Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
August 14, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32048
Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy
Summary
Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the
perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the
Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State
organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries
have often differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. The finalization on July 14,
2015, of a “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA) between Iran and six negotiating
powers could enhance Iran’s ability to counter the United States and its allies in the region, but
could also pave the way for cooperation to resolve some of the region’s several conflicts.
During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran’s support for militant Middle East
groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran’s
nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States orchestrated broad international
economic pressure on Iran to try to ensure that the program is verifiably confined to purely
peaceful purposes. The international pressure contributed to the June 2013 election as president of
Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran’s
international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced a November 2013 interim
nuclear agreement, an April 2, 2015, framework for a comprehensive nuclear agreement, and the
JCPOA on July 14, 2015. The JCPOA, if implemented, stipulates technical steps that would give
the international community confidence that it would take Iran at least one year to produce a
nuclear weapon, were Iran to try to do so. In exchange, Iran is to receive relief from most of the
U.S., multinational, and U.N. sanctions imposed on Iran since 2010.
The JCPOA could significantly improve U.S.-Iran relations, but the agreement comes in the
context of U.S. and allied concerns about Iranian actions in the region. U.S. allies, particularly
Israel and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE,
Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) express concern that a lifting of sanctions will furnish Iran with
additional resources with which to expand its influence further. The Persian Gulf states express
concern that Iran has made substantial gains in recent years, for example in supporting the rebel
Houthi movement in Yemen and in organizing Shiite forces to defend the embattled government
of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The war against the Islamic State organization has also given Iran
additional influence over the government of Iraq as well as common interests with the United
States in Iraq. On Syria, Iran has supported Assad, whereas the United States has asserted that his
departure is key to a political solution. The GCC states express concerns that the JCPOA could
cause the United States to tilt toward Iran or forfeit its role as the final guarantor of Gulf security.
To reassure these allies, the United States has held high level meetings centered in part on
increased military cooperation, particularly the sale of additional arms.
Domestically, Rouhani’s unexpected election win and latitude from Iran’s Supreme Leader to
negotiate the JCPOA demonstrates that Iran’s population supports reducing Iran’s isolation.
Rouhani has sought to satisfy this sentiment not only through the nuclear negotiations but also by
orchestrating the release of some political prisoners and easing some media and social
restrictions. But, Iran’s judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to restrict social
freedoms and prosecute regime critics and dissenters, and hold several U.S.-Iran dual nationals on
various charges. For further information, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by
Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr; CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman;
and CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy
Contents
Political History ............................................................................................................................... 1
U.S.–Iran Relations since the Iranian Revolution ..................................................................... 2
Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition ................................................................................... 3
Unelected or Indirectly Elected Institutions: The Supreme Leader, Council of
Guardians, and Expediency Council ...................................................................................... 5
Council of Guardians and Expediency Council .................................................................. 5
Elected Institutions and Recent Elections ................................................................................. 8
The Presidency .................................................................................................................... 9
The Majles .......................................................................................................................... 9
The Assembly of Experts .................................................................................................. 10
Elections since 1989 and Their Implications .................................................................... 10
Human Rights Practices ................................................................................................................ 14
The Strategic Challenge Posed by Iran ......................................................................................... 17
Nuclear Program and International Response ......................................................................... 17
Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Activities ............................................................................ 18
International Diplomatic Efforts to Address Iran’s Nuclear Program ............................... 19
Developments during the Obama Administration ............................................................. 21
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs ............................................................. 23
Chemical and Biological Weapons ................................................................................... 23
Missiles and Warheads ...................................................................................................... 23
Conventional and “Asymmetric Warfare” Capability ................................................................... 25
Asymmetric Warfare Capacity/Threat to the Gulf .................................................................. 25
Power Projection through Allies and Proxies: the Qods Force ............................................... 28
U.S. Policy Responses and Further Options .................................................................................. 29
Obama Administration Policy: Pressure Coupled with Engagement ...................................... 29
U.S. Defense Posture in the Persian Gulf and Military Options ............................................. 31
Military Options to Prevent a Nuclear Iran ....................................................................... 31
Gulf State Cooperation with U.S. Policy Toward Iran ...................................................... 32
GCC Military Capacity and U.S. Deployments in the Gulf .............................................. 33
Potential for Israeli Military Action Against Iran ............................................................. 38
Economic Sanctions ................................................................................................................ 38
Possible Additional Sanctions ........................................................................................... 40
Further Option: Regime Change ............................................................................................. 40
Democracy Promotion and Internet Freedom Efforts ....................................................... 41
Figures
Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Government.............................................................................. 46
Figure 2. Map of Iran .................................................................................................................... 48
Tables
Table 1. Major Factions, Personalities, and Interest Groups ........................................................... 6
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Table 2. Human Rights Practices: General Categories .................................................................. 15
Table 3. Iran’s Missile Arsenal ...................................................................................................... 24
Table 4. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal .............................................................................. 27
Table 5. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) ............................................................ 28
Table 6. Military Assets of the Gulf Cooperation Council Member States ................................... 37
Table 7. Selected Economic Indicators .......................................................................................... 38
Table 8. Digest of Existing U.S. Sanctions Against Iran ............................................................... 39
Table 9. Iran Democracy Promotion Funding ............................................................................... 44
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 49
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Political History
Iran is a country of about 75 million people, located in the heart of the Persian Gulf region. The
United States was an ally of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (“the Shah”), who
ruled from 1941 until his ouster in February 1979. The Shah assumed the throne when Britain and
Russia forced his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi (Reza Shah), from power because of his perceived
alignment with Germany in World War II. Reza Shah had assumed power in 1921 when, as an
officer in Iran’s only military force, the Cossack Brigade (reflecting Russian influence in Iran in
the early 20th century), he launched a coup against the government of the Qajar Dynasty. Reza
Shah was proclaimed Shah in 1925, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. The Qajars had been in decline
for many years before Reza Shah’s takeover. That dynasty’s perceived manipulation by Britain
and Russia had been one of the causes of the 1906 constitutionalist movement, which forced the
Qajars to form Iran’s first Majles (parliament) in August 1906 and promulgate a constitution in
December 1906. Prior to the Qajars, what is now Iran was the center of several Persian empires
and dynasties whose reach had shrunk steadily over time. Since the 16th century, Iranian empires
lost control of Bahrain (1521), Baghdad (1638), the Caucasus (1828), western Afghanistan
(1857), Baluchistan (1872), and what is now Turkmenistan (1894). Iran adopted Shiite Islam
under the Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722), which ended a series of Turkic and Mongol conquests.
The Shah was anti-Communist, and the United States viewed his government as a bulwark
against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to pro-Soviet
Arab regimes and movements. Israel maintained a representative office in Iran during the Shah’s
time and the Shah supported a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 1951, under
pressure from nationalists in the Majles (parliament) who gained strength in the 1949 Majles
elections, he appointed a popular nationalist parliamentarian, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, as prime
minister. Mossadeq was widely considered left-leaning, and the United States was wary of his
drive for nationalization of the oil industry, which had since 1913 been controlled by the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company. His followers began an uprising in August 1953 when the Shah tried to
dismiss him, and the Shah fled. The Shah was restored in a CIA-supported uprising that toppled
Mossadeq (“Operation Ajax”) on August 19, 1953.
The Shah tried to modernize Iran and orient it toward the West, but in so doing he alienated
religious Iranians and the Shiite clergy. He also allegedly tolerated severe repression and torture
of dissidents by his SAVAK intelligence service. The Shah exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
in 1964 because of Khomeini’s active opposition to what he asserted were the Shah’s anti-clerical
policies and forfeiture of Iran’s sovereignty to the United States. Khomeini fled to and taught in
Najaf, Iraq, a major Shiite theological center. In 1978, three years after the March 6, 1975, Algiers
Accords between the Shah and Iraq’s Baathist leaders that temporarily ended mutual hostile
actions, Iraq expelled Khomeini to France, where he continued to agitate for revolution that
would establish Islamic government in Iran. Mass demonstrations and guerrilla activity by pro-
Khomeini forces caused the Shah’s government to collapse. Khomeini returned from France on
February 1, 1979 and, on February 11, 1979, he declared an Islamic Republic of Iran. Khomeini’s
concept of velayat-e-faqih (rule by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent, or “Supreme Leader”) was
enshrined in the constitution that was adopted in a public referendum in December 1979 (and
amended in 1989). The constitution provided for the post of Supreme Leader of the Revolution.
The regime based itself on strong opposition to Western influence, and relations between the
United States and the Islamic Republic turned openly hostile after the November 4, 1979, seizure
of the U.S. Embassy and its U.S. diplomats by pro-Khomeini radicals, which began the so-called
“hostage crisis” that ended in January 1981 with the release of the hostages. Ayatollah Khomeini
died on June 3, 1989, and was succeeded as Supreme Leader by Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i.
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The regime faced serious unrest in its first few years, including a June 1981 bombing at the
headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and the prime minister’s office that killed
several senior leaders. The regime used these events, along with the hostage crisis with the United
States, to justify purging many of the secular, liberal, and left-wing personalities that were
prominent in the years just after the revolution. Examples included the regime’s first Prime
Minister Mehdi Bazargan; the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party (Communist), the People’s Mojahedin
Organization of Iran (PMOI, see below), and the first elected President Abolhassan Bani Sadr.
The regime was under economic and military threat during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, which
resulted at times in nearly halting Iran’s oil exports. Since that war, Iran has not faced severe
external threat but domestic political rifts have continued.
U.S.–Iran Relations since the Iranian Revolution
The February 11, 1979, fall of the Shah of Iran, who was a key U.S. ally, opened a deep and
ongoing rift in U.S.-Iranian relations. The Carter Administration sought to engage the Islamic
regime, which initially had numerous moderates in senior posts, but the Administration’s allowing
the ex-Shah into the United States for medical treatment ostensibly triggered the November 4,
1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by radical pro-Khomeini “students in the line of the
Imam (Khomeini).” The radicals held 66 U.S. diplomats hostage for 444 days, releasing them
minutes after President Reagan’s inauguration on January 20, 1981. The United States broke
relations with Iran on April 7, 1980, two weeks prior to the failed U.S. military attempt to rescue
the hostages during April 24-25, 1980.
Iran has an interest section in Washington, DC, under the auspices of the Embassy of Pakistan; it
is staffed by Iranian Americans. The former Iranian Embassy closed in April 1980 when the two
countries broke diplomatic relations, and remains under the control of the State Department. The
U.S. interest section in Tehran—under the auspices of the Embassy of Switzerland there—has no
American personnel. Iran’s Mission to the United Nations in New York runs most of Iran’s
diplomacy inside the United States. The former U.S. embassy in Tehran is now used as a museum
commemorating the revolution and as a Basij headquarters.
Reagan Administration. The Reagan Administration designated Iran as a “state sponsor of
terrorism” in January 1984, primarily because of Iran’s support for Lebanese Hezbollah. The
designation reinforced a U.S “tilt” toward Iraq in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, which included
diplomatic efforts to block conventional arms sales to Iran.1 During 1987-1988, U.S. naval forces
engaged in several skirmishes with Iranian naval elements in the course of U.S. efforts to protect
international oil shipments in the Gulf from Iranian mines and other attacks. On April 18, 1988
(“Operation Praying Mantis”), Iran lost one-quarter of its larger naval ships in an engagement
with the U.S. Navy, including a frigate sunk. However, the Administration to some extent
undermined its efforts to contain Iran by providing some arms to Iran (“TOW” anti-tank weapons
and I-Hawk air defense equipment) as part of an effort to enlist Iran’s help in compelling
Hezbollah to release U.S. hostages in held in Lebanon. On July 3, 1988, U.S. forces in the Gulf
mistakenly shot down Iran Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes over the Gulf, killing all 290 on
board.
George H. W. Bush Administration. President George H.W. Bush laid the groundwork for a
rapprochement with Iran in his January 1989 inaugural speech, in which he said that “goodwill
begets goodwill” with respect to Iran. The comments were interpreted as offering to improve
1 Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein’s Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1991), p. 168.
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relations with Iran if it helped obtain the release of the U.S. hostages in Lebanon. Iran apparently
did assist in obtaining their release, and all remaining U.S. hostages there were freed by the end
of December 1991. However, no U.S.-Iran thaw followed, possibly because Iran continued to
back groups opposed to Israel and Middle East peace.
Clinton Administration. Upon taking office in 1993, the Clinton Administration announced a
strategy of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq—attempting to keep both weak rather than
alternately tilting to one or the other. In 1995 and 1996, the Clinton Administration and Congress
banned U.S. trade and investment with Iran and imposed penalties on investment in Iran’s energy
sector (Iran Sanctions Act) in response to growing concerns about Iran’s weapons of mass
destruction and its efforts to subvert the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Clinton Administration
expressed skepticism of the EU’s policy of “critical dialogue” with Iran, in which the EU states
met with Iran but criticized its human rights policies and its support for militant movements. The
election of Mohammad Khatemi as president in May 1997 precipitated a U.S. offer of direct
dialogue without preconditions, but Khatemi ruled out U.S.-Iran direct talks. In a June 1998
speech, then-Secretary of State Albright called for mutual confidence building measures that
could lead to a “road map” for normalization, and in a March 17, 2000 speech, she acknowledged
past U.S. meddling in Iran. At the September 2000 U.N. “Millennium Summit” in New York,
Albright and President Clinton attended Khatemi’s speeches.
George W. Bush Administration. Despite limited tacit cooperation with Iran on post-Taliban
Afghanistan, President George W. Bush identified Iran as a U.S. adversary by including it as part
of an “axis of evil” (along with Iraq and North Korea) in his January 2002 State of the Union
message. Later that year, Iran’s nuclear program emerged as a major issue for U.S. policy toward
Iran, and President Bush’s January 20, 2005 second inaugural address and his January 31, 2006
State of the Union message stated that the United States would be a close ally of a free and
democratic Iran—reflecting apparent sentiment for changing Iran’s regime.2 The second of those
statements was made after the more hardline Ahmadinejad was elected president in June 2005,
replacing Khatemi. On the other hand, reflecting the views of those in the Administration who
favored diplomacy, the Administration continued a dialogue with Iran on Afghanistan and
expanded the dialogue to include issues facing post-Saddam Iraq,3 but did not offer unconditional,
direct dialogue on all issues of mutual concern. The United States aided victims of the December
2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran. Some assert that the Bush Administration missed an opportunity
for a “grand bargain” with Iran on its nuclear program and regional issues by rebuffing a reported
May 2003 Iranian overture, transmitted by the Swiss Ambassador to Iran, for a sweeping
agreement on all major outstanding issues of mutual concern.4 However, State Department
officials disputed that the proposal was fully vetted within Iran’s leadership.
Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition
Iran’s regime is widely considered authoritarian, although it provides for elected institutions,
checks and balances, and diversity of opinion among leaders. The perception of authoritarianism
is based largely on the powers invested in the position of “Supreme Leader” (known formally in
2 Helene Cooper and David Sanger, “Strategy on Iran Stirs New Debate at White House,” New York Times, June 16,
2007.
3 Robin Wright, “U.S. In ‘Useful’ Talks With Iran,” Los Angeles Times, May 13, 2003.
4 http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/2003_Spring_Iran_Proposal.pdf.
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Iran as “Leader of the Revolution”), who is not directly elected by the population, is not term-
limited, and has sweeping powers. The Supreme Leader is, however, chosen by an all-elected
body. The President and the Majles (unicameral parliament) are directly elected. There are also
elections for municipal councils, which in turn select mayors. Even within the unelected
institutions, factional disputes between those who insist on ideological purity and those
considered more pragmatic have been frequent and have often caused sudden alterations in
Iranian policies. Iranian leaders assert that Iran is the most politically stable country in the region.
Aside from the 2009-2010 uprising against alleged fraud in the re-election of then President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the regime has faced only episodic unrest from minorities, intellectuals,
students, labor groups, and women. Iran’s minority groups have also been a source of periodic
unrest, primarily in the geographic areas where they are concentrated. Persians are about 51% of
the population of about 75 million, and the major ethnic minorities are Azeris and Kurds. Shiite
Muslims are about 90% of the Muslim population and Sunni Muslims are about 10%. About 2%
of the population is non-Muslim, including Christians, Zoroastrians (an ancient religion in what is
now Iran), Jewish, and Baha’i.
Supreme Leader:
Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i
Born in July 1939 to an Azeri (Turkic) family from Mashhad. Was jailed by the Shah of Iran for supporting
Ayatol ah Khomeini’s revolution. After the regime took power in 1979, helped organize Revolutionary Guard
and other security organs. Lost some use of right arm in purported assassination attempt in June 1981. Was
elected president in 1981 and served until 1989. Was selected Khomeini’s successor in June 1989 upon his death.
Upon that selection, Khamene’i religious ranking was advanced in official organs to “Grand Ayatol ah” from the
lower ranking “Hoj at ol-Islam.” But, stil lacks the undisputed authority to end factional disputes and the public
adoration Khomeini had. Has taken more of a day-to-day role since 2009 uprising, including in the nuclear
negotiations issue. Sided decisively with hardline opponents of then president Ahmadinejad after mid-2011, but
acquiesced to the election of the relatively moderate Rouhani. Khamene’i publicly supported the 2013 interim
nuclear agreement and has not indicated disapproval of the JCPOA. Reputedly issued religious proclamation
(2003) against Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, and has publicly (2012) called doing so a “sin,” and is widely
believed to fear direct military confrontation with United States on Iranian soil. Generally does not meet with
Western officials and is suspicious of relations with the West as potentially making Iran vulnerable to Western
cultural influence, spying, and possible regime destabilization efforts.
Policies
Throughout career, has consistently taken hardline stances on regional issues, particularly toward Israel, often
calling it a cancerous tumor that needs to be excised from the region. In March 2014, publicly questioned
whether the Holocaust occurred—an issue highlighted by former president Ahmadinejad.
