded
fishing and tourism (Figure 3).
More broadly, physical changes in the Arctic include warming ocean, soil, and air temperatures;
melting permafrost; shifting vegetation and animal abundances; and altered characteristics of
Arctic cyclones. All these changes are expected to affect traditional livelihoods and cultures in the
region and survival of polar bear and other animal populations, and raise risks of pollution, food
supply, safety, cultural losses, and national security. Moreover, linkages (“teleconnections”)
between warming Arctic conditions and extreme events in the mid-latitude continents are
increasingly evident, identified in such extreme events as the heat waves and fires in Russia in
2010; severe winters in the eastern United States and Europe in 2009/2010 and in Europe in
2011/2012;49 and Indian summer monsoons and droughts. Hence, changing climate in the Arctic
suggests important implications both locally and across the Hemisphere.
Like the rest of the globe, temperatures in the Arctic have varied50 but show a significant warming
trend since the 1970s, and particularly since 1995.51 The annual average temperature for the
Arctic region (from 60o to 90o N) is now about 1.8o F warmer than the “climate normal” (the
average from 1961 to 1990). Temperatures in October-November are now about 9o F above the
seasonal normal. Scientists have concluded that most of the global warming of the last three
decades is very likely caused by human-related emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG, mostly
carbon dioxide); they expect the GHG-induced warming to continue for decades, even if, and
after, GHG concentrations in the atmosphere have been stabilized. The extra heat in the Arctic is
amplified by processes there (the “polar amplification”) and may result in irreversible changes on
human timescales.
48 Muyin Wang and James E. Overland, “A Sea Ice Free Summer Arctic within 30 Years?,” Geophysical Research
Letters 36, no. L07502 (April 3, 2009): 10.1029/2009GL037820; Marika Holland, Cecilia M. Bitz, and Bruno
Tremblay, “Future abrupt reductions in the summer Arctic sea ice,” Geophysical Research Letters 33, no. L23503
(2006); But see also Julien Boé, Alex Hall, and Xin Qu, “Sources of spread in simulations of Arctic sea ice loss over
the twenty-first century,” Climatic Change 99, no. 3 (April 1, 2010): 637-645; I. Eisenman and J. S. Wettlaufer,
“Nonlinear threshold behavior during the loss of Arctic sea ice,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106,
no. 1 (January 6, 2009): 28-32; Dirk Notz, “The Future of Ice Sheets and Sea Ice: Between Reversible Retreat and
Unstoppable Loss,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, no. 49 (December 8, 2009): 20590-20595.
49 Overland et al. state that “a warm Arctic-cold continent pattern represents a paradox of recent global warming: there
is not a uniform pattern of temperature increases” due to a set of newly recognized processes described in Overland, J.
E, K. R Wood, and M. Wang. “Warm Arctic-cold Continents: Climate Impacts of the Newly Open Arctic Sea.” Polar
Research 30 (2011). The authors raise a critical, unanswered question, “Is the observed severe mid-latitude weather in
two adjacent years simply due to an extreme in chaotic processes alone, or do they included a partial but important
Arctic forcing and connection due to recent changing conditions?” In other words, are recent patterns random
anomalies, or might we expect more of the same?; among other examples, see also Lim, Young-Kwon, and Siegfried
D. Schubert. “The Impact of ENSO and the Arctic Oscillation on Winter Temperature Extremes in the Southeast
United States.” Geophysical Research Letters 38, no. 15 (August 11, 2011): L15706.
50 There was a regionally warm period in the Arctic from the mid-1920s to around 1940, which scientists have assessed
to have been driven by natural climate variability. They have found that period to be distinctly different from the recent
multi-decadal warming, in part because the early 20th century warming was concentrated in the northern high latitudes.
See, for example, Figure 2, upper left graphic, in Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, “Simulatoin of Early 20th
Century Warming,” at http://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/early-20th-century-global-warming.
51 Steele, Michael, Wendy Ermold, and Jinlun Zhang. “Arctic Ocean Surface Warming Trends over the Past 100
Years.” Geophysical Research Letters 35, no. 2 (January 29, 2008): L02614.
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Figure 3. Arctic Sea Ice Extent in September 2008, Compared with Prospective
Shipping Routes and Oil and Gas Resources
Source: Graphic by Stephen Rountree at U.S. News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/
world/2008/10/09/global-warming-triggers-an-international-race-for-the-artic/photos/#1.
The observed warmer temperatures along with rising cyclone size and strength in the Arctic have
reduced sea ice extent, thickness, and ice that persists year-round (“perennial ice”); natural
climate variability has likely contributed to the record low ice extents of 2007 and 2012. The
2007 minimum sea ice extent was influenced by warm Arctic temperatures and warm, moist
winds blowing from the North Pacific into the central Arctic, contributing to melting and pushing
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ice toward and into the Atlantic past Greenland. Warm winds did not account for the near-record
sea ice minimum in 2008.52 In early August 2012, an unusually large storm with low pressure
developed over the Arctic, helping to disperse the already weak ice into warmer waters and
accelerating its melt rate. By August 24, 2012, sea ice extent had shrunk below the previous
observed minimum of late September 2007.53
Modeling of GHG-induced climate change is particularly challenging for the Arctic, but it
consistently projects warming through the 21st century, with annual average Arctic temperature
increases ranging from +1° to +9.0° C (+2° to +19.0° F), depending on the GHG scenario and
model used. While such warming is projected by most models throughout the Arctic, some
models project slight cooling localized in the North Atlantic Ocean just south of Greenland and
Iceland. Most warming would occur in autumn and winter, “with very little temperature change
projected over the Arctic Ocean” in summer months.54
Due to observed and projected climate change, scientists have concluded that the Arctic will have
changed from an ice-covered environment to a recurrent ice-free55 ocean (in summers) as soon as
the late 2030s. The character of ice cover is expected to change as well, with the ice being
thinner, more fragile, and more regionally variable. The variability in recent years of both ice
quantity and location could be expected to continue.
Territorial Claims and Sovereignty Issues56
Motivated in part by a desire to exercise sovereign control over the Arctic region’s increasingly
accessible oil and gas reserves (see “Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration”), the four Arctic coastal
states other than the United States—Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of which Greenland
is a territory)—are in the process of preparing territorial claims in the Arctic, including claims for
expanded Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), for submission to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf. (As mentioned earlier—see “U.S. Activities As a Non-Party to
UNCLOS”—the United States, as a non-party to UNCLOS, cannot participate as a member of the
commission; it cannot submit a claim under Article 76. Over the years, however, it has submitted
observations on submissions made by other states, requesting that those observations be made
available online and to the commission. In addition, since 2001, the United States has gathered
and analyzed data to determine the outer limits of its extended continental shelf.)
Russia has been attempting to chart the Arctic Ocean’s enormous underwater Lomonosov Ridge
in an attempt to show that it is an extension of Russia’s continental margin. The Russian claim to
this ridge, if accepted, would reportedly grant Russia nearly one-half of the Arctic area; a 2001
claim submitted by Russia was rejected as insufficiently documented. Canada also claims a
52 J. Overland, J. Walsh, and M. Wang, Arctic Report Card - Atmosphere (NOAA Arctic Research Program, October 6,
2008), http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard/atmosphere.html.
53 National Snow and Ice Data Center, “Arctic sea ice extent breaks 2007 record low” (August 27, 2012); Japanese
Aerospace Exploration Agency, “A new record minimum of the Arctic sea ice extent was set on 24 August 2012”;
Arctic ROOS (Norway), “Daily Updated Time series of Arctic sea ice area and extent derived from SSMI data
provided by NERSC,” at http://arctic-roos.org/observations/satellite-data/sea-ice/ice-area-and-extent-in-arctic.
54 William L. Chapman and John E. Walsh, “Simulations of Arctic Temperature and Pressure by Global Coupled
Models,” Journal of Climate 20, no. 4 (February 1, 2007): 609-632.
55 See footnote 47. Also, although one Canadian scientist has predicted that recurrent ice-free summers may begin
sometime between 2013 and 2020, this is not consistent with other climate models’ projections.
56 This section was prepared by Carl Ek, who was a Specialist in International Relations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division, until his retirement on April 30, 2014. For questions relating to this section, contact Derek E. Mix,
Analyst in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
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portion of the Lomonosov Ridge as part of its own underwater continental shelf.57 In August
2007, a Russian submersible on a research expedition deposited an encased Russian Federation
flag on the seabed of the presumed site of the North Pole. The action captured worldwide
attention, but analysts note that it did not constitute an official claim to the territory and was
therefore a purely symbolic act.
At a May 2008 meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland, the five Arctic coastal states reaffirmed their
commitment to the UNCLOS legal framework for the establishment of extended continental shelf
limits in the Arctic.58 (For further discussion, see “Extent of the Continental Margin” in “Oil, Gas,
and Mineral Exploration.”)
In addition to this process, there are four unresolved Arctic territorial disputes:
Scientists have forecast that in coming decades, global warming will reduce the
ice pack in Canada’s northern archipelago sufficiently to permit ships to use the
trans-Arctic shipping route known as the Northwest Passage during the summer
months (see “Commercial Sea Transportation”). The prospect of such traffic
raises a major jurisdictional question. Ottawa maintains that such a passage
would be an inland waterway, and would therefore be sovereign Canadian
territory subject to Ottawa’s surveillance, regulation, and control. The United
States, the European Union, and others assert that the passage would constitute
an international strait between two high seas.
The United States and Canada are negotiating over a binational boundary in the
Beaufort Sea.
The United States and Russia in 1990 signed an agreement regarding a disputed
area of the Bering Sea; the U.S. Senate ratified the pact the following year, but
the Russian Duma has yet to approve the accord.
Denmark and Canada disagree over which country has the territorial right to
Hans Island, a tiny, barren piece of rock between Greenland and Canada’s
Ellesmere Island. Some analysts believe the two countries are vying for control
over a future sea lane that might be created if the Arctic ice were to melt
sufficiently to create a Northwest Passage. Others claim that the governments are
staking out territorial claims in the event that future natural resource discoveries
make the region economically valuable.59
In addition to these disputes, Norway and Russia had been at odds for decades over the boundary
between the two in the so-called “Grey Zone” in the Barents Sea, an area believed to hold rich
undersea deposits of petroleum. On September 15, 2010, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens
Stoltenberg and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed an agreement in Murmansk, a
Russian city near the Norwegian border. The accord awards roughly half of the 175,000-square-
kilometer area to each country; it spells out fishing rights, and provides for the joint development
of future oil and gas finds that straddle the boundary line. Some observers believe it is noteworthy
that Russia would concede sovereignty over such a large, resource-rich territory to a small,
neighboring country. But others have noted that Moscow may be hoping for Norwegian
57 “Russia, Canada Make Competing Claims To Arctic Resources,” The Canadian Press, September 16, 2010.
58 “5 Countries Agree To Talk, Not Compete, Over the Arctic,” New York Times, May 29, 2008.
59 For additional information, see Natalie Mychajlyszyn, The Arctic: Geopolitical Issues, Canadian Library of
Parliament, October 24, 2008.
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cooperation in developing offshore resources, and eventually in winning approval when Russia
submits its Article 76 UNCLOS claim.60
In August 2010, Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon announced a new “Statement of
Canada’s Arctic Policy,” which reaffirmed the government’s commitment to Canada’s sovereignty
in the region, to economic and social development, to environmental protection, and to
empowerment of the peoples in the north. The statement also emphasized the government’s
intention to negotiate settlements to its disputes with the United States over the Beaufort Sea
boundary, and with Denmark over Hans Island. Minister Cannon declared that “making progress
on outstanding boundary issues will be a top priority.”61 Also, despite their dispute over Hans
Island, Canada and Denmark have been working together on Arctic issues. In May 2010, the two
countries’ military chiefs of staffs signed a memorandum of understanding on Arctic Defense,
Security, and Operational Cooperation, committing the two countries to “enhanced consultation,
information exchange, visits, and exercises.”62
Commercial Sea Transportation63
Background
The search for a shorter route from the Atlantic to Asia has been the quest of maritime powers
since the Middle Ages. The melting of Arctic ice raises the possibility of saving several thousands
of miles and several days of sailing between major trading blocs.64 If the Arctic were to become a
viable shipping route, the ramifications could extend far beyond the Arctic. For example, lower
shipping costs could be advantageous for China (at least its northeast region), Japan, and South
Korea because their manufactured products exported to Europe or North America could become
less expensive relative to other emerging manufacturing centers in Southeast Asia, such as
India.65 Melting ice could potentially open up two trans-Arctic routes (see Figure 3):66
The Northern Sea Route (NSR, a.k.a. the “Northeast Passage”), along Russia’s
northern border from Murmansk to Provideniya, is about 2,600 nautical miles in
length. It was opened by the Soviet Union to domestic shipping in 1931 and to
transit by foreign vessels in 1991. This route would be applicable for trade
between northeast Asia (north of Singapore) and northern Europe. In the summer
of 2013, about 50 laden cargo ships transited the NSR.67
60 “Russia, Norway Sign Deal On Barents Sea Border, Seek More Development in Mineral-rich Arctic,” Associated
Press, September 15, 2010.
61 Cannon quoted in “Canada Seeks To Settle Arctic Borders,” Agence France Presse, August 20, 2010. For additional
information concerning Canada’s August statement on Arctic policy, see “Statement on Canada’s Arctic foreign policy:
Exercising sovereignty and promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy abroad,” Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Canada website, http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/canada_arctic_foreign_policy-
la_politique_etrangere_du_canada_pour_arctique.aspx?lang=eng.
62 “Canada and Denmark Sign Arctic Cooperation Arrangement,” Targeted News Service, May 17, 2010.
63 This section prepared by John Frittelli, Specialist in Transportation Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division.
64 Extended daylight hours in the Arctic during the summer may also be an advantage.
65 Presentation by Stephen Carmel, Senior Vice President, Maersk Line Ltd., Halifax International Security Forum,
Arctic Security: The New Great Game? November 21, 2009, available at http://fora.tv/.
66 A third but more remote possibility is a route directly over the North Pole.
67 Northern Sea Route Information Office; http://www.arctic-lio.com/.
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The Northwest Passage (NWP) runs through the Canadian Arctic Islands. The
NWP actually consists of several potential routes. The southern route is through
Peel Sound in Nunavut, which has been open in recent summers and contains
mostly one-year ice. However, this route is circuitous, contains some narrow
channels, and is shallow enough to impose draft restrictions on ships. The more
northern route, through McClure Strait from Baffin Bay to the Beaufort Sea north
of Alaska, is much more direct, and therefore more appealing to ocean carriers,
but more prone to ice blockage.68 The NWP is potentially applicable for trade
between northeast Asia (north of Shanghai) and the northeast of North America,
but may be less commercially viable than the NSR.69 A ship carrying coal from
western Canada to Finland became the first bulk carrier to transit the NWP in the
summer of 2013.70
Destination Traffic, Not Trans-Arctic Traffic
Most cargo ship activity currently taking place in the Arctic is to transport natural resources from
the Arctic or to deliver general cargo and supplies to communities and natural resource extraction
facilities. Thus, cargo ship traffic in the Arctic presently is mostly regional, not trans-Arctic.
While there has been a recent uptick in Arctic shipping activity, this activity has more to do with a
spike in commodity prices than it does with the melting of Arctic ice. Even so, recent activity is
less than it has been in the past. The NSR continues to account for the bulk of Arctic shipping
activity.
Cruise Ship Activity
Considerable cruise ship activity takes place in Arctic waters. In the summer of 2007, three cruise
ships reportedly sailed through the NWP from the Atlantic to Alaska’s North Slope.71 In August
2010, a cruise ship with over 150 passengers ran aground in the NWP. In the Barents Sea, there
are regular cruise ships sailing to Svalbard. The inherent dangers for passenger ships in the Arctic
have prompted calls for international regulations promoting the safety of cruise ships in the area.
Some have suggested that cruise ships sail in pairs to provide assistance to one another, given the
Arctic’s remoteness and the difficulty land-based rescuers would have in reaching a vessel in
distress.72 Requiring that Arctic cruise vessels have ice-strengthened hulls and be equipped with
enclosed lifeboats could be other safety requirements. In 2003, some Arctic cruise and tourist
operators formed the Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators (AECO) to establish
agreed-upon safety and environmental protection guidelines, but this organization only covers the
portion of the Arctic around Greenland, Svalbard, and Jan Mayen.73
68 This was the route pioneered by the SS Manhattan, an oil tanker modified for ice breaking in 1969 to carry Alaskan
North Slope oil to the Atlantic. This was the first commercial passage through the NWP, but the building of the
Alaskan pipeline was found to be the more economical means of transporting oil from the North Slope to the lower 48
states.
69 Although the NWP is often compared to the alternative route through the Panama Canal in terms of distance and
sailing days from Asia to the U.S. east coast, another alternative to consider is the shorter and faster transcontinental
rail route across Canada or the United States. The Panama Canal is undergoing an expansion project, expected to be
completed by 2015, to allow larger ships with about three times the cargo capacity to pass through.
70 “Cargo Ship Carves a Path in Arctic Sea,” The Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2013, p. A11.
71 “U.S. Needs to Prepare for Arctic Traffic Surge,” Anchorage Daily News, February 12, 2008, p. A4.
72 “Northern Waters,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), August 14, 2008, p. A8.
73 See http://www.aeco.no/index.htm for more information.
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Unpredictable Ice Conditions Hinder Trans-Arctic Shipping
Arctic waters do not necessarily have to be ice free to be open to shipping. Multiyear ice can be
over 10 feet thick and problematic even for icebreakers, but one-year ice is typically 3 feet thick
or less. This thinner ice can be more readily broken up by icebreakers or ice class ships (cargo
ships with reinforced hulls and other features for navigating in ice-infested waters). However,
more open water in the Arctic has resulted in another potential obstacle to shipping: unpredictable
ice flows. In the NWP, melting ice and the opening of waters that were once covered with one-
year ice has allowed blocks of multiyear ice from farther north, or icebergs from Greenland, to
flow into potential sea lanes. The source of this multiyear ice is not predicted to dissipate in spite
of climate change. Moreover, the flow patterns of these ice blocks are very difficult to predict,
and they have floated into potential routes for shipping.74 Thus, the lack of ice in potential sea
lanes during the summer months can add even greater unpredictability to Arctic shipping. This is
in addition to the extent of ice versus open water, which is also highly variable from one year to
the next and seasonally.
The unpredictability of ice conditions is a major hindrance for trans-Arctic shipping in general,
but can be more of a concern for some types of ships than it is for others. For instance, it would
be less of a concern for cruise ships, which may have the objective of merely visiting the Arctic
rather than passing through and could change their route and itinerary depending on ice
conditions. On the other hand, unpredictability is of the utmost concern for container ships that
carry thousands of containers from hundreds of different customers, all of whom expect to unload
or load their cargo upon the ship’s arrival at various ports as indicated on the ship’s advertised
schedule. The presence of even small blocks of ice or icebergs from a melting Greenland ice sheet
requires slow sailing and could play havoc with schedules. Ships carrying a single commodity in
bulk from one port to another for just one customer have more flexibility in terms of delivery
windows, but would not likely risk an Arctic passage under prevailing conditions.
Ice is not the sole impediment to Arctic shipping. The region frequently experiences adverse
weather, including not only severe storms, but also intense cold, which can impair deck
machinery. During the summer months when sea lanes are open, heavy fog is common in the
Arctic.
Commercial ships would face higher operating costs on Arctic routes than elsewhere. Ship size is
an important factor in reducing freight costs. Many ships currently used in other waters would
require two icebreakers to break a path wide enough for them to sail through; ship owners could
reduce that cost by using smaller vessels in the Arctic, but this would raise the cost per container
or per ton of freight.75 Also, icebreakers or ice-class cargo vessels burn more fuel than ships
designed for more temperate waters and would have to sail at slower speeds. The shipping season
in the Arctic only lasts for a few weeks, so icebreakers and other special required equipment
would sit idle the remainder of the year. None of these impediments by themselves may be
enough to discourage Arctic passage but they do raise costs, perhaps enough to negate the savings
of a shorter route. Thus, from the perspective of a shipper or a ship owner, shorter via the Arctic
does not necessarily mean cheaper and faster.76
74 S.E.L. Howell and J.J. Yackel, “A Vessel Transit Assessment of Sea Ice Variability in the Western Arctic, 1969-
2002: Implications for Ship Navigation,” Canadian Journal of Remote Sensing, vol. 30, no. 2, 2004.
75 “Arctic Unlikely to See Major Shipping Growth,” New Zealand Transport and Logistics Business Week, April 24,
2008.
76 Stephen M. Carmel, Senior Vice President, Maersk Line Ltd., “The Cold, Hard Realities of Arctic Shipping,” United
States Naval Institute, Proceedings; July 2013, pp. 38-41.
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Basic Navigation Infrastructure Is Lacking
Considerable investment in navigation-related infrastructure would be required if trans-Arctic
shipping were to become a reality. Channel marking buoys and other floating visual aids are not
possible in Arctic waters because moving ice sheets will continuously shift their positions.
Therefore, vessel captains would need to rely on marine surveys and ice charts. For some areas in
the Arctic, however, these surveys and charts are out of date and not sufficiently accurate.77 To
remedy this problem, aviation reconnaissance of ice conditions and satellite images would need to
become readily available for ship operators.78 Ship-to-shore communication infrastructure would
need to be installed where possible. Refueling stations may be needed, as well as, perhaps,
transshipment ports where cargo could be transferred to and from ice-capable vessels at both ends
of Arctic routes. Shipping lines would need to develop a larger pool of mariners with ice
navigation experience. Marine insurers would need to calculate the proper level of risk premium
for polar routes, which would require more detailed information about Arctic accidents and
incidents in the past.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, along with the state of Alaska, is studying the feasibility of a
“deep-draft” port in the Arctic (accommodating ships with a draft of up to 35 feet). The northern
and northwestern coastlines of Alaska are exceptionally shallow, generally limiting harbor and
near shore traffic to shallow-draft barges. Coast Guard cutters and icebreakers have drafts of 35 to
40 feet while NOAA research vessels have drafts of 16 to 28 feet, so at present these vessels are
based outside the Arctic and must sail considerable distances to reach Arctic duty stations. Supply
vessels supporting offshore oil rigs typically have drafts over 20 feet. A deep-draft port could
serve as a base of operations for larger vessels, facilitating commercial maritime traffic in the
Arctic.79 The study concluded that the existing harbors of Nome or Port Clarence on Alaska’s
west coast may be the most suitable for deepening because of their proximity to the Bering Strait
and deeper water.80
The U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System, a Cabinet-level committee of federal
agencies with responsibilities for marine transportation, identified and prioritized a list of
infrastructure improvements for Arctic navigation in a 2013 report.81 In the near term (two to
three years), it prioritizes improvements to information infrastructure (weather forecasting,
nautical charting, ship tracking) and emergency response capabilities for ships in distress.
Regulation of Arctic Shipping
Due to the international nature of the shipping industry, maritime trading nations have adopted
international treaties that establish standards for ocean carriers in terms of safety, pollution
77 In July and August 2010, NOAA surveyed the Bering Straits area in order to update its charts but stated that it will
take more than 25 years to map the prioritized areas of navigational significance in U.S. Arctic waters. See
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20100720_fairweather.html.
78 Ice reporting that currently exists is intended for scientists not mariners.
79 For further information, see http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/en/cw/AKPortsStudy.htm, and FY2013 USACE Budget
Justification, p. POD-5.
80 Alaska Deep-Draft Arctic Port System Study, March 2013; http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Library/
ReportsandStudies/AlaskaRegionalPortsStudy.aspx. The navigation channel at Nome presently ranges from 10 to 20
feet in depth. Much of the harbor at Port Clarence has a natural depth of 35 to 40 feet; http://www.charts.noaa.gov/
OnLineViewer/AlaskaViewerTable.shtml.
81 U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System, U.S. Arctic Marine Transportation System: Overview and
Priorities for Action, 2013; http://www.cmts.gov/downloads/CMTS_Arctic_MTS_Report_Narrative.pdf.
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prevention, and security. These standards are agreed upon by shipping nations through the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations agency that first met in 1959.82
Key conventions that the 168 IMO member nations have adopted include the Safety of Life at Sea
Convention (SOLAS), which was originally adopted in response to the Titanic disaster in 1912
but has since been revised several times; the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL),
which was adopted in 1973 and modified in 1978; and the Standards for Training, Certification,
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (SCTW), which was adopted in 1978 and amended in 1995. It is
up to ratifying nations to enforce these standards. The United States is a party to these
conventions, and the U.S. Coast Guard enforces them when it boards and inspects ships and
crews arriving at U.S. ports and the very few ships engaged in international trade that sail under
the U.S. flag.
Like the United States, most of the other major maritime trading nations lack the ability to
enforce these regulations as a “flag state” because much of the world’s merchant fleet is
registered under so-called “flags of convenience.” While most ship owners and operators are
headquartered in developed countries, they often register their ships in Panama, Liberia, the
Bahamas, the Marshall Islands, Malta, and Cyprus, among other “open registries,” because these
nations offer more attractive tax and employment regulatory regimes. Because of this
development, most maritime trading nations enforce shipping regulations under a “port state
control” regime—that is, they require compliance with these regulations as a condition of calling
at their ports. The fragmented nature of ship ownership and operation can be a further hurdle to
regulatory enforcement. It is common for cargo ships to be owned by one company, operated by a
second company (which markets the ship’s space), and managed by a third (which may supply the
crew and other services a ship requires to sail), each of which could be headquartered in different
countries.
Arctic Guidelines
While SOLAS and other IMO conventions include provisions regarding the operation of ships in
ice-infested waters, they are not specific to the polar regions. To supplement existing
requirements, in December 2002, the IMO approved guidelines for ships operating in Arctic ice-
covered waters.83 These were only recommendations for ships operating in the Arctic, not
requirements. They apply to passenger and cargo ships of 500 gross tons or more engaged in
international voyages. They do not apply to fishing vessels, military vessels, pleasure yachts, and
smaller cargo ships. The guidelines are intended to improve safety and prevent pollution in the
Arctic, and they include provisions on ship construction, ship equipment related to navigation,
and crew training and ship operation. The guidelines recommend that ships carry fully enclosed
lifeboats or carry tarpaulins to cover their lifeboats. They recommend that each crew include at
least one ice navigator with documented evidence of having completed an ice navigation training
program. The IMO is in the process of drafting mandatory requirements for ships operating in the
Arctic.84
Nations can enforce additional requirements on ships arriving at their ports or sailing through
their coastal waters. For instance, U.S. Coast Guard regulations largely follow IMO conventions
but mandate additional requirements in some areas. U.S. coastal states can require ships calling at
82 See http://www.imo.org/ for more information.
83 See MSC/Circ. 1056/MEPC/Circ.399, at http://www.imo.org/.
84 Edwin H. Anderson, “Polar Shipping, The Forthcoming Polar Code and Implications for the Polar Environments,”
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, v. 43, no. 1, January 2012.
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their ports to take additional safety and pollution prevention safeguards. Canada and Russia have
additional pollution regulations for Arctic waters exceeding MARPOL. The U.S. Coast Guard is
seeking agreement with Russia to establish a vessel traffic separation scheme for the Bering Strait
between Alaska and Russia, which now experiences over 300 transits per year.85
Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration86
Decreases in summer polar ice will likely allow for more options for exploring for oil and gas in
certain offshore areas. Similarly, shrinking glaciers onshore could expose land containing
economic deposits of gold, iron ore, or other minerals that were previously covered by glacial ice.
Currently, areas offshore of Alaska encompassing more than 1 billion acres and more than 6,000
miles of coastline—more coastline than in the rest of the United States combined—are considered
to have potential for energy development. These Arctic regions include the Beaufort and Chukchi
Seas, the Bering Sea, Cook Inlet, and the Gulf of Alaska.
Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to onshore exploration activities
because ground structures, such as pipelines and other infrastructure that depend on footings sunk
into the permafrost for support, could become unstable. Additionally, despite the warming
temperatures, exploration and development in the Arctic would still be subject to harsh
conditions, especially in winter, which makes it costly and challenging to develop infrastructure
necessary to produce, store, and transport oil, gas, and minerals from newly discovered deposits.
In offshore areas, severe weather poses challenges to the ongoing operation of federally regulated
operations involving six producing wells.87
Shrinking sea ice cover in the Arctic has also intensified interest in surveying and mapping the
continental margins of countries with lands in the Arctic. Delineating the extent of the continental
margins beyond the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) could lead to considering
development on substantial amounts of submerged lands.88 Mapping projects are underway, by
individual countries and through cooperative government studies, to support national claims to
submerged lands which may contain large amounts of oil, natural gas, methane hydrates, or
minerals.
Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration
A driver for the increased interest in exploring for oil and gas offshore in the Arctic is the
shrinking Arctic ice cap, or conversely, the growing amount of ice-free ocean in the summertime.
Reduced sea ice in the summer means that ships towing seismic arrays89 can explore previously
85 The Coast Guard is studying shipping routes through the Bering Strait for possible safety enhancements. See 75 FR
68568, November 8, 2010.
86 This section prepared by Peter Folger, Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and
Industry Division; Marc Humphries, Analyst in Energy Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division; and Laura
Comay, Analyst in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division.
87 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, “BP Exploration (Alaska) (BPXA)—Northstar,” at http://www.boem.gov/
About-BOEM/BOEM-Regions/Alaska-Region/Leasing-and-Plans/Plans/BP-North-Star.aspx; and written
communication to CRS from Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement on October 4-11, 2012. There are no
federally regulated production facilities or pipelines in the Alaska region.
88 One way of delineating the extent of the continental margins that is currently underway in the region is by the terms
of Article 76 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
89 A seismic array is typically a long string or streamer of geophones—acoustic devices used for recording seismic
signals—towed behind a ship while the ship traverses a prospective oil and gas-bearing portion of the seafloor. The
seismic signals are processed and interpreted to give a cross-section or three-dimensional image of the subsurface.
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inaccessible regions of the Arctic Ocean, Chukchi Sea, Beaufort Sea, and other offshore regions
for longer periods of time without as much risk of colliding with floating sea ice. Less sea ice
over longer periods compared to previous decades also means that the seasonal window for
offshore drilling in the Arctic remains open longer in the summer and increases the chances for
making a discovery.
In addition to the improved access to larger portions of the Arctic afforded by shrinking sea ice,
interest in Arctic oil and gas was fueled by a 2008 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) appraisal of
undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle.90 The USGS stated that the “extensive Arctic
continental shelves may constitute the geographically largest unexplored prospective area for
petroleum remaining on Earth.”91 In the report, the USGS estimates that 90 billion barrels of oil,
nearly 1,700 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may
remain to be discovered in the Arctic (including both U.S. and international resources north of the
Arctic Circle).92 An article published in Science magazine indicated that 30% of the world’s
undiscovered natural gas and 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil may be found north of the
Arctic Circle.93 In terms of U.S. resources specifically, DOI’s Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management (BOEM) estimated in 2015 that the Alaska portions of the U.S. outer continental
shelf (OCS) contain undiscovered, technically recoverable resources of approximately 27 billion
barrels of oil and 131 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (although not all of these resources may be
economically viable to recover).94 A 2015 report by the National Petroleum Council stated that
U.S. offshore oil and gas exploration in the Arctic over the next 35 years “would help sustain
domestic supplies as production of U.S. shale oil and tight oil may decline.”95
Despite the warming trend in the Arctic, a discovery of new oil and gas deposits far from existing
storage, pipelines, and shipping facilities cannot be developed until infrastructure is built to
extract and transport the petroleum. In 2010, Secretary of the Interior Salazar asked the USGS to
assess the science needs that would inform the Obama Administration’s consideration of how to
develop oil and gas resources in the Arctic.96 The USGS released a report in response that
discussed, among other issues, the need for a more refined regional understanding of climate
change to inform development scenarios, better oil-spill risk assessment and preparation, and
90 See USGS Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal website at http://energy.usgs.gov/arctic/.
91 USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of
the Arctic Circle, at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/. Hereinafter referred to as USGS 2008 Fact Sheet.
92 The study included “only those resources believed to be recoverable using existing technology, but with the
important assumptions for offshore areas that the resources would be recoverable even in the presence of permanent sea
ice and oceanic water depth.” Further, the report stated: “No economic considerations are included in these initial
estimates; results are presented without reference to costs of exploration and development, which will be important in
many of the assessed areas.” USGS 2008 Fact Sheet, p. 1.
93 Donald L. Gautier et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic,” Science, vol. 324, no. 5931, pp.
1175-1179 (2009); see also Energy Information Administration, “Today in Energy: Arctic Oil and Natural Gas
Resources,” January 20, 2012, at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4650.
