Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
August 17, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL30588


Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
At the end of 2014, the United States and partner countries completed a transition to a smaller
mission consisting primarily of training and advising the Afghanistan National Security Forces
(ANSF). The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011,
stands at about 9,800. About 1,000 of the U.S. contingent are counter-terrorism forces that
continue to conduct combat, operating under U.S. “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel” that has
replaced the post-September 11 “Operation Enduring Freedom.” U.S. forces constitute the bulk of
the 13,000-person NATO-led “Resolute Support Mission.” The post-2016 U.S. force is to be
several hundred military personnel, under U.S. Embassy authority. However, amid assessments
that the ANSF is having some difficulty preventing gains by the Taliban and other militant
groups, President Obama announced that U.S. forces would remain at about 10,000 through the
end of 2015. There has not been an announced change in the size in the post-2016 U.S. forces.
U.S. officials assert that insurgents do not pose a threat to the stability of the government, but
militants continue to conduct high-profile attacks and gain ground in some areas. The insurgency
benefits, in some measure, from weak governance in Afghanistan. A dispute over the 2014
presidential election in Afghanistan was settled in September 2014 by a U.S.-brokered solution
under which Ashraf Ghani became President and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah was appointed to a new
position of Chief Executive Officer of the government. Ghani and Abdullah’s disagreements over
new cabinet selections delayed the completion of a new cabinet until April 2015, and there is still
no permanent Defense Minister. Governance is also widely assessed to suffer from widespread
official corruption, although Ghani has undertaken anti-corruption initiatives since taking office.
And, a further complicating factor in governance is that the government has been tacitly
accepting the regrouping of local factional militias to help compensate for ANSF weaknesses.
Militias have often been cited for human rights abuses and arbitrary administration of justice.
By engaging Afghanistan’s neighbors, Ghani is taking significant steps to try to achieve a
negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and insurgent groups. Ghani’s trips to
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and China since taking office have had some early success in producing
negotiations—if not necessarily any breakthroughs—between government officials and Taliban
representatives. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups are watching any talks closely,
asserting that a settlement might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights.
Further talks might be complicated by dissension within the Taliban over the benefits of
negotiations, a struggle over succession to Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Umar, who was
revealed to have died in 2013, and by defections to a small but growing Islamic State affiliate in
Afghanistan.
A component of U.S. policy to help establish a self-sustaining Afghanistan is to encourage
economic development and integration into regional trade and investment patterns. Despite
modest successes in these efforts, Afghanistan will remain dependent on foreign aid for many
years. Through the end of FY2014, the United States provided about $100 billion to Afghanistan
since the fall of the Taliban, of which about 60% has been to equip and train the ANSF. About
$5.7 billion is being provided in FY2015, including $4.1 billion for the ANSF. The FY2016
request is for $5.3 billion, including $3.8 billion for the ANSF. These figures do not include funds
for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics,
Elections, and Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Contents
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
From Early History to the 19th Century ..................................................................................... 1
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era ........................................................................................ 1
Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period .................................................................................... 2
The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities .............................................. 2
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal ....................................................................... 3
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban ............................................................... 4
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001) ..................................................................... 5
U.S. Policy Toward the Taliban During Its Rule/Bin Laden Presence ................................ 5
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals ..................................................................................... 6
Bush Administration Afghanistan Policy Before September 11 ......................................... 6
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom ......................................................... 7
Major Combat Operations: 2001-2003 ............................................................................... 7
Afghan Governance ......................................................................................................................... 8
“National Unity Government” of Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah ........................................... 9
U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure ...................................................................... 11
General Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................. 13
Advancement of Women ................................................................................................... 14
Security Policy: Transition, and Beyond ....................................................................................... 16
Who Is “The Enemy”? ............................................................................................................ 16
The Taliban ....................................................................................................................... 16
Al Qaeda and Associated Groups ..................................................................................... 17
Hikmatyar Faction (HIG) .................................................................................................. 19
Haqqani Network .............................................................................................................. 20
Insurgent Tactics ............................................................................................................... 21
Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods ...................................... 21
The Anti-Taliban Military Effort: 2003-2009 ......................................................................... 22
Obama Administration Policy: “Surge,” Transition, and Drawdown ...................................... 23
Transition and Drawdown: Afghans in the Lead .............................................................. 24
Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and 2017 Planned Exit ...................................................... 25
Adjustments to the 2015 and 2016 Force Levels and Missions ........................................ 26
Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) ................................................................................ 28
Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) ............................................................................ 28
Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law .......................................................... 30
Size of the ANSF .............................................................................................................. 31
ANSF Top Leadership and Ethnic Issues .......................................................................... 31
ANSF Funding .................................................................................................................. 31
The Afghan National Army (ANA) .................................................................................. 32
Afghan Air Force .............................................................................................................. 33
Afghan National Police (ANP) ......................................................................................... 33
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector ................................................................................ 36
Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ................................................ 36
Reintegration and Potential Reconciliation with Insurgents ................................................... 37
Regional Dimension ...................................................................................................................... 40
Pakistan ................................................................................................................................... 42
U.S.-Pakistan Cooperation on Afghanistan....................................................................... 44
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Iran .......................................................................................................................................... 44
Bilateral Government-to-Government Relations .............................................................. 45
Iranian Assistance to Afghan Militants and to Pro-Iranian Groups and Regions.............. 46
Assistance to Ethnic and Religious Factions in Afghanistan ............................................ 46
Iran’s Development Aid for Afghanistan .......................................................................... 46
India ........................................................................................................................................ 47
India’s Development Activities in Afghanistan ................................................................ 48
Russia, Central Asian States, and China ................................................................................. 48
Russia/Northern Distribution Network ............................................................................. 48
Central Asian States .......................................................................................................... 49
China ................................................................................................................................. 50
Persian Gulf States .................................................................................................................. 51
Saudi Arabia ...................................................................................................................... 51
UAE .................................................................................................................................. 52
Qatar.................................................................................................................................. 52
Aid and Economic Development ................................................................................................... 52
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan ............................................................................................... 53
Aid Oversight and Conditionality ..................................................................................... 54
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act ..................................................... 54
Direct Support to the Afghan Government ....................................................................... 55
Other Donor Aid ............................................................................................................... 56
Development in Key Sectors ................................................................................................... 57
Education .......................................................................................................................... 57
Health ................................................................................................................................ 57
Roads ................................................................................................................................ 58
Bridges .............................................................................................................................. 58
Railways ............................................................................................................................ 59
Electricity .......................................................................................................................... 59
Agriculture ........................................................................................................................ 60
Telecommunications ......................................................................................................... 61
Airlines .............................................................................................................................. 62
Mining and Gems .............................................................................................................. 62
Oil, Gas, and Related Pipelines ......................................................................................... 63
Trade Promotion/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones ............................................................. 64

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan ........................................................................................................ 74
Figure 2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ............................................................................................. 75

Tables
Table 1. Post-Taliban Political Process ............................................................................................ 8
Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) ....................................................... 13
Table 3. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate ........................................... 23
Table 4. Summary of U.S. Strategy and Implementation .............................................................. 30
Table 5. Major Security-Related Indicators ................................................................................... 40
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Table 6. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan ......................................................................... 42
Table 7. Major Reporting Requirements ....................................................................................... 66
Table 8. Comparative Social and Economic Statistics .................................................................. 67
Table 9. Major Non-U.S. Pledges for Afghanistan 2002-2012...................................................... 68
Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 ........................................................ 69
Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2001 ......................................................... 70
Table 12. Post-Taliban U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan ................................................................. 71
Table 13. NATO/ISAF and RSM Contributing Nations ................................................................ 72
Table 14. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan ......................................................................... 73

Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 75

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Background
Afghanistan has a history of a high degree of decentralization, and resistance to foreign invasion
and occupation. Some have termed it the “graveyard of empires.”
From Early History to the 19th Century
Alexander the Great conquered what is now Afghanistan in three years (330 B.C.E. to 327
B.C.E.), although at significant cost and with significant difficulty, and requiring, among other
steps, marriage to a resident of the conquered territory. For example, he was unable to fully pacify
Bactria, an ancient region spanning what is now northern Afghanistan and parts of the
neighboring Central Asian states. (A collection of valuable Bactrian gold was hidden from the
Taliban when it was in power and emerged from the Taliban period unscathed.) From the third to
the eighth century, A.D., Buddhism was the dominant religion in Afghanistan. At the end of the
seventh century, Islam spread in Afghanistan when Arab invaders from the Umayyad Dynasty
defeated the Persian empire of the Sassanians. In the 10th century, Muslim rulers called Samanids,
from Bukhara (in what is now Uzbekistan), extended their influence into Afghanistan, and the
complete conversion of Afghanistan to Islam occurred during the rule of the Gaznavids in the 11th
century. They ruled over a vast empire based in what is now Ghazni province of Afghanistan.
In 1504, Babur, a descendant of the conquerors Tamarlane and Genghis Khan, took control of
Kabul and then moved on to India, establishing the Mughal Empire. (Babur is buried in the Babur
Gardens complex in Kabul, which has been refurbished with the help of the Agha Khan
Foundation.) Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, Afghanistan was fought over by the Mughal
Empire and the Safavid Dynasty of Persia (now Iran), with the Safavids mostly controlling Herat
and western Afghanistan, and the Mughals controlling Kabul and the east. A monarchy ruled by
ethnic Pashtuns was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani. He was a senior officer in the
army of Nadir Shah, ruler of Persia, when Nadir Shah was assassinated and Persian control over
Afghanistan weakened.
A strong ruler, Dost Muhammad Khan, emerged in Kabul in 1826 and created concerns among
Britain that the Afghans were threatening Britain’s control of India; that fear led to a British
decision in 1838 to intervene in Afghanistan, setting off the first Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842).
Nearly all of the 4,500-person British force was killed in that war. The second Anglo-Afghan War
took place during 1878-1880.
Early 20th Century and Cold War Era
King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan (Third
Anglo-Afghan War) shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as
recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular
modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was
succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir
Shah. Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for
promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting
freedoms for women, including dropping a requirement that they cover their face and hair. In part,
the countryside was secured during the King’s time by local tribal militias called arbokai.
However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for Communist factions in
Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also built ties to the Soviet government by entering into a significant
political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union. The Soviets built large
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infrastructure projects in Afghanistan during Zahir Shah’s time, such as the north-south Salang
Pass/Tunnel and Bagram airfield.
This period was the height of the Cold War, and the United States sought to prevent Afghanistan
from falling into the Soviet orbit. As Vice President, Richard Nixon visited Afghanistan in 1953,
and President Eisenhower visited in 1959. President Kennedy hosted King Zahir Shah in 1963.
The United States tried to use aid to counter Soviet influence, providing agricultural and other
development assistance. Among the major U.S.-funded projects were large USAID-led irrigation
and hydroelectric dam efforts in Helmand Province, including Kajaki Dam (see below).
Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s, during the Nixon Administration, when the
diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While
receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad
Daoud, a military leader who established a dictatorship with strong state involvement in the
economy. Daoud was overthrown and killed1 in April 1978, during the Carter Administration, by
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, Communist party) military officers under the
direction of two PDPA (Khalq, or “Masses” faction) leaders, Hafizullah Amin and Nur
Mohammad Taraki, in what is called the Saur (April) Revolution. Taraki became president, but he
was displaced in September 1979 in a coup led by Amin. Both leaders drew their strength from
rural ethnic Pashtuns and tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part
by redistributing land and bringing more women into government. The attempt at rapid
modernization sparked rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves.
Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period
The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent further gains by
the Islamic militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets
replaced Amin with another PDPA leader who the Soviets apparently perceived as pliable, Babrak
Karmal, leader of the Parcham (“Banner”) faction of the PDPA. Kamal had joined the 1978 PDPA
takeover but was subsequently exiled by Taraki and Amin, who perceived him as a political
threat.
Soviet occupation forces numbered about 120,000. They were assisted by Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan (DRA) military forces of about 25,000-40,000, supplemented by about 20,000
paramilitary and tribal militia forces, including the PDPA-dominated paramilitary organization
called the Sarandoy. Soviet and Afghan forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the
country, in part because DRA forces were plagued by desertions and their effectiveness was
limited. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided through the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence
directorate (ISI).
The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities
The mujahedin were also relatively well organized and coordinated by seven major parties that in
early 1989 formed what they claimed was a government-in-exile—a Peshawar-based “Afghan
Interim Government” (AIG). The seven party leaders and their parties—sometimes referred to as
the “Peshawar 7”—were Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi (Islamic Revolutionary Movement of
Afghanistan); Sibghatullah Mojaddedi (Afghan National Liberation Front); Gulbuddin Hikmatyar

1 Daoud’s grave was discovered outside Kabul in early 2008. He was reburied in an official ceremony in Kabul in
March 2009.
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(Hezb-i-Islam—Gulbuddin, Islamic Party of Gulbuddin, HIG); Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamiat-
Islami/Islamic Society); Yunus Khalis (Hezb-i-Islam); Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf (Ittihad
Islami
/Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan); and Pir Gaylani (National Islamic Front
of Afghanistan, NIFA). Mohammadi and Khalis died of natural causes in 2002 and 2006,
respectively, and Rabbani was killed in a September 2011, assassination. The others are still
active in Afghan politics and governance or, in the case of Hikmatyar, insurgency.
The mujahedin weaponry included U.S.-supplied portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems
called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The United States
decided in 1985 to provide these weapons to the mujahedin after substantial debate within the
Reagan Administration and some in Congress over whether they could be used effectively and
whether doing so would harm broader U.S.-Soviet relations. The mujahedin also stored weaponry
in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. However,
some warned that a post-Soviet power structure in Afghanistan could be adverse to U.S. interests
because much of the covert aid was being channeled to the Islamist groups.
Partly because of the effectiveness of the Stinger in shooting down Soviet helicopters and fixed
wing aircraft, the Soviet Union’s losses mounted—about 13,400 Soviet soldiers were killed in the
war, according to Soviet figures—turning Soviet domestic opinion against the war. In 1986, after
the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of
Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai (known by his first name). Najibullah was a Ghilzai
Pashtun, and was from the Parcham faction of the PDPA. Some Afghans say that he governed
effectively, for example in his appointment of a prime minister to handle administrative duties.
Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal
On April 14, 1988, then-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the
Geneva Accords) requiring the Soviet Union to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by
February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government. A warming of relations
moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict,
a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity
for supporting communist regimes abroad. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington
agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants as of January 1, 1992, which was
implemented by all accounts.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military
assistance was provided by the United States to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of
the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20
million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990.2 The Soviet
pullout was viewed as a decisive U.S. “victory.” The Soviet pullout caused a reduction in
subsequent covert funding and, as indicated in Table 10, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan remained
at relatively low levels because support for a major U.S.-led effort to rebuild the economy of
Afghanistan was lacking. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the
Soviet Union was completing its pullout, and it remained so until the fall of the Taliban in 2001.
Despite the Soviet troop withdrawal in 1989, Najibullah still enjoyed Soviet financial and
advisory support and he defied expectations that his government would collapse soon after a

2 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year
to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet:
Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.
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Soviet withdrawal. However, his position weakened subsequently after the Soviets cut off
financial and advisory support as of January 1, 1992. On March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly
agreed to step down once an interim government was formed—an announcement set off
rebellions by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan—particularly Abdul
Rashid Dostam—who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masoud of the
Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masoud had earned a
reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from conquering his power base in the
Panjshir Valley north of Kabul. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18, 1992.3
The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban
The fall of Najibullah exposed rifts among the mujahedin parties. The leader of one of the smaller
parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, was
president during April-May 1992. Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani became
president in June 1992 with agreement that he would serve until December 1994. He refused to
step down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear successor.
That decision was strongly opposed by other mujahedin leaders, including Gulbuddin Hikmatyar,
a Pashtun, and leader of the Islamist conservative Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin mujahedin party.
Hikmatyar and several allied factions fought unsuccessfully to dislodge Rabbani. Rabbani
reached an agreement for Hikmatyar to serve as Prime Minister, but because of mutual mistrust,
Hikmatyar never formally took office and fighting eventually destroyed much of west Kabul.
In 1993-1994, Afghan Islamic clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin, formed the
Taliban movement. Many were former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with conflict
among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries
(“madrassas”) mainly of the “Deobandi” school of Islam.4 Some say this interpretation of Islam is
similar to the “Wahhabism” that is practiced in Saudi Arabia. Taliban practices were also
consonant with conservative Pashtun tribal traditions. The Taliban’s leader, Mullah Muhammad
Umar, had been a fighter in Khalis’s Hezb-i-Islam party during the anti-Soviet war—Khalis’ party
was generally considered moderate Islamist during the anti-Soviet war, but Khalis and his faction
turned against the United States in the mid-1990s.
The Taliban viewed the Rabbani government as weak, corrupt, and anti-Pashtun, and the four
years of civil war between the mujahedin groups (1992-1996) created popular support for the
Taliban as able to deliver stability. With the help of defections, the Taliban took control of the
southern city of Qandahar in November 1994. Umar reportedly entered the Qandahar shrine
containing a purported cloak used by the Prophet Mohammad and donned it in front of hundreds
of followers.5 By February 1995, the movement’s fighters were near Kabul. In September 1995,
the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its Tajik governor, Ismail
Khan (ally of Rabbani and Masoud, who later escaped and took refuge in Iran. In September
1996, Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masoud to the Panjshir
Valley (north of Kabul); the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. Taliban

3 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban
movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.
4 The Deobandi school began in 1867 in a seminary in Uttar Pradesh, in British-controlled India, that was set up to train
Islamic clerics and to counter the British educational model.
5 According to press reports in December 2012, the cloak remains in the shrine, which is guarded by a family of
caretakers who, despite professions of political neutrality, have suffered several assassinations over the years.
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gunmen entered the U.N. facility in Kabul that was sheltering Najibullah, his brother, and aides,
and hanged them.
Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001)
The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who held the title of Head of State and
“Commander of the Faithful.” He remained in the Taliban power base in Qandahar and made no
public speeches or appearances, although he did occasionally receive high-level foreign officials.
In May 1996, shortly before the Taliban entered Kabul, Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden
relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan, where he had been a recruiter of Arab fighters during the
anti-Soviet war. He initially settled in territory in Nangarhar province (near Jalalabad city)
controlled by Hezb-i-Islam of Yunus Khalis (Mullah Umar’s party leader), but later had freer
reign as the Taliban captured territory in Afghanistan. Umar reportedly forged a political and
personal bond with Bin Laden and refused U.S. demands to extradite him. Like Umar, most of the
senior figures in the Taliban regime were Ghilzai Pashtuns, which predominate in eastern
Afghanistan. They are rivals of the Durrani Pashtuns, who are predominant in the south.
The Taliban lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic
customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The
Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to use
physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western
music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home,
except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery. In what many consider
an extreme action, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills
above Bamiyan city, considering them idols.
U.S. Policy Toward the Taliban During Its Rule/Bin Laden Presence
The Clinton Administration opened talks with the Taliban after it captured Qandahar in 1994, and
engaged the movement after it took power. However, the Administration was unable to moderate
the Taliban’s policies, and relations worsened. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban
as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government.
The United Nations continued to seat the Rabbani government. The State Department ordered the
Afghan embassy in Washington, DC, closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council Resolution
1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban to end discrimination
against women. Women’s rights groups urged the Clinton Administration not to recognize the
Taliban government. In May 1999, the Senate-passed S.Res. 68 called on the President not to
recognize an Afghan government that oppresses women.
The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership gradually became the Clinton Administration’s
overriding agenda item with the Taliban. In April 1998, then-U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Bill Richardson headed a small U.S. delegation to Afghanistan, but it did not meet
Mullah Umar or persuade the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden. After the August 7, 1998, Al
Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration began to
strongly pressure the Taliban to extradite him, imposing U.S. sanctions on Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions as well. On August 20, 1998, the
United States fired cruise missiles at Al Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan.6 Some

6 A pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (Al Shifa) believe to be producing chemical weapons for Al Qaeda also was struck
that day, although U.S. reviews later corroborated Sudan’s assertions that the plant was strictly civilian in nature.
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observers assert that the Administration missed several opportunities to strike bin Laden himself,
including a purported sighting of him by an unarmed Predator drone at a location called Tarnak
Farm in Afghanistan in the fall of 2000.7 Clinton Administration officials asserted that U.S.
domestic and international support for ousting the Taliban militarily at that time was lacking.
The “Northern Alliance” Congeals
The Taliban’s policies caused different Afghan factions to ally with the Tajik core of the anti-
Taliban opposition—the ousted President Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masoud, and their ally in the
Herat area, Ismail Khan. Joining the Tajik factions in the broader “Northern Alliance” were
Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and even some Pashtun Islamist factions discussed below. Virtually all
these figures remain key players in politics in Afghanistan.
Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major faction of the Northern Alliance was the
Uzbek militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan)
of General Abdul Rashid Dostam. Frequently referred to by some Afghans as one
of the “warlords” who gained power during the anti-Soviet war, Dostam first
joined those seeking to oust Rabbani during his 1992-1996 presidency, but later
joined him and the other Northern Alliance factions opposed to the Taliban.
Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are
prominent in Bamiyan, Dai Kundi, and Ghazni provinces of central Afghanistan.
The main Hazara Shiite militia in the Northern Alliance was Hizb-e-Wahdat
(Unity Party, composed of eight groups). In 1995, the Taliban captured and killed
Hizb-e-Wahdat’s leader Abdul Ali Mazari. The most prominent current Hazara
faction leader is Mohammad Mohaqeq.
Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Some Pashtuns joined the Northern Alliance. Among
them was the conservative Islamist mujahedin faction Ittihad Islami) headed by
Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Sayyaf reportedly viewed the Taliban as selling out
Afghanistan to Al Qaeda.
Bush Administration Afghanistan Policy Before September 11
Prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy continued Clinton Administration
policy toward Afghanistan: applying economic and political pressure on the Taliban while
retaining some dialogue with it, and refusing to militarily assist the Northern Alliance. The
September 11 Commission report said that, prior to the September 11 attacks, Administration
officials leaned toward providing such aid, as well as aiding anti-Taliban Pashtuns. Additional
covert options were reportedly also under consideration.8 In accordance with U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the Taliban
representative office in New York closed, although a Taliban representative continued to operate
informally in the New York area.9 In March 2001, Administration officials received a Taliban
envoy to discuss bilateral issues. In one significant departure from Clinton Administration policy,
the Bush Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan to try to reduce its support for the

7 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4540958.
8 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002.
9 Mujahid has reconciled with the current Afghan government,and serves as one of the deputy leaders of the
70-member High Peace Council on political reconciliation.
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Taliban. At that time, there were widespread but unconfirmed allegations that Pakistani advisers
were helping the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance.
Even though the Northern Alliance was supplied with Iranian, Russian, and Indian financial and
military support, the Northern Alliance nonetheless continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it
lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75%
of the country, including almost all provincial capitals. The Alliance suffered a major setback on
September 9, 2001 (two days before, and possibly a part of, the September 11 attacks), when
Ahmad Shah Masoud was assassinated by Al Qaeda operatives posing as journalists. He was
succeeded by a top lieutenant, Muhammad Fahim, a veteran Tajik figure but who lacked
Masoud’s charisma and undisputed authority (Fahim died of natural causes in early 2014, at that
time serving as First Vice President).
September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom
After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the
Taliban when it refused a U.S. demand to extradite Bin Laden. President Bush articulated a policy
that equated those who harbor terrorists to terrorists themselves, and asserted that a friendly
regime in Kabul was needed to enable U.S. forces to search for Al Qaeda members there.
The Administration sought U.N. backing for military action. U.N. Security Council Resolution
1368 of September 12, 2001, said that the Council “expresses its readiness to take all necessary
steps to respond (implying force) to the September 11 attacks.” This was widely interpreted as a
U.N. authorization for military action in response to the attacks, but it did not explicitly authorize
Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban. The Resolution did not reference Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter, which allows for responses to threats to international peace and security.
In Congress, S.J.Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L.
107-40, signed September 18, 2011), was somewhat more explicit than the U.N. Resolution,
authorizing:10 “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.”
Major Combat Operations: 2001-2003
Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001.
The U.S. effort initially consisted primarily of U.S. air-strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces,
facilitated by the cooperation between reported small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special
operations forces and Central Intelligence Agency operatives. The purpose of these operations
was to help the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces advance by directing U.S. air
strikes on Taliban positions. In late October 2001, about 1,300 Marines were deployed to pressure
the Taliban at Qandahar, but there were few U.S.-Taliban pitched battles.
The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9, 2001, to forces
led by General Dostam (who is mentioned above).11Northern Alliance forces—despite promises
to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell that they would not enter Kabul—did so on November 12,
2001, to popular jubilation. The Taliban subsequently lost the south and east to U.S.-supported