Ful y backs efforts by Revolutionary Guard and other Iranian organs to support pro-Iranian movements and
governments, including that of Syria. On economic issues, he has tended to support the business community
(bazaaris), and opposed state control of the economy, but believes Iran’s economy is self-sufficient enough to
withstand the effects of international sanctions.
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Office
His office is run by Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani, with significant input from Khamene’i’s second and
increasingly influential son, Mojtaba. Also advised by Keyhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari and former Foreign
Minister Ali Akbar Velayati.
Khamene’i’s health is widely considered good, although the government acknowledged that he underwent
prostate surgery in September 2014. Potential successors include former judiciary chief Ayatol ah Mahmoud
Shahrudi; Expediency Council Chairman and longtime regime stalwart Ayatol ah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani;
hardline senior cleric Ayatol ah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi; current Judiciary head Ayatol ah Sadeq Larijani;
and hardline Tehran Friday prayer leader Ayatol ah Ahmad Khatemi. None is considered a clear consensus
choice if Khamene’i leaves the scene unexpectedly, and experts assess that the Assembly of Experts might use a
constitutional provision to set up a three-person leadership council to replace Khamene’i rather than select one
person. Of the potential successors, only Rafsanjani can legitimately claim to have been a constant presence at
Ayatol ah Khomeini’s side in the revolution that established the Islamic Republic.
Photograph from http://www.leader.ir
Unelected or Indirectly Elected Institutions: The Supreme Leader,
Council of Guardians, and Expediency Council
At the apex of the Islamic Republic’s power structure is the “Supreme Leader,” He is chosen by
an elected body—the Assembly of Experts—which also has the constitutional power to remove
him, as well as to re-write Iran’s constitution (subject to approval in a national referendum). Upon
Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, the Assembly selected one of his disciples, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i,
as Supreme Leader.5 Although he has never had Khomeini’s undisputed political or religious
authority, the powers of the office ensure that Khamene’i is Iran’s paramount leader. Under the
constitution, the Supreme Leader is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, giving him the
power to appoint commanders. He is directly represented on the highest national security body,
the Supreme National Security Council, which is composed of top military and civilian security
officials. The constitution gives the Supreme Leader the power to approve the removal of an
elected president if either the judiciary or the Majles (parliament) decide there is cause for that
removal. The Supreme Leader appoints half of the 12-member Council of Guardians; all
members of the Expediency Council, and the head of Iran’s judiciary.
Council of Guardians and Expediency Council
The 12-member Council of Guardians (COG) consists of six Islamic jurists appointed by the
Supreme Leader, and six secular lawyers selected by the judiciary and confirmed by the Majles.
Currently headed by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the conservative-controlled body reviews
legislation to ensure it conforms to Islamic law. It also vets election candidates by evaluating their
backgrounds according to constitutional requirements that each candidate demonstrate knowledge
of Islam, loyalty to the Islamic system of government, and other criteria that are largely
subjective. The COG also certifies election results.
The 42-member “Expediency Council” was established in 1988 to resolve legislative
disagreements between the Majles and the COG. It has since evolved into a policy advisory body
for the Supreme Leader and an overseer of the performance of the president and his cabinet. Its
members serve five-year terms; its chairman, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, was reappointed in
5 At the time of his selection as Supreme Leader, Khamene’i was generally referred to at the rank of Hojjat ol-Islam,
one rank below Ayatollah, suggesting his religious elevation was political rather than through traditional mechanisms.
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February 2007 and again in March 2012. The Expediency Council’s executive officer is former
Revolutionary Guard commander-in-chief Mohsen Reza’i.
Table 1. Major Factions, Personalities, and Interest Groups
Supreme Leader Ali
See box above.
Khamene’i
President Hassan Rouhani
See box below.
Expediency Council Chair
Born in 1934, a longtime key regime strategist, Khomeini disciple, and advocate of
Ayatol ah Ali Akbar Hashemi-
“grand bargain” to resolve all outstanding issues with United States. Was Majles
Rafsanjani
speaker during 1981-1989 and president 1989-1997. Family owns large share of
Iran’s total pistachio production. Ouster as Assembly of Experts chairman in 2011
widely attributed to his tacit support of popular opposition to Ahmadinejad 2009
reelection. That perception undoubtedly contributed to COG denying his
candidacy in 2013 presidential elections. Election of Rouhani, an ally, as president
in 2013 has revived Rafsanjani’s influence somewhat.
The political activities of Rafsanjani’s children have contributed to his uneven
relations with Khamene’i. Daughter Faizah was jailed in September 2012 for
participating in the 2009 protests. Five Rafsanjani other family members were
arrested in 2009 and 2010 on similar charges.
Senior Shi te Clerics
The most senior clerics, most of whom are in Qom, including several Grand
Ayatol ahs, are generally “quietist”—they believe that the senior clergy should
refrain from direct involvement in politics. These include Grand Ayatol ah Nasser
Makarem Shirazi, Grand Ayatol ah Abdol Karim Musavi-Ardabili, and Grand
Ayatol ah Yusuf Sanei, all of whom criticized the regime’s crackdown against
oppositionists during the 2009 uprising. Others believe in political involvement,
including Ayatol ah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, the founder of the hardline
Haqqani school and spiritual mentor to Ahmadinejad until breaking with him in
2011. Yazdi is an assertive defender of the powers of the Supreme Leader.
Society of Militant Clerics
Longtime organization of moderate-to-hardline clerics. Did not back Ahmadinejad
for reelection in 2009 and led a bloc opposing Ahmadinejad in the March 2, 2012,
Majles elections. President Rouhani is a member of this group.
Reformist and Green
Mir Hossein Musavi is the titular leader of the Green movement, the coalition of
Movement Leaders: Mir
youth and intellectuals that led the 2009-2010 uprising that protested the allegedly
Hossein Musavi/
fraudulent re-election of then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Musavi is a non-
Mohammad Khatemi/Mehdi
cleric, about 71 years old and an architect by training. He was a disciple of
Karrubi
Ayatol ah Khomeini who served as foreign minister (1980), then prime minister
(1981-1989), at which time he successful y managed the state rationing program
during the privations of the Iran-Iraq War. Musavi often feuded with Khamene’i,
who was then president. At that time, he was an advocate of state control of the
economy. His post was abolished in the 1989 revision of the constitution.
Musavi supports political and social freedoms and reducing Iran’s international
isolation, but also state intervention in the economy to benefit workers and lower
classes. Appeared at some of the 2009 protests, sometimes harassed by security
agents, but harder line opposition leaders resented his statements supporting
reconciliation with the regime. He and his wife (prominent activist Zahra
Rahnevard), along with fellow Green Movement leader and defeated 2009
presidential candidate Mehdi Karrubi, were placed in detention in mid-2011. In
early 2014, Karrubi was allowed to return to his home, although stil under the
control of regime guards. Musavi remains in detention. Karrubi was Speaker of the
Majles during 1989-1992 and 2000-2004.
Mohammad Khatemi was elected president on a reformist platform in May 1997,
with 69% of the vote; reelected June 2001 with 77%. Rode wave of sentiment for
easing social and political restrictions, but these groups became disil usioned with
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Khatemi’s failure as president to buck hardliners on reform issues. He endorsed
Musavi in the 2009 election.
Student Groups
Groups composed of well-educated, Westernized urban youth have been the
backbone of the Green Movement. The Office of Consolidation of Unity is the
student group that led the 1999 riots but which later became control ed by regime
loyalists. An offshoot, the Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS), believes in
regime replacement and in 2013 formed a “National Iran Congress” to advocate
that outcome. CIS founder Amir Abbas Fakhravar is based in the United States.
Co-founder Arzhang Davoodi has been in prison for 11 years and in July 2014 was
sentenced to death.
Islamic Iran Participation
The most prominent and best organized pro-reform grouping, but in 2009 lost
Front (IIPF)
political ground to Green Movement groups. IIPF leaders include Khatemi’s
brother, Mohammad Reza Khatemi (deputy speaker in the 2000-2004 Majles) and
Mohsen Mirdamadi. Backed Musavi in June 2009 election; several IIPF leaders
detained and prosecuted in postelection dispute. The party was outlawed in
September 2010.
Mojahedin of the Islamic
Composed mainly of left-leaning Iranian figures who support state control of the
Revolution Organization
economy, but want greater political pluralism and relaxation of rules on social
(MIR)
behavior. A major constituency of the reformist camp. Its leader is former Heavy
Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi, who supported Musavi in 2009 election and has
been incarcerated for most of the time since June 2009. The organization was
outlawed by the regime simultaneously with the outlawing of the IIPF, above.
Combatant Clerics
Very similar name to the Society of Militant Clerics, above, but politically very
Association
different. Formed in 1988, it is run by reformist critics. Leading figures include
Mohammad Khatemi, former Interior Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur, and
former Prosecutor General Ali Asgar Musavi-Koiniha.
Other Prominent Dissidents
Other leading dissidents, some in Iran, others in exile (including in the United
States), have been challenging the regime since well before the Green Movement
formed. Journalist Akbar Ganji served six years in prison for alleging high-level
involvement in 1999 murders of Iranian dissident intellectuals. Religion scholar
Abdol Karim Soroush left Iran in 2001 after challenging the doctrine of clerical
rule. Former Revolutionary Guard organizer Mohsen Sazegara broadcasts on-line
to Iran from his base in the United States. Nobel Peace Prize laureate (2003) and
Iran human rights activist lawyer Shirin Abadi, who for many years represented
clients persecuted or prosecuted by the regime, left Iran after the 2009 uprising.
Some well-known dissidents incarcerated since 2010 include filmmaker Jafar
Panahi; journalist Abdolreza Tajik; famed blogger Hossein Derakshan. 80-year-old
Iran Freedom Movement leader Ibrahim Yazdi was released from prison in April
2011 after resigning as the Freedom Movement’s leader. Human rights lawyer
Nasrin Sotoudeh was released from prison in September 2013. In May 2015, the
regime arrested Ms. Narges Mohammad, a well-known activist against regime
executions. Other significant dissidents in exile include former Culture Minister
Ataol ah Mohajerani, Mohsen Kadivar, and U.S.-based Fatemah Haghighatgoo.
Monarchists/Shah’s Son
Some Iranians outside Iran, including in the United States, want to replace the
regime with a constitutional monarchy led by Reza Pahlavi, the U.S.-based son of
the late former Shah and a U.S.-trained combat pilot. The Shah’s son, who is about
60 years old, has delivered statements condemning the regime for the post-2009
election crackdown and he has called for international governments to withdraw
their representation from Tehran. He appears periodically in broadcasts into Iran
by Iranian exile-run stations in California,6 as well as in other Iran-oriented media.
Pahlavi has always had some support particularly in the older generation in Iran,
6 Ron Kampeas, “Iran’s Crown Prince Plots Nonviolent Insurrection from Suburban Washington,” Associated Press,
August 26, 2002.
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but he reportedly is trying to broaden his fol owing by asserting that he supports
democracy and not restoration of a monarchy. Since March 2011, he has been
increasingly cooperating with—and possibly attempting to co-opt—younger
leaders in a “National Council of Iran” (NCI), which was formally established along
with over 30 other groups in April 2013. The Council drafted a set of democratic
principles for a post-Islamic republic Iran but has since floundered as a result of
defections and relative lack of activity.
Leftist Groups
Some oppositionists who support left-wing ideologies support the People’s
Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). See text box at the end of this report.
Sunni Armed Opposition:
Jundullah is composed of Sunni Muslims primarily from the Baluchistan region
Jundul ah
bordering Pakistan. The region is inhabited by members of the Baluch minority and
is far less developed than other parts of Iran. On the grounds that Jundullah has
attacked civilians in the course of violent attacks in Iran, the State Department
formally named it an FTO on November 4, 2010. Some saw the designation as an
overture toward the Iranian government, while others saw it as a sign that the
United States supports only opposition groups that are committed to peaceful
methods. Jundullah has conducted several attacks on Iranian security and civilian
officials, including a May 2009 bombing of a mosque in Zahedan and the October
2009 kil ing of five IRGC commanders in Sistan va Baluchistan Province. The
regime claimed a major victory against the group in February 2010 with the
capture of the group’s top leader, Abdolmalek Rigi. The regime executed him in
June 2010, but the group retaliated in July 2010 with a Zahedan bombing that kil ed
28 persons, including some IRGC personnel. The group is believed responsible for
a December 15, 2010, bombing at a mosque in Chahbahar, also in Baluchistan, that
kil ed 38.
Kurdish Armed Groups: Free
An armed Kurdish group operating out of Iraq is the Free Life Party, known by its
Life Party (PJAK)
acronym PJAK. Its leader is believed to be Abdul Rahman Hajji Ahmadi, born in
1941, who is a citizen of Germany and lives in that country. Many PJAK fighters
reportedly are women. PJAK was designated by the Treasury Department in early
February 2009 as a terrorism supporting entity under Executive Order 13224,
although the designation statement indicated the decision was based mainly on
PJAK’s association with the Turkish Kurdish opposition group Kongra Gel, also
known as the PKK. Five Kurds executed by Iran’s regime in May 2010 were alleged
members of PJAK.
In June 2010 and July 2011, Iran conducted some shelling of reputed PJAK bases
inside Iraq, reportedly kil ing some Kurdish civilians.
Arab Oppositionists/Ahwazi
Another militant group, the Ahwazi Arabs, operates in the largely Arab-inhabited
Arabs
areas of southwest Iran. Relatively inactive over the past few years, and the regime
continues to execute captured members of the organization.
Sources: Various press accounts and author conversations with Iran experts in and outside Washington, DC.
Elected Institutions and Recent Elections
Several major institutions are directly elected by the population, but international organizations
and governments question the credibility of Iran’s elections because of the COG’s role in limiting
the number and ideological diversity of candidates. Women can vote and run for most offices, but
the COG interprets the Iranian constitution as prohibiting women from running for the office of
president. Presidential candidates must receive more than 50% of the vote to avoid a runoff,
which is generally held several weeks later.
Another criticism of the political process in Iran is the relative absence of political parties;
establishing a party requires the permission of the Interior Ministry under Article 10 of Iran’s
constitution. The standards to obtain approval are high: to date, numerous parties have filed for
permission since the regime was founded, but only those considered loyal to the regime have
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been granted (or allowed to retain) license to operate. Some have been licensed and then banned,
such as the two reformist parties Islamic Iran Participation Front and Organization of Mojahedin
of the Islamic Revolution, which were formally outlawed in September 2010.
The Presidency
The main directly elected institution is the presidency, which is clearly subordinate to the
Supreme Leader. Each president has tried and generally failed to expand his authority relative to
the Supreme Leader. Presidential authority, particularly on matters of national security, is also
disputed by key clerics and allies of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other
powerful institutions. But the presidency does provide vast opportunities for the holder of the post
to reward supporters.
The president appoints and supervises the cabinet, develops the budgets of cabinet departments,
and imposes and collects taxes on corporations and other bodies. The presidency also runs
oversight bodies such as the Anticorruption Headquarters and the General Inspection
Organization, to which all government officials are formally required to submit annual financial
statements. Religious foundations, called “bonyads,” for example, are loosely regulated and
largely exempt from taxation. Likewise, the IRGC is able to generate profits from its business
affiliates, which enjoy vast tax and regulatory benefits, and can spend significant amounts of
unbudgeted funds on arms, technology, support to pro-Iranian movements, and other functions.
Prior to 1989, Iran had both an elected president and a prime minister selected by the elected
Majles (parliament). However, the holders of the two positions were constantly in institutional
conflict and a 1989 constitutional revision eliminated the prime ministership. Because Iran’s
presidents have sometimes asserted the powers of their institution against the office of the
Supreme Leader itself, in October 2011, Khamene’i raised the possibility of eliminating the post
of president and restoring the post of prime minister. Because the prime minister would be
selected by the elected Majles rather than being directly elected by the population, he presumably
would not be as independent of the Supreme Leader.
The Majles
Iran’s Majles, or parliament, is unicameral, consisting of 290 seats, all elected. Majles elections
occur one year prior to the presidential elections; the elections for the ninth Majles were held on
March 2, 2012 and the next will be held on March 26, 2016. The Majles confirms cabinet
selections and drafts and acts on legislation. Among its main duties is to consider and enact a
proposed national budget, actions that typically take place in advance of the Persian New Year
(Nowruz) each March 21. It actively legislates on domestic economic and social issues, but it
tends to defer to the presidency and security institutions on defense and foreign policy issues. It is
constitutionally required to ratify major international agreements, including any comprehensive
nuclear agreement, but the Supreme Leader’s broad powers would enable him to avoid this
requirement.
The Majles has always been highly factionalized. However, all factions tend to defer immediately
to the authority of the Supreme Leader. There is no “quota” for the number of women to be
elected, but women regularly run and win election. Still, their representation has been small
relative to the female population. There is one “reserved seat” for each of Iran’s recognized
religious minorities, including Jews and Christians.
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The Assembly of Experts
A major but little publicized elected institution is the Assembly of Experts. Akin to a standing
electoral college, it is empowered to choose a new Supreme Leader upon the death of the
incumbent, and it formally “oversees” the work of the Supreme Leader. The Assembly can
replace him if necessary, although invoking that power would, in practice, most likely occur in
the event of a severe health crisis. The Assembly is also empowered to amend the constitution.
The Assembly has 86 seats, elected to an eight-year term, with elections conducted on a
provincial basis. It generally meets two times a year, for a few days each. The fourth election for
the Assembly was held on December 15, 2006; after that election, Rafsanjani, still a major figure
having served two terms as president (1989-1997), was named deputy leader of the Assembly.
After the death of the leader of the Assembly (Ayatollah Meshkini), Rafsanjani was selected its
head in September 2007. Rafsanjani’s opposition to the crackdown on the 2009 uprising ran him
afoul of the Supreme Leader and he was not reelected as chair of the body in March 2011. He was
replaced by aging and infirm compromise candidate Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani,
who died in October 2014 and was replaced on an acting basis by deputy Chairman Mahmoud
Shahrudi, a former chief of the judiciary. The Assembly selected 83-year old Mohammad Yazdi as
the new chairman in March 2015; he will serve until the next Assembly of Experts election on
March 26, 2016 (concurrent with the Majles elections).