94 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 2017-2022 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Draft Proposed
Program, January 2015, p. 5-9, at http://www.boem.gov/2017-2022-DPP/. The proposed program estimates a range of
resources that would be economically recoverable under various oil and gas price points and cost conditions.
95 National Petroleum Council, Arctic Potential: Realizing the Promise of U.S. Arctic Oil and Gas Resources, March
2015, at http://www.npc.org/reports/research.html. The report was commissioned by Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz.
96 DOI press release, “Secretary Salazar Unveils Arctic Studies Initiative That Will Inform Oil and Gas Decisions for
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas,” April 13, 2010, http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2010_04_13_releaseA.cfm.
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increased collaboration with Native communities and international stakeholders on science
issues.97
President Obama and many in Congress have expressed interest in expanding America’s ocean
energy portfolio in the region.98 As part of the Administration’s strategy to enhance domestic
energy production, BOEM approved a five-year offshore oil and gas leasing program for 2012-
2017 that contains three lease sales in Alaska planning areas: in the Chukchi Sea (2016), Cook
Inlet (2016), and Beaufort Sea (2017).99 In January 2015, BOEM released a draft proposed
leasing program for 2017-2022 that proposes three additional Arctic lease sales: in the Beaufort
Sea (2020), Cook Inlet (2021), and Chukchi Sea (2022).100 Also in 2015, legal issues were
resolved concerning a 2008 lease sale for the Chukchi Sea planning area,101 and in May 2015,
BOEM conditionally approved Shell Oil Company’s multiyear plan for exploratory drilling in this
area.102 Several other steps must occur before Shell can begin the exploratory drilling, tentatively
planned to start in summer 2015.103
At the same time, the Obama Administration and others have expressed concerns about industry’s
ability to respond to potential oil spills in the Arctic, given the region’s remoteness and harsh
conditions. The section of this report on “Oil Pollution and Pollution Response,” below, discusses
this issue in greater detail. In February 2015, BOEM and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement (BSEE) proposed safety regulations for Arctic exploratory drilling that include
multiple requirements for companies to prepare for potential oil spills.104 Opponents of Arctic oil
97 U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2011-3048, An Evaluation of the Science Needs to Inform Decisions on Outer
Continental Shelf Energy Development in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, Alaska, 2011, at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/
2011/3048/.
98 For statements of legislative interest, see, for example, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United
States Arctic Opportunities Hearing, 114th Cong., 1st sess., March 5, 2015, at http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/hearings-and-business-meetings?ID=1ecba404-f39d-487f-b6e9-17ba0f4e8f23. For interest by President
Obama, see, for example, U.S. President, National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 2013, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf.
99 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Proposed Final Outer Continental Shelf Oil & Gas Leasing Program, 2012-
2017, June 2012, at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/
Five_Year_Program/2012-2017_Five_Year_Program/PFP%2012-17.pdf..
100 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 2017-2022 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Draft Proposed
Program, January 2015, at http://www.boem.gov/2017-2022-DPP/.
101 DOI’s Oil and Gas Lease Sale 193 in the Chukchi Sea planning area, held in 2008, was the subject of litigation
alleging that DOI had not adequately analyzed the sale’s potential environmental consequences. For example, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that BOEM needed to undertake additional analysis of production levels
from OCS oil fields that might be discovered in the Chukchi Sea; see http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/
About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasing_and_Plans/Leasing/Lease_Sales/Sale_193/2014-01-
22_9CCoA_193_remand.pdf. In response to court orders, BOEM undertook two further environmental impact
statements providing updated analysis of the sale’s potential environmental effects; see Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Chukchi Sea Planning Area Oil and Gas Lease Sale 193 in the Chukchi Sea: Final Second Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement, February 2015, available at http://www.boem.gov/ak193/. In March 2015 DOI issued
a record of decision affirming the lease sale. For a chronology of the actions concerning Lease Sale 193, see
http://www.boem.gov/ak193/.
102 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, press release, “BOEM Conditionally Approves Shell’s Revised Chukchi Sea
Exploration Plan,” May 11, 2015, at http://www.boem.gov/press05112015/.
103 Among the conditions of the permit approval are requirements that Shell obtain all necessary permits and approvals
from other state and federal agencies, including permits to drill from the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement, authorizations under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and biological opinions under the Endangered
Species Act.
104 Department of the Interior, “Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf,” 80 Fed.
Reg. 9915, February 24, 2015.
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and gas drilling have also expressed concerns about potential interference with wildlife and
subsistence activities of Alaska Natives, as well as broader concerns about the contribution of oil
and gas activities to climate change.
Some of these concerns were exacerbated by Shell’s experiences in its exploratory drilling
operations in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas during the 2012 drilling season.105 Shell experienced
a number of challenges, including difficulty meeting requirements for containment of potential
spills, violations of air emission permits, and an incident involving the company’s drillship
Kulluk, which ran aground on the shore of Sitkalidak Island, AK, sparking attention to safety
issues.106 Federal officials investigated the incidents and identified lessons learned and
recommended practices to ensure Arctic drilling safety,107 many of which informed the Arctic
exploratory drilling regulations proposed by BOEM and BSEE in 2015.
Concerns about the impacts of oil and gas activities have led in the past to bans by both Congress
and the President on leasing in certain Arctic ocean areas deemed especially sensitive.108 While
not affecting all Alaska operations, congressional and presidential moratoriums since the 1980s
effectively banned federally regulated planning and permitting in the Bristol Bay area of the
North Aleutian Basin. Congress allowed most statutory bans in the region to expire in 2004,109 but
in 2010, President Obama reinstated a moratorium in the North Aleutian Basin, withdrawing
acreage located in Bristol Bay from eligibility for oil and gas leasing until after 2017.110 On
December 16, 2014, the President modified this moratorium to indefinitely withdraw the area
from disposition for leasing.111 Pursuant to the ban, gathering geological and geophysical data and
other development-related activities are prohibited in Bristol Bay. Additionally, on January 27,
2015, President Obama indefinitely withdrew from leasing disposition the Hanna Shoal region of
the Chukchi Sea planning area as well as certain other parts of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas.112
105 Among other approvals, on August 4, 2011, BOEM issued a conditional approval of Shell’s revised exploration plan
(EP) for the Beaufort Sea to drill up to four exploration wells starting in summer 2012. On December 16, 2011, BOEM
issued conditional approval of Shell’s revised EP in the Chukchi Sea to drill up to six exploration wells beginning in
the 2012 drilling season.
106 Shell’s drillship Kulluk ran aground off the southern coast of Alaska in a storm. The rig was towed to safe harbor,
with no serious injuries to the crew.
107 Department of the Interior, Review of Shell’s 2012 Alaska Offshore Oil And Gas Exploration Program, March 8,
2013, at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/Shell-report-3-8-13-Final.pdf.
108 Section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. § 1341(a)) authorizes the President to, “from
time to time, withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf.”
109 FY2004 DOI Appropriations (P.L. 108-108). Furthermore, the Continuing Appropriations Resolution 2009 (P.L.
110-329) did not extend the annual congressional moratorium on oil and gas leasing activities in the lower 48 states. On
March 11, 2009, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) was enacted without moratorium provisions,
confirming that the congressional oil and gas development bans in federal waters along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts,
parts of Alaska, and the Gulf of Mexico that had been in place since 1982 had not been restored in 2009 appropriations
measures.
110 Presidential Memorandum, “Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf from Leasing
Disposition,” March 31, 2010, at http://www.doi.gov/whatwedo/energy/ocs/upload/2010alaska-mem-rel.pdf.
111 Presidential Memorandum, “Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf from Leasing
Disposition,” December 16, 2014, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/16/presidential-
memorandum-withdrawal-certain-areas-united-states-outer-con.
112 Presidential Memorandum, “Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf Offshore
Alaska from Leasing Disposition,” January 27, 2015, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/27/
presidential-memorandum-withdrawal-certain-areas-united-states-outer-con. The withdrawal does not affect valid
existing rights under previously existing leases in the withdrawn areas. For example, 10 of the leases sold in BOEM’s
Lease Sale 193 (see footnote 101) were at least partially in the Hanna Shoal area. Shell’s proposed 2015 Arctic
exploratory drilling would occur in the Burger prospect, which is near to Hanna Shoal. However, BOEM found that the
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Extent of the Continental Margin
Increased interest in developing offshore resources in the Arctic has sparked efforts by nations
bordering the Arctic Ocean to map the extent of their continental margins beyond the 200-mile
EEZ limit. Under UNCLOS, nations can submit a claim to submerged lands if they demonstrate
that their continental margin extends beyond the 200-mile limit according to the definition in
Article 76. Under Article 76, the extent of the continental margin beyond the 200-mile limit
depends on the position of the foot of the continental slope, the thickness of sediments, and the
depth of water. Also, the continental margin could include geologic features that extend from the
continent out to sea, which may include undersea ridges continuing for hundreds of miles
offshore.
As mentioned earlier—see “U.S. Activities As a Non-Party to UNCLOS”—the United States, as a
non-party to UNCLOS, cannot participate as a member of the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf; it cannot submit a claim under Article 76. Over the years, however, it has
submitted observations on submissions made by other states, requesting that those observations
be made available online and to the commission. In addition, since 2001 the United States has
gathered and analyzed data to determine the outer limits of its extended continental shelf.
Arctic border countries have begun the complex investigations needed to support claims for an
extended continental shelf in the Arctic. Claims have already been submitted by several countries,
including the Russian Federation, which submitted its UNCLOS claim to a portion of the Arctic
continental shelf in 2001.113 Russia made claims to the Lomonosov Ridge, an undersea feature
spanning the Arctic from Russia to Canada, as an extension of its continental margin. The
submission demonstrated Russia’s bid to extend activities in Arctic regions. The United States has
started to gather and analyze data through an initiative called the Extended Continental Shelf
Project.114 In this effort, the United States is working closely with Canada to prepare and present
Canada’s submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
Canada and the United States share overlapping regions of the seabed as part of the extended
continental margin of both nations. Both countries have conducted research singly and jointly to
map the extended continental shelf.115 Consistent with past U.S. directives addressing the
extended continental shelf and boundary issues in the Arctic,116 the Obama Administration has
undertaken an initiative to improve the delivery of relevant scientific information to officials
responsible for energy development decisions in the Arctic.117 This initiative is part of a broader
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exploratory drilling, given proposed mitigation measures, would have no significant impact on wildlife activities in
Hanna Shoal. See BOEM, Finding of No Significant Impact: Revised Outer Continental Shelf Lease Exploration Plan
EP006, Shell 2015 Chukchi Sea, Alaska, May 11, 2015, at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/
BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasing_and_Plans/Plans/2015-05-11-Shell-FONSI.pdf.
113 Tony Halpin, “President Medvedev Threatens Russian Arctic Annexation,” Times Online (September 18, 2008), at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4773567.ece.
114 The purpose of the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project is to establish the full extent of the continental shelf of
the United States, consistent with international law. Involved in this mission are the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
Department of State (DOS), and the University of New Hampshire (UNH). NOAA has the lead in collecting
bathymetric data. The U.S. Geological Survey has the lead in collecting seismic data.
115 See USGS, U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/continentalshelf/.
116 A prominent directive issued by the Bush Administration addressed, among other issues, national security and
maritime transportation. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-66 and Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/HSPD-25, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090112-3.html.
117 This initiative is part of an effort Arctic Research Commission Chairman Fran Ulmer began in December 2011. For
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response to USGS recommendations that more dialogue and collaborative science planning occur
between and among the scientific community and federal agencies involved in Arctic oil and gas
development decisions.118 These USGS recommendations stem from earlier USGS findings that
most of the potential oil and gas resources estimated for the Arctic are likely to exist within
already agreed-upon territorial boundaries.119 (For further discussion, see “Territorial Claims and
Sovereignty Issues.”)
Minerals
A warming Arctic means new opportunities and challenges for mineral exploration and
development. Receding glaciers expose previously ice-covered land that could host economic
mineral deposits that were previously undetectable and un-mineable below the ice. Longer
summers would also extend exploration seasons even for areas not currently ice-covered but
which are only accessible for ground surveys during the warmer months. In some parts of the
Arctic, such as Baffin Island, Canada, less sea ice allows ships to transport heavy equipment to
remote locations, and to convey ore from mines to the market further south. Some railway and
mining operators are considering developing railroads and other infrastructure to transport ore
year-round.120 As with onshore oil and gas development, however, mining infrastructure that
depends on footings sunk into permafrost could become unstable if the permafrost melts in
response to warmer temperatures. Also, as with oil and gas development, mineral deposits that
may be technically recoverable with current technology may not be economically profitable.
Some industry commentators suggest that mining might offer better long-term economic
development opportunities compared to oil and gas development because of a larger permanent
workforce and project lifelines of several decades.121 Similar to oil and gas, however, industry
observers note that uncertainties and knowledge gaps exist in the understanding of environmental
change in the Arctic, and how to deal with the risks of significant Arctic industrial activity.122
One important part of the current infrastructure in the Arctic that supports oil, gas, and mineral
development is the construction and use of ice roads—built and used during the winter—but
which are not passable during the warmer months. Warmer temperatures are shortening the ice
road transport seasons and creating transportation challenges. For example, the opening date for
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a full discussion of this initiative see “Obama Administration Outlines Arctic Energy Policy Initiatives,” Oil and Gas
Journal (February 7, 2012), available at http://www.ogj.com/articles/2012/02/obama-administration-outlines-arctic-
energy-policy-initiatives.html.
118 Holland-Bartels, Leslie, and Pierce, Brenda, eds., 2011, An evaluation of the science needs to inform decisions on
Outer Continental Shelf energy development in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, Alaska: U.S. Geological Survey
Circular 1370, 278 p. (2011). This report is available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1370/.
119 Don Gautier, Research Geologist, USGS, quoted in “Countries in Tug-of-War Over Arctic Resources,” CNN.com
(January 2, 2009), at http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/science/01/02/arctic.rights.dispute/index.html?iref=newssearch.
120 Carolyn Fitzpatrick, “Heavy Haul in the High North,” Railway Gazette International (July 24, 2008), at
http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/10/heavy-haul-in-the-high-north.html.
121 Cecelia Jamasmie, Melting Arctic is nothing but good news for the mining industry: Lloyd's/Chatham House,
Mining.com, April 13, 2012, http://www.mining.com/melting-arctic-is-nothing-but-good-news-for-the-mining-
industry-lloydschatam-house/.
122 Charles Emmerson and Glada Lahn, Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North, Chatham House,
2012, http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/Files/News%20and%20Insight/360%20Risk%20Insight/
Arctic_Risk_Report_20120412.pdf.
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tundra roads in northern Alaska usually occurred in early November prior to 1991 and has shifted
to January in recent years.123
Oil Pollution and Pollution Response124
Oil Pollution Implications of Arctic Change
Climate change impacts in the Arctic, particularly the decline of sea ice and retreating glaciers,
have stimulated human activities in the region, many of which have the potential to create oil
pollution. A primary concern is the threat of a large oil spill in the area. Although a major oil spill
has not occurred in the Arctic region,125 recent economic activity, such as oil and gas exploration
and tourism (cruise ships), increases the risk of oil pollution (and other kinds of pollution) in the
Arctic. Significant spills in high northern latitudes (e.g., the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska
and spills in the North Sea) suggest that the “potential impacts of an Arctic spill are likely to be
severe for Arctic species and ecosystems.”126
Risk of Oil Pollution in the Arctic
A primary factor determining the risk of oil pollution in the Arctic is the level and type of human
activity being conducted in the region. Although climate changes in the Arctic are expected to
increase access to natural resources and shipping lanes, the region will continue to present
logistical challenges that may hinder human activity in the region. For example (as discussed in
another section of this report),127 the unpredictable ice conditions may discourage trans-Arctic
shipping. If trans-Arctic shipping were to occur on a frequent basis, it would represent a
considerable portion of the overall risk of oil pollution in the region. In recent decades, many of
the world’s largest oil spills have been from oil tankers, which can carry millions of gallons of
oil.128
Although the level of trans-Arctic shipping is uncertain, many expect oil exploration and
extraction activities to intensify in the region.129 Oil well blowouts from offshore oil extraction
operations have been a source of major oil spills, eclipsing the largest tanker spills. The largest
unintentional oil spill in recent history was from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf
of Mexico.130 During that incident, the uncontrolled well released (over an 87-day period)
approximately 200 million gallons of crude oil.131 The second-largest unintentional oil spill in
123 See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Arctic Change, at http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/land-
road.shtml?page=land.
124 This section prepared by Jonathan L. Ramseur, Specialist in Environmental Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division.
125 Arctic Council, Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group, Guide to Oil Spill Response in
Snow and Ice Conditions, 2015, at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/403.
126 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 (2008).
127 See this report’s section “Implications for Sea Transportation,” by John Fritelli.
128 For example, the Exxon Valdez spilled approximately 11 million gallons of oil, but its carrying capacity was
approximately 60 million gallons.
129 See this report’s section “Implication of Changes in the Arctic for Oil, Gas, and Mineral Exploration and
Development,” by Peter Folger and Marc Humphries.
130 Larger oil spills occurred during the 1991 Iraq War, but many of those spills were deliberate. A 1910-1911 onshore
oil blowout in the California San Joaquin Valley is reported to have spilled 9.4 million barrels of crude oil (almost 400
million gallons).
131 An estimated 17% of this oil did not enter the Gulf environment but was directly recovered from the wellhead by the
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recent history—the IXTOC I, estimated at 140 million gallons—was due to an oil well blowout in
Mexican Gulf Coast waters in 1979.132
Until the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident, the spill record for offshore platforms in U.S. federal
waters had shown improvement from prior years.133 A 2003 National Research Council (NRC)
study of oil and gas activities on Alaska’s North Slope stated “blowouts that result in large spills
are unlikely.”134 Similar conclusions were made in federal agency documents regarding deepwater
drilling in the Gulf of Mexico before the 2010 Deepwater Horizon event.135 Some would likely
contend that the underlying analyses behind these conclusions should be adjusted to account for
the 2010 Gulf oil spill. However, others may argue that the proposed activities in U.S. Arctic
waters present less risk of an oil well blowout than was encountered by the Deepwater Horizon
drill rig, because the proposed U.S. Arctic operations would be in shallower waters (150 feet)
than the deepwater well (approximately 5,000 feet) that was involved in the 2010 Gulf oil spill. In
addition, Shell Oil has stated that the pressures in the Chukchi Sea (the location of Shell’s recent
interest) would be two to three times less than they were in well involved in the 2010 Gulf oil
spill.136 Regardless of these differences, even under the most stringent control systems, some oil
spills and other accidents are likely to occur from equipment failure or human error.
Potential Impacts
No oil spill is entirely benign. Even a relatively minor spill, depending on the timing and location,
can cause significant harm to individual organisms and entire populations. Regarding aquatic
spills, marine mammals, birds, bottom-dwelling and intertidal species, and organisms in early
developmental stages—eggs or larvae—are especially vulnerable. However, the effects of oil
spills can vary greatly. Oil spills can cause impacts over a range of time scales, from only a few
days to several years, or even decades in some cases.
Conditions in the Arctic may have implications for toxicological effects that are not yet
understood. For example, oil spills on permafrost may persist in an ecosystem for relatively long
periods of time, potentially harming plant life through their root systems. Moreover, little is
known about the effects of oil spills on species that are unique to the Arctic, particularly, species’
abilities to thrive in a cold environment and the effect temperature has on toxicity.137
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responsible party (British Petroleum, BP). See the Federal Interagency Solutions Group, Oil Budget Calculator Science
and Engineering Team, Oil Budget Calculator: Deepwater Horizon-Technical Documentation, November 2010; and
CRS Report R42942, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Recent Activities and Ongoing Developments, by Jonathan L.
Ramseur.
132 National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science, Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates, and
Effects (2003).
133 See CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background and Governance, by Jonathan L. Ramseur; and Dagmar Etkin
(Environmental Research Consulting), Analysis of U.S. Oil Spillage, Prepared for American Petroleum Institute,
August 2009.
134 National Research Council of the National Academies of Science, Cumulative Environmental Effects of Oil and Gas
Activities on Alaska’s North Slope (2003).
135 See, for example, Minerals Management Service (MMS), Outer Continental Shelf Oil & Gas Leasing Program:
2007-2012, Final Environmental Impact Statement, April 2007, Chapter 4; MMS, Proposed Gulf of Mexico OCS Oil
and Gas Lease Sale 206, Central Planning Area, Environmental Assessment, October 2007.
136 Letter from Marvin E. Odum, President, Shell Oil Company to S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, Minerals Management
Service (May 14, 2010). Cited in a staff paper from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
and Offshore Drilling (“The Challenges of Oil Spill Response in the Arctic,” January 2011).
137 AMAP, Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 (2008).
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The effects of oil spills in high latitude, cold ocean environments may last longer and cause
greater damage than expected. Some recent studies have found that oil spills in lower latitudes
have persisted for longer than initially expected, thus raising the concern that the persistence of
oil in the Arctic may be understated. In terms of wildlife, population recovery may take longer in
the Arctic because many of the species have longer life spans and reproduce at a slower rate.138
Response and Cleanup Challenges in the Arctic Region
Climate changes in the Arctic are expected to increase human activities in the region, many of
which impose a risk of oil pollution, particularly from oil spills. Conditions in the Arctic region
impose unique challenges for personnel charged with (1) oil spill response, the process of getting
people and equipment to the incident, and (2) cleanup duties, either recovering the spilled oil or
mitigating the contamination so that it poses less harm to the ecosystem. These challenges may
play a role in the policy development for economic activities in the Arctic.
Spill Response Challenges
Response time is a critical factor for oil spill recovery. With each hour, spilled oil becomes more
difficult to track, contain, and recover, particularly in icy conditions, where oil can migrate under
or mix with surrounding ice.139 Most response techniques call for quick action, which may pose
logistical challenges in areas without prior staging equipment or trained response professionals.
Many stakeholders are concerned about a “response gap” for oil spills in the Arctic region.140 A
response gap is a period of time in which oil spill response activities would be unsafe or
infeasible. The response gap for the northern Arctic latitudes is likely to be extremely high
compared to other regions.141
According to a 2014 National Research Council (NRC) report, “the lack of infrastructure in the
Arctic would be a significant liability in the event of a large oil.”142 The Coast Guard has no
designated air stations north of Kodiak, AK, which is almost 1,000 miles from the northernmost
point of land along the Alaskan coast in Point Barrow, AK.143 Although some of the communities
have airstrips capable of landing cargo planes, no roads connect these communities.144 Vessel
infrastructure is also limited. The nearest major port is in the Aleutian Islands, approximately
1,300 miles from Point Barrow. Two of the major non-mechanical recovery methods—in situ
138 AMAP, Arctic Oil and Gas 2007 (2008).
139 World Wildlife Fund, Oil Spill: Response Challenges in Arctic Waters (2007).
140 Coastal Response Research Center, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions (2009),
partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the University of New Hampshire.
141 Although the response gap in the Arctic has not been quantified, a recent estimate of Prince William Sound (PWS)
may be instructive. A 2007 study found a response gap for PWS of 38% for the time of the study period (65% during
the winter season). Note that PWS has existing infrastructure for response, while the more remote Arctic areas do not.
Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC, Response Gap Estimate for Two Operating Areas in Prince William Sound,
Alaska (2007), Report to Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council.
142 National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science, Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic
Marine Environment, 2014.
143 U.S. Coast Guard, Report to Congress: U.S. Coast Guard Polar Operations, December 2008.
144 A single road connects Deadhorse, Alaska and the Prudhoe Bay with central Alaska (Fairbanks). For more details
and maps of the area, see Nuka Research and Planning Group, Oil Spill Prevention and Response in the U.S. Arctic
Ocean: Unexamined Risks, Unacceptable Consequences, Commissioned by Pew Environment Group, November 2010.
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burning and dispersant application—may be limited (or “precluded”) by the Arctic conditions and
lack of logistical support: aircraft, vessels, and other infrastructure.145
A 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report identified further logistical obstacles
that would hinder an oil spill response in the region, including “inadequate” ocean and weather
information for the Arctic and technological problems with communications.146 A 2014 GAO
report highlighted steps taken by some groups (e.g., the National Oceanic Atmospheric
Administration) to improve some of these logistical elements.147
Oil Spill Cleanup Challenges
The history of oil spill response in the Aleutian Islands highlights the challenges and concerns for
potential spills in the Arctic region:
The past 20 years of data on response to spills in the Aleutians has also shown that almost
no oil has been recovered during events where attempts have been made by the
responsible parties or government agencies, and that in many cases, weather and other
conditions have prevented any response at all.148
The behavior of oil spills in cold and icy waters is not as well understood as oil spills in more
temperate climates.149 The 2014 NRC report highlights some recent advancements in
understanding oil spill behavior in arctic climates. At the same time, the report recommends
further study in multiple areas.
The 2014 NRC report states that in colder water temperatures or sea ice, “the processes that
control oil weathering—such as spreading, evaporation, photo-oxidation, emulsification, and
natural dispersion—are slowed down or eliminated for extended periods of time.”150 In some
respects, the slower weathering processes may provide more time for response strategies, such as
in situ burning or skimming. On the other hand, the longer the oil remains in an ecosystem, the
more opportunity there is for exposure.
In addition, the 2014 report states:
Arctic conditions impose many challenges for oil spill response—low temperatures and
extended periods of darkness in the winter, oil that is encapsulated under ice or trapped in
ridges and leads, oil spreading due to sea ice drift and surface currents, reduced
effectiveness of conventional containment and recovery systems in measurable ice
concentrations, and issues of life and safety of responders.
145 World Wildlife Fund, Oil Spill: Response Challenges in Arctic Waters (2007). For further discussion of issues
relating to oil spills, see CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills: Background and Governance, by Jonathan L. Ramseur.
146 Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard: Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but More
Communication about Agency Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial, GAO-10-870, September 2010.
147 Government Accountability Office, Key Issues Related to Commercial Activity in the U.S. Arctic over the Next
Decade, GAO-14-299, March 2014.
148 Transportation Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences, Risk of Vessel Accidents and Spills in the
Aleutian Islands: Designing a Comprehensive Risk Assessment (2008), Special Report 293, National Academies Press.
Washington, DC.
149 National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science, Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic
Marine Environment, 2014.
150 National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science, Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic
Marine Environment, 2014.
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Existing Policy Framework
Considering both the recent increase in human activity in the region (and expectation of further
interest) and the response and recovery challenges that an oil spill would impose in Arctic waters,
many would assert that the region warrants particular attention in terms of governance. However,
the existing framework for international governance of maritime operations in the Arctic region
lacks legally binding requirements. While the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) and
other International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions include provisions regarding ships
in icy waters, the provisions are not specific to the polar regions. Although the IMO has
“Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic,” a 2009 NOAA report described the non-binding IMO
provisions as “inconsistent with the hazards of Arctic navigation and the potential for
environmental damage from such an incident.”151
In 2013, the member states of the Arctic Council signed an Agreement on Cooperation on Marine
Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic.152 The agreement’s objective is to
“strengthen cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance ... on oil pollution preparedness and
response in the Arctic.”
In addition, the United States has separate bilateral agreements with Canada and Russia that
address oil spill response operations. The agreement with Canada was established in 1974 for the
Great Lakes and has been amended several times to add more geographic areas, including Arctic
waters. According to the 2014 NRC report: “Formal contingency planning and exercises with
Canada have enabled both the United States and Canada to refine procedures and legal
requirements for cross-border movement of technical experts and equipment in the event of an
emergency.”
The U.S.-Russian agreement was made in 1989 and applies to oil spills in Arctic waters.
However, the 2014 NRC report asserts that the agreement has not been tested to the same extent
as the U.S-Canada agreement.
Fisheries153
Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic, including in the Barents and Norwegian Seas north
of Europe, the Central North Atlantic off of Greenland and Iceland, and the Newfoundland and
Labrador Seas off of northeastern Canada.154
In the 110th Congress, P.L. 110-243 stated that “the United States should initiate international
discussions and take necessary steps with other Arctic nations to negotiate an agreement or
agreements for managing migratory, transboundary, and straddling fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean
and establishing a new international fisheries management organization or organizations for the
region.” In response to this, the United States participated in meetings with other Arctic nations at
the March 2009 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization Committee on Fisheries meetings in
Rome. These international discussions are continuing. No additional legislation has been enacted
related to U.S. fisheries in the Arctic.
151 Coastal Response Research Center, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions, (2009),
partnership between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the University of New Hampshire.
152 Available at http://www.arctic-council.org.
153 This section prepared by Eugene Buck, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry
Division.
154 Erik J. Molenaar and Robert Corell, Arctic Fisheries, Arctic Transform, February 9, 2009; available at http://arctic-
transform.org/download/FishBP.pdf.
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On February 5, 2009, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, acting under the authority
of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, unanimously approved the
Council’s draft Arctic Fisheries Management Plan and approved the preferred alternative, which
would (1) close the Arctic to commercial fishing until information improves so that fishing can be
conducted sustainably and with due concern to other ecosystem components; (2) determine the
fishery management authorities in the Arctic and provide the Council with a vehicle for
addressing future management issues; and (3) implement an ecosystem-based management policy
that recognizes the resources of the U.S. Arctic and the potential for fishery development that
might affect those resources, particularly in the face of a changing climate.
On November 3, 2009, the National Marine Fisheries Service (Department of Commerce) issued
a final rule that implemented the North Pacific Council’s Fishery Management Plan for Fish
Resources of the Arctic Management Area, as well as Amendment 29 to the Fishery Management
Plan for Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crabs. This action followed the North
Pacific Council’s recommendations establishing a basis for sustainable management of
commercial fishing in the Arctic Management Area and moving the northern boundary of the crab
fishery south of the Arctic Management Area to Bering Strait.155 In October 2009, an international
symposium focused on conservation of fish stocks and the potential for future fisheries
management in the Arctic Ocean.156 The National Marine Fisheries Service maintains an “Arctic
Fisheries” web page summarizing activates related to fisheries.157
Protected Species158
Concern over development of the Arctic relates to how such development might affect threatened
and endangered species. Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543), the
polar bear was listed as threatened on May 15, 2008. The failure by the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) to make a 90-day finding on a 2008 petition to list Pacific walrus led to submission of 60-
days’ notice of a future citizen suit. However, eventually walruses were listed as candidate species
under ESA;159 this status means that federal agencies carrying out actions that may affect the
species must confer with FWS though they are not necessarily obliged to modify their actions.
Both polar bears and walruses are heavily dependent during their life cycles on thick sea ice,
making them especially susceptible to the shrinking Arctic ice cap.
On December 30, 2008, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) determined that a listing
of ribbon seal as threatened or endangered was not warranted.160 On October 22, 2010, NMFS
listed the southern distinct population segment (DPS) of spotted seals as threatened.161 Listing of
two other DPS (Okhotsk and Bering Sea) had earlier been determined to not be warranted.162 On
155 74 Federal Register 56734-56746, November 3, 2009.
156 Information on the symposium is available at http://www.nprb.org/iafs2009/.
157 The website is available at http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/arctic/.
158 Prepared by Lynne Corn and Eugene Buck, Specialists in Natural Resources Policy, Resources, Science, and
Industry Division.
159 Fish and Wildlife Service, “Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Review of Native Species That Are
Candidates for Listing as Endangered or Threatened; Annual Notice of Findings on Resubmitted Petitions; Annual
Description of Progress on Listing Actions; Proposed Rule,” 76 Federal Register 66370-66439, October 26, 2001.
160 73 Federal Register 79822-79828.
161 75 Federal Register 65239-65248.
162 74 Federal Register 53683-58696, October 20, 2009.
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December 10, 2010, NMFS proposed that (1) four subspecies of ringed seal be listed as
threatened,163 and (2) that two DPS of one subspecies of bearded seal be listed as threatened.164
In either terrestrial or marine environments, the extreme pace of change makes a biological
response many times more difficult. For species with adaptations for a specific optimum
temperature for egg development, or production of young timed to match the availability of a
favored prey species, or seed dispersal in predictable fire regimes, etc., evolutionary responses
may well not keep pace with the rate of change.165 While species of plants and animals farther
south might migrate, drift, or be transplanted from warming habitats to more northerly sites that
may continue to be suitable,166 once a terrestrial species reaches the Arctic Ocean, it is very
literally at the end of the line. No more northern or colder habitat is available.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA; 16 U.S.C. §§1361 et seq.) protects whales, seals,
walruses, and polar bears. The MMPA established a moratorium on the “taking” of marine
mammals in U.S. waters and by U.S. nationals on the high seas, including the Arctic. The MMPA
protects marine mammals from “clubbing, mutilation, poisoning, capture in nets, and other
human actions that lead to extinction.” Under the MMPA, the Secretary of Commerce, acting
through National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), is responsible for the conservation and
management of whales and seals. The Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS), is responsible for walruses and polar bears.167 Despite the MMPA’s
general moratorium on taking, the MMPA allows U.S. citizens to apply for and obtain
authorization for taking small numbers of mammals incidental to activities other than commercial
fishing (e.g., offshore oil and gas exploration and development) if the taking would have only a
negligible impact on any marine mammal species or stock, provided that monitoring requirements
and other conditions are met.