10 Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL, providing $17 million in funding
for it for FY2002.
11 In the process, Dostam captured Taliban fighters and imprisoned them in freight containers, causing many to
suffocate. They were buried in a mass grave at Dasht-e-Laili.
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Pashtun leaders, including Hamid Karzai. The Taliban regime ended on December 9, 2001, when
the Taliban and Mullah Umar fled Qandahar, leaving it under Pashtun tribal law. Subsequently,
U.S. and Afghan forces conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley (Paktia
Province) during March 2-19, 2002. In March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops raided suspected
Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar (Operation Valiant Strike). On May 1,
2003, U.S. officials declared an end to “major combat.”
Afghan Governance12
The George W. Bush Administration argued that the U.S. departure from the region after the 1989
Soviet pullout allowed Afghanistan to degenerate into chaos, and that this pattern not be repeated.
The Administration and its international partners decided to try to dismantle local security
structures and build a relatively strong, democratic, Afghan central government. The effort, which
many outside experts described as “nation-building,” was supported by the United Nations.
The Obama Administration’s strategy review in late 2009 initially narrowed official U.S. goals to
preventing terrorism safe haven in Afghanistan, but policy in some ways expanded the preexisting
nation-building effort. No matter how the U.S. mission has been defined, building the capacity of
and reforming Afghan governance have been consistently judged to be key to the success of U.S.
policy. These objectives have been stated explicitly in each Obama Administration policy review,
strategy statement, and report on progress in Afghanistan, as well as all major international
conferences on Afghanistan. Table 1 briefly depicts the process and events that led to the
formation of the post-Taliban government of Afghanistan.
Table 1. Post-Taliban Political Process
Interim
Formed by Bonn Agreement. Headed by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, but key security
Administration
positions dominated by mostly minority “Northern Alliance.” Karzai reaffirmed as leader
by June 2002 “emergency loya jirga.” (A jirga is a traditional Afghan assembly.)
Constitution
Approved by January 2004 “Constitutional Loya Jirga” (CLJ). Set up strong presidency
without a prime ministership to balance presidential power, but gave parliament significant
powers to compensate. Gives men and women equal rights under the law, allows for
political parties as long as they are not “un-Islamic;” allows for court rulings according to
Hanafi (Sunni) Islam (Chapter 7, Article 15). Named ex-King Zahir Shah to non-hereditary
position of “Father of the Nation;” he died July 23, 2007.
Presidential Election
Elections for president and two vice presidents, for five-year term, held October 9, 2004.
Turnout was 80% of 10.5 mil ion registered. Karzai and running mates (Ahmad Zia
Masoud, a Tajik and brother of legendary mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masoud,
who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks, and Karim
Khalili, a Hazara) elected with 55% against 16 opponents, including one female. Funding:
$90 mil ion from donors, including $40 mil ion from U.S. (FY2004, P.L. 108-106).
Parliamentary
Elections held September 18, 2005, on “Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates
Elections
stood as individuals, not in party list. Parliament consists of a 249 elected lower house
(Wolesi Jirga, House of the People) and a selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga,
House of Elders). 2,815 candidates for Wolesi Jirga, including 347 women. Turnout was
57% (6.8 mil ion voters) of 12.5 mil ion registered. Upper house is appointed by the
president (34 seats, half of which are to be women), and by the provincial councils (68
seats). When district councils are elected, they wil appoint 34 of those 68 seats. Funded
by $160 mil ion in aid, including $45 mil ion from U.S. (FY2005 supplemental, P.L. 109-13).
First Provincial
Provincial elections held September 18, 2005, simultaneous with parliamentary elections.
Elections/
Powers vague, but have taken the lead in deciding local reconstruction. Provincial council
District Elections
sizes range from 9 to the 29 seats on the Kabul provincial council. Total seats are 420, of

12 Detail on governance issues is provided in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government
Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.
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which 121 held by women. 13,185 candidates, including 279 women. District elections not
held due to complexity and potential tensions of drawing district boundaries.
Second
Presidential and provincial elections were held August 20, 2009, but required a runoff
Presidential/Provincial because no candidate received over 50% in certified results. Runoff cancel ed when Dr.
Elections
Abdul ah dropped out. Election costs: $300 mil ion.
Second Parliamentary Originally set for May 22, 2010; held September 18, 2010. Result disputed but dispute
Elections
resolved through Afghan negotiations that overturned results in some districts. Abdul
Raouf Ibrahimi, an ethnic Uzbek, is lower house speaker, and upper house speaker is
Muslim Yaar, a Pashtun.
Third
First round held on April 5, 2014, and runoff between Dr. Abdul ah Abdul ah and Ashraf
Presidential/Provincial Ghani held on June 14. Allegations of widespread fraud not ful y resolved by a ful recount,
Election
but Ghani was declared the winner on September 22 pursuant to a U.S.-brokered power-
sharing agreement between Abdul ah and Ghani under which Ghani became President and
Abdul ah became Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of government. Ghani was sworn in on
September 29. The two did not nominate a new cabinet until January 12, 2015. A loya jirga
(traditional Afghan assembly) in 2016 is to review the position of CEO and potentially
convert it into a permanent position of Prime Minister.
Third Parliamentary
Originally scheduled for 2015, but wil be held in 2016 pending enactment and
Elections
implementation of election reform. Election reform commission established on March 20,
2015, and the United States announced a $30 mil ion grant to help assist the commission.
Because of the election delay, in June 2015 Ghani extended the term of the existing
parliament, by decree.

“National Unity Government” of Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah
The conclusion of virtually every Administration and outside assessment in recent years has been
that Afghan central governmental capacity and effectiveness has increased since 2001, but that
local governance lags and corruption remains widespread. The U.S.-brokered partnership
between President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Dr. Abdullah Abdullah has defied expectations of
many observers and remains intact, although tensions reportedly are building. The two conducted
what was widely characterized as a successful visit to Washington, DC, during March 23-27.
Ghani, who in concert with his office has set general Afghan policy guidelines, has announced
initiatives to hold corrupt individuals accountable; to install officials based on merit; to promote
women; and, through several trips to regional countries with a stake in Afghanistan’s future, to
explore new ways to settle the conflict with the Taliban insurgency. Since taking office, he has
reportedly emphasized punctuality and tightly run meetings of high officials.
Dr. Abdullah’s role has, at times since taking office, appeared unclear as he has struggled to
define and assert his authorities. Some observers say his effectiveness suffers from a relatively
small advisory team. Still, the unity government is functioning and has not appeared close to
breaking down to date. Ex-President Karzai has, through meetings with senior leaders and
factional figures, sometimes brokered dispute resolutions and continues to influence some
national policies.
Most of the apparent tensions between Ghani and Abdullah stem from differences over
appointments. Ghani and Abdullah jointly agreed to share the role of making the 25 cabinet
nominations, and that arrangement brought into play the need to balance competence and
factional interests. The first cabinet nominations were delayed until January 12, 2015, well
beyond the constitutionally required 30-day period for such nominations (October 28, 2014),
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causing substantial confusion in governance as acting ministers were left in charge.13 By the time
of the Ghani and Abdullah visit to the United States, only nine ministers had been confirmed by
the National Assembly, with two-thirds of the nominees having been rejected by the National
Assembly or withdrawn. Shortly before their visit to the United States, Ghani and Abdullah made
nominations to fill the remaining seats, and virtually all were confirmed in mid-April 2015. Ghani
and Abdullah have yet to complete appointments to the 34 provincial governorships or to several
major ambassadorships. The appointment of the first female to Afghanistan’s Supreme Court was
voted down in July 2015. A commission on election reform has been established, although the
appointed leader, women’s activist Shukria Barekzai, stepped down due to lack of consensus
between Ghani and Abdullah on her appointment. Some experts assert that Ghani has tended to
outwardly favor other Pashtuns and has unnecessarily created resentment among the other ethnic
minorities.14
The one cabinet post that has long eluded consensus is the all-important post of Defense Minister.
Current Chief of Staff of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) Sher Mohammad Karimi was the
original nominee. However, he was rejected in large part because two Pashtuns—ex-Communist
military leader Nur-ul-Haq Ulumi and Rahmat Nabil—were confirmed as Interior Minister and
Director of Intelligence. Tajiks in the National Assembly insisted that at least one of the heads of
these security ministries be a Tajik. Ghani subsequently, and reportedly without obtaining
Abdullah’s concurrence, nominated ex-Communist general Afzal Ludin for the post. Ludin
withdrew from the nomination when it became evident that he was not supported by Abdullah or
the many mujahedin faction leaders who support Abdullah—in large part because of Ludin’s role
in defeating mujahedin forces at the battle of Jalalabad in 1989. On May 21, 2015, Ghani and
Abdullah agreed to a third nominee, Masoom Stanekzai, who headed the government’s insurgent
fighter reintegration program (discussed below). However, he, too, is an ethnic Pashtun and non-
Pashtuns in the National Assembly led a successful effort to vote him down in June 2015. He is
serving in that post on an acting basis as of August 2015. Among other major cabinet posts that
have been settled:
 The Foreign Minister is Salahuddin Rabbani, a Tajik (Abdullah nominee). He
served most recently as the head of the High Peace Council that supervises
reconciliation talks with the Taliban. He succeeded his father—Burhanuddin
Rabbani, who was political head of the Northern Alliance and nominally
Abdullah’s superior—in that post. He has also assumed the post his father had as
titular head of the Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society) political organization.
 The Minister of Finance is Eklil Hakimi, who was previously serving as
Ambassador to the United States.
 The cabinet has four women—more than at any time since the Communist era.
Women head the ministries of Labor, Social Affairs, and Martyred and Disabled
Affairs; Counter-Narcotics; Higher Education; and Women’s Affairs. The
Minister of Counter-Narcotics, Salamat Azimi, is the first Afghan woman to head
an Afghan ministry directly associated with security issues.



13 Sources include various press reports and author conversations with Kabul and Europe-based Afghan observers.
January 2015.
14 Azam Ahmed and Mujib Mashal. “Nostalgia for Karzai Points to Trouble for His Successor.” New York Times, May
15, 2015.
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Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah
On September 29, 2014, Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmedzai was inaugurated as
President, and he appointed Dr. Abdullah Abdullah as CEO.

Ashraf Ghani, born in 1949, is from Lowgar Province. He is from a prominent tribe, belonging to the Ghilzai
Pashtun tribal confederation, that has supplied many past Afghan leaders, including the last Soviet-installed leader,
Dr. Najibul ah Ahmedzai. Ghani attended university at the American University of Beirut, and received a Ph.D.
degree in Cultural Anthropology from Columbia University. He joined the World Bank in 1991, where he helped
several various countries manage development and institutional transformation projects. During 2002-2004, he
served as Finance Minister in Karzai’s first cabinet and was credited with extensive reforms and institution of the
National Solidarity Program of locally driven economic development. He is married to Rula Ghani, and they have
two children.
During 2004-2005, he served as chancel or of Kabul University. He subsequently founded the Institute for State
Effectiveness, which helps countries undergoing transition build institutions. After 2009, he served as an advisor
to Karzai on various initiatives, including institutional reform and relations with the U.S.-led coalition helping
secure Afghanistan.

Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, born in 1960 in Kabul, is an eye doctor by training. His mother was an ethnic Tajik
and his father was a Pashtun from Qandahar. However, he is widely identified politically as a Tajik because he
was a top aide to legendary Tajik mujahedin commander and Northern Alliance military leader Ahmad Shah
Masoud, who was assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks on the United States.
During the Northern Alliance’s political struggle against the Taliban during 1996-2001, Abdul ah served as the
Northern Alliance’s foreign minister—Masoud’s international envoy. He served as Foreign Minister during 2001-
2006, a time when the Northern Alliance’s influence on Karzai was substantial. Karzai dismissed him in an early
2006 cabinet reshuffle.
As noted above, Abdul ah lost the 2009 presidential election to Karzai, despite widespread confirmed allegations
of fraud in that vote. He subsequently became chief opposition leader in Afghanistan.
Sources: Various press reporting, author conversations with Afghan figures in Afghanistan and Washington, DC, 2001-2014. Photographs from
http://www.facebook.com/ashrafghani and http://www.facebook.com/Dr.AbdullahAbdullah, respectively.

U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure
U.S. and international civilian officials and institutions have helped build the capacity of the
Afghan government. The U.S. embassy in Kabul, which had closed in 1989 when the Soviets
pulled out of Afghanistan and was guarded by Afghan caretakers, reopened after the Taliban was
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ousted in late 2001. The U.S. Ambassador and other high-ranking U.S. Embassy officials manage
not only diplomacy with the Afghan government but also U.S. economic assistance and Embassy
operations. Ambassador James Cunningham served during 2012-2014, and was succeeded by his
deputy Ambassador, Peter McKinley. Three other Ambassador-level officials serve at the embassy
in various capacities.
Regarding Afghanistan policymaking, in February 2009, the Administration set up the position of
appointed “Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan” (SRAP), occupied first by
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, reporting to Secretary of State Clinton. Holbrooke died on
December 13, 2010, and that office at the State Department was led during February 2011-
November 2012 by Ambassador Marc Grossman. In May 2013, he was replaced by Ambassador
James Dobbins, who retired in July 2014 and was replaced by deputy SRAP Dan Feldman.
In line with the U.S. military drawdown, the Administration has sought to “normalize” its
presence in Afghanistan. From 2009 to 2012, the U.S. civilian presence expanded dramatically to
mentor and advise the Afghan government, particularly at the local level. During 2011-2014,
there were about 1,300 U.S. civilian officials in Afghanistan—up from only about 400 in 2009—
of which about one-third serve outside Kabul helping build governance at the provincial and
district levels. That is up from only 67 outside Kabul in 2009. Staff levels dropped by about 20%
by the completion of the transition in December 2014, even though State Department assumed the
lead role in Afghanistan. All U.S. personnel, including military, are to be under Embassy
authority after 2016, as announced by President Obama on May 27, 2014.
On February 7, 2010, in an effort to improve civilian coordination between the United States, its
foreign partners, and the Afghan government, the powers of the NATO “Senior Civilian
Representative” in Afghanistan were enhanced as UK Ambassador Mark Sedwill took office. This
office works with U.S. military officials, officials of partner countries, and the special U.N.
Assistance Mission-Afghanistan (UNAMA, see Table 2).
Consulates. In June 2010, Deputy Secretary of State William Burns formally inaugurated a U.S.
consulate in Herat. The State Department spent about $80 million on a facility in Mazar-e-Sharif
that was slated to open as a U.S. consulate in April 2012, but the site was abandoned because of
concerns about the security of the facility. A U.S. consulate there is considered an important
signal of U.S. interest in engagement with the Tajik and Uzbek minorities of Afghanistan.
Alternative locations are being considered,15 and consulates are planned for the major cities of
Qandahar and Jalalabad.

15 Ernesto Londono. “U.S. Abandons Consulate Plan in Northern Afghanistan.” Washington Post, May 6, 2012.
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Table 2. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
The United Nations is extensively involved in Afghan governance and national building, primarily in factional conflict
resolution and coordination of development assistance. The coordinator of U.N. efforts is the U.N. Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Since October 2014, the head of UNAMA has been Nicholas Haysom, of South
Africa. UNAMA’s mandate is subject to Security Council renewal, in the form of a U.N. Security Council resolution,
at the end of March of each year.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1806 of March 20, 2008, expanded UNAMA’s authority to strengthen cooperation
between the international peacekeeping force (ISAF, see below) and the Afghan government. In concert with the
Obama Administration’s emphasis on Afghan policy, UNAMA opened offices in many of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.
Resolution 2096 of March 2013 reiterates the expanded UNAMA mandate, while noting that UNAMA and the
international community are moving to a supporting role rather than as direct deliverers of services in Afghanistan.
Resolution 2096 restated UNAMA’s coordinating role with other high-level representatives in Afghanistan and
election support role, as well as its role in reintegration of surrendering insurgent fighters through a “Salaam (Peace)
Support Group” that coordinates with Afghanistan’s High Peace Council (that is promoting reconciliation and
reintegration). UNAMA has always been involved in local dispute resolution and disarmament of local militias,
UNAMA is also playing a growing role in engaging regional actors in Afghan stability. It was a co-convener of the
January 28, 2010, and July 20, 2010, London and Kabul Conferences, respectively. Along with Turkey, UNAMA chairs
a “Regional Working Group” to enlist regional support for Afghan integration.
On development, UNAMA co-chairs the joint Afghan-international community coordination body called the Joint
Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), and is helping implement Afghanistan’s development strategy based on
Afghanistan’s “National Strategy for Development,” presented on June 12, 2008, in Paris. However, UNAMA’s donor
coordination role did not materialize because of the large numbers and size of donor-run projects in Afghanistan.
For more background on UNAMA, see CRS Report R40747, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan:
Background and Policy Issues
, by Rhoda Margesson.

General Human Rights Issues16
Since 2001, U.S. policy has been to build capacity in human rights institutions in Afghanistan and
to promote civil society and political participation. As do previous years’ State Department
human rights reports, the report on Afghanistan for 2013 analyzed numerous human rights
deficiencies, attributing most of them to overall lack of security, loose control over the actions of
Afghan security forces, corruption, and cultural attitudes including discrimination against women.
One of the institutional human rights developments since the fall of the Taliban has been the
establishment of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), headed by a
woman, Sima Simar, a Hazara Shiite from Ghazni Province. It is an oversight body on human
rights practices but its members are appointed by the government and some believe it is not
independent.
Since 2002, there has been a proliferation of Afghan organizations that demand transparency
about human rights deficiencies. Prominent examples of Afghan NGO’s that monitor and agitate
for improved human rights practices include the Afghanistan Human Rights and Democracy
Organization, and the Equality for Peace and Democracy organization. It is in part the work of
these groups that has produced responses by the government. Afghanistan’s National Directorate
of Security (NDS, intelligence directorate but with arrest powers), which has widely been accused
of detainee abuse and torture, established in late 2011 a “human rights unit” to investigate abuse
allegations and train NDS staff not to conduct such abuses.

16 Much of the information in this section is derived from the State Department report on human rights practices
worldwide for 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper
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Counterbalancing the influence of post-Taliban modern institutions such as the AIHRC are
traditional bodies such as the National Ulema Council. The Council consists of the 150 most
widely followed clerics throughout Afghanistan, who represent about 3,000 clerics nationwide. It
has taken conservative positions on free expression and social freedoms, such as the type of
television and other media programs available in Afghanistan. Clerics sometimes ban
performances by Afghan singers and other performers whose acts they consider inconsistent with
Islamic values. On the other hand, some rock bands have been allowed to perform high profile
shows since 2011. Because of the power of Islamist conservatives, alcohol is increasingly
difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores, although it is not banned for sale to non-Muslims.
Advancement of Women
Women and women’s groups are a large component of the burgeoning of civil society in post-
Taliban Afghanistan. Freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the Taliban
with their elections to the parliament and their service at many levels of government. The Afghan
government pursues a policy of promoting equality for women under its National Action Plan for
Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA). The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework requires
Afghanistan to implement the NAPWA and all of its past commitments and laws to strengthen the
rights of women and provide services to them.
The major institutional development since 2001 was the formation in 2002 of a Ministry of
Women’s Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights. Its primary function is to promote
public awareness of relevant laws and regulations concerning women’s rights. It plays a key role
in trying to protect women from domestic abuse by overseeing the running of as many as 29
women’s shelters across Afghanistan. Women’s rights groups in Afghanistan expressed outrage
over a June 2012 statement by Afghanistan’s justice minister that the shelters encourage
“immorality and prostitution.” The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-
327) authorized $15 million per year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs—
derived from Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts controlled by USAID. The United States
has continued to donate to the Ministry since AFSA expired.
One of the most prominent civil society groups operating in post-Taliban Afghanistan is the
Afghanistan Women’s Network. It has at least 3,000 members and its leaders say that 75
nongovernmental organizations work under its auspices. In addition, the AIHRC and outside
Afghan human rights groups focus extensively on rights for Afghan women.
Among the most notable accomplishments since 2001 is that women are performing jobs that
were rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996. The civil service is
19% female, although that is below the 30% target level set in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework. Women serve in the police force and military, and the first Afghan female pilots
arrived for training in the United States in July 2011. There are over 150 female judges, up from
50 in 2003, and several hundred 500 female journalists nationwide. Women constitute over one-
third of the seats of the nationwide Community Development Councils (CDCs, discussed above),
and each CDC is required to have two women in its executive bodies.
Women are legally permitted to drive, and press reports say an increasing number of Afghan
women, although mainly in Kabul and other main cities, are learning how to drive and exercising
that privilege. The wearing of the full body covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and
fewer women are wearing it than was the case a few years ago. In November 2010, the
government opened a USAID-funded women-only park in Kabul called “Women’s Garden”
where women can go without male escort and undertake fitness and job training activities.
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Some groups, such as Human Rights Watch, report backsliding on women’s rights over the past
seven years. 17Numerous abuses, such as denial of educational and employment opportunities,
continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. This is particularly prevalent
in rural areas, and less so in larger urban areas. Along with the assertion of authority of
conservative Islamic institutions, on March 2, 2012, the Ulema Council issued a pronouncement
saying women should be forced to wear the veil and be forbidden from traveling without a male
chaperone. The pronouncement did reiterate support for the rights of women to inherit and own
property, and to choose their marital partners. Karzai endorsed the Ulema Council statement.
Among the most widespread abuses reported:
 More than 70% of marriages in Afghanistan are forced, despite laws banning the
practice, and a majority of brides are younger than the legal marriage age of 16.
 The practice of baad, in which women are given away to marry someone from
another clan to settle a dispute, remains prevalent.
 There is no law specifically banning sexual harassment, and women are routinely
jailed for zina—a term meaning adultery, and a crime under the penal code, and
that includes running away from home, defying family choice of a spouse,
eloping, or fleeing domestic violence. These incarcerations are despite the fact
that running away from home is not a crime under the penal code. Under that
code, a male who is convicted of “honor killing” (killing a wife who commits
adultery) can be sentenced to no more than two years in prison. In December
2011, a woman was jailed for having a child outside wedlock—even though the
child was a product of rape.
 Women’s rights activists have been assassinated on several occasions. On
December 10, 2012, the head of the Women’s Affairs Ministry department in
Laghman Province was gunned down. Her predecessor in that post was killed by
a bomb planted in her car four months earlier. A prominent women’s rights
activist and author, Sushmita Banerjee, a citizen of India, was abducted by
Taliban militants from her home in Paktika province and found killed. Two
Taliban suspects were subsequently arrested.
In an effort to prevent these abuses, on August 6, 2009, then-President Karzai issued, as a decree,
the “Elimination of Violence Against Women” (EVAW) law that makes many of the practices
above unlawful. Partly as a result of the decree, prosecutions of abuses against women are
increasingly obtaining convictions. A “High Commission for the Elimination of Violence Against
Women” has been established to oversee implementation of the EVAW, and provincial offices of
the commission have been established in all but two provinces, according to the March 7, 2014,
U.N. report. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs is working with local authorities in 11 provinces to
improve implementation of the decree.
On the other hand, despite the EVAW decree, only a small percentage of reports of violence
against women are registered with the judicial system, and about one-third of those proceed to
trial.18 The number of women jailed for “moral crimes” has increased by 50% since 2011. Efforts
by the National Assembly to enact the EVAW in December 2010 and in May 2013 failed due to

17 “We Have the Promises of the World: Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, December 2009,
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/hrw_report_2009.pdf.
18 Alissa Rubin, “Slow Gains in Justice for Afghan Women,” New York Times, December 12, 2012,
http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Qy9mDiEa5Rw%3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US.
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opposition from Islamic conservatives who do not want to limit the ability of male elders to
decide family issues. On May 22, 2013, about 200 male Islamist students demonstrated in Kabul
demanding repeal of the EVAW decree outright.
Women’s Advancement During the Ghani/Abdullah Administration. President Ghani has signaled
his strong support for women’s rights by highlighting in his inaugural speech the support he has
received from his wife, Rula Ghani. Some in the audience reportedly opposed making that
reference, because Afghan culture considers it taboo to mention wives and female family
members in public. Some Afghan conservatives have criticized Ghani because Mrs. Ghani was a
Christian whom he met while studying at university in Beirut in the 1970s, and some Afghan
clerics allege that there is no public record of her converting to Islam.19 Ghani sought to
implement his commitment to the advancement of women by appointing a female as a member of
Afghanistan’s Supreme Court, but the National Assembly voted her nomination down in July
2015. He has also appointed two female governors – one more than was the case during Karzai’s
presidency – in Ghor and in Daykundi provinces. However, protests by male factionleaders
initially prevented Masooma Muradi, appointed governor of Daykundi, from taking office. There
are three female ministers in the Ghani/Abdullah cabinet.
Security Policy: Transition, and Beyond20
The stated U.S. policy goal is to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for
terrorist organizations. The Administration has defined that goal as enabling the Afghan
government and security forces to defend the country against the continuing Taliban-led
insurgency and to govern effectively and transparently. However, the insurgent challenge to
stability in Afghanistan has persisted because of a number of factors that include (1) public
resentment of corruption in the Afghan government; (2) the absence of governance or security
forces in many rural areas; (3) safe haven enjoyed by militants in Pakistan; (4) a popular backlash
against civilian casualties caused by military operations; and (5) unrealized expectations of
economic development.
The U.S. security mission changed from combat leadership to a “support” role on June 18, 2013,
but many of the long-standing pillars of U.S. and NATO security strategy remained intact until
the end of 2014. In August 2014, General John Campbell succeeded Marine General Joseph
Dunford as top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan.
Who Is “The Enemy”?
Security in Afghanistan is challenged by several armed groups, loosely allied with each other.
There is not agreement about the relative strength of insurgents in the areas where they operate.
The Taliban
The core insurgent faction in Afghanistan remains the Taliban movement. It was led by Mullah
Muhammad Umar, head of the Taliban regime during 1996-2001, until his death, apparently from

