Argentina: Background and U.S. Relations
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Rebecca M. Nelson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
August 11, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43816


link to page 20 Argentina: Background and U.S. Relations

Summary
Argentina, a South American country with a population of almost 42 million, has had a vibrant
democratic tradition since its military relinquished power in 1983. Current President Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner, from a center-left faction of the Peronist party, the Front for Victory
(FPV), was first elected in 2007 (succeeding her husband, Néstor Kirchner, who served one term)
and is now in the final months of her second term. Argentina’s constitution does not allow for
more than two successive terms, so President Fernández is ineligible to run in the next
presidential election, with a first round scheduled for October 25, 2015. Eleven candidates
competed in an August 9, 2015, combined open primary for electoral alliances, and three top
candidates emerged: Daniel Scioli, governor of Buenos Aires province under the banner of
President Fernández’s FPV; Mauricio Macri, mayor of Buenos Aires, heading the Let’s Change
coalition that includes center-right and center-left opposition parties; and Sergio Massa, a deputy
in Argentina’s Congress, who heads a centrist dissident Peronist faction known as United for a
New Alternative.
Argentina has Latin America’s third-largest economy and is endowed with vast natural resources.
Agriculture has traditionally been a main economic driver, but the country also has a diversified
industrial base and a highly educated population. In 2001-2002, a severe economic crisis
precipitated by unsustainable debt led to the government defaulting on nearly $100 billion in
foreign debt owed to private creditors, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and foreign
governments. Subsequent Argentine administrations resolved more than 90% of the country’s
debt owed to private creditors through two debt restructurings offered in 2005 and 2010; repaid
debt owed to the IMF in 2006; and, in May 2014, reached an agreement to repay foreign
governments, including the United States. U.S. Court rulings in 2014 increased pressure on
Argentina to reach an agreement with private creditors who chose not to participate in the 2005
and 2010 debt restructuring offers. These court rulings also interfered with Argentina’s ability to
make payments on the restructured bonds. The unresolved debt issues have made it difficult for
Argentina to access international credit markets and to emerge from its current economic
slowdown.
U.S.-Argentine relations, as described by the Department of State, are based on such shared
interests as regional peace and stability, nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, education, and
cooperation on science and technology. Commercial relations are robust, with the United States
running a $6.6 billion trade surplus and U.S. companies investing approximately $15 billion in
the country. At various junctures, however, there have been tensions in the bilateral relationship,
including over Argentina’s payment of international arbitral awards in investment disputes and
the repayment of debt owed to the U.S. government. While these issues have been settled, the
unresolved holdout debt issue has contributed to increased tension, with Argentine officials at
times rhetorically lashing out at the United States. A continued interest of Congress is progress in
the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-
Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) that killed 85 people. Both Iran and Hezbollah are alleged to
be linked to the bombing.
This report provides background on the political and economic situation in Argentina and U.S.-
Argentine relations. An Appendix provides links to selected U.S. government reports on
Argentina.
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Argentina: Background and U.S. Relations

Contents
Political and Economic Situation .................................................................................................... 1
2015 Presidential Election ......................................................................................................... 4
Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................................. 6
Economic Snapshot and Challenges ......................................................................................... 6
U.S.-Argentine Relations ................................................................................................................. 8
Trade and Investment Issues ..................................................................................................... 9
Debt Issues ............................................................................................................................... 11
Debt Owed to the Paris Club Countries ............................................................................. 11
Debt Owed to Private Bondholders .................................................................................. 12
AMIA Investigation and Death of Alberto Nisman................................................................. 14
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 16

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Argentina, with Provinces ................................................................................... 2

Appendixes
Appendix. Selected U.S. Executive Branch Reports ..................................................................... 17

Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 17

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Argentina: Background and U.S. Relations