Indigenous People Living in the Arctic168
People have been living in the Arctic for thousands of years, and indigenous peoples developed
highly specialized cultures and economies based on the physical and biological conditions of the
long-isolated region. However, with trade, the influx of additional populations especially since
the 19th century, and ongoing physical changes in the Arctic, indigenous populations have already
experienced substantial change in their lifestyles and economies. Over the past two decades,
greater political organization across indigenous populations has increased their demands for
163 75 Federal Register 77476-77495.
164 75 Federal Register 77496-77515.
165 Among biologists, it is traditionally said that a species faced with extreme change can respond in three basic ways:
“migrate, mutate, or die.” When change is rapid enough, mutation (accompanied by natural selection of individuals
within the population more suited to the changed environment) may not be able to occur fast enough, leaving migration
and death as the only options. The problem of response rate is more severe for species that reproduce slowly (e.g., polar
bears) and less severe for species that reproduce rapidly (e.g., algae).
166 The efficacy and the effect of this tactic is often questioned, since natural migration is unlikely to involve the entire
suite of species in an ecosystem (e.g., host plants might not move north (or up) as fast as their moth herbivores, nor as
fast as the birds that depend on the moths). Moreover, the southerners will not find a land of sterile bare dirt—the
species that are already there may be threatened themselves by the competition from the new arrivals, perhaps tipping
the balance and pushing still more species toward extinction.
167 Under the MMPA, both NMFS and FWS have responsibility for additional marine mammal species (e.g., manatees,
sea otters, dolphins) which are not currently found in the Arctic.
168 This section was originally prepared by Roger Walke, who was a Specialist in American Indian Policy, Domestic
Social Policy Division, until his retirement from CRS in October 2010. It has been updated by Jane A. Leggett,
Specialist in Environmental and Energy Policy in CRS’s Resources, Science and Industry Division.
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international recognition and broader rights, as well as attention to the economic, health, and
safety implications of climate change in the North.
Background
Seven of the eight Arctic nations have indigenous peoples,169 whose predecessors were present in
parts of the Arctic over 10,000 years ago, well before the arrival of peoples with European
backgrounds.170 Current Arctic indigenous peoples comprise dozens of diverse cultures and speak
dozens of languages from eight or more non-Indo-European language families.171
Before the arrival of Europeans, Arctic indigenous peoples lived in economies that were chiefly
dependent, in varying proportions, on hunting land and marine mammals, catching salt- and
fresh-water fish, herding reindeer (in Eurasia), and gathering, for their food, clothing, and other
products.172 Indigenous peoples’ interaction with and knowledge of Arctic wildlife and
environments has developed over millennia and is the foundation of their cultures.173
The length of time that Arctic indigenous peoples were in contact with Europeans varied across
the Arctic. As recorded by Europeans, contact began as early as the 9th century CE, if not before,
in Fennoscandia174 and northwestern Russia, chiefly for reasons of commerce (especially furs); it
progressed mostly west-to-east across northern Asia, reaching northeastern Arctic Asia by the 17th
century.175 North American Arctic indigenous peoples’ contact with Europeans started in Labrador
in the 16th century and in Alaska in the 18th century, and was not completed until the early 20th
century.176 Greenland’s indigenous peoples first saw European-origin peoples in the late 10th
century, but those Europeans died out during the 15th or 16th century and Europeans did not return
permanently until the 18th century.177
169 Arctic Human Development Report, ed. Joan Nymand Larsen et al. (Akureyri, Iceland: Stefansson Arctic Institute,
2004), p. 47; this report is subsequently cited in this section as AHDR. The seven countries are Canada, Denmark-
Greenland, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.
170 John F. Hoffecker, A Prehistory of the North: Human Settlement of the Higher Latitudes (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 2005), pp. 8, 81, 112-115.
171 AHDR, pp. 47, 53; David Crystal, Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), chap. 50; Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 16th ed., ed. M. Paul Lewis (Dallas: SIL
International, 2009), available at http://www.ethnologue.com/. The number of languages and language families varies
not only with definitions of the Arctic but with definitions of languages and language families.
172 Jim Berner et al., Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 12;
this report is subsequently cited in this section as ACIA.
173 ACIA, pp. 654-655.
174 Fennoscandia refers to the Scandinavian Peninsula, Finland, the Kola Peninsula of Russia, and certain parts of
Russia bordering on Finland.
175 Janet Martin, Treasure in the Land of Darkness: The Fur Trade and Its Significance for Medieval Russia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 41-42; James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia:
Russia’s North Asian Colony, 1581-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 69-83, 102; Lassi K.
Heininen, “Different Images of the Arctic and the Circumpolar North in World Politics,” in Knowledge and Power in
the Arctic, Proceedings at a Conference in Rovaniemi, April 16-18, 2007, Arctic Centre Reports 48, ed. Paula
Kankaanpaa et al. (Rovaniemi, Finland: University of Lapland, Arctic Centre, 2007), p. 125.
176 James W. VanStone, “Exploration and Contact History of Western Alaska,” and David Damas, “Copper Eskimo,”
and J. Garth Taylor, “Historical Ethnography of the Labrador Coast,” in Handbook of North American Indian: Vol. 5,
Arctic, vol. ed. David Damas, gen. ed. William C. Sturtevant (Washington: Smithsonian, 1984), pp. 149-155, 408, 509-
510.
177 Inge Kleivan, “History of Norse Greenland,” in Handbook, Vol. 5, Arctic, op. cit., pp. 549-555; Finn Gad, “Danish
Greenland Policies,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Vol. 4, History of Indian-White Relations, vol. ed.
Wilcomb E. Washburn, gen. ed. William C. Sturtevant (Washington: Smithsonian, 1988), p. 110.
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Contact led to significant changes in Arctic indigenous economies, political structures, foods,
cultures, and populations, starting especially in the 20th century. For example, life expectancy
among Alaska Natives has increased from 47 years in 1950 to over 69 years in 2000 (though it
still lags behind that of U.S. residents overall, at 77 years).178
Also, at present, most Arctic indigenous peoples have become minorities in their countries’ Arctic
areas, except in Greenland and Canada. (One source estimates that, around 2003, about 10% of an
estimated 3.7 million people in the Arctic were indigenous.)179 While many Arctic indigenous
communities remain heavily dependent on hunting, fishing, and herding and are more likely to
depend on traditional foods than non-indigenous Arctic inhabitants,180 there is much variation.
Most Arctic indigenous people may no longer consume traditional foods as their chief sources of
energy and nutrition.181 Major economic change is also relatively recent but ongoing.182 Many
Arctic indigenous communities have developed a mixture of traditional economic activities and
wage employment.183 The economics of subsistence and globalization will be key factors in the
effects of climate change on Arctic indigenous peoples, and on their reactions to Arctic climate
change.
Arctic indigenous peoples’ current political structures vary, as do their relationships with their
national governments. Some indigenous groups govern their own unique land areas within the
national structure, as in the United States and Canada; others have special representative bodies,
such as the Saami parliaments in Norway, Finland, and Sweden;184 a few areas have general
governments with indigenous majorities, such as Greenland (a member country of Denmark),
Nunavut territory in Canada, and the North Slope and Northwest Arctic boroughs in Alaska.185
Control of land, through claims and ownership, also varies among Arctic indigenous peoples, as
do rights to fishing, hunting, and resources.186 Arctic indigenous peoples’ political relationships to
their national and local governments, and their ownership or claims regarding land, are also
significant factors in the responses to Arctic climate change by the indigenous peoples and by
Arctic nations’ governments.
178 Parkinson, Alan J. The Arctic Human Health Initiative. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2006.
179 AHDR, pp. 19, 29. Estimates of Arctic indigenous populations are complicated by varying definitions not only of the
Arctic but also of indigenous peoples; for instance, Russia does not count some non-European Arctic ethnic groups,
such as the Yakut, as “indigenous minorities” (see “Peoples of the Arctic: Characteristics of Human Populations
Relevant to Pollution Issues,” in AMAP Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution Issues, ed. Simon J. Wilson et al. (Oslo:
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 1998), pp. 167-169; this report is subsequently cited in this section as
AMAP 1998.
180 AMAP 1998, chapter 5; see also Birger Poppel et al., SLiCA Results, Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic
(Anchorage: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska Anchorage, 2007), pp. 4-7,
http://www.arcticlivingconditions.org.
181 Annika E. Nilson and Henry P. Huntington, Arctic Pollution 2009 (Oslo: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Programme, 2009), pp. 39-41; this report is subsequently cited in this section as AMAP 2009.
182 ACIA, p. 1000.
183 SLiCA Results, op.cit., pp. v, 4-8.
184 AHDR, p. 232.
185 AHDR, chapter 4, and pp. 232-233.
186 AHDR, chapters 6-7, and pp. 232-233.
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Effects of Climate Change
Arctic climate change is expected to affect the economies, population, subsistence, health,
infrastructure, societies, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples. Changes in sea ice and sea
level, permafrost, tundra, weather, and vegetation distributions, as well as increased commercial
shipping, mineral extraction, and tourism, will affect the distribution of land and sea mammals, of
freshwater and marine fish, and of forage for reindeer. These will in turn affect traditional
subsistence activities and related indigenous lifestyles.187 Arctic indigenous peoples’ harvesting of
animals is likely to become riskier and less predictable, which may increase food insecurity,
change diets, and increase dependency on outside, non-traditional foods.188 Food cellars in many
locations have thawed during summers, threatening food safety. Related health risks of diabetes,
obesity, and mental illness have been associated with these changes.189
Sea, shoreline ice, and permafrost changes have damaged infrastructure and increased coastal and
inland erosion, especially in Alaska, where GAO found in 2003 that “coastal villages are
becoming more susceptible to flooding and erosion caused in part by rising temperatures.”190 In
response, Congress funded the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to conduct a Baseline Erosion
Assessment that identified and prioritized among the 178 communities identified at risk from
erosion.191 (Risks from flooding were not examined.) GAO concluded in 2009 that many Native
villages must relocate, but even those facing imminent threats have been impeded by various
barriers, including difficulties identifying appropriate new sites, piecemeal programs for state and
federal assistance, and obstacles to eligibility for certain federal programs.192 The Alaska
Federation of Natives placed among its 2010 federal priorities a request to Congress to mitigate
flooding and erosion in Alaska Native villages and to fund relocation of villages where
necessary.193 However, “the cost is extraordinary,” acknowledges Senator Lisa Murkowski.194
Oil, gas, and mineral exploration and development are expected to increase, as are other
economic activities, such as forestry and tourism, and these are expected to increase economic
187 ACIA, pp. 1000-1001, 1004.
188 ACIA, pp. 1000-1001, 1004.
189 Parkinson, Alan J. The Arctic Human Health Initiative. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2006; Brubaker, Michael, James Berner, Raj Chavan, and John Warren. “Climate Change and Health Effects
in Northwest Alaska.” Global Health Action 4 (October 18, 2011).
190 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Alaska Native Villages: Villages Affected by Flooding and Erosion
Have Difficulty Qualifying for Federal Assistance, GAO-04-895T, June 29, 2004, p. i, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04895t.pdf. See also, Government Accountability Office, Alaska Native Villages: Most Are Affected by Flooding and
Erosion, but Few Qualify for Federal Assistance, GAO-04-142, December 12, 2003, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04142.pdf.
191 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Alaska Baseline Erosion Assessment (BEA), March 2009.
192 GAO, Alaska Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding
and Erosion, June 3, 2009.
193 Alaska Federation of Natives, Human Resources Committee, 2010 Federal Priorities (Anchorage: Alaska
Federation of Natives, 2010), pp. 22-23, available at http://www.nativefederation.org/documents/
2010_AFN_Federal_Priorities.pdf. See also, Government Accountability Office, Alaska Native Villages: Limited
Progress Has Been Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion, GAO-09-551, June 3, 2009,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09551.pdf. For a more detailed anecdote, see a 2012 interview with Brice Eningowuk,
Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation Committee member at Shearer, Christine. “Climate Crisis: Alaskan Village
Shishmaref Sinking Into the Sea.” Imagined Magazine, July 8, 2012, http://imaginedmag.com/2012/07/climate-crisis-
alaskan-village-shishmaref-sinking-into-the-sea/.
194 Press Office of Senator Lisa Murkowski. “Murkowski Urges Greater Tribal Consultation from Administration;
Senator Spotlights ‘Monumental’ Climate Struggles Faced by Alaska Natvies, Coastal Communities”, July 19, 2012.
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opportunities for all Arctic residents, including indigenous peoples.195 Pressures to increase
participation in the wage economy, however, may speed up changes in indigenous cultures.
Increased economic opportunities may also lead to a rise in the non-indigenous population, which
may further change the circumstances of indigenous cultures. Some representatives of Arctic
indigenous people have related a “conflicting desire between combating climate change and
embracing the potential for economic growth through foreign investment.”196
Although important advances in public health have occurred in indigenous communities over past
decades, some health problems may increase with continued Arctic climate change. Economic
development may exacerbate Arctic pollution problems, including higher exposure to mercury, air
pollution, and food contamination. The influx and redistribution of contaminants in the air,
oceans, and land may change in ways that are now poorly understood.197 Warmer temperatures
and longer warm seasons may increase insect- and wildlife-borne diseases.198 Climate change
may lead to damage to water and sanitation systems, reducing protection against waterborne
diseases.199 Changes in Arctic indigenous cultures may increase mental stress and behavioral
problems.200
The response to climate change by Arctic indigenous peoples has included international activities
by Arctic indigenous organizations and advocacy before their national governments. As one
report noted, “the rise of solidarity among indigenous peoples organizations in the region is
surely a development to be reckoned with by all those interested in policy issues in the Arctic.”201
Six national or international indigenous organizations are permanent participants of the Arctic
Council, the regional intergovernmental forum.202 Due in part to advocacy by Arctic indigenous
people, the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 2007 the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.203 In April 2009, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (an organization of Inuit in
the Arctic regions of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Russia) hosted in Alaska the worldwide
“Indigenous Peoples Global Summit on Climate Change.”204 The conference report, forwarded to
the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change (December 2009), noted “accelerating” climate change caused by “unsustainable
195 ACIA, pp. 1001, 1004.
196 Aqqaluk Lynge, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Council, quoted in Stephanie McFeeters, “Lynge talks future of Inuit
people,” The Dartmouth, February 8, 2012.
197 See, for example, “Health: Increased Bacterial Loads in Potable Water Could Have Significant Health Effects on
Indigenous People From the Arctic to Uganda, Says Vanier Scholar.” National Aboriginal Health Organization
(NAHO), February 17, 2012. http://www.naho.ca/blog/2012/02/17/health-increased-bacterial-loads-in-potable-water-
could-have-significant-health-effects-on-indigenous-people-from-the-arctic-to-uganda-says-vanier-scholar/; or,
Kallenborn et al. Combined Effects of Selected Pollutants and Climate Change in the Arctic Environment. Oslo,
Norway: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Council, 2011.
198 AMAP Assessment 2009: Human Health in the Arctic, ed. Simon J. Wilson and Carolyn Symon (Oslo: Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 2009), pp. 4-6, 143.
199 Brubaker, Michael, James Berner, Raj Chavan, and John Warren. “Climate Change and Health Effects in Northwest
Alaska.” Global Health Action 4 (October 18, 2011); John Warren, “Climate change could affect human health,”
Mukluk Telegraph, January/February 2005, pp. 5-6.
200 John Warren, “Climate change could affect human health,” Mukluk Telegraph, January/February 2005, pp. 5-6.
201 AHDR, p. 235.
202 See http://www.arctic-council.org/. The six organizations are the Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan
Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, RAIPON (Russian Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North), and Saami Council.
203 United Nations, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Resolution A/RES/61/295, at http://social.un.org/
index/IndigenousPeoples/DeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples.aspx.
204 See http://www.indigenoussummit.com/servlet/content/home.html.
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development” and, among several recommendations, called for a greater indigenous role in
national and international decisions on climate change, including a greater role for indigenous
knowledge in climate change research, monitoring, and mitigation.205
Polar Icebreaking206
Coast Guard polar icebreakers perform a variety of missions supporting U.S. interests in polar
regions. The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar
icebreaker, Polar Star, and one medium polar icebreaker, Healy. A Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Mission Need Statement (MNS) approved in June 2013 states that “current
requirements and future projections ... indicate the Coast Guard will need to expand its
icebreaking capacity, potentially requiring a fleet of up to six icebreakers (3 heavy and 3 medium)
to adequately meet mission demands in the high latitudes.... ”207
In addition to Polar Star, the Coast Guard has a second heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea. This
ship suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been non-operational since then. Polar Star
and Polar Sea entered service in 1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now well beyond their
originally intended 30-year service lives. This situation—combined with the MNS statement
about the Coast Guard needing up to three heavy polar icebreakers and concerns among some
observers about whether the United States is adequately investing in capabilities to carry out its
responsibilities and defend its interests in the Arctic—has focused policymaker attention on the
question of whether and when to procure one or more new heavy polar icebreakers as
replacements for Polar Star and Polar Sea. A new heavy polar icebreaker might cost roughly
$900 million to $1.1 billion to procure.
The Administration’s FY2013 budget submission initiated a new project for the design and
construction of a new polar icebreaker, and included $860 million over five years for the
procurement of the ship. The submission stated that DHS anticipated awarding a construction
contract for the ship “within the next five years” (i.e., by FY2018) and taking delivery on the ship
“within a decade” (i.e., by 2023).
The Administration’s FY2014 budget submission reduced the five-year funding for a new polar
icebreaker to $230 million—a 73% reduction—but still stated that DHS anticipated awarding a
construction contract for the ship “within the next four years” (i.e., by FY2018).
The Administration’s FY2015 budget submission maintained five-year funding for a new polar
icebreaker at $230 million, but did not state when a construction contract for the ship might be
awarded, creating uncertainty about the timing of the project.
The Administration’s FY2016 budget submission, submitted to Congress in February 2015,
reduced five-year funding for a new polar icebreaker further, to $166 million—an 81% reduction
from the figure in the FY2013 budget submission—and again did not state when a construction
205 K. Galloway-McLean et al., Report of the Indigenous Peoples’ Global Summit on Climate Change: 20-24 April
2009, Anchorage, Alaska (Darwin, Australia: United Nations University—Traditional Knowledge Initiative, 2009), pp.
5-7; available at http://www.indigenoussummit.com/servlet/content/home.html.
206 This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division. It is adapted from CRS Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
207 Department of Homeland Security, Polar Icebreaking Recapitalization Project Mission Need Statement, Version
1.0, approved by DHS June 28, 2013, p. 9.
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contract for the ship might be awarded, maintaining the uncertainty about the timing of the
project.
On September 1, 2015, the White House issued a fact sheet in conjunction with a visit to Alaska
by President Obama indicating that the Administration, in its own internal planning, had at some
point over the past two years deferred procurement of a new polar icebreaker to FY2022, but that
this has now been changed to FY2020.208 The newly announced procurement date of FY2020 is a
two-year acceleration from the previously unpublicized date of FY2022, and a two-year deferral
from the FY2018 date implied in the FY2013 and FY2014 budget submissions. The fact sheet
states that the Administration will also “begin planning for construction of additional icebreakers”
beyond the one that the Administration proposes to procure in FY2020.
A polar icebreaker procured in FY2020 might enter service in 2024 or 2025. Polar Star has been
refurbished and reentered service in December 2012 for an intended period of 7 to 10 years—a
period that will end between December 2019 and December 2022. Consequently, unless the
service life of Polar Star is further extended (or unless Polar Sea is repaired and returned to
service), there will be a period of perhaps two to six years during which the United States will
have no operational heavy polar icebreakers.
Search and Rescue209
General
Increasing sea and air traffic through Arctic waters has increased concerns regarding Arctic-area
search and rescue capabilities. Table 1 presents figures on ship casualties in Arctic Circle waters
from 2005 to 2014, as shown in the 2015 edition of an annual report on shipping and safety by the
insurance company Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty.
Table 1. Ship Casualties in Arctic Circle Waters, 2005-2014
Ships of 100 gross tons or more
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Total
Machinery damage/failure
2
3
5
13
14
16
12
13
20
27
125
Wrecked/stranded
1
4
10
11
14
9
9
8
10
14
90
Miscellaneous
0
0
5
1
4
4
2
6
5
5
32
Fire/explosion
0
0
3
1
2
6
6
1
4
2
25
Col ision
0
0
0
1
4
10
4
4
2
0
25
Contact (e.g., harbor wall)
0
0
1
1
1
3
1
3
6
4
20
Hul damage
0
1
3
1
6
2
2
1
2
1
19
Foundered (i.e., sunk or
0
0
1
1
2
0
3
1
1
2
11
submerged)
Total
3
8
28
30
47
50
39
37
50
55
347
208 The White House, “FACT SHEET: President Obama Announces New Investments to Enhance Safety and Security
in the Changing Arctic,” September 1, 2015, accessed September 2, 2015, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/09/01/fact-sheet-president-obama-announces-new-investments-enhance-safety-and.
209 This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
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Source: Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty, Safety and Shipping Review 2015, p. 28. (Table entitled “Arctic
Circle Waters—All Casualties including Total Losses 2005–2014.” The table includes its own source note, which
states, “Source: Lloyd’s List Intelligence Casualty Statistics Analyses: AGCS [Allianz Global Corporate &
Specialty]”.)
Notes: Of the 55 ship casualties in 2014, one ship (located near Iceland and Northern Norway) was a total loss.
Given the location of current U.S. Coast Guard operating bases, it could take Coast Guard aircraft
several hours, and Coast Guard cutters days or even weeks, to reach a ship or a downed aircraft in
distress in Arctic waters. In addition, the harsh climate complicates search and rescue operations
in the region. Particular concern has been expressed about cruise ships that may experience
problems and need assistance; there have already been incidents of this kind in recent years in
waters off Antarctica.
A May 13, 2013, press report states:
Arctic nations must urgently improve rescue services in the resource-rich region that is
opening up fast to shipping, energy and mining companies, Canadian experts said on
Monday [May 13]....
“It is crucial that northern nations strengthen response capabilities to shipping-related
accidents foreseen in newly-opened northern waters,” scientists from the Canadian
Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program wrote in a report.
Faster responses to emergencies for people living in the Arctic, including floods or forest
fires, were also urgently need[ed], the report said.210
Increasing U.S. Coast Guard search and rescue capabilities for the Arctic could require one or
more of the following: enhancing or creating new Coast Guard operating bases in the region;
procuring additional Arctic-capable aircraft, cutters, and rescue boats for the Coast Guard; and
adding systems to improve Arctic maritime communications, navigation, and domain
awareness.211 It may also entail enhanced forms of cooperation with navies and coast guards of
other Arctic countries.
Coast Guard Statements
A January 2011 press report summarized remarks made by the Commandant of the Coast Guard,
Admiral Robert Papp, concerning Coast Guard search and rescue capabilities in the Arctic. The
article quoted Papp as saying that there is a need for a range of Coast Guard operational
capability for the Arctic, and that “In the meantime, he said the service will lean on partnerships
with other Arctic nations. However, he warned that the Coast Guard will likely not be able to
respond to any crises in the Arctic circle in a timely fashion. He recalled that the Canadian Coast
Guard came under fire when it took six days to rescue a cruise ship and oil tanker that both ran
aground in its northern waters.” The article stated:
“We wouldn’t be able to make it in six days,” he said. “It’d probably take us six weeks to
get adequate resources up for a similar thing in our waters, so we have to start focusing
on this.”212
210 Alister Doyle, “Arctic Nations Must Urgently Improve Rescue Services—Canadian Experts,” Reuters
(http://in.reuters.com), May 13, 2013.
211 For a report assessing certain emergency scenarios in the Arctic, including search and rescue scenarios, see Opening
the Arctic Seas, Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions, Coastal Response and Research Center, University of
New Hampshire, report of January 2009, based on conference held March 18-20, 2008, at Durham, New Hampshire.
212 Cid Standifer, “Coast Guard Comandant: Service Still Committed To Eight NSCs,” Inside the Navy, January 17,
2011.
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A March 2011 press report summarizing remarks made by Admiral Papp during and after a
hearing before the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation subcommittee of the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee stated:
Because retreating ice continues to make the passageways in the Arctic Ocean more
navigable, the Coast Guard needs to have air stations in the region to conduct helicopter
rescue missions, Papp said. He has not chosen specific cities for the air station sites, but
he said the Alaskan cities of Barrow and Kotzebue come to mind.
When lawmakers focus on Arctic resources, the United States’ shortage of icebreakers
usually draws the bulk of attention, but Papp said the Coast Guard is also in dire need of
small boats to conduct rescue missions.213
At a June 23, 2011, hearing on the Coast Guard’s proposed FY2012 budget before the Oceans,
Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard subcommittee of the Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee, the following exchange occurred:
ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, JR., COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD: I
visited Barrow, Kotzebue, and Nome. And, actually, it was a revisit because I had served
up there as an ensign (ph) 35 years ago. And so it was good to get back up there and see
the changes.
But what has not changed is the infrastructure up there. And I think that we have to have
a robust discussion on the infrastructure needed to support what is no doubt going to be
an increase in human activity up there off the – the North Coast of Alaska.
Icebreakers I think are important, but they cloud the discussion of the other needs that we
have up there. And I think we've focused on icebreakers over the last few years, even
though they are important...
SENATOR MARK BEGICH: Right.
PAPP: ... and needed. But, right now, if we were to have to mount a response like we did
in the Gulf of Mexico—I sent 3,000 people down for Deepwater Horizon. You know how
many hotel rooms are available in Barrow.
BEGICH: That’s right.
PAPP: And we—we have no place to put people up there. We have no hangars for
aircraft. We have no piers, no Coast Guard boats. So my immediate, pressing concern is
as human activity occurs, as you have that ship that goes through that—first of all, we'll
assure safety standards because no matter where ships operate in the world, we are
involved in their safety standards.
But if an accident happens, how do we respond? And, right now, we’ve got zero
capability to respond in the Arctic right now. And we've got to do better than that.
That—when people ask me what keeps me awake at night—an oil spill, a collision, a ship
sinking in the Arctic keeps me awake at night because we have nothing to respond or, if
we respond, it’s going to take us weeks to get there.214
State Department Statement
The State Department states that
213 Jennifer Scholtes, “Papp: Coast Guard Arctic Plan Must Look Beyond Icebreakers,” CQ Homeland Security, March
1, 2011.
214 Source: Transcript of hearing.
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the United States and the seven other Arctic Council (AC) Member States (Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden) adopted a Ministerial
Declaration in April 2009 in Tromso, Norway, which established a Task Force with the
mandate of developing a Search and Rescue (SAR) agreement for the Arctic. The United
States hosted the first meeting of the Arctic SAR Task Force during December 9-11,
2009, in Washington, D.C. The next round of negotiations is scheduled [sic] for February
25-26, 2010, in Moscow, Russian Federation. The Arctic SAR Task Force has been asked
to finalize the Arctic SAR agreement such that it can be presented for adoption by the AC
at its Ministerial meeting in Spring 2011.
The United States is at the forefront of efforts to promote safety in the Arctic. The
Department of State’s Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs is coordinating federal
interagency interest to negotiate an instrument for the saving of lives at sea and the rescue
of survivors after aircraft accidents in the Arctic. The U.S. Coast Guard is a prominent
agency participating in this effort. With so few resources available for SAR in the Arctic,
developing a regional agreement to set baseline standards for greater international
cooperation and coordination will be of great value.215
Arctic Council Agreement on Arctic Search and Rescue (May 2011)
On May 12, 2011, representatives from the member states of the Arctic Council, meeting in
Nuuk, Greenland, signed an agreement on cooperation on aeronautical and maritime search and
rescue in the Arctic. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton signed for the United States. Key
features of the agreement include the following:
Article 2 states: “The objective of this Agreement is to strengthen aeronautical
and maritime search and rescue cooperation and coordination in the Arctic.”
Article 3 and the associated Annex to the agreement essentially divide the Arctic
into search and rescue areas within which each party has primary responsibility
for conducting search and rescue operations, stating that “the delimitation of
search and rescue regions is not related to and shall not prejudice the delimitation
of any boundary between States or their sovereignty, sovereign rights or
jurisdiction,” and that “each Party shall promote the establishment, operation and
maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue capability within its
area.”
Article 4 and the associated Appendix I to the agreement identify the competent
authority for each party. For the United States, the competent authority is the
Coast Guard.
Article 5 and the associated Appendix II to the agreement identify the agencies
responsible for aeronautical and maritime search and rescue for each party. For
the United States, those agencies are the Coast Guard and the Department of
Defense.
Article 6 and the associated Appendix III to the agreement identify the
aeronautical and/or maritime rescue coordination centers (RCCs) for each party.
For the United States, the RCCs are Joint Rescue Coordination Center Juneau
(JRCC Juneau) and Aviation Rescue Coordination Center Elmendorf (ARCC
Elmendorf).
215 Source: State Department website, http://www.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/opa/arc/c29382.htm, July 7, 2011.
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Article 7 states that “the Parties shall conduct aeronautical and maritime search
and rescue operations pursuant to this Agreement consistent” with certain general
guidelines.216
Article 8 states that “a Party requesting permission to enter the territory of a Party
or Parties for search and rescue purposes, including for refueling, shall send its
request to a search and rescue agency and/or RCC of the relevant Party or
Parties,” and that “the Party receiving such a request shall immediately confirm
such receipt. The receiving Party, through its RCCs, shall advise as soon as
possible as to whether entry into its territory has been permitted and the
conditions, if any, under which the mission may be undertaken.”
Article 9 states that “the Parties shall enhance cooperation among themselves in
matters relevant to this Agreement,” that “the Parties shall exchange information
that may serve to improve the effectiveness of search and rescue operations,” and
that “the Parties shall promote mutual search and rescue cooperation by giving
due consideration to collaborative efforts.”
Article 10 states that “the Parties shall meet on a regular basis in order to
consider and resolve issues regarding practical cooperation.”
Article 11 states that “after a major joint search and rescue operation, the search
and rescue agencies of the Parties may conduct a joint review of the operation led
by the Party that coordinated the operation.”
Article 12 states that “unless otherwise agreed, each Party shall bear its own costs
deriving from its implementation of this Agreement,” and that “implementation
of this Agreement shall be subject to the availability of relevant resources.”
Article 18 states that “any Party to this Agreement may, where appropriate, seek
cooperation with States not party to this Agreement that may be able to
contribute to the conduct of search and rescue operations, consistent with existing
international agreements.”
216 The guidelines, as stated in Article 7, are as follows:
(a) search and rescue operations conducted pursuant to this Agreement in the territory of a Party
shall be carried out consistent with the laws and regulations of that Party;
(b) if a search and rescue agency and/or RCC of a Party receives information that any person is, or
appears to be, in distress, that Party shall take urgent steps to ensure that the necessary assistance is
provided;
(c) any Party having reason to believe that a person, a vessel or other craft or aircraft is in a state of
emergency in the area of another Party as set forth in paragraph 2 of the Annex shall forward as
soon as possible all available information to the Party or Parties concerned;
(d) the search and rescue agency and/or RCC of a Party that has received information concerning a
situation provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph may request assistance from the other
Parties;
(e) the Party to whom a request for assistance is submitted shall promptly decide on and inform the
requesting Party whether or not it is in a position to render the assistance requested and shall
promptly indicate the scope and the terms of the assistance that can be rendered;
(f) the Parties shall ensure that assistance be provided to any person in distress. They shall do so
regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is
found; and
(g) a Party shall promptly provide all relevant information regarding the search and rescue of any
person to the consular or diplomatic authorities concerned.
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Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress
Article 19 states that “any Party may at any time withdraw from this Agreement
by sending written notification thereof to the depositary217 through diplomatic
channels at least six months in advance.”218
Figure 4 shows an illustrative map of the national areas of search and rescue responsibility based
on the geographic coordinates listed in the Annex to the agreement.