Elections since 1989 and Their Implications
Rafsanjani served as president during 1989-1997, winning election in a vote held soon after
Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in June of 1989. He was succeeded by avowed reformist Mohammad
Khatemi who won landslide victories in the elections of 1997 and 2001. After marginalizing
Khatemi by accusing him of opening up the political system too much, hardliners began to regain
the sway they held when Ayatollah Khomeini was alive. Conservatives won 155 out of the 290
Majles seats in the February 20, 2004, Majles elections, in large part because the COG disallowed
3,600 reformist candidates.
2005 Presidential Election. The COG narrowed the field for the June 2005 presidential elections
to 8 out of the 1,014 persons who filed. The major candidates were Rafsanjani,7 Ali Larijani,
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. With 21% and 19.5%,
respectively, Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, who apparently had the tacit backing of Khamene’i,
moved to a runoff on June 24. Reformist candidates fared relatively poorly. Ahmadinejad won
with 61.8% to Rafsanjani’s 35.7%. During Ahmadinejad’s first term, which began in August
2005, splits widened between Ahmadinejad and other conservatives. In the March 2008 Majles
elections, some conservatives banded together in an anti-Ahmadinejad bloc.
2009 Presidential Election. Reformists saw this conservative split as an opportunity to unseat
Ahmadinejad in the June 12, 2009 presidential election and rallied behind Mir Hossein Musavi,
who had been prime minister during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. The COG also allowed the
candidacies of reformist Mehdi Karrubi and former IRGC Commander Mohsen Reza’i (see
above). Musavi’s young, urban supporters used social media such as Facebook and Twitter to
organize large rallies in Tehran, but pro-Ahmadinejad rallies were large as well. Turnout was
about 85%. The Interior Ministry announced two hours after the polls closed that Ahmadinejad
had won, although in the past results had been announced the day after. The vote totals, released
7 Rafsanjani was constitutionally permitted to run because a third term would not have been consecutive with his
previous two terms. In the 2001 presidential election, the Council permitted 10 out of the 814 registered candidates.
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June 13, showed Ahmadinejad receiving about 25 million votes (63%), Musavi with about 13
million, and under 1 million each for Reza’i and Karrubi. Musavi supporters immediately began
protesting, citing the infeasibility of counting votes so quickly. Some outside analysts said the
results tracked pre-election polls.8 Large public demonstrations occurred June 13-19, 2009,
largely in Tehran but also in other cities. Security forces used some force and killed over 100
protesters (opposition figure—Iran government figure was 27), including a 19-year-old woman,
Neda Soltani, who subsequently became an emblem of the uprising.
The opposition congealed into the “Green Movement of Hope and Change,” which mounted a
challenge to the regime. Some protests in December 2009 overwhelmed regime security forces in
some parts of Tehran, but the movement’s outward activity declined after its demonstration
planned for the February 11, 2010, anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic was
suppressed. Minor protests were held on several subsequent occasions in 2010. The uprising
apparently failed to win support from older Iranians and Iranians who live in rural areas.
As the unrest ebbed, Ahmadinejad sought to promote the interests of his loyalists and a nationalist
version of Islam that limits clerical authority. That brought him into conflict, to some extent, with
Supreme Leader Khamene’i. Amid that rift, the March 2, 2012, Majles elections attracted only
5,400 candidacies—33% fewer than the previous Majles elections. Only 10% of them were
women. The COG issued a final candidate list of 3,400 for the 290 seats up for election. Two
blocs of candidates supported strongly by Khamene’i won about 75% of the seats—weakening
Ahmadinejad politically.
June 14, 2013, Presidential Election
In early 2013, the presidential election was set for June 14, with municipal elections to be held
concurrently, perhaps in part to improve turnout among voters mobilized by local issues.
Candidate registration took place during May 7-11, 2013, and the COG finalized the presidential
candidate field on May 22. A runoff was to be held on June 21 if no candidate received more than
50% of the votes. The major candidates who filed included the following:
Four figures close to the Supreme Leader—Tehran mayor Qalibaf, former Majles
Speaker Haddad Adel, former foreign minister and top Khamene’i foreign policy
advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, and Iran’s then chief nuclear negotiator, Seyed Jalilli.
The COG approved them to run; Haddad Adel dropped out before the vote.
Former chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani, a moderate and Rafsanjani ally.
Former IRGC Commander-in-Chief Mohsen Reza’i was approved to run, but his
constituency had not broadened since the 2009 contest. The COG disapproved
Rafsanjani’s candidacy—a disqualification that shocked Iranians because of
Rafsanjani’s prominent place in the history of the regime. Ahmadinejad ally,
Mashai, was also turned down to run by the COG.
Green Movement supporters, at first expected to boycott the vote, mobilized behind Rouhani late
in the campaign as the perception took hold that the regime was committed to avoiding another
election-related rift in society. This vote propelled a 70% turnout and a first-round victory for
Rouhani, garnering about 50.7% of the 36 million votes cast and enough to avoid a runoff. Many
8 A paper published by Chatham House and the University of St. Andrews strongly questions how Ahmadinejad’s vote
could have been as large as reported by official results, in light of past voting patterns throughout Iran. “Preliminary
Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election.” http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk.
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asserted that the Rouhani victory represented the continued strength of the ideals of the Green
Movement, even if supporters of those ideals participated in a regime-conducted election.
Rouhani was sworn in on August 4, 2013, and nominated a cabinet that same day. His nominees
appeared to reflect a commitment to implement his platform and to appoint competent officials
rather than political loyalists. The Majles approved all but three of his choices. The most
significant appointees, as well as other personnel moves made by Rouhani, include the following:
Foreign Minister: Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Ambassador to the United
Nations in New York. Rouhani assigned Zarif to serve concurrently as chief
nuclear negotiator, a post traditionally held by the chairman of the Supreme
National Security Council. In September 2013, Rouhani appointed senior IRGC
leader and former Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani as head of that body;
Shamkhani has held more moderate positions than his IRGC peers.
Oil Minister: Bijan Zanganeh, who served in the same post during the Khatemi
presidency and attracted significant foreign investment to the sector. He replaced
Rostam Qasemi, who was associated with the corporate arm of the IRGC.
Zanganeh has reappointed and recruited many oil industry technocrats.
Defense Minister: Hosein Dehgan. An IRGC stalwart, he was an early organizer
of the IRGC unit in Lebanon that helped form Hezbollah’s militia wing; that unit
later became the Qods Force. He later was IRGC Air Force commander and
deputy Defense Minister.
Justice Minister: Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi, a controversial minister because of
Pour-Mohammadi’s alleged abuses of political dissidents in previous positions,
including as Interior Minister (2005-2008).
The relatively moderate ex-Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi serves as the head
of Iran’s atomic energy agency; and Reza Najafi is envoy to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Salehi was intimately involved in the last stages
of nuclear negotiations that led to the April 2, 2015, framework accord.
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Hojjat ol-Islam Dr. Hassan Rouhani
Hassan Rouhani is a Hoj at ol-Islam, one rank below Ayatol ah. He was born in 1948. He holds a Ph.D. in law from
Glasgow Caledonian University in Scotland. Rouhani is a long-time regime stalwart who was part of Ayatol ah
Khomeini’s circle prior to the triumph of the Islamic revolution. He is also an associate and protégé of Rafsanjani, and
Rouhani’s pragmatic policy approach on issues such as the nuclear issue and relations with the United States
approximates Rafsanjani’s views. Rouhani’s closeness to Rafsanjani potentially complicates Rouhani’s relations with
Khamene’i, but there is no evidence of direct Rouhani-Khamene’i tension to date.
Often nicknamed the “diplomat sheikh,” Rouhani was chief nuclear negotiator during 2003-2005, when Iran did agree
to suspend uranium enrichment. He is believed amenable to a nuclear deal with the international community that
would reduce international sanctions but not necessarily preclude any options for Iran’s nuclear program over the
longer term. He also campaigned on a platform of easing the Islamic Republic’s social restrictions and its suppression
of free expression. That platform helped Rouhani draw support from the Green movement and other reformists to
win his election. On the other hand, some accounts suggest that he supported the crackdown against an earlier
student uprising in July 1999, during the presidency of reformist figure Mohammad Khatemi.
Rouhani is a longtime member of the political establishment. Then President Rafsanjani appointed him a member of
the Supreme National Security Council in 1989, and he remains on that body. He has been a member of the Assembly
of Experts since 1999, and was a member of the Majles during 1980-2000, serving twice as deputy speaker. He has
also been a member of the Expediency Council since 1991. He headed the Center for Strategic Studies, a foreign
policy think tank that has advised the Expediency Council and the Supreme Leader, since 1992.
Rouhani Presidency
Rouhani’s presidency, to date, has focused mainly on the nuclear negotiations, regional issues,
and the economy. Reformists say they are assessing his presidency based on the degree to which
he fulfills campaign promises to ease restrictions on freedom of expression. A test of his
intentions and capabilities has been whether the titular Green Movement leaders Mousavi and
Karrubi, who were detained in early 2011, would be set free. In early 2014, the regime moved
Karrubi back to his home from a detention facility, but regime guards reportedly are posted in his
home. Musavi has not been released. In June 2014, Supreme Leader Khamene’i told a reformist
parliamentarian that they would have faced worse consequences if the regime had put them on
trial.9 Nor has Rouhani succeeded in easing travel restrictions on the reformist former president
Mohammad Khatemi, who ran afoul of Khamene’i in the latter stages of his term. Still, in late
2013, Rouhani apparently prevailed on the judiciary to release nearly 80 political prisoners
incarcerated for involvement in the uprising, including prominent human rights lawyer Nasrin
Sotoudeh.
In a direct rebuke to Rouhani, in August 2014, the Majles voted to oust Minister for Science,
Research, and Technology Reza Faraji Dana. Majles hardliners say the minister was appointing to
senior ministry positions persons who supported the 2009 uprising. Several Rouhani nominees to
replace him were voted down before the Majles confirmed Mohammad Farhadi as the
replacement in in November 2014. Hardliners have criticized Foreign Minister Zarif for
concessions made by Iran in the JCPOA, but Khamene’i’s repeated statements of support for the
talks and the negotiating team prevented hardliners from weakening Rouhani within the regime.
The JCPOA and resulting sanctions relief, if implemented, are likely to improve Rouhani’s
chances for re-election 2017, as well as improving the prospects for moderate candidates to do
well in the 2016 Majles elections.
9 “Iran’s Khamenei Warns Off Bid to Free Opposition Chiefs” Agence France Presse, July 1, 2014.
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link to page 19 Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy
Human Rights Practices
International criticism of Iran’s human rights practices predates the crackdown against the 2009
uprising. Table 2, which discusses the regime’s record on a number of human rights issues, is
based on the latest State Department human rights report (for 2014) 10 and on reports from a U.N.
Special Rapporteur, Ahmad Shaheed. These reports cite Iran for a wide range of serious abuses—
aside from its suppression of political opponents—including unjust executions, politically
motivated abductions by security forces, torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention.
Iran’s human rights record is scrutinized—and widely criticized—by the United Nations, the
United States, and multilateral groupings. After a four-year review of Iran’s human rights record
that took place in February 2010, on March 24, 2011, the U.N. Human Rights Council voted, 22
to 7, to reestablish the post of “Special Rapporteur” on Iranian human rights abuses, and former
Maldives Foreign Minister Ahmad Shaheed was appointed to this role in June 2011. A previous
Special Rapporteur mission on Iran existed during 1988-2002. The U.N. Human Rights Council
has since continued to renew the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on a yearly basis.
Iran has been censured for refusing permission for the Special Rapporteur to conduct fact-finding
visits to Iran. On November 21, 2011, the U.N. General Assembly’s Third Committee, by a vote
of 86-32, with 59 abstentions, approved a resolution asserting that Iran must cooperate with the
efforts of the Special Rapporteur. The full Assembly approved the resolution on December 19,
2011, by a vote of 89-30 with 64 abstentions. In April 2014, the European Parliament passed a
resolution calling on European Union (EU) diplomats to raise Iran’s human rights record at
official engagements. Earlier, on March 25, 2014, an EU human rights delegation visited Iran and
held a meeting there with the released opposition figure Nasrin Sotoudeh, mentioned above.
In an effort to explain why Iran’s human rights record has not improved significantly since he
took office, Rouhani has asserted that he does not control Iran’s judiciary and security
institutions, which remain controlled by hardliners. The most prominent of the security
institutions are the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), the IRGC, the Basij
organization of the IRGC, and the Law Enforcement Forces (riot police, regular police, and
gendarmerie). The Ministry of Islamic Guidance monitors journalists reporting from Iran as well
as media and communications operations. Iran has an official body, the High Council for Human
Rights, headed by former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Larijani (brother of the Majles
speaker and the judiciary head). However, it generally defends the government’s actions to
outside bodies rather than encouraging improvement of human rights practices.
Suggesting that hardliner opposition can sometimes be overcome, the Special Rapporteur has
noted that the 2012 revisions to the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code made some
reforms, including eliminating death sentences for children convicted of drug-related offenses.
The Rapporteur credits Rouhani with a September 2013 proposal for a new “charter for citizen’s
rights.” In 2014, Iran ratified an additional International Labour Organization convention. In
August 2014, Rouhani’s government obtained approval by service providers to operate higher-
speed Internet networks that allow for easier transmission of photos and videos.
Despite the criticism of its human rights record, on April 29, 2010, Iran acceded to the U.N.
Commission on the Status of Women, after dropping an attempt to sit on the higher-profile
10 Much of the information in this section comes from the State Department human rights report for 2014:
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper; and
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Human Rights Council. It also has a seat on the boards of the U.N. Development Program
(UNDP) and UNICEF. Iran’s U.N. dues are about $9 million per year.
As part of its efforts to try to compel Iran to improve its human rights practices, the United States
has imposed numerous sanctions on Iranian officials alleged to have committed human rights
abuses, and on firms that help Iranian authorities censor or monitor the Internet. Human rights-
related sanctions are analyzed in significant detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by
Kenneth Katzman.
Table 2. Human Rights Practices: General Categories
Regime Practice/Recent Developments
Issues
Media
Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance actively blocks pro-reform websites and blogs
Freedoms
and closing newspapers critical of the government, but some editors say that the government has
become more tolerant of critical media since Rouhani took office. The Majles investigated the
November 2012 death in custody of blogger, Sattar Beheshti; seven security officers were
arrested and the Tehran “Cyber Police” commander was removed for the incident. Iran is setting
up a national network that would have a monopoly on Internet service for Iranians.
Labor
Independent unions are legal but not allowed in practice. The sole authorized national labor
Restrictions
organization is a state-control ed “Workers’ House” umbrella. A bus drivers’ union leader,
Mansur Osanloo, was jail from 2007 until 2011.
Women’s
Women can vote in all elections and run in parliamentary and municipal elections. Nine women
Rights
are in the Majles (290 total seats), but women cannot serve as judges. There was one woman in
a previous cabinet (Minister of Health). Women are permitted to drive and work outside the
home without restriction, including owning their own businesses, although less than 20% of the
workforce is female. Women are required to be covered in public, generally with a garment
called a chador, but enforcement has relaxed since Rouhani took office. Women do not have
inheritance or divorce rights equal to that of men, and their court testimony carries half the
weight of a male’s. Laws against rape are not enforced effectively. In September 2014, an Iranian-
British woman was jailed briefly for trying to attend a men’s vol eyball match.
Religious
Each year since 1999, the State Department religious freedom report has named Iran as a
Freedom
“Country of Particular Concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). No
sanctions have been added under IRFA, on the grounds that Iran is already subject to extensive
U.S. sanctions. Continued deterioration in religious freedom have been noted in the past few
International Religious Freedom reports, stating that government rhetoric and actions creates a
threatening atmosphere for nearly all non-Shia religious groups.
Executions
Human rights observer groups say the government executed about 735 persons in 2014; many of
Policy
those executed have been Kurdish oppositionists. Iran is a party to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and is obligated to
cease the executions of minors.
Human
Since 2005, State Department “Trafficking in Persons” reports (including the report for 2015)
Trafficking
have placed Iran in Tier 3 (worst level) for failing to take significant action to prevent trafficking
in persons. Iranian women, boys, and girls are trafficked for sexual exploitation in Iran as well to
Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and Europe.
Stonings
In 2002, the head of Iran’s judiciary issued a ban on stoning. However, Iranian officials later called
that directive “advisory,” thus putting decisions at the discretion of individual judges.
Detentions of
Iran does not recognize any dual nationality. Iranian-American scholar Haleh Esfandiari, of the
U.S. Nationals
Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, was imprisoned for several months in 2007 on
and Dual
the grounds that the Center was involved in democracy promotion efforts in Iran. An Iranian-
Nationals
American journalist, Roxanna Saberi, was imprisoned for five months in 2009 for expired press
credentials. Three American hikers (Sara Shourd, Shane Bauer, and Josh Fattal) were arrested in
August 2009 after crossing into Iran from a hike in northern Iraq. They were released in 2010
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and 2011 on $500,000 bail each—brokered by Oman.
Former FBI agent Robert Levinson remains missing after a visit in 2005 to Kish Island to meet an
Iranian source (Dawud Salahuddin, allegedly responsible for the 1980 kil ing in the United States
of an Iranian diplomat who had served the Shah’s government). Iran denies knowing his status or
location. In December 2011, Levinson’s family released a one-year old taped statement by him,
provided to the family in unclear circumstances. In January 2013, his family released recent
photos of him, also provided by captors through uncertain channels, and the family
acknowledged in late 2013 that his visit to Kish Island was related to CIA contract work.
A former U.S. Marine, Amir Hekmati, was arrested in 2011 and remains in jail in Iran allegedly
for spying for the United States. His family has been permitted to visit him there. On December
20, 2012, a U.S. Christian convert of Iranian origin, Rev. Saeed Abedini, was imprisoned for
“undermining national security” for setting up orphanages in Iran in partnership with Iranian
Christians. His closed trial was held January 22, 2013, and he was convicted and sentenced to
eight years in prison.