Political and Economic Situation
In December 2013, Argentina—a South American nation located in the continent’s southern
cone—celebrated 30 years of civilian democratic rule since the military relinquished power after
seven years of harsh dictatorship. The
military’s so-called Dirty War against leftists
Argentina at a Glance
and their sympathizers in the late 1970s and
Population: 41.8 mil ion (2014, WB).
early 1980s had resulted in thousands of
Area: 1.1 mil ion square miles, about the size of the
disappearances. The military ultimately fell
United States east of the Mississippi; second-largest
into disrepute in the aftermath of its failure in
country in South America and eighth-largest country in
the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) war
the world.
with Great Britain in 1982, and the country
GDP: $540.2 bil ion (2014, current prices, IMF).
returned to civilian democratic rule with the
Per Capita GDP: $12,873 (2014, current prices, IMF
est.)
election of Raúl Alfonsín of the Radical Civic
Union (UCR) as president in 1983. Carlos
Key Trading Partners: Brazil (21%), China (11%),
United States (10%) (2014, INDEC).
Menem of the Justicialist Party (PJ), also
Life Expectancy: 76 (2013, WB)
known as the Peronist Party, won the 1989
Legislature: Bicameral Congress, with 72-member
elections and served two presidential terms
Senate and 257-member Chamber of Deputies.
until 1999, during which he transformed
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF); National
Argentina from having a state-dominated
Institute of Statistics and Census, INDEC (Argentina); World
protectionist economy to one committed to
Bank (WB); and U.S. Department of State.
free market principles and open to trade.1
Increasing corruption and high unemployment, however, led to the defeat of the Peronists in the
1999 presidential election, which was won by Fernando de la Rúa of the UCR as the candidate of
a coalition known as the Alliance for Work, Justice, and Education.
In 2001-2002, Argentina’s democratic political system endured considerable stress amid a severe
economic crisis and related social unrest. In late 2001, as the banking system faltered and
confidence in the government of President de la Rúa evaporated, widespread demonstrations
turned violent, and the president resigned. The subsequent interim government then defaulted on
nearly $100 billion in public debt, the largest sovereign default in history at the time. Ultimately,
the political system survived the crisis. President Eduardo Duhalde (January 2002-May 2003), a
Peronist (Justicialist Party, PJ) senator selected by Congress to fill out the remainder of President
de la Rúa’s term, implemented policies that stabilized the economy; then, left-leaning President
Néstor Kirchner (May 2003-December 2007), a Peronist who had served as a provincial governor
of Santa Cruz in Patagonia, further enhanced internal political and economic stability.


1 Peronism as a political movement dates to the 1940s when Juan Domingo Peron, a colonel serving as Secretary of
Labor in a military government that assumed power in 1943, went on to build a formidable political base through
support from the rapidly growing union movement. Peron was ousted by the military in 1955, but after 18 years of
exile, he returned and was reelected president in 1973. He died a year later and was succeeded by his second wife
Isabel, who had little political experience. Economic and political chaos ensued, with political violence surging and the
country experiencing its first bout of hyperinflation. The military intervened in 1976 and ruled until the return to
democracy in 1983. Today in Argentina, Peronism has many different factions across the political spectrum.
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Argentina: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 1. Map of Argentina, with Provinces

Source: Prepared by Calvin C. DeSouza, Geospatial Information Systems Analyst, CRS.

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Despite some difficulties, Kirchner made popular policy moves in the areas of human rights and
economic policy that helped restore Argentines’ faith in democracy. In June 2005, the government
offered the first of two restructurings of its defaulted private bond debt with a historically low
recovery rate to bondholders (about 30% on a net present value basis). While this was politically
popular in Argentina, the government’s failure to repay its arrears to official Paris Club creditors
or to reach a deal with remaining private creditors in defaulted bond debt who did not accept the
government’s offer continued to prevent Argentina from having full access to international capital
markets. Legislative elections in 2005 demonstrated strong support for Kirchner; his left-leaning
wing of the PJ, known as the Front for Victory (FPV), made significant gains. Kirchner would
have been eligible to run again in the 2007 presidential elections, but instead he supported the
candidacy of his wife, Senator Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (hereinafter Fernández).
Cristina Fernández is now in her second term and final months as president (a new president is to
be inaugurated in December 2015). She won the 2007 presidential election with 45% of the vote,
defeating her closest rival by 23 points, and became the first woman in Argentine history to be
elected president. In concurrent legislative elections, Fernández’s FPV faction of the PJ gained
further seats, solidifying its majority in both houses of Argentina’s bicameral Congress.
Nevertheless, Fernández’s political honeymoon was short-lived because of an energy crisis and a
series of farmers’ strikes that led to the congressional defeat of her proposed tax increase on key
agricultural exports. As a result, the Kirchners suffered a significant setback in the 2009
legislative elections, with the FPV losing control of both houses. It appeared that former President
Kirchner was poised to run again for the presidency in 2011, but his death from a heart attack
changed the political landscape. Instead, Fernández ran for reelection and won a second mandate
in October 2011 with 54% of the vote, the largest percentage in a presidential race since the
country’s return to democratic rule. Her support was buoyed by an outpouring of sympathy after
the death of her husband as well as by the absence of a strong opposition candidate. The
President’s FPV also regained a legislative majority in both houses of Congress.
President Fernández’s popularity, however, fell considerably after her reelection amid large-scale
public protests against corruption, increasing crime, the government’s economic policies, and the
government’s efforts to exert influence over the media and the judiciary. In Argentina’s October
2013 legislative elections, in which one-half of the Chamber of Deputies and one-third of the
Senate were at stake, President Fernández’s Front for Victory managed to retain control of both
houses. The FPV and its allies gained several seats in the 257-seat Chamber of Deputies, and in
the 72-member Senate, the FPV lost several seats but retained a majority.2 Nevertheless, the FPV
was unable to secure the two-thirds majorities needed to approve a constitutional reform that
would have allowed President Fernández to run for a third consecutive term in 2015.
In 2014, despite her lame duck status, President Fernández still achieved congressional approval
for initiatives to regulate the oil sector, reform telecommunications, and revise the civil and
criminal codes.3 Her government also did an about face by resolving long-standing arbitral
disputes with foreign companies and finalizing an agreement to pay foreign government creditors.
However, the Fernández government’s impasse with private creditors who did not participate in
the government’s debt restructurings in 2005 and 2010—the so-called “holdouts”—intensified in
2014 because of U.S. court rulings that made it difficult for Argentina to make payments on its
restructured debt unless it also paid the holdouts (see “Debt Issues” below).