Figure 4. Illustrative Map of Arctic SAR Areas in Arctic SAR Agreement
(Based on geographic coordinates listed in the agreement)
Source: “Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement,” accessed July 7, 2011, at http://www.arcticportal.org/features/
features-of-2011/arctic-search-and-rescue-agreement.
The State Department states that the agreement:
is the first legally-binding instrument negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council.
It coordinates life-saving international maritime and aeronautical SAR coverage and
response among the Arctic States across an area of about 13 million square miles in the
Arctic.
As Arctic sea ice coverage decreases, ship-borne activities are increasing significantly in
the Arctic. Flight traffic is also on the rise as new polar aviation routes cross the Arctic
217 Article 20 identifies the government of Canada as the depository for the agreement.
218 Source: Text of final version of agreement made ready for signing and dated April 21, 2011, http://arctic-
council.org/filearchive/Arctic_SAR_Agreement_EN_FINAL_for_signature_21-Apr-2011.pdf.
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air space in several directions. As human presence and activities in the Arctic expand, the
potential for accidents increases as well. Limited rescue resources, challenging weather
conditions, and the remoteness of the area render SAR operations difficult in the Arctic,
making coordination among the Arctic nations imperative. The SAR Agreement will
improve search and rescue response in the Arctic by committing all Parties to coordinate
appropriate assistance to those in distress and to cooperate with each other in undertaking
SAR operations. For each Party, the Agreement defines an area of the Arctic in which it
will have lead responsibility in organizing responses to SAR incidents, both large and
small. Parties to the Agreement commit to provide SAR assistance regardless of the
nationality or status of persons who may need it.
The Arctic Council launched this initiative at its 2009 Ministerial Meeting in Tromso,
Norway, establishing a Task Force, co-chaired by the United States and the Russian
Federation. The Task Force proceeded in a highly collaborative spirit, meeting five times
(in Washington, Moscow, Oslo, Helsinki and Reykjavik).
The signature of the SAR Agreement in Nuuk is a positive step toward building
partnerships in the Arctic. In particular, it reflects the commitment of the Arctic Council
States to enhance their cooperation and offer responsible assistance to those involved in
accidents in one of the harshest environments on Earth.
This Agreement illustrates one of the most successful negotiations to date to address
emerging issues in the Arctic. Arctic Council participants approached SAR negotiations
with collaboration and dedication to a positive outcome. The United States congratulates
its colleagues in this effort and looks forward to further collaboration on the vital issues
facing the rich but fragile Arctic region.219
Geopolitical Environment220
In recent years, many observers have noted that the loss of Arctic ice is leading to stepped-up
human activity in the high north, particularly in the form of increasing commercial traffic and
economic development. This trend has brought forth a range of issues on the geopolitical front,
from environmental protection to search-and-rescue capabilities to the delineation of national
boundaries—which will determine access to natural resources. These concerns are being
addressed cooperatively in both bilateral and multilateral fashion, especially under the aegis of
the Arctic Council and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). International law
Professor William Moomaw of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy has noted that “the
lure of riches in the Arctic draws ever more companies and nations, but so far it’s been relatively
amicable jousting and jostling there.”221
Nonetheless, some observers continue to raise questions concerning security in the high north,
and have advanced sometimes conflicting views regarding the potential roles of military forces in
the region. Of the other Arctic coastal nations, the United States enjoys strong political and
economic ties with Canada, Norway, and Denmark; all four countries are members of NATO.
Although the United States views Russia as an important partner in developing policies to cope
with changing conditions in the Arctic, relations with Moscow have had numerous areas of
tension in recent years. Several non-Arctic nations, including India and China, have also evinced
219 Source: State Department website, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163285.htm, July 7, 2011.
220 This section was prepared by Carl Ek, who was a Specialist in International Relations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division, until his retirement on April 30, 2014. For questions relating to this section, contact Derek E. Mix,
Analyst in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
221 “China Pushes for Arctic Foothold – From a Thousand Miles Away,” Christian Science Monitor Global News Blog,
March 7, 2013.
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interest in the high north, and recently gained permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. In
addition, the European Union, which sought but was denied full observer status in 2009 and 2013,
is nonetheless developing policy toward the Arctic.222
Multilateral Political Cooperation
As noted elsewhere in this report, in May 2008, ministerial representatives of the five Arctic
littoral states attended a meeting convened by Denmark in Ilulissat, Greenland (a semi-
autonomous territory of Denmark). Danish Foreign Minister Stig Møller implied that the meeting
was intended to develop interim measures for Arctic governance: “We must continue to fulfill our
obligations in the Arctic area until the U.N. decides who will have the right to the sea and the
resources in the region. We must agree on the rules and what to do if climate changes make more
shipping possible.”223 Attendees discussed a variety of issues, including the environment,
transportation, resources, and security. The Danish Foreign Ministry stated that the resulting
Ilulissat Declaration
sent a clear political signal to the local inhabitants and the rest of the world that we will
act responsibly when addressing the development in the Arctic Ocean. We have
committed ourselves politically to solve any disagreements through negotiation. Thus,
hopefully, we have eradicated all the myths about a ‘race for the North Pole.’ The legal
framework is in place and the five States have now declared that they will abide by it.224
The Arctic Council
The Arctic has increasingly become a subject of discussions in bilateral meetings among leaders
of the nations in the region and elsewhere around the globe. The main international forum for
cooperation in the high north, however, is the eight-nation Arctic Council, of which the United
States is an active member.
A series of meetings initiated by Finland in 1989 eventually led to the creation of the Arctic
Council in 1996. The Council has become the primary intergovernmental “high level forum” for
cooperation in the Arctic region. It addresses a wide range of issues, including regional
development, the environment, emergency response, climate change, and natural resource
extraction.
The Council membership consists of the eight countries that have sovereign territory within the
Arctic Circle: the United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark (by virtue of its territory Greenland),
Russia, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland. Only these countries have voting rights. Six indigenous
Arctic peoples’ organizations are permanent participants. Permanent observer status is held by
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the UK, China, India, Italy, Japan, South
Korea, and Singapore; the latter six were added during the May 2013 summit meeting. Also
represented on the Council are several intergovernmental and nongovernmental observers,
222 “China, India Enter Heating-up Arctic Race,” Asia Times, January 25, 2012; “Aston in Far North to Reach EU
Policy on Arctic,” Agence France Presse, March 8, 2012; “EU Application to Arctic Council Postponed,” North
Norway European Office, May 18, 2011, http://www.northnorway.org/nyheter/847-eu-application-to-arctic-council-
postponed See also: “Arctic Governance: Balancing Challenges and Development,” European Parliament Regional
Briefing 2012, DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2012_136 June, 2012.
223 Conference on the Arctic Ocean, May 26, 2008, Arctic Council website: http://arctic-council.org/article/2008/5/
conference_on_the_arctic_ocean.
224 Conference In Ilulissat, Greenland: Landmark Political Declaration on the Future of the Arctic, Edited December
11, 2008, website of the Danish Foreign Ministry, http://www.um.dk/en.
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including the International Red Cross, the United Nations Development Program, the Nordic
Council, and the Worldwide Fund for Nature.
The Council has six working groups devoted to various issues: (1) the Arctic Contaminants
Action Program; (2) the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program; (3) Conservation of Arctic
Flora and Fauna; (4) Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response; (5) Protection of the
Arctic Marine Environment; and (6) the Sustainable Development Working Group. The United
States reportedly vetoed security as an issue of consideration for the Council.225
Each member state is represented by a Senior Arctic Official (SAO), who is usually drawn from
that country’s foreign ministry. The SAOs hold meetings every six months. The Council convenes
ministerial-level meetings every two years, at the end of each chairmanship, while the working
groups meet more frequently. The Council has a two-year rotating chairmanship. In May 2013,
Sweden passed the gavel to Canada. The United States took over the chairmanship on April 24,
2015. The United States previously held the chairmanship from 1998 to 2000.
In May 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attended the Arctic Council ministerial
summit, held in Nuuk, Greenland; she was accompanied by U.S. Interior Secretary Ken Salazar.
They were the first U.S. Cabinet members to attend an Arctic Council meeting, and observers
stated that their visits served to raise the profile of Arctic issues. Noting the increased commercial
activity in the region, Secretary Clinton declared, “We need to pursue these opportunities in a
smart, sustainable way that preserves the Arctic environment and ecosystem.”226 Among other
issues, attendees focused on efforts to reduce emissions that cause “black carbon” to settle on the
Arctic region, accelerating ice melt. In addition, the Council discussed launching a longer-term
study on methods to cope with possible future oil spills.
The major “deliverable” of the summit, however, was the signing of an Agreement on
Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) in the Arctic. The accord
was the “first legally-binding instrument negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council.”227
The SAR initiative, developed mainly by the United States and Russia, had been introduced
during the April 2009 summit. The Council also approved the establishment of a permanent
secretariat, to be based in Tromsø, Norway.
In June 2012, then-Secretary Clinton traveled once more to the Arctic, visiting the newly opened
secretariat in Tromsø as part of an eight-day trip to Scandinavia. While there, she emphasized that
the U.S. government “want[s] the Arctic Council to remain the premier institution that deals with
Arctic questions.”228
The Council held its most recent summit on May 15, 2013, in Kiruna, Sweden. Secretary of State
John Kerry’s attendance, following on the heels of Secretary Clinton’s two years earlier,
underlined the growing importance attached by the U.S. government to polar issues. The Council
revisited several of its core topics, including ocean acidification, ice loss, black carbon,
biodiversity, the status of indigenous peoples, and emergency preparedness. Consideration of the
225 A New Security Architecture for the Arctic: An American Perspective, By Heather A. Conley, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, January, 2012, p. 14.
226 “States Set Rules on Exploiting Arctic Wealth,” Agence France Presse, May 12, 2011.
227 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Clinton Signs the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement with Other Arctic
Nations,” May 12, 2011. “Warming Arctic Opens Way to Competition For Resources,” Washington Post, May 16,
2011.
228 “Clinton in Arctic to See Impact of Climate Change,” Agence France Presse, June 2, 2012.
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latter issue resulted in the approval of a second Council accord: the Agreement on Cooperation on
Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic.
From a geopolitical perspective, perhaps the most important step taken by the Council at the May
2013 summit was enlargement; six countries—China, India, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and
Italy—were approved for permanent observer status.229 Prior to the meeting, the five Nordic
countries reportedly had endorsed the admission of new observers, while Russia and Canada were
said to be opposed—the latter for fear of diluting the interest of indigenous peoples.230
Washington reportedly played its cards close to the vest, remaining silent on the issue until the
day of the decision. Secretary of State John Kerry is said to have brokered the compromise. Not
long before the conference, one analyst summarized the arguments for and against (mostly for)
adding new seats to the table:
Openness would be a shrewd move, at a stroke enhancing the council’s legitimacy and
the quality of its deliberations, and reducing the risk of being bypassed by countries
acting unilaterally. Some of the council’s recent applicants could also represent a
financial boon: China, South Korea, India and Japan have the fastest-growing stable of
Arctic scientists, while the EU last year proposed devoting €80 billion to Arctic research.
Meanwhile, the risks of admitting new members, even heavy-hitters like China, are low.
First, observers’ powers are limited: they may engage with the forum’s working groups,
propose projects and state their views (all with permission), but they have no vote.
Secondly, observer status does not alter international law: under UNCLOS [United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea], extra-regional actors have no jurisdiction in
Arctic waters, and no applicant disputes this. Thirdly, the council is still fundamentally
devoted to promoting research and knowledge sharing, and new observers could
contribute greatly in this regard. Some Permanent Participants also fear being
marginalised if new observers are admitted, but the same countries could still engage
bilaterally with Arctic states from outside of the council, and there is no difference in
power between permanent and ad hoc observer status. The main danger of admitting too
many new observers is therefore likely to be confined to a diminished capacity for
reaching swift consensus.231
According to some observers, the decision to add India and Singapore—which are situated
thousands of miles from the Arctic Circle—would seem to indicate that the Council is
transforming itself from a regional to an international forum. As noted, the revolving chair of the
Council has passed from Scandinavia to North America—Canada held the post from 2013 until
April 2015, when the United States took over. Patrick Borbey, Chair of Canadian Senior Arctic
Officials, stated that his government hopes the Council will “evolve from a very solid
organization doing great scientific assessment to one that actually makes policy and implements it
... and makes sure it’s monitored on an ongoing basis.”232 Canada’s stated priorities for its
chairmanship are intended to benefit the 4 million people of the north through responsible
resource development, safe shipping, and the promotion of sustainable circumpolar communities.
Canada also will seek to strengthen the Arctic Council in an effort to “enhance the capacity of the
229 For additional information, see Japan, Korea, Singapore and the Arctic Sea Lanes. The Diplomat. March, 2014.
230 The European Union (EU) had applied for observer status, but its request was put on hold pending the resolution of
a dispute with Canada and indigenous peoples regarding commercial sealing.
231 “The Arctic Council: Underpinning Stability in the Arctic,” The Arctic Institute/Centre for Circumpolar Security
Studies, March 26, 2013, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2013/03/the-arctic-council-underpinning.html.
232 “Nations Ponder How to Handle Busier, More Polluted Arctic,” Climatewire, May 13, 2013,
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1059981040.
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Permanent Participant organizations, improve the Council’s coordination and maximize
efficiencies.”233
Russia
It has been noted that Russia “has at least half of the Arctic in terms of area, coastline, population
and probably mineral wealth.”234 Moscow is keen to capitalize on natural resource development
and shipping in the region. As noted elsewhere in this report, Russia and Norway in late 2010
resolved a 40-year dispute over national borders in the Barents Sea; the accord permits
exploration for undersea oil, believed to be in rich supply there. In March 2013, it was announced
that Russia and China had signed an agreement under which China would purchase oil from
Russia in exchange for exploration licenses in the Arctic. In addition, scientists estimate that the
sea route along the Siberian coast (referred to as the Northeast Passage or the Northern Sea
Route, or NSR) will be ice-free and navigable well before the Northwest Passage through the
Canadian archipelago.235 Indeed, the route is already being used: 34 vessels traversed the NSR in
2011, 46 sailed the passage in 2012, and 71 did so in 2013.236 Russia sees significant economic
opportunities in offering icebreaker escorts, refueling posts, and supplies to the commercial ships
that will ply the waterway.237 The NSR will cut transport times and costs for Russian ships as
well—the development of the shale gas industry in the United States means that Russia will likely
now turn to Asia to market its liquefied natural gas (LNG).238 But analysts note that Russia’s
ability to capitalize on new opportunities will require international cooperation and goodwill.
A demonstration of such cooperation took place in August 2012, when Russia joined the United
States and Norway in the Barents Sea for the biannual Northern Eagle 2012 naval maneuvers, an
exercise that Norwegian Defense Minister Espen Barth Eide referred to as “a strong and interest-
based neighborhood cooperation with Russia.”239 However, planning for the 2014 exercise, which
was scheduled to be held in May, was put on hold. In the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea
and its efforts to further destabilize Ukraine, some analysts have questioned whether Moscow will
continue to pursue a policy of multilateral cooperation in the Arctic. Other Arctic Council
member states have begun to push back. In protest of Russia’s recent actions in Crimea/Ukraine,
Canada announced that it would not participate in an April 2014 working-level-group Arctic
Council meeting in Moscow. In addition, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during whose
233 Canada’s Arctic Council Chairmanship. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Canada. Modified
February 7, 2014. http://www.international.gc.ca/arctic-arctique/chairmanship-presidence.aspx?lang=eng.
234 “The Arctic: Special Report,” The Economist, June 16, 2012, p. 11.
235 Canada’s Arctic Passage Still a Ways Off. Maritime Executive. March 27, 2014.
236 Transit Statistics. Northern Sea Route Information Office. Accessed April 20, 2014. http://www.arctic-lio.com/
nsr_transits.
237 During an October 2011 conference on Arctic shipping, President Putin enthused that “the Arctic is the shortcut
between the largest markets of Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.… It is an excellent opportunity to optimize costs.”
“Warming Revives Dream of Sea Route in Russian Arctic,” New York Times, October 17, 2011.
238 Arctic LNG Project Backs Russia’s Political Strategy. Maritime Executive. April 15, 2014.
239 “Foreign Ministers of Russia and Canada Agreed To Go To the Ice Without the Third Parties,” WPS: Defense &
Security, September 20, 2010. “Russia Will Staunchly Defend its Interests in the Arctic Region – Putin,” Interfax. June
30, 2011. “Russia to Deploy Troops to Defend Interests in Arctic,” Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2011; “Russia Lets
China Into Arctic Rush as Energy Giants Embrace,” Bloomberg.com, March 25, 2013; “Russia, U.S., Norway to Hold
Joint Naval Drills in August,” RIA Novosti, May 24, 2012, http://en.rian.ru/world/20120524/173654802.html. “Norway
Hails Northern Eagle as Bridge-builder,” Defense New; August 24, 2012; “China Eyes Arctic Options in Energy,
Transport,” CNN Wire. May 16, 2013.
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tenure a “reset” in relations with Russia was sought, reportedly stated that Arctic cooperation may
be jeopardized if Russia pursues expansionist policies in the high north.240
China
China expert Elizabeth Economy has noted that Beijing “has begun the process of engaging in the
Arctic through research, investment, and diplomacy.”241 Although its borders lie some distance
from the Arctic, China has displayed a growing interest in the region, based mainly upon the
potential opportunities for shorter sea routes and the eventual development of energy-related
natural resources, as well as metals and minerals; the International Institute of Strategic Studies
states that “China is the world’s largest consumer of raw materials and hydrocarbon resources.242
China’s economy is strongly dependent upon exports; some analysts have estimated that as much
as one-half of China’s GDP is reliant upon exports and shipping. Ocean transportation is the chief
avenue for China’s large petroleum imports. Beijing is keenly interested in having free access to
the future northern waterways, which would drastically reduce both sailing times and
transportation costs. Other observers have argued that China’s interest is motivated in the Arctic’s
emerging status as “the new fishing grounds—the world’s largest storehouse of biological
protein.”243 Finally, some have also interpreted China’s growing interest in the Arctic as further
evidence of its effort to expand its influence as a global player: “They know that [the] Arctic may
be one of the hot spots of the 21st century.”244
Many Chinese believe that the Arctic should be considered as part of the “global commons.”
According to David Curtis Wright of the U.S. Naval War College, “The mantra that the Arctic and
its natural resource wealth belong to no one country but constitute the common heritage of all
humankind is virtually de rigueur in recent Chinese public commentary on Arctic affairs.”245 This
attitude was reflected during a May 2012 workshop on Sino-Nordic cooperation hosted in
Beijing, when Chinese participants referred to their country as a “near-Arctic state” and a
“stakeholder.” Some analysts believe that China will likely remain officially circumspect on this
question, as its “foreign policy rests on a profound respect for territorial integrity.”246
Nonetheless, some Chinese analysts reportedly are encouraging their government to challenge
Canada’s claim of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.
In recent years, China has been cultivating relationships with the Nordic countries. In April 2012,
former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Sweden and Iceland, and two months later former
240 Naval Exercise on Hold Due to Ukraine Tensions. Navy Times. March 13, 2014. Hillary Warns Against Russia in
Arctic. Barents Observer. April 3, 2014. http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2014/04/hillary-warns-against-russia-
arctic-03-04 Canada Takes Principled Stand on Arctic Council Meetings. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and
Development Canada. April 15, 2014, http://www.international.gc.ca/media/arctic-arctique/news-communiques/2014/
04/15a.aspx?lang=eng, Crimea Crises Changes Nordic Defense Perspective.
241 China’s Arctic Play: Just the Tip of the Iceberg. The Diplomat. April 5, 2014.
242 It was reported that China in December 2012 “offered Greenland a $5 billion investment package that included
rights to mine iron, gold, nickel, and rare earth metals.... ” See “Denmark, Norway Focus on Arctic Security,” Defense
News, March 11, 2013. China’s Strategic Arctic Interests. Strategic Comments. IISS. Vol. 20, Comment 6. March 2014.
243 “What Is China’s Arctic Game Plan?” The Atlantic, May 2013.
244 “China Plans First Commercial Trip through Arctic Shortcut in 2013,” Reuters. March 12, 2013. “China Pushes for
Arctic Foothold—From a Thousand Miles Away,” Christian Science Monitor Global News Blog, March 7, 2013.
245 “The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World,” David Curtis Wright, Naval War College, China Maritime Studies
Institute, Number 8, August 2011.
246 “China Defines Itself as a ‘Near-Arctic State,’ Says SIPRI,” Swedish International Peace Research Institute, May
10, 2012. “China’s Arctic Ambitions,” Stratfor, June 18, 2012. “China: Icebreaking in the Arctic,” The ISN Blog, May
4, 2012; “Ice Station Dragon: China’s Strategic Arctic Interest,” Defense News, May 16, 2011.
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President Hu Jintao went to Denmark; the two leaders reportedly discussed large-scale
investments in the region, and in February 2014, a Greenlandic representative was in Beijing to
discuss economic cooperation. In April 2013, China and Iceland signed a free trade agreement—
China’s first such pact with a European government. In addition, China (like several other
nations) has established a research station in the Svalbard archipelago and has beefed up the size
of its embassy staff in Iceland. In October 2013, Chinese Vice Premier Ma Kai met with Icelandic
President Grimsson and stated that “China is willing to expand pragmatic [cooperation] with
Iceland in fields of economy, trade, geothermal energy, Arctic research environment, science and
technology and social development.”247
China has been active in conducting research on the Arctic; in 1994, Beijing purchased from
Ukraine a research icebreaker it named the Xuelong, and has constructed a state-of-the-art polar
capable research vessel, the Snow Dragon; in August 2012, the latter conducted a trans-Arctic
voyage, from Shanghai to Iceland; it was China’s fifth Arctic research expedition. In September
2013, the Yong Shen, a Chinese cargo ship, became the first commercial vessel to complete the
voyage from Asia to Rotterdam via the Northern Sea route.248
United States
The attendance by Secretaries of State Clinton and Kerry of the last two Arctic Council summits,
as mentioned above, indicates that the Obama Administration has placed some degree of priority
on the far north. Consistent with this, the Obama Administration has recently updated national
policy toward the region.
As noted elsewhere in this report, the Bush Administration in early January 2009 issued a
presidential directive outlining its policy on the Arctic region; the last such directive had been
issued in 1994. The Obama Administration operates under the Bush Administration’s policy
directive and augmented it on May 10, 2013, when it announced its National Strategy for the
Arctic Region. The new policy blueprint identifies three major “lines of effort”: (1) Advancing
United States security interests; (2) Pursuing responsible Arctic region stewardship; and (3)
Strengthening international cooperation. These activities are to be guided by four principles: (1)
Safeguard peace and stability; (2) Make decisions using the best available information; (3) Pursue
innovative arrangements among various levels of government and the private sector; and (4)
Consult and coordinate with Alaska natives.
Regarding the Arctic Council, the National Strategy states that “[w]orking through bilateral
relationships and multilateral bodies, including the Arctic Council, we will pursue arrangements
that advance collective interests, promote shared Arctic state prosperity, protect the Arctic
environment, and enhance regional security, and we will work toward U.S. accession to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Law of the Sea Convention).” Thus, the
Council is regarded as one of the organizations, though not the only one, through which the
United States will seek to fulfill its goals for the region. The Strategy highlights the Arctic
Council under its third “line of effort”—that of strengthening international cooperation.
In recent years, the Arctic Council has facilitated notable achievements in the promotion
of cooperation, coordination, and interaction among Arctic states and Arctic indigenous
247 “China Knocks on Iceland’s Door,” New York Times, March 12, 2013; “China Signs Free Trade Agreement with
Iceland as it Looks for Foothold in the Arctic,” The Washington Post, April 16, 2013. China Willing To Expand Co-op
with Iceland: Vice Premier. ECNS.CN. October 28, 2013. http://www.ecns.cn/2013/10-28/85976.shtml.
248 “Chinese Icebreaker Concludes Arctic Expedition,” Xinhua News Agency, September 27, 2012. Chinese Make First
Successful North Sea Route Voyage. The Arctic Journal. September 12, 2013.
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peoples. Recent successes of the Council include its advancement of public safety and
environmental protection issues, as evidenced by the 2011 Arctic Search-and-Rescue
Agreement and by the 2013 Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response
Agreement. The United States will continue to emphasize the Arctic Council as a forum
for facilitating Arctic states’ cooperation on myriad issues of mutual interest within its
current mandate.249
Besides the Arctic Council, the strategy document appears to suggest that the Administration will
adopt a multilateral approach to problem-solving, utilizing unspecified “existing partnerships,”
“multilateral fora,” “new arrangements,” and “efficient and effective joint ventures” to address
emerging challenges in the high north.
The strategy defines the issue of security in the widest sense: “U.S. security in the Arctic
encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from those supporting safe commercial and
scientific operations to national defense.” Some of these issues involve solutions that can be
viewed as appropriate for the Arctic Council to generate, such as the above-mentioned 2011
search-and-rescue agreement. On the issue of national defense, which concerns protection of state
sovereignty, many of the issues, such as developing infrastructure and enhancing domain
awareness, are primarily domestic in nature. Concerning freedom of navigation, the strategy
document states that the United States will rely upon “[e]xisting international law [which]
provides a comprehensive set of rules governing the rights, freedoms, and uses of the world’s
oceans and airspace, including the Arctic.” The document states: “we encourage Arctic and non-
Arctic states to work collaboratively through appropriate fora to address the emerging challenges
and opportunities in the Arctic region, while we remain vigilant to protect the security interests of
the United States and our allies.”
The document also frequently asserts that the interests of the Arctic region’s indigenous peoples
must be protected. As noted above, indigenous Arctic peoples’ organizations have permanent
participant status on the Arctic Council. According to the Council’s website, they “have full
consultation rights in connection with the Council’s negotiations and decisions.” The Council
thus represents a potentially important venue for the Administration’s goal of ensuring that their
voices are heard and heeded.
In a speech at the aforementioned Arctic Council’s ministerial in May 2013, Secretary of State
Kerry stated that there was considerable overlap in interests among the eight member states, and
that their decisions “don’t stop at the 66th parallel.” He cited climate change as the most far-
reaching issue, and also noted other areas of concern, including “acidification, pollution, ice melt,
rising sea levels, disappearing species, and indiscriminate development practices” that can have
an effect “downstream” on further challenges “to our economies, to our national security, and to
international stability.” He lauded the work of the Arctic Council, “which addresses these
challenges.”250
Finally, the U.S. Department of State has raised the issue of fisheries, stating that as stocks move
northward, there will be a need to adapt current fisheries management mechanisms and create
new ones for regions not currently being fished. According to the State Department, “The United
States is ... considering whether it would be desirable for a group of States with interests in
present and future Arctic fisheries to adopt some form of general statement or declaration.” While
249 White House, National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf.
250 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks at the Arctic Council Ministerial Session,” U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry,
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/05/209403.htm.
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the Arctic Council’s Kiruna Declaration251 does not specifically mention fisheries management,
the Council’s goal of promoting sustainable and responsible use of natural resources make it a
potential venue for the Administration to explore interest in adopting a general statement on the
issue.
At the end of January 2014, the White House released the Implementation Plan for the National
Strategy for the Arctic Region. The plan essentially follows and complements the objectives
spelled out in the May 2013 Strategy document. Under the rubric of security, for example, the
Implementation Plan calls for the development of communication infrastructure to support aerial
and maritime transportation, and to improve domain awareness. Under the heading of Arctic
stewardship, the plan lists a wide array of topics, including developing greater understanding of
environmental and ecological processes, and improving conditions for indigenous peoples
through addressing issues concerning health, cultural heritage, and community sustainability. On
the international level, the plan calls for greater preparedness on oil pollution cleanup and search-
and-rescue capabilities, as well as safeguarding marine ecosystems. It calls for the development
of a “robust agenda” for the U.S. chairmanship of the Arctic Council, and for U.S. accession to
the Law of the Sea Convention.252 On February 13, 2014, Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski stated
in a letter to the President that she was “severely disappointed” with the implementation plan,
which, she argued, “provides a snapshot of existing Arctic-related programs and projects with
numerous assessments to be undertaken, but no real path of action.” The following day, Secretary
of State Kerry announced the creation of a new, high-level position: Special Representative for
the Arctic Region. In a press statement, Secretary Kerry stated that he would “look forward to
work closely with Alaska’s Congressional delegation to strengthen American’s engagement in
Arctic issues.”253
Security Issues
Throughout the Cold War, the Arctic region was a zone of major strategic interest, where the
United States, the Soviet Union, and allied states conducted air and naval maneuvers and tested
ballistic missiles. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, however, the
importance of the high north diminished in the 1990s. Although the establishment of the Arctic
coastal states’ sovereignty through the demarcation of boundaries in the region is being conducted
peacefully under the auspices of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Arctic is once
again being viewed by some as a potential emerging security issue. In a December 2011
Washington Post op-ed, Heather Conley, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, noted several developments:
In April [2011], President Obama signed a new command plan that gives NORAD and
the U.S. Northern Command greater responsibility in protecting the North Pole and U.S.
Arctic territory.… In 2009, Norway moved its operational command to its northern
territories above the Arctic Circle. Russia has plans to establish a brigade that is specially
equipped and prepared for military warfare in Arctic conditions. Denmark has made it a
251 U.S. Department of State, “Kiruna Declaration: On the Occasion of the Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic
Council,” May 15, 2013, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209405.htm.
252 Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The White House. January, 2014.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
implementation_plan_for_the_national_strategy_for_the_arctic_region_-_fi.... pdf.
253 Adaptation of a letter from Senator Murkowski to President Obama. Alaska Dispatch. February 13, 2014. Secretary
Kerry Announces Department Will Establish a Special Representative for the Arctic Region. U.S. Department of State.
Press Release. February 14, 2014.
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strategic priority to form an Arctic Command. Canada is set to revitalize its Arctic fleet,
including spending $33 billion to build 28 vessels over the next 30 years.254
Similarly, Canadian academic Rob Huebert pointed out that in August 2010 the United States,
Canada, and Denmark conducted in the Canadian Arctic their annual joint naval exercises
involving several advanced and powerful warships. Huebert observed that “while defence
officials are quick to point out they see no military threat to the region, it’s still interesting to see
these three Arctic friends coming together to improve their naval combat capability in the Far
North.”255 In varying degrees, the Arctic coastal states have indicated a willingness to establish
and maintain a military presence in the high north.256
Although some have argued that terrorism and hijacking may constitute security concerns in the
region, others maintain that such threats are chimerical, given the challenges of distance and
geography, and the difficulty of navigating in a polar environment. The Economist has asserted
that “the risks of Arctic conflict have been exaggerated. Most of the Arctic is clearly assigned to
individual countries. According to a Danish estimate, 95% of Arctic mineral resources are within
agreed national boundaries.”257 Other factors may also postpone energy exploration. For example,
in the New York Times, three scholars noted that “the shale gas revolution is already delaying
some Arctic energy projects.” In addition, some companies are reportedly “fearful of the financial
and public relations risk of working in the pristine icy wilderness.”258
A report by the Arctic Institute noted that “[t]he armed forces, beyond their responsibility for
handling all contingencies, are also the only agencies with both the requisite monitoring
instruments and the physical capabilities to operate in such a vast and inhospitable region.”259
However, as mentioned above, the Arctic Council does not address regional security issues. To
fill this apparent void, a report by the Washington, DC-based Center for Strategic and
International Studies has proposed the creation of a separate organization, the Arctic Coast Guard
Forum (ACGF), consisting initially of the eight Arctic Council states, but possibly expanding
eventually to include other countries willing to contribute assets. The ACGF, which could
potentially be headquartered at the U.S. Air Force base in Thule, Greenland, would “focus first on
information sharing yet should also seek to develop methods of cooperation in support of the
Arctic Council’s search-and-rescue agreement and future international oil spill response
agreement.”260
However, other, relatively little-publicized multilateral discussions of security issues have already
been taking place. In mid-2011, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), in cooperation with the
Norwegian Ministry of Defense, established the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR),
254 Heather Conley, “The Colder War: U.S., Russia and Others Are Vying for Control of Santa’s Back Yard,”
Washington Post, December 23, 2011.
255 “Welcome To a New Era of Arctic Security,” Rob Huebert, Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute, August,
2010.
256 See, for example, “Canada Vows ‘Firm’ Defence of Arctic Border,” Canwest News Service, November 24, 2009.
“Danes With Dogs To Join Military Sovereignty Patrol Of Canadian Arctic,” The Canadian Press, March 3, 2010.
“Norway Plans One New Arctic Base, Perhaps More,” Defense News, March 8, 2010.