In mid-July 2014, Washington Post Tehran correspondent Jason Rezaian (a dual national) was
detained along with two American journalists and his journalist wife, an Iranian national. His wife
was released in October. In April 2015, Rezaian was formally charged with espionage, and his
closed trial began on May 22.
Several bil s in the 114th Congress address the issue. For example, S.Con.Res. 14 expresses the
sense of Congress that no sanctions be lifted as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal unless the
dual nationals are released. However, these issues were not addressed in the JCPOA.
Groups
Christians
Christians are a “recognized minority” that has one allocated seat in the Majles. At times, there
have been unexplained assassinations of pastors in Iran, as well as prosecutions of Christians for
converting from Islam. In September 2011, a Protestant Iranian pastor who was born a Muslim,
Youcef Nadarkhani, was sentenced to death for refusing to recant his Christian faith. The United
States government and many human rights groups cal ed for an overturning of the sentence. He
was released on September 8, 2012, but was rearrested on Christmas Day 2012. On February
29, 2012, the House debated but postponed action on H.Res. 556 demanding he be released.
The issue of pastor Saeed Abedini, a dual national, is discussed below.
Baha’is
Iran is repeatedly cited for virtually unrelenting repression of the Baha’i community, which Iran’s
Shi te Muslim clergy views as a heretical sect, which numbers about 300,000-350,000. Seven
Baha’i leaders were sentenced to 20 years in August 2010; their sentences were reduced in
September 2010 to 10 years but the ful sentence was restored on appeal. In the 1990s, several
Baha’is were executed for apostasy. Virtually yearly congressional resolutions condemn Iran’s
treatment of the Baha’is.
Jews
Also a “recognized minority,” with one seat in the Majles, the 8,800-member (2012 census)
Jewish community enjoys somewhat more freedoms than Jewish communities in several other
Muslim states. However, in June 1999, Iran arrested 13 Jews that it said were part of an
“espionage ring” for Israel, and 10 were convicted. An appeals panel reduced the sentences and
all were released by April 2003. On November 17, 2008, Iran hanged Muslim businessman Ali
Ashtari for providing Iranian nuclear information to Israel. On September 4, 2013, Rouhani’s
“Twitter” account issued greetings to Jews on the occasion of Jewish New Year (“Rosh
Hashanah”). The Jewish Majles member accompanied Rouhani on his visit to the U.N. General
Assembly meetings in September 2013.
Azeris
Azeris are one-quarter of the population and are mostly well integrated into government and
society (Khamene’i himself is of Azeri heritage), but many Azeris complain of ethnic and linguistic
discrimination. Each year, there are arrests of Azeri students and cultural activists who press for
their right to celebrate their culture and history. The government accuses them of promoting
revolution or separatism.
Kurds
There are about 5 mil ion-11 mil ion Kurds in Iran. The Kurdish language is not banned, but
schools do not teach it and Kurdish political organizations, activists, and media outlets are
routinely scrutinized, harassed, and closed down for supporting greater Kurdish autonomy.
Several Kurdish oppositionists have been executed since 2010. In May 2015, violent unrest broke
out in the Kurdish city of Mahabad after a local woman was kil ed in unclear circumstances in a
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hotel room there, reportedly while with a member of Iran’s intelligence services.
Arabs
Ethnic Arabs are prominent in southwestern Iran, particularly Khuzestan Province. The 2 mil ion
to 4 mil ion Arabs in Iran encounter systematic oppression and discrimination, including torture
and a prohibition on speaking or studying Arabic.
Sources: State Department reports on human rights practices, on international religious freedom, and and on
trafficking in persons). 2015 trafficking in persons report:
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/243559.pdf. The 2014 human rights report is cited above.
The Strategic Challenge Posed by Iran
Successive Administrations have identified Iran as a key national security challenge, citing Iran’s
nuclear and missile programs as well as its long-standing attempts to counter many U.S.
objectives in the region. Reflecting the many different ways Iran could harm U.S. interests,
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, in his February 2015 annual threat assessment
testimony before Congress, described Iran as “ ...an ongoing threat to U.S. national interests
because of its support to the Assad regime in Syria, promulgation of anti-Israel policies,
development of advanced military capabilities, and pursuit of its nuclear program.”
Some interpret Iran’s defense strategy as intended primarily to protect itself from any potential
U.S.-led effort to change Iran’s regime. The unclassified executive summary of a congressionally
mandated Defense Department report on Iran’s military power states that “Iran’s military doctrine
is defensive. It is designed to deter an attack, survive an initial strike, retaliate against an
aggressor, and force a diplomatic solution to hostilities while avoiding any concessions that
challenge its core interests.”11 The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291)
requires an updated DOD report on Iran’s military power in 2015.The sections below analyze
Iran’s nuclear, missile, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.
Nuclear Program and International Response
No Iranian program has been as paramount a concern to U.S. officials as has its nuclear program.
A nuclear armed Iran, in the view of U.S. and regional officials, would be more assertive than it
now is in trying to influence the policies of regional states and in supporting leaders and groups in
the Middle East and elsewhere that oppose U.S. interests and allies. Iran could conclude that the
United States would hesitate to use military pressure against it if it possessed nuclear weapons.
U.S. policymakers express concern that Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon would produce a
nuclear arms race in one of the world’s most volatile regions. Israeli leaders describe an Iranian
nuclear weapon as a threat to Israel’s existence. There are also concerns that Iran might transfer
nuclear technology to extremist groups or countries.
Iran’s nuclear program became a significant U.S. national security issue in 2002, when Iran
confirmed that it was building a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water
production plant at Arak.12 The perceived threat from Iran’s program escalated significantly in
2010, when Iran began enriching to 20% U-235, which is relatively easy technically to enrich
further to weapons-grade uranium (90%+). Another requirement for a nuclear weapon is a
11 Department of Defense. Unclassified Executive Summary. “Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” January
2014.
12 In November 2006, the IAEA, at U.S. urging, declined to provide technical assistance to the Arak facility on the
grounds that it was likely for proliferation purposes.
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triggering mechanism that Iran might have researched prior to 2003. The United States and its
partners also have insisted that Iran must not possess a nuclear-capable missile.
Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Activities
The U.S. intelligence community has stated in its annual “worldwide threat assessment”
testimony in recent years that Iran has not made a decision to eventually build nuclear weapons.
Iran’s signing of the JCPOA on July 14, 2015, indicates that Iran likely has put such a decision off
for at least a decade. Iranian leaders have always professed that WMD are inconsistent with its
ideology, citing Supreme Leader Khamene’i’s 2003 formal pronouncement (fatwa) that nuclear
weapons are un-Islamic. On February 22, 2012, he stated that the production of and use of a
nuclear weapon is prohibited as a “great sin,” and that stockpiling such weapons is “futile,
expensive, and harmful.”13
Some Iranian leaders appear to perceive a nuclear weapons capability as a means of ending Iran’s
historic vulnerability to great power invasion or domination. However, other Iranian leaders have
argued that a nuclear weapon would make Iran less secure by stimulating a regional arms race
and imposition of further international sanctions, and possibly by prompting military action by
Israel or the United States.
Iranian leaders assert that Iran’s nuclear program is for medical uses and electricity generation in
light of finite oil and gas resources. Iran argues that uranium enrichment is its “right” as a party to
the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that it wants to make its own nuclear fuel to avoid
potential supply disruptions by international suppliers. U.S. officials have said that Iran’s gas
resources make nuclear energy unnecessary, but that the United States and its partners accept
Iran’s right to use nuclear energy as long as Iran verifiably demonstrates that its nuclear program
is for only peaceful purposes.
Allegations that Iran might have researched a nuclear explosive device have caused experts and
governments to question Iran’s assertions of purely peaceful intent for its nuclear program. The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been investigating information detailed in its
report of November 8, 2011 on Iran’s alleged research efforts on designs for a nuclear explosive
device (“possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program, or “PMD”). No IAEA report or
U.S. intelligence comments have asserted that Iran has diverted any nuclear material for a nuclear
weapons program.14 This issue is discussed in greater detail in: CRS Report R43333, Iran
Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr.
Nuclear Weapons Time Frame Estimates
Estimates vary as to how long it would take Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, were there a
decision to do so. Vice President Biden told the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on
April 30, 2015, that Iran could likely have enough fissile material for a nuclear weapons within 2-
3 months of a decision to manufacture that material. The stated U.S. objective of the JCPOA was
to increase the “breakout time”—an all-out effort by Iran to develop a nuclear weapon using
13 “Leader Says West Knows Iran Not Seeking ‘Nuclear Weapons,’” Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network,
February 22, 2012.
14 The February 25, 2011, IAEA report listed Iran’s declared nuclear sites as well as a summary of all the NPT
obligations Iran is not meeting. IAEA report of February 25, 2011. http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2011/02/
gov2011-7.pdf.
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declared facilities or undeclared covert facilities—to at least 12 months – an objective the
Administration says is accomplished if the JCPOA is fully implemented.
Status of Uranium Enrichment and Ability to Produce Plutonium15
A key to extending the “breakout time” for an Iranian nuclear weapon is to limit Iran’s ability to
produce fissile material by enriching uranium with devices called centrifuges. Iran has about
19,000 total installed centrifuges, of which about 10,000 are in operation. Prior to the JPA, Iran
had a stockpile of 400 lbs of 20% enriched uranium (short of the 550 lbs. that would be needed to
produce one nuclear weapon from that stockpile. Weapons grade uranium is enriched to 90%.
Under the JPA, Iran was allowed to retain, but not increases, its stockpile of about 22,000 lbs
(10,000 kilograms) of low-enriched (3.5%-5%) uranium (enough to produce about eight nuclear
weapons if it were to enrich that stockpile to weapons grade). Under the JCPOA, Iran will only be
allowed to stockpile about 650 lbs of uranium enriched to a maximum of 3.67%.
Plutonium Route? Another means of acquiring fissile material for a nuclear weapon is to produce
plutonium. Iran’s heavy water plant at Arak, which had been slated for completion in 2014, could,
if completed, produce plutonium that can be reprocessed into fissile material for a nuclear
weapon. The JPA required Iran to halt construction of the reactor, although not necessarily all
construction of the site, and provisions on Arak in the JCPOA.
Bushehr Reactor/Russia to Build Additional Reactors
U.S. officials have generally been less concerned about the Russian-built nuclear power plant at
Bushehr. Under their 1995 bilateral agreement commissioning the Russian construction, Russia
supplies nuclear fuel for the plant and takes back spent nuclear material for reprocessing. Russia
delayed opening the plant apparently to pressure Iran on the nuclear issue, but it was fueled by
October 25, 2010, was linked to Iran’s power grid in September 2011, and was reported
operational as of September 3, 2012.
In November 2014, Russia and Iran reached agreement for Russia to build two more reactors at
Bushehr—and possibly as many as six more beyond that—at Bushehr and other sites. Under the
reported terms, Russia would supply and reprocess all fuel for these reactors. In January 2015,
Iran announced it had begun actual construction on two nuclear power plants near the existing
one at Bushehr. Because all nuclear fuel and reprocessing is supplied externally, these plants are
not considered a significant proliferation concern and are not addressed in the JCPOA.
International Diplomatic Efforts to Address Iran’s Nuclear Program
International concerns about Iran’s nuclear program produced a global consensus to apply
economic pressure on Iran, coupled with diplomacy, to persuade Iran to limit its nuclear program.
In 2003, France, Britain, and Germany (the “EU-3”) opened a separate diplomatic track to curb
Iran’s program. On October 21, 2003, Iran pledged, in return for peaceful nuclear technology, to
suspend uranium enrichment activities and sign and ratify the “Additional Protocol” to the NPT
(allowing for enhanced inspections). Iran signed the Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003,
although the Majles did not ratify it.
15 http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_Safeguards_Report_14Nov2013.pdf. These issues
are discussed in greater detail in CRS Report R43333, cited above.
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Iran ended the suspension after several months, but the EU-3 and Iran reached a more specific
November 14, 2004, “Paris Agreement”— under which Iran suspended uranium enrichment in
exchange for renewed trade talks and other aid.16 The Bush Administration supported Paris
Agreement on March 11, 2005 by announcing it would drop U.S. objections to Iran applying to
join the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Paris Agreement broke down in 2005 in large part
because Iran rejected an EU-3 proposal for a permanent nuclear agreement that would provide
Iran with peaceful uses of nuclear energy and limited security guarantees. On August 8, 2005,
Iran broke the IAEA seals and began uranium “conversion” (one step before enrichment) at its
Esfahan facility. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board declared Iran in non-compliance with
the NPT and, on February 4, 2006, the IAEA board voted 27-317 to refer the case to the Security
Council. On March 29, 2006, the Council presidency set a 30-day time limit for ceasing
enrichment.18
“P5+1” Formed. The Bush Administration offered on May 31, 2006, to join the nuclear talks.
The expanded negotiating group was called the “Permanent Five Plus 1” (P5+1: United States,
Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany). The P5+1’s intent was to persuade Iran to again
suspend uranium enrichment through a combination of incentives and possible economic
sanctions. A P5+1 offer to Iran on June 6, 2006, focused on guaranteeing Iran nuclear fuel (Annex
I to Resolution 1747) and threatened sanctions if Iran did not agree (sanctions were imposed in
subsequent years).19
First Four U.N. Security Council Resolutions Adopted
The U.N. Security Council subsequently imposed sanctions on Iran in an effort to shift Iran’s
calculations toward compromise.
Resolution 1696. On July 31, 2006, the Security Council voted 14-1 (Qatar
voting no) for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696, giving Iran until August
31, 2006 to suspend enrichment suspension, suspend construction of the Arak
heavy-water reactor, and ratify the Additional Protocol to Iran’s IAEA Safeguards
Agreement. It was passed under Article 40 of the U.N. Charter, which makes
compliance mandatory, but not under Article 41, which refers to economic
sanctions, or Article 42, which authorizes military action.
Resolution 1737. After Iran refused a proposal to temporarily suspend
enrichment, the Security Council adopted U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737
unanimously on December 23, 2006, under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N.
Charter. It demanded enrichment suspension by February 21, 2007, and
prohibited sale (or financing of a sale) to Iran of technology that could contribute
to Iran’s nuclear program. It required U.N. member states to freeze the financial
assets of named Iranian nuclear and missile firms and related persons.
Resolution 1747. On March 24, 2007, Resolution 1747 was adopted unanimously
demanding Iran suspend enrichment by May 24, 2007. The Resolution added
16 For text of the agreement, see http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/eu_iran14112004.shtml. EU-3-Iran
negotiations on a permanent nuclear pact began on December 13, 2004, and related talks on a trade and cooperation
accord (TCA) began in January 2005.
17 Voting no: Cuba, Syria, Venezuela. Abstaining: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, South Africa.
18 See http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/290/88/PDF/N0629088.pdf?OpenElement.
19 One source purports to have obtained the contents of the package from ABC News: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/
Notes/BN060609.htm.
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entities to those sanctioned by Resolution 1737 and banned arms transfers by Iran
(a provision directed at stopping Iran’s arms supplies to its regional allies and
proxies). It called for, but did not require, countries to cease selling arms or dual
use items to Iran and for countries and international financial institutions to avoid
giving Iran any new loans or grants (except loans for humanitarian purposes).
Resolution 1803. On March 3, 2008, Resolution 1803 was adopted by a vote of
14-0 (Indonesia abstaining). It added persons and entities to those sanctioned;
banned travel outright by certain sanctions persons; banned virtually all sales of
dual use items to Iran; and authorized inspections of shipments by Iran Air Cargo
and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, if such shipments are suspected of
containing banned WMD-related goods. In May 2008, the P5+1 added political
and enhanced energy cooperation with Iran to previous incentives, and the text of
that enhanced offer was revealed as an Annex to Resolution 1929 (see below).
Resolution 1835. On September 27, 2008, the Council adopted Resolution 1835
(September 27, 2008), demanding compliance with existing resolutions but not
adding sanctions.
In July 2008, just prior to the passage of Resolution 1835, Iran it indicated it might be ready to
accept a temporary “freeze for freeze”: the P5+1 would impose no new sanctions and Iran would
stop expanding uranium enrichment. No agreement on that concept was reached, even though the
Bush Administration sent then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns to a
P5+1-Iran negotiation in Geneva on July 19, 2008. A table outlining the provisions of the U.N.
Security Council Resolutions on Iran’s nuclear program can be found in: CRS Report RS20871,
Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
Developments during the Obama Administration
After President Obama was inaugurated, the P5+1 met in February 2009 to adjust its negotiating
strategy in light of the new U.S. Administration’s stated commitment to direct U.S. engagement
with Iran.20 On April 8, 2009, U.S. officials anounced that a U.S. diplomat would henceforth
attend all P5+1–Iran meetings. In July 2009, the United States and its allies announced that Iran
needed to offer constructive proposals by late September 2009 or face “crippling sanctions.” On
September 9, 2009, Iran issued new proposals that the P5+1 said it considered a sufficient basis to
resume the talks with Iran.
Tentative Agreements Fall Apart. The October 1, 2009, P5+1-Iran meeting in Geneva produced a
tentative agreement for Iran to allow Russia and France to reprocess 75% of Iran’s low-enriched
uranium stockpile for medical use. Technical talks on the tentative accord were held in Vienna on
October 19-21, 2009 and a draft agreement was approved by the P5+1 countries. However, the
Supreme Leader reportedly opposed Iran’s concessions and the agreement was not finalized.