19 Declan Walsh and Rod Nordland. “Jolting Some, Afghan Leader Brings Wife into the Picture.” New York Times,
October 15, 2014.
20 Much of the information in this section is taken from U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) reports entitled, “Progress
Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” The latest one was issued in October 2014, covering April 1 to
September 30, 2014. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Oct2014_Report_Final.pdf.
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natural causes in 2013. After several years of concealing his death, top aides announced his
passing in late July 2015. He was succeeded, in a selection process still disputed by some high-
ranking Taliban figures, by Akhtar Mohammad Mansour and two deputies – Haqqani Network
operational commander Sirajuddin Haqqani, and cleric Haibatullah Akhunzadeh. A group of
hardline opponents of Mansour were centered around Umar’s son, Mullah Yaqub, who asserted
that Pakistan had engineered the “succession.” Yaqub was backed by hardline military
commander Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, who had been a U.S. detainee in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba until 2007, as well as Mansoor Dadullah. Other anti-compromise leaders in the top Taliban
ranks include Mullah Najibullah (a.k.a. Umar Khatab) and the top Taliban military commander
Ibrahim Sadar. Sadar assumed that role in 2014, replacing another hardliner At least one Taliban
figure in the Taliban office in Doha, Qatar, Tayeb Agha, resigned on the grounds that the
succession should have been determined in Afghanistan itself, not by figures in exile in Pakistan.
Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri declared his support for Mansour on August 13, potentially
helping rally the dissidents to acquiesce to Mansour’s accession. The admission of Umar’s death
came only days after a statement was issued by the Taliban, in Umar’s name, backing the concept
of negotiations to settle the Afghan conflict.
Other purported pragmatists who likely support Mansour include Noorudin Turabi, logistics
expert, and head of the Taliban’s senior shura council, Shahabuddin Delawar. The Taliban has
several official spokespersons, including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi and Zabiullah Mujahid. It operates a
radio station, “Voice of Shariat,” and publishes videos.
Non-Pashtun Taliban. Some press reports also note that there are non-Pashtun anti-government
groups operating in northern Afghanistan and other non-Pashtun areas that are affiliated with the
Taliban. These non-Pashtun Taliban factions are said to be less ideological than is the core of the
Taliban movement in implementing Islamic law and other restrictions in areas under their control.
Pakistani Taliban. A major Pakistani group, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,
TTP), primarily challenges the government of Pakistan but also supports the Afghan Taliban.
Some TTP fighters reportedly operate from safe havens in Taliban-controlled areas on the Afghan
side of the border. Based in part on a failed bombing in New York City in May 2010 allegedly by
the TTP, the State Department designated the TTP as an FTO on September 2, 2010. Its two prior
leaders, Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud, were killed by U.S. drone strikes in August
2009 and November 2013, respectively. The United States military repatriated to Pakistan in
December 2014 a member of the Mehsud clan, Latif Mehsud, and two other Pakistan Taliban
militants, who were captured in the course of alleged militant activity in Afghanistan.21
Al Qaeda and Associated Groups
U.S. officials have long considered Al Qaeda to have a minimal presence in Afghanistan itself,
operating there as a facilitator for insurgent groups rather than a fighting force. U.S. officials put
the number of Al Qaeda and affiliated fighters in Afghanistan at between 50-100,22 operating
mostly in provinces of north-eastern Afghanistan such as Kunar. Press reports say a key Al Qaeda
operative, Faruq a-Qahtani al-Qatari, is working with Afghan militants to train a new generation
of Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan.23

21 Associated Press, December 7, 2014.
22 Text of the Panetta interview with ABC News is at http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=11025299.
23 Kimberly Dozier. “Officials: Al-Qaida Plots Comeback in Afghanistan.” Associated Press, February 28, 2014.
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Until the death of Bin Laden at the hands of a U.S. Special Operations Force raid on May 1, 2011,
there had been frustration within the U.S. government with the search for Al Qaeda’s top leaders.
In December 2001, in the course of the post-September 11 major combat effort, U.S. Special
Operations Forces and CIA operatives reportedly narrowed Osama Bin Laden’s location to the
Tora Bora mountains in Nangarhar Province (30 miles west of the Khyber Pass), but Afghan
militia fighters failed to prevent his escape. Some U.S. officials later publicly questioned the U.S.
decision to rely mainly on Afghan forces in this engagement.
U.S. efforts to find remaining senior Al Qaeda leaders reportedly focus on his close ally and
successor as Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is presumed to be on the Pakistani side of
the border. A U.S. strike reportedly missed Zawahiri by a few hours in the village of Damadola,
Pakistan, in January 2006.24 Many observers say that Zawahiri is increasingly focused on
empowering Islamic movements to power in the region, particularly in his native Egypt. Some
senior Al Qaeda leaders are said to be in Iran, including Sayf al Adl. Sulayman Abu Ghaith, son-
in-law of bin Laden and Al Qaeda spokesperson, was expelled by Iran in March 2013 and taken
into custody by U.S. authorities as he tried to return to his native Kuwait.
U.S. efforts—primarily through armed unmanned aerial vehicles—have killed numerous other
senior Al Qaeda operatives in recent years. In August 2008, an airstrike was confirmed to have
killed Al Qaeda chemical weapons expert Abu Khabab al-Masri. Two senior operatives allegedly
involved in the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa reportedly were killed by an unmanned aerial
vehicle strike in January 2009. Two top leaders in Al Qaeda—Attiyah Abd al-Rahman and Abu
Yahya al-Libi—were killed in Pakistan by reported U.S. drone strikes during 2011 and 2012. U.S.
airstrikes in October 2014 killed Al Qaeda operative Abu Bara Al Kuwaiti in Nangarhar Province.
Al Qaeda Affiliated Groups
Some outside experts assert that Al Qaeda is far more active in Afghanistan than the DOD
assessments indicate, if the activities of Al Qaeda’s affiliates are considered.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). An Al Qaeda affiliate, the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), is a militant group active primarily against the authoritarian government in
Uzbekistan. The IMU might have as many as 300 fighters in Konduz Province alone and is active
in virtually all the northernmost provinces of Afghanistan. The IMU contingent in Afghanistan
reportedly is led by Qari Balal, who escaped from a Pakistani jail in 2010.25 A splinter IMU
group, the Jamaat Ansarullah, is active in Central Asia and northern Afghanistan.26
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. A Pakistani Islamist militant group said to be increasingly active inside
Afghanistan is Laskhar-e-Tayyiba (LET, or Army of the Righteous). LET was initially focused on
operations against Indian control of Kashmir, but reportedly is increasingly active elsewhere in
South Asia and elsewhere. The State Department has stated that the group was responsible for the
May 23, 2014, attack on India’s consulate in Herat.

24 Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. “U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours.” New York Times, November 10,
2006.
25 Bill Roggio. “U.S. Military Continues to Claim Al Qaeda is ‘Restricted’ to ‘Isolated Areas of Northeastern
Afghanistan.” Long War Journal, November 19, 2014.
26 U.N. report by the sanctions monitoring team established by U.N. resolutions sanctioning the Taliban. U.N. Security
Council Document S/2014/888. December 11, 2014.
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Lashkar-i-Janghvi. Another Pakistan-based group that is somewhat active in Afghanistan is
Lashkar-i-Janghvi. It has conducted some suicide attacks in Afghanistan and was accused of
several attacks on Afghanistan’s Hazara Shiite community during 2011-2012.
Islamic State Organization. Since mid-2014, several small Afghan Taliban and other militant
factions—such as Da Fidayano Mahaz and Tora Bora Mahaz—have announced affiliation with
the Islamic State organization, which is seeking to spread its influence throughout the Islamic
world. The Islamic State’s recruitment effort in Afghanistan might be building on its leader’s ties
to the Afghan conflict; Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi reportedly lived in Kabul
during the Taliban regime and cooperated with Al Qaeda there.27 Some reports indicated that an
Islamic State-linked Afghan faction might have been responsible for a bombing in Jalalabad in
April 2015 that killed more than 30 civilians—a bombing that the Taliban leadership condemned.
However, subsequent reports left the perpetrators of the attack unclear. U.S. unmanned aerial
vehicles reportedly killed a top Islamic State recruiter in Afghanistan on February 9, 2015. Some
reports indicate that HIG leader Hikmatyar is supporting the Islamic State as a counterweight to
the Taliban, with which he has long feuded despite their common opposition to the Afghan
government.
Harakat ul-Jihad Islami (Movement of Islamic Jihad) is a Pakistan-based militant group that
trained in Al Qaeda camps. Its former leader, Ilyas Kashmiri, was killed in U.S. drone strike in
June 2011. He had earlier been indicted in the United States for supporting LET operative David
Coleman Headley, who planned a terrorist attack on a Danish newspaper (Jyllands-Posten).
Hikmatyar Faction (HIG)
Another significant insurgent leader is former mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who
leads Hizb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG). The faction received extensive U.S. support against the
Soviet Union, but turned against its mujahedin colleagues after the Communist government fell in
1992. The Taliban displaced HIG as the main opposition to the 1992-1996 Rabbani government.
HIG currently is ideologically and politically allied with the Taliban insurgents, but HIG fighters
sometimes clash with the Taliban over control of territory in HIG’s main centers of activity in
provinces to the north and east of Kabul. HIG is not widely considered a major factor on the
Afghanistan battlefield and has focused primarily on high-profile attacks. A suicide bombing on
September 18, 2012, which killed 12 persons, including 8 South African nationals working for a
USAID-chartered air service, was allegedly carried out by a female HIG member. HIG claimed
responsibility for a suicide bombing in Kabul on May 16, 2013, that killed six Americans (two
soldiers and four contractors). On February 19, 2003, the U.S. government formally designated
Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” under Executive Order 13224, subjecting
it to a freeze of any U.S.-based assets. The group is not designated as a “Foreign Terrorist
Organization” (FTO).
HIG is nonetheless widely considered amenable to reconciliation with Kabul. In January 2010,
Hikmatyar set conditions for reconciliation, including elections under a neutral caretaker
government following a U.S. withdrawal. In March 2010, the Afghan government and HIG
representatives confirmed talks in Kabul, including with then President Karzai, who subsequently
acknowledged that and other meetings. Some close to Hikmatyar attended the government’s
consultative peace loya jirga on June 2-4, 2010, which discussed issue of reconciliation with the
insurgency. HIG figures met Afghan government representatives at a June 2012 academic
conference in Paris and a subsequent meeting in Chantilly, France, in December 2012. In January

27 Ibid. p. 12.
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2014, Hikmatyar reportedly told his partisans to vote in the April 5, 2014, Afghan elections—
guidance interpreted as an attempt to position HIG for a future political role.
Haqqani Network28
The “Haqqani Network,” founded by Jalaludin Haqqani, a mujahedin commander and U.S. ally
during the U.S.-backed war against the Soviet occupation, is often cited by U.S. officials as a
potent threat to Afghan security and to U.S. and allied forces and countries. Defense Department
reports on Afghan security have called the faction “the most virulent strain of the insurgency, the
greatest risk to coalition forces, and a critical enabler of Al Qaeda.”29 Jalaluddin Haqqani served
in the Taliban regime as Minister of Tribal Affairs, and his network has fought against the current
Afghan government. Over the past few years, Jalaludin’s son Siraj (or Sirajuddin) has largely
taken over the group’s operations. Two other sons, Badruddin and Nasruddin, were killed by U.S.
and Pakistani operations in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Press reports in August 2015 indicated
Jalaluddin Haqqani might also have died at some unknown time in the past – but the network has
not confirmed such reports. As noted above, Sirajuddin was named deputy leader of the Taliban
following the admission that Mullah Umar had died.
The deaths of several Haqqani sons and other relatives, combined with U.S.-led operations
against the group, have caused many experts to assess that the Haqqani Network’s influence in its
core base of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost provinces of Afghanistan is waning. Some prominent
Afghan clans in those areas are said to have drifted from the Haqqani orbit to focus on
participating in the Afghan political process. The Haqqani Network had about 3,000 fighters and
supporters at its zenith during 2004-2010, but it is believed to have far fewer than that currently.
However, the network is still capable of carrying out operations, including major bombings in
Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan. The network’s earns funds through licit and illicit businesses
in the areas of Afghanistan where it has a presence as well as in Pakistan and the Persian Gulf.
Suggesting it often acts as a tool of Pakistani interests, the Haqqani network has targeted several
Indian interests in Afghanistan, almost all of which have been located outside the Haqqani main
base of operations in eastern Afghanistan. The network claimed responsibility for two attacks on
India’s embassy in Kabul (July 2008 and October 2009), and is considered the likely perpetrator
of the August 4, 2013, attack on India’s consulate in Jalalabad. U.S. officials also attributed to the
group the June 28, 2011, attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul; a September 10, 2011,
truck bombing in Wardak Province (which injured 77 U.S. soldiers); and attacks on the U.S.
Embassy and ISAF headquarters in Kabul on September 13, 2011.
The attacks on Indian interests and the fact that it is at least tolerated in the North Waziristan area
of Pakistan supports those who allege that it has ties to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate (ISI), which might view the Haqqanis as a potential ally in Afghanistan. Then Joint
Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mullen, following September 2011 attacks on U.S. Embassy Kabul,
testified (Senate Armed Services Committee, September 22, 2011), that the Haqqani network acts
“as a veritable arm” of the ISI. Other U.S. officials issued more cautious versions of that
assertion.
Even as it continues to conduct attacks, top Haqqani commanders have reportedly told journalists
that the Haqqani Network would participate in political settlement talks with the United States if

28 A profile of the faction and its activities is provided in: Joshua Partlow. “In Afghan War, Haqqani Group Is
‘Resilient’ Foe.” Washington Post, May 30, 2011.
29 DOD report on Afghan stability, April 2014. p. 12.
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the Taliban decided to undertake such talks.30 Sirajuddin Haqqani’s selection as a deputy to
Mansour suggest that that assertion is likely valid. However, the faction’s participation in any
settlement could potentially be complicated by its designation as an FTO under the Immigration
and Naturalization Act. That designation was made on September 9, 2012, after the 112th
Congress enacted S. 1959 (Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act of 2012), on August 10,
2012 (P.L. 112-168). That law required, within 30 days of enactment, an Administration report on
whether the group meets the criteria for FTO designation and an explanation of a negative
decision.
Insurgent Tactics
U.S. commanders express substantial concern about insurgent use of improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), including roadside bombs. In January 2010, then President Karzai issued a decree
banning importation of fertilizer chemicals (ammonium nitrate) commonly used for the roadside
bombs, but there reportedly is informal circumvention of the ban for certain civilian uses, and the
material reportedly still comes into Afghanistan from production plants in Pakistan. U.S.
commanders have said they have verified some use of surface-to-air missiles,31 although missiles
apparently were not used in the Taliban’s downing of a U.S. Chinook helicopter that killed 30
U.S. soldiers on August 6, 2011.
Some insurgents have used bombs hidden in turbans, which generally are not searched out of
respect for Afghan religious traditions and out of respect for visitors and guests to Afghan
functions. Such a bomb killed former President Rabbani on September 20, 2011, and then-
President Karzai’s cousin Hashmat Karzai on July 29, 2014. A suicide bomber who wounded
then-intelligence chief Asadullah Khalid in December 2012 had explosives implanted in his body.
Another major concern has been “insider attacks” (attacks on ISAF forces by Afghan security
personnel, also known as “green on blue” attacks).32 These attacks, some of which apparently
were carried out by Taliban infiltrators into the Afghan forces, were particularly frequent in 2012.
On August 5, 2014, an apparent insider attack killed Major General Harold Greene during his
visit to Afghanistan’s most prestigious military academy outside Kabul.
Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods33
All of the insurgent groups in Afghanistan benefit, at least in part, from narcotics trafficking.
However, the adverse effects are not limited to funding insurgents; the trafficking also
undermines rule of law within government ranks. The trafficking generates an estimated $70
million-$100 million per year for insurgents—perhaps about 25% of the insurgents’ budgets that
is estimated by some U.N. officials at about $400 million. For a detailed analysis of narcotics
issue and U.S. and coalition counter-narcotics efforts, see CRS Report R43540, Afghanistan:
Drug Trafficking and the 2014 Transition
, by Liana W. Rosen and Kenneth Katzman.
The Obama Administration has also sought to reduce other sources of Taliban funding, including
continued donations from wealthy residents of the Persian Gulf. On June 29, 2012, the

30 Jibran Ahmad. “Afghan Haqqani Factions Would Consider Talks Under Taliban.” Reuters, November 13, 2012.
31 Major General John Campbell, commander of RC-E, July 28, 2010, press briefing.
32 For more information on the insider attack, see CRS General Distribution memorandum “Insider Attacks in
Afghanistan,” October 1, 2012, available on request.
33 For detail on the issue of Afghanistan counter-narcotics, see CRS Report R43540, Afghanistan: Drug Trafficking and
the 2014 Transition
, by Liana W. Rosen and Kenneth Katzman.
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Administration sanctioned (by designating them as terrorism supporting entities under Executive
Order 13224) two money exchange networks (hawalas) in Afghanistan and Pakistan allegedly
used by the Taliban to move its funds earned from narcotics and other sources. However, the
limited foreign cooperation against these funding channels has limited the effect of these
sanctions on insurgent operations.
The Anti-Taliban Military Effort: 2003-2009
During 2003 to mid-2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent
violence with focused combat operations mainly in the south and east where ethnic Pashtuns
predominate. These included “Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003); “Operation Avalanche”
(December 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July 2004); “Operation Lightning
Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil” (Elephant, October 2005). By
late 2005, U.S. and partner commanders considered the insurgency mostly defeated and
NATO/ISAF assumed lead responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan during 2005-2006. The
optimistic assessments proved misplaced when violence increased significantly in mid-2006.
NATO-led operations during 2006-2008 cleared key districts but did not prevent subsequent re-
infiltration. NATO/ISAF also tried preemptive combat and increased development work, without
durable success. As a result, growing U.S. concern took hold, reflected in such statements as one
in September 2008 by then-Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Mike Mullen that “I’m not
sure we’re winning” in Afghanistan.
Taking into account security deterioration, the United States and its partners decided to respond
primarily by increasing force levels. U.S. troop levels started 2006 at 30,000 and increased to
39,000 by April 2009. Partner forces also increased during that period to 39,000 at the end of
2009—rough parity with U.S. forces. In September 2008, the U.S. military and NATO each began
strategy reviews, which were briefed to the incoming Obama Administration.
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Table 3. Background on NATO/ISAF Formation and U.N. Mandate
Partner forces have always been key to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. During 2006-2014, most U.S. troops in
Afghanistan served in the NATO-led “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF), which consisted of all 28
NATO members states plus partner countries—a total of 50 countries including the United States. The International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which ended its mission at the end of 2014, was created by the Bonn Agreement
and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, a Chapter 7 resolution),34 initially limited to Kabul.
In October 2003, after Germany agreed to contribute 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz,
ISAF contributors endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, as authorized on October 14, 2003, by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510. In August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF—previously the ISAF
command rotated among donor forces including Turkey and Britain.
NATO/ISAF’s responsibilities broadened significantly in 2004 with NATO/ISAF’s assumption of security responsibility
for northern and western Afghanistan (Stage 1, Regional Command North, in 2004 and Stage 2, Regional Command
West, in 2005, respectively). The transition process continued on July 31, 2006, with the formal handover of the
security mission in southern Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF control. As part of this “Stage 3,” a British/Canadian/Dutch-
led “Regional Command South” (RC-S) was formed for Helmand, Qandahar, and Uruzgan. All three rotated the
command of RC-S. “Stage 4,” the assumption of NATO/ISAF command of peacekeeping in 14 provinces of eastern
Afghanistan (and thus all of Afghanistan), was completed on October 5, 2006.
The ISAF mission was renewed yearly by U.N. Security Council resolutions. Resolution 2069 of October 10, 2013
was the last renewal until the ISAF mission ended at the end of 2014. Resolution 2189 of December 12, 2014,
welcomed the establishment of the Resolute Support Mission as the fol ow-on to ISAF.

Obama Administration Policy: “Surge,” Transition, and Drawdown
The Obama Administration maintained that the Afghanistan mission merited a high priority, but
that the U.S. level of effort there be reduced over time. The Administration integrated the late
2008 policy reviews into a 60-day inter-agency “strategy review,” chaired by South Asia expert
Bruce Riedel and co-chaired by then-SRAP Holbrooke and then-Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy Michele Flournoy. President Obama announced a “comprehensive” strategy on March 27,
2009,35 that announced deployment of an additional 21,000 U.S. forces.
In June 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, who headed U.S. Special Operations forces from
2003 to 2008, replaced General McKiernan as top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan. In
August 2009, General McChrystal delivered a strategy assessment that recommended that the
goal of the U.S. military should be to protect the population rather than to focus on searching out
and combating Taliban concentrations and that there is potential for “mission failure” unless a
fully resourced, comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy is pursued to reverse Taliban
momentum within 12-18 months. His assessment stated that about 44,000 additional U.S. combat
troops would be needed to provide the greatest chance for success.36
The assessment set off debate within the Administration and another policy review. Some senior
U.S. officials, such as then-Secretary of Defense Gates, argued that adding many more U.S.

34 Its mandate was extended until October 13, 2006, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623 (September 13, 2005);
and until October 13, 2007, by Resolution 1707 (September 12, 2006).
35 “White Paper,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.
36 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
“Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?.
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forces could produce a potentially counterproductive sense of “U.S. occupation.” President
Obama announced the following at West Point academy on December 1, 2009:37
 That 30,000 additional U.S. forces (a “surge”) would be sent to “reverse the
Taliban’s momentum” and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security
forces and government. The addition brought U.S. force levels to 100,000, with a
significant portion of the extra forces deployed to the provinces of southern
Afghanistan. Germany remained in command of Regional Command-North,
headquartered in Konduz, and Italy led RC-West, based in Herat. Turkey
commanded ISAF forces in Kabul as of 2011.
 There would be a transition, beginning in July 2011, to Afghan leadership of the
stabilization effort and a corresponding drawdown of U.S. force levels. The
Obama Administration argued this transition would compel the Afghan
government to place greater effort on training its own forces, but Afghan and
regional officials asserted that the deadline signaled a rapid decrease in U.S.
involvement.38 To address the Afghan assertions, the November 2010 NATO
summit in Lisbon decided on a gradual transition to Afghan leadership that would
be completed by the end of 2014.
On June 23, 2010, President Obama accepted the resignation of General McChrystal after
comments by him and his staff to Rolling Stone magazine that disparaged several U.S. civilian
policymakers on Afghanistan. General Petraeus was named General McChrystal’s successor and
assumed command on July 4, 2010.
Transition and Drawdown: Afghans in the Lead
At the time the surge was announced, the Afghan Interior Ministry estimated that the government
controlled about 30% of the country, while insurgents controlled 4% (13 out of 364 districts) and
influenced or operated in another 30%, and tribes and local groups with varying degrees of
loyalty to the central government controlled the remainder. Some outside groups reported higher
percentages of insurgent control or influence.39 The Taliban had named “shadow governors” in 33
out of 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces, although many provinces in northern Afghanistan were
assessed as having minimal Taliban presence.
The surge was subsequently assessed as having reduced areas under Taliban control or influence
substantially and the transition to Afghan security leadership began on schedule in July 2011. The
transition was divided into five “tranches”—March 2011, November 2011, May 2012, December
2012, and June 2013. In each tranche, the process of completing the transition to Afghan
responsibility took 12-18 months. The announcement of the final tranche coincided with the
announcement by then-President Karzai and visiting NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen on June 18, 2013 that Afghan forces had formally assumed the lead role throughout
Afghanistan. In concert with the transition, and asserting that the killing of Osama Bin Laden

37 President Obama speech, op. cit. Testimony of Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and Admiral Mullen before the
Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. December 2, 2009.
38 Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan.
Commander’s Initial Assessment.” August 30, 2009, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. White House. Remarks by the President In Address to the Nation on the
Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. December 1, 2009.
39 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/asia/12afghan.html?_r=1.
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represented a key accomplishment of the core U.S. mission, on June 22, 2011, President Obama
announced that:
 10,000 U.S. forces would be withdrawn by the end of 2011. That drawdown
brought U.S. force levels down to 90,000.
 23,000 forces (the remainder of the surge forces) would be withdrawn by
September 2012. This brought down U.S. force levels to 68,000.
 In the February 12, 2013, State of the Union message, President Obama
announced that U.S. force level would drop to 34,000 by February 2014, which
occurred.
Some in Congress had expressed support for winding down the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan
more rapidly. In the 112th Congress, two amendments to a defense authorization bill (H.R. 1540)
requiring plans to accelerate the transition to Afghan-led security or requiring the withdrawal of
most U.S. forces were voted down. A provision enacted as part of a FY2013 defense authorization
bill (Section 1226 of P.L. 112-239) expressed the Sense of Congress that the United States draw
down troops at a steady pace through the end of 2014.
As the U.S. force in Afghanistan shrank, U.S. officials largely succeeded in preventing a “rush to
the exits” by partner forces—partner drawdowns occurred at roughly the same rate and
proportion as the U.S. drawdown, despite public pressure in the European countries to end or
reduce military involvement in Afghanistan. Still, during 2010-2012, the Netherlands, Canada,
and France, respectively, ended their combat missions, although they continued to furnish trainers
for the ANSF until the end of 2014. South Korea ended its security mission in Parwan Province,
near Bagram Airfield, in June 2014. Its hospital and development experts will remain until 2016.
Partner forces that continued to conduct combat until the end of 2014 included Britain, Canada,
Poland, Denmark, Romania, and Australia. As noted below, several countries are contributing
trainers and advisers to the Resolute Support Mission. Partner force contributions as of late 2014,
just before ISAF closed and RSM began, are listed in Table 13.
Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and 2017 Planned Exit
As international forces were drawn down in 2014, Afghan officials expressed increasing concerns
about U.S. and partner plans for the post-2014 period. On May 27, 2014, President Obama
announced the size of the post-2014 U.S. force and plan for an eventual U.S. military exit from
Afghanistan after 2016. He asserted that a full military departure from Afghanistan would free up
U.S. resources for anti-terrorism missions elsewhere and focus the Afghans on improving their
training and organization that they require to operate on their own after 2016. According to the
President’s announcement:40
 The U.S. military contingent in Afghanistan would be 9,800 in 2015, deployed in
various parts of Afghanistan, consisting mostly of trainers as part of the
“Resolute Support Mission” (RSM). The commander of U.S. Special Operations
Forces, Lieutenant General Joseph Votel, testified at his confirmation hearings on
July 10, 2014, that about 2,000 of the post-2014 U.S. force would be Special
Operations Forces, of which about 980 would directly support a counterterrorism
mission.41 The U.S. military has renamed the Afghanistan and related operations