257 “The Arctic: Special Report,” The Economist, June 16, 2012, p. 10.
258 “Hands Across the Melting Ice,” by James F. Collins, ross A. Virginia, and Kenneth Yalowitz, New York Times,
May 13, 2013. “Oil Executives Tune Out the Call of the Wild Arctic,” Reuters, May 31, 2013.
259 “The Arctic Council: Underpinning Stability in the Arctic,” the Arctic Institute/Centre for Circumpolar Security
Studies, March 26, 2013. http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2013/03/the-arctic-council-underpinning.html.
260 “A New Security Architecture for the Arctic: An American Perspective,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), January 2012, p. 37.
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consisting of high-ranking military officers from the eight members of the Arctic Council, plus
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. Their first meeting, held in June 2011 in Oslo,
addressed a range of issues, including infrastructure, the environment, joint exercises and
training, and marine domain awareness. In August 2012, the ASFR held a conference Bodo,
Norway; the meeting focused mainly on how to improve the communications infrastructure in the
high north.261 Another newly formed venue at which military leaders discuss Arctic issues is the
Northern Chiefs of Defense conference, the first of which was held in Goose Bay, Labrador, in
May 2012; it was attended by military representatives from the eight Arctic Council
governments.262
NATO
The Arctic has also become a region of interest for NATO. However, as one writer has noted,
“[t]here is currently no consensus within the alliance that NATO has any role to play in the Arctic,
as Canada strongly opposes any NATO involvement on sovereignty grounds and other NATO
members are concerned with negative Russian reaction.”263 Speaking in Reykjavík in January
2009, former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer urged that member states not allow
the Arctic to become a divisive issue. He also recommended that the alliance and Russia
cooperate through building upon their shared experience in search-and-rescue operations. Former
Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who became secretary general of the alliance in
August 2009, has also addressed security in the high north. Citing the “potentially huge security
implications” of Arctic climate change, Rasmussen in October 2009 stated that “I think it is
within the natural scope of work for NATO to be the forum for consultation and discussion on
[selected Arctic] issues.” In March 2009, however, Russia’s NATO ambassador stated that
Moscow would not cooperate with the alliance on Arctic matters. And in September 2010, then-
Russian President Medvedev reportedly observed that “the Arctic can do fine without NATO,”
and that his government “views [possible NATO] activity with quite serious tension, because it is
after all a zone of peaceful cooperation, economic cooperation, and of course the military factor
always—at a minimum—creates additional questions.” On a visit to Moscow in November 2010,
Rasmussen assured the Russians that NATO does not intend to establish a presence in the
Arctic.264 Since 2006, several member and partner states have participated in Cold Response, a
wide-ranging annual crisis response exercise hosted by Norway. During the most recent joint
maneuvers, held in March 2014, 16 nations fielded air, land, and naval assets and approximately
261 “Arctic Nations Meet to Discuss Communication, Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy,” EUCOM website,
August 30, 2012, http://www.eucom.mil/blog-post/24109/arctic-nations-meet-to-discuss-communication-maritime-
domain-awareness-strategy.
262 “General Natynczyk and Fellow Northern Chiefs of Defence Discuss Shared Arctic Interests,” News release,
Canadian National Defense web page, April 13, 2012, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-
eng.asp?id=4151 “Northcom Strives to Promote Safe, Secure Arctic,” U.S. Department of Defense web page,
December 17, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118814.
263 “A New Security Architecture for the Arctic: An American Perspective,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), January 2012, p. 30.
264 “Russia, Norway Sign Border Deal For Arctic Energy,” Reuters, September 15, 2010. “NATO Chief Cautions
Against Division Over Arctic,” Canwest News Service, January 29, 2009. “NATO Proposes Arctic Cooperation With
Russia,” Reuters, January 29, 2009. Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer On Security Prospects
In the High North, January 29, 2009, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090129a.html. “NATO Chief Wars Of
Climate Change Security Risks,” Agence France Presse, October 1, 2009. “Rogozin Says He Won’t Discuss
Cooperation In Arctic With NATO,” Interfax: Russia & CIS General Newswire, March 27, 2009.
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16,000 troops. Although the exercises are multilateral, they are not conducted under the auspices
of NATO.265
A 2013 NATO Parliamentary Assembly report noted that “50% of the territory surrounding the
Arctic Sea is a territory of a NATO member state,” and suggested that “NATO could serve as a
forum for dialogue on military issues....”266 The report contends that the alliance is well-equipped
to play a key role in addressing security challenges that will likely emerge, particularly those that
involve surveillance, search-and-rescue, and environmental cleanup. However, observers note
that the lack of unanimity over a NATO presence in the Arctic is reflected by the fact that the high
north is mentioned neither in the alliance’s 2010 strategic concept, nor in the final declaration of
the 2012 Chicago summit. On May 8, 2013, following a visit to Norway, Secretary General
Rasmussen stated that “at the present time,” the alliance had “no intention of raising its presence
and activities in the High North.” He later tweeted that “the Arctic is a harsh environment. It
rewards cooperation, not confrontation. I trust we’ll continue to see cooperation.”267
Writing in an Atlantic Council blog, Dr. Page Wilson, of the UK’s Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst, has argued that, for the present, “NATO’s reluctance to increase its focus on the Arctic
may appear curious,” whereas, “[i]n fact, it is eminently sensible.” She notes that the alliance is
already active in the region, with regular military exercises (such as the above-mentioned Cold
Response), the air policing mission over Iceland, and the presence in Greenland of elements of
the U.S. Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense. In addition, she notes that several
international fora, chief among them the Arctic Council, are fostering cooperation in areas such as
environmental, social, and economic issues, and that discussion of security matters can be
deferred “until such time as greater clarity and agreement emerges about the nature of the Arctic
as a political space.” However, another scholar has noted that the March 28, 2014, appointment of
former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg as the alliance’s new Secretary General
“should alert global attention to ... the Arctic.”268
Russia
The Russian government has stated that, although it deplores the notion of an arms race in the
high north and does not foresee a conflict there, it intends to protect its Arctic interests.269
However, Russia has at times appeared to be sending out mixed messages in this regard. For
example, at the conclusion of a meeting in September 2010, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov and former Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon stated that “any militarization
[of the Arctic] is out of the question.” And in June 2011, then-Prime Minister (and currently
265 “NATO Tests Its Forces in Arctic,” February 16, 2012, Atlantic Council web page: http://www.acus.org/natosource/
nato-tests-its-forces-arctic, “NATO, Russia Stage Arctic War Games,” April 25, 2012. Atlantic Council web page:
http://www.acus.org/print/68922. See also Cold Response 2014, Norwegian Armed Forces web page: http://mil.no/
excercises/coldresponse/Pages/about.aspx. “Øvelse Cold Response er en norskledet, internasjonal øvelse som foregår i
store deler av Nord-Norge,” Norwegian Ministry of Defense, January 21, 2013, http://forsvaret.no/aktuelt/ovelser/
Sider/Cold-Response.aspx.
266 “Security in the High North: NATO’s Role,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly draft report, 071 PCTR 13 E, March
28, 2013.
267 “NATO Won’t Up Presence in the Arctic: Chief,” Agence France Presse, May 8, 2013. “NATO Rejects Direct
Arctic Presence,” Defense News, May 27, 2013.
268 Between a Rock and a Cold Place? NATO and the Arctic. January 15, 2014. Atlantic Council website:
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/between-a-rock-and-a-cold-place-nato-and-the-arctic, What the New
NATO Secretary General Appointment Means for the Arctic. The Fletcher Forum. April 8, 2014.
269 “Russia Will Protect Interests in Arctic: Official,” Agence France Presse, June 10, 2009. “Russia Opposes Arms
Race In Arctic Region—Diplomat,” ITAR-TASS World Service, July 21, 2009.
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President) Vladimir Putin stated, “Russia will definitely expand its presence in the Arctic. We are
open for dialogue with our foreign partners and with all neighbors in the Arctic region. But we
will naturally defend our own geopolitical interests firmly and consistently.” The following
month, Putin announced plans to build a large shipping port on the Yamal peninsula, and the
government stated that it would be sending two brigades to the north to protect its interests. In
addition, Russia is reportedly rebuilding former Soviet airbases in the region. In addition,
President Putin in December 2013 stated that there was a need for “every lever for the protection
of its security and national interests” in the Arctic, and ordered the development by 2014 of a
strategic command in the region. However, as noted above, in order to reap the economic benefits
of natural resources development and shipping, the Russians will need to rely heavily on foreign
capital and technology, and, according to Canadian Arctic specialist Michael Byers, “probably
they realize how expensive it would to take another approach [than cooperation], especially one
involving militarization.”270
However, some analysts believe that Russia’s recent occupation of Crimea and its continuing
interference in Eastern Ukraine may have repercussions for Arctic cooperation in the security
arena. In March 2014, Norway announced that it was suspending scheduled military activities
with Russia.271 On April 1, 2014, NATO Foreign Ministers issued a statement condemning
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and refused to recognize Moscow’s “illegal and illegitimate
attempt to annex Crimea,” and expressed “grave concern over the authorisation by the Russian
Parliament to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine.” Later in
April, the defense ministers of the five Nordic states met to discuss military cooperation in the
Arctic. In addition, Alaska Senator Mark Begich recently stated that “with unpleasant reminders
of the Cold War, ... a strong military presence in the Arctic is more important than ever.”272
China
Some Chinese leaders also have voiced concern over perceived emerging security issues in the
Arctic. In early March 2010, a Chinese admiral stated that “the current scramble for the
sovereignty of the Arctic among some nations has encroached on many other countries’ interests,”
and added that China had to “make short and long term ocean strategic development plans to
exploit the Arctic because it will become a future mission for the navy.” Some analysts, however,
believe that China’s general approach toward the Arctic will remain decidedly low-key: “To date,
China has adopted a wait-and-see approach to Arctic developments, wary that active overtures
would cause alarm in other countries due to China’s size and status as a rising global power.”
China is believed to be keen on resolving through diplomacy the national interests of both littoral
and non-Arctic states in the high north. Toward that end, it sought permanent observer status on
the Arctic Council. Its candidacy reportedly was delayed by a dispute with Norway, which in
2010 awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo.273 It was reported in early
270 Putin Says Beefing Up Presence in the Arctic Among Top Priorities for Russian Military. Associated Press.
December 10, 2013. Vows To Increase Russia’s Arctic Military Presence. The World Post. December 10, 2013. The
Arctic: The Arctic: Where the U.S. and Russia Could Square Off Next. The Atlantic. March 28, 2014.
271 Nevertheless, Norwegian petroleum giant Statoil stated that it would continue with its joint drilling operations with
Russia. Norway’s Statoil Says Business as Usual in Russia. Reuters News. April 14, 2014.
272 NATO’s Relations with Russia. Accessed April 24, 2014. NATO website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
topics_50090.htm, Begich: Military Presence in the Arctic Is ‘More Important than Ever.’ The Hill. March 19, 2014.
273 “China Prepares For an Ice-free Arctic,” Linda Jakobson, SIPRI Insights On Peace and Security, No. 2010/2, March
2010. “Admiral Urges Government to Stake Claim in the Arctic,” South China Morning Post, March 6, 2010. “Norway
Wants to Block China from Arctic Council Over 2010 Nobel Peace Prize Row,” Agence France Presse, January 25,
2012. “Clinton in Arctic to See Impact of Climate Change,” Agence France Presse, June 2, 2012.
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April 2013 that Norway would support China’s bid for observer status at the May Arctic Council
meeting. As noted above, China was approved at the meeting for observer status.274
U.S. Military Forces and Operations275
During the Cold War, the Arctic was an arena of military competition between the United States
and the Soviet Union, with both countries, for example, operating nuclear-powered submarines,
long-range bombers, and tactical aircraft in the region. The end of the Cold War and the collapse
of most elements of the Russian military establishment following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in December 1991 greatly reduced this competition and led to a reduced emphasis on the
Arctic in U.S. military planning.
Renewed tensions with Russia following its seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014,
combined with a significant recent increase in Russian military operations in the Arctic,276 have
led to growing concerns among observers that the Arctic is once again becoming a region of
military tension and competition,277 and to concerns about whether the United States is
adequately prepared militarily to defend its interests in the region.278
U.S. military officials and military officials from other Arctic states have stressed the cooperative
aspects of how the Arctic states have addressed Arctic issues, and have suggested that the
competitive aspects of the situation have been exaggerated in some press accounts. They also
speculate that Russia’s increased military operations in the Arctic are intended partly for domestic
274 “China Pours Cash into Melting Arctic in Bid to Win Influence,” RIA-Oreanda News [Russia], April 2, 2013.
275 This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
276 See, for example, Agence France-Presse, “Russia Launches Military Drills In Arctic,” Defense News, August 24,
2015; Maxim Pyadushkin, “A Return to the Arctic, Russia Backs Up Economic Expansion with Military Buildup,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 17-30: 52; Jeremy Bender and Mike Nudelman, “This Map Shows
Russia’s Dominant Militarization of the Arctic,” Business Insider, August 7, 2015; Trude Pettersen, “Arctic Training
for Strategic Nuclear Submarines,” Barents Observer, July 30, 2015; Trude Pettersen, “Russia’s New Maritime
Doctrine to Strengthen Arctic Presence,” Alaska Dispatch News, July 29, 2015; “Russia Sees Arctic As Naval Priority
in New Doctrine,” BBC, July 27, 2015; “Russia to Double Military Troops on Novaya Zemlya,” Arctic-Info, July 10,
2015; Jeremy Bender, “Russia Is Deploying Advanced Aerial Weapon Systems to the Arctic,” Business Insider
Australia, June 23, 2015; Sohrab Ahmari, “The New Cold War’s Arctic Front,” Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2015;
Thomas Nilson, “Arctic, Barents Submarine Patrols Up 50 Percent Over Last Year,” Alaska Dispatch News, April 15,
2015; “Putin Said To Put Northern Fleet On Alert For Arctic Exercises,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 17,
2015; Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia Launches Massive Arctic Military Drills,” Military Times, March 16, 2015; Sean
Doogan, “Russian Military Increases Capabilities, Overflights Near Alaska Airspace,” Alaska Dispatch News, March
14, 2015; Jeremy Bender, “Russia’s Arctic Pivot Is A Massive Military Undertaking,” Business Insider, March 12,
2015; Matthew Bodner, “Russia’s Polar Pivot,” Defense News, March 11, 2015;; “Submarine Warfare in Arctic: Russia
Mastering New Underwater Tactics,” Sputnik International, March 2, 2015; Jeff Stein, “What Is Russia Up To in the
Arctic?” Newsweek, February 24, 2015; Jeremy Bender, “Russia Is Sending Some Serious Weaponry To The Arctic,”
Business Insider, January 21, 2015; “Russia Moves First Troops to Arctic Base Near Finnish Border,” Barents
Observer, January 15, 2015; Jeremy Bender, “Russia Is Constructing An Arctic Stronghold 30 Miles From The Finnish
Border,” Business Insider, January 14, 2015; Gareth Jennings, “Russia To Build More Arctic Airfields,” IHS Jane’s
Defence Weekly, January 12, 2015; Kevin McGwin, “Preventing and Preparing For War” The Arctic Journal, January
7, 2015.
277 See, for example, Michael Birnbaum, “3 Maps That Show How Russia and NATO Might Accidentally Escalate Into
War,” Washington Post, August 12, 2015; Roland Oliphant, “Russia and NATO launch Rival War Games, Telegraph
(UK), May 26, 2015.
278 See, for example, “Steven Lee Myers,” U.S. Is Playing Catch-Up With Russia in Scramble for the Arctic,” New
York Times, August 29, 2015; Jen DiMascio, “Frozen in Place? U.S. Military Slow to Respond to Arctic Change,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 17-30: 54.
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Russian consumption.279 Even so, U.S. military forces are paying renewed attention to the Arctic.
This is particularly true in the case of the Navy and Coast Guard, for whom diminishment of
Arctic sea ice is opening up potential new operating areas for their surface ships. The U.S. Army,
too, is beginning to focus more on Arctic operations,280 and Canada and the Nordic countries are
taking or contemplating steps to increase their own military presence and operations in the region.
DOD in General
2010 QDR (Submitted February 2010)
DOD’s report on the 2010 QDR, submitted to Congress in February 2010, states:
The effect of changing climate on the Department’s operating environment is evident in
the maritime commons of the Arctic. The opening of the Arctic waters in the decades
ahead[,] which will permit seasonal commerce and transit[,] presents a unique
opportunity to work collaboratively in multilateral forums to promote a balanced
approach to improving human and environmental security in the region. In that effort,
DoD must work with the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security to
address gaps in Arctic communications, domain awareness, search and rescue, and
environmental observation and forecasting capabilities to support both current and future
planning and operations. To support cooperative engagement in the Arctic, DoD strongly
supports accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.281
The report also states:
The Department of Defense and its interagency partners must be able to more
comprehensively monitor the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains for potential
direct threats to the United States. Such monitoring provides the U.S. homeland with an
extended, layered in depth defense. This effort includes enhanced coordination with
Canada for the defense of North America as well as assisting Mexico and Caribbean
partners in developing air and maritime domain awareness capacities. Special attention is
required to develop domain awareness tools for the Arctic approaches as well. In
coordination with domestic and international partners, DoD will explore technologies that
have the potential to detect, track, and identify threats in these spheres to ensure that
capabilities can be deployed to counter them in a timely fashion.282
The report further states:
Central to the security of the United States is a strong transatlantic partnership, which is
underpinned by the bilateral relationships between the United States and the governments
of Europe. We will continue to work with this community of like-minded nations,
whether by engaging with allies still shaping their democracies after decades of living in
the shadow of the Soviet Union, building on the benefits of French reintegration into
NATO’s military structure, or addressing new security issues such as those arising in the
Arctic region.283
279 See, for example, Brian Whitmore, “What’s Putin Doing in the Arctic? Trying To Keep Russians Distracted,”
Defense One, August 12, 2015.
280 See, for example, Michelle Tan, “Inside the Army’s Growing Arctic Circle Mission,” Military Times, May 7, 2014.
281 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 86.
282 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 19.
283 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 57.
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The report states: “We will seek out opportunities to work with Moscow on emerging issues, such
as the future of the Arctic” and that DOD “will also enhance defense relationships and continue to
work with Canada in the context of regional security, increased interaction in the Arctic, and
combat operations in Afghanistan.”284
April 2011 Change to DOD Unified Command Plan
In April 2011, President Obama assigned responsibility for the Arctic to U.S. Northern Command.
Previously, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Pacific Command had
shared responsibility for the Arctic. The April 2011 change in DOD’s Unified Command Plan also
assigned Alaska to U.S. Northern Command. Previously, U.S. Northern Command and U.S.
Pacific Command had shared responsibility for Alaska and adjacent waters.285
May 2011 DOD Report to Congress
A May 2011 DOD report to Congress on Arctic operations and the Northwest Passage that was
prepared at congressional direction286 stated:
The Arctic is warming on average twice as fast as the rest of the planet, resulting in
increased human activity in the region. Although some perceive that competition for
resources and boundary disputes may result in conflict in the Arctic, the opening of the
Arctic also presents opportunities to work collaboratively in multilateral forums to
promote a balanced approach to improving human and environmental security in the
region.
Strategic guidance on the Arctic is articulated in National Security Presidential Directive
(NSPD) 66 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 25, Arctic Region Policy.
Additional guidance is found in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The overarching strategic national security
objective is a stable and secure region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded and
the U.S. homeland is protected. This objective is consistent with a regional policy that
reflects the relatively low level of threat in a region bounded by nation states that have
not only publicly committed to working within a common framework of international law
and diplomatic engagement, but also demonstrated ability and commitment to doing so
over the last fifty years.
DoD will take responsible steps to anticipate and prepare for the Arctic operations of the
near-(2010-2020), mid- (2020-2030), and far-term (beyond 2030). Capabilities will need
to be reevaluated as conditions change, and gaps must be addressed in order to be
prepared to operate in a more accessible Arctic. Key challenges include: shortfalls in ice
and weather reporting and forecasting; limitations in command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) due to lack of assets
and harsh environmental conditions; limited inventory of ice-capable vessels; and limited
shore-based infrastructure. The key will be to address needs in step with the rate at which
activity in the Arctic increases, and balance potential investments in these capabilities
284 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 62.
285 For an article discussing the change, see Jim Garamone, “Unified Command Plan Reflects Arctic’s Importance,”
American Forces Press Service, April 7, 2011.
286 The direction was contained on page 337 of H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010, the House
Armed Services Committee’s report on<LISRef number="5136" congress="114" title=""
type="houseBill" id="3540906801" />, the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act.
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with other national priorities. The United States has a vital Arctic neighbor and partner in
Canada, with its shared values and interests in the region. DoD will work with the
Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) to ensure common Arctic interests are
addressed in a complementary manner....
Existing DoD posture in the region is adequate to meet near- to mid-term U.S. defense
needs. DoD does not currently anticipate a need for the construction of a deep-draft port
in Alaska between now and 2020. Given the long lead times for construction of major
infrastructure in the region, DoD will periodically re-evaluate this assessment as the
Combatant Commanders update their regional plans on a regular basis.
The United States needs assured Arctic access to support national interests in the Arctic.
This access can be provided by a variety of proven capabilities, including submarines and
aircraft, but only U.S.-flagged ice-capable ships provide visible U.S. sovereign maritime
presence throughout the Arctic region. This need could potentially be met by either
icebreakers or ice-strengthened surface vessels, none of which are in the U.S. Navy
current surface combatant inventory, but which do exist in U.S. Coast Guard’s inventory
in limited numbers.
Finally, significant uncertainty remains about the rate and extent of climate change in the
Arctic and the pace at which human activity will increase. The challenge is to balance the
risk of being late-to-need with the opportunity cost of making premature Arctic
investments. Not only does early investment take resources from other pressing needs,
but the capabilities would be later in their lifecycle when finally employed. Given the
many competing demands on DoD’s resources in the current fiscal environment, the
Department believes that further evaluation of the future operating environment is
required before entertaining significant investments in infrastructure or capabilities.287
January 2012 GAO Report Reviewing May 2011 DOD Report
A January 2012, congressionally directed288 GAO report reviewing the May 2011 DOD report
above stated the following:
While DOD has undertaken some efforts to assess the capabilities needed to meet
national security objectives in the Arctic, it is unclear whether DOD will be in a position
to provide needed capabilities in a timely and efficient manner because it lacks a risk-
based investment strategy for addressing near-term needs and a collaborative forum with
the Coast Guard for addressing long-term capability needs. DOD’s [May 2011] Arctic
Report acknowledges that it has some near-term gaps in key capabilities needed to
communicate, navigate, and maintain awareness of activity in the region. However, DOD
has not yet evaluated, selected, or implemented alternatives for prioritizing and
addressing near-term Arctic capability needs. In addition, DOD and the Coast Guard have
established a working group to identify potential collaborative efforts to enhance U.S.
Arctic capabilities. This working group is focused on identifying potential near-term
investments but not longer-term needs, and it is currently expected to be dissolved in
January 2012. Uncertainty involving the rate of Arctic climate change necessitates careful
planning to ensure efficient use of resources in developing Arctic needs such as basing
infrastructure and icebreakers, which require long lead times to develop and are
expensive to build and maintain. Without taking steps to meet near- and long-term Arctic
287 Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage, OUSD (Policy), May
2011. pp 2-4 (executive summary). See also Christopher J. Castelli, “Report: ‘Significant’ Gap Undermines DOD
Tracking Of Ships In Arctic,” Inside the Pentagon, June 16, 2011.
288 The direction was contained on page 291 of H.Rept. 112-78 of May 17, 2011, the House Armed Services
Committee’s report on H.R. 1540, the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act.
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capability needs, DOD risks making premature Arctic investments, being late in
obtaining needed capabilities, or missing opportunities to minimize costs by collaborating
on investments with the Coast Guard.289
November 2013 DOD Arctic Strategy
On November 22, 2013, DOD released a DOD strategy for the Arctic.290 The executive summary
of the document states (highlights as in the original):
The Arctic is at a strategic inflection point as its ice cap is diminishing more rapidly than
projected and human activity, driven by economic opportunity—ranging from oil, gas,
and mineral exploration to fishing, shipping, and tourism—is increasing in response to
the growing accessibility. Arctic and non-Arctic nations are establishing their strategies
and positions on the future of the Arctic in a variety of international forums. Taken
together, these changes present a compelling opportunity for the Department of Defense
(DoD) to work collaboratively with allies and partners to promote a balanced approach to
improving human and environmental security in the region in accordance with the 2013
National Strategy for the Arctic Region.
Security in the Arctic encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from resource
extraction and trade to activities supporting safe commercial and scientific operations to
national defense. Security cooperation activities and other military-to-military forms of
engagement establish, shape, and maintain international relations and the partnerships
necessary to meet security challenges and reduce the potential for friction. The
Department will continue to build cooperative strategic partnerships that promote
innovative, affordable security solutions, and burden-sharing in the Arctic, and seek to
increase opportunities with Arctic partners to enhance regional expertise and cold-
weather operational experience.
The Department will continue to train and operate routinely in the region4 as it monitors
the changing environment, revisiting assessments and taking appropriate action as
conditions change.
This strategy identifies the Department’s desired end-state for the Arctic: a secure and
stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is
protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges. It also articulates two
main supporting objectives: Ensure security, support safety, and promote defense
cooperation, and prepare to respond to a wide range of challenges and contingencies—
operating in conjunction with other nations when possible, and independently if
necessary—in order to maintain stability in the region. Finally, it identifies the ways and
means the Department intends to use to achieve these objectives as it implements the
National Strategy for the Arctic Region.291
The document also states:
U.S. national security interests in the Arctic are delineated in National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 25,
Arctic Region Policy. This policy states that national security interests include such
289 Government Accountability Office, Arctic Capabilities[:]DOD Addressed Many Specified Reporting Elements in Its
2011 Arctic Report but Should Take Steps to Meet Near- and Long-term Needs, GAO-12-180, January 2012, Summary
page.
290 Department of Defense, Arctic Strategy, November 2013, 14 pp. The news release announcing the document is
posted at http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=16389. The document itself is posted at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_Arctic_Strategy.pdf.
291 Department of Defense, Arctic Strategy, November 2013, p. 2.
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matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for
strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security
operations; and ensuring freedom of the seas. Preserving freedom of the seas, which
includes all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the seas and adjacent airspace, including
freedom of navigation and overflight, in the Arctic supports the nation’s ability to
exercise these rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace throughout the world,
including through strategic straits.292
The document states that DOD
will pursue comprehensive engagement with allies and partners to protect the homeland
and support civil authorities in preparing for increased human activity in the Arctic.
Strategic partnerships are the center of gravity in ensuring a peaceful opening of the
Arctic and achieving the Department’s desired end-state. Where possible, DoD will seek
innovative, low-cost, small-footprint approaches to achieve these objectives (e.g., by
participating in multilateral exercises ... ). The Department [of Defense] will also evolve
its infrastructure and capabilities in step with the changing physical environment in order
to ensure security, support safety, promote defense cooperation, and prepare to respond to
a wide range of challenges and contingencies in the Arctic in the coming decades. The
Department [of Defense] will accomplish its objectives through the following ways:
• Exercise sovereignty and protect the homeland;
• Engage public and private sector partners to improve domain awareness in the
Arctic;
• Preserve freedom of the seas in the Arctic;
• Evolve Arctic infrastructure and capabilities consistent with changing conditions;
• Support existing agreements with allies and partners while pursuing new ones to
build confidence with key regional partners;
• Provide support to civil authorities, as directed;
• Partner with other departments and agencies and nations to support human and
environmental safety; and
• Support the development of the Arctic Council and other international institutions
that promote regional cooperation and the rule of law.293
The document states that challenges and risks to DOD’s Arctic strategy include the possibility
that projections about future access to and activity in the Arctic may prove inaccurate; the
possibility that fiscal constraints may delay or deny needed investment in Arctic capabilities and
curtail Arctic training; the possibility that “political rhetoric and press reporting about boundary
disputes and competition for resources may inflame regional tensions”; and the possibility that
“being too aggressive in taking steps to address anticipated future security risks may create the
conditions of mistrust and miscommunication under which such risks could materialize.”294
Regarding the final two of these risks, the document states:
Efforts to manage disagreements diplomatically may be hindered if the public narrative
becomes one of rivalry and conflict. The Department [of Defense] will mitigate this risk
by ensuring its plans, actions, and words are coordinated, and when appropriate, by
engaging the press to counter unhelpful narratives with facts. The Under Secretary of
292 Department of Defense, Arctic Strategy, November 2013, p. 3.
293 Department of Defense, Arctic Strategy, November 2013, p. 7.
294 Department of Defense, Arctic Strategy, November 2013, pp. 12-13.
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Defense for Policy will monitor DoD activities, programs, and posture in the region to
ensure the Department [of Defense] is sending a clear message to key audiences
regarding the Department’s efforts to promote security, safety, and defense cooperation....
There is some risk that the perception that the Arctic is being militarized may lead to an
“arms race” mentality that could lead to a breakdown of existing cooperative approaches
to shared challenges. The Department [of Defense] will mitigate this risk by focusing on
collaborative security approaches as outlined in the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic
Region, and by supporting other Federal departments and agencies where they have
leadership roles. Building trust through transparency about the intent of our military
activities and participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises and other engagements
that facilitate information-sharing will be a key means of addressing this risk.295
January 2014 Implementation Plan for National Strategy for Arctic Region
The Administration’s January 2014 implementation plan for its national strategy for the Arctic
region (see “Background”) makes DOD the lead federal agency for one of the plan’s 36 or so
specific initiatives, and a supporting agency for 18 others.296 The initiative for which DOD is
designated the lead federal agency is entitled “Develop a framework of observations and
modeling to support forecasting and prediction of sea ice.”297
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (Submitted March 2014)
The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) report on the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),
submitted to Congress in March 2014, states:
Climate change also creates both a need and an opportunity for nations to work together,
which the Department will seize through a range of initiatives. We are developing new
policies, strategies, and plans, including the Department’s Arctic Strategy and our work
in building humanitarian assistance and disaster response capabilities, both within the
Department and with our allies and partners.298
May 2015 House Armed Services Committee Report Language
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 114-102 of May 5, 2015) on H.R.
1735, the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act, stated:
Arctic Investments and Capabilities
The committee notes that as one of seven Arctic nations, the United States has a vested
interest in the security and stability of the Arctic region. With the Arctic becoming
increasingly accessible and more broadly transited in the coming decades by both Arctic
and non-Arctic nations, it is imperative that the United States be prepared to operate in
the Arctic region when needed. To that end, the committee notes that the Department of
Defense released a document outlining its Arctic Strategy in November 2013 and the
Department of the Navy released its updated ‘‘Arctic Roadmap’’ in February 2014. The
committee commends the Department for its focus on the Arctic region as its activity in
the region increases.
295 Department of Defense, Arctic Strategy, November 2013, p. 13.
296 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, pp. 6-32.
297 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, pp. 15-16.
298 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, p. 25. An electronic word search of the document
shows that this is the only occurrence of the word Arctic in the document.
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In order to meet the strategic objectives in the region, the committee believes it is
important for the Department to continue to invest in training exercises, partnerships,
infrastructure, and capabilities necessary to support potential operations in the Arctic
region. The committee also encourages the Department to continue research efforts to
develop security capabilities and strategies for the Arctic region. The committee notes
that the Navy’s ‘‘Arctic Roadmap’’ provided a plan to identify the requirements for an
Arctic Center of Excellence in Fiscal Year 2015. Once the Navy has established the
requirements for the Arctic Center of Excellence, the committee encourages the Navy to
establish the center in a timely manner.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report to the
House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2016, that identifies the
formal requirements that have been established for this center and a timeline for standing
up the initial capabilities of the center. In establishing this center and determining a
suitable location, the committee encourages the Navy to coordinate with other
government agencies, academic institutions, and existing polar research efforts that can
provide support and promote the United States security interests. (Pages 117-118)
May 2015 Senate Armed Services Committee Bill Language
Section 1043 of S. 1376, the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act as reported by the
Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 114-49 of May 19, 2015), states:
SEC. 1043. Strategy to protect United States national security interests in the Arctic
region.
(a) Report on strategy required.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report that sets forth an updated military strategy for the protection of
United States national security interests in the Arctic region.
(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of United States military interests in the Arctic region.
(2) A description of operational plans and associated military requirements for the
protection of United States national security interests in the Arctic region, including
United States citizens, territory, freedom of navigation, and economic and trade interests.