In April 2010, Brazil and Turkey negotiated with Iran to revive the October arrangement. On May
17, 2010, with the president of Brazil and prime minister of Turkey in Tehran, the three signed an
arrangement (“Tehran Declaration”) for Iran to send 2,600 pounds of uranium to Turkey, which
would be exchanged for medically useful reprocessed uranium.21 Iran forwarded to the IAEA a
formal letter of acceptance. The Administration publicly rejected it on the grounds that it did not
20 Dempsey, Judy. “U.S. Urged to Talk With Iran.” International Herald Tribune, February 5, 2009.
21 Text of the pact is at http://www.cfr.org/publication/22140/.
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address Iran’s enrichment to the 20% level and the Administration subsequently worked to
finalize agreement on another Security Council resolution that would pressure Iran economically.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929
Immediately after announcement of the Tehran Declaration, Secretary of State Clinton announced
that the P5+1 had reached agreement on a new sanctions resolution that would give U.S. allies
authority to take substantial new measures against Iran. Adopted on June 9, 2010,22 Resolution
1929 was the most sweeping of those adopted on Iran’s nuclear program, and an annex presented
a modified offer of incentives to Iran.23 By authorizing U.N. member states to sanction key
Iranian economic sectors such as energy and banking, Resolution 1929 placed significant
additional economic pressure on Iran.
The Resolution produced no immediate breakthrough in the talks: rounds of negotiations on
December 6-7, 2010 in Geneva and January 21-22, 2011 in Istanbul floundered over Iran’s
demand for immediate lifting of international sanctions. Additional rounds of P5+1-Iran talks in
2012 and 2013 (2012: April in Istanbul; May in Baghdad; and June in Moscow. 2013: Almaty
Kazakhstan in February and in April) focused on a P5+1 proposal that Iran halt enrichment to the
20% level (“stop”); allow removal from Iran of the existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium
(“ship”); and eventually close the Fordow facility (“shut”). The P5+1 proposals offered to allow
Iran to enrich uranium to the 3.5%-5% level and guaranteed Iran a supply of medical isotopes.
Joint Plan of Action (JPA)
P5+1 leaders asserted that the 2013 election of Rouhani as president improved the prospects for a
nuclear settlement. In advance of his visit to the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York
during September 23-27, 2013, Rouhani stated that the Supreme Leader had given him and his
team authority to negotiate a nuclear deal. The Supreme Leader largely affirmed that authority in
a speech to the IRGC on September 17, 2013, in which he said he believes in the concept of
“heroic flexibility”—adopting “proper and logical diplomatic moves, whether in the realm of
diplomacy or in the sphere of domestic policies.”24 On the sidelines of the U.N. General
Assembly meetings in September 2013, talks between Secretary of State John Kerry, Foreign
Minister Zarif and other P5+1 officials resulted in a decision to hold another round of P5+1-Iran
talks in Geneva on October 15-16, 2013. Talks continued during November 7-9, 2013, and again
beginning on November 20, on an interim “standstill” agreement that would allow time to
negotiate a comprehensive accord. An agreement on a “Joint Plan of Action” (JPA) was
announced on November 24, 2013. Its key provisions were that Iran would eliminate its stockpile
of 20% enriched uranium and cease enriching to that level, and that it not grow its stockpile of
3.5% enriched uranium. In exchange, Iran receives $700 million per month in hard currency
payments from oil sales. For other key provisions of the JPA, see: CRS Report R43333, Iran
Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr.
The Administration argues that the JPA froze Iran’s nuclear advancement. The IAEA has stated in
its reports that Iran has complied with its terms.
22 It was adopted by a vote of 12-2 (Turkey and Brazil voting no) with one abstention (Lebanon).
23 Text of the resolution is at http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/
Draft_resolution_on_Iran_annexes.pdf.
24 Open Source Center, “Iran: Leader Outlines Guard Corps Role, Talks of ‘Heroic Flexibility,’” published September
18, 2013.
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The Comprehensive Accord25
The JPA contained provisions that set the stage for a comprehensive nuclear agreement – “Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA). P5+1-Iran negotiations on a comprehensive settlement
began in February 2014 but did not make insufficient progress to meet several self-imposed
deadlines. However, on April 2, 2015, the parties reached a framework for a JCPOA, and the
JCPOA was finalized on July 14, 2015. For information on the provisions of the JCPOA, see:
CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr. For
analysis of the implications of and issues raised by the JCPOA, see: CRS Report R44142, Iran
Nuclear Agreement: Selected Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K.
Kerr.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs
Iran has developed some weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and U.S. officials say it
has a relatively advanced ballistic and cruise missile program. Although Iran is widely believed
unlikely to use chemical or biological weapons or to transfer them to its regional proxies or allies,
Iran’s missiles are considered to pose a realistic and significant threat to U.S. ships, forces, and
allies in the Gulf region and beyond. The April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord makes no
reference to limiting Iran’s ability to develop ballistic missiles, although the tentative accord
indicates that U.S. sanctions on such Iranian efforts would remain in place.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
Official U.S. reports and testimony state that Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical
warfare (CW) agents and “probably” has the capability to produce some biological warfare agents
for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so.26 This raises questions about Iran’s
compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which Iran
signed on January 13, 1993, and ratified on June 8, 1997.
Missiles and Warheads27
The Administration asserts that Iran’s ballistic missiles and its acquisition of indigenous
production of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) provide capabilities for Iran to project power.
DNI Clapper testified in February 2015, that the intelligence community assesses that “Iran’s
ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD.”
Tehran views its conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter—and if
necessary retaliate against—forces in the region, including U.S. forces. A particular worry of U.S.
commanders remains Iran’s inventory of cruise missiles, which can reach U.S. ships in the Gulf
quickly after launch. U.S. officials and reports have estimated that Iran is steadily expanding its
25 For detail on the framework accord, reaction, and congressional review and oversight issues, see CRS Report
R43333, Iran: Efforts to Achieve a Nuclear Accord, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Michael John Garcia.
26 Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to
31 December 2010,” March 2011.
27 For more information on Iran’s missile arsenal, see CRS Report R42849, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch
Programs, by Steven A. Hildreth.
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missile and rocket inventories and has “boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing systems
with accuracy improvements and new sub-munition payloads.”
It is unclear the extent to which Iran continues to receive outside assistance for its missile
program. Some reports suggest Iranian technicians may have witnessed North Korea’s satellite
launch in December 2012, which, if true, could support the view that Iran-North Korea missile
cooperation is extensive. Table 3 contains some details on Iran’s missile programs.28 Iran’s
programs do not appear to have been permanently set back by the November 12, 2011, explosion
at a ballistic missile base outside Tehran that destroyed it and killed the base commander.
Table 3. Iran’s Missile Arsenal
Shahab-3
The 800-mile range missile is operational, and Defense Department reports indicate Tehran
(“Meteor”)
has improved its lethality and effectiveness.
Shahab-3 “Variant” The Sijil, or Ashoura, is a solid fuel Shahab-3 variant with 1,200-1,500-mile range. The April
/Sijil/Ashoura
2012 DOD report indicates the missile is increasing in range, lethality, and accuracy,
potentially putting large portions of the Near East and Southeastern Europe in range. In June
2011, Iran unveiled underground missile silos.
BM-25
1,500-mile range. In April 2006, Israel’s military intelligence chief said that Iran had received a
shipment of North Korean-supplied BM-25 missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The
Washington Times appeared to corroborate this reporting in a July 6, 2006, story, which
asserted that the North Korean-supplied missile is based on a Soviet-era “SS-N-6” missile.
Press accounts in December 2010 indicated that Iran may have received components but not
the entire BM-25 missile from North Korea.
ICBM
U.S. officials have long asserted that Iran might be capable of developing an intercontinental
ballistic missile (3,000 mile range) by 2015. That deadline has arrived, and Iran has not
announced any tests of a missile of intercontinental range. However, DNI Clapper has
testified that Iran has the means and motivation to develop longer range missiles, including
ICBMs.
Short Range
Iran is fielding increasingly capable, short range ballistic missiles, according to DOD 2012 and
Ballistic Missiles
2014 reports, such as ability to home in on and target ships while the missile is in flight. One
and Cruise
version could be a short range bal istic missile named the Qiam, tested in August 2010. Iran
Missiles
has long worked on a 200 mile range “Fateh 110” missile (solid propellant), a version of which
is the Khaliji Fars (Persian Gulf) anti-ship ballistic missile that could threaten maritime activity
throughout the Persian Gulf. Iran also is able to arm its patrol boats with Chinese-made C-
802 anti-ship cruise missiles. Iran also has C-802’s and other missiles emplaced along Iran’s
coast, including the Chinese-made CSSC-2 (Silkworm) and the CSSC-3 (Seersucker). Iran also
possesses a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles, including the Shahab-1 (Scud-b), the
Shahab-2 (Scud-C), and the Tondar-69 (CSS-8).
Space Vehicle
In February 2009, Iran successful y launched a small, low-earth satellite on a Safir-2 rocket
(range about 155 miles). The Pentagon said the launch was “clearly a concern of ours”
because “there are dual-use capabilities here which could be applied toward the development
of long-range missiles.” Iran has claimed additional satellite launches since, including the launch
and return of a vehicle carrying a small primate in December 2013.
Warheads
Wall Street Journal report of September 14, 2005, said that U.S. intelligence believes Iran is
working to adapt the Shahab-3 to deliver a nuclear warhead. Subsequent press reports said
that U.S. intelligence captured an Iranian computer in mid-2004 showing plans to construct a
nuclear warhead for the Shahab.29
28 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dennis C. Blair,
Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010.
29 William Broad and David Sanger, “Relying On Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran’s Nuclear Aims,” New York
Times, November 13, 2005.
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Conventional and “Asymmetric Warfare” Capability
Iran’s armed forces are likely able to deter or fend off any aggression from Iran’s neighbors, and
Iran’s Supreme Leader and other Iranian political and military figures have repeatedly warned
that Iran could and would take military action if it perceives it is threatened. Iran can also project
power through its recruiting, advising, and arming of various factions in the region. However,
Iran generally lacks the ability to deploy concentrated armed force across long distances or
waterways such as the Persian Gulf. Iran’s conventional military arsenal and training are almost
certainly insufficient for Iran to defeat the United States in a direct military confrontation.
Organizationally, Iran’s armed forces are divided to perform functions appropriate to their roles in
Iran. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, known in Persian as the Sepah-e-Pasdaran
Enghelab Islami)30 controls the Basij (Mobilization of the Oppressed) volunteer militia that has
been the main instrument to repress domestic dissent. The IRGC and the regular military
(Artesh)—the national army that existed under the former Shah—report to a joint headquarters,
headed by Dr. Hassan Firuzabadi. The Artesh is deployed mainly at bases outside major cities and
its leaders have publicly asserted that the regular military does not have a mandate to suppress
public demonstrations and will not do so.
The IRGC Navy and regular Navy (Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, IRIN) are distinct forces; the
IRIN has responsibility for the Gulf of Oman, whereas the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the
closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. The regular Air Force controls most of Iran’s combat
aircraft, whereas the IRGC Air Force runs Iran’s ballistic missile programs. Iran has a small
number of warships on its Caspian Sea coast. In January 2014, Iran sent some warships into the
Atlantic Ocean for the first time ever, presumably to try to demonstrate growing naval strength.
Iran’s armed forces have few formal relationships with foreign militaries outside the region. Iran’s
military-to-military relationships with Russia, China, Ukraine, Belarus, and North Korea
generally have focused on Iranian arms purchases or upgrades. Such sales to Iran are banned by
U.N. Resolution 1929 of June 2010 and many of these relationships have lapsed, although arms
sales might revive in light of the JCPOA’s dropping of the worldwide arms sales ban on Iran in a
maximum of five years. Iranian technicians reportedly have attended at least some of North
Korea’s missile and space launches. Iran and India have a “strategic dialogue” and some Iranian
naval officers reportedly underwent some training in India in the 1990s, but this military-to-
military relationship has diminished in recent years. Iran’s military also conducted joint exercises
with the Pakistani armed forces in the early 1990s, a relationship that has also declined. In
September 2014, two Chinese warships docked at Iran’s port of Bandar Abbas, for the first time
in history, to conduct four days of naval exercises,31 and in October the leader of Iran’s regular
(not IRGC) Navy made the first visit ever to China by an Iranian Navy commander.
Asymmetric Warfare Capacity/Threat to the Gulf
Iran appears to be attempting to compensate for its conventional military weaknesses by
developing a significant capacity for “asymmetric warfare” that would maximize Iran’s
advantages and minimize those of a large, advanced force like that of the United States. The
30 For a more extensive discussion of the IRGC, see Katzman, Kenneth, “The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard,” Westview Press, 1993.
31 Thomas Erdbrink and Chris Buckley. “China’s Navy Sends Ships for Exercises with Iran.” New York Times,
September 22, 2014.
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unclassified executive summary of the 2014 Defense Department report on Iran’s military
capability says that Iran continues to develop “anti-access and area denial” capabilities to control
the Strait of Hormuz and its approaches. It is developing increasingly lethal systems such as more
advanced naval mines, submarines, coastal defense and anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, and
attack craft.32
The purpose of Iran threatening or trying to block the Strait could be to threaten the world
economy, perhaps in order to extract concessions from the international community. It is a long-
asserted core U.S. interest to preserve the free flow of oil and freedom of navigation in the
Persian Gulf, which is only about 20 miles wide at its narrowest point. The Strait is identified by
the Energy Information Administration as a key potential “chokepoint” for the world economy.
Each day, about 17 million barrels of oil flow through the Strait, which is 35% of all seaborne
traded oil and 20% of all worldwide traded oil.33 Iran publicly stated that it was stopping or firing
on several commercial shipping companies transiting the Strait in May 2015 to force a resolution
of commercial disputes with the shipping companies involved, but may have been seeking to
demonstrate its potential ability to control the Strait.
Were Iran to take action against the United States and the GCC states, Iranian forces would
probably rely most heavily on ships, submarines, and short range missiles. Iran could potentially
use its large fleet of small boats to “swarm” U.S. ships. It also has the ability to lay numerous
mines in the narrow Strait of Hormuz. Iran has added naval bases along its Gulf coast in recent
years, enhancing its ability to threaten shipping in the Strait. In February 2013, Iran began
constructing an additional naval base near Iran’s border with Pakistan, on the Sea of Oman.
32 Department of Defense. Unclassified Executive Summary. “Annual Report on Military Power of Iran.” January
2014.
33 http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18991.
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Table 4. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal
Military Personnel: 475,000+. Regular army ground force is about 350,000, Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
ground force is about 100,000. IRGC navy is about 20,000 and regular navy is about 18,000. Regular Air Force has
about 30,000 personnel and IRGC Air Force is of unknown size—it controls Iran’s strategic missile forces.
Security Forces: About 40,000-60,000 law enforcement forces on duty, with another 600,000 Basij (volunteer
militia under IRGC control) available for combat or internal security missions.
Tanks: 1,650+ Includes 480 Russian-made T-72
Ships: 100+ (IRGC and regular Navy) Includes 4 Corvette; 18 IRGC-control ed Chinese-made patrol boats, several
hundred small boats.) Also has 3 Kilo subs (reg. Navy control ed). 2012 DOD report says Iran may have acquired
additional ships and submarines over the past two years, but does not stipulate a supplier, if any.
Midget Subs: Iran has been long said to possess several small subs, possibly purchased assembled or in kit form from
North Korea. Iran claimed on November 29, 2007, to have produced a new small sub equipped with sonar-evading
technology, and it claimed to deploy four Iranian-made “Ghadir class” subs to the Red Sea in June 2011.
Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs): 150+ I-Hawk plus possibly some Stinger
Combat Aircraft: 330+ Includes 25 MiG-29 and 30 Su-24. Stil dependent on U.S. F-4’s, F-5’s and F-14 bought
during Shah’s era.
Anti-aircraft Missile Systems: Russia delivered to Iran (January 2007) 30 anti-aircraft missile systems (Tor M1),
worth over $1 bil ion. In December 2007, Russia agreed to sell the highly capable S-300 air defense system, which
would greatly enhance Iran’s air defense capability, at an estimated cost of $800 mil ion. The system would not,
according to most experts, technically violate the provisions of U.N. Resolution 1929, because the system is not
covered in the U.N. Registry on Conventional Arms. On September 22, 2010, then Russian President Medvedev
signed a decree banning the supply of the system to Iran, asserting that its provision to Iran is banned by Resolution
1929. In August 2011, Iran and Russia took their dispute over the non-delivery of the S-300 to the International
Court of Justice. After the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord, Russian officials indicated they would proceed
with the S-300 delivery.
Defense Budget: About 3% of GDP, or about $15 bil ion - $30 bil ion. Out of a total national budget of about $300
bil ion.
Sources: IISS Military Balance (2015)—Section on Middle East and North Africa, and various press reports.
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Table 5. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The IRGC is generally loyal to Iran’s political hardliners and is clearly more politically influential than is Iran’s regular
military, which is numerically larger, but was held over from the Shah’s era. The IRGC’s political influence has grown
sharply as the regime has relied on it to suppress dissent. A Rand Corporation study stated: “Founded by a decree
from Ayatol ah Khomeini shortly after the victory of the 1978-1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC) has evolved well beyond its original foundations as an ideological guard for the nascent
revolutionary regime... The IRGC’s presence is particularly powerful in Iran’s highly factionalized political system, in
which [many senior figures] hail from the ranks of the IRGC.. ”
Through its Qods (Jerusalem) Force (QF), the IRGC has a foreign policy role in exerting influence throughout the
region by supporting pro-Iranian movements and leaders. The IRGC-QF numbers approximately 10,000-15,000
personnel who provide advice, support, and arrange weapons deliveries to pro-Iranian factions or leaders in Lebanon,
Iraq, Syria, Persian Gulf states, Gaza/West Bank, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. IRGC leaders have confirmed the QF
is in Syria to assist the regime of Bashar al-Assad against an armed uprising, and it reportedly provided advisers to
help the Iraqi government counter an offensive by the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) that started in June
2014. The QF commander, Brigadier General Qassem Soleimani reportedly has a direct and independent channel to
Khamene’i. The QF commander during 1988-1995 was Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, who served as Defense
minister during 2009-2013. He led the QF when it allegedly assisted Lebanese Hezbol ah carry out two bombings of
Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires (1992 and 1994) and is wanted by Interpol for a role in the 1994 bombing
there. He allegedly recruited Saudi Hezbol ah activists later accused of the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing.