40 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/27/statement-president-afghanistan.
41 Votel Pledges Support for Special Operations Forces. DOD News, July 10, 2014.
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“Operation Freedom’s Sentinel”—replacing the post-September 11 mission name
Operation Enduring Freedom. As of January 1, 2016, the U.S. force would
decline to about 5,000, consolidated in Kabul and at Bagram Airfield. The
planned number of partner forces in RSM for 2016 was not specified. The level
of U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan, as of August 2015, is 9,800.
 The NATO summit in Wales September 4-5, 2014, announced that the total RSM
force for RSM in 2015 would be about 13,000. Of the 6,000+ non-U.S. forces in
RSM, Turkey leads RSM in the Kabul area; Germany leads in the north; and Italy
leads in the west. General Campbell stated on February 12, 2015, that 40 nations
are contributing forces to RSM, implying that there are nearly as many countries
contributing to RSM as there were to ISAF. In concert with this transition, the
“regional commands” discussed above have been renamed “Train, Advise, and
Assist Commands” (TAACs).
 After 2016, the U.S. military presence is to decline to one consistent with normal
security relations with Afghanistan—a figure assessed at about 1,000 by experts.
The forces are to be under U.S. Chief-of-Mission authority, without separate U.S.
or NATO military chain of command in country. The U.S. forces will primarily
protect U.S. installations and help process Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of
weaponry to Afghanistan, including training the Afghans on their use.
During 2014, the United States and its partners prepared for the end of the ISAF mission. U.S.
airpower in country was reduced, although hundreds of U.S. combat aircraft in the Persian Gulf
region remain involved in the Afghanistan mission.42 Since 2010, ISAF has turned over the vast
majority of the about 800 bases to the ANSF; the large Camp Leatherneck and Camp Bastion
bases in Helmand Province were turned over to Afghan control in October 2014. The provincial
reconstruction teams (PRTs), discussed below, were turned over to Afghan institutions. In the
process of transitioning its mission, DOD disposed of about $36 billion worth of U.S. military
equipment, including 28,000 vehicles and trailers. Some equipment was resold to other buyers,
including Afghan businesses, and some was returned to the United States.43
Adjustments to the 2015 and 2016 Force Levels and Missions
U.S. and other expert concerns about the post-2014 drawdown plan intensified after the June
2014 collapse of a large portion of the Iraqi Security Forces in the face of an offensive by Islamic
State fighters. Critics of Administration plans for Afghanistan force levels asserted that the
decision to leave no significant residual troop force in Iraq after 2011 contributed to the growth of
the Islamic State’s strength there, and that such events could be repeated in Afghanistan if
substantial numbers of troops are not left there. A reported National Intelligence Estimate of late
2013 assessed that, even with continued international force support, Afghan security is likely to
erode significantly by 2017 as both insurgents and pro-government faction leaders increase their
geographic and political influence.44 A report by the Center for Naval Analyses, mandated by the
FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, entitled Independent Assessment of the Afghan
National Security Forces
, released February 2014, said that “...the Taliban insurgency will
become a greater threat to Afghanistan’s stability in the 2015-2018 timeframe than it is now.”45

42 C.J. Chivers. “Afghan Conflict Losing Air Power as U.S. Pulls Out.” New York Times, July 7, 2012.
43 Ernesto Londono. “U.S. Selling and Scrapping Equipment in Afghanistan.” Washington Post, August 5, 2014.
44 Ernesto Londono et al. “Grim Future Seen for Afghanistan.” Washington Post, December 29, 2013.
45 http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/CNA%20Independent%20Assessment%20of%20the%20ANSF.pdf.
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Some concerns of U.S. commanders and outside studies have been realized. uring 2014, the
Taliban made some gains in several districts of northern Helmand Province, including Sangin and
Musa Qala districts. In July 2014, Taliban fighters attempted to storm provincial governance and
security offices in the key city of Qandahar, and overran a center of one of the province’s districts
near the border with Pakistan. In September 2014, an offensive in Ghazni province enabled the
militants to gain control of the Arjestan district of the province. In 2015, Taliban insurgents have
made some significant gains in northern Afghanistan, particularly around Konduz and in
Badakhshan Province. Compounding the concerns of U.S. and NATO commanders has been
heavy ANSF losses of about 4,000 combat deaths for each of 2013 and 2014, which some of
these commanders called “unsustainable.” In 2015, Taliban forces have continued to make some
gains in southern Afghanistan, pose an increasing threat to security in the northern city of
Konduz, and have demonstrated continued ability to conduct major bombings and other
operations in Kabul.
In order to try to cope with insurgent challenges, the government reportedly has encouraged the
reorganizing of local factional militias in areas where government control is being challenged.46
Among the faction leaders said to be reconstituting militia forces are Balkh Province governor
Atta Mohammad Noor, Herat leader Ismail Khan, and first Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostam.
These militias could spark ethnic and communal conflict and both reflect and accelerate a
diminishment of authority on the part of elected leaders.
Still, some experts and officials express optimism about the ANSF’s ability to handle the security
situation. Recent DOD reports on security and stability in Afghanistan, which assess that the
ANSF has been able to “demonstrate resiliency in the face of heavy fighting and have generally
performed well, but have suffered high attrition and casualties.”47 U.S. commanders have
described the Taliban as likely to be a persistent, though not an “existential” threat, over the
longer term. U.S. officials assert that the overwhelming majority of violence occurs in areas with
only 25% of the Afghan population.
Alteration to the 2015 Drawdown Schedule and Rules of Engagement
Apparently based in part on a review by General Campbell after he assumed command, the
Administration has made some adjustments to the U.S. mission to try to reassure Afghanistan’s
leaders and population. In November 2014, President Obama reportedly authorized all U.S. forces
in Afghanistan (not just counter-terrorism units) to carry out combat missions (if and when they
or the Afghan government are presented with a direct threat) and are not strictly limited to their
training and advisory missions. The President also reportedly authorized ongoing support from
U.S. combat aircraft (and drones)—soothing Afghan concerns that a removal of U.S. airpower
from Afghanistan would place the ANSF at risk.48
Apparently reflecting continued concerns within the Administration, in concert with the March
23-27 visit to Washington, DC, of Ghani and Abdullah, the President announced on March 24,
2015:49

46 “Afghans Forming Militias to Fight Against Taliban.” New York Times, May 25, 2015.
47 DoD report on “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” June 2015, p. 5.
48 Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt. “In Secret, Obama Extends U.S. Role in Afghan Combat.” New York Times,
November 22, 2014.
49 White House. “Remarks by President Obama and President Ghani of Afghanistan in Joint Press Conference.” March
24, 2015.
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 That U.S. forces would remain at a level of about 9,800 for all of 2015 (the
current level), rather than draw down to 5,000 by the end of the year, as
originally announced. The force would remain deployed in major areas of
Afghanistan throughout 2015 rather than consolidate to Kabul and Bagram by the
end of 2015. According to President Obama, the “specific trajectory of the 2016
drawdown will be established later [in 2015] to enable our final consolidation to
a Kabul-based embassy presence by the end of 2016.”
 In concert with a security meeting with Ghani and Abdullah at Camp David
during their visit, Secretary of Defense Carter would resume the Security
Consultative Forum, a strategic U.S.-Afghanistan defense dialogue begun in May
2010, with Afghanistan’s Defense and Interior Ministries.
Possible Alteration to the Post-2016 Exit Plan
The President’s March 24, 2015, announcement did not announce an alteration to the decision to
reduce U.S. force levels to a relatively small Embassy-led presence by the end of 2016. During
his late February 2015 visit to Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter confirmed that
that decision is being revisited and most experts assert that the post-2016 force will ultimately be
larger than what was announced in May 2014. However, there are no published indications of
how large a post-2016 force is under consideration, or when an alteration of the current plans for
the post-2016 U.S. force might be announced.
Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA)
The post-2014 U.S. military presence is based on a Bilateral Security Accord (BSA). Ex-
President Karzai refused to sign the document even though Afghanistan and the United States had
agreed in November 2013 on issues such as U.S. operational authority and legal immunities for
U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The immunity issue was a non-negotiable U.S. requirement that was
authorized by a special loya jirga in November 2013.50 After the resolution of the 2014 election
dispute, the document—as well as a similar document providing for the presence of NATO
forces—was signed on September 30, 2014, between U.S. Ambassador Cunningham and Ghani’s
National Security Advisor Mohammad Hanif Atmar. Afghanistan’s parliament ratified the BSA in
late November 2014. During the Washington, DC, visit of Ghani and Abdullah, the
Administration announced that the U.S and Afghan governments agreed to form the bilateral Joint
Commission stipulated by the BSA to oversee the implementation of that agreement.
Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA)
The BSA followed a broader “Strategic Partnership Agreement” (SPA) signed by President
Obama and President Karzai in Afghanistan on May 1, 2012. The broad agreement signaled that
the United States is committed to Afghan stability and development for many years after the
transition is complete. The SPA was completed after more than one year of negotiations that
focused on resolution of two disagreements in particular—Afghan insistence on control over
detention centers and a halt to or control over nighttime raids on insurgents by U.S. forces. The
SPA agreement also demonstrated U.S.-Afghan ability to overcome public Afghan discomfort
over such issues as the March 2011 burning of a Quran by a Florida pastor; the mistaken burning

50 Anne Gearan. “U.S., Afghanistan Reach Post-2014 Security Accord.” Washington Post, October 13, 2013.
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by U.S. soldiers of several Qurans on February 20, 2012; and the March 11, 2012, killing of 16
Afghans by U.S. officer Sergeant Robert Bales, who was arrested and tried in the United States.
The strategic partnership agreement represents a broad outline of the post-2014 relationship, with
details to be filled in subsequently. It has a duration of 10 years. The major provisions include:51
 A commitment to continue to foster U.S.-Afghan “close cooperation” to secure
Afghanistan. This strongly implies, but does not state outright, that U.S. troops
will remain in Afghanistan after 2014, and no troop numbers were mentioned in
the document. The document provided for negotiations on the BSA.
 A U.S. commitment to request appropriations to provide training and arms to the
Afghan security forces. The agreement did not stipulate dollar amounts or which
systems are to be provided.
 U.S. designation of Afghanistan as a “Major Non-NATO Ally,” a designation
reserved for close U.S. allies. In keeping with that pledge, on July 7, 2012, then-
Secretary Clinton announced that designation, opening Afghanistan to receive
(sale, donation) U.S. weaponry of the same level of sophistication as that sold to
U.S. NATO allies, and facilitating U.S. training and leasing of defense articles.
 A U.S. pledge not to establish “permanent” U.S. bases or use Afghan facilities
against neighboring countries. The agreement allows long-term U.S. use of
Afghan facilities. Over the past several years, successive National Defense
Authorization Acts have contained provisions explicitly prohibiting the U.S.
establishment of permanent bases in Afghanistan.
 An Administration commitment to request economic aid for Afghanistan for the
duration of the agreement (2014-2024). No amounts were specified in the
document. The Afghan government reportedly unsuccessfully sought a specific
$2 billion per year commitment be written into the agreement.
 A commitment by the two countries to form a U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral
Commission to monitor implementation of the SPA. During the Ghani and
Abdullah visit to the United States in March 2015, the Administration announced
that Secretary of State John Kerry will visit Kabul later in 2015 to co-chair
another meeting of the Commission, which last met in May 2013.
In October 2011, Karzai called a loya jirga to endorse the concept of the SPA as well as his
insistence on Afghan control over detentions and approval authority for U.S.-led night raids. A
November 16-19, 2011, traditional loya jirga (the jirga was conducted not in accordance with the
constitution and its views are therefore non-binding), consisting of about 2,030 delegates, gave
Karzai the approvals he sought, both for the pact itself and his suggested conditions. The final
SPA was ratified by the Afghanistan National Assembly on May 26, 2012, by a vote of 180-4.
The SPA replaced an earlier, more limited strategic partnership agreement established on May 23,
2005, when Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint declaration.”52 The declaration provided for
U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against
international terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” Karzai’s signing of the
declaration was supported by the 1,000 Afghan representatives on May 8, 2005, at a consultative

51 The text is at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf.
52 See http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/WH/20050523-2.pdf.
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jirga in Kabul. The jirga supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain
security but urged Karzai to delay a firm decision to request such a presence.

Table 4. Summary of U.S. Strategy and Implementation
Goals: To prevent the Taliban insurgency from destabilizing the Afghan government and Al Qaeda or other
international terrorist organizations from again taking root in Afghanistan.
U.S. Strategy Implementation: Ful security responsibility was transferred to Afghan security forces at the end of 2014.
the United States and its partners are performing a Train, Advise, and Assist mission. Some Special Operations forces
are conducting combat until at least the end of 2016.
Drawdown and Provision of U.S. Enablers: Fol owing the 2009 “surge,” U.S. force levels reached a high of 100,000 in mid-
2011, then fell to 68,000 (“surge recovery) by September 20, 2012, and to 34,000 by February 2014. Current U.S.
force level is about 9,800 plus about 6,000 forces from NATO partners in the “Resolute Support Mission” that trains
and enables the ANSF. The U.S. force wil remain at about 9,800 during 2015, and no drawdown schedule has been
announced for 2016. Beginning in 2017, the U.S. force is to consist of several hundred military personnel who
primarily wil administer arms sales and assist Afghan security ministries (with no separate U.S. or NATO military
chain of command in country).
Long-Term Broad Engagement: A strategic partnership agreement (SPA), signed in Kabul on May 1, 2012, pledges U.S.
security and economic assistance to Afghanistan until 2024. U.S. economic and Afghan force train and equip funding
pledged by U.S. to remain roughly at current levels (about $6 bil ion total) through FY2017.
Political Settlement/Pakistan Cooperation: U.S. policy is to support a political settlement between the Afghan government
and the Taliban. As part of that effort, U.S. officials attempt to enlist Pakistan’s commitment to deny safe haven in
Pakistan to Afghan militants and to promote talks between the Afghan government and Taliban representatives.
Economic Development: U.S. policy supports Afghan efforts to build an economy that can be self-sufficient by 2024 by
further developing agriculture, col ecting corporate taxes and customs duties, exploiting vast mineral deposits,
expanding small industries, and integrating Afghanistan into regional diplomatic and trading and investment structures.

Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law
Key to the post-2014 security of Afghanistan is the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF), consisting primarily of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National
Police (ANP). Among the major concerns raised in DOD and other reports on the ANSF is that
about 35% of the force does not reenlist each year, meaning that about one-third of the force must
be recruited to replenish its ranks. Many believe that the force was expanded too quickly to allow
for thorough vetting or for recruitment of the most qualified personnel. Some of the deficiency
throughout the ANSF is due to illiteracy, which prompted an increasing focus on (and about $200
million in funding for) providing literacy training after 2010. The goal was to have all ANSF have
at least first-grade literacy, and half to have third-grade literacy, by the end of 2014. That goal
was not met, but literacy in the ANSF has been improved by the program, by all accounts.
U.S. commanders frequently note concerns about the ANSF’s deficiency of logistical capabilities,
such as airlift, medical evacuation, resupply, and other associated functions. Many units also
suffer from a deficiency of weaponry, spare parts, and fuel, although those shortfalls are ebbing,
according to DOD. According to the SIGAR, DOD gave the ANSF $600 million of weapons from
2002 until the end of 2013.53
The training component of the Resolute Support Mission supersedes the prior training institutions
such as the “Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan” (CSTC-A) and the NATO

53 http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/sigar-14-84-ar.pdf.
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Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A). In 2012, CSTC-A’s mission was reoriented to building
the capacity of the Afghan Defense and Interior Ministries, and to provide resources to the ANSF.
Size of the ANSF
On January 21, 2010, the joint U.N.-Afghan “Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board” (JCMB)
agreed that, by October 2011, the ANA would expand to 171,600 and the ANP to about 134,000,
(total ANSF of 305,600). Both forces reached that level by September 2011. In August 2011, a
larger target size of 352,000 (195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP) was set, to be reached by
November 2012. The size of the forces reached approximately that level by September 2012 and
is currently at or close to these target levels. These figures do not include the approximately
30,000 local security forces discussed below. A higher ANSF target level of 378,000 was not
adopted because of the concerns about the Afghan ability to sustain so large a force. In the run-up
to the May 20-21, 2012, NATO summit in Chicago, which focused on long-term financial and
military sustainment of the ANSF, there was initial agreement to reduce the total ANSF to
228,500 by 2017. However, based on assessments of the difficulty of securing Afghanistan, the
February 21, 2013, NATO meeting reversed that decision. About 1,700 women serve in the
ANSF, of which about 1,370 are police.
ANSF Top Leadership and Ethnic Issues
In the immediate aftermath of the 2001 ousting of the Taliban regime, Northern Alliance figures
took key security positions and weighted recruitment for the new ANSF toward ethnic Tajiks.
Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment, but the naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim
Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004, mitigated that difficulty. The problem was
further alleviated with better pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and the force is
ethnically integrated in each unit. According to recent DOD reports, the overall ANSF force is
now roughly in line with the ethnic composition of Afghanistan, although Tajiks are slightly
overrepresented in the command ranks. Some of the difficulties in forming a new cabinet after the
national unity government was formed in September 2014 have concerned maintaining ethnic
balance in the leadership of the security services, as discussed above.
ANSF Funding
The FY2015 costs of the ANSF are about $5.4 billion, which is expected to fall to about $5.0
billion in FY2016. The Administration is contributing $4.1 billion for the ANSF for FY2015 and
has requested a slightly lower amount ($3.8 billion) for FY2016. U.S. partners have pledged
$1.25 billion annually for the ANSF during 2015-2017,54 and Afghanistan has reaffirmed it will
contribute $500 million for 2015, despite budgetary difficulties. During the Ghani and Abdullah
visit to the United States in March 2015, the Administration reaffirmed that it would seek
continued funding for a 352,000 person ANSF at least through 2017, according to an
Administration fact sheet.
According to DOD, as of FY2014, all U.S. funding for the ANSF is subject to the “Leahy Law”
that requires withholding of U.S. funding for any unit of a foreign force that, according to
credible information, has committed a gross violation of human rights. As of FY2005, the

54 White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Fact Sheet: Wales Summit—NATO’s Changing Role in Afghanistan.”
September 4, 2014.
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security forces funding has been DOD funds, not State Department-controlled funds (Foreign
Military Financing, FMF).
Other Contributions: NATO Trust Fund for the ANA and Law and Order Trust
Fund for the ANP

In 2007 ISAF set up a trust fund for donor contributions to fund the transportation of equipment
donated to and the training of the ANA; the mandate was expanded in 2009 to include
sustainment costs and in 2010 to support literacy training for the ANA. As of May 2015, 26 donor
nations have given the ANA Trust Fund about $1 billion, according to the DOD report on
Afghanistan issued in June 2015. For calendar year 2015, 25 nations have pledged $440 million.
There is also a separate “Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan” (LOTFA), run by the U.N.
Development Program (UNDP). It pays salaries of the ANP. The United States donates to that
fund, for the purpose of paying ANP salaries and food costs. From 2002 to 2012, donors
contributed $2.75 billion to the Fund, of which the United States contributed about $1 billion.
Japan’s 2009 pledge to pay the expenses of the Afghan police for at least six months (about $125
million for each six month period) is implemented through the LOTFA. The EU pledged $175
million for the fund from January 2011 to March 2013. South Korea contributes about $100
million per year to the fund. The fund is in the process of transition from management by UNDP
to the Afghan government.
Other Bilateral Donations. Other bilateral donations to the ANSF, both in funds and in arms and
equipment donations, include the “NATO Equipment Donation Program” through which donor
countries supply the ANSF with equipment. Since 2002, about $2.9 billion in assistance to the
ANSF has come from these sources. There is also a NATO-Russia Council Helicopter
Maintenance Trust Fund. Launched in March 2011, this fund provides maintenance and repair
capacity to the Afghan Air Force helicopter fleet, much of which is Russian-made.
The Afghan National Army (ANA)
The Afghan National Army has been built “from scratch” since 2002—it is not a direct
continuation of the national army that existed from the 1880s until the Taliban era. That army
disintegrated entirely during the 1992-1996 mujahedin civil war and the 1996-2001 Taliban
period. Some officers who served prior to the Taliban have joined the ANA.
The ANA is reportedly highly regarded by Afghans as a symbol of nationhood and factional non-
alignment. As noted above, U.S. commanders say the ANA is performing well against Taliban
and other insurgents, despite taking heavy casualties. The commando forces of the ANA, trained
by U.S. Special Operations Forces, and numbering about 5,300, are considered well-trained.
There is a problem of absenteeism within the ANA in large part because soldiers do not serve in
their provinces of residence. Many in the ANA take long trips to their home towns to remit funds
to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. However, that problem
has eased somewhat in recent years because almost all of the ANA is now paid electronically. The
FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) required that ANA recruits be vetted for
terrorism, human rights violations, and drug trafficking.
The United States and other donors have given the ANA primarily light weapons rather than
heavy arms such as new tanks. The ANA operates perhaps a few hundred Russian-built T-55 and
T-62 tanks left over from the Soviet occupation. The United States is also helping the ANSF build
up an indigenous weapons production capability. However, in line with U.S. efforts to cut costs
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for the ANSF, the Defense Department reportedly plans shifted in 2013 from providing new
equipment to maintaining existing equipment.
The United States has built five ANA bases: Herat (Corps 207), Gardez (Corps 203), Qandahar
(Corps 205), Mazar-e-Sharif (Corps 209), and Kabul (Division HQ, Corps 201, Air Corps).
Coalition officers conduct heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul
Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul. U.S. funds are being used to construct a new
Defense Ministry headquarters in Kabul at a cost of about $92 million.
Afghan Air Force
Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the Afghan Air Force, and
it remains mostly a support force for ground operations rather than a combat-oriented force.
However, the Afghan Air Force has been able to make ANA units nearly self-sufficient in airlift.
The force is a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the Soviet invasion, and
is expanding gradually after its equipment was virtually eliminated in the 2001-2002 U.S. combat
against the Taliban regime. It has about 6,300 personnel of a target size of about 8,000 by 2016.
There are five female Afghan Air Force personnel.
The Afghan Air Force has about 100 aircraft including gunship, attack, and transport
helicopters—of a planned fleet of 140 aircraft. Because the Afghan Air Force has familiarity with
Russian helicopters and other equipment, the post-2014 Afghan Air Force is focused primarily on
adding to its inventory of about 60 Mi-17 helicopters. Defense Department officials planned to
buy the force another 45 Mi-17 helicopters, via the Russian state-owned Rosoboronexport arms
sales agency at a cost of about $572 million and delivery by the end of 2014. However, separate
House and Senate letters to the Administration, with a total of nearly 100 Member signers, called
on the Defense Department to cancel the purchase because of U.S.-Russia differences over Syria.
DOD announced in November 2013 that it would not buy the 15 Mi-17s slated to be bought in
FY2014, but would go ahead with the buy of 30 Mi-17s that used FY2013 funds.55 To provide
tactical air support, the Afghan Air Force is buying 20 A-29 aircraft, but they will not be fully
operational until 2017, according to DOD. The relative lack of ability by the Afghan Air Force to
provide tactical support might have contributed to the U.S. decision, discussed above, to continue
to provide air support beyond 2014.
Among other U.S.-funded purchases, the Brazilian firm Embraer has been contracted by DOD to
provide 20 Super Tucano turboprop aircraft to the force. U.S. plans do not include supply of
fixed-wing combat aircraft such as F-16s, which Afghanistan wants as part of a broader request
for the United States to augment Afghan air capabilities, according to U.S. military officials.
There is a concern that Afghanistan will not soon have the capability to sustain operations of an
aircraft as sophisticated as the F-16.
Afghanistan also is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to
safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan. In 2010, Russia and
Germany supplied MI-8 helicopters to the Afghan Air Force.
Afghan National Police (ANP)
U.S. and Afghan officials believe that a credible and capable national police force is at least as
important to combating the insurgency as the ANA. The DOD reports on Afghanistan contain
substantial detail on U.S.-led efforts to continue what it says are “significant strides [that] have

55 Politico. November 18, 2013.
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been made in professionalizing the ANP.” However, many outside assessments of the ANP are
negative, asserting that there is rampant corruption to the point where citizens mistrust and fear
the ANP. Among other criticisms are a desertion rate far higher than that of the ANA; substantial
illiteracy; involvement in local factional or ethnic disputes because the ANP works in the
communities its personnel come from; and widespread use of drugs. It is this view that has led to
consideration of stepped up efforts to promote local security solutions such as those discussed
above. About 2,000 ANP are women, and on January 16, 2014—for the first time—a woman was
appointed as a district police commander.
The United States and Afghanistan have worked to correct long-standing deficiencies. Some U.S.
commanders credit a November 2009 doubling of police salaries (to $240 per month for service
in high combat areas), and the streamlining and improvement of the payments system for the
ANP, with reducing the solicitation of bribes by the ANP. The raise also stimulated an eightfold
increase in recruitment. Others note the success, thus far, of efforts to pay police directly (and
avoid skimming by commanders) through cell phone-based banking relationships (E-Paisa, run
by Roshan cell network).
The ANP is increasingly being provided with heavy weapons and now have about 5,000 armored
vehicles countrywide. Still, most police units lack adequate ammunition and vehicles. In some
cases, equipment requisitioned by their commanders is being sold and the funds pocketed by the
police officers.
A component of the ANP is the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). The force, which
numbers over 14,000, has been used to clear areas during counterinsurgency operations. The
ANCOP force is considered effective because it deploys nationally and is less susceptible to local
power brokers than are other ANP units.
The U.S. police training effort was first led by State Department/Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), but DOD took over the lead role in April 2005. A number
of early support programs, such as the auxiliary police program attempted during 2005, were
discarded as ineffective. It was replaced during 2007-2011 with the “focused district
development
” program in which a district police force was taken out and retrained, its duties
temporarily performed by more highly trained ANCOP. Police training includes instruction in
human rights principles and democratic policing concepts, and the State Department human rights
report on Afghanistan, referenced above, says the government and observers are increasingly
monitoring the police force to prevent abuses.
Supplements to the National Police: Afghan Local Police (ALP) and
Other Local Forces