(3) An identification of any operational seams and a plan to enhance unity of effort
among the combatant commands with responsibility for the Arctic region.
(4) A description of the security environment in the Arctic region, including the activities
of foreign nations operating within the Arctic region.
(5) A description of United States military capabilities required to implement the strategy
required by subsection (a).
(6) An identification of any capability gaps and resource gaps, including in installations,
infrastructure, and personnel in the Arctic region, that would impact the implementation
of the strategy required by subsection (a) or the execution of any associated operational
plan, and a mitigation plan to address such gaps.
(7) A plan to enhance military-to-military cooperation with partner nations that have
mutual security interests in the Arctic region.
(c) Form.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may include a classified annex.
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June 2015 GAO Report
A June 2015 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report states:
Recent strategic guidance on the Arctic issued by the administration and the Department
of Defense (DOD) establish a supporting role for the department relative to other federal
agencies, based on a low level of military threat expected in the region. In January 2014
the administration issued the Implementation Plan to the National Strategy for the Arctic
Region that designated DOD as having a largely supporting role for the activities outlined
in the plan. Additionally, DOD’s Arctic Strategy issued in November 2013 and the
Navy’s Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 issued in February 2014 emphasize that, as sea ice
diminishes and the Arctic Ocean opens to more activity, the department may be called
upon more frequently to support other federal agencies and work with partners to ensure
a secure and stable region. To further its role, DOD participates in a number of forums
focused on military security cooperation in the Arctic, including the Arctic Security
Forces Roundtable, a senior-level event aimed at encouraging discussion among the
security forces of Arctic and non-Arctic nations. In addition, DOD leads training
exercises focused on building partner capacity in the region, including Arctic Zephyr, a
multilateral scenario-based exercise. DOD continues to monitor the security environment
in the region and is tracking indicators that could change its threat assessment and affect
DOD’s future role.
DOD has taken actions, along with interagency partners, to address some near-term
capabilities needed in the Arctic, such as maritime domain awareness and
communications. In recent years, DOD has conducted a number of studies to identify
near-term capabilities the department needs to operate in the Arctic. The Implementation
Plan to the National Strategy for the Arctic Region created an interagency framework and
identified activities to address many of these needed capabilities. For example, as the lead
agency for Arctic sea ice forecasting, DOD has established an interagency team to focus
on improved sea ice modeling. DOD has also begun other efforts within the department
to address capability needs. For example, the Navy’s Arctic Roadmap prioritizes near-
term actions to enhance its ability to operate in the Arctic and includes an implementation
plan and timeline for operations and training, facilities, equipment, and maritime domain
awareness, among other capabilities.
U.S. Northern Command—the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities—stated that it is in
the process of updating its regional plans for the Arctic and is conducting analysis to
determine future capability needs. For example, Northern Command is updating the
Commander’s Estimate for the Arctic, which establishes the commander’s intent and
missions in the Arctic and identifies near-, mid-, and long-term goals. Additionally, the
command is conducting studies of various Arctic mission areas, such as maritime
homeland defense and undersea surveillance, to identify future capability needs.
However, according to DOD’s Arctic Strategy, uncertainty remains around the pace of
change and commercial activity in the region that may affect its planning timelines.
Difficulty in developing accurate sea ice models, variability in the Arctic’s climate, and
the uncertain rate of activity in the region create challenges for DOD to balance the risk
of having inadequate capabilities or insufficient capacity when required to operate in the
region with the cost of making premature or unnecessary investments. According to its
Arctic Strategy, DOD plans to mitigate this risk by monitoring the changing Arctic
conditions to determine the appropriate timing for capability investments.299
299 Government Accountability Office, Arctic Planning[:] DOD Expects to Play a Supporting Role to Other Federal
Agencies and Has Efforts Under Way to Address Capability Needs and Update Plans, GAO-15-566, June 2015,
summary page.
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DOD Cooperation with Canada and Other Countries
In December 2009, it was reported that “U.S. and Canadian defense officials are studying
emerging gaps in their awareness of Arctic activities, seeking to boost North American Aerospace
Defense [NORAD] Command’s maritime-warning mission and crafting a new threat assessment
for the region.” The effort would reportedly involve both NORAD and a Canadian-American
advisory board called the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.300
In May 2010, it was reported that “American and Canadian defense officials are bolstering
collaboration on military exercises, investment plans and technology development related to the
Arctic.” The report stated that “U.S. and Canadian intelligence officials have created a classified
joint “utilization” assessment for the Arctic looking out to 2020, which will be continuously
updated.” It also stated that “American and Canadian defense officials have just started
implementing a new five-year work plan that contains specific initiatives and requires concrete
deliverables, Stockton said, noting the Arctic received special attention in the plan. The plan also
covers defense critical infrastructure protection, defense support to civil agencies and defense
cooperation in the Americas.”301
In December 2012, the commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM and the commander of the
Canadian Joint Operations Command signed two documents on Arctic cooperation. A December
11, 2012, statement issued by NORAD and USNORTHCOM on the signing of the documents
stated in part:
Army Gen. Charles Jacoby, Jr., commander of NORAD and U.S. Northern Command,
and Lt.-Gen. Stuart Beare, Canadian Joint Operations Command commander, signed two
significant documents today—the Tri Command Framework for Arctic Cooperation and
the Tri-Command Training and Exercise Statement of Intent—during the 230th meeting
of the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defense in Colorado Springs, Colo.
The Tri-Command Framework for Arctic Cooperation acknowledges the Arctic is not a
region of conflict and the Canadian and U.S. militaries will support other departments
and agencies in response to threats and hazards in the region when requested and
directed. In that context, the goal of the Framework is to promote enhanced military
cooperation in the Arctic and identify specific areas of potential Tri-Command
cooperation in the preparation for and conduct of safety, security and defense operations.
It strengthens an already unique and mature partnership where coordination and
cooperation occurs on a regular basis. The Tri-Command Framework for Arctic
Cooperation document is not a plan but rather outlines a process that supports the
identification of opportunities for potential cooperation in the Arctic. Areas that continue
to be improved, particularly in the Arctic, include planning, domain awareness,
information-sharing, training and exercises, operations, capability development, and
science and technology....
The second document, the Tri Command Training and Exercise Statement of Intent, is
aimed at enhancing joint and combined readiness in support of safety, security and
defence missions through combined training and exercises and reinforcing partnerships
and collaboration among the Commands. The Tri-Command Training and Exercise
Directive will help to ensure a timely and coordinated response to safety, security and
defence challenges to North America.
300 Christopher J. Castelli, “DOD, Canada Aim TO Develop Arctic Policy Options By Early 2010,” Inside the Navy,
December 7, 2009.
301 Christopher J. Castelli, “American, Canadian Defense Officials Tighten Ties On Arctic Issues,” Inside the Navy,
May 3, 2010.
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The signing of the Tri Command Framework for Arctic Cooperation and the Tri-
Command Training and Exercise Statement of Intent follows on a Tri Command Strategy
that spells out a series of shared tasks designed to strengthen working relationships with
all Tri-Command defense and security partners.302
In June 2013, it was reported that
Defense chiefs representing the world’s eight main Arctic nations will strengthen
cooperation in marine surveillance and expand joint military exercises.
Moreover, defense commanders agreed to identify and appraise the military and civilian
capabilities in each country that can be used to support civilian missions in the Arctic
over the next 12 months.
The new strategy, following a two-day meeting of defense commanders in the coastal
Greenland town of Ilulissat that ended June 12, will focus on how the eight Arctic nations
can bolster defense and security cooperation in the Arctic and how military resources can
be better deployed to support civilian needs across borders.303
In March 2014 it was reported that
The joint Canada-U.S. North American Aerospace Defence Command wants improved
surveillance systems to keep close tabs on increasing activity in the Arctic, particularly in
the region’s waters, according to documents obtained by the [Ottawa] Citizen.
Although the installation of any new systems wouldn’t take place until around 2025, the
final report on what needs to be done will be presented to top military commanders on
both sides of the border this spring.
The “Norad Next” initiative aims to provide direction for the alliance in the coming
decades and determine what threats North America might face. It would see “the future
modernization of the Norad surveillance network to provide improved multi-domain
coverage, particularly in the Arctic region,” according to a May 2012 briefing paper
obtained by the Citizen under the Access to Information law.
The initiative is spearheaded by Norad’s U.S. commander Gen. Charles Jacoby.
“A cornerstone of Gen. Jacoby’s direction to his staff has been to emphasize the
importance of outpacing emerging capabilities of potential adversaries,” the briefing
added.
Norad Next coincides with the need to replace the alliance’s inventory of aging
surveillance equipment. Many of its current radars reach the end of their life cycles in the
2020-2025 time frame, according to the U.S. Department of Defense.
Norad spokeswoman Capt. Jennifer Stadnyk noted that the alliance has maintained
forward operating locations in the North for many years. “Additionally, the ever-
increasing numbers of vessels transiting Arctic waters emphasize the need for Norad to
observe, share and act on activity in that domain,” she added in an email. “This will be
studied during the Norad Next analysis.”
Members of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence, with representatives from both
countries, discussed the Norad Next concept during their meeting in December.
302 NORAD news release, “NORAD, USNORTHCOM and Canadian Joint Operations Commmand Commander Sign
Cooperative U.S./Canada Documents,” December 11, 2012, accessed December 21, 2012, at http://www.norad.mil/
News/2012/121112a.html.
303 Gerard O’Dwyer, “Arctic Nations Set Cooperation Guidelines,” DefenseNews.com, June 27, 2013. See also Gerard
O’Dwyer, “Greenland Meeting Highlights Arctic’s Growing Importance,” DefenseNews.com, June 2, 2013.
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The initiative will make recommendations only; any decision for follow on action will
have to be considered and approved by Canadian and U.S. leadership, Stadnyk added.304
In May 2014 it was reported that
Canadian and US military officials are looking at modernizing the North American
Aerospace Defense Command’s (NORAD’s) surveillance capabilities as well as
expanding its responsibilities to include monitoring Arctic waters.
A strategic review with various recommendations from NORAD on how to proceed is
expected to be presented in the coming months to both Canada’s chief of the Defence
Staff, Gen. Tom Lawson, and US Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Royal Canadian Air Force Lt. Gen. Alain Parent, deputy commander of NORAD, said
the review will focus NORAD toward the 2025-2030 timeframe....
But a 2012 briefing for the Canadian government noted that NORAD commander US
Gen. Charles Jacoby is specifically interested in “the modernization of the NORAD
surveillance network to provide improved multi-domain coverage, particularly of the
Arctic region.”
The five-page briefing on what is being called “NORAD Next” was forwarded to the
government in June 2012 by then-Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Walter
Natynczyk.
It was obtained by Defense News and declassified under the Canadian government’s
access to information law.
“A cornerstone of Gen. Jacoby’s direction to his staff has been to emphasize the
importance of outpacing emerging capabilities of potential adversaries,” the briefing
noted. Those capabilities, however, have been censored from the report.
Canadian Army Capt. Jennifer Stadnyk, a spokeswoman for NORAD and US Northern
Command, said the alliance’s aircraft have been operating from forward locations in the
Arctic for many years.
In April, NORAD aircraft conducted Operation Spring Forward, practicing a number of
activities in the northern region of Canada.
But Stadnyk noted there has been an increasing amount of maritime traffic in the Arctic.
“The ever-increasing numbers of vessels transiting Arctic waters emphasize the need for
NORAD to observe, share and act on activity in that domain,” she said. “This will be
studied during the NORAD Next analysis.”
NORAD Next will make recommendations to the US and Canadian governments; they
will determine which recommendations they will accept and act on, NORAD officials
said.
Any recommendations that are approved will be implemented during a timeframe
covering 2025 to 2030, Stadnyk said.
Stadnyk said it’s not possible at this point to estimate the cost to Canada and the US of
any recommendations from the NORAD review.305
304 David Pugliese, “Norad To Increase Focus On Arctic Surveillance,” Ottawa Citizen (www.ottawacitizen.com),
March 3, 2014.
305 David Pugliese, “Canada, US Eye Arctic Responsibilities for NORAD,” DefenseNews.com, May 3, 2014.
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Navy and Coast Guard in General
The Navy and Coast Guard are exploring the potential implications that increased human
activities in the Arctic may have for Navy and Coast Guard required numbers of ships and
aircraft, ship and aircraft characteristics, new or enlarged Arctic bases, and supporting systems,
such as navigation and communication systems. The Navy and Coast Guard have sponsored or
participated in studies and conferences to explore these implications, the Coast Guard has
deployed cutters and aircraft into the region to perform missions and better understand the
implications of operating such units there, and Navy sailors have ridden on Canadian Navy ships
deploying to Arctic waters for similar reasons.306
Points or themes that have emerged in studies, conferences, and deployments regarding the
potential implications for the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard of diminished Arctic sea ice include but
are not limited to the following:
The diminishment of Arctic ice is creating potential new operating areas in the
Arctic for Navy surface ships and Coast Guard cutters.
U.S. national security interests in the Arctic include “such matters as missile
defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic
sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations;
and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.”307
Search and rescue in the Arctic is a mission of increasing importance, particularly
for the Coast Guard, and one that poses potentially significant operational
challenges (see “Search and Rescue” above).
More complete and detailed information on the Arctic is needed to more properly
support expanded Navy and Coast Guard ship and aircraft operations in the
Arctic.
The Navy and the Coast Guard currently have limited infrastructure in place in
the Arctic to support expanded ship and aircraft operations in the Arctic.
Expanded ship and aircraft operations in the Arctic may require altering ship and
aircraft designs and operating methods.
Cooperation with other Arctic countries will be valuable in achieving defense and
homeland security goals.
Navy
November 2009 Navy Arctic Roadmap
The Navy issued its first Arctic roadmap on November 10, 2009.308 The document, dated October
2009,309 was intended to guide the service’s activities regarding the Arctic for the period FY2010-
306 See, for example, Blake Essig, “USCG Expands Operations into the Arctic,” KTUU (www.ktuu.com), June 29, 2014.
307 NSPD 66/HSPD 25, Section III B.
308 Memorandum for Distribution dated November 10, 2009, from Admiral J. W. Greenert, Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, on the subject of the Navy Arctic Roadmap, accessed July 24, 2013, at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/
documents/USN_artic_roadmap.pdf.
309 U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap, Washington, 2009, 29 pp. (October 2009, sponsored by Task Force Climate
Change [and] Oceanographer of the Navy).
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FY2014. The document has now been succeeded by the 2014-2030 Navy Arctic roadmap (see
discussion below).
August 2011 Navy Arctic Environmental Assessment and Outlook Report
In August 2011, the Navy released an Arctic environment assessment and outlook report.310 The
report states:
As the Arctic environment continues to change and human activity increases, the U.S.
Navy must be prepared to operate in this region. It is important to note that even though
the Arctic is opening up, it will continue to be a harsh and challenging environment for
the foreseeable future due to hazardous sea ice, freezing temperatures and extreme
weather. Although the Navy submarine fleet has decades of experience operating in the
Arctic, the surface fleet, air assets, and U.S. Marine Corps ground troops have limited
experience there. The Navy must now consider the Arctic in terms of future policy,
strategy, force structure, and investments.311
November 2013 DOD Arctic Strategy
The November 2013 DOD Arctic strategy (see discussion above in the section on DOD) states
that “The Department of the Navy, in its role as DoD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain
Awareness, will lead DoD coordination on maritime detection and tracking,” and that “DoD will
take steps to work with other Federal departments and agencies to improve nautical charts,
enhance relevant atmospheric and oceanic models, improve accuracy of estimates of ice extent
and thickness, and detect and monitor climate change indicators. In particular, the Department of
the Navy will work in partnership with other Federal departments and agencies (e.g., DHS, the
Department of Commerce) and international partners to improve hydrographic charting and
oceanographic surveys in the Arctic.”312
January 2014 Implementation Plan for National Strategy for Arctic Region
The Administration’s January 2014 implementation plan for its national strategy for the Arctic
region (see “Background”) mentions the Navy by name only once, as one of several agencies that
will “collaborate to improve marine charting in the Arctic (Integrated Ocean and Coastal
Mapping) and topographic mapping (Alaska Mapping Executive Committee).”313 As noted above
in the discussion of DOD in general, however, the January 2014 implementation plan makes
DOD the lead federal agency for one of the plan’s 36 or so specific initiatives and a supporting
agency for 18 others.314 The Navy will likely be a prominent participant in DOD’s activities for a
number of these 19 initiatives.
310 Department of the Navy, Arctic Environmental Assessment and Outlook Report, August 2011, 25 pp., accessed July
24, 2013, at http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2011/08/U.S.-Navy-Arctic-Environmental-Assessment.pdf.
311 Department of the Navy, Arctic Environmental Assessment and Outlook Report, August 2011, p. v.
312 Department of Defense, Arctic Strategy, November 2013, p. 9.
313 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, p. 23.
314 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, pp. 6-32. The activity entitled
“Develop a Framework of Observations and Modeling to Support Forecasting and Prediction of Sea Ice” is presented
on pages 15-16.
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February 2014 Updated Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014-2030
On February 24, 2014, the Navy released an updated Arctic roadmap intended to guide Navy
activities regarding the Arctic for the period 2014-2030.315 The document is the successor to the
November 2009 Navy Arctic roadmap (see discussion above). The executive summary of the
2014-2030 Navy Arctic roadmap states:
The United States Navy, as the maritime component of the Department of Defense, has
global leadership responsibilities to provide ready forces for current operations and
contingency response that include the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic Region remains a
challenging operating environment, with a harsh climate, vast distances, and little
infrastructure. These issues, coupled with limited operational experience, are just a few
substantial challenges the Navy will have to overcome in the Arctic Region. While the
Region is expected to remain a low threat security environment where nations resolve
differences peacefully, the Navy will be prepared to prevent conflict and ensure national
interests are protected....
Navy functions in the Arctic Region are no different from those in other maritime
regions; however, the Arctic Region environment makes the execution of many of these
functions4 much more challenging....
In support of National and Department of Defense aims, the Navy will pursue the
following strategic objectives:
• Ensure United States Arctic sovereignty and provide homeland defense;
• Provide ready naval forces to respond to crisis and contingencies;
• Preserve freedom of the seas; and
• Promote partnerships within the United States Government and with international
allies and partners....
Resource constraints and competing near-term mission demands require that naval
investments be informed, focused, and deliberate. Proactive planning today allows the
Navy to prepare its forces for Arctic Region operations. This Roadmap emphasizes low-
cost, long-lead activities that position the Navy to meet future demands. In the near to
mid-term, the Navy will concentrate on improving operational capabilities, expertise, and
capacity, extending reach, and will leverage interagency and international partners to
achieve its strategic objectives. The Roadmap recognizes the need to guide investments
by prudently balancing regional requirements with national goals....
This Roadmap provides direction to the Navy for the near-term (present-2020), mid-term
(2020-2030), and far-term (beyond 2030), placing particular emphasis on near-term
actions necessary to enhance Navy’s ability to operate in the Arctic Region in the future.
In the near-term, there will be low demand for additional naval involvement in the
Region. Current Navy capabilities are sufficient to meet near-term operational needs.
Navy will refine doctrine, operating procedures, and tactics, techniques, and procedures
to guide future potential operations in the Arctic Region. In the mid-term, the Navy will
provide support to the Combatant Commanders, United States Coast Guard, and other
United States Government agencies. In the far-term, increased periods of ice-free
conditions could require the Navy to expand this support on a more routine basis.316
315 U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014 – 2030, February 2014, 43 pp., accessed February 26, 2014, at
http://www.navy.mil/docs/USN_arctic_roadmap.pdf.
316 U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014 – 2030, February 2014, pp. 3-4. Italics as in original.
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Regarding “United States Navy Ways and Means for Near-Term, Mid-Term, and Far-Term
Operations,” the roadmap states:
Near-term: Present to 2020.
The Navy will continue to provide capability and presence primarily through undersea
and air assets. Surface ship operations will be limited to open water operations in the
near-term. Even in open water conditions, weather factors, including sea ice, must be
considered in operational risk assessments. During shoulder seasons, the Navy may
employ ice strengthened Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships to conduct Navy
missions.
By 2020, the Navy will increase the number of personnel trained in Arctic operations.
The Navy will grow expertise in all domains by continuing to participate in exercises,
scientific missions, and personnel exchanges in Arctic-like conditions. Personnel
exchanges will provide Sailors with opportunities to learn best practices from other
United States’ military services, interagency partners, and international allies and
partners.
The Navy will refine or develop the necessary strategy, policy, plans, and requirements
for the Arctic Region. Additionally, the Navy will continue to study and make informed
decisions on pursuing investments to better facilitate Arctic operations. The Navy will
emphasize low cost, long-lead time activities to match capability and capacity to future
demands. The Navy will update operating requirements and procedures for personnel,
ships, and aircraft to operate in the Region with interagency partners and allies. Through
ongoing exercises, such as Ice Exercise (ICEX) and Scientific Ice Expeditions (SCICEX)
research, and transits through the region by Navy submarines, aircraft and surface
vessels, the Navy will continue to learn more about the evolving operating environment.
The Navy will focus on areas where it provides unique capabilities and will leverage joint
and coalition partners to fill identified gaps and seams.
Mid-term: 2020 to 2030.
By 2030, the Navy will have the necessary training and personnel to respond to
contingencies and emergencies affecting national security. As the Arctic Ocean becomes
increasingly ice-free, surface vessels will operate in the expanding open water areas. The
Navy will improve its capabilities by participating in increasingly complex exercises and
training with regional partners. While primary risks in the mid-term will likely be
meeting search and rescue or disaster response mission demands, the Navy may also be
called upon to ensure freedom of navigation in Arctic Ocean waters. The Navy will work
to mitigate the gaps and seams and transition its Arctic Ocean operations from a
capability to provide periodic presence to a capability to operate deliberately for
sustained periods when needed.
Far-term: Beyond 2030.
In the far-term, Navy will be capable of supporting sustained operations in the Arctic
Region as needed to meet national policy guidance. The Navy will provide trained and
equipped personnel, along with surface, subsurface, and air capabilities, to achieve
Combatant Commander’s objectives. The high confidence of diminished ice coverage
and navigable waterways for much of the year will enable naval forces to operate
forward, ready to respond to any potential threat to national security, or to provide
contingency response. Far-term risks include increased potential for search and rescue
and DSCA [Defense Support of Civil Authorities], but may also require naval forces to
have a greater focus on maritime security and freedom of navigation in the Region.317
317 U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014 – 2030, February 2014, pp. 18-19.
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A March 24, 2014, press report states:
The Navy has published a thorough breakdown of what it needs for future surface
operations in the Arctic, from new doctrine to platform assessments and an updated cold-
weather handbook for sailors.
The next step? Getting buy-in from the rest of the fleet.
With shrinking budgets and growing mission requirements elsewhere, particularly the
Pacific, the service has little appetite for new tasks, experts say, especially ones that are
decades away and where threats remain speculative.
“We know there is no immediate threat in the Arctic, and there are [threats] elsewhere,”
said Robert Freeman, a meteorologist and the spokesman for the Navy’s Task Force
Climate Change, which released the report last month....
The Navy study projects sea traffic in the Arctic over the coming decades, and it lays out
milestones for preparing to operate in the Arctic, as well as a few general timelines. The
Navy wants more sailors trained in Arctic operations by 2020. It wants to be able to
respond to a national security threat in the region by 2030.
Yet as meteorologists move forward with Arctic planning, the Navy’s operational side is
focused on other parts of the globe.
The service is already manning more ships with fewer sailors than in past years, its top
officers say. Combatant commanders across the globe meanwhile request more ships than
the Navy can give them, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert told the
House Armed Services Committee earlier this month.
Arctic planning is likely to take a backseat at a time of tight budgets and the possibility of
further cuts in the years ahead, Freeman and others admit. Even sending surface ships to
future Arctic exercises with other countries, which the Navy did in 2010 and 2012, could
be difficult as the service considers other needs, they say.
Under the study, Navy leaders aren’t required to meet the timelines but must produce
regular progress reports, which Freeman considers a step forward.
“It’s drawing in the operational community more than they were before,” he said. “It’s
making the operational fleet look at this. They could come back and say, ‘It’s too hard.
We have to table this until later.’ And that’s fine.”
The trouble with waiting is that the development of Arctic technologies, infrastructure
and training take time....
The two combatant commands responsible for the region—Northern Command and
European Command—have yet to outline plans for Arctic operations, and there are
questions of which of the Navy’s numbered fleets should cover the region....
Walter Berbrick, a professor at the Naval War College and director of its Arctic Studies
Group, said that absent funding, the Navy needs to begin reaching for the “low-hanging
fruit” of preparation. Sailors should “cross-deck” with foreign navies such as Norway or
Denmark and report back with their experiences. Officers need to attend seminars and
symposiums on the region.
“There’s so much uncertainty now around the region,” Berbrick said. “Our people have
to get smarter.”
A full capabilities assessment by the Navy—which the roadmap suggested be finished
this fiscal year—would be another positive step forward, Berbrick said. When the
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services and Congress are ready to allocate money for the Arctic, they’ll know what they
need, he said.318
Coast Guard
Coast Guard High Latitude Study Provided to Congress in July 2011
In July 2011, the Coast Guard provided to Congress a study on the Coast Guard’s missions and
capabilities for operations in high-latitude (i.e., polar) areas. The study, commonly known as the
High Latitude Study, is dated July 2010 on its cover. The High Latitude Study concluded the
following:
[The study] concludes that future [Coast Guard] capability and capacity gaps will
significantly impact four [Coast Guard] mission areas in the Arctic: Defense Readiness,
Ice Operations, Marine Environmental Protection, and Ports, Waterways, and Coastal
Security. These mission areas address the protection of important national interests in a
geographic area where other nations are actively pursuing their own national goals. U.S.
national policy and laws define the requirements to assert the nation’s jurisdiction over its
territory and interests; to ensure the security of its people and critical infrastructure; to
participate fully in the collection of scientific knowledge; to support commercial
enterprises with public utility; and to ensure that the Arctic environment is not degraded
by increased human activity.
The Coast Guard’s ability to support Defense Readiness mission requirements in the
Arctic is closely linked to DoD responsibilities. The Coast Guard presently possesses the
only surface vessels capable of operating in ice-covered and ice-diminished waters. The
Coast Guard supports (1) DoD missions such as the resupply of Thule Air Base in
Greenland and logistics support (backup) for McMurdo Station in Antarctica and (2)
Department of State (DoS) directed Freedom of Navigation Operations. These unique
Coast Guard capabilities have been noted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy’s Task
Force Climate Change, and the recently issued Naval Operations Concept 2010.
The common and dominant contributor to these significant mission impacts is the gap in
polar icebreaking capability....319
Other capability gaps contributing to the impact on Coast Guard ability to carry out its
missions in the Arctic include:
Communications System Capability – Continuous coverage along Alaska’s West
Coast, the Bering Strait, and throughout the North Slope is required for exchanging
voice and data communications with Coast Guard units and other government and
commercial platforms offshore.
Forward Operating Locations - No suitable facilities currently exist on the North
Slope or near the Bering Strait with facilities sufficient to support extended aircraft
servicing and maintenance. Aircraft must travel long distances and expend
significant time transiting to and from adequate facilities. This gap reduces on-scene
presence and capability to support sustained operations in the region.
Environmental response in ice-covered waters - The technology and procedures for
assessment and mitigation measures for oil spills in ice-covered waters are not fully
developed or tested.
318 Steven Beardsley, “Navy Spots An Arctic Future, But Struggles To Plot A Course,” Stars and Stripes
(www.stripes.com), March 24, 2014.
319 For additional discussion, see “Polar Icebreaking”.
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Capability gaps in the Arctic region have moderate impacts on [the Coast Guard’s] Aids
to Navigation (AtoN), Search and Rescue (SAR), and Other Law Enforcement (OLE)
missions. Both AtoN and SAR involve the safety of mariners and will gain more
importance not only as commerce and tourism cause an increase in maritime traffic, but
as U.S. citizens in northern Alaska face more unpredictable conditions. Performance of
OLE will be increasingly necessary to ensure the integrity of U.S. living marine resources
from outside pressures....
In addition to the assessment of polar icebreaking needs, the Arctic mission analysis
examined a set of theoretical mixes (force packages) of Coast Guard assets consisting of
icebreakers, their embarked helicopters, and deployment alternatives using aviation
forward operating locations in Arctic Alaska....
All [six] of the force mixes [considered in the study] add assets to the existing Coast
Guard Alaska Patrol consisting of (1) a high-endurance cutter (not an icebreaker)
deployed in the Bering Sea carrying a short range recovery helicopter, and (2) medium
range recovery helicopters located at Kodiak in the Gulf of Alaska, and seasonally
deployed to locations in Cold Bay and St. Paul Island....
These force packages and associated risk assessment provide a framework for acquisition
planning as the Coast Guard implements a strategy for closing the capability gaps. By
first recapitalizing the aging icebreakers, the Coast Guard provides a foundation for
buildout of these force mixes. In addition to the cost of the icebreakers, the force
packages require investment in forward operating locations and in medium range
helicopters. The mission analysis reports developed rough order-of-magnitude cost
estimates for forward operating locations at approximately $36M [million] each and for
helicopters at $9M each....
The analysis shows that the current Coast Guard deployment posture is not capable of
effective response in northern Alaska and that response may be improved through a mix
of deployed cutters, aircraft, and supporting infrastructure including forward operating
locations and communications/navigation systems.320
May 2013 Coast Guard Arctic Strategy
On May 21, 2013, the Coast Guard released a strategy document for the Arctic.321 The executive
summary of the document states in part:
The U.S. Coast Guard, as the maritime component of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), has specific statutory responsibilities in U.S. Arctic waters. This strategy
outlines the ends, ways, and means for achieving strategic objectives in the Arctic over
the next 10 years. The Coast Guard is responsible for ensuring safe, secure, and
environmentally responsible maritime activity in U.S. Arctic waters. Our efforts must be
accomplished in close coordination with DHS components, and involve facilitating
commerce, managing borders, and improving resilience to disasters.
The Coast Guard’s current suite of cutters, boats, aircraft, and shore infrastructure must
meet a number of near-term mission demands. The Coast Guard employs mobile
command and control platforms such as large cutters and ocean-going ice-strengthened
buoy tenders, as well as seasonal air and communications capabilities through leased or
deployable assets and facilities. These mobile and seasonal assets and facilities have
proven to be important enablers for front-line priorities in the region, including search
320 United States Coast Guard High Latitude Region Mission Analysis Capstone Summary, July 2010, pp. 10-11, 13-15.
321 United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy, Washington, May 2013, 47 pp.; accessed May 24, 2013, at
http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/CG_Arctic_Strategy.pdf.
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and rescue operations, securing the maritime border, collecting critical intelligence,
responding to potential disasters, and protecting the marine environment....
Although winter sea travel is still severely limited due to extensive ice coverage across
the region, recent summer and early autumn sea ice extent record lows have made
seasonal maritime navigation more feasible. Economic development, in the forms of
resource extraction, adventure tourism, and trans-Arctic shipping drives much of the
current maritime activity in the region.
[Oil and gas exploration] activities [in the region] bring risk, which can be mitigated
through appropriate maritime governance. Additionally, tourism is increasing rapidly in
the Arctic. Due to undeveloped shore-based infrastructure, much of the increased tourism
is expected to involve transportation via passenger vessel, further increasing near- and
offshore activities in Arctic waters.
This document outlines three strategic objectives in the Arctic for the U.S. Coast Guard
over the next 10 years:
• Improving Awareness
• Modernizing Governance
• Broadening Partnerships
Improving Awareness: Coast Guard operations require precise and ongoing awareness of
activities in the maritime domain. Maritime awareness in the Arctic is currently restricted
due to limited surveillance, monitoring, and information system capabilities. Persistent
awareness enables identification of threats, information-sharing with front-line partners,
and improved risk management. Improving awareness requires close collaboration within
DHS, as well as with the Departments of State, Defense, Interior, the National Science
Foundation and other stakeholders to enhance integration, innovation, and fielding of
emerging technologies. The Intelligence Community and non-federal partners are also
vital stakeholders.
Modernizing Governance: The concept of governance involves institutions, structures of
authority, and capabilities necessary to oversee maritime activities while safeguarding
national interests. Limited awareness and oversight challenge maritime sovereignty,
including the protection of natural resources and control of maritime borders. The Coast
Guard will work within its authorities to foster collective efforts, both domestically and
internationally, to improve Arctic governance. In so doing, the Coast Guard will review
its own institutions and regimes of governance to prepare for future missions throughout
the Arctic.