IRGC leadership developments are significant because of the political influence of the IRGC. Mohammad Ali Jafari has
been Commander in Chief of the IRGC since September 2007. He is considered a hardliner against political dissent
and a close ally of the Supreme Leader. He criticized Rouhani for accepting a phone call from President Obama on
September 27, 2013, and has continued to oppose major concessions as part of a permanent nuclear settlement. The
Basij militia reports to the IRGC commander in chief; its leader is Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi. It
operates from thousands of positions in Iran’s institutions. Command reshuffles in July 2008 integrated the Basij more
closely with provincially based IRGC units and increased the Basij role in internal security. In November 2009, the
regime gave the IRGC’s intelligence units greater authority, perhaps surpassing those of the Ministry of Intelligence, in
monitoring dissent. The IRGC Navy has responsibility to patrol the Strait of Hormuz and the regular Navy has
responsibility for the broader Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman (deeper waters further off the coast).
As noted, the IRGC is also increasingly involved in Iran’s economy, acting through a network of contracting
businesses it has set up, most notably Ghorb (also called Khatem ol-Anbiya, Persian for “Seal of the Prophet”). Active
duty IRGC senior commanders reportedly serve on Ghorb’s board of directors and its chief executive, Rostam
Ghasemi, served as Oil Minister during 2011-2013. In September 2009, the Guard bought a 50% stake in Iran
Telecommunication Company at a cost of $7.8 bil ion. The Wall Street Journal reported on May 27, 2014, that Khatam
ol-Anbia has $50 bil ion in contracts with the Iranian government, including in the energy sector but also in port and
highway construction. It has as many as 40,000 employees.
On October 21, 2007, the Treasury Department designated several IRGC companies as proliferation entities under
Executive Order 13382. Also that day, the IRGC as a whole, the Ministry of Defense, several IRGC commanders, and
several Iranian banks were sanctioned under that same executive order. Simultaneously, the Qods Force was named
as a terrorism supporting entity under Executive Order 13224. These orders freeze the U.S.-based assets and
prevent U.S. transactions with the named entities, but these entities are believed to have virtually no U.S.-based
assets. On June 9, 2011, the IRGC and Basij were named as human rights abusers under Executive Order 13553, with
the same penalties as the above Executive Orders. The United States wil not be removing any of the IRGC
designations under the JCPOA, but the EU wil be doing so in about eight years.
Sources: Include Frederic Wehrey et al., “The Rise of the Pasdaran,” Rand Corporation, 2009; Katzman,
Kenneth, “The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard,” Westview Press, 1993; Dept. of the Treasury;
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/09/30/130930fa_fact_filkins?printable=true¤tPage=all.
Power Projection through Allies and Proxies: the Qods Force
An instrument of Iran’s national security policy is not only to deploy conventional force but to
supports armed factions in the region, some of which are named as terrorist organizations by the
United States. Some U.S. observers interpret Iran’s objectives in supporting armed factions as
attempting to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that Iran asserts favors the United
States, Israel, and Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. However, in order not to stoke Sunni-Shiite
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tensions, Iran often publicly couches its support for Shiite-led movements as support for an
“oppressed” underclass. The strategy helps Iran expand its influence with little direct risk, gives
Tehran a measure of deniability, and serves as a “force multiplier” that compensates for a
relatively weak conventional force. Some U.S. officials have predicted that, in the event of a
U.S.-Iran confrontation, Iran would try to retaliate through terrorist attacks inside the United
States or against U.S. embassies and facilities in Europe or the Persian Gulf. Iran could also try to
direct anti-U.S. militias in Afghanistan to attack U.S. personnel there. Iran’s support for armed
factions that use international terrorism, particularly Lebanese Hezbollah, formed the basis of
Iran’s addition to the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism (“terrorism list”) in January 1984. For
a detailed assessment of Iran’s overall foreign policy and the Qods Force involvement in
supporting regional allies and proxies, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman.
U.S. Policy Responses and Further Options
The varied threats to U.S. interests posed by Iran have engendered a complex mixture of U.S.
responses and consideration of further options, as discussed in the sections below.
Obama Administration Policy: Pressure Coupled with Engagement
Upon taking office, President Obama asserted that there was an opportunity to persuade Iran to
limit its nuclear program through diplomacy to build a relationship after decades of estrangement
and enmity. Some Obama Administration officials expressed skepticism that engagement would
yield changes in Iran’s policies, while some officials argued that the United States needed to
present Iran with a clearer choice between the consequences of refusing to address international
demands on its nuclear program and the benefits of forging a compromise on that issue.
The Administration’s initial approach emerged in President Obama’s first message to the Iranian
people on the occasion of Nowruz (Persian New Year) on March 21, 2009. He stated that the
United States “is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us,
and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran, and the international
community.” He also referred to Iran as “The Islamic Republic of Iran,” a formulation not
generally used by officials favoring regime change. Other early steps included the following.
President Obama’s reported two letters in 2009 to Iran’s Supreme Leader
expressing the Administration’s philosophy in favor of engagement with Iran.
A major speech to the “Muslim World” in Cairo on June 4, 2009, in which
President Obama acknowledged that the United States had played a role in the
overthrow of Mossadeq, and said that Iran had a right to peaceful nuclear power
if it complies with its responsibilities under the NPT.
An announcement on April 8, 2009, that U.S. officials would attend all P5+1
meetings with Iran, and a loosening of restrictions on U.S. diplomats to meet
their Iranian counterparts at international meetings.
2009-2013: Emphasis on Economic Pressure
At the end of 2009, Iran’s crackdown on the election-related unrest that year and its refusal to
accept compromises to limit its nuclear program, discussed above, caused the Administration to
shift to a “two track strategy:” economic pressure coupled with nuclear negotiations that offered
sanctions relief in return for nuclear compromise. The sanctions imposed during 2010 and 2013
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received broad international support and cooperation and were highly effective in causing
economic difficulty in Iran, as discussed in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. The
Administration also criticized Iran’s human rights abuses, altered some trade regulations to help
Iranians circumvent their government’s restrictions on Internet usage, and continued to fund
exchanges with civil society activists in Iran. The Administration repeatedly stated that a military
option is “on the table” and it continued to work with the Persian Gulf states and other regional
allies, as discussed in detail below.
2013-Present: Rouhani Presidency
The election of Hassan Rouhani in June 2013 provided the Administration an opportunity for a
shift to emphasis on diplomacy. The Administration immediately reiterated an offer, first stated by
Vice President Biden in February 2013, to engage in direct talks with Iran on the nuclear issue.
The potential for rapprochement improved during the 2013 U.N. General Assembly meetings in
New York. On September 20, 2013, the Washington Post published an op-ed by Rouhani stating a
commitment to engage in constructive interaction with the world. President Obama, in his
September 24, 2013, speech, confirmed that he had exchanged letters with Rouhani stating the
U.S. willingness to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully and that the United States “[is] not
seeking regime change.”34 An Obama-Rouhani meeting did not occur, reportedly because of
Rouhani’s perceived need to avoid angering hardline regime elements in Iran, but President
Obama called Rouhani by phone on September 27, 2013—the first direct contact between
presidents of the two countries since the 1979 revolution. Since then, the United States and Iran
have held bilateral meetings at the margins of all nuclear talks, including discussions of regional
issues such as the Islamic State organization, as well as the detention of several dual citizens
discussed above.
Still, the JCPOA addresses nuclear issues only, and not broader regional and bilateral issues.
However, President Obama has stated that he hopes that the JCPOA would “usher[] in a new era
in U.S.-Iranian relations.”35 An improvement in U.S.-Iran relations could lead to resolution to
some of the conflicts roiling the region and possibly produce a restoration of official U.S.-Iran
diplomatic relations. The Administration has, however, emphasized that JCPOA is justified by its
benefits for limiting Iran’s nuclear program even if no improvement in U.S.-Iran relations results
from it.
There has been occasional past U.S. consideration of requesting that Tehran allow U.S. personnel
to staff the U.S. interests section in Tehran, but Iran has not supported the idea to date. The
Obama Administration has said embassy exchanges are not under discussion in connection with
the Iran nuclear talks, but in May 2015 the two governments confirmed that they had granted
each other permission to move their respective interests sections in Washington, DC, and in
Tehran to more spacious locations.
As an example of the way in which past injuries continue to affect the relationship, in early 2014,
Iran appointed one of those involved in the 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran—Hamid
Aboutalebi—as ambassador to the United Nations. That appointment prompted the April 2014
congressional passage of S. 2195 (P.L. 113-100), which gave the Administration authority to deny
him a visa to take up his duties. The United States subsequently announced he would not be
admitted to the United States and Iran subsequently replaced him with Gholam Ali Khoshroo,
who studied in the United States and served in the reformist government of president Khatemi.
34 Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 24, 2013.
35 Roger Cohen. “U.S. Embassy, Tehran.” New York Times, April 8, 2015.
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U.S. Defense Posture in the Persian Gulf and Military Options
Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to back up diplomacy with the capability to exercise
significant military options against Iran. The possible stated uses of U.S. military action against
Iran include preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear state, reassuring and being positioned to
defend the Persian Gulf states or other U.S. allies, protecting the free flow of oil or shipping in
the Gulf, and containing Iranian power generally. In past years, the U.S. presence in the Gulf has
also been intended to contain Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
Military Options to Prevent a Nuclear Iran
President Obama has repeatedly stated that “all options are on the table” to prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon. In a March 2, 2012, interview in The Atlantic, President Obama
clarified that the “military option” as meaning that there is a military component to preventing a
nuclear-armed Iran.36 S.J.Res. 41, which passed the Senate on September 22, 2012, in the 112th
Congress, rejects any U.S. policy that relies on “containment” of a potential nuclear Iran, but
acknowledges that President Obama has ruled out a containment policy.
President Obama has repeated several times since the JCPOA was finalized that the military
option remains available should Iran violate the agreement or after the primary JCPOA
restrictions expire.37 Some argue that the United States should, as a deterrent, make clear that the
military option can and will be exercised if Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapons after the
restrictions of the JCPOA start to expire in ten years.38
The Administration argues that military action, while a viable option should Iran at some point
seek to develop a nuclear weapon, is not a preferable alternative to the JCPOA. The
Administration asserts that military action would only set back Iran’s nuclear advancement
temporarily—and with far less certainty or duration than the JCPOA. Others argue that U.S.
military action could set back Iran’s nuclear program substantially because there are a limited
number of key targets and all targets, even the hardened Fordow site, are vulnerable to U.S. air
power.39 A U.S. ground invasion to remove Iran’s regime has not, at any time, appeared to be
under serious consideration, in part because of the likely resistance an invasion would meet in
Iran.
Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly stressed the potential adverse consequences of military
action, such as Iranian retaliation that might expand throughout the region, a reduction of Iran’s
regional isolation, a strengthening of Iran’s regime domestically, and an escalation of world oil
prices.40 Most U.S. allies in Europe oppose military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities or for
other purposes, unless Iran undertakes clearly provocative action. European and Asian countries
tend to emphasize the potential consequences of military action against Iran, such as Iran’s
possible implementation of threats to close the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s actions against some
36 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Obama to Iran and Israel: ‘As President of the United States, I Don’t Bluff’,” The Atlantic, March
2, 2012.
37 Speech by President Obama at American University. August 7, 2015. President Obama Interview with CNN’s Fareed
Zakaria. Broadcast on August 9, 2015.
38 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/StatementWeb2.pdf
39 Joby Warrick, “Iran: Underground Sites Vulnerable, Experts Say,” Washington Post, March 1, 2012. For an extended
discussion of U.S. air strike options on Iran, see Rogers, Paul. Iran: Consequences Of a War. Oxford Research Group,
February 2006.
40 http://2scottmontgomery.blogspot.com/2011/12/panetta-brookings-speech.html.
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commercial shipping in the Gulf in the spring of 2015 might represent an Iranian effort to
demonstrate it can implement such threats.
Some argue that there are U.S. military options that would not require hostilities. These options
include a naval embargo or a “no-fly zone” over Iran to pressure the regime. These options appear
to be under current consideration.
A U.S. decision to take military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities might raise the question of
presidential authorities. No legislation has been passed by both chambers and signed into law
limiting the President’s authority to use military force against Iran. In the 109th Congress,
H.Con.Res. 391 (introduced on April 26, 2006) called on the President to not initiate military
action against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress. A similar bill, H.Con.Res.
33, was introduced in the 110th Congress. An amendment to H.R. 1585, the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2008, requiring authorization for force against Iran, was defeated 136 to
288. A provision that sought to bar the Administration from taking military action against Iran
without congressional authorization was taken out of an early draft of an FY2007 supplemental
appropriation (H.R. 1591). Other provisions, including requiring briefings to Congress about
military contingency planning related to Iran’s nuclear program, were in the House version (H.R.
5658) of a FY2009 defense authorization bill, but not the final law. The FY2011 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383, signed January 7, 2011) contained a provision (§1243) requiring
the Administration to develop a “National Military Strategy to Counter Iran.”
Gulf State Cooperation with U.S. Policy Toward Iran
U.S. military options against Iran depend, in large measure, on cooperation from the Persian Gulf
countries that share the waterway with Iran. The six Persian Gulf monarchy states, all led by
Sunni royal families, in 1981 formed an alliance called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC:
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates). The United States
and the GCC states have a long history of security cooperation, dating to the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
war and expanding significantly after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. With Iraq militarily
weak since the fall of Saddam Hussein, most of the GCC leaders currently express concerns about
the influence and intentions of Iran in the Gulf and broader region. Some of the GCC leaders
accuse Iran of fomenting unrest among Shiite communities in the GCC states themselves,
particularly those in the Eastern Provinces of Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain, which has a majority
Shiite population.
The GCC leaders express concerns that a comprehensive nuclear deal could lead to a broader
U.S.-Iran rapprochement and possibly weaken the U.S. commitment to Gulf security. The GCC
states publicly backed the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord while asserting concerns
about Iran’s “destabilizing activities in the region.” In light of these stated concerns, President
Obama announced in his statement on the framework accord that he would invite the GCC
leaders to Camp David later in 2015 to discuss Gulf security. The meetings were held May 13-14,
2015, between President Obama and two Gulf leaders (Amir of Kuwait and of Qatar) and four
other Gulf leadership delegations (Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan
representing the UAE and its ailing President Khalifa bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan; Deputy Prime
Minister Fahd bin Mahmoud Al Said, representing the ailing Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said;
Crown Prince Mohammad bin Nayef and deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman
representing Saudi King Salman; and Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, representing
his father, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain. The joint statement issued after the summit
announced a new U.S.-GCC strategic partnership and reiterated that it is U.S. policy to use all
elements of U.S. national power to secure core U.S. interests in the Gulf and to deter and confront
external aggression “against our allies and partners ... ” An annex to the joint statement says that
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the United States will increase security cooperation with the GCC states in the following ways:
(1) facilitating U.S. arms transfers to the GCC states; (2) increased U.S.-GCC cooperation on
maritime security, cybersecurity, and counter-terrorism; (3) organizing additional large-scale joint
military exercises and U.S. training; and (4) stating a renewed commitment to a concept of a
Gulf-wide ballistic missile defense capability, which the United States has sought to promote in
recent years.41 The joint statement highlighted joint efforts to counter Iran’s “malign influence” in
the region as well as a commitment to defeating the Islamic State and to countering violent
extremism more broadly.
The “strategic partnership” builds on the “U.S.-GCC Strategic Dialogue” inaugurated by then-
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in March 2012. In February 2010, then-Secretary Clinton also
raised the issue of a possible U.S. extension of a “security umbrella” or guarantee to regional
states against Iran.42 The GCC states reportedly had sought such a commitment at the Camp
David summit, but the joint statement instead stated that
In the event of [ ] aggression or the threat of [ ] aggression [against the GCC states], the
United States stands ready to work with our GCC partners to determine urgently what
action may be appropriate, using the means at our collective disposal, including the
potential use of military force, for the defense of our GCC partners.43
Senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and Secretary of State John
Kerry, visited the Gulf in July and August to continue to explain the U.S. position on the Iran
nuclear agreement and build on what was agreed at the Camp David meetings. GCC Foreign
Ministers reaffirmed their public support for the JCPOA during meetings with Secretary Kerry on
August 3, 2015, saying in a joint U.S.-GCC statement that: “the Ministers agreed that, once fully
implemented, the JCPOA contributes to the region’s long-term security, including by preventing
Iran from developing or acquiring a military nuclear capability.”44
GCC Military Capacity and U.S. Deployments in the Gulf
A key component of the military component of U.S. strategy in the Gulf is the maintenance of a
large U.S. military presence in the Gulf. U.S. officials assert that, as of 2015, there are about
35,000 forces in the Gulf region. Most of them are stationed at various Gulf state facilities that
the United States has access to, in accordance with Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs)
between the United States and these countries. Some of the forces are aboard the at least one U.S.
aircraft carrier task force that is in the Gulf region virtually continuously. The DCA’s and other
agreements not only stipulate modalities of joint cooperation, but also reportedly provide for the
United States to preposition substantial military equipment in some of the Gulf states and to have
access to Gulf state military facilities in operations.45
U.S. arms sales to the GCC countries have been intended to improve their air and naval
capabilities and their interoperability with U.S. forces, as well as to improve border and maritime
41 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/14/annex-us-gulf-cooperation-council-camp-david-joint-
statement.
42 Paul Richter and Alexandra Davis. “U.S. Promises to Beef Up Defense Aid to Persian Gulf Allies.” Los Angeles
Times, April 7, 2015.
43 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/14/us-gulf-cooperation-council-camp-david-joint-statement.
44 Department of State. Joint Statement of the U.S.-GCC Foreign Ministers Meeting. August 3, 2015.
45 The texts of the DCAs and related agreements are classified, but general information on the provisions of the
agreements has been provided in some open sources, including http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/
pub185.pdf.