In 2008, the failure of several police training efforts led to a decision to develop local forces to
protect their communities. Until then, U.S. military commanders opposed assisting local militias
anywhere in Afghanistan for fear of re-creating militias that commit abuses and administer
arbitrary justice. However, the urgent security needs in Afghanistan caused then-top U.S. and
NATO commander in Afghanistan General David Petraeus and his successors to expand local
security experiments, based on successful experiences in Iraq and after designing mechanisms to
place them firmly under Afghan government (mainly Ministry of Interior) control. Among these
initiatives are the following:
Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (ALP). The Village Stability
Operations (VSO) concept began in February 2010 in Arghandab district of
Qandahar Province when U.S. Special Operations Forces organized about 25
villagers into an armed neighborhood watch group. The pilot program was
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expanded into a joint Afghan-U.S. Special Operations effort in which 12-person
teams from these forces lived in communities to help improve governance,
security, and development. An outgrowth of the VSO was the Afghan Local
Police (ALP) program in which the U.S. Special Operations Forces set up and
trained local security organs of about 300 members each. These local units are
under the control of district police chiefs and each fighter is vetted by a local
shura as well as Afghan intelligence. The latest DOD report (June 2015) says
there are about 28,300 ALP now operating nationwide—the target size for the
program. However, the ALP program has been cited by Human Rights Watch and
other human rights groups for killings, rapes, arbitrary detentions, and land grabs.
Some of the findings, although not the most serious of them, were substantiated
by a U.S. military investigation.56
 The ALP initiative was also adapted from another program, begun in 2008,
termed the “Afghan Provincial Protection Program,” that was funded with DOD
(CERP) funds. The program was implemented in Wardak Province (Jalrez
district) in early 2009 with 100 recruits, and was eventually expanded to 1,200
personnel. U.S. commanders said no U.S. weapons were supplied to the militias,
but the Afghan government provided weapons (Kalashnikov rifles) to the
recruits, possibly using U.S. funds. Participants were given $200 per month.
Afghan Public Protection Force. This force, which operates as a “state-owned
enterprise” (a business) but under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior,
guards sites and convoys. It was formed to implement Karzai’s August 17, 2010,
decree (No. 62) that private security contractor forces be disbanded and their
functions performed by official Afghan government forces by March 20, 2012.
That deadline was extended to March 2013 because of the slow pace of standing
up the new protection force, and some development organizations continued to
use locally hired guard forces. The unit secures supply convoys and sites, and
now numbers about 22,000 personnel and guards nearly 150 sites. In February
2014 the Afghan government decided to fold the unit into the Ministry of Interior.
The local security experiments to date resemble but technically are not arbokai, which are private
tribal militias. Some believe that the arbokai concept should be revived as a means of securing
Afghanistan, as the arbokai did during the reign of Zahir Shah and in prior pre-Communist eras.
Reports persist that some tribal groupings have formed arbokai without specific authorization.
Reversal of Early Militia Disarmament Programs. The local security programs discussed above
somewhat reverse the 2002-2007 efforts to disarm local sources of armed force. And, as noted in
several DOD reports on Afghan stability, there have sometimes been clashes and disputes
between the local security units and the ANSF units, particularly in cases where the units are of
different ethnicities. These are the types of difficulties that prompted earlier efforts to disarm
local militia forces, as discussed below. The main program, run by UNAMA, was called the
“DDR” program—Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration—and it formally concluded
on June 30, 2006. The program got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did
not reduce the percentage of Tajiks in senior positions by a July 1, 2003, target date, dampening
Pashtun recruitment. In September 2003, Karzai replaced 22 senior Tajiks in the Defense Ministry

56 Ernesto Londono. “U.S. Cites Local Afghan Police Abuses.” Washington Post, December 16, 2011. The Human
Rights Watch report is entitled “Just Don’t Call It a Militia.” http://www.hrw.org, September 12, 2011.
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officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, enabling DDR to proceed. The major donor for the
program was Japan, which contributed about $140 million.
The DDR program was initially expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although that figure was
later reduced. Of those demobilized, 55,800 former fighters exercised reintegration options
provided by the program: starting small businesses, farming, and other options. Some studies
criticized the DDR program for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen
or stockpiling of weapons and for the rehiring of some militiamen.57 Part of the DDR program
was the collection and cantonment of militia weapons, but generally only poor-quality weapons
were collected.
After June 2005, the disarmament effort emphasized another program called “DIAG”—
Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), run by the Afghan Disarmament and
Reintegration Commission, headed by then Vice President Khalili. The effort was intended to
disarm as many as 150,000 members of 1,800 different “illegal armed groups”—militiamen that
were not part of recognized local forces (Afghan Military Forces, AMF) and were never on the
rolls of the Defense Ministry. Under the DIAG, no payments were made to fighters, and the
program depended on persuasion rather than use of force against the illegal groups. DIAG was
not as well funded as was DDR, receiving $11 million in operating funds. As an incentive, Japan
and other donors offered $35 million for development projects where illegal groups have
disbanded. The goals of DIAG were not met in part because armed groups in the south said they
need to remain armed against the Taliban.
Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector
Many experts believe that an effective justice sector is vital to Afghan governance. Some of the
criticisms and allegations of corruption at all levels of the Afghan bureaucracy have been
discussed throughout this report. U.S. justice sector programs generally focus on promoting rule
of law and building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court
construction. The rule of law issue is covered in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics,
Elections, and Government Performance
, and CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of
Law and Justice Sector Assistance
.
Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
U.S. and partner officials praised the effectiveness of “Provincial Reconstruction Teams”
(PRTs)—enclaves of U.S. or partner forces and civilian officials that provide safe havens for
international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul
government. The PRTs, the concept for which was announced in December 2002, performed
activities ranging from resolving local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects,
although most PRTs in combat-heavy areas focused on counterinsurgency. Many of the additional
U.S. civilian officials deployed to Afghanistan during 2009 and 2010 were based at PRTs. Some
aid agencies say they felt secure when working with the PRTs,58 but several relief groups did not
want to associate with military forces because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality.
Despite the benefits, during his presidency, Karzai consistently criticized the PRTs as holding
back Afghan capacity-building and repeatedly called them “parallel governing structures.”

57 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament?, June
6, 2005, http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament%20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf.
58 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2003.
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USAID observers backed some of the criticism, saying that there was little Afghan input into PRT
development project decision-making. To address this criticism, during 2008-2012 some donor
countries, including the United States, enhanced the civilian diplomatic and development
component of the PRTs to try to change their image from military institutions. Each U.S.-run PRT
has had U.S. forces to train Afghan security forces; DOD civil affairs officers; representatives of
USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan government (Interior Ministry)
personnel. USAID officers assigned to the PRTs administer PRT reconstruction projects. USAID
spending on PRT projects is in the table at the end of this report.
Virtually all the PRTs, listed in Table 14, were placed under the ISAF mission. In line with a
decision announced at the May 20-21, 2012, NATO summit in Chicago, all of the PRTs were
transferred to Afghan control by the end of 2014. Related U.S.-led structures such as District
Support Teams (DSTs), which help district officials provide government services, also closed.
Reintegration and Potential Reconciliation with Insurgents59
President Ghani has prioritized forging a reconciliation agreement with the insurgency, despite
skepticism from many Afghan notables over the Taliban’s intentions as well as those of Pakistan.
A settlement will undoubtedly require compromises that could produce backsliding on human
rights—most insurgents are highly conservative Islamists who seek strict limitations on women’s
rights, and a political settlement could require Taliban figures’ obtaining ministerial posts, seats in
parliament, or control over territory. The Obama Administration initially withheld endorsement of
the concept over similar concerns, but eventually backed the concept with the stipulation that any
settlement require insurgent leaders, as an outcome,60 to (1) cease fighting, (2) accept the Afghan
constitution, and (3) sever any ties to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
An “Afghan High Peace Council” (HPC) intended to oversee the settlement process was
established on September 5, 2010. Former President/Northern Alliance political leader
Burhanuddin Rabbani was appointed by Karzai to head it, largely to gain Tajik and other
Northern Alliance support for the concept. On September 20, 2011, Rabbani was assassinated by
a Taliban infiltrator posing as an intermediary; on April 14, 2012, the HPC voted his son,
Salahuddin, as his replacement. Rabbani is now also Foreign Minister in the Ghani-Abdullah
government.
Ghani is a Pashtun from the east of the country—the geographic region where most Taliban
leaders hail from—and many experts assert that the Taliban is more amenable to talking with his
government than it was with that of Karzai, who is a southern Pashtun. Ghani’s trips to Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, and China after taking office reportedly focused on building support among these
regional powers for renewed talks; these countries are perceived as holding some leverage over
the Taliban movement (or, in the case of China, over Pakistan). Ghani reportedly sought to take
advantage of apparent growing support for an Afghan reconciliation in Pakistan.
There have been some indications of positive movement on the issue. In December 2014, Taliban
figures reportedly traveled from their base in Qatar to China as part of an effort by China to
promote reconciliation. In February 2015, after Pakistani officials indicated they were prodding
the Taliban to enter into formal talks with the Afghan government and CEO Abdullah said in

59 This issue is discussed in substantial detail in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
, by Kenneth Katzman.
60 The concept that this stipulation could be an “outcome” of negotiations was advanced by Secretary of State Clinton
at the first annual Richard C. Holbrooke Memorial Address. February 18, 2011.
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February 2015 that such talks would begin “in the near future.” In early May 2015, the Pugwash
International Conference on Science and World Affairs convened talks in Qatar between Taliban
representatives and Afghan officials, acting in their personal capacities. The meetings reportedly
resulted in agreement for the Taliban to reopen its office in Qatar, to serve as a location for further
talks, and for possible amendments to the Afghan constitution should a settlement be reached—a
concept previously rejected by the Afghan government. Later in the month, a member of the High
Peace Council Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai met in western China with three figures who had
served in the Taliban regime—a meeting convened by China reportedly with assistance from
Pakistan.61 On July 7, 2015, in what was apparently the first acknowledged government-Taliban
meeting, leaders of the High Peace Council met with Taliban figures in Muree, Pakistan.
However, a follow-up meeting planned for August 2015 was abruptly cancelled when the Taliban
confirmed the death of its leader Mullah Umar and the succession process touched off dissension
within the movement.
The Afghanistan-Taliban meetings represent an advance in the process from 2011, when U.S.
diplomats held a series of meetings with Tayeb Agha, an aide to Mullah Umar, to pursue
confidence-building measures with the Taliban. The U.S.-Taliban meetings were based, in large
part, on proposals for the United States to transfer five senior Taliban captives from the
Guantanamo detention facility to a form of house arrest in Qatar; and the Taliban would release
the one U.S. prisoner of war it held, Bowe Bergdahl. The U.S.-Taliban talks broke off in March
2012 but were resurrected in 2013. On June 18, 2013, the Taliban opened a representative office
in Qatar and issued a statement refusing future ties to international terrorist groups. However, the
Taliban violated understandings with the United States and Qatar by raising a flag of the former
Taliban regime and calling the facility the office of the “Islamic Emirate” of Afghanistan—the
name the Taliban regime gave for Afghanistan during its rule. These actions prompted U.S.
officials, through Qatar, to compel the Taliban to close the office. However, the Taliban officials
remained in Qatar, and indirect U.S.-Taliban talks through Qatari mediation revived in mid-2014.
These indirect talks led to the May 31, 2014, exchange of Bergdahl for the release to Qatar of the
five Taliban figures, with the stipulation that they cannot travel outside Qatar for at least one year.
The five released, and their positions during the Taliban’s period of rule, were Mullah
Mohammad Fazl, the chief of staff of the Taliban’s military; Noorullah Noori, the Taliban
commander in northern Afghanistan; Khairullah Khairkhwa, the Taliban regime Interior Minister;
Mohammad Nabi Omari, a Taliban official; and Abdul Haq Wasiq, the Taliban regime’s deputy
intelligence chief. The one-year travel ban expired on June 1, 2015, but, apparently as a result of
U.S.-Qatar talks, Qatar has extended their travel ban pending a permanent resolution that might
ensure the five do not rejoin the Taliban insurgency effort.
The 2015 Taliban-Afghanistan talks also go beyond earlier exchanges between Taliban
representatives and the Afghan government in the level of representation of both sides. In June
2012, Afghan government officials and Taliban representatives held talks at two meetings—one
in Paris, and one an academic conference in Kyoto, Japan. Meetings between senior Taliban
figures and members of the Northern Alliance faction were held in France (December 20-21,
2012) and reportedly included submission by the Taliban of a political platform that signaled
acceptance of some aspects of human rights and women’s rights provisions of the current
constitution.62 Earlier talks among then-president Karzai’s brother, Qayyum; Arsala Rahmani, a
former Taliban official who reconciled and entered the Afghan parliament but was assassinated in
May 2012; and the former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, took place in

61 “Taliban Representatives Meet with Afghan Envoy in China.” New York Times, May 26, 2015.
62 Author conversations with Afghan officials and U.S. experts. 2012-13.
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Saudi Arabia and UAE. Some Taliban sympathizers reportedly attended the June 2-4, 2010,
consultative peace jirga.
Removing Taliban Figures From U.N. Sanctions Lists. A key Taliban demand in negotiations is
the removal of the names of some Taliban figures from U.N. lists of terrorists. These lists were
established pursuant to Resolution 1267 and Resolution 1333 (October 15, 1999, and December
19, 2000, both pre-September 11 sanctions against the Taliban and Al Qaeda) and Resolution
1390 (January 16, 2002). The Afghan government has submitted a list of 50 Taliban figures it
wants taken off the list, which includes about 140 Taliban-related persons or entities. On January
26, 2010, Russia, previously a hold-out against such a process, dropped opposition to removing
five Taliban-era figures from these sanctions lists, paving the way for their de-listing: those
removed included Taliban-era foreign minister Wakil Mutawwakil and representative to the
United States Abdul Hakim Mujahid. Mujahid is now on the HPC.
On June 17, 2011, in concert with U.S. confirmations of talks with Taliban figures, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolution 1988 and 1989. The resolutions drew a separation between
the Taliban and Al Qaeda with regard to the sanctions. However, a decision on whether to remove
the 50 Taliban figures from the list, as suggested by Afghanistan, was deferred. On July 21, 2011,
14 Taliban figures were removed from the “1267” sanctions list; among them were four members
of the High Peace Council (including Arsala Rahmani, mentioned above).
Reintegration
A related concept is referred to as reintegration—an effort to induce insurgent fighters to
surrender and reenter their communities. A specific Afghan reintegration plan was drafted by the
Afghan government and adopted by a “peace loya jirga” during June 2-4, 2010,63 providing for
surrendering fighters to receive jobs, amnesty, protection, and an opportunity to be part of the
security architecture for their communities. Later in June 2010, President Karzai issued a decree
to implement the plan, which includes efforts by Afghan local leaders to convince insurgents to
reintegrate. UNAMA said on December 6, 2013, that local civil society-sponsored meetings
called the “Afghan People’s Dialogue on Peace,” intended to promote peace and reconciliation,
have been expanding.
The reintegration effort received formal international backing at the July 20, 2010, Kabul
Conference. Britain, Japan, and several other countries, including the United States, have donated
several hundred million dollars to support the reintegration process. The U.S. contribution to the
program has been about $100 million (CERP funds).64 However, the October 2014 DOD report
indicates that there has been funding shortfall for the program for 2014 and the program slowed.
During the Ghani and Abdullah visit in March 2015, the United States announced an additional
$10 million to support the reintegration program.
Nearly 10,000 fighters have been reintegrated since the program began operating in 2010. A
majority of those reintegrated are from the north and west, with growing participation from
militants in the more violent south and east. Some observers say there have been cases in which
reintegrated fighters have committed human rights abuses against women and others, suggesting
that the reintegration process might have unintended consequences.

63 Afghanistan National Security Council. “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program.” April 2010.
64 The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) authorized the use of CERP funds to win local
support, to “reintegrate” Taliban fighters.
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Previous efforts had marginal success. A “Program for Strengthening Peace and Reconciliation”
(referred to in Afghanistan by its Pashto acronym “PTS”) operated during 2003-2008, headed by
then-Meshrano Jirga speaker Sibghatullah Mojadeddi and then-Vice President Karim Khalili, and
overseen by Karzai’s National Security Council. The program persuaded 9,000 Taliban figures
and commanders to renounce violence and join the political process, but made little impact on the
tenacity or strength of the insurgency.
Table 5. Major Security-Related Indicators
Force
Current Level
Total Foreign
About 16,000: 9,800 U.S. and 6,000 partner forces in Resolute Support Mission (down from peak
Forces in
of 140,000 international forces in 2011). U.S. total was 25,000 in 2005; 16,000 in 2003; 5,000 in
Afghanistan
2002.
U.S. Casualties in 2,215 kil ed, of which about 1,832 were by hostile action (plus 2 DOD civilians kil ed by hostile
Afghanistan
action). Additional 11 U.S. military deaths by hostile action in other OEF theaters. 150 U.S. kil ed
from October 2001-January 2003. 500+ kil ed in 2010. U.S. casualties have dropped dramatically
since mid-2013 when Afghan forces assumed lead security role.
Afghan National
About 185,000, close to the 195,000 target size that was planned by November 2012. 5,300 are
Army (ANA)
commando forces, trained by U.S. Special Forces.
Afghan National
About 157,000, at the target size of 157,000. 21,000 are Border Police; 3,800+ counternarcotics
Police (ANP)
police; 14,400 Civil Order Police (ANCOP).
Afghan Local
Supplements ANP at local level, numbers about 28,300. Under MoI supervision. Receives some of
Police
the U.S. MoI funding.
ANSF Salaries
About $1.6 bil ion per year, paid by donor countries bilaterally or via trust funds
Al Qaeda in
Between 50-100 members in Afghanistan, according to U.S. commanders. Also, small numbers of
Afghanistan
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and other Al Qaeda affiliates.
Number of
Taliban fighters
Up to 25,000, including about 3,000 Haqqani network and 1,000 HIG.
Afghan casualties See CRS Report R41084, Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians, by Susan G. Chesser.
Sources: CRS; testimony and public statements by DOD officials.

Regional Dimension
The Obama Administration has encouraged Afghanistan’s neighbors to support a stable and
economically viable Afghanistan and to include Afghanistan in regional security and economic
organizations and patterns. Economically, the Administration is emphasizing development of a
Central Asia-South Asia trading hub—part of a “New Silk Road” (NSR)—in an effort to keep
Afghanistan stable and economically vibrant as donors wind down their involvement. The
FY2014 omnibus appropriation, (P.L. 113-76), provided up to $150 million to promote
Afghanistan’s links within its region.
The Administration first obtained formal pledges from Afghanistan’s neighbors to non-
interference in Afghanistan at an international meeting on Afghanistan in Istanbul on November
2, 2011 (“Istanbul Declaration”), and again at the December 5, 2011, Bonn Conference on
Afghanistan (the 10th anniversary of the Bonn Conference that formed the post-Taliban
government). As a follow-up to the Istanbul Declaration, confidence-building measures to be
taken by Afghanistan’s neighbors were discussed at a Kabul ministerial conference on June 14,
2012. At that meeting, also known as the “Heart of Asia” ministerial conference, Afghanistan
hosted 14 other countries from the region, as well as 14 supporting countries and 11 regional and
international organizations. The assembled nations and organizations agreed to jointly fight
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terrorism and drug trafficking, and pursue economic development.65 Heart of Asia meetings have
continued periodically since, including one that coincided with a visit by President Ghani to
China in October 2014. However, a detailed analysis of the process indicates that regional interest
in the process has waned due to factors in the various participating countries.66
Afghanistan has integrated into regional security and economic organizations. In November 2005,
Afghanistan joined the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and, in June
2012, Afghanistan was granted full observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), a security coordination body that includes Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. U.S. officials have also sought to enlist both regional and greater
international support for Afghanistan through the still-expanding 50-nation “International Contact
Group.” Another effort, the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference (RECCA) on
Afghanistan, was launched in 2005. Turkey and UNAMA co-chair a “Regional Working Group”
initiative, which organized the November 2, 2011, Istanbul meeting mentioned above. UNAMA
also leads a “Kabul Silk Road” initiative to promote regional cooperation on Afghanistan.
In addition, several regional meetings series have been established between the leaders of
Afghanistan and neighboring countries. These series include summit meetings between
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey; and between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. However, this
latter forum ended in mid-2012 after Afghanistan signed the SPA with the United States, which
Iran strongly opposed. Britain hosted an Afghanistan-Pakistan meeting in February 2013. Russia
has assembled several “quadrilateral summits” among it, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, to
focus on counternarcotics and anti-smuggling.

65 Participating were Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, UAE, and Uzbekistan.
66 Richard Giasy and Maihan Saeedi. “The Heart of Asia Process at a Juncture: An Analysis of Impediments to Further
Progress.” Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2014.
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Table 6. Afghan and Regional Facilities Used for
Operations in and Supply Lines to Afghanistan
Facility
Use
Bagram Air
50 miles north of Kabul, the operational hub of U.S. and NATO forces and aircraft in
Base
Afghanistan. Hospital constructed, one of the first permanent structures there.
Qandahar Air
The hub of military operations in the south, and stil in use by U.S. forces at least through 2015.
Field
Shindand Air
In Farah province, about 20 miles from Iran border. Used by U.S. and partner forces and
Base
combat aircraft since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, who
control ed it.
Peter Ganci
Was used by 1,200 U.S. military personnel as well as refueling and cargo aircraft for shipments
Base: Manas,
to and from Afghanistan. Kyrgyz governments on several occasions demanded the United States
Kyrgyzstan
vacate the base but subsequently agreed to allow continued use in exchange for large increase
in U.S. payments for its use. Kyrgyz parliament voted in June 2013 not to extend the U.S. lease
beyond 2014. U.S. forces ceased using and formally handed over the facility to Kyrgyz officials
on June 4, 2014.
Incirlik Air
About 2,000 U.S. military personnel there; U.S. aircraft supply U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
Base, Turkey
Al Dhafra, UAE Air base used by about 2,000 U.S. military personnel conducting operations in Afghanistan and
against the Islamic State.
Al Udeid Air
Largest air facility used by U.S. in region. Houses central air operations coordination center for
Base, Qatar
U.S. missions in Afghanistan and against the Islamic State. Facility also houses CENTCOM
forward headquarters.
Naval Support
U.S. naval command headquarters for regional anti-smuggling, anti-terrorism, and anti-
Facility, Bahrain
proliferation naval search missions. About 5,000 U.S. military personnel there.
Uzbekistan
Karsi-Khanabad Air Base not used by U.S. after September 2005, fol owing U.S.-Uzbek dispute
over May 2005 Uzbek crackdown on unrest in Andijon. Some U.S. shipments through
Uzbekistan began in February 2009 through Navoi airfield in central Uzbekistan.
Tajikistan
Some use of air bases and other facilities by coalition partners, and emergency use by U.S
permitted. India also uses Tajikistan air bases under separate agreement.
Pakistan
The main U.S. supply route to Afghanistan.
Russia
Allowed non-lethal equipment bound for Afghanistan to transit Russia by rail as of 2006, as part
of “Northern Distribution Network,” which received increase use after 2011.

Pakistan
The Afghanistan neighbor that is considered most crucial to Afghanistan’s security is Pakistan.
Experts and officials of many governments continue to debate whether Pakistan is committed to
Afghan stability or to exerting control of Afghan decisions through the use of proxies and ties to
insurgent groups. DOD reports on Afghanistan’s stability repeatedly have identified Afghan
militant safe haven in Pakistan as a threat to Afghan stability, and recent DOD reports state that
Pakistan uses proxy forces in Afghanistan to counter Indian influence there. Some assert that
Pakistan’s ultimate goal is that Afghanistan provide Pakistan strategic depth against India.
However, Pakistan’s leaders appear to increasingly believe that instability in Afghanistan will
rebound to Pakistan’s detriment and are actively promoting a political settlement within
Afghanistan. Ghani visited Pakistan in November 2014—after he previously hosted Pakistani
military officials in Kabul—and reportedly requested stronger cooperation in training and border
management. He was given an unprecedented briefing at the headquarters of Pakistan’s Army
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Chief of Staff. Subsequently, Pakistan began training small numbers of ANSF officers in
Pakistan. In May 2015, a clear demonstration of improving cooperation between the two
countries came in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding for Afghanistan’s NDS
intelligence service to be trained by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), its
key intelligence arm. That agreement came despite the fact that, in recent months, Pakistan has
complained that Pakistani militants that the Pakistani military has pushed out of border areas of
Pakistan are being given safe haven in Afghanistan.
Pakistan appears to anticipate that improved relations with Afghanistan’s leadership will also
limit India’s influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan has long asserted that India is using its Embassy
and four consulates in Afghanistan (Pakistan says India has nine consulates) to recruit anti-
Pakistan insurgents, and that India is using its aid programs only to build influence there. At a
February 2013 meeting in Britain, Pakistan demanded that Afghanistan scale back relations with
India and sign a strategic agreement with Pakistan that includes Pakistani training for the ANSF.
Pakistan’s Defense Secretary stated in January 2014 that Pakistan would not accept a robust role
for India in Afghanistan as international forces wind down involvement in Afghanistan.
Yet, Ghani’s efforts to improvement relations with Pakistan have incurred criticism domestically.
Anti-Pakistan sentiment remains strong among the Tajiks and other non-Pashtuns. Ex-President
Karzai has accused Ghani of making too many concessions to Pakistan to improve relations.
Many Afghans had viewed positively Pakistan’s role as the hub for U.S. backing of the mujahedin
that forced the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-1989, but later came to resent Pakistan as one of only
three countries to formally recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government (Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates are the others). Relations improved after military leader President
Pervez Musharraf left office in 2008 and was replaced by the civilian President Asif Zardari.
However, the September 2011 insurgent attacks on the U.S. Embassy and killing of former
President Rabbani caused then president Karzai to move strategically closer to India. In May
2013, Afghan and Pakistani border forces clashed, killing some from each side.
International Border Question. There are no indications the two countries are close to settling the
long-standing issue of their border. Pakistan has long sought that Afghanistan formally recognize
as the border the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir
Henry Mortimer Durand) and then-Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating
Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition).
The border is recognized by the United Nations, but Afghanistan continues to indicate that the
border was drawn unfairly to separate Pashtun tribes and should be renegotiated. Afghan leaders
criticized October 21, 2012, comments by then-SRAP Grossman that U.S. “policy is that border
is the international border,” even though it reflected a long-standing U.S. position. As of October
2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell, but
as many as 3 million might still remain in Pakistan. Tensions erupted in December 2014, just
weeks after the Ghani visit to Islamabad, over trenches being dug by the Pakistani military along
the border.
Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA). U.S. efforts to persuade Pakistan to
forge a “transit trade” agreement with Afghanistan bore success with the signature of a trade
agreement between the two on July 18, 2010. The agreement allows for easier exportation via
Pakistan of Afghan products, which are mostly agricultural products that depend on rapid transit
and are key to Afghanistan’s economy. On June 12, 2011, in the context of a Karzai visit to
Islamabad, both countries began full implementation of the agreement. It is expected to greatly
expand the $2 billion in trade per year the two countries were doing prior to the agreement. The
agreement represented a success for the Canada-sponsored “Dubai Process” of talks between
Afghanistan and Pakistan on modernizing border crossings, new roads, and a comprehensive
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border management strategy to meet IMF benchmarks. A drawback to the agreement is that
Afghan trucks, under the agreement, are not permitted to take back cargo from India after
dropping off goods there. The Afghanistan-Pakistan trade agreement followed agreements to send
more Afghan graduate students to study in Pakistan, and a June 2010 Afghan agreement to send
small numbers of ANA officers to undergo training in Pakistan.67
U.S.-Pakistan Cooperation on Afghanistan
In the several years after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Pakistani cooperation against Al Qaeda
was considered by U.S. officials to be relatively effective. Pakistan arrested over 700 Al Qaeda
figures after the September 11 attacks68 and allowed U.S. access to Pakistani airspace, some ports,
and some airfields for the major combat phase of OEF. In April 2008, in an extension of the work
of the Tripartite Commission (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and ISAF, in which military leaders of these
entities meet on both sides of the border), the three countries agreed to set up five “border
coordination centers” (BCCs). The BCCs include networks of radar nodes to give liaison officers
a common view of the border area and build on an agreement in May 2007 to share intelligence
on extremists’ movements. Four have been established, including one near the Torkham Gate at
the Khyber Pass, but all four are on the Afghan side of the border. Pakistan has not fulfilled its
May 2009 pledge to establish one on the Pakistani side of the border.
The May 1, 2011, U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan added to preexisting strains
caused by Pakistan’s refusal to crack down on the Haqqani network. Relations worsened further
after a November 26, 2011, incident in which a U.S. airstrike killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, and
Pakistan responded by closing border crossings, suspending participation in the border
coordination centers, and boycotting the December 2011 Bonn Conference. U.S –Pakistan
cooperation on Afghanistan has since improved somewhat.
Iran
Iran has long sought to deny the United States the use of Afghanistan as a base from which to
pressure or attack Iran, to the point where Iran strenuously but unsuccessfully sought to scuttle
the May 1, 2012, U.S.-Afghanistan SPA and the U.S.-Afghanistan BSA. As a longer-term
objective, Iran seeks to exert its historic influence over western Afghanistan and to protect
Afghanistan’s Shiite and other Persian-speaking minorities. Still, most experts appear to see Iran
as a relatively marginal player in Afghanistan compared to Pakistan, while others assert that
Tehran is able to mobilize large numbers of Afghans in the west to support its policies. The
United States is attempting to gauge Tehran’s influence through an “Iran watch” office at the U.S.
consulate in Herat established in 2013.
The Obama Administration initially saw Iran as potentially helpful to its strategy for Afghanistan.
Iran was invited to the U.N.-led meeting on Afghanistan at the Hague on March 31, 2009, at
which Iran pledged cooperation on combating Afghan narcotics and in helping economic
development in Afghanistan—both policies Iran is pursuing to a large degree. The United States
supported Iran’s attendance of the October 18, 2010, meeting of the International Contact Group
on Afghanistan, held in Rome. The United States and Iran also took similar positions at a U.N.
meeting in Geneva in February 2010 that discussed drug trafficking across the Afghan border.