Broadening Partnerships: Success in the Arctic requires a collective effort across both
the public and private sectors. Such a collective effort must be inclusive of domestic
regulatory regimes; international collaborative forums such as the Arctic Council,
International Maritime Organization (IMO), and Inuit Circumpolar Council; domestic
and international partnerships; and local engagements in Arctic communities focusing on
training and volunteer service. Success in the Arctic also depends upon close
intergovernmental cooperation to support national interests, including working closely
within DHS, as well as with the Department of State, Department of Interior and other
Federal partners as the U.S. prepares to assume Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in
2015.
Beyond these three strategic objectives, there are a number of additional factors that will
position the Coast Guard for long-term success. These factors include building national
awareness of the Arctic and its opportunities, strengthening maritime regimes, improving
public-private relationships through a national concept of operations, seeking necessary
authorities, and identifying future requirements and resources to shape trends favorably.
This strategy outlines a number of priorities, ranging from capabilities and requirements
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to advances in science and technology that will facilitate our Nation’s success in the
region. Specifically, the strategy advocates to leverage the entire DHS enterprise and
component capabilities to secure our borders, prevent terrorism, adapt to changing
environmental conditions, enable community resilience and inform future policy.
Operating in the Arctic is not a new venture for the Coast Guard. However, adapting to
changing conditions will require foresight, focus, and clear priorities. This strategy will
ensure we attain the aim of safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime
activity in the Arctic by improving awareness, modernizing governance, and broadening
partnerships to ensure long-term success.322
A June 2013 press report stated:
Arctic sea lanes may be staying open longer and traffic in the frigid waters may be
increasing, but the Coast Guard’s new 10-year plan for Arctic missions won’t send more
Coasties to the region or establish a year-round presence, the service’s top officer said.
The service’s seasonal, mobile approach has been “tested and proven … over the last
several years,” Commandant Adm. Bob Papp said when he released the Coast Guard’s
Arctic Strategy on May 21. “That will be our approach in the coming decade.”
The service will not increase deployment time to the Arctic, continuing to rely on
standard six-month cutter deployments to maintain a presence, Papp said.
The national security cutters carry supplies, small boats and helicopters, and have the
communication and intelligence capabilities needed for a sustained offshore presence in
the ice-free waters, he said. They patrol the Arctic for the summer season, typically from
June to September, depending on how long the waters are ice-free, said Lt. Veronica
Colbath, a spokeswoman for District 17, which covers Alaska.
Using the cutter fleet instead of establishing bases over the next 10 years will save money
and allow for greater flexibility, Papp said. The strategy also stresses expanding
partnerships with domestic and international regulatory bodies monitoring the Arctic,
including the Arctic Council, International Maritime Organization and the Inuit
Circumpolar Council.
With long-term forecasts showing the region will become ice-free for longer periods,
Papp said that at some point the Coast Guard might need a full-time sector, based in
Barrow, Alaska.
However, that’s not part of the current strategy.
“We are not going to permanently station anyone up there,” Papp said.323
January 2014 Implementation Plan for National Strategy for Arctic Region
The Administration’s January 2014 implementation plan for its national strategy for the Arctic
region (see “Background”) makes “Department of Homeland Security (United States Coast
Guard)” the lead federal agency for six of the plan’s 36 or so specific initiatives, and a supporting
agency for 13 others.324 The six initiatives where the Coast Guard is designated the lead federal
agency include:
enhance Arctic domain awareness;
322 United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy, Washington, May 2013, pp. 9-10. Emphasis as in original.
323 Antonieta Rico, “Papp: No Plans For More Coasties in Arctic,” NavyTimes.com, June 1, 2013.
324 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, pp. 7-31.
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improve hazardous material spill prevention, containment, and response;
promote Arctic oil pollution preparedness, prevention, and response
internationally;
enhance Arctic search and rescue;
expedite International Maritime Organization (IMO) Polar Code development
and adoption; and
promote Arctic waterways management.325
For the second initiative above—“Improve Hazardous Material Spill Prevention, Containment,
and Response”—the Coast Guard shares lead-agency status with the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), with the Coast Guard being the lead federal agency for open ocean and coastal
spills, and EPA being the lead federal agency for inland spills.326
Potential Oversight Questions Relating to Arctic Policy and
Strategy327
January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25)
As noted earlier (see “January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25)” in
“Background”), the Obama Administration is currently operating under the January 2009 Arctic
region policy directive (NSPD 66/HSPD 25) issued by the George W. Bush Administration.328
Potential oversight questions include but not are limited to the following:
Is NSPD 66/HSPD 25 a suitable statement of U.S. policy for the Arctic region?329
Although the Obama Administration is currently operating under NSPD
66/HSPD 25, does the Obama Administration fully agree with all parts of it? If
not, with which parts does it not fully agree?
Does the Obama Administration intend to eventually conduct a review of NSDP
66/HSPD 25? If so, what is the Administration’s schedule for conducting and
releasing the results of that review?
In connection with the above questions, a March 2013 report from the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) on U.S. interests and U.S. government actors in the Arctic stated:
325 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, pp. 7-8, 13, 24, 25, 31, and 31,
respectively.
326 Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for the Arctic Region, January 2014, p. 13.
327 This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
328 CRS communication with State Department official, October 8, 2010.
329 On this question, a January 19, 2009, press article about the new directive stated:
The new policy directive covers several key areas, including national security, energy exploration
and the environment, but it does not specify whether any should take precedence over others.
That led Jeremy Rabkin, a professor at George Mason University Law School, to comment: “It’s
really a list of all the things we’re concerned about; that’s not policy. I don’t see anything here that
helps you decide what gets priority.”
(Juliet Eilperin and Spencer S. Hsu, “White House Directive Guides Policy On Arctic,”
Washington Post, January 19, 2009: 2.)
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NSPD-66/HSPD-25 contains a rigorous implementation schedule for the federal
government. Yet, as this directive passes its fourth anniversary, many implementation
strategies have not been put into effect. That said, several of the policy priorities and
implementation strategies are redundant. For example, to meet U.S. security interests in
the Arctic, an interagency group under the leadership of the departments of State,
Defense, and Homeland Security is requested to “develop greater capabilities and
capacity [ ... ] to protect U.S. air, land and sea borders” and “increase Arctic maritime
domain awareness.” Under maritime transportation, these same agencies, with the
departments of Transportation and Commerce, are to “determine basing and logistics
support requirements, including necessary airlift and icebreaking capabilities; and
improve plans and cooperative agreements for search and rescue.” These overlapping
mandates raise the question whether this strategy is a security function, an act of
commerce—or both—and who ultimately is accountable for implementing the strategy.
Such policy overlap and redundancy accurately reflects U.S. Arctic policymaking today
and unfortunately reflects poorly on the interagency process following the release of
NSPD-66. A successful future policy demands a more streamlined and prioritized
process.
It is time to update NSPD-66. Other Arctic coastal states emerged with Arctic policy
statements around the same time as the United States did, in the 2007 to 2009 timeframe.
Since issuing these statements, however, most other Arctic nations have updated and
further refined their whole-of-government strategies. Unfortunately, the United States has
failed to do so. Separate federal agencies and departments have developed, or will be
developing, their own separate strategies based on NSPD-66, but this effort has been
uneven at best.... The Department of Defense report on Arctic Operations and the
Northwest Passage was congressionally mandated by the fiscal year 2011 National
Defense Authorization Act. However, there is no such mandate for other U.S.
government agencies and, consequently, most other agencies have yet to develop their
own implementation strategy stemming from NSPD-66.
What would an updated U.S. Arctic strategy require? The seven policy areas identified in
NSPD-66 remain relevant, but these areas must be defined more clearly.
First and foremost, the United States must create a long-term economic strategy for the
American Arctic. The first component of an Arctic economic strategy must be an energy,
mineral resource, and infrastructure strategy. NSPD-66 states that “Energy development
in the Arctic region will play an important role in meeting growing global energy
demand.” How large a role? At present, U.S. energy strategy consists of a five-year
offshore licensing and permitting plan that ends in 2017. The government needs to define
its long-term offshore and onshore energy strategy for Alaska, answering such questions
as whether America’s Arctic energy resources are intended to meet U.S. demand or to be
exported to Asian markets. Other questions in need of answers include the status of port,
pipeline, and liquid natural gas infrastructure; whether methane hydrates are viable; and
whether energy development can be pursued in an environmentally sustainable way in
such a fragile environment.
Based on the answers to these questions, America’s Arctic economic strategy must also
include a detailed maritime transportation and infrastructure strategy. This strategy would
ideally be built around ecosystem-based management. It is clear that a future U.S. Arctic
maritime or infrastructure strategy will likely be a public-private partnership, as the
private sector will provide significantly more financial and physical resources than will
the U.S. government.330
330 Heather A. Conley et al, The New Foreign Policy Frontier[:] U.S. Interests and Actors in the Arctic, Washington,
Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 2013, pp. 21-22.
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May 2013 Arctic Strategy and January 2014 Implementation Plan
As noted earlier (see “Background”), the Administration on May 10, 2013, released a national
strategy for the Arctic, and on January 30, 2014, released an implementation plan for that
strategy. Potential oversight questions include but not are limited to the following:
Does the May 2013 Arctic strategy document correctly identify U.S. interests in
the Arctic and principal U.S. lines of effort for the region?
Does the May 2013 Arctic strategy document adequately balance goals for the
region against potential resources available for pursuing those goals, and provide
an adequate guide for prioritizing the goals in a situation of constrained
resources?
Does the January 2014 implementation plan correctly identify the principal
initiatives needed to implement the Arctic strategy document?
Does the January 2014 implementation plan correctly identify the next steps to be
taken for implementing the various initiatives? Does it provide adequate metrics
for measuring progress in achieving the initiatives? Does it select the correct
federal agencies to act as lead agencies and supporting agencies for achieving
them?
Does the January 2014 implementation plan adequately identify risks and
challenges in implementing the various initiatives, including those related to
potential limits on resources? Does it provide an adequate guide for prioritizing
the initiatives in a situation of constrained resources?
Who in the executive branch has been designated as the person responsible for
ensuring that the various goals in the January 2014 implementation plan are
implemented in a timely manner?331
CRS Reports on Specific Arctic-Related Issues
CRS Report RL34266, Climate Change: Science Highlights, by Jane A. Leggett
CRS Report RS21890, The U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and the United States:
Developments Since October 2003, by Marjorie Ann Browne
CRS Report RL32838, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): Votes and Legislative Actions
Since the 95th Congress, by M. Lynne Corn and Beth Cook
CRS Report RL34547, Possible Federal Revenue from Oil Development of ANWR and Nearby
Areas, by Salvatore Lazzari
331 For examples of congressional reactions to the January 2014 implementation plan, see, the January 30, 2014, press
release from the office of Senator Mark Begich entitled “Begich Calls on White House to Fund Arctic Plan,” accessed
February 26, 2014, at http://www.begich.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/1/begich-calls-on-white-house-to-fund-
arctic-plan; and the February 13, 2014, press release from the office of Senator Lisa Murkowski entitled “Murkowski
Slams “Unambitious” White House Arctic Plan,” accessed February 26, 2014, at http://www.murkowski.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=30e9f7c2-28ce-4baf-9ffe-5171ac6ceaa8&ContentType_id=
b94acc28-404a-4fc6-b143-a9e15bf92da4&Group_id=c01df158-d935-4d7a-895d-f694ddf41624. The February 13,
2014, press release cites a February 11, 2014, letter from Senator Murkowski to President Obama, which was accessed
February 26, 2014, at http://www.murkowski.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=875ea38b-f881-459d-a2b1-
220e17f99dc7.
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CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background and Governance, by
Jonathan L. Ramseur
CRS Report RL33941, Polar Bears: Listing Under the Endangered Species Act, by Eugene H.
Buck, M. Lynne Corn, and Kristina Alexander
CRS Report RL34573, Does the Endangered Species Act Listing Provide More Protection of the
Polar Bear?, by Kristina Alexander
CRS Report RS22906, Use of the Polar Bear Listing to Force Reduction of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions: The Legal Arguments, by Robert Meltz
CRS Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
CRS Report RL34342, Homeland Security: Roles and Missions for United States Northern
Command, by William Knight
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Appendix A. Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA)
of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373)
The text of the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31,
1984)332 is as follows:
TITLE I – ARCTIC RESEARCH AND POLICY
SHORT TITLE
SEC. 101. This title may be cited as the “Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984”.
FINDINGS AND PURPOSES
SEC. 102. (a) The Congress finds and declares that-
(1) the Arctic, onshore and offshore, contains vital energy resources that can reduce the
Nation’s dependence on foreign oil and improve the national balance of payments;
(2) as the Nation’s only common border with the Soviet Union, the Arctic is critical to
national defense;
(3) the renewable resources of the Arctic, specifically fish and other seafood, represent
one of the Nation’s greatest commercial assets;
(4) Arctic conditions directly affect global weather patterns and must be understood in
order to promote better agricultural management throughout the United States;
(5) industrial pollution not originating in the Arctic region collects in the polar air mass,
has the potential to disrupt global weather patterns, and must be controlled through
international cooperation and consultation;
(6) the Arctic is a natural laboratory for research into human health and adaptation,
physical and psychological, to climates of extreme cold and isolation and may provide
information crucial for future defense needs;
(7) atmospheric conditions peculiar to the Arctic make the Arctic a unique testing ground
for research into high latitude communications, which is likely to be crucial for future
defense needs;
(8) Arctic marine technology is critical to cost-effective recovery and transportation of
energy resources and to the national defense;
(9) the United States has important security, economic, and environmental interests in
developing and maintaining a fleet of icebreaking vessels capable of operating effectively
in the heavy ice regions of the Arctic;
(10) most Arctic-rim countries, particularly the Soviet Union, possess Arctic technologies
far more advanced than those currently available in the United States;
(11) Federal Arctic research is fragmented and uncoordinated at the present time, leading
to the neglect of certain areas of research and to unnecessary duplication of effort in other
areas of research;
(12) improved logistical coordination and support for Arctic research and better
dissemination of research data and information is necessary to increase the efficiency and
utility of national Arctic research efforts;
332 Title II of P.L. 98-373 is the National Critical Materials Act of 1984.
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(13) a comprehensive national policy and program plan to organize and fund currently
neglected scientific research with respect to the Arctic is necessary to fulfill national
objectives in Arctic research;
(14) the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, should
focus its efforts on the collection and characterization of basic data related to biological,
materials, geophysical, social, and behavioral phenomena in the Arctic;
(15) research into the long-range health, environmental, and social effects of
development in the Arctic is necessary to mitigate the adverse consequences of that
development to the land and its residents;
(16) Arctic research expands knowledge of the Arctic, which can enhance the lives of
Arctic residents, increase opportunities for international cooperation among Arctic-rim
countries, and facilitate the formulation of national policy for the Arctic; and
(17) the Alaskan Arctic provides an essential habitat for marine mammals, migratory
waterfowl, and other forms of wildlife which are important to the Nation and which are
essential to Arctic residents.
(b) The purposes of this title are-
(1) to establish national policy, priorities, and goals and to provide a Federal program
plan for basic and applied scientific research with respect to the Arctic, including natural
resources and materials, physical, biological and health sciences, and social and
behavioral sciences;
(2) to establish an Arctic Research Commission to promote Arctic research and to
recommend Arctic research policy;
(3) to designate the National Science Foundation as the lead agency responsible for
implementing Arctic research policy; and
(4) to establish an Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee to develop a national
Arctic research policy and a five year plan to implement that policy.
ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION
SEC. 103. (a) The President shall establish an Arctic Research Commission (hereafter
referred to as the “Commission”).
(b)(1) The Commission shall be composed of five members appointed by the President,
with the Director of the National Science Foundation serving as a nonvoting, ex officio
member. The members appointed by the President shall include-
(A) three members appointed from among individuals from academic or other research
institutions with expertise in areas of research relating to the Arctic, including the
physical, biological, health, environmental, social, and behavioral sciences;
(B) one member appointed from among indigenous residents of the Arctic who are
representative of the needs and interests of Arctic residents and who live in areas directly
affected by Arctic resource development; and
(C) one member appointed from among individuals familiar with the Arctic and
representative of the needs and interests of private industry undertaking resource
development in the Arctic.
(2) The President shall designate one of the appointed members of the Commission to be
chairperson of the Commission.
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the term of office of each
member of the Commission appointed under subsection (b)(1) shall be four years.
(2) Of the members of the Commission originally appointed under subsection (b)(1)-
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(A) one shall be appointed for a term of two years;
(B) two shall be appointed for a term of three years; and
(C) two shall be appointed for a term of four years.
(3) Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the Commission shall be filled, after
notice of the vacancy is published in the Federal Register, in the manner provided by the
preceding provisions of this section, for the remainder of the unexpired term.
(4) A member may serve after the expiration of the member’s term of office until the
President appoints a successor.
(5) A member may serve consecutive terms beyond the member’s original appointment.
(d)(1) Members of the Commission may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem
in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, United States Code. A
member of the Commission not presently employed for compensation shall be
compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the rate for GS-16 of the General
Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code, for each day the member is
engaged in the actual performance of his duties as a member of the Commission, not to
exceed 90 days of service each year. Except for the purposes of chapter 81 of title 5
(relating to compensation for work injuries) and chapter 171 of title 28 (relating to tort
claims), a member of the Commission shall not be considered an employee of the United
States for any purpose.
(2) The Commission shall meet at the call of its Chairman or a majority of its members.
(3) Each Federal agency referred to in section 107(b) may designate a representative to
participate as an observer with the Commission.
These representatives shall report to and advise the Commission on the activities relating
to Arctic research of their agencies.
(4) The Commission shall conduct at least one public meeting in the State of Alaska
annually.
DUTIES OF COMMISSION
SEC. 104. (a) The Commission shall-
(1) develop and recommend an integrated national Arctic research policy;
(2) in cooperation with the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee established
under section 107, assist in establishing a national Arctic research program plan to
implement the Arctic research policy;
(3) facilitate cooperation between the Federal Government and State and local
governments with respect to Arctic research;
(4) review Federal research programs in the Arctic and suggest improvements in
coordination among programs;
(5) recommend methods to improve logistical planning and support for Arctic research as
may be appropriate and in accordance with the findings and purposes of this title;
(6) suggest methods for improving efficient sharing and dissemination of data and
information on the Arctic among interested public and private institutions;
(7) offer other recommendations and advice to the Interagency Committee established
under section 107 as it may find appropriate; and
(8) cooperate with the Governor of the State of Alaska and with agencies and
organizations of that State which the Governor may designate with respect to the
formulation of Arctic research policy.
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(b) Not later than January 31 of each year, the Commission shall-
(1) publish a statement of goals and objectives with respect to Arctic research to guide
the Interagency Committee established under section 107 in the performance of its duties;
and
(2) submit to the President and to the Congress a report describing the activities and
accomplishments of the Commission during the immediately preceding fiscal year.
COOPERATION WITH THE COMMISSION
SEC. 105. (a)(1) The Commission may acquire from the head of any Federal agency
unclassified data, reports, and other nonproprietary information with respect to Arctic
research in the possession of the agency which the Commission considers useful in the
discharge of its duties.
(2) Each agency shall cooperate with the Commission and furnish all data, reports, and
other information requested by the Commission to the extent permitted by law; except
that no agency need furnish any information which it is permitted to withhold under
section 552 of title 5, United States Code.
(b) With the consent of the appropriate agency head, the Commission may utilize the
facilities and services of any Federal agency to the extent that the facilities and services
are needed for the establishment and development of an Arctic research policy, upon
reimbursement to be agreed upon by the Commission and the agency head and taking
every feasible step to avoid duplication of effort.
(c) All Federal agencies shall consult with the Commission before undertaking major
Federal actions relating to Arctic research.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE COMMISSION
SEC. 106. The Commission may-
(1) in accordance with the civil service laws and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5,
United States Code, appoint and fix the compensation of an Executive Director and
necessary additional staff personnel, but not to exceed a total of seven compensated
personnel;
(2) procure temporary and intermittent services as authorized by section 3109 of title 5,
United States Code;
(3) enter into contracts and procure supplies, services, and personal property; and
(4) enter into agreements with the General Services Administration for the procurement
of necessary financial and administrative services, for which payment shall be made by
reimbursement from funds of the Commission in amounts to be agreed upon by the
Commission and the Administrator of the General Services Administration.
LEAD AGENCY AND INTERAGENCY ARCTIC RESEARCH POLICY
COMMITTEE
SEC. 107. (a) The National Science Foundation is designated as the lead agency
responsible for implementing Arctic research policy, and the Director of the National
Science Foundation shall insure that the requirements of section 108 are fulfilled.
(b)(1) The President shall establish an Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee
(hereinafter referred to as the “Interagency Committee”).
(2) The Interagency Committee shall be composed of representatives of the following
Federal agencies or offices:
(A) the National Science Foundation;
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(B) the Department of Commerce;
(C) the Department of Defense;
(D) the Department of Energy;
(E) the Department of the Interior;
(F) the Department of State;
(G) the Department of Transportation;
(H) the Department of Health and Human Services;
(I) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
(J) the Environmental Protection Agency; and
(K) any other agency or office deemed appropriate.
(3) The representative of the National Science Foundation shall serve as the Chairperson
of the Interagency Committee.
DUTIES OF THE INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE
SEC. 108. (a) The Interagency Committee shall-
(1) survey Arctic research conducted by Federal, State, and local agencies, universities,
and other public and private institutions to help determine priorities for future Arctic
research, including natural resources and materials, physical and biological sciences, and
social and behavioral sciences;
(2) work with the Commission to develop and establish an integrated national Arctic
research policy that will guide Federal agencies in developing and implementing their
research programs in the Arctic;
(3) consult with the Commission on-
(A) the development of the national Arctic research policy and the 5-year plan
implementing the policy;
(B) Arctic research programs of Federal agencies;
(C) recommendations of the Commission on future Arctic research; and
(D) guidelines for Federal agencies for awarding and administering Arctic research
grants;
(4) develop a 5-year plan to implement the national policy, as provided for in section 109;
(5) provide the necessary coordination, data, and assistance for the preparation of a single
integrated, coherent, and multiagency budget request for Arctic research as provided for
in section 110;
(6) facilitate cooperation between the Federal Government and State and local
governments in Arctic research, and recommend the undertaking of neglected areas of
research in accordance with the findings and purposes of this title;
(7) coordinate and promote cooperative Arctic scientific research programs with other
nations, subject to the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State;
(8) cooperate with the Governor of the State of Alaska in fulfilling its responsibilities
under this title;
(9) promote Federal interagency coordination of all Arctic research activities, including-
(A) logistical planning and coordination; and
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(B) the sharing of data and information associated with Arctic research, subject to section
552 of title 5, United States Code; and
(10) provide public notice of its meetings and an opportunity for the public to participate
in the development and implementation of national Arctic research policy.
(b) Not later than January 31, 1986, and biennially thereafter, the Interagency Committee
shall submit to the Congress through the President, a brief, concise report containing-
(1) a statement of the activities and accomplishments of the Interagency Committee since
its last report; and
(2) a description of the activities of the Commission, detailing with particularity the
recommendations of the Commission with respect to Federal activities in Arctic research.
5-YEAR ARCTIC RESEARCH PLAN
SEC. 109. (a) The Interagency Committee, in consultation with the Commission, the
Governor of the State of Alaska, the residents of the Arctic, the private sector, and public
interest groups, shall prepare a comprehensive 5-year program plan (hereinafter referred
to as the “Plan”) for the overall Federal effort in Arctic research. The Plan shall be
prepared and submitted to the President for transmittal to the Congress within one year
after the enactment of this Act and shall be revised biennially thereafter.
(b) The Plan shall contain but need not be limited to the following elements:
(1) an assessment of national needs and problems regarding the Arctic and the research
necessary to address those needs or problems;
(2) a statement of the goals and objectives of the Interagency Committee for national
Arctic research;
(3) a detailed listing of all existing Federal programs relating to Arctic research, including
the existing goals, funding levels for each of the 5 following fiscal years, and the funds
currently being expended to conduct the programs;
(4) recommendations for necessary program changes and other proposals to meet the
requirements of the policy and goals as set forth by the Commission and in the Plan as
currently in effect; and
(5) a description of the actions taken by the Interagency Committee to coordinate the
budget review process in order to ensure interagency coordination and cooperation in (A)
carrying out Federal Arctic research programs, and (B) eliminating unnecessary
duplication of effort among these programs.
COORDINATION AND REVIEW OF BUDGET REQUESTS
SEC. 110. (a) The Office of Science and Technology Policy shall-
(1) review all agency and department budget requests related to the Arctic transmitted
pursuant to section 108(a)(5), in accordance with the national Arctic research policy and
the 5-year program under section 108(a)(2) and section 109, respectively; and
(2) consult closely with the Interagency Committee and the Commission to guide the
Office of Science and Technology Policy’s efforts.
(b)(1) The Office of Management and Budget shall consider all Federal agency requests
for research related to the Arctic as one integrated, coherent, and multiagency request
which shall be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget prior to submission of
the President’s annual budget request for its adherence to the Plan. The Commission
shall, after submission of the President’s annual budget request, review the request and
report to Congress on adherence to the Plan.
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(2) The Office of Management and Budget shall seek to facilitate planning for the design,
procurement, maintenance, deployment, and operations of icebreakers needed to provide
a platform for Arctic research by allocating all funds necessary to support icebreaking
operations, except for recurring incremental costs associated with specific projects, to the
Coast Guard.
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS; NEW SPENDING AUTHORITY
SEC. 111. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for
carrying out this title.
(b) Any new spending authority (within the meaning of section 401 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974) which is provided under this title shall be effective for any fiscal
year only to such extent or in such amounts as may be provided in appropriation Acts.
DEFINITION
SEC. 112. As used in this title, the term “Arctic” means all United States and foreign
territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States territory north and west of the
boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas,
including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian
chain.
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Appendix B. P.L. 101-609 of 1990, Amending Arctic
Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984
The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (see Appendix A) was amended by P.L.
101-609 of November 16, 1990. The text of P.L. 101-609 is as follows:
SECTION 1. Except as specifically provided in this Act, whenever in this Act an
amendment or repeal is expressed as an amendment to, or repeal of a provision, the
reference shall be deemed to be made to the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984.
SEC. 2. Section 103(b)(1) (15 U.S.C. 4102(b)(1)) is amended—
(1) in the text above clause (A), by striking out `five’ and inserting in lieu thereof
`seven’;
(2) in clause (A), by striking out `three’ and inserting in lieu thereof `four’; and
(3) in clause (C), by striking out `one member’ and inserting in lieu thereof `two
members’.
SEC. 3. Section 103(d)(1) (15 U.S.C. 4102(d)(1)) is amended by striking out `GS-16’ and
inserting in lieu thereof `GS-18’.
SEC. 4. (a) Section 104(a) (15 U.S.C. 4102(a)) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (4), by striking out `suggest’ and inserting in lieu thereof `recommend’;
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking out `suggest’ and inserting in lieu thereof `recommend’;
(3) in paragraph (7), by striking out `and’ at the end thereof;
(4) in paragraph (8), by striking out the period and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon;
and
(5) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:
‘(9) recommend to the Interagency Committee the means for developing international
scientific cooperation in the Arctic; and
‘(10) not later than January 31, 1991, and every 2 years thereafter, publish a statement of
goals and objectives with respect to Arctic research to guide the Interagency Committee
established under section 107 in the performance of its duties.’.
(b) Section 104(b) is amended to read as follows:
‘(b) Not later than January 31 of each year, the Commission shall submit to the President
and to the Congress a report describing the activities and accomplishments of the
Commission during the immediately preceding fiscal year.’.
SEC. 5. Section 106 (15 U.S.C. 4105) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (3), by striking out `and’ at the end thereof;
(2) in paragraph (4), by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu
thereof; and’; and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
‘(5) appoint, and accept without compensation the services of, scientists and engineering
specialists to be advisors to the Commission. Each advisor may be allowed travel
expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title
5, United States Code. Except for the purposes of chapter 81 of title 5 (relating to
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compensation for work injuries) and chapter 171 of title 28 (relating to tort claims) of the
United States Code, an advisor appointed under this paragraph shall not be considered an
employee of the United States for any purpose.’
SEC. 6. Subsection (b)(2) of section 108 (15 U.S.C. 4107(b)(2)) is amended to read as
follows:
‘(2) a statement detailing with particularity the recommendations of the Commission with
respect to Federal interagency activities in Arctic research and the disposition and
responses to those recommendations.’
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Appendix C. January 2009 Arctic Policy Directive
(NSPD 66/HSPD 25)
On January 12, 2009, the George W. Bush Administration released a presidential directive
establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic region. The directive, dated January 9, 2009, was
issued as National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25
(NSPD 66/HSPD 25). The text of NSPD 66/HSPD 25 is as follows:
SUBJECT: Arctic Region Policy
I. PURPOSE
A. This directive establishes the policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic
region and directs related implementation actions. This directive supersedes Presidential
Decision Directive/NSC-26 (PDD-26; issued 1994) with respect to Arctic policy but not
Antarctic policy; PDD-26 remains in effect for Antarctic policy only.
B. This directive shall be implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States, with the obligations of the United States under the treaties and
other international agreements to which the United States is a party, and with customary
international law as recognized by the United States, including with respect to the law of
the sea.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The United States is an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling interests in that
region. This directive takes into account several developments, including, among others:
1. Altered national policies on homeland security and defense;
2. The effects of climate change and increasing human activity in the Arctic region;
3. The establishment and ongoing work of the Arctic Council; and
4. A growing awareness that the Arctic region is both fragile and rich in resources.
III. POLICY
A. It is the policy of the United States to:
1. Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region;
2. Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources;
3. Ensure that natural resource management and economic development in the region are
environmentally sustainable;
4. Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United
States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and
Sweden);
5. Involve the Arctic’s indigenous communities in decisions that affect them; and
6. Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global
environmental issues.
B. National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic
1. The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic
region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states
to safeguard these interests. These interests include such matters as missile defense and
early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic
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deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of
navigation and overflight.
2. The United States also has fundamental homeland security interests in preventing
terrorist attacks and mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the
United States vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region.
3. The Arctic region is primarily a maritime domain; as such, existing policies and
authorities relating to maritime areas continue to apply, including those relating to law
enforcement.[1] Human activity in the Arctic region is increasing and is projected to
increase further in coming years. This requires the United States to assert a more active
and influential national presence to protect its Arctic interests and to project sea power
throughout the region.
4. The United States exercises authority in accordance with lawful claims of United
States sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic region, including
sovereignty within the territorial sea, sovereign rights and jurisdiction within the United
States exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf, and appropriate control in
the United States contiguous zone.
5. Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The Northwest Passage is a strait used
for international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route includes straits used for
international navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those
straits. Preserving the rights and duties relating to navigation and overflight in the Arctic
region supports our ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including
through strategic straits.
6. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to national security and
homeland security interests in the Arctic, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and
Homeland Security, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments
and agencies, shall:
a. Develop greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect United States air,
land, and sea borders in the Arctic region;
b. Increase Arctic maritime domain awareness in order to protect maritime commerce,
critical infrastructure, and key resources;
c. Preserve the global mobility of United States military and civilian vessels and aircraft
throughout the Arctic region;
d. Project a sovereign United States maritime presence in the Arctic in support of
essential United States interests; and
e. Encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic region.
C. International Governance
1. The United States participates in a variety of fora, international organizations, and
bilateral contacts that promote United States interests in the Arctic. These include the
Arctic Council, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), wildlife conservation and
management agreements, and many other mechanisms. As the Arctic changes and human
activity in the region increases, the United States and other governments should consider,
as appropriate, new international arrangements or enhancements to existing
arrangements.
2. The Arctic Council has produced positive results for the United States by working
within its limited mandate of environmental protection and sustainable development. Its
subsidiary bodies, with help from many United States agencies, have developed and
undertaken projects on a wide range of topics. The Council also provides a beneficial
venue for interaction with indigenous groups. It is the position of the United States that
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the Arctic Council should remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within its current
mandate and not be transformed into a formal international organization, particularly one
with assessed contributions. The United States is nevertheless open to updating the
structure of the Council, including consolidation of, or making operational changes to, its
subsidiary bodies, to the extent such changes can clearly improve the Council’s work and
are consistent with the general mandate of the Council.
3. The geopolitical circumstances of the Arctic region differ sufficiently from those of the
Antarctic region such that an “Arctic Treaty” of broad scope—along the lines of the
Antarctic Treaty—is not appropriate or necessary.