2 “Modest Victory Fails to Mask Uncertain Future for Kirchnerismo,” Latin American Weekly Report, October 31,
2013.
3 M. Victoria Murillo, “Curtains for Argentina’s Kirchner Era,” Current History, February 2015.
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In the first half of 2015, the Fernández government was grappling with the fallout from the death
of Alberto Nisman, the special prosecutor who, for the last decade, had been investigating the
1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in which 85 people were
killed. In January 2015, Nisman was found dead from a gunshot wound just a day before he was
to testify before Argentina’s Congress regarding explosive accusations that President Fernández
and other government officials attempted to whitewash the AMIA investigation in efforts to
improve relations with Iran. After Nisman’s death, an Argentine prosecutor took up Nisman’s
case against President Fernández related to Iran, but it was ultimately dismissed in April 2015.
While the investigation into Nisman’s death continues, many observers are skeptical that the truth
will be uncovered. In the aftermath of Nisman’s allegations, President Fernández’s popularity fell
to under 30%, but in recent months it has begun to increase and approached 50% in late July
2015.4 (For more, see “AMIA Investigation and Death of Alberto Nisman” below.)
2015 Presidential Election
Argentina’s next presidential election is scheduled for October 25, 2015; a second round would
be held between the two leading candidates on November 24 if no candidate in the first round
receives more than 45% of the vote, or, if receiving at least 40% of the vote, fails to achieve a 10-
point lead over the next candidate. On August 9, 2015, Argentina held a combined open primary
known as the PASO (Open, Simultaneous, and Obligatory Primaries) when voters chose which of
11 electoral alliances’ primaries they would participate in regardless of whether they were party
members. The PASO is viewed as a first take on the presidential race as well as a way to cut
down on the overall number of candidates—only those alliances receiving at least 1.5% of the
vote are eligible to compete in the first round in October.
Polls had long predicted the top three winners of the PASO. Daniel Scioli, who ran as the sole
candidate for President Fernández’s Front for Victory (FPV) faction of the Peronist party,
received 38.4% of the total national vote; Mauricio Macri, who ran as the candidate of the Let’s
Change (Cambiemos) alliance, won almost 81% of the vote in his primary in a three-candidate
race, and his electoral alliance received 30.1% of the total vote; and Sergio Massa, of the centrist
United for a New Alternative (UNA) faction of the Peronist party, won almost 69% of the vote in
his primary, and his electoral alliance received 20.6% of the total vote. Three other electoral
alliances received much smaller shares of the total vote: the center-left Progressives, with 3.5%;
the hard-left Workers’ Leftist Front (FIT), with 3.3%; and the Federal Commitment, a centrist
faction of the Peronist party, with 2. 1%.5
 Scioli is the governor of Buenos Aires province and was a close ally of President
Kirchner, serving as his vice president from 2003 to 2007. Going into the
presidential race, Scioli reportedly was not close to President Fernández, but
ultimately he received her endorsement and benefitted from the president’s rising
public support. Fernández endorsed Scioli after he accepted as his vice
presidential running mate the Kirchners’ longtime supporter Carlos Zannini, who
serves as the president’s legal secretary. During the primary campaign, Scioli
vied to win the support of the Kirchners’ leftist supporters by emphasizing