67 Partlow, Joshua. “Afghans Build Up Ties With Pakistan.” Washington Post, July 21, 2010.
68 Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September
11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh (September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003);
and a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005).
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Iran did not attend the January 28, 2010, international meeting on Afghanistan in London, but it
did attend the July 28, 2010, international meeting in Kabul (both discussed above). Iran also
attended the region-led international meeting in Istanbul on November 2, 2011, the December 5,
2011, Bonn Conference, and the Tokyo donors’ conference on July 8, 2012.
Bilateral Government-to-Government Relations
Iran has had some success in building ties to the Afghan government, despite that government’s
heavy reliance on U.S. support. Ghani visited Tehran during April 19-20, 2015, shortly after his
visit to Washington, DC, and held meetings with President Rouhani and Supreme Leader Ali
Khamene’i. The public outcome of the visit was agreement to work jointly against the Islamic
State organization, which has reportedly made inroads in Afghanistan and which Iran is helping
combat in Iraq and Syria.
Ghani has generally endorsed the approach of his predecessor on Iran. Karzai frequently called
Iran a “friend” of Afghanistan and repeatedly said that Afghanistan must not become an arena for
the broader competition and disputes between the United States and Iran.69 There were mutual
high level visits between the two countries during the Karzai presidency. In June 2011, Iran’s
then-Defense Minister, Ahmad Vahidi, visited Kabul to sign a bilateral border security agreement,
and the two signed a Memorandum of Understanding on broader security and economic
cooperation in August 2013. Karzai visited Tehran in December 2013 to develop a relationship
with the new government of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and the two countries signed a
“strategic cooperation agreement.” Most U.S. analysts have downplayed the pact as an effort by
Afghanistan to assuage Iranian concerns about the likely long-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
Earlier, in October 2010, Karzai acknowledged accepting about $2 million per year in cash
payments from Iran, but Iran reportedly ceased the payments after the Karzai government signed
the SPA with the United States in May 2012.
At the public level, many Afghans say they appreciate Iran’s aid for efforts to try to oust the
Taliban regime. Iran saw that regime as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan, especially after
Taliban forces captured Herat in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer to the
ethnic minority-dominated Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel,
funds, and ammunition.70 In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into direct
conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the course of the Taliban’s
offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action,
but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that Pakistan would intervene on
behalf of the Taliban. Iran offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led
war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to
transit Iran. Iran helped construct Afghanistan’s first post-Taliban government, in cooperation
with the United States—at the December 2001 “Bonn Conference.” In February 2002, Iran
expelled Karzai opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but it did not arrest him.
At other times, Afghanistan and Iran have had disputes over Iran’s efforts to expel Afghan
refugees. There are 1 million registered Afghan refugees in Iran, and about 1.4 million Afghan
migrants (non-refugees) living there. A crisis erupted in May 2007 when Iran expelled about
50,000 into Afghanistan. About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the

69 Comments by President Karzai at the Brookings Institution. May 5, 2009.
70 Steele, Jonathon. “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.” Washington Times, December 15,
1997.
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Taliban fell. Press reports in May 2014 said Iran might be recruiting Shiite Afghan refugees in
Iran to go to Syria to fight on behalf of the Assad regime there.
Iranian Assistance to Afghan Militants and to Pro-Iranian Groups and Regions
Despite its relations with the Afghan government, Iran, perhaps attempting to demonstrate that it
can cause U.S. combat deaths in Afghanistan, has armed some militants there.71 Recent State
Department reports on international terrorism have stated that the Qods Force of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran (IRGC-QF) provides training to the Taliban on small unit
tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect weapons fire, and that it has shipped arms to militants
in Qandahar. This phrasing implies that Iran is arming Pashtun Taliban militants in the core of the
combat zone in Afghanistan. Weapons provided reportedly include mortars, 107mm rockets,
rocket-propelled grenades, and plastic explosives. In March 2011, NATO said it had seized 48
Iranian-made rockets in Nimruz Province, bound for Afghan militants; the 122mm rockets have a
range (13 miles) greater than those previously provided by Iran. On August 3, 2010, the Treasury
Department, acting under Executive Order 13224, named two IRGC-QF officers as terrorism
supporting entities, freezing any U.S.-based assets.72
Iran reportedly has allowed a Taliban office to open in Iran, and high-level Taliban figures have
visited Iran.73 While some see the contacts as Iranian support of the insurgency, others see it as an
effort to exert some influence over reconciliation efforts. Iran previously allowed Taliban figures
to attend conferences in Iran that were attended by Afghan figures, including the late High Peace
Council head Burhanuddin Rabbani.
Assistance to Ethnic and Religious Factions in Afghanistan
Others are puzzled by Iran’s support of Taliban fighters who are Pashtun, because Iran has
traditionally supported Persian-speaking or Shiite factions in Afghanistan, many of whom have
been oppressed by the Pashtuns. Some of Iran’s funding has been intended to support pro-Iranian
groups in the west as well as Hazara Shiites in Kabul and in the Hazara heartland of Bamiyan,
Ghazni, and Dai Kundi, in part by providing scholarships and funding for technical institutes. Iran
has used some of its funds to construct mosques in Herat, pro-Iranian theological seminaries in
Shiite districts of Kabul, and Shiite institutions in Hazara-dominated areas. Iran also offers
scholarships to Afghans to study in Iranian universities, and there are consistent allegations that
Iran has funded Afghan provincial council and parliamentary candidates who are perceived as
pro-Tehran.74 These efforts have helped Iran retain close ties with Afghanistan’s leading Shiite
cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Mohseni, as well as Hazara political leader Mohammad Mohaqiq.
Iran’s Development Aid for Afghanistan
Iran’s economic aid to Afghanistan does not conflict with U.S. efforts to develop Afghanistan.
Iran has pledged about $1 billion in aid to Afghanistan, of which about $500 million has been
provided to date. The funds have been used mostly to build roads and bridges in western

71 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall Street Journal, October 18,
2004.
72 The Treasury Department. Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran’s Support for Terrorism. August 3,
2010.
73 Maria Abi-Habib. “Iranians Build Up Afghan Clout. Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2012; Afghan Taliban
Reportedly Sends Delegation to Iran for Talks. CBSnews.com, June 3, 2013.
74 King, Laura. “In Western Afghan City, Iran Makes Itself Felt.” Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2010.
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Afghanistan. In cooperation with India, Iran has been building roads that would connect western
Afghanistan to Iran’s port of Chahbahar, and provide Afghan and other goods an easier outlet to
the Persian Gulf. In late July 2013, Iran and Afghanistan signed a formal agreement allowing
Afghanistan to use the port. Iran also has provided credits to the Afghan private sector and helped
develop power transmission lines in the provinces bordering Iran, two of which were turned over
to Afghan ownership in January 2013. Some of the funds reportedly are funneled through the
Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, which provides charity worldwide. Iran also provides
gasoline and other fuels to Afghanistan.
India
India’s goals are to deny Pakistan “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, to deny Pakistan the ability to
block India from trade and other connections to Central Asia and beyond, and to prevent militants
in Afghanistan from attacking Indian targets in Afghanistan. India saw the Afghan Taliban’s
hosting of Al Qaeda during 1996-2001 as a major threat because of Al Qaeda’s association with
radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan seeking to end India’s control of part of the disputed
territories of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups have committed major acts of terrorism
in India, including the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 and in July 2011.
Afghanistan has sought close ties to India—in large part to access India’s large and rapidly
growing economy—but without alarming Pakistan. In May 2011, India and Afghanistan
announced a “Strategic Partnership” agreement that demonstrated India’s support for U.S. efforts
to better integrate Afghanistan into regional political, economic, and security structures. On
October 5, 2011, Karzai signed the pact in New Delhi; it affirmed Pakistani fears by giving India,
for the first time, a formal role as a guarantor of Afghan stability. Indian experts noted that no
Indian troops or security forces deployed to Afghanistan as a consequence, but it did produce a
2011 agreement for India to train some ANSF personnel in India (600 ANSF yearly at India’s
Army’s jungle warfare school).
In the immediate aftermath of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border clashes in early May 2013, Karzai
visited India to seek sales of Indian artillery, aircraft, and other systems that would help it better
defend its border with Pakistan.75 Karzai visited again in mid-December 2013, and reportedly
urged India to deliver on the 2011 strategic pact by selling Afghanistan tanks, artillery, and
helicopters.76 India reportedly resisted the request in order not to become ever more directly
involved in the conflict in Afghanistan or alarm Pakistan. Ghani has cancelled that request, as
discussed above, apparently to avoid complicating his outreach to Pakistan. Ghani visited India in
April 2015 to engage directly with the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
India’s relationship with the Afghan government and with individual factions reflects India’s
concerns about potential preponderant Pakistani influence in post-2014 Afghanistan. India
supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s and retains ties to Alliance
figures. Many Northern Alliance figures have lived in India at one time, although Indian
diplomats stress they have close connections to Afghanistan’s Pashtuns as well. Still, India
reportedly does not want to be saddled with the burden of helping secure Afghanistan as U.S.-led
forces depart. India has stressed its economic aid activities there, showcased by its hosting of a
June 28, 2012, meeting in Delhi to discuss investment and economic development in Afghanistan.

75 Hamid Shalzi. “Afghanistan’s Karzai Seeks Indian Military Aid Amid Tensions with Pakistan.” Reuters, May 19,
2013.
76 “Hamid Karzai Heads to India Waving Wish List of Military Hardware.” Livemint.com, December 11, 2013.
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Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the Hindu nationalist BJP party, elected in May 2014, has not
changed India’s policy on Afghanistan.
India’s Development Activities in Afghanistan
Prior to 2011, India limited its involvement in Afghanistan to development issues. India is the
fifth-largest single country donor to Afghan reconstruction, funding projects worth over $1.5
billion, with an additional $500 million announced during the Singh visit to Kabul in May 2011.
Indian officials assert that all their projects are focused on civilian, not military, development and
are in line with the development priorities set by the Afghan government. India, along with the
Asian Development Bank, financed a $300 million project, mentioned above, to bring electricity
from Central Asia to Afghanistan. It has also renovated the well-known Habibia High School in
Kabul and committed to a $67 million renovation of Darulaman Palace as the permanent house
for Afghanistan’s parliament. India and Afghanistan finalized the construction plans for that
building in early 2012. At a cost of about $85 million, India financed the construction of a road to
the Iranian border in remote Nimruz province, linking landlocked Afghanistan to Iran’s
Chahbahar port on the Arabian Sea. India constructed a 42 Megawatt hydroelectric Selwa Dam in
Herat Province at a cost of about $77 million, completed in 2013, which increased electricity
availability in the province. In December 2011, an Indian firm, the Steel Authority of India, Ltd.
(SAIL) was declared winning bidder on three of four blocs of the Hajji Gak iron ore project in
Bamiyan Province.
India is also helping Afghanistan’s Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) with its
efforts to build local governance organizations, and it provides 1,000 scholarships per year for
Afghans to undergo higher education in India. Some Afghans want to enlist even more Indian
assistance in training Afghan bureaucrats in accounting, forensic accounting, oversight, and other
disciplines that will promote transparency in Afghan governance.
Russia, Central Asian States, and China
Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability, but in the
U.S. military posture that supports U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The region to the north of
Afghanistan is a growing factor in U.S. efforts to rely less on routes through Pakistan to bring out
the substantial amount of equipment that will be withdrawn as most U.S. forces depart.
Russia/Northern Distribution Network
Russia seeks to contain U.S. power in Central Asia, but tacitly accepts the U.S. presence as
furthering the battle against radical Islamists based in Afghanistan. In part acting on the latter
interest, Russia cooperated in developing the Northern Distribution Network supply line to
Afghanistan. In February 2009, Russia allowed a resumption of shipment of non-lethal equipment
into Afghanistan through Russia. (Russia had suspended the shipments in 2008 over differences
over the Russia-Georgia conflict.) About half of all ground cargo for U.S. forces in Afghanistan
flowed through the Northern Distribution Network from 2011-2014, despite the extra costs as
compared to the Pakistan route. The route played a significant role in removing much U.S.
equipment during the 2014 U.S. drawdown.
Russia has not been a major actor in post-Taliban Afghanistan, perhaps because of the legacy of
the Soviet occupation. However, in line with Russian official comments in June 2010 that more
economic and social assistance is needed there, Russia is investing $1 billion in Afghanistan to
develop its electricity capacity and build out other infrastructure. Included in those investments
are implementation of an agreement, reached during a Karzai visit to Moscow on January 22,
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2011, for Russia to resume long dormant Soviet occupation-era projects such as expanding the
Salang Tunnel connecting the Panjshir Valley to Kabul, hydroelectric facilities in Kabul and
Baghlan provinces, a customs terminal, and a university in Kabul. Russia is also raising its profile
with a $25 million investment in the Kabul Housebuilding Factory, the country’s largest factory,
and a $20 million project to renovate the former “Soviet House of Science and Culture” as the
“Russian Cultural Center” that will expand Russia’s cultural influence in Afghanistan. In
November 2010, in its most significant intervention in Afghanistan since its occupation, Russian
officers reportedly joined U.S. and Afghan forces attempting to interdict narcotics trafficking in
Afghanistan. However, the move prompted a complaint by President Karzai because he was not
consulted about the inclusion of the Russians.
During the 1990s, after its 1989 withdrawal and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia
supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some military equipment and technical
assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.77 The Taliban
government was the only one in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some
Chechen fighters fighting alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed.
Central Asian States
These states are potentially crucial to Afghanistan stability. Cooperation among the Central Asian
states is necessary for the success of the New Silk Road (NSR) strategy that seeks to help
Afghanistan become a trade crossroads between South and Central Asia. An increasing amount of
trade is flowing from Afghanistan to and through the Central Asian states, and Afghanistan earns
key transit fees and customs duties from this commerce. As noted below, railway lines are being
built to Uzbekistan. The Panj bridge, built largely with U.S. funds, has become a major
thoroughfare for goods to move between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan is funding a $50
million program to develop Afghan professionals. The revival of a long-standing plan to establish
Afghanistan as a transit hub for Central Asian natural gas (TAPI pipeline) is discussed later in this
report under “Development in Key Sectors.”
The Central Asian countries have long had an interest in seeing Afghanistan stabilized and
moderate. In 1996, several of the Central Asian states banded together with Russia and China into
the SCO because of the perceived Taliban threat.
Tajikistan
On security cooperation, Tajikistan allows access primarily to French combat aircraft, and
Kazakhstan has allowed use of facilities in case of emergency. In May 2011, Kazakhstan became
the first Central Asian state to pledge forces to Afghanistan (four non-combat troops). Earlier, in
April 2010, Kazakhstan agreed to allow U.S. over flights of lethal military equipment to
Afghanistan, allowing the United States to use polar routes to fly materiel directly from the
United States to Bagram Airfield.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan, a backer of ethnic Uzbek faction leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, allowed use of
Karshi-Khanabad air base by OEF forces from October 2001 until a rift emerged in May 2005
over Uzbekistan’s crackdown against riots in Andijon. Uzbekistan’s March 2008 agreement with
Germany for it to use Karshi-Khanabad air base temporarily, for the first time since the rift with

77 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July 27, 1998.
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the United States, suggested potential for resumed U.S.-Uzbek cooperation on Afghanistan.
Renewed U.S. discussions with Uzbekistan apparently bore some fruit with the Uzbek decision in
February 2009 to allow the use of Navoi airfield for shipment of U.S./NATO goods into
Afghanistan. Use of Uzbekistan’s facilities is less crucial in light of the U.S. drawdown from
Afghanistan.
Uzbekistan has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly
responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed
President Islam Karimov, is active in Afghanistan. The IMU is linked to Al Qaeda.78 One of its
leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in
Konduz in November 2001.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan has generally taken a position of “positive neutrality” on Afghanistan. It does not
allow its territory to be part of the Northern Distribution Network and no U.S. forces have been
based in Turkmenistan. This neutrality essentially continues the policy Turkmenistan had when
the Taliban was in power. Turkmenistan was the only Central Asian state to actively engage the
Taliban government, possibly viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing
spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. It saw Taliban control as facilitating
construction of the TAPI natural gas pipeline, discussed above, that was under consideration
during Taliban rule and discussion of which has been revived in recent years. Still, the September
11 attacks on the United States stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests
and caused the country to publicly support the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan.
China79
China’s involvement in Afghanistan has been primarily to secure access to Afghan minerals and
other resources; to help its Pakistan ally avoid encirclement by India; and to reduce the Islamist
militant threat to China itself. China is concerned about the potential for Islamic militants who
operate in Afghanistan to assist China’s restive Uighur (Muslim) community. The East Turkestan
Islamic Movement (ETIM) is an opposition group in China, some of whose operatives are based
in Afghanistan. A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a small
border with a sparsely inhabited sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan Corridor,” and it is
building border access routes and supply depots to facilitate China’s access to Afghanistan
through the corridor. Over the past several years, China has deepened its involvement in Afghan
security issues and sought a more prominent role as a potential mediator in Afghan reconciliation
at least in part to try to lessen the perceived threat from militant Islamists based in Afghanistan.
In September 2012, China and Afghanistan signed security and economic agreements. No
Chinese forces ever deployed to Afghanistan, but China trained small numbers of ANP at a
People’s Armed Police facility in China since 2006, with a focus on counternarcotics. It also has
offered training for ANSF officers at People’s Liberation Army training colleges and universities.
In late October 2014, China hosted President Ghani for bilateral meetings as well as to attend a
meeting of the “Heart of Asia” (Istanbul ministerial) process in Beijing. As a consequence of that
visit, some Taliban figures reportedly visited China, apparently accompanied by Pakistani
security officials, as part of an effort by Pakistan and China to promote an Afghan political

78 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000.
79 For more information, see CRS Report RL33001, U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,
by Shirley A. Kan.
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settlement.80 Also during the Ghani visit, China agreed to train 3,000 Afghan bureaucrats and to
provide an additional $330 million in bilateral aid over the coming three years. From 2002 to
2014, China provided about $255 million in economic aid to Afghanistan.
Still, many experts see China’s activities in Afghanistan as primarily economically driven.
Chinese delegations continue to assess the potential for new investments in such sectors as
mining and energy.81 The cornerstone of China’s investment to date has been the development of
the Aynak copper mine south of Kabul, but that project is stalled over security issues surrounding
the mine site. In early 2012, China National Petroleum Co. was awarded the rights to develop oil
deposits in the Amu Darya basin (see below).
During the Taliban era, in December 2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban
policies, a Chinese official delegation met with Mullah Umar. However, China did not
enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the Taliban, possibly because China was
wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby.
Persian Gulf States
The Gulf states are considered a key part of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan. As noted, the late
Ambassador Holbrooke focused substantial U.S. attention—and formed a multilateral task
force—to try to curb continuing Gulf resident donations to the Taliban in Afghanistan. He
maintained that these donations are a larger source of Taliban funding than is the narcotics trade.
The Gulf states have also been a source of development funds and for influence with some
Afghan clerics and factions.
Two Gulf states, UAE and Bahrain, have contributed some of their small forces to Afghanistan
security missions. The UAE has deployed about 250 troops to OEF and ISAF security missions in
southern Afghanistan, including Helmand province. Some are military medical personnel who run
small clinics and health programs for Afghans in the provinces where they operate. The UAE said
in March 2013 it would keep at least some forces in Afghanistan after 2014. In January 2009,
Bahrain sent 100 police officers to Afghanistan to help U.S./NATO-led stabilization operations
there; that tour extends until the end of the ISAF mission at the end of 2014.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has many ties to Afghan figures as a result of its channeling of hundreds of millions
of dollars to the Islamist mujahedin, factions during the war against the Soviet occupation. Some
of these mujahedin later joined the Taliban. A majority of Saudi citizens practice the strict
Wahhabi brand of Islam similar to that of the Taliban, and Saudi Arabia was one of three
countries to formally recognize the Taliban government. Some press reports indicate that, in late
1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and
Afghan Islamic scholars to decide Bin Laden’s fate.
Saudi Arabia has played a role as a go-between for negotiations between the Afghan government
and “moderate” Taliban figures. This role was recognized at the London conference on January
28, 2010, in which then-President Karzai stated that he saw a role for Saudi Arabia in helping
stabilize Afghanistan. Some observers say that a political settlement might involve Mullah Umar
going into exile in Saudi Arabia. The Afghan government also sees Saudi Arabia as a potential

80 Edward Wong. “Exploring a New Role: Peacemaker in Afghanistan.” New York Times, January 14, 2015.
81 CRS conversations with Chinese officials in Beijing. August 2007.
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new source of investment; in early November 2012 Saudi Arabia agreed to fund a $100 million
mosque and education center in Kabul. Some saw the investment as a Saudi effort to enhance its
influence in Afghanistan as international involvement there wanes. President Ghani visited Saudi
Arabia in late October 2014, in part to perform the Hajj (Pilgrimage to Mecca) but also to hold
meetings with Saudi officials on potential scenarios to re-energize talks on an Afghan political
settlement.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It
broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and permitted the United
States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not
permit U.S. airstrikes from the base.
UAE
The United Arab Emirates, the third country that recognized the Taliban regime, is emerging as
another major donor to Afghanistan. In addition to deploying about 250 troops to the U.S.-led
effort (most of which are not under ISAF command), the UAE has donated at least $135 million
to Afghanistan since 2002, according to the Afghan Finance Ministry. Projects funded include
housing in Qandahar, roads in Kabul, a hospital in Zabol province, and a university in Khost. At
the same time, the UAE property market has been an outlet for investment by Afghan leaders who
may have acquired their funds through soft loans from the scandal-plagued Kabul Bank or
through corruption connected to donor contracts or other businesses.
Qatar
Until 2011, Qatar was not regarded as a significant player on the Afghanistan issue. It did not
recognize the Taliban regime when it was in power. However, in 2010 Qatar offered itself as a
mediator on Afghan reconciliation with the Taliban and U.S.-Taliban confidence-building
measures that led to the release of Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl. Qatar accepts the presence of Taliban
mediators and served as a location for a Taliban political office that opened briefly in June 2013.
Karzai’s two visits to Qatar in 2013 were related to the opening of the Taliban office in Doha.
Qatar pledged to prevent the five Taliban figures who were exchanged for Bergdahl from
traveling outside Qatar at least until June 1, 2015, and, at U.S. request, has extended their travel
ban pending a permanent resolution of their status. Other Taliban figures in Qatar are able to
travel abroad for meetings to explore the prospects for Afghanistan reconciliation.
Aid and Economic Development
Experts have long asserted that economic development is pivotal to Afghanistan’s long term
stability as donors reduce their financial involvement in Afghanistan in concert with the reduction
of their military involvement. In December 2011, the World Bank released a report warning that
an abrupt aid cutoff could lead to fiscal implosion, loss of control over the security sector, the
collapse of political authority, and possible civil war. The role of the economy in post-2014
Afghanistan was assessed in an Administration report released in December 2011, called the
“U.S. Economic Strategy for Afghanistan.”82