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security. The United States has continued to agree to major sales to virtually all of the GCC states,
including such equipment as combat aircraft, precision-guided munitions, Littoral Combat Ships,
radar systems, and communications gear.
The U.S.-GCC defense posture in the Gulf is as follows:46
Saudi Arabia. The United States does not have a DCA with Saudi Arabia.
Nonetheless, a few hundred U.S. military personnel are in Saudi Arabia training
its military, Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG), and Ministry of Interior
forces. The Saudi force has about 225,000 active duty personnel, with about 600
tanks, of which 200 are U.S.-made M1A2 “Abrams” tanks. The Saudi Air Force
relies heavily on the U.S.-made F-15 “Eagle.”
Kuwait. The United States has had a DCA with Kuwait since 1991, and about
13,000 U.S. Army personnel are stationed there, providing ground combat
capability in the wake of the full U.S withdrawal from Iraq. The forces operate
out of such facilities as Camp Arifjan, south of Kuwait City, where the United
States prepositions ground armor including tanks. U.S. forces train at Camp
Buehring, about 50 miles west of the capital, and operate in other facilities such
as Shaykh Jabir Air Base. Kuwait has a small force of about 15,000 active
military personnel. It relies almost exclusively on U.S. equipment, including the
M1A2 Abrams tank the F/A-18 “Hornet” combat aircraft.
Qatar. The United States has had a DCA with Qatar since 1992 and signed an
updated version in December 2013. About 5,000 U.S. forces, mostly Air Force,
are in Qatar, manning the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which has responsibility for the Middle East and Central Asia; a
Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) that oversees U.S. combat aircraft
missions in the region; the large Al Udeid Air Base, and the As Saliyah army
prepositioning site where U.S. tanks are prepositioned. Qatar’s armed force is
small with about 12,000 active military personnel. Qatar has historically relied on
French military equipment, fielding AMX-30 tanks and Mirage combat aircraft.
In May 2015, during a visit to the Gulf by French President Francois Hollande,
Qatar agreed to buy 24 French-made Rafale fighter jets worth about $7 billion.47
UAE. The United States has had a DCA with UAE since 1994. About 5,000 U.S.
forces, mostly Air Force and Navy, are stationed in UAE, operating surveillance
and refueling aircraft from Al Dhafra Air Base, and servicing U.S. Navy and
contract ships which dock at the large commercial port of Jebel Ali. The UAE
armed forces include about 63,000 active duty personnel. Its ground forces use
primarily French tanks such as the Leclerc purchased in the 1990s and the AMX-
30, but its air forces are equipped with F-16s the country has bought from the
United States in recent years. The UAE has stated that it wants to buy the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter, but U.S. officials have stated that the system will not be
approved for sale to the GCC for at least several years after the aircraft is
delivered to Israel, based on U.S. policy to maintain Israel’’ “Qualitative Military
Edge” (QME).
46 The U.S. deployments in the Gulf are discussed in greater detail in CRS reports on the individual GCC states.
Information in this section is derived from author visits to the GCC states since 1993 and conversations with U.S. and
Gulf state diplomats. See also: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Military Balance, 2015.”
47 France and Qatar Seal $7 Billion Rafale Fighter Jet Deal. Reuters, April 30, 2015.
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Bahrain. The United States has had a DCA with Bahrain since 1991. About 6,000
U.S. personnel, mostly Navy, operate out of the large Naval Support Activity
facility that houses the U.S. command structure for all U.S. naval operations in
the Gulf. U.S. Air Force personnel also access Shaykh Isa Air Base. Bahrain has
the smallest military in the Gulf, with only about 6,000 active personnel, but it
has internal security forces under the Ministry of Interior with about 11,000
personnel. The United States has given Bahrain older model U.S. M60A3 tanks
and a frigate ship as “excess defense articles,” and the country has bought U.S.-
made F-16s with national funds. In June 2015, the Administration released a
“hold” on a sale of TOW anti-tank weapons and Humvee vehicles that was
placed on the sale in May 2011 on the grounds that Bahrain could use the
equipment to crack down on the unrest that erupted in February 2011. The
Administration justified the release by asserting that Bahrain’s human rights
record has improved over the past year. See: CRS Report 95-1013, Bahrain:
Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Oman. The United States has had a “facilities access agreement” (not a DCA)
with Oman since April 1980. Under the agreement, U.S. forces, mostly Air Force,
have access to Omani air bases such as those at Seeb, Masirah Island, Thumrait,
and Musnanah. A few hundred U.S. forces serve at these facilities. Oman has a
25,000 person force that has historically relied on British-made military
equipment. The United States has provided some M60A3 tanks as excess defense
articles, and Oman has bought F-16s using national funds.
The United States has consistently sought to promote cooperation among the GCC states, each of
which has its own military forces. In the past few years, the GCC leaders have formally supported
suggestions by Saudi Arabia to form a unified GCC military command structure, but similar
proposals have been discussed within the GCC for at least two decades with minimal
implementation to date. The United States has sought to promote that concept by attempting to
deal with the GCC countries as a bloc, rather than individually, but suspicions and grievances
among the GCC states has precluded progress on that concept to date.
In addition, even though the GCC states are large buyers of U.S. and other military equipment,
commentators often question the level of training and expertise of the Gulf military forces. Some
of the GCC states rely heavily on foreign troops in their ranks, such as Pakistani troops serving
under contract. The UAE has reportedly contracted with private security firms to develop certain
elements of a force that can be used for internal security and other purposes. On the other hand,
some police units in Bahrain and some UAE forces have acquired sufficient expertise to help U.S.
forces that have sought to stabilize Afghanistan.
Assistance Issues. The GCC states are considered wealthy states, and several of them have higher
per capita GDP than does the United States itself. The two least wealthy GCC states, Bahrain and
Oman, are or are able to be subsidized by the four wealthier GCC countries. Therefore, only
Bahrain and Oman receive U.S. military assistance, and the amounts they receive are miniscule
compared to military aid to such other Arab allies of the United States as Egypt or Jordan. For
FY2016, the Administration has requested only about $5.5 million in military and counter-
terrorism aid to Oman, and about $8 million for Bahrain.
Integrated Missile Defense
A cornerstone of the initiative, similar to that of forerunner efforts, is to coordinate Gulf state
missile defense capabilities. Secretary of Defense Hagel emphasized the joint missile defense
vision during his December 2013 and May 2014 visits to the Gulf, including stating that the
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United States prefers to sell related equipment to the GCC as a bloc, rather than individually. As
part of this effort, there have been several recent missile defense sales including PAC-3 sales to
UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia; and the advanced “THAAD” (Theater High Altitude Area
Defense) to UAE and Qatar. Oman reportedly is negotiating to buy the THAAD as well. In
September 2012, the United States put in place an early-warning missile defense radar in Qatar
that, when combined with radars in Israel and Turkey, would provide a wide range of coverage
against Iran’s missile forces.48
Separate from the efforts to forge a Gulf-wide missile defense, the United States has sought a
defense against an eventual long-range Iranian missile system. In August 2008, the George W.
Bush Administration reached agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to establish a
missile defense system to counter Iranian ballistic missiles. These agreements were reached over
Russia’s opposition, which was based on the belief that the missile defense system would be used
to neutralize Russian capabilities. However, reportedly based on assessments of Iran’s focus on
missiles of regional range, on September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration reoriented this
missile defense program to focus on ship-based systems and systems based in other European
countries, including Romania. Some saw this as an effort to win Russia’s support for additional
sanctions on Iran, although Russia continues to disagree with the plan. The FY2013 national
defense authorization act (P.L. 112-239) contained provisions urging the Administration to
undertake more extensive efforts, in cooperation with U.S. partners and others, to defend against
the missile programs of Iran (and North Korea).
48 David Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “To Calm Israel, U.S. Offers Ways to Restrain Iran,” New York Times, September 3,
2012.
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Table 6. Military Assets of the Gulf Cooperation Council Member States
Saudi
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Arabia
UAE
Total
8,200+
15,500+
42,600+
11,800
227,000+
63,000
Manpower
ARMY and NATIONAL GUARD
Personnel
6,000
11,000
25,000
8,500
175,000
44,400
Main Battle
Tanks
180
293
154
39
600
467
AIFV/APC
225
789
206
230
3,011
1,957
Artil ery
151
218
233
91+
771
579+
Attack
—
—
—
—
15
—
Helicopters
SAMs
91
136+
48
75
1,805
N/A
NAVY
Personnel
700
2,000
4,200
1,800
13,500
2,500
Destroyers
/Frigates
1
—
3
—
7
—
Submarines
—
—
2
—
—
10
Patrol/Coastal
Combatants
64
52
46
23
83
141
Amphibious
1
4
—
—
8
—
Landing Craft
AIR FORCE
Personnel (Air
1,500
2,500
5,000
1,500
20,000
4,500
Defense)
(16,000)
Fighter Aircraft
33
39
15
12
261
138 (18 JAC)
Attack
Helicopters
28
16
—
8
—
37 (JAC)
MISSILE DEFENSE
Patriot PAC-2
Yes
Yes
—
Yes
Yes
Yes
Patriot PAC-3
Yes
Yes
—
Yes
Yes
Yes
THAAD
—
—
—
Ordered
—
Ordered
Source: Compiled by Hector Pina using The Military Balance, 2015, Vol. 115, current as of February 10, 2015,
published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies
Notes: AIFV= Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle, APC= Armored Personnel Carrier, SAM= Surface-to-Air
Missile, THAAD= Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
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Potential for Israeli Military Action Against Iran49
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has asserted that a nuclear-armed Iran would
constitute an existential threat to Israel, and that Israel would take unilateral action to prevent a
nuclear-armed Iran. Netanyahu has opposed the JCPOA as a “historic mistake.” Still, most
outside experts consider an Israeli military strike on Iran unlikely if the JCPOA is implemented
and Iran is assessed as complying. The JCPOA was endorsed by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 2231 and a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities in an environment of Iranian compliance
with the JCPOA could potentially constitute a violation of that Resolution. Earlier, before the JPA
or JCPOA, in May 2013, by a vote of 99-0, the Senate passed a “sense of Congress” resolution,
S.Res. 65, that the United States should support Israel diplomatically, economically, and militarily
if it felt compelled to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Although Israeli strategists say that a strike might be a viable option, several U.S. experts doubt
that Israel has the capability to make such action sufficiently effective to justify the risks. The
IAF is capable but far smaller than that of the United States, and could require overflight of
several countries not likely to support Israeli action, such as Iraq.
Economic Sanctions
The United States and its partners have employed economic sanctions to try to cause Iran to agree
to limits on its nuclear program, to reassess the wisdom of supporting regional armed factions,
and to limit Iranian power generally. The imposition and effectiveness of sanctions is analyzed in
considerable depth in: CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman. An outline of
the existing sanctions regime is provided in the box below.
Table 7. Selected Economic Indicators
Economic Growth
Negative 5% growth in 2013, flat to minor (1%) growth in 2014
Per Capita Income
$12,800/yr (purchasing power parity) (2013)
GDP
$988 bil ion (purchasing power parity) (2013)
Proven Oil Reserves
135 bil ion barrels (highest after Russia and Canada)
Oil Production/Exports
About 1.1 mbd exports since the end of 2013. (About1.3 mbd with condensates)
Major Oil/Gas Customers
Remaining customers: primarily China, India, South Korea, Japan, and Turkey.
Turkey also buys 8.6 bil ion cubic meters/yr of gas from Iran.
Major Export Markets
Mirrors major oil customers.
Major Imports
Mirrors major oil customers.
Development Assistance
2003 (latest available): $136 mil ion grant aid. Biggest donors: Germany ($38
Received
mil ion); Japan ($17 mil ion); France ($9 mil ion).
Inflation
About 25%, down from about 42% in 2013-2014.
Unemployment Rate
Official rate is 15.3%, but outside experts believe the rate is higher
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; various press; IMF; Iran Trade Planning Division; CRS conversations with
experts and foreign diplomats.
49 This option is analyzed in substantial depth in CRS Report R42443, Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s
Nuclear Facilities, coordinated by Jim Zanotti.
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Table 8. Digest of Existing U.S. Sanctions Against Iran
Ban on U.S. Trade With and Investment in Iran. Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995) bans almost all U.S. trade with and
investment in Iran. P.L. 111-195 (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, CISADA)
codifies the trade ban, which generally does not apply to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms. P.L. 112-239 sanctions
most foreign dealings with Iran’s energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sector, as well as the sale of certain items for
Iranian industrial processes and the transfer to Iran of precious metals (often a form of payment for oil or gas).
U.S. Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Deal With Iran’s Energy Sector. The Iran Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172) has been
amended several times and authorizes the imposition of five out of a menu of twelve sanctions on firms determined
to have: invested more than $20 mil ion to develop Iran’s petroleum (oil and gas) sector; bought Iranian oil (unless
such country has a sanctions exemption under the FY2012 National Defense Act, see below); sold Iran more than $1
mil ion worth of gasoline or equipment to import gasoline or refine oil into gasoline; sold $1 mil ion or more worth
of energy equipment to Iran; provided shipping services to transport oil from Iran; engaged in an energy joint venture
with Iran outside Iran; or bought Iran’s sovereign debt.
Sanctions On Iran’s Central Bank. CISADA bans accounts with banks that do business with the Revolutionary Guard and
sanctioned entities and the Treasury Department in November 2011 declared Iran’s financial system an entity of
primary money laundering concern. Section 1245 of the FY2012 National Defense Act (P.L. 112-81) prevents foreign
banks that do business with Iran’s Central Bank from opening U.S. accounts unless the parent countries of the banks
earn an exemption by “significantly reducing” their purchases of Iranian oil.
Terrorism List Designation Sanctions. Iran’s designation by the Secretary of State as a “state sponsor of terrorism”
(January 19, 1984—commonly referred to as the “terrorism list”) triggers several sanctions, including the fol owing:
(1) a ban on the provision of U.S. foreign assistance to Iran under Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act; (2) a
ban on arms exports to Iran under Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 95-92, as amended); (3) under
Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (P.L. 96-72, as amended), a significant restriction—amended by other
laws to a “presumption of denial”—on U.S. exports to Iran of items that could have military applications; (4) under
Section 327 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132, April 24, 1996), a requirement that
U.S. representatives to international financial institutions vote against international loans to terrorism list states.
Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Aid Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. The Iran-Syria-North Korea
Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178, March 14, 2000, as amended) authorizes the Administration to impose sanctions
on foreign persons or firms determined to have provided assistance to Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
programs. Sanctions include restrictions on U.S. trade with the sanctioned entity.
Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Sell Advanced Arms to Iran. The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 102-484,
October 23, 1992, as amended) provides for U.S. sanctions against foreign firms that sell Iran “destabilizing numbers
and types of conventional weapons” or WMD technology.
Ban on Transactions With Foreign Entities Determined to Be Supporting International Terrorism. Executive Order 13324
(September 23, 2001) authorizes a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determined to be supporting international
terrorism. The Order was not specific to Iran, but several Iranian entities have been designated.
Ban on Transactions With Foreign Entities that Support Proliferation. Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005) amended
previous executive orders to provide for a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determined to be supporting
international proliferation. As is the case for Executive Order 13324, mentioned above, Executive Order 13382 was
not specific to Iran. However, numerous Iranian entities, including the IRGC itself, have been designated.
Divestment. A Title in P.L. 111-195 authorizes and protects from lawsuits various investment managers who divest
from shares of firms that conduct sanctionable business with Iran.
Counter-Narcotics. In February 1987, Iran was first designated as a state that failed to cooperate with U.S. anti-drug
efforts or take adequate steps to control narcotics production or trafficking. The Clinton Administration, on
December 7, 1998, removed Iran from the U.S. list of major drug producing countries. This exempted Iran from the
annual certification process that kept drug-related U.S. sanctions in place on Iran.
Sanctions Against Human Rights Abuses and Internet Monitoring. Various laws discussed above, and Executive Orders,
impose sanctions on named Iranian human rights abusers, and on firms that sell equipment Iran can use to monitor
the Internet usage of citizens or employ against demonstrators.
Source: CRS. For analysis and extended discussion of U.S. and international sanctions against Iran, see CRS
Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Possible Additional Sanctions
Should a comprehensive deal not be agreed, the Administration and Congress say additional U.S.
and possibly other multilateral sanctions are likely to be imposed. Options include the following:
Mandating reductions in diplomatic exchanges with Iran, prohibiting travel by
additional Iranian officials, or banning passenger flights to and from Iran.
Limiting lending to Iran by international financial institutions. Resolution 1747
calls for restraint on but does not outright ban international lending to Iran.
Banning trade financing or official insurance for trade financing. This option was
not made mandatory by Resolution 1929, but several countries imposed this
sanction (as far as most trade financing) subsequently.
Banning all investment in Iran’s energy sector. Such a step is authorized, but not
mandated, by Resolution 1929. Several countries used that authority to impose
these sanctions on Iran.
Restricting operations of and insurance for Iranian shipping. A call for restraint is
in Resolution 1929, but is not mandatory. The EU and other national measures
announced subsequently did include this sanction (IRISL) to take effect as of
July 1.
Imposing an international ban on trade with Iran, particularly purchases of
Iranian oil or gas. A related idea could be the enactment of a global ban on trade
with Iran or of U.S. sanctions that seek to compel a partial or comprehensive
global ban on trade with Iran.
Further Option: Regime Change
Even before the election of Rouhani, the Obama Administration has consistently sought to allay
Iran’s long-standing suspicions that the main U.S. goal is to unseat the Islamic regime in Iran.
Since then, in a September 24, 2013, General Assembly speech, President Obama explicitly stated
the United States does not seek to change Iran’s regime. However, many of Iran’s leaders,
particularly Khamene’i, continue to articulate a perception that the United States has never
accepted the 1979 Islamic revolution. Khamene’i and other Iranian figures note that the United
States provided some funding to anti-regime groups, mainly pro-monarchists, during the 1980s,50
and the George W. Bush Administration expressed attraction to this option on several occasions.