4 “Learning from Cristina,” Buenos Aires Herald, July 28, 2015.
5 In addition, five other alliances received less than 0.5% of the national vote and will not be able to participate in the
first electoral round in October. See Argentina, Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, Direccíon Nacional
Electoral, “Elecciones Argentinas, Primarias, Abiertas, Simultáneas y Obligatorias 2015,” available at
http://www.resultados.gob.ar/iniciov.htm.
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continuity with the government programs established under the Kirchners and a
strong government role in the economy.6 His challenge during the general
campaign will be to attract the support of more moderate Peronists.
 Macri is the leader of the center-right Propuesta Republicana (PRO, Republican
Proposal) party and is in his second term as mayor of Buenos Aires. Macri has a
business background and also served as president of one of Argentina’s most
popular football clubs, Boca Juniors. One difficulty for his candidacy is that his
political party is centered in Buenos Aires and does not have a nationwide reach.
Some observers believe that during the general election, Macri is likely to
emphasize unity among the PRO and two other parties of the Let’s Change
coalition—the center-left Radical Civic Union (UCR), led by Ernesto Sanz, and
the center-left Civic Coalition, led by Elisa Carrió. Both leaders vied for the
nomination during the primary but have vowed their strong support for Macri.
Some analysts note that Macri has moved more to the center during the primary
campaign so as not to alienate those Argentines supportive of the government’s
social programs.
 Massa is a former cabinet chief in the Fernández government and former mayor
of Tigre who was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 2013 and serves as the
leader of a centrist dissident Peronist faction known as the Renewal Front (FR),
which became disillusioned with the Fernández government. He served as head
of Argentina’s National Social Security Administration (ANES) from 2002 to
2007 under Presidents Duhalde and Kirchner. At 43 years of age, Massa
reportedly represents a generation of young politicians with experience in
government and a reputation as an efficient administrator. Massa initially was
doing well in opinion polls, but his third-place finish in the PASO might make it
easier for those opposed to the leftist FPV to support Macri as more of a viable
opposition candidate.
Many observers contend that Scioli’s success in the PASO make him the most likely winner in the
presidential race, while others maintain that his election is not certain. If Scioli wins, some
analysts believe that President Fernández will be able to exert continued influence in the
government, although others contend that the strong role of the presidency in Argentina’s political
system would ensure that Scioli would be in charge. If Scioli fails to win outright in the first
round in October—by receiving either 45% of the vote or at least 40% with a 10-point lead—he
could face a second round race in which opponents of the leftist FPV could unite behind one
candidate. For over a decade, opposition parties have not been able to gain enough nationwide
support to win the presidency, and for this reason many analysts believe that a Peronist candidate
will succeed Fernández. Given the outcome of the PASO, however, it appears that Mauricio
Macri could be in a position to win if he received the support of some dissident or centrist
Peronists.
At the same time as the presidential race in October 2015, Argentina is to hold elections for one-
half of the Chamber of Deputies and one-third of the Senate as well as seats for the Parliament of
Mercosur (Common Market of the South), also known as Parlasur. Given that the FPV currently
has majorities in both houses of Argentina’s Congress, it will likely retain a strong voice in the
legislature.