82 The report, produced by the National Security Staff, was released December 2, 2011. It was mandated by the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (Section 1535 of P.L. 111-383).
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The Obama Administration has been optimistic about the Afghan economy’s ability to withstand
the donor drawdown. Afghanistan’s economy (Gross Domestic Product, GDP) has grown an
average of 9% per year since 2001, although aid cutbacks and political uncertainty about the post-
2104 security situation caused a slowing to 3.1% growth in 2013 and a further slowing in 2014.
Similarly, the uncertainty harmed Afghanistan’s economy and domestic revenue generation in
2014 and produced a $550 million budgetary shortfall in the final months of 2014. Previously,
government revenues had been increasing steadily, and totaled about $2.5 billion for 2013. U.S.
officials say the government is increasingly able to execute parts of its budget and deliver basic
goods and services.
Donor aid already accounts for more than 95% of Afghanistan’s GDP and at least two-thirds of
total Afghan government expenditures (operating budget and development budget). Afghan
officials say that Afghanistan needs at least $10 billion in donated funds per year from 2014 until
2025, at which time Afghanistan expects to be financially self-sufficient. Afghan government
revenue comes mostly through taxation (68%), including through a flat 20% corporate tax rate,
and most of the remainder from customs duties. The tax system has been computerized.
Since the international community intervened in Afghanistan in 2001, there have been debates
over many aspects of aid to Afghanistan, including amounts, mechanisms for delivery, donor
coordination, and distribution within Afghanistan. Some of the more stable provinces, such as
Bamiyan and Balkh, complain that 80% of international aid has flowed to the restive provinces,
ignoring the needs of poor Afghans in peaceful areas.
Adding to the complexity of strategy development is the analysis that some economic sectors in
Afghanistan have been developed largely with private investment, including by wealthy or well-
connected Afghans who have founded companies. Therefore, it is often difficult to determine the
effects on Afghanistan’s economy of aid, as compared to the effects of investment, trade, and
other variables. In July 2011 then-Secretary of State Clinton and other U.S. officials articulated a
post-transition vision of greater Afghan economic integration in the region and its role in a “New
Silk Road” trading pattern that would presumably accelerate Afghan private sector growth and
customs revenue receipts.
Further hindering Afghanistan is that its economy and society are still fragile after decades of
warfare that left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan
children raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than 3.5 million Afghan refugees
have since returned, although a comparable number remain outside Afghanistan. The literacy rate
is very low and Afghanistan has a small, although growing, pool of skilled labor, middle
managers, accountants, and information professionals. And, the widespread government
corruption in Afghanistan, which is analyzed in greater detail in CRS Report RS21922,
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman, has caused
some donors to withhold funds or to avoid giving aid directly to the Afghan government.
U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
During the 1990s, the United States was the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan
people even though no U.S. aid went directly to the Taliban government when it was in power
during 1996-2001; monies were provided through relief organizations. Between 1985 and 1994,
the United States had a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, implemented by USAID
personnel based in Pakistan. Citing the difficulty of administering this program, there was no
USAID mission for Afghanistan from the end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy
in Afghanistan in late 2001. The table at the end of this paper portrays U.S. assistance to
Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban. The cited figures do not include costs for U.S. combat
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operations. For information on those costs, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11
, by Amy Belasco.
Aid Oversight and Conditionality
Some laws have required the withholding of U.S. aid subject to Administration certification of
Afghan compliance on a variety of issues, including counter-narcotics efforts, corruption, vetting
of the Afghan security forces, Afghan human rights practices and protection of women’s rights,
and other issues. All required certifications have been made and virtually no U.S. funds have been
withheld from Afghanistan.
The conference report on the FY2008 defense authorization bill (P.L. 110-181) established a
“Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction” (SIGAR) modeled on a similar
outside auditor for Iraq. Funds provided for the SIGAR are in the tables below. The SIGAR issues
quarterly reports and specific audits of aspects of Afghan governance and security, with particular
attention to how U.S.-provided funds have been used. The SIGAR, as of July 2012, is John
Sopko. Some executive branch agencies, including USAID, have criticized some SIGAR audits
as inaccurate or as highlighting problems that the agencies are already correcting. For example,
DOD took strong exception to a December 4, 2013, audit by the SIGAR that asserted that the
U.S. military had failed to adequately manage risk accounting for $3 billion in DOD funds for the
ANSF.83
Aid Authorization: Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA)
of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized about $3.7 billion in U.S.
civilian aid for FY2003-FY2006. The law, whose authority has now expired, was intended to
create a central source for allocating funds; that aid strategy was not implemented. However,
some of the humanitarian, counternarcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the
act were met or exceeded by appropriations. No Enterprise Funds authorized by the act have been
appropriated. The act authorized the following:
 $15 million per year in counternarcotics assistance (FY2003-FY2006);
 $10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005 for political development, including
national, regional, and local elections;
 $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15
million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s
Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 to the Human Rights
Commission of Afghanistan);
 $425 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 in humanitarian and development aid;
 $300 million for an Enterprise Fund; and
 $550 million in drawdowns of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and
regional militaries. (The original law provided for $300 million in drawdowns.
That was increased by subsequent appropriations laws.)
A subsequent law (P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), implementing the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission, contained “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The

83 David Zucchino. “Watchdog Faults U.S. Military’s Oversight of Aid to Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times, December
5, 2013.
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subtitle mandated the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires
additional Administration reports to Congress.
A bill in the 110th Congress to reauthorize AFSA, H.R. 2446, passed by the House on June 6,
2007 (406-10). It would have authorized about $1.7 billion in U.S. economic aid and $320 in
military aid (including drawdowns of equipment) per year for several years. A Senate version (S.
3531), with fewer provisions than the House bill, was not taken up by the full Senate.
Direct Support to the Afghan Government
Currently, the United States disburses about 50% of its donated aid funds through the Afghan
government. The Kabul Conference (July 20, 2010) communiqué endorsed a goal of 50% direct
funding and for 80% of all funds to align with Afghan government priorities. USAID has
approved 14 ministries to receive direct U.S. aid. However, a SIGAR report of late January 2014
assessed that auditors hired by the U.S. government to oversee the direct aid provided found
substantial potential for the misuse of some of the aid in the form of kickbacks or payment of
Afghan salaries in the form of cash.84
The United States channels much of its direct aid through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund (ARTF), run by the World Bank. Donors have contributed about $6 billion to the ARTF, the
funds of which are about equally split between funding Afghan salaries and priority development
investments. Through FY2012, the USAID has provided about $2 billion to the ARTF.
No “enterprise fund” that was envisioned in the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act was ever
established. However, small amounts of USAID funds were used to assist a few Afghan
enterprises, at least partially fulfilling the intent of the legislation.
Development Partnership Announced on March 24, 2015. In an effort to increase cooperation
with the Afghan government in assisting development, during the Ghani visit to Washington, DC,
the Administration announced an $800 million “New Development Partnership.” The funds,
which will come from already appropriated funds (not representing a request for additional
funding), will be overseen by USAID, and will be disbursed on programs in Afghanistan “only
after agreed reforms or development results have been accomplished, as measured by clear and
objective indicators of achievement.”85
National Solidarity Program
Through the ARTF, the United States supports an Afghan government program that promotes
local decision making on development—the “National Solidarity Program” (NSP). Donors have
provided the program with over $600 million, about 90% of which has been U.S. funding. The
program provides block grants of up to $60,000 per project to local councils to implement their
priority projects. The program has given at least 20,000 grants to a total of 21,600 villages that
participate in the program—participation requires setting up a Community Development Council
(CDC) to help decide on what projects should be funded. The Afghan implementer is the Ministry
of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. Funds from the NSP have brought bridges, water wells,
and some hydroelectric power to numerous villages. The program has been widely hailed by

84 Matthew Rosenberg and Azam Ahmed. “Report Says Afghanistan Can’t be Trusted to Prevent Misuse of U.S. Aid.”
New York Times, January 30, 2014.
85 State Department factsheet, “Strengthening the Strategic Partnership of the United States and Afghanistan.” March
24, 2015.
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many institutions s a highly effective, Afghan-run program. U.S. funds for the program are drawn
from a broad category of ESF for “good governance.”86
Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund
The Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund was set up in early 2013 to channel an additional
percentage of U.S. aid directly to Afghanistan. The multilateral fund is managed by the Asian
Development Bank. An initial U.S. contribution of $45 million was made in March 2013, but was
supplemented by tens of millions more to support a power grid project running north-south. (This
is not the same program as the U.S. “Afghan Infrastructure Fund,” which is a DOD-State program
to fund Afghan infrastructure projects.)
Other Donor Aid
As shown in Table 9, non-U.S. donors, including such institutions as the EU and the Asian
Development Bank, provided over $29 billion in assistance to Afghanistan from the fall of the
Taliban until 2012. When combined with U.S. aid, this by far exceeds the $27.5 billion for
reconstruction identified by the IMF as required for 2002-2010. Major pledges have been made
primarily at donor conferences such as Tokyo (2002), Berlin (April 2004), Kabul (April 2005),
London (February 2006), Paris (June 2008), London (January 2010), and Tokyo (July 2012).
The Tokyo conference (July 8, 2012) focused on identifying sources of post-2014 assistance
(2012-2022 is termed the “transformation decade”).87 At the conference, the United States and its
partners pledged a total of $16 billion in aid to Afghanistan through 2015 ($4 billion per year for
2012-2015) and agreed to sustain support through 2017 at levels at or near the past decade. As
part of that overall pledge, at the conference, then-Secretary Clinton said the Administration
would ask Congress to sustain U.S. aid to Afghanistan at roughly the levels it has been through
2017. Among other major pledges, Japan pledged $5 billion over five years (2012-2017), and
Germany pledged $550 million over four years (2014-2016).
The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework issued in concert with the final conference
declaration lays out requirements of the Afghan government in good governance, anti-corruption,
holding free and fair elections, and human rights. As an incentive, if Afghanistan meets the
benchmarks, the Framework will increase (to 10% by 2014 and to 20% by 2024) the percentage
of aid provided through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and other incentive
mechanisms. The ARTF gives Kabul the maximum discretion in use of the donated funds. A
senior officials meeting held in Kabul on July 3, 2013, to review the Afghan performance found
that the Afghan government had met only a few of the stipulated benchmarks and was making
slow progress on most of the others. A follow-up to the Tokyo conference is the London
Conference that was held on December 4, 2014. At the meeting, which was attended by President
Ghani and CEO Abdullah, donor governments assessed the government’s progress on the
stipulated benchmarks and reiterated their prior pledges of assistance to Afghanistan through
2017. More than 60 countries, including Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, attended the
meeting.88

86 “Gunmen in Afghanistan Kill 9 Local Aid Workers.” New York Times, June 3, 2015.
87 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/article/the-tokyo-declaration-partnership-for-self-reliance-in-afghanistan-
from-transition-to-transf.
88 Michael Gordon. “Meeting Afghan Leaders, Donors Pledge Support.” New York Times, December 5, 2014.
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Among multilateral lending institutions, the World Bank has been key to Afghanistan’s
development. In May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after 20 years. Its
projects have been concentrated in the telecommunications and road and sewage sectors. The
Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also been playing a major role in Afghanistan, including in
financing railway construction. The ADB funded the paving of a road from Qandahar to the
border with Pakistan and contributed to a project to bring electricity from Central Asia to
Afghanistan. On the eve of the London donor’s conference of January 28, 2010, the IMF and
World Bank announced $1.6 billion in Afghanistan debt relief.
Development in Key Sectors
Efforts to build the legitimate economy are showing some results, by accounts of senior U.S.
officials. Some sectors, discussed below, are being developed primarily (although not
exclusively) with private investment funding. Private investment has been the main driver of
much of the new construction evident particularly in Kabul, including luxury hotels; a $25
million Coca Cola bottling factory (opened in September 2006); apartment and office buildings;
and marriage halls and other structures. The bottling factory is located near the Bagrami office
park (another private initiative), which includes several other factories. The Serena luxury hotel
was built by the Agha Khan foundation, a major investor in Afghanistan. Phase one of a major,
multi-billion dollar development near the Kabul airport, called “New Kabul City,” is in the early
stages of construction.
An arm of DOD, called the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), sought to
facilitate additional private investment in Afghanistan. However, A SIGAR report of November
2014 assessed that the Task Force’s efforts yielded very little result. Funding for the Task Force is
included in the aid table at the end of this paper.
Uncertainty about the post-2014 political and security situation caused some Afghan businessmen
to relocate outside the country, or to develop external components of their business in case the
situation in Afghanistan deteriorates. The following sections outline what has been accomplished
with U.S. and international donor funds and private investment.
Education
Despite the success in enrolling Afghan children in school since the Taliban era (8 million in
school, of which about 40% are girls), continuing Taliban attacks on schools have caused some to
close. Afghanistan’s university system is said to be highly underfunded, in part because Afghans
are entitled to free higher education (to the B.A. level) by the Constitution, which means that
demand for the higher education far outstrips Afghan resources. The shortfall is impeding the
development of a large enough pool of skilled workers for the Afghan government. Afghanistan
requires about $35 million to operate its universities and institutes for one year. A substantial
portion of USAID funds have gone directly to the Ministry of Education for the printing and
distribution of textbooks.
Health
The health care sector, as noted by Afghan observers, has made considerable gains in reducing
infant mortality and giving about 85% of the population at least some access to health
professionals. Still, according to some outside groups, nearly 20% of all Afghans had a close
relative or friend who died in 2013 because that person was unable to reach medical care or
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because of unaffordable cost—even though health care is free according to Afghan law and
regulations.89
USAID funds for health have gone directly to the Ministry of Health to contract with
international NGOs to buy medical supplies for clinics. Egypt operates a 65-person field hospital
at Bagram Air Base that instructs Afghan physicians, and Jordan operates a similar facility in
Mazar-e-Sharif. A $236 million USAID program called “Partnership Contracts for Health”
provided immunizations, prenatal exams, and equipment and salaries in 13 provinces.
Roads
Road building is considered a U.S. and international priority. At least 10,000 miles of roads have
been built since 2001 by all donors, of which about half was funded by the United States. Road
construction has been USAID’s largest project category there, accounting for about $2 billion in
U.S. spending since the fall of the Taliban.90 Roads are considered key to enabling Afghan
farmers to bring legitimate produce to market in a timely fashion, and former commander of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan General Eikenberry (later Ambassador) said “where the roads end, the
Taliban begin.” The major road, the Ring Road (including Highway One from Qandahar to
Kabul), has been completely repaved using funds from various donors, including substantial
funds from the Asian Development Bank, at a total expense of about $4 billion (all donors).
Among other major projects completed are a road from Qandahar to Tarin Kowt (Uruzgan
province) built by U.S. military personnel, inaugurated in 2005; a road linking the Panjshir Valley
to Kabul; and a Salang Bypass Road through Bamiyan province. In several of the most restive
provinces, U.S. funds, including CERP, have been used to build small roads linking farming
communities to the markets for their products. The October 2014 DOD report states that
completing the Khost-Gardez highway is one of four high priority infrastructure projects for
USAID.
The Afghan government has committed to developing an East-West road across Afghanistan,
from Herat to Kabul. However, funding only for a few segments (Herat to Chest-e-Sharif, and
Maidany Shar to Bamiyan, and Bamiyan City to Yakowlang in that same province) has been
identified, from Italy and Japan.
On the other hand, observers note that the Afghan government lacks the resources to adequately
maintain the roads built with international funds. Many of the roads built have fallen into
disrepair and are marked with major potholes.
Bridges
Afghan officials say that trade with Central Asia increased after a bridge over the Panj River,
connecting Afghanistan and Tajikistan, opened in late 2007. The bridge was built with $33
million in (FY2005) U.S. assistance. The bridge is helping what press reports say is robust
reconstruction and economic development in the relatively peaceful and ethnically homogenous
province of Panjshir, the political base of the Northern Alliance.

89 Rod Nordland. “Aid Group Sees Daunting Obstacles to Health Care for Afghans.” New York Times, February 26,
2014.
90 Kevin Seiff. “A Crumbling Investment.” Washington Post, January 31, 2014.
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Railways
Afghanistan is beginning to develop functioning railways—a sector it lacked as a legacy of
security policy during the late 19th century that saw railroads as facilitating invasion of
Afghanistan. Rail is considered increasingly crucial to Afghanistan’s ability to develop its mineral
wealth because it is the means by which minerals can be exported to neighboring countries. Three
railway projects are underway. One, a 75 mile line from Mazar-i-Sharif to Hairaton, on the border
with Uzbekistan, was completed in March 2011 with $165 million from the Asian Development
Bank. It began operations in early 2012 and shortly thereafter began carrying its peak capacity of
4,000 tons of cargo per month. In September 2012, the government established the Afghan Rail
Authority to maintain and regulate this sector.
Some planned rail lines might not get built if foreign investors believe they will not yield a
significant payoff for their projects in the mining sector. In particular, China has committed to
building a rail line from its Mes Aynak copper mine project to the northern border and it is
conducting a feasibility study for that railway as of mid-2014. A spur to the Hajji Gak iron mine
would be funded by India (about $1 billion) as part of its project there. However, there are
indications India and China might opt instead truck their minerals out, a process that would slow
full exploitation of these mines. There are also plans to build a line from Herat and Kabul to
Qandahar, and then on to the border with Pakistan. The planned railways will link Afghanistan to
the former Soviet railway system in Central Asia, and to Pakistan’s railway system, increasing
Afghanistan’s economic integration in the region.
Electricity
This sector has been a major U.S. focus because the expansion of electricity proves popular with
the Afghan public. The United States has provided $340 million in direct aid to the national
power company, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkas (DABS), to generate revenue from power
provision and manage the nation’s electricity grid. Some of the U.S. funding comes from an
“Infrastructure Fund” funded by DOD. That authority was provided in the FY2011 DOD
authorization bill (P.L. 111-383). Actual funding is depicted in the aid tables below. The DOD
report on Afghanistan of October 2014 says that DABS is now operating without government
subsidies.
The Afghan government set a goal for electricity to reach 65% of households in urban areas and
25% in rural areas by 2010—a goal that was not met—but USAID says that as of April 2013,
DABS serves about 28% of the population. Power shortages in Kabul, caused in part by the
swelling of Kabul’s population to about 4 million, have been alleviated as of 2009 by Afghan
government agreements with several Central Asian neighbors to import electricity, as well as
construction of new plants such as that at Tarakhil in north Kabul. Kabul is now generally lit up at
night. There has been some criticism of the 105 megawatt Tarakhil plant, built at a cost of about
$300 million, because of the high costs of fuel, the questionable need for it, and the possible
inability of the Afghan authorities to maintain it. USAID has spent a $35 million to help the
national electric utility—operate and maintain the plant. In January 2013, Afghanistan gained
formal title to the Tarakhil plant as well as two less efficient power plants built by Iran in western
Afghanistan. Russia has refurbished some long dormant hydroelectric projects in Afghanistan that
were suspended when Soviet troops withdrew in 1989.
Southern Afghanistan Power Projects/Kajaki Dam. Much of the U.S. electricity capacity effort n
focused on southern Afghanistan. The key long-term project is to expand the capacity of the
Kajaki Dam, located in Helmand Province (“Kandahar-Helmand Power Project,” KHPP).
Currently, two turbines are operating—one was always working, and the second was repaired by
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USAID contractors. USAID had planned to further expand capacity of the dam by installing a
third turbine (which there is a berth for but which never had a turbine installed.) The DOD report
of October 2014 identifies the third turbine as one of the four infrastructure project priorities for
USAID. In September 2008, 4,000 NATO troops (Operation Ogap Tsuka) delivered components
of the third turbine to the dam, hoping to install it by 2010, but technical and security problems
delayed the project. In early 2013, USAID decided to instead provide these funds to DABS so
that it could contract for completion of the work, and $75 million of the U.S. aid to DABS is
obligated for the third turbine installation. About $205 million has been spent by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers to improve power lines and substations fed by the dam.91
Because the Kajaki Dam project has proceeded slowly, since 2009 the U.S. military and USAID
have implemented a plan (“Qandahar Power Bridging Solution”) to build smaller substations and
generator projects that can bring more electricity to Qandahar and other places in the south
quickly, including to the Qandahar Industrial Park. The initiative was intended at least in part to
support the U.S.-military led counterinsurgency strategy in Qandahar during 2009-2013. There
was extensive criticism of the Bridging Solution based on the cost of fuel for the diesel
generators, for which the Afghans are dependent on continued U.S. funding. The October 2014
DOD report on Afghanistan stated that in 2014 DOD reduced subsidies for the fuel and that
DABS was shifting to a more market-based pricing for supplying electricity to consumers.
However, that shift apparently has proceeded slower and DABS has been unable to afford fuel for
the generators to the degree that was expected. Electricity availability in Qandahar and
surrounding areas has diminished sharply and many businesses there report struggling to stay in
operation.92 The shortages are expected to worsen when the U.S.-funded Bridging Solution ends
at the end of FY2015 (September 30, 2015).
The SIGAR and other experts have also recommended that some attention be shifted to building
up northern power distribution routes rather than focusing exclusively on the south and east.
Some of the USAID funds provided to DABS, including through the Afghanistan Infrastructure
Trust Fund above, have been used to build a north-south power grid. The October 2014 DOD
report states that “Power Transmission and Connectivity”—a reference to this project—is one of
USAID’s four priority infrastructure projects.
There is also an apparent increasing emphasis on providing electricity to individual homes and
villages through small solar power installations. A contractor to USAID, IRG, has provided small
solar powered-electricity generators to homes in several districts of Afghanistan, alleviating the
need to connect such homes to the national power grid. However, there are technical drawbacks,
including weather-related inconsistency of power supply and the difficulty of powering
appliances that require substantial power. The U.S. broadcasting service to Afghanistan, Radio
Azadi, run by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, has given out 20,000 solar-powered radios
throughout Afghanistan.
Agriculture
Even though only about 12.5% of Afghanistan’s land is arable, about 80% of Afghans live in rural
areas and the agriculture sector has always been key to Afghanistan’s economy and stability.
About 25% of Afghanistan’s GDP is contributed by agriculture. The late Ambassador Holbrooke,
including in his January 2010 strategy document, outlined U.S. policy to boost Afghanistan’s
agriculture sector not only to reduce drug production but also as an engine of economic growth.

91 Michael Phillips. “Afghan Dam Saga Reflects U.S. Travails.” Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2012.
92 http://www.tolonews.com/en/business/19094-power-outages-in-kandahar-close-factories
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Prior to the turmoil that engulfed Afghanistan in the late 1970s, Afghanistan was a major exporter
of agricultural products. From 2002 until the end of 2012, USAID obligated $1.9 billion to build
capacity at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), increase access to
markets, and provide alternatives to poppy cultivation, according to a January 2013 SIGAR
report.
USAID programs have helped Afghanistan double its legitimate agricultural output over the past
five years. One emerging “success story” is growing Afghan exports of high-quality pomegranate
juice called Anar. Other countries are promoting not only pomegranates but also saffron, rice, and
other crops that draw buyers outside Afghanistan. In 2013, Afghanistan produced 4.5 tons of
saffron, most of which was exported abroad. Another emerging success story is Afghanistan’s
November 2010 start of exports of raisins to Britain.93 Wheat production was robust in 2009
because of healthy prices for that crop, and Afghanistan is again self-sufficient in wheat
production. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has about 110 personnel in Afghanistan on long-
term and priority projects; there are also at least 25 agriculture experts from USAID in
Afghanistan. Their efforts include providing new funds to buy seeds and agricultural equipment,
and to encourage agri-business. In addition, the National Guard from several states deployed nine
“Agribusiness Development Teams” to help Afghan farmers with water management, soil
enhancement, crop cultivation, and improving the development and marketing of their goods.
U.S. strategy has addressed not only crop choice but also trying to construct the entirety of the
infrastructure needed for a healthy legitimate agriculture sector, including road building, security
of the routes to agriculture markets, refrigeration, storage, transit through Pakistan and other
transportation of produce, building legitimate sources of financing, and other aspects of the
industry. U.S. officials in Kabul say that Pakistan’s restrictions on trade between Afghanistan and
India had prevented a rapid expansion of Afghan pomegranate exports to that market, but the
transit trade agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, discussed above, is expected to
alleviate some of these bottlenecks. Dubai is another customer for Afghan pomegranate exports.
There is a vibrant timber industry in the northeast provinces. However, the exports are illegal. De-
forestation has been outlawed because of the potential for soil erosion and other economic and
environmental effects.
In terms of specific programming, USAID has a $150 million program for the relatively safe
areas of Afghanistan to continue to develop licit crops. The Incentives Driving Economic
Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW) program is planned to run through
FY2014. In southern and eastern areas of the country where counterinsurgency operations are
ongoing, USAID’s $474 million Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture
(AVIPA-Plus) program ran through FY2011 and includes initiatives coordinated with U.S.
counterinsurgency operations in Helmand and Qandahar provinces. The program provides
vouchers for wheat seed, fertilizer, and tools, in addition to supporting cash for work programs
and small grants to local cooperatives.
Telecommunications
Several Afghan telecommunications firms have been formed and over $1.2 billion in private
investment has flowed into this sector, according to the DOD Task Force for Business and
Stability Operations. With startup funds from the Agha Khan Foundation (the Agha Khan is
leader of the Isma’ili community, which is prevalent in northern Afghanistan), the highly