4. The Senate should act favorably on U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea promptly, to protect and advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the
Arctic. Joining will serve the national security interests of the United States, including the
maritime mobility of our Armed Forces worldwide. It will secure U.S. sovereign rights
over extensive marine areas, including the valuable natural resources they contain.
Accession will promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans. And it
will give the United States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests
are debated and interpreted.
5. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to international governance, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments
and agencies, shall:
a. Continue to cooperate with other countries on Arctic issues through the United Nations
(U.N.) and its specialized agencies, as well as through treaties such as the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Convention on Long Range
Transboundary Air Pollution and its protocols, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer;
b. Consider, as appropriate, new or enhanced international arrangements for the Arctic to
address issues likely to arise from expected increases in human activity in that region,
including shipping, local development and subsistence, exploitation of living marine
resources, development of energy and other resources, and tourism;
c. Review Arctic Council policy recommendations developed within the ambit of the
Council’s scientific reviews and ensure the policy recommendations are subject to review
by Arctic governments; and
d. Continue to seek advice and consent of the United States Senate to accede to the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention.
D. Extended Continental Shelf and Boundary Issues
1. Defining with certainty the area of the Arctic seabed and subsoil in which the United
States may exercise its sovereign rights over natural resources such as oil, natural gas,
methane hydrates, minerals, and living marine species is critical to our national interests
in energy security, resource management, and environmental protection. The most
effective way to achieve international recognition and legal certainty for our extended
continental shelf is through the procedure available to States Parties to the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
2. The United States and Canada have an unresolved boundary in the Beaufort Sea.
United States policy recognizes a boundary in this area based on equidistance. The
United States recognizes that the boundary area may contain oil, natural gas, and other
resources.
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3. The United States and Russia are abiding by the terms of a maritime boundary treaty
concluded in 1990, pending its entry into force. The United States is prepared to enter the
agreement into force once ratified by the Russian Federation.
4. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to extended continental shelf
and boundary issues, the Secretary of State, in coordination with heads of other relevant
executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. Take all actions necessary to establish the outer limit of the continental shelf
appertaining to the United States, in the Arctic and in other regions, to the fullest extent
permitted under international law;
b. Consider the conservation and management of natural resources during the process of
delimiting the extended continental shelf; and
c. Continue to urge the Russian Federation to ratify the 1990 United States-Russia
maritime boundary agreement.
E. Promoting International Scientific Cooperation
1. Scientific research is vital for the promotion of United States interests in the Arctic
region. Successful conduct of U.S. research in the Arctic region requires access
throughout the Arctic Ocean and to terrestrial sites, as well as viable international
mechanisms for sharing access to research platforms and timely exchange of samples,
data, and analyses. Better coordination with the Russian Federation, facilitating access to
its domain, is particularly important.
2. The United States promotes the sharing of Arctic research platforms with other
countries in support of collaborative research that advances fundamental understanding of
the Arctic region in general and potential Arctic change in particular. This could include
collaboration with bodies such as the Nordic Council and the European Polar
Consortium, as well as with individual nations.
3. Accurate prediction of future environmental and climate change on a regional basis,
and the delivery of near real-time information to end-users, requires obtaining, analyzing,
and disseminating accurate data from the entire Arctic region, including both
paleoclimatic data and observational data. The United States has made significant
investments in the infrastructure needed to collect environmental data in the Arctic
region, including the establishment of portions of an Arctic circumpolar observing
network through a partnership among United States agencies, academic collaborators,
and Arctic residents. The United States promotes active involvement of all Arctic nations
in these efforts in order to advance scientific understanding that could provide the basis
for assessing future impacts and proposed response strategies.
4. United States platforms capable of supporting forefront research in the Arctic Ocean,
including portions expected to be ice-covered for the foreseeable future, as well as
seasonally ice-free regions, should work with those of other nations through the
establishment of an Arctic circumpolar observing network. All Arctic nations are
members of the Group on Earth Observations partnership, which provides a framework
for organizing an international approach to environmental observations in the region. In
addition, the United States recognizes that academic and research institutions are vital
partners in promoting and conducting Arctic research.
5. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to promoting scientific
international cooperation, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, and Commerce and the
Director of the National Science Foundation, in coordination with heads of other relevant
executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. Continue to play a leadership role in research throughout the Arctic region;
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b. Actively promote full and appropriate access by scientists to Arctic research sites
through bilateral and multilateral measures and by other means;
c. Lead the effort to establish an effective Arctic circumpolar observing network with
broad partnership from other relevant nations;
d. Promote regular meetings of Arctic science ministers or research council heads to
share information concerning scientific research opportunities and to improve
coordination of international Arctic research programs;
e. Work with the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) to promote
research that is strategically linked to U.S. policies articulated in this directive, with input
from the Arctic Research Commission; and
f. Strengthen partnerships with academic and research institutions and build upon the
relationships these institutions have with their counterparts in other nations.
F. Maritime Transportation in the Arctic Region
1. The United States priorities for maritime transportation in the Arctic region are:
a. To facilitate safe, secure, and reliable navigation;
b. To protect maritime commerce; and
c. To protect the environment.
2. Safe, secure, and environmentally sound maritime commerce in the Arctic region
depends on infrastructure to support shipping activity, search and rescue capabilities,
short- and long-range aids to navigation, high-risk area vessel-traffic management,
iceberg warnings and other sea ice information, effective shipping standards, and
measures to protect the marine environment. In addition, effective search and rescue in
the Arctic will require local, State, Federal, tribal, commercial, volunteer, scientific, and
multinational cooperation.
3. Working through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United States
promotes strengthening existing measures and, as necessary, developing new measures to
improve the safety and security of maritime transportation, as well as to protect the
marine environment in the Arctic region. These measures may include ship routing and
reporting systems, such as traffic separation and vessel traffic management schemes in
Arctic chokepoints; updating and strengthening of the Guidelines for Ships Operating in
Arctic Ice-Covered Waters; underwater noise standards for commercial shipping; a
review of shipping insurance issues; oil and other hazardous material pollution response
agreements; and environmental standards.
4. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to maritime transportation in
the Arctic region, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Transportation, Commerce, and
Homeland Security, in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments
and agencies, shall:
a. Develop additional measures, in cooperation with other nations, to address issues that
are likely to arise from expected increases in shipping into, out of, and through the Arctic
region;
b. Commensurate with the level of human activity in the region, establish a risk-based
capability to address hazards in the Arctic environment. Such efforts shall advance work
on pollution prevention and response standards; determine basing and logistics support
requirements, including necessary airlift and icebreaking capabilities; and improve plans
and cooperative agreements for search and rescue;
c. Develop Arctic waterways management regimes in accordance with accepted
international standards, including vessel traffic-monitoring and routing; safe navigation
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standards; accurate and standardized charts; and accurate and timely environmental and
navigational information; and
d. Evaluate the feasibility of using access through the Arctic for strategic sealift and
humanitarian aid and disaster relief.
G. Economic Issues, Including Energy
1. Sustainable development in the Arctic region poses particular challenges. Stakeholder
input will inform key decisions as the United States seeks to promote economic and
energy security. Climate change and other factors are significantly affecting the lives of
Arctic inhabitants, particularly indigenous communities. The United States affirms the
importance to Arctic communities of adapting to climate change, given their particular
vulnerabilities.
2. Energy development in the Arctic region will play an important role in meeting
growing global energy demand as the area is thought to contain a substantial portion of
the world’s undiscovered energy resources. The United States seeks to ensure that energy
development throughout the Arctic occurs in an environmentally sound manner, taking
into account the interests of indigenous and local communities, as well as open and
transparent market principles. The United States seeks to balance access to, and
development of, energy and other natural resources with the protection of the Arctic
environment by ensuring that continental shelf resources are managed in a responsible
manner and by continuing to work closely with other Arctic nations.
3. The United States recognizes the value and effectiveness of existing fora, such as the
Arctic Council, the International Regulators Forum, and the International Standards
Organization.
4. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to economic issues, including
energy, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, Commerce, and Energy, in coordination with
heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. Seek to increase efforts, including those in the Arctic Council, to study changing
climate conditions, with a view to preserving and enhancing economic opportunity in the
Arctic region. Such efforts shall include inventories and assessments of villages,
indigenous communities, subsistence opportunities, public facilities, infrastructure, oil
and gas development projects, alternative energy development opportunities, forestry,
cultural and other sites, living marine resources, and other elements of the Arctic’s
socioeconomic composition;
b. Work with other Arctic nations to ensure that hydrocarbon and other development in
the Arctic region is carried out in accordance with accepted best practices and
internationally recognized standards and the 2006 Group of Eight (G-8) Global Energy
Security Principles;
c. Consult with other Arctic nations to discuss issues related to exploration, production,
environmental and socioeconomic impacts, including drilling conduct, facility sharing,
the sharing of environmental data, impact assessments, compatible monitoring programs,
and reservoir management in areas with potentially shared resources;
d. Protect United States interests with respect to hydrocarbon reservoirs that may overlap
boundaries to mitigate adverse environmental and economic consequences related to their
development;
e. Identify opportunities for international cooperation on methane hydrate issues, North
Slope hydrology, and other matters;
f. Explore whether there is a need for additional fora for informing decisions on
hydrocarbon leasing, exploration, development, production, and transportation, as well as
shared support activities, including infrastructure projects; and
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g. Continue to emphasize cooperative mechanisms with nations operating in the region to
address shared concerns, recognizing that most known Arctic oil and gas resources are
located outside of United States jurisdiction.
H. Environmental Protection and Conservation of Natural Resources
1. The Arctic environment is unique and changing. Increased human activity is expected
to bring additional stressors to the Arctic environment, with potentially serious
consequences for Arctic communities and ecosystems.
2. Despite a growing body of research, the Arctic environment remains poorly
understood. Sea ice and glaciers are in retreat. Permafrost is thawing and coasts are
eroding. Pollutants from within and outside the Arctic are contaminating the region.
Basic data are lacking in many fields. High levels of uncertainty remain concerning the
effects of climate change and increased human activity in the Arctic. Given the need for
decisions to be based on sound scientific and socioeconomic information, Arctic
environmental research, monitoring, and vulnerability assessments are top priorities. For
example, an understanding of the probable consequences of global climate variability and
change on Arctic ecosystems is essential to guide the effective long-term management of
Arctic natural resources and to address socioeconomic impacts of changing patterns in
the use of natural resources.
3. Taking into account the limitations in existing data, United States efforts to protect the
Arctic environment and to conserve its natural resources must be risk-based and proceed
on the basis of the best available information.
4. The United States supports the application in the Arctic region of the general principles
of international fisheries management outlined in the 1995 Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of December 10, 1982, relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and similar instruments. The United States
endorses the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems in the Arctic from destructive
fishing practices and seeks to ensure an adequate enforcement presence to safeguard
Arctic living marine resources.
5. With temperature increases in the Arctic region, contaminants currently locked in the
ice and soils will be released into the air, water, and land. This trend, along with
increased human activity within and below the Arctic, will result in increased
introduction of contaminants into the Arctic, including both persistent pollutants (e.g.,
persistent organic pollutants and mercury) and airborne pollutants (e.g., soot).
6. Implementation: In carrying out this policy as it relates to environmental protection
and conservation of natural resources, the Secretaries of State, the Interior, Commerce,
and Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
in coordination with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall:
a. In cooperation with other nations, respond effectively to increased pollutants and other
environmental challenges;
b. Continue to identify ways to conserve, protect, and sustainably manage Arctic species
and ensure adequate enforcement presence to safeguard living marine resources, taking
account of the changing ranges or distribution of some species in the Arctic. For species
whose range includes areas both within and beyond United States jurisdiction, the United
States shall continue to collaborate with other governments to ensure effective
conservation and management;
c. Seek to develop ways to address changing and expanding commercial fisheries in the
Arctic, including through consideration of international agreements or organizations to
govern future Arctic fisheries;
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d. Pursue marine ecosystem-based management in the Arctic; and
e. Intensify efforts to develop scientific information on the adverse effects of pollutants
on human health and the environment and work with other nations to reduce the
introduction of key pollutants into the Arctic.
IV. Resources and Assets
A. Implementing a number of the policy elements directed above will require appropriate
resources and assets. These elements shall be implemented consistent with applicable law
and authorities of agencies, or heads of agencies, vested by law, and subject to the
availability of appropriations. The heads of executive departments and agencies with
responsibilities relating to the Arctic region shall work to identify future budget,
administrative, personnel, or legislative proposal requirements to implement the elements
of this directive.
———————————————————————————
[1] These policies and authorities include Freedom of Navigation (PDD/NSC-32), the
U.S. Policy on Protecting the Ocean Environment (PDD/NSC-36), Maritime Security
Policy (NSPD-41/HSPD-13), and the National Strategy for Maritime Security
(NSMS).333
333 Source for text: http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm. The text is also available at http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/
opp_advisory/briefings/may2009/nspd66_hspd25.pdf.
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Appendix D. May 2013 National Strategy for
Arctic Region
On May 10, 2013, the Obama Administration released a document entitled National Strategy for
the Arctic Region.334 The executive summary of the document is reprinted earlier in this report
(see “May 2013 National Strategy for Arctic Region” in “Background”). This appendix reprints
the main text of the document. The main text states:
Introduction
We seek an Arctic region that is stable and free of conflict, where nations act responsibly
in a spirit of trust and cooperation, and where economic and energy resources are
developed in a sustainable manner that also respects the fragile environment and the
interests and cultures of indigenous peoples.
As the United States addresses these opportunities and challenges, we will be guided by
our central interests in the Arctic region, which include providing for the security of the
United States; protecting the free flow of resources and commerce; protecting the
environment; addressing the needs of indigenous communities; and enabling scientific
research. In protecting these interests, we draw from our long-standing policy and
approach to the global maritime spaces in the 20th century, including freedom of
navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea and airspace
related to these freedoms; security on the oceans; maintaining strong relationships with
allies and partners; and peaceful resolution of disputes without coercion.
To achieve this vision, the United States is establishing an overarching national approach
to advance national security interests, pursue responsible stewardship of this precious and
unique region, and serve as a basis for cooperation with other Arctic states335 and the
international community as a whole to advance common interests.
Even as we work domestically and internationally to minimize the effects of climate
change, the effects are already apparent in the Arctic. Ocean resources are more readily
accessible as sea ice diminishes, but thawing ground is threatening communities as well
as hindering land-based activities, including access to resources. Diminishing land and
sea ice is altering ecosystems and the services they provide. As an Arctic nation, the
United States must be proactive and disciplined in addressing changing regional
conditions and in developing adaptive strategies to protect its interests. An undisciplined
approach to exploring new opportunities in this frontier could result in significant harm to
the region, to our national security interests, and to the global good.
When implementing this strategy, the United States will proceed in a thoughtful,
responsible manner that leverages expertise, resources, and cooperation from the State of
Alaska, Alaska Natives, and stakeholders across the entire nation and throughout the
international community. We will encourage and use science-informed decisionmaking to
aid this effort. We will endeavor to do no harm to the sensitive environment or to Alaska
native communities and other indigenous populations that rely on Arctic resources. Just
as a common spirit and shared vision of peaceful partnership led to the development of an
334 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 2013, 11 pp.; accessed May 14, 2013, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf. The document includes a cover letter from President Obama dated May
10, 2013.
335 A footnote in the document at this point states: “Arctic state is defined as one of the eight nations making up the
permanent membership of the Arctic Council and includes the following nations: Canada, Denmark (including
Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.”
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international space station, we believe much can be achieved in the Arctic region through
collaborative international efforts, coordinated investments, and public-private
partnerships.
Structure of the Strategy
Through this National Strategy for the Arctic Region, we seek to guide, prioritize, and
synchronize efforts to protect U.S. national and homeland security interests, promote
responsible stewardship, and foster international cooperation.
This strategy articulates three priority lines of effort. It also identifies guiding principles
as a foundation for Arctic region activities. Through a deliberate emphasis on the priority
lines of effort and objectives, it aims to achieve a national unity of effort that is consistent
with our domestic and international legal rights, obligations, and commitments and that is
well coordinated with our Arctic neighbors and the international community. These lines
of effort identify common themes where specific emphasis and activities will be focused
to ensure that strategic priorities are met. The three lines of effort, as well as the guiding
principles are meant to be acted upon as a coherent whole.
Changing Conditions
While the Arctic region has experienced warming and cooling cycles over millennia, the
current warming trend is unlike anything previously recorded. The reduction in sea ice
has been dramatic, abrupt, and unrelenting. The dense, multi-year ice is giving way to
thin layers of seasonal ice, making more of the region navigable year-round. Scientific
estimates of technically recoverable conventional oil and gas resources north of the
Arctic Circle total approximately 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30
percent of the world’s undiscovered gas deposits, as well as vast quantities of mineral
resources, including rare earth elements, iron ore, and nickel.336 These estimates have
inspired fresh ideas for commercial initiatives and infrastructure development in the
region. As portions of the Arctic Ocean become more navigable, there is increasing
interest in the viability of the Northern Sea Route and other potential routes, including the
Northwest Passage, as well as in development of Arctic resources.
For all of the opportunities emerging with the increasing accessibility and economic and
strategic interests in the Arctic, the opening and rapid development of the Arctic region
presents very real challenges. On the environmental front, reduced sea ice is having an
immediate impact on indigenous populations as well as on fish and wildlife. Moreover,
there may be potentially profound environmental consequences of continued ocean
warming and Arctic ice melt. These consequences include altering the climate of lower
latitudes, risking the stability of Greenland’s ice sheet, and accelerating the thawing of
the Arctic permafrost in which large quantities of methane – a potent driver of climate
change – as well as pollutants such as mercury are stored. Uncoordinated development –
and the consequent increase in pollution such as emissions of black carbon or other
substances from fossil fuel combustion – could have unintended consequences on climate
trends, fragile ecosystems, and Arctic communities. It is imperative that the United States
proactively establish national priorities and objectives for the Arctic region.
Lines of Effort
To meet the challenges and opportunities in the Arctic region, and in furtherance of
established Arctic Region Policy,337 we will pursue the following lines of effort and
336 A footnote in the document at this point states: “U.S. Geological Survey, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal:
Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,” fact sheet, 2008, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/
3049/fs2008-3049.pdf.”
337 A footnote in the document at this point states: “National Security Presidential Directive-66/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-25, January 2009.”
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supporting objectives in a mutually reinforcing manner that incorporates the broad range
of U.S. current activities and interests in the Arctic region.
1. Advance United States Security Interests
Our highest priority is to protect the American people, our sovereign territory and rights,
natural resources, and interests of the United States. To this end, the United States will
identify, develop, and maintain the capacity and capabilities necessary to promote safety,
security, and stability in the region through a combination of independent action, bilateral
initiatives, and multilateral cooperation. We acknowledge that the protection of our
national security interests in the Arctic region must be undertaken with attention to
environmental, cultural, and international considerations outlined throughout this
strategy. As many nations across the world aspire to expand their role in the Arctic, we
encourage Arctic and non-Arctic states to work collaboratively through appropriate fora
to address the emerging challenges and opportunities in the Arctic region, while we
remain vigilant to protect the security interests of the United States and our allies.
To accomplish this line of effort, the United States Government will seek to:
• Evolve Arctic Infrastructure and Strategic Capabilities – Working cooperatively
with the State of Alaska, local, and tribal authorities, as well as public and private sector
partners, we will develop, maintain, and exercise the capacity to execute Federal
responsibilities in our Arctic waters, airspace, and coastal regions, including the capacity
to respond to natural or man-made disasters. We will carefully tailor this regional
infrastructure, as well as our response capacity, to the evolving human and commercial
activity in the Arctic region.
• Enhance Arctic Domain Awareness – We seek to improve our awareness of activities,
conditions, and trends in the Arctic region that may affect our safety, security,
environmental, or commercial interests. The United States will endeavor to appropriately
enhance sea, air, and space capabilities as Arctic conditions change, and to promote
maritime-related information sharing with international, public, and private sector
partners, to support implementation of activities such as the search-and-rescue agreement
signed by Arctic states.
• Preserve Arctic Region Freedom of the Seas – The United States has a national
interest in preserving all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace
recognized under international law. We will enable prosperity and safe transit by
developing and maintaining sea, under-sea, and air assets and necessary infrastructure. In
addition, the United States will support the enhancement of national defense, law
enforcement, navigation safety, marine environment response, and search-and-rescue
capabilities. Existing international law provides a comprehensive set of rules governing
the rights, freedoms, and uses of the world’s oceans and airspace, including the Arctic.
The law recognizes these rights, freedoms, and uses for commercial and military vessels
and aircraft. Within this framework, we shall further develop Arctic waterways
management regimes, including traffic separation schemes, vessel tracking, and ship
routing, in collaboration with partners. We will also encourage other nations to adhere to
internationally accepted principles. This cooperation will facilitate strategic partnerships
that promote innovative, low-cost solutions that enhance the Arctic marine transportation
system and the safe, secure, efficient and free flow of trade.
• Provide for Future United States Energy Security – The Arctic region’s energy
resources factor into a core component of our national security strategy: energy security.
The region holds sizable proved and potential oil and natural gas resources that will likely
continue to provide valuable supplies to meet U.S. energy needs. Continuing to
responsibly develop Arctic oil and gas resources aligns with the United States “all of the
above” approach to developing new domestic energy sources, including renewables,
expanding oil and gas production, and increasing efficiency and conservation efforts to
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reduce our reliance on imported oil and strengthen our nation’s energy security. Within
the context of this broader energy security strategy, including our economic,
environmental and climate policy objectives, we are committed to working with
stakeholders, industry, and other Arctic states to explore the energy resource base,
develop and implement best practices, and share experiences to enable the
environmentally responsible production of oil and natural gas as well as renewable
energy.
2. Pursue Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship
Responsible stewardship requires active conservation of resources, balanced
management, and the application of scientific and traditional knowledge of physical and
living environments. As Arctic environments change, increased human activity demands
precaution, as well as greater knowledge to inform responsible decisions. Together,
Arctic nations can responsibly meet new demands – including maintaining open sea lanes
for global commerce and scientific research, charting and mapping, providing search-
and-rescue services, and developing capabilities to prevent, contain, and respond to oil
spills and accidents – by increasing knowledge and integrating Arctic management.338
We must improve our ability to forecast future conditions in the Arctic while being
mindful of the potential for unexpected developments.
To realize this line of effort, we will pursue the specific objectives outlined below:
• Protect the Arctic Environment and Conserve Arctic Natural Resources –
Protecting the unique and changing environment of the Arctic is a central goal of U.S.
policy. Supporting actions will promote healthy, sustainable, and resilient ecosystems
over the long term, supporting a full range of ecosystem services. This effort will be risk-
based and proceed on the basis of best available information. The United States in the
Arctic will assess and monitor the status of ecosystems and the risks of climate change
and other stressors to prepare for and respond effectively to environmental challenges.
• Use Integrated Arctic Management to Balance Economic Development,
Environmental Protection, and Cultural Values – Natural resource management will
be based on a comprehensive understanding of environmental and cultural sensitivities in
the region, and address expectations for future infrastructure needs and other
development-related trends. This endeavor can promote unity of effort and provide the
basis for sensible infrastructure and other resource management decisions in the Arctic.
We will emphasize science-informed decisionmaking and integration of economic,
environmental, and cultural values. We will also advance coordination among Federal
departments and agencies and collaboration with partners engaged in Arctic stewardship
activities.
• Increase Understanding of the Arctic through Scientific Research and Traditional
Knowledge – Proper stewardship of the Arctic requires understanding of how the
environment is changing, and such understanding will be based on a holistic earth system
approach. Vast areas of the Arctic Ocean are unexplored, and we lack much of the basic
338 A footnote in the document at this point states: “Much of this work is already underway including efforts under
Executive Order 12501 (Arctic Research), Executive Order 13547 (Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the
Great Lakes), and Executive Order 13580 (Interagency Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy
Development and Permitting in Alaska). Entities under these Executive Orders are developing partnerships with
Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, public and private sector partners to ensure that natural resource decisions in the
Arctic integrate economic, environmental, and cultural interests of the Nation.”
The above-mentioned Executive Order 12501, which was issued January 28, 1985, implements The Arctic Research
and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31, 1984) by, among other things, establishing the
Arctic Research Commission and the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee. The text of Executive Order
12501 is available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12501.html.
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knowledge necessary to understand and address Arctic issues. The changes in the Arctic
cannot be understood in isolation and must be viewed in a global context. As we learn
more about the region, we have identified several key subcomponents of the Arctic that
require urgent attention: land ice and its role in changing sea level; sea-ice and its role in
global climate, fostering biodiversity, and supporting Arctic peoples; and, the warming
permafrost and its effects on infrastructure and climate. Better earth system-level
knowledge will also help us meet operational needs such as weather and ice forecasting.
We can make faster progress through a well-coordinated and transparent national and
international exploration and research agenda that reduces the potential for duplication of
effort and leads to better leveraging of resources.
• Chart the Arctic region – We will continue to make progress in charting and mapping
the Arctic region’s ocean and waterways, so long obscured by perennial ice, and mapping
its coastal and interior lands according to reliable, modern standards. Given the vast
expanse of territory and water to be charted and mapped, we will need to prioritize and
synchronize charting efforts to make more effective use of resources and attain faster
progress. In so doing, we will make navigation safer and contribute to the identification
of ecologically sensitive areas and reserves of natural resources.
3. Strengthen International Cooperation
What happens in one part of the Arctic region can have significant implications for the
interests of other Arctic states and the international community as a whole. The remote
and complex operating conditions in the Arctic environment make the region well-suited
for collaborative efforts by nations seeking to explore emerging opportunities while
emphasizing ecological awareness and preservation. We will seek to strengthen
partnerships through existing multilateral fora and legal frameworks dedicated to
common Arctic issues. We will also pursue new arrangements for cooperating on issues
of mutual interest or concern and addressing unique and unprecedented challenges, as
appropriate.
U.S. efforts to strengthen international cooperation and partnerships will be pursued
through four objectives:
• Pursue Arrangements that Promote Shared Arctic State Prosperity, Protect the
Arctic Environment, and Enhance Security – We will seek opportunities to pursue
efficient and effective joint ventures, based on shared values that leverage each Arctic
state’s strengths. This collaboration will assist in guiding investments and regional
activities, addressing dynamic trends, and promoting sustainable development in the
Arctic region.
Arctic nations have varied commercial, cultural, environmental, safety, and security
concerns in the Arctic region. Nevertheless, our common interests make these nations
ideal partners in the region. We seek new opportunities to advance our interests by
proactive engagement with other Arctic nations through bilateral and multilateral efforts
using of a wide array of existing multilateral mechanisms that have responsibilities
relating to the Arctic region.
As appropriate, we will work with other Arctic nations to develop new coordination
mechanisms to keep the Arctic region prosperous, environmentally sustainable,
operationally safe, secure, and free of conflict, and will protect U.S., allied, and regional
security and economic interests.
• Work through the Arctic Council to Advance U.S. Interests in the Arctic Region –
In recent years, the Arctic Council has facilitated notable achievements in the promotion
of cooperation, coordination, and interaction among Arctic states and Arctic indigenous
peoples. Recent successes of the Council include its advancement of public safety and
environmental protection issues, as evidenced by the 2011 Arctic Search-and-Rescue
Agreement and by the 2013 Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response
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Agreement. The United States will continue to emphasize the Arctic Council as a forum
for facilitating Arctic states’ cooperation on myriad issues of mutual interest within its
current mandate.
• Accede to the Law of the Sea Convention – Accession to the Convention would
protect U.S. rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace throughout the Arctic
region, and strengthen our arguments for freedom of navigation and overflight through
the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route. The United States is the only Arctic
state that is not party to the Convention. Only by joining the Convention can we
maximize legal certainty and best secure international recognition of our sovereign rights
with respect to the U.S. extended continental shelf in the Arctic and elsewhere, which
may hold vast oil, gas, and other resources. Our extended continental shelf claim in the
Arctic region could extend more than 600 nautical miles from the north coast of Alaska.
In instances where the maritime zones of coastal nations overlap, Arctic states have
already begun the process of negotiating and concluding maritime boundary agreements,
consistent with the Law of the Sea Convention and other relevant international law. The
United States supports peaceful management and resolution of disputes, in a manner free
from coercion. While the United States is not currently a party to the Convention, we will
continue to support and observe principles of established customary international law
reflected in the Convention.
• Cooperate with other Interested Parties – A growing number of non-Arctic states and
numerous non-state actors have expressed increased interest in the Arctic region. The
United States and other Arctic nations should seek to work with other states and entities
to advance common objectives in the Arctic region in a manner that protects Arctic
states’ national interests and resources. One key example relates to the promotion of safe,
secure, and reliable Arctic shipping, a goal that is best pursued through the International
Maritime Organization in coordination with other Arctic states, major shipping states, the
shipping industry and other relevant interests.
Guiding Principles
The U.S. approach to the Arctic region must reflect our values as a nation and as a
member of the global community. We will approach holistically our interests in
promoting safety and security, advancing economic and energy development, protecting
the environment, addressing climate change and respecting the needs of indigenous
communities and Arctic state interests. To guide our efforts, we have identified the
following principles to serve as the foundation for U.S. Arctic engagement and activities.
• Safeguard Peace and Stability by working to maintain and preserve the Arctic region
as an area free of conflict, acting in concert with allies, partners, and other interested
parties. This principle will include United States action, and the actions of other
interested countries, in supporting and preserving international legal principles of
freedom of navigation and overflight and other uses of the sea related to these freedoms,
unimpeded lawful commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The United States
will rely on existing international law, which provides a comprehensive set of rules
governing the rights, freedoms, and uses of the world’s oceans and airspace, including the
Arctic.
• Make Decisions Using the Best Available Information by promptly sharing –
nationally and internationally – the most current understanding and forecasts based on
up-to-date science and traditional knowledge.
• Pursue Innovative Arrangements to support the investments in scientific research,
marine transportation infrastructure requirements, and other support capability and
capacity needs in this region. The harshness of the Arctic climate and the complexity
associated with developing, maintaining, and operating infrastructure and capabilities in
the region necessitate new thinking on public-private and multinational partnerships.
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• Consult and Coordinate with Alaska Natives consistent with tribal consultation
policy established by Executive Order.339 This policy emphasizes trust, respect, and
shared responsibility. It articulates that tribal governments have a unique legal
relationship with the United States and requires Federal departments and agencies to
provide for meaningful and timely input by tribal officials in development of regulatory
policies that have tribal implications. This guiding principle is also consistent with the
Alaska Federation of Natives Guidelines for Research.340
Conclusion
We seek a collaborative and innovative approach to manage a rapidly changing region.
We must advance U.S. national security interests, pursue responsible stewardship, and
strengthen international collaboration and cooperation, as we work to meet the challenges
of rapid climate-driven environmental change. The melting of Arctic ice has the potential
to transform global climate and ecosystems as well as global shipping, energy markets,
and other commercial interests. To address these challenges and opportunities, we will
align Federal activities in accordance with this strategy; partner with the State of Alaska,
local, and tribal entities; and work with other Arctic nations to develop complementary
approaches to shared challenges. We will proactively coordinate regional development.
Our economic development and environmental stewardship must go hand-in-hand. The
unique Arctic environment will require a commitment by the United States to make
judicious, coordinated infrastructure investment decisions, informed by science. To meet
this challenge, we will need bold, innovative thinking that embraces and generates new
and creative public-private and multinational cooperative models.341
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke, Coordinator
John Frittelli
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Specialist in Transportation Policy
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
jfrittelli@crs.loc.gov, 7-7033
Marjorie Ann Browne
Marc Humphries
Specialist in International Relations
Specialist in Energy Policy
mbrowne@crs.loc.gov, 7-7695
mhumphries@crs.loc.gov, 7-7264
Laura B. Comay
Jane A. Leggett
Analyst in Natural Resources
Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy
lcomay@crs.loc.gov, 7-6036
jaleggett@crs.loc.gov, 7-9525
M. Lynne Corn
Jonathan L. Ramseur
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy
Specialist in Environmental Policy
lcorn@crs.loc.gov, 7-7267
jramseur@crs.loc.gov, 7-7919
Peter Folger
Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy
pfolger@crs.loc.gov, 7-1517
339 A footnote in the document at this point states: “See Executive Order 13175 – Consultation and Coordination with
Indian Tribal Governments, November 2000.”
340 A footnote in the document at this point states: “Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) (1996) AFN Board Adopts
Policy Guidelines for Research. AFN, Anchorage. Alaska Natives Knowledge Network. Policy adopted in 1993,
http://ankn.uaf.edu/IKS/afnguide.html.”
341 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, May 2013, pp. 4-11.
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