6 Jonathan Gilbert, “Some Fear Departing President Has No Plans of Really Leaving,” New York Times, June 29, 2015;
Nick Miroff, “Kirchner Era Is Over. Long Live ‘Kichnerismo’?” Washington Post, July 20, 2015.
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Human Rights Issues
Both the Kirchner and the Fernández governments have made significant efforts to bring to
justice those responsible for the killing of thousands of people (some 30,000, according to
Argentine human rights groups)7 and the torture of thousands during the Dirty War, which
occurred under military rule from 1976 to 1983. Since the Argentine Supreme Court overturned
amnesty laws in 2003, more than 550 people, including many former military and police officials,
have been convicted for the atrocities committed under military rule. These have included former
military rulers General Jorge Rafael Videla (1976-1981), who died in prison in 2013, and General
Reynaldo Bignone (1982-1983), who remains in prison. Argentine judicial authorities continue to
investigate and prosecute individuals implicated in the disappearances, killings, and torture
committed during the Dirty War, as well as cases of kidnapping and the illegal adoption of
children born to those detained under the dictatorship.8
Despite progress in addressing past abuses, some human rights groups have criticized the current
Argentine government regarding press freedom as well as alleged efforts to thwart judicial
independence. Press rights groups have criticized the government for punishing media outlets
critical of the government by withholding public advertising and instead awarding such
advertising to outlets close to the government.
Over the past several years, the government has battled with the Clarín media group, which owns
Argentina’s most widely read newspaper, as well as radio stations, broadcast and cable television
outlets, and an Internet service provider. In 2009, the government enacted a controversial law
regulating broadcast and print media that it indicated was designed to strengthen pluralism and
information freedom. The government maintained that it wanted Clarín to sell some of its assets
in order to create more competition in the media market, while some press rights groups
contended that the government actually wanted to muzzle Clarín, which has often been critical of
the government. In October 2013, Argentina’s Supreme Court upheld key provisions of the law.
Clarín subsequently presented a plan to the government to break up its holdings into six different
companies. An outline of the plan initially had been approved by the government’s regulatory
agency, the Federal Audiovisual Communications Authority (AFSCA) in February 2014, but in
October 2014, the board of directors of AFSCA voted against Clarín’s plan and said that the
agency itself would undertake enforcement of the media law and the breakup of the media group.
The President of the AFSCA said that Clarín’s plan would have maintained linkages among the
new companies and violated the spirit of the media law.9 Clarín maintains that the government is
attempting to stifle dissent and appropriate private property.10
Economic Snapshot and Challenges
With a gross domestic product (GDP) of $540 billion (2014, IMF), Argentina has the third-largest
economy in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico. The country has vast natural resources,
including abundant fertile land suitable for agriculture, which have traditionally been the main

7 “Argentina: On the Death of Jorge Rafael Videla,” Human Rights Watch, May 17, 2013; and Jonathan Gilbert,
“Argentine Judge Orders Arrest of Spanish Ex-Officials,” New York Times, November 2, 2014.
8 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015; and U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices 2014
, June 2015.
9 “The Battle for Clarín,” LatinNews Daily Report, October 9, 2014; “Argentina, Media War, The Government’s Media
Regulatory Agency Is Forcing a Reorganization of the Clarín Group Under the Country’s Broadcast Media Law,”
Reporters Without Borders, October 23, 2014.
10 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2014, June 2015.
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drivers of economic growth. A highly educated population and a diversified industrial base also
contribute to growth. Argentina is classified by the World Bank as having a high-income
economy.11 Poverty rates, which had increased a decade ago because of the 2001-2002 financial
crisis, have fallen considerably in recent years as the economy has recovered. In 2012,
Argentina’s urban poverty rate was 4.3% compared to 24.8% in 2006.12
The global economic recession in 2009 had a negative effect on the Argentine economy, which
contracted slightly by 0.1%. The economy rebounded in 2010 and 2011, however, with growth
averaging 8.9%, due to an improvement in the global economy and higher demand for
Argentina’s exports by China (especially soybeans) and Brazil (especially cars and other
vehicles). Argentina’s economic growth slowed considerably in 2012 to an estimated 0.8% due to
a variety of factors. These include sluggish global demand, high inflation, and a drought that
affected agricultural production. Growth was also dampened by domestic economic policies, such
as import and foreign currency controls, that discouraged foreign investment and made it more
difficult for businesses to acquire capital goods. In 2013, a strong agricultural harvest resulted in
an estimated growth rate of 2.9%.13
In 2014, however, economic growth slowed to an estimated 0.5% because of macroeconomic
imbalances and uncertainties related to the standoff with holdout creditors. 14 For 2015, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is forecasting that the economy will contract 0.3% because of
imbalances, adverse terms of trade, and weak economic activity in Brazil.15 Other analysts are
predicting a growth rate of 0.9% in 2015 because of the government’s expansionary fiscal policy
ahead of the October elections.16
There have been some concerns that Argentina’s economic deterioration could threaten some of
the social gains that the country has made over the past decade.17 In order to assist the Argentine
government in this area, the World Bank approved a new three-year program in September 2014,
with funding approaching $3 billion to support poverty reduction and inclusive growth in
Argentina.18
The Argentine government has consistently understated inflation since 2007. In February 2014,
the government took action to improve its reporting on inflation and unveiled a new consumer
price index, but private economists remain skeptical. Private economists estimate that inflation
had reached 40% by late 2014. In 2015, inflation has decreased to about 28%.19