There was criticism in Iranian opposition and other circles of the Administration decision not to
materially support the 2009 domestic uprising in Iran. The Administration asserts that it was
appropriately critical of the regime crackdown on protests. On December 28, 2009, President
Obama stated that “Along with all free nations, the United States stands with those who seek their
universal rights.”51 On September 19, 2010, then-Secretary of State Clinton asserted that overt
and extensive U.S. support for the opposition could undermine the opposition’s position in Iran.
50 CRS conversations with U.S. officials responsible for Iran policy. 1980-1990. After a period of suspension of such
assistance, in 1995, the Clinton Administration accepted a House-Senate conference agreement to include $18-$20
million in funding authority for covert operations against Iran in the FY1996 Intelligence Authorization Act (H.R.
1655, P.L. 104-93), according to a Washington Post report of December 22, 1995. The Clinton Administration
reportedly focused the covert aid on changing the regime’s behavior, rather than its overthrow.
51 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on the Attempted Attack on Christmas Day
and Recent Violence in Iran,” December 28, 2009.
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In 2011, the Administration reevaluated its stance slightly in the context of the broader Middle
East uprisings. Statements by then-Secretary Clinton accused Iran of hypocrisy for supporting
demonstrations in Egypt while preventing similar free expression inside Iran.52 Many observers
noted that President Obama’s 2011Nowruz address was far more explicitly supportive of the
Iranian opposition than in prior years, mentioning specific dissidents who have been jailed and
saying to the “young people of Iran ... I want you to know that I am with you.”53 Since that
statement, the Administration has sanctioned Iranian officials for human rights abuses in Iran and
for assisting Syria with its crackdown against demonstrations. These statements and steps stop
short of constituting a policy of “regime change,” although Iran interprets any public support for
the domestic opposition as evidence of U.S. intent to overthrow the clerical government.
Some in Congress have advocated a U.S. policy of overthrow of the regime. In the 111th
Congress, one bill said that it should be U.S. policy to promote the overthrow of the regime (The
Iran Democratic Transition Act, S. 3008). However, the JPA and JCPOA would appear to
represent a further sign of Administration acceptance of Iran’s regime.
Democracy Promotion and Internet Freedom Efforts
In the absence of all-out U.S. pursuit of regime change, successive Administrations and Congress
have agreed on steps to promote gradual political evolution in Iran through “democracy
promotion” and sanctions on Iranian human rights abuses. The laws and Executive Orders
discussed in this section are analyzed in greater detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.
That report also contains tables listing Iranian entities sanctioned under these provisions.
U.S. actions have focused on preventing the Iranian government’s suppression of electronic
communication. Several laws and Executive Orders issued since 2010 are intended to promote
Internet freedom, and the Administration has amended U.S.-Iran trade regulations to allow for the
sale to Iranians of consumer electronics and software that help them communicate. Under
Secretary of State Wendy Sherman testified on October 14, 2011, that some of the democracy
promotion funding for Iran has been to train Iranians in the use of technologies that undermine
regime Internet censorship efforts.
Democracy Promotion Funding
Binding legislation to favor democracy promotion in Iran was enacted in the 109th Congress. The
Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293), signed September 30, 2006, authorized funds (no
specific dollar amount) for Iran democracy promotion.54 Iran asserts that funding democracy
promotion represents a violation of the 1981 “Algiers Accords” that settled the Iran hostage crisis
and provide for non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. The George W. Bush
Administration asserted that open funding of Iranian pro-democracy activists (see below) was a
stated effort to change regime behavior, not to overthrow the regime, although some saw the Bush
Administration’s efforts as a cover to achieve a regime change objective.
The State Department, the implementer of U.S. democracy promotion programs for Iran, has used
funds in appropriations to support pro-democracy programs run by at organizations based in the
52 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/27/statement-national-security-council-spokesman-tommy-
vietor-iran.
53 White House, “Remarks of President Obama Marking Nowruz,” March 20, 2011.
54 This legislation was a modification of H.R. 282, which passed the House on April 26, 2006, by a vote of 397-21, and
S. 333, which was introduced in the Senate.
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United States and in Europe; the department refuses to name grantees for security reasons. The
funds shown below have been obligated through DRL and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in
partnership with USAID. Some of the funds have been appropriated for cultural exchanges,
public diplomacy, and broadcasting to Iran. A further indication of the sensitivity of specifying
the use of the funds is that, since FY2010, the Obama Administration has requested funds for Iran
democracy promotion as part of a broader “Near East regional democracy programs” rather than
delineating a specific request for Iran programs.
Many have consistently questioned the effectiveness of such funding. In the view of many
experts, U.S. funds would make the aid recipients less attractive to most Iranians. Even before the
post-2009 election crackdown, Iran was arresting civil society activists by alleging they are
accepting the U.S. democracy promotion funds, while others have refused to participate in U.S.-
funded programs, fearing arrest.55
Perhaps in response to some of these criticisms, the Obama Administration altered Iran
democracy promotion programs somewhat toward working directly with Iranians inside Iran who
are organized around such apolitical issues as health care, the environment, and science.56 During
2009, less emphasis was placed on funding journalists and human rights activists in Iran, or on
sponsoring visits by Iranians to the United States.57 One issue arose concerning the State
Department decision in late 2009 not to renew a contract to the Iran Human Rights
Documentation Center (IHRDC), based at Yale University, which was cataloguing human rights
abuses in Iran. However, IHRDC has reportedly continued to receive some U.S. funding to
continue its work.
Broadcasting/Public Diplomacy Issues
Another part of the democracy promotion effort has been the development of new U.S.
broadcasting services to Iran. The broadcasting component of policy has been an extension of a
trend that began in the late 1990s. Radio Farda (“tomorrow,” in Farsi) began under Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), in partnership with the Voice of America (VOA), in 2002. The
service was established as a successor to a smaller Iran broadcasting effort begun with an initial
$4 million from the FY1998 Commerce/State/Justice appropriation (P.L. 105-119). It was to be
called Radio Free Iran but was never formally given that name by RFE/RL. Radio Farda now
broadcasts 24 hours/day. Based in Prague, Radio Farda has 59 full time employees. No U.S.
assistance has been provided to Iranian exile-run stations.58 Its estimated budget is $11.1 million
for FY2014 and $11.5 million for FY2015.
VOA Persian Service (Formerly called Persian News Network (PNN). The VOA established a
Persian language service to Iran in July 2003. Prior to 2014, it was called Persian News Network
(PNN), encompassing radio (1 hour a day or original programming); television (6 hours a day of
primetime programming, rebroadcast throughout a 24-hour period); and Internet. The service had
55 Three other Iranian Americans were arrested and accused by the Intelligence Ministry of actions contrary to national
security in May 2007: U.S. funded broadcast (Radio Farda) journalist Parnaz Azima (who was not in jail but was not
allowed to leave Iran); Kian Tajbacksh of the Open Society Institute funded by George Soros; and businessman and
peace activist Ali Shakeri. Several congressional resolutions called on Iran to release Esfandiari (S.Res. 214 agreed to
by the Senate on May 24; H.Res. 430, passed by the House on June 5; and S.Res. 199). All were released by October
2007. Tajbacksh was rearrested in September 2009 and remains incarcerated.
56 CRS conversation with U.S. officials of the “Iran Office” of the U.S. Consulate in Dubai, October 2009.
57 Jay Solomon, “U.S. Shifts Its Strategy Toward Iran’s Dissidents,” Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2010.
58 The conference report on the FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriations, P.L. 109-102, stated the sense of Congress
that such support should be considered.
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come under substantial criticism from observers for losing much of its audience among young,
educated, anti-regime Iranians who are looking for signs of U.S. official support. VOA officials
told CRS in August 2014 that they have successfully addressed these issues through the human
resources office of the VOA. VOA officials say they are bringing back a show that had particular
appeal with audiences inside Iran—“Parazit” (Persian for static)—a weekly comedy show
modeled on a U.S. program on Comedy Central network called “The Daily Show.” Observers say
that the show deteriorated in quality in 2012 after its founder, Kambiz Hosseini, was ousted from
it and it was taken off PNN in February 2012. A different show that satirizes Iranian leaders and
news from Iran—called On Ten—began in April 2012.
According VOA briefings, costs for PNN are: FY2010, $23.78 million; FY2011, $22.5 million;
FY2012, $23.32 million. In FY2013 its costs are expected were about $18 million. Its budget for
FY2014 is $23.1 million and $17.9 million for FY2015.
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Table 9. Iran Democracy Promotion Funding
FY2004
Foreign operations appropriation (P.L. 108-199) earmarked $1.5 mil ion for “educational, humanitarian
and non-governmental organizations and individuals inside Iran to support the advancement of
democracy and human rights in Iran.” The State Department Bureau of Democracy and Labor (DRL)
gave $1 mil ion to a unit of Yale University, and $500,000 to National Endowment for Democracy.
FY2005
$3 mil ion from FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) for democracy promotion. Priority
areas: political party development, media, labor rights, civil society promotion, and human rights.
FY2006
$11.15 for democracy promotion from regular FY2006 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 109-102). $4.15
mil ion administered by DRL and $7 mil ion for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
FY2006
Total of $66.1 mil ion (of $75 mil ion requested) from FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234): $20 mil ion
supp.
for democracy promotion; $5 mil ion for public diplomacy directed at the Iranian population; $5 mil ion
for cultural exchanges; and $36.1 mil ion for Voice of America-TV and “Radio Farda” broadcasting.
Broadcasting funds are provided through the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
FY2007
FY2007 continuing resolution provided $6.55 mil ion for Iran (and Syria) to be administered through
DRL. $3.04 mil ion was used for Iran. No funds were requested.
FY2008
$60 mil ion (of $75 mil ion requested) is contained in Consolidated Appropriation (H.R. 2764, P.L.
110-161), of which, according to the conference report $21.6 mil ion is ESF for pro-democracy
programs, including non-violent efforts to oppose Iran’s meddling in other countries. $7.9 mil ion is
from a “Democracy Fund” for use by DRL. The Appropriation also ful y funded additional $33.6 mil ion
requested for Iran broadcasting: $20 mil ion for VOA Persian service; and $8.1 mil ion for Radio Farda;
and $5.5 mil ion for exchanges with Iran.
FY2009
Request was for $65 mil ion in ESF “to support the aspirations of the Iranian people for a democratic
and open society by promoting civil society, civic participation, media freedom, and freedom of
information.” H.R. 1105 (P.L. 111-8) provides $25 mil ion for democracy promotion programs in the
region, including in Iran.
FY2010
$40 mil ion requested and used for Near East Regional Democracy programming. Programs to
promote human rights, civil society, and public diplomacy in Iran constitute a significant use of these
region-wide funds.
FY2011
$40 mil ion requested and wil be used for Near East Regional Democracy programs. Programming for
Iran with these funds to be similar to FY2010.
FY2012
$35 mil ion for Near East Regional Democracy, and Iran-related use similar to FY2010 and FY2011.
FY2013
$30 mil ion for Near East Regional Democracy, with Iran use similar to prior two fiscal years.
FY2014
$30 mil ion for Near East Regional Democracy, with Iran use similar to prior three fiscal years.
FY2015
$30 mil ion for Near East Regional Democracy, with Iran use likely similar to previous years. Request
mentions funding to be used to help circumvent Internet censorship.
FY2016
$30 mil ion requested for Near East Regional Democracy, with Iran use likely similar to prior years.
Sources: Information provided by State Department and reviewed by Department’s Iran Office,
February 1, 2010; State Department Congressional Budget Justifications; author conversation with Department
of State Iran Office, April 21, 2011.
State Department Public Diplomacy Efforts
The State Department also is trying to enhance its public diplomacy to reach out to the Iranian
population.
In May 2003, the State Department added a Persian-language website to its list of
foreign language websites, under the authority of the Bureau of International
Information Programs. The website was announced as a source of information
about the United States and its policy toward Iran.
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In February 14, 2011, the State Department began Persian-language Twitter feeds
in an effort to connect better with Internet users in Iran.
In part to augment U.S. public diplomacy, the State Department announced in
April 2011 that a Persian-speaking U.S. diplomat based at the U.S. Consulate in
Dubai would make regular appearances on Iranian media.
Since 2006, the State Department has been increasing the presence of Persian-speaking U.S.
diplomats in U.S. diplomatic missions around Iran, in part to help identify and facilitate Iranian
participate in U.S. democracy-promotion programs. The Iran unit at the U.S. consulate in Dubai
has been enlarged significantly into a “regional presence” office, and “Iran-watcher” positions
have been added to U.S. diplomatic facilities in Baku, Azerbaijan; Istanbul, Turkey; Frankfurt,
Germany; London; Ashkabad, Turkmenistan; and Herat Afghanistan, all of which have large
expatriate Iranian populations and/or proximity to Iran.59 An “Office of Iran Affairs” has been
formed at the State Department, and it is reportedly engaged in contacts with U.S.-based exile
groups such as those discussed earlier.
59 Farah Stockman, “‘Long Struggle’ With Iran Seen Ahead,” Boston Globe, March 9, 2006.
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Opposition Group: People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK, PMOI)
The best-known exiled opposition group is the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MEK), also known as the People’s
Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). Secular and left-leaning, it was formed in the 1960s to try to overthrow the
Shah of Iran and has been characterized by U.S. reports as attempting to blend several ideologies, including Marxism,
feminism, and Islam, although the organization denies that it ever advocated Marxism. It allied with pro-Khomeini
forces during the Islamic revolution and, according to State Department reports, supported the November 1979
takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The group was driven into exile after it unsuccessful y rose up against the
Khomeini regime in September 1981. It has been led for decades by spouses Maryam and Massoud Rajavi but in 2011
Ms. Zohreh Akhyani was elected as MEK Secretary-General. Maryam Rajavi is based in France but the whereabouts of
Massoud Rajavi are unknown.
The State Department designated the PMOI as an FTO in October 1997—during the presidency of the relatively
moderate Mohammad Khatemi. The NCR was named as an alias of the PMOI in October 1999, and in August 2003,
the Treasury Department ordered the groups’ offices in the United States closed. State Department reports on
international terrorism for the years until 2011 asserted that the members of the organization were responsible for:
the alleged kil ing of seven American military personnel and contract advisers to the former Shah during 1973-1976;
bombings at U.S. government facilities in Tehran in 1972 as a protest of the visit to Iran of then-President Richard
Nixon; and bombings of U.S. corporate offices in Iran to protest the visit of then Secretary of State Kissinger. The
reports also listed as terrorism several attacks by the group against regime targets (including 1981 bombings that
kil ed high ranking officials), attacks on Iranian government facilities, and attacks on Iranian security officials. However,
the reports did not assert that any of these attacks purposely targeted civilians. The group’s alliance with Saddam
Hussein’s regime in contributed to the designation, even though Saddam was a tacit U.S. ally when the group moved
to Iraq in 1986.
The PMOI challenged the FTO listing in the U.S. court system and, in June 2012, the Appeals Court gave the State
Department until October 1, 2012, to decide on the FTO designation, although without prescribing how the
Department should decide. On September 28, 2012, maintaining there had not been confirmed acts of PMOI
terrorism for more than a decade and that it had cooperated on the Camp Ashraf issue (below), the group was
removed from the FTO list as well as from the designation as a terrorism supporter under Executive Order 13224.
However, State Department officials, in a background briefing that day, said “We do not see the [PMOI] as a viable or
democratic opposition movement. . They are not part of our picture in terms of the future of Iran.” The NCR-I
reopened its offices in Washington, DC, in April 2013. The State Department has been meeting with the MEK since
its removal from the FTO list, including in Iraq.
Camp Ashraf Issue
The de-listing of the group has not resolved the situation of PMOI members in Iraq. U.S. forces attacked PMOI
military installations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (March 2003) and negotiated a ceasefire with PMOI
elements in Iraq, according to which the approximately 3,400 PMOI members consolidated at Camp Ashraf, near the
border with Iran. Its weaponry was placed in storage, guarded first by U.S. and now by Iraqi personnel. In July 2004,
the United States granted the Ashraf detainees “protected persons” status under the 4th Geneva Convention,
although that designation lapsed when Iraq resumed ful sovereignty in June 2004. The Iraqi government’s pledges to
adhere to all international obligations with respect to the PMOI in Iraq has come into question on several occasions:
on July 28, 2009, Iraq used force to overcome resident resistance to setting up a police post in the camp, kil ing 13 n
residents of the camp. On April 8, 2011, Iraq Security Forces kil ed 36 Ashraf residents; the State Department issued
a statement attributing the deaths to the actions of Iraq and its military.
In December 2011, the Iraqi government and the United Nations agreed to relocate Ashraf residents to the former
U.S. military base Camp Liberty, near Baghdad’s main airport. The relocation was completed by September 17, 2012,
leaving a residual group of 101 PMOI persons at Ashraf. The group asserted that conditions at Liberty are poor and
the facility is unsafe. On February 9, 2013, the camp was attacked by rockets, kil ing eight PMOI members; the Shi te
militia group Kata’ib Hezbol ah (KAH) claimed responsibility. Another rocket attack on the camp took place on June
15, 2013. On September 1, 2013, 52 of the residual Ashraf residents were kil ed by gunmen that appeared to have
assistance from Iraqi forces guarding Ashraf’s perimeter. Seven others remain missing. All survivors of the attack were
moved to Camp Liberty, and Ashraf has been taken over by Iran-backed Shi te militias.
Since 2011, the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has sought to resettle PMOI members outside Iraq.
About 600 have been resettled so far: 450 to Albania; 95 to Germany; 95 to Italy; 15 to Norway; and 2 to Finland.
The United States reportedly might resettle 100 or more, but the U.S. requirement that those resettled disavow the
group has apparently held up implementation of that program. About 200 have returned to Iran; a few of them
reportedly have been imprisoned and/or mistreated.
Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Government
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Source: CRS.
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Figure 2. Map of Iran
Source: Map boundaries from Map Resources, 2005. Graphic: CRS.
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Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
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