93 Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach. “New Hope for Afghan Raisin Farmers.” New York Times, October 9, 2010.
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successful Roshan cellphone company was founded. Another Afghan cellphone firm is Afghan
Wireless. The most significant post-Taliban media network is Tolo Television, owned by Moby
Media. U.S. funds are being used to supplement the private investment; a $4 million U.S. grant,
in partnership with the Asia Consultancy Group, is being used to construct communication towers
in Bamiyan and Ghor provinces. The Afghan government is attempting to link all major cities by
fiber optic cable.
Airlines
The 52-year-old national airline, Ariana, is said to be in significant financial trouble due to
corruption that has affected its safety ratings and left it unable to service a heavy debt load.
However, there are new privately run airlines, such as Safi Air (run by the Safi Group, which has
built a modern mall in Kabul) and Kam Air. Another, Pamir, was ordered closed in 2010 due to
safety concerns. In January 2013, the U.S. military ceased contracting with an Afghan airline,
Kam Air, on the grounds that it was helping traffic opium; the U.S. military rescinded the ruling
after Afghan complaints that questioned the allegation. The Afghan government agreed to
investigate the allegations.
Mining and Gems
Afghanistan’s mining sector has been largely dormant since the Soviet invasion. Some Afghan
leaders complain that not enough has been done to revive such potentially lucrative industries as
minerals mining, such as of copper and lapis lazuli (a stone used in jewelry). The issue became
more urgent in June 2010 when the DOD Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
announced, based on surveys, that Afghanistan may have untapped minerals worth over $1
trillion.94 Although copper and iron are the largest categories by value, there are believed to also
be significant reserves of such minerals as lithium in western Afghanistan—lithium is crucial to
the new batteries being used to power electric automobiles. However, as noted above, some of the
expected revenue from this sector might not materialize if investors decide not to build rail lines
needed to export the minerals from Afghanistan in large volumes. An additional brake on
investment is the lack of legislative action on a new Law on Mines. The Afghan Cabinet
approved a draft in February 2013 and sent it to the National Assembly in July 2013, but the
Assembly has not acted on it to date.
Mes Aynak Copper Field. A major project, signed in November 2007, is with China Metallurgical
Group for the company to invest $3.0 billion to develop Afghanistan’s Mes Aynak copper field in
Lowgar Province. The agreement, viewed as generous to the point where it might not be
commercially profitable for China Metallurgical Group, includes construction of two coal-fired
electric power plants (one of which will supply more electricity to Kabul city); a segment of
railway (discussed above); and a road from the project to Kabul. Work on the mine was slowed
by various factors, including the need to clear mines in the area and to excavate ancient Buddhist
artifacts that local activists insist be preserved. Actual extraction was expected to begin in mid-
2012, and still has not begun. U.S. forces do not directly protect the project, but U.S. forces have
set up small bases on some of the roads leading to the mine project to provide general stability
there.
Hajji Gak Iron Ore Project. In September 2011 seven bids were submitted for another large
mining project, the Hajji Gak iron ore mine (which may contain 60 billion tons of iron ore) in

94 Risen, James. “U.S. Identifies Mineral Riches in Afghanistan.” New York Times, June 14, 2010.
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Bamiyan Province. The bids—from Chinese, Indian, and other firms—were evaluated and, in late
2011, the Steel Authority for India Ltd. (SAIL) was awarded the largest share of the project. One
of the four blocs of the project was awarded to Kilo Gold of Canada. The project, involving an
investment of nearly $11 billion, is expected to generate $200 million in annual government
revenues when fully operational (by 2017), although this level might not be reached unless the
associated rail lines are built to allow export in high volumes. SAIL denied reports in May 2015
that it would not proceed with the project, saying only that it had completed an assessment of the
costs and benefits of the project.
Other mining projects have been awarded (subject to finalized contract negotiations):
 The Balkhab coooper mine in Sar-i-Pol Province, awarded to Afghan Gold and
Minerals Co.
 The Shaida copper mine in Herat Province, awarded to Afghan Minerals Group
 The Badakshan gold project, in that province, awarded to Turkish-Afghan
Mining Co.
 Zarkashan copper and gold project (Ghazni Province), awarded to Sterling
Mining/Belhasa International LLC.
Oil, Gas, and Related Pipelines
Years of war have stunted developed of a hydrocarbons energy sector in Afghanistan. The country
has no hydrocarbons export industry and a small refining sector that provides some of
Afghanistan’s needs for gasoline or other fuels. Most of Afghanistan’s fuel comes from
neighboring states. However, Afghanistan’s prospects in this sector appeared to brighten by the
announcement in March 2006 of an estimated 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 36.5 trillion cubic feet
of gas reserves, amounts that could make Afghanistan self-sufficient in energy or even able to
export. In a major development, on December 15, 2010, the Afghan government let a six-month
contract to a local firm, Ghazanfar Neft Gas (Ghazanfar Group), to collect and market crude oil
from the Angot field in northern Afghanistan (part of a field that may contain 80 million barrels
of oil), initially producing at the low rate of 800 barrels per day.
The energy sector took a major step forward with the awarding in early 2012 of development
rights to the Amu Darya basin (northern Afghanistan) oil fields to China National Petroleum Co.
The field began producing at about 5,000 barrels per day in early 2013, with a longer-term
potential of 145,000 barrels per day. The $3 billion development has a local partner, the Watan
Group, owned by Karzai relatives Rashid and Rateb Popal.
Among pending development, in November 2012 a consortium consisting of Kuwait Energy,
Dragon Oil of UAE, Turkey’s state-owned TPAO, and the Ghazanfar Group (see above) bid to
develop part of the “Afghan-Tajik Basin,” estimated to hold 950 million barrels of oil, 7 trillion
cubic feet of gas, and other gas liquids. China National Petroleum Company won a contract to
develop large oil fields in Balkh Province (Angot field, including Kasha Kari bloc and others),
estimated to hold 1.8 billion barrels of oil.
USAID has funded test projects to develop gas resources in northern Afghanistan. A key project is
to build a 200 megawatt gas-fired thermal plant and associated transmission lines in northern
Afghanistan (“Shehbergan Program”). The October 2014 DOD report identifies the Shebergan
program as one of the four USAID infrastructure priorities for Afghanistan. The plant would be
part of a plan to link Afghanistan’s natural gas field in Shehbergan to the population center in
Mazar-e-Sharif. The total cost of the project, targeted for 2016 completion, is estimated at $580
million, provided by USAID, the Overseas Private Investment Corp., the Asian Development
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Bank, and the Afghan government. In December 2013, Turkish National Petroleum Company
received a $37 million contract to drill natural gas wells in the Juma and Bashikurd fields (near
the Angot oilfields discussed above).
Another pilot project, funded by the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, is to
develop filling stations and convert cars to use compressed natural gas (CNG), which is produced
in the gas field in Shehbergan and could provide an inexpensive source of fuel in the future.
During the March 2015 Ghani visit to Washington, DC, the United States and Afghanistan
announced forming a “Joint Working Group” to explore ways to support Afghanistan’s
integration into regional energy markets.
TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) Gas Pipeline Project.
Another long-stalled major energy project appears to be gaining momentum. During 1996-1998,
the Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western
Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A consortium led by Los
Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a $7.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline that would
originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible
extensions into India.95 The deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 suspended hopes for
the pipeline projects. In May 2002, the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan agreed
to revive the project and sponsors signed a series of preliminary agreements at an inaugural
meeting in July 2002, in Turkmenistan. In late 2011, the Asian Development Bank agreed to
finance the project, removing what had been a major hurdle. On July 8, 2014, Turkmenistan,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India signed an operational agreement on the pipeline under which
Pakistan and India would each get 42% of the gas transported and Afghanistan would get the
remainder. India is a large customer for natural gas and its participation is considered crucial to
making the venture commercially viable.96 U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative
to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan.
Trade Promotion/Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
The key to U.S. economic strategy, as exemplified by the New Silk Road strategy, is to encourage
Afghanistan’s trade relationships. The United States is doing so by promoting regional economic
integration, discussed above, as well as through bilateral economic agreements with Afghanistan.
A key to the strategy was accomplished in 2011 when Afghanistan and Pakistan finalized
provisions to implement their 2010 transit trade agreement. To facilitate Afghanistan’s ability to
increase trade, USAID is funding a five-year project ($63 million total during 2010-2014) to
simplify the customs clearance process. This includes new import procedures that have reduced
the time needed for imports to clear customs by 45%. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries
of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership talks with Afghanistan.
Earlier, in September 2004, the United States and Afghanistan signed a bilateral trade and
investment framework agreement (TIFA), and most of Afghanistan’s exports are eligible for duty
free treatment under the enhanced Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. The

95 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel
of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say
Russia’s Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997,
p. 3.
96 “Operational Accord on Tapi Gas Pipeline Signed.” Dawn.com, July 18, 2014.
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Administration economic strategy report of December 2011 says the Administration is reaching
out to Afghan exporters and U.S. importers of Afghan products to make increased use of the GSP
program. The TIFA is seen as a prelude to a broader and more complex bilateral free trade
agreement, but negotiations on an FTA have not begun. The TIFA is monitored by a joint TIFA
“Council” that meets periodically.
Another initiative supported by the United States is the establishment of joint Afghan-Pakistani
“Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” (ROZs) which would be modeled after “Qualified Industrial
Zones” run by Israel and Jordan in which goods produced in the zones receive duty free treatment
for import into the United States. Bills in the 110th Congress, S. 2776 and H.R. 6387, would have
authorized the President to proclaim duty-free treatment for imports from ROZs to be designated
by the President. In the 111th Congress, a version of these bills was introduced (S. 496 and H.R.
1318). President Obama specifically endorsed passage of these bills in his March 2009 strategy
announcement. H.R. 1318 was incorporated into H.R. 1886, a major Pakistan aid appropriation
that passed by the House on June 11, 2009, and was then appended to H.R. 2410. However, the
version of the major Pakistan aid bill that became law (S. 1707, P.L. 111-73) did not authorize
ROZs.
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Table 7. Major Reporting Requirements
Several provisions require Administration reports on numerous aspects of U.S. strategy, assistance, and related issues.

P.L. 108-458, The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments required, through the end of FY2010, an
overarching annual report on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Other reporting requirements expired, including
required reports (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction; (2) on how U.S. assistance is
being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint
State and DOD report on U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan.

P.L. 110-181 (Section 1230), FY2008 Defense Authorization Act requires a quarterly DOD report on the
security situation in Afghanistan; the first was submitted in June 2008. It was required by that law through
FY2011. Section 1231 required a report on the Afghan National Security Forces through the end of FY2010. The
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81) extended the reporting requirement—the reports
entitled “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” cover a six month period—until the end of
FY2014.

Section 1229 of the same law requires the quarterly report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR).

P.L. 111-8 (Omnibus Appropriation, explanatory statement) required a State Department report on the use of
funds to address the needs of Afghan women and girls (submitted by September 30, 2009).

P.L. 111-32, FY2009 Supplemental Appropriation (Section 1116), required a White House report, by the time of
the FY2011 budget submission, on whether Afghanistan and Pakistan are cooperating with U.S. policy sufficiently
to warrant a continuation of Administration policy toward both countries, as well as efforts by these
governments to curb corruption, their efforts to develop a counterinsurgency strategy, the level of political
consensus in the two countries to confront security challenges, and U.S. government efforts to achieve these
objectives. The report was released with a date of September 30, 2010.

The same law (Section 1117) required a report, by September 23, 2009, on metrics to be used to assess
progress on Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy. A progress report measured against those metrics is to be
submitted by March 30, 2010, and every six months thereafter, until the end of FY2011.

Section 1228 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) required a report, within 120
days, on the Afghan Provincial Protection Program and other local security initiatives. Section 1235 authorized a
DOD-funded study of U.S. force levels needed for eastern and southern Afghanistan, and Section 1226 required
a Comptrol er General report on the U.S. “campaign plan” for the Afghanistan (and Iraq) effort.

Sections 1212-1226 of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239) contains
several reporting or congressional notification requirements on Afghanistan, on issues such as women’s rights, an
independent assessment of the performance of the ANSF, negotiations on the bilateral security agreement, the
political reconciliation and insurgent reintegration process, the U.S. campaign plan, insider attacks, any changes to
U.S. troop levels, and other issues. These sections also contain authorities on use of some DOD funds in
Afghanistan, such as CERP and funding for the reintegration process.

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Table 8. Comparative Social and Economic Statistics
Population
28 mil ion +. Kabul population is 3 mil ion, up from 500,000 in Taliban era.
Ethnicities/Religions

Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%.
Size of Religious
Religions: Sunni (Hanafi school) 80%; Shi te (Hazaras, Qizilbash, and Isma’ilis) 19%; other 1% Christians-
Minorities
estimated 500-8,000 persons; Sikh and Hindu-3,000 persons; Bahai’s-400 (declared blasphemous in May
2007); Jews-1 person; Buddhist- small numbers. No Christian or Jewish schools. One church.
Literacy Rate
28% of population over 15 years of age. 43% of males; 12.6% of females.
GDP, and GDP Growth
$33.55 bil ion purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2012. 109th in the world. Per capita: $1,000 purchasing power
and Unemployment
parity. 212th in the world. Growth has averaged about 9% per year every year since Taliban rule, but fell to
Rates
3.1% in 2013. Growth is forecast at about 5% for 2014 by the IMF. GDP was about $10 bil ion (PPP) during
last year of Taliban rule. Unemployment rate is about 8%, but underemployment rate may be nearly 50%.
Children in
8 mil ion, of which 40% are girls. Up from 900,000 boys in school during Taliban era. 4,000 schools built (all
School/Schools Built
donors) and 140,000 teachers hired since Taliban era. 17 universities, up from 2 in 2002. 75,000 Afghans in
since 2002
universities in Afghanistan (35% female); 5,000 when Taliban was in power.
Afghans With Access to
85% with basic health services access-compared to 9% during Taliban era. Infant mortality down 22% since
Health Coverage
Taliban to 135 per 1,000 live births. 680 clinics built.
Roads Built
About 3,000 miles paved post-Taliban, including repaving of “Ring Road” (78% complete) that circles the
country. Kabul-Qandahar drive reduced to 6 hours. About 1,500 additional miles stil under construction.
Judges/Courts
Over 1,000 judges (incl. 200 women) trained since fall of Taliban.
Banks Operating
17, including branches in some rural areas, but about 90% of the population stil use hawalas (informal money
transfer services). No banks existed during Taliban era. Some limited credit card use. Some Afghan police
now paid by cel phone (E-Paisa).
Access to Electricity
15%-20% of the population. Much of its electricity imported from neighboring states.
Government Revenues
About $2 bil ion in 2012 compared to $200 mil ion in 2002. Total Afghan budget is about $4.5 bil ion
(excl. donor funds)
(including development funds)—shortfall covered by foreign donors, including through Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund.
Financial Reserves/Debt
About $4.4 bil ion, up from $180 mil ion in 2002. Includes amounts due Central Bank. $8 bil ion bilateral debt,
plus $500 mil ion multilateral. U.S. forgave $108 mil ion in debt in 2004, and $1.6 bil ion forgiven by other
creditors in March 2010.
Foreign/Private
About $500 mil ion to $1 bil ion per year. Four Afghan airlines: Ariana (national) plus at least two privately
Investment
owned: Safi and Kam. Turkish Air and India Air fly to Kabul.
Legal Exports/
80% of the population is involved in agriculture. Self-sufficiency in wheat production as of May 2009 (first time
Agriculture
in 30 years). Exports: $400 mil ion+ (2011): fruits, raisins, melons, pomegranate juice (Anar), nuts, carpets,
lapis lazuli gems, marble tile, timber products (Kunar, Nuristan provinces).
Oil Proven Reserves
3.6 bil ion barrels of oil, 36.5 tril ion cubic feet of gas. Current oil production negligible, but USAID funding
project to revive oil and gas facilities in the north.
Cellphones/Tourism
About 18 mil ion cellphone subscribers, up from neglibile amounts during Taliban era. Tourism: National park
opened in Bamiyan June 2009. Increasing tourist visits.
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; various press and U.S. government official testimony; IMF and World Bank
estimates.
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Table 9. Major Non-U.S. Pledges for Afghanistan 2002-2012
($ in millions)
Japan

13,150
European Union

2,880
Germany

2,680
Asian Development Bank

2,270
Britain

2,220
World Bank

2,140
India

1,515
Canada

1,255
Iran

1,000
Netherlands

775
Norway

745
Australia

645
Italy

645
Sweden

635
United Nations

445
Denmark

435
France

320
China

255
Spain

220
Turkey

210
Finland

160
Russia

150
Saudi Arabia

140
UAE

135
Switzerland

120
South Korea

115
Czech Republic

105
Total

$24,900
(includes donors of under
(of which $19,700
$100 million, not listed)
disbursed—about 80%)
Sources: Afghanistan Ministry of Finance: Development Cooperation Report, 2010; various U.S. government
reports, including Defense Department reports on Afghanistan stability. Figure for Japan includes $5 bil ion
pledged in 2008 (over five years) to fund Afghan National Police salaries, and funds pledged at July 8, 2012,
Tokyo donors conference. Figures for Germany included $550 mil ion pledged (over four years) at that meeting.
Note: Table includes donors of over $100 mil ion only.
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link to page 74 link to page 74 Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Table 10. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998
($ in millions)
Fiscal
Devel.
Econ. Supp.
P.L. 480 (Title I
Other (Incl. Regional
Year
Assist.
(ESF)
and II)
Military
Refugee Aid)
Total
1978
4.989

5.742
0.269
0.789
11.789
1979
3.074

7.195

0.347
10.616
1980

(Soviet invasion-December 1979)


1981






1982






1983






1984






1985
3.369




3.369
1986


8.9


8.9
1987
17.8
12.1
2.6


32.5
1988
22.5
22.5
29.9


74.9
1989
22.5
22.5
32.6


77.6
1990
35.0
35.0
18.1


88.1
1991
30
30
20.1


80.1
1992
25.0
25.0
31.4


81.4
1993
10
10
18.0

30.2
68.2
1994
3.4
2.0
9.0

27.9
42.3
1995
1.8

12.4

31.6
45.8
1996


16.1

26.4
42.5
1997


18.0

31.9a
49.9
1998


3.6

49.14b
52.74
Source: Department of State.
a. Includes $3 mil ion for demining and $1.2 mil ion for counternarcotics.
b. Includes $3.3 mil ion in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 mil ion in earthquake relief aid,
100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 mil ion, $2 mil ion for demining, and $1.54 for
counternarcotics.
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Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2001
($ in millions)

FY1999
FY2000
FY2001
U.S. Department of
42.0 worth of
68.875 for 165,000
131.1 (300,000
Agriculture (DOA) and
wheat (100,000
metric tons.
metric tons under
USAID Food For Peace
metric tons under
(60,000 tons for
P.L. 480, Title II,
(FFP), via World Food
“416(b)” program.)
May 2000 drought
and 416(b))
Program(WFP)
relief)
State/Bureau of
16.95 for Afghan
14.03 for the same
22.03 for similar
Population, Refugees and
refugees in Pakistan
purposes
purposes
Migration (PRM) via
and Iran, and to
UNHCR and ICRC
assist their
repatriation
State Department/
7.0 to various
6.68 for drought
18.934 for similar
Office of Foreign
NGOs to aid
relief and health,
programs
Disaster Assistance
Afghans inside
water, and
(OFDA)
Afghanistan
sanitation programs
State Department/HDP
2.615
3.0
2.8
(Humanitarian Demining
Program)
Aid to Afghan Refugees
5.44 (2.789 for
6.169, of which
5.31 for similar
in Pakistan (through
health, training—
$3.82 went to
purposes
various NGOs)
Afghan females in
similar purposes
Pakistan)
Counter-Narcotics


1.50
USAID/Office of


0.45 (Afghan
Transition Initiatives
women in
Pakistan)
DOD



Foreign Military



Financing
Anti-Terrorism



Economic Support Funds



(E.S.F)
Peacekeeping



Totals
76.6
113.2
182.6
Source: CRS.

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Table 12. Post-Taliban U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan
(appropriations/allocations in $ millions)





2016
Fiscal Year
2002 2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015 Request
ESF
117
239
894
1280
473
1211
1400
2088
3346
2168
1837
1850
851
1225
1200
DA
18.3
42.5
153
170
185
167
149
.4
.3
0
0
0



GHCS
7.5
49.7
33.4
38
41.5
101
63
58.
92
70
0
0



Refugee Accounts
160
61
63
47
42
54
44
77
82
65
99
13



Food Aid
206
74
99
97
108
70
231
82
32
19
0.6
0



IDA
197
86
11
4
0
0
17
27
30
66
61
14



INCLE
60
0
220
709
216
252
308
484
589
400
324
6.1
225
325
250
NADR
44
34.7
67
38.
18.2
37
27
49
58
69
65
54

43.5
38
IMET
0.2
0.4
0.7
1.0
1.0
1.2
1.7
1.4
1.8
1.6
2
0.8
.51
1.4
1.2
FMF
57
191
414
397
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0



Other
33
23
36
18
0.2
0.1
21
5
5.8
7.4
8
0



DOD—ASSF
0
0
0
995
1908
7406
2750
5607
9167
10619
9200
5124
4727
4109
3800
DOD—CERP
0
0
40
136
215
209
488
551
1000
400
400
200
30
15

Infrastructure Fund
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
299
400
325
199
0

Business Task Force
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
59
239
242
179
64
5

DOD—CN
0
0
72
225
108
291
193
230
392
376
421
372



DOD—Other
7.5
165
285
540
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0



DEA Counternarc
0.6
2.9
3.7
17
23.7
20
41
19
0
0
0
0



Total U.S.
Assistance
909
970
2392
4712
3339
9818
5732
9292
14854
14800
13058
8084
6097
5725
5314
Sources and Notes: Prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Assistance. Department of State budget, SIGAR reports, and CRS calculations. Does not include USG
operational expenses (over $5 bil ion since 2002). Food aid includes P.L.480 Title II and other programs. “Other” = Office of Transition Initiatives, Treasury Assistance, and
Peacekeeping. ESF = Economic Support Funds; DA = Development Assistance; GHCS = Global Health/Child Survival; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; NADR =
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining, and Related: IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics and Law Enforcement;
ASSF = Afghan Security Forces Funding; IDA = International Disaster Assistance.
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Table 13. NATO/ISAF and RSM Contributing Nations
(ISAF figures are those just prior to the end of the ISAF mission on December 31, 2014; RSM figures are
current levels)
NATO Countries
Non-NATO Partners

ISAF
RSM

ISAF
RSM
Belgium
160
43
Albania
22
42
Bulgaria
320
110
Armenia
121
121
Canada
0
0
Austria
3
10
Czech Republic
227
236
Australia
273
400
Denmark
145
160
Azerbaijan
94
94
Estonia
4
4
Bahrain
0
0
France
88
0
Bosnia-
8
53
Herzegovina
Germany
1,599
850
Croatia
153
91
Greece
9
4
Finland
88
80
Hungary
101
97
Georgia
755
885
Iceland
2
4
Ireland
7
7
Italy
1,411
500
Jordan
626
0
Latvia
11
25
Macedonia
152
38
Lithuania
84
70
Malaysia
2
0
Luxemburg
1
1
Mongolia
40
120
Netherlands
30
83
Montenegro
25
17
Norway
57
56
New Zealand
1
8
Poland
304
150
South Korea
0
0
Portugal
37
10
Sweden
13
30
Romania
327
650
Ukraine
10
10
Slovakia
277
39
United Arab
35
0
Emirates
Slovenia
2
7
Tonga
0
0
Spain
181
294



Turkey
393
503



United Kingdom
3,906
470



United States
20,000
6,825




Total Listed (approximate): ISAF: 32,000 RSM – 13,200

Sources: ISAF “Placemat,” press reports; and country announcements; DoD report June 2015.
Notes: *ISAF figures reflect Canada combat troop pul out in July-August 2011. Some countries might be
contributing additional forces not under ISAF command.
Congressional Research Service
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Table 14. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan
Party/
Ideology/
Leader
Leader
Ethnicity
Regional Base
Taliban
Mul ah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (stil at large
Ultra-
Throughout
possibly in Afghanistan). Umar, born in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan
orthodox
south and east.
province, is about 65 years old.
Islamic,
Small numbers
Pashtun
elsewhere.
Haqqani
Jalaludin Haqqani. Allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Said to
Same as
Paktia, Paktika,
Network
be supported, or at least tolerated, by Pakistani ISI.
above
Khost, Kabul
Islamic Society Party founder, Prof. Burhanuddi Rabbani, assassinated by
Moderate
Much of
(leader of
Taliban in September 2011. Replaced as party head by son,
Islamic,
northern and
“Northern
Salahuddin, who is also Foreign Minister. Other key
mostly Tajik western
Alliance”)
members are CEO Dr. Abdul ah, former parliament lower
Afghanistan,
house speaker Yunus Qanooni, and Ismail Khan (Herat area).
including Kabul
National
Abdul Rashid Dostam. Was Karzai rival in October 2004
Secular, left-
Jowzjan, Balkh,
Islamic
presidential election, then his top “security adviser.” As of
leaning,
Faryab, Sar-i-Pol,
Movement of
October 2011, reportedly has joined new opposition
Uzbek
and Samangan
Afghanistan
movement called “Truth and Justice Party.”
provinces.
Hizb-e-
Composed of Shi te Hazara tribes from central Afghanistan.
Shi te,
Bamiyan, Ghazni,
Wahdat
Former members Karim Khalili is vice president, but
Hazara
Dai Kundi
Mohammad Mohaqiq is Karzai rival. Generally pro-Iranian.
tribes
province
Was part of Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought
unsuccessful y with Taliban over Bamiyan. Stil revered by
Hazaras is the former leader of the group, Abdul Ali Mazari,
who was captured and kil ed by the Taliban in March 1995.
Pashtun
Various regional governors and local leaders in the east and
Moderate
Dominant in the
tribal/regional
south; central government led by Hamid Karzai.
Islamic,
south and east
leaders
Pashtun
Hizb-e-Islam
Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Was part of
Orthodox
Small groups in
Gulbuddin
Soviet-era U.S.-backed “Afghan Interim Government” based
Islamic,
Nangarhar,
(HIG)
in Peshawar, Pakistan. Was nominal “prime minister” in
Pashtun
Nuristan, and
1992-1996 mujahedin government but never actually took
Kunar provinces
office. Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in
1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Stil
active in operations east of Kabul, but open to ending
militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam faction, Yunus
Khalis, the mentor of Mul ah Umar, died July 2006.
Islamic Union
Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, leads a pro-
orthodox
Paghman
Karzai faction in parliament. Lived many years in and
Islamic,
(west of Kabul)
political y close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his “Wahhabi”
Pashtun
ideology. During anti-Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with
Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry.
Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Source: CRS.
Congressional Research Service
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Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

CRS-74


Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Figure 2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities

Source: 2003 National Geographic Society. http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted
by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics.
Notes: This map is intended to be il ustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of
Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

Congressional Research Service
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