11 According to the World Bank, a high-income economy in 2015 has a gross national income (GNI) per capita income
(calculated using the World Bank Atlas method) of $12,736 or more. The Bank estimates that Argentina’s per capita
income was estimated at $14,560 in 2014. See World Bank, Data, Country and Lending Groups, available at
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates
Argentina’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as $12,873 in 2013. See IMF, World Economic Outlook
Database, April 2015 edition.
12 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America 2014, 2014.
13 GDP growth, constant prices. IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2015 edition.
14 IMF, World Economic Outlook: Legacies, Clouds, Uncertainties, October 2014.
15 IMF, Transcript of the Western Hemisphere Department Briefing, April 17, 2015, and World Economic Outlook
Database, April 2015 edition.
16 Country Report Argentina,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), August 2015.
17 “Argentina: Dark Clouds Gathering,” LatinNews Daily, September 24, 2014.
18 World Bank, “New WBG Strategy to Support Poverty Reduction & Inclusive Growth in Argentina,” press release,
September 9, 2014.
19 “Country Report Argentina,” EIU, August 2015.
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At this juncture, a significant economic challenge for Argentina is how to resolve its outstanding
defaulted external debt owed to remaining private creditors (approximately $15 billion, with
principal and past due interest) who did not participate in Argentina’s 2005 and 2010 bond
exchanges (also see “Debt Issues” below). The outstanding debt has effectively blocked
Argentina from the international credit markets. On a positive note, Argentina reached an
agreement with the Paris Club group of official creditors in May 2014 to repay some $9.7 billion
(including $608 million owed to the U.S. government) over a five-year period; it made its first
Paris Club payment in late July 2014 and a second payment in May 2015.20 Yet the ongoing
conflict with private creditors has essentially counteracted the positive effects of Argentina’s
agreement to resolve debt to official bilateral creditors and could increase the risk of a balance of
payments crisis.21
U.S.-Argentine Relations
In the aftermath of Argentina’s return to democracy in 1983, the United States and Argentina
developed strong relations, which were especially close during the presidency of Carlos Menem
(1989-1999). At times, however, there have been tensions in the bilateral relationship. The tough
U.S. approach toward Argentina during its political and financial crisis in 2001-2002, in which
the United States supported the cutoff of assistance from the IMF until Argentina committed to a
sustainable economic plan, caused friction.
Tensions in bilateral relations increased in 2011 because of two incidents that occurred in the
aftermath of a White House decision to exclude a visit to Argentina on President Obama’s first
trip to South America. First, Argentine Foreign Minister Hector Timerman criticized the decision
of the mayor of Buenos Aires to send two police officials to the U.S.-backed International Law
Enforcement Academy in El Salvador, which provides police management and specialized
training to officials from throughout Latin America. Timerman publicly suggested that the school
was teaching oppressive tactics. In another incident in 2011, Argentine officials seized U.S.
government equipment associated with joint training activities on hostage rescue and crisis
management between U.S. military personnel and Argentine federal police. According to the
Department of State, the training had been approved by Argentine officials and the equipment
involved was standard gear associated with the training.22 Foreign Minister Timerman supervised
the seizure of the cargo at the airport (opening part of the cargo in front of the press), which,
according to U.S. officials, was coordinated at the highest levels of the Argentine government.23
Ultimately, tensions waned after an Argentine court ruled that the incident was not a criminal
case, but a problem with customs clearance.
In September 2014, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta
Jacobson acknowledged that U.S.-Argentine relations were in a tough period. She maintained that
the litigation involving private creditors is an issue for the courts to decide, but expressed hope

20 The Paris Club is an informal group of 19 creditor nations, including the United States, Canada, Japan, and many
European countries. The group meets about 10 times annually to collaborate on official debt workout mechanisms for
developing countries. “Paris Club Confirms First Receipt of Argentine Arrears,” Reuters News, August 4, 2014;
“Country Pays Fresh Installment of Debt to Paris Club,” Buenos Aires Herald, May 29, 2015.
21 “Country Report Argentina,” EIU, August 2015.
22 U.S. Department of State, “Update on Seizure of U.S. Cargo by Argentine Authorities,” fact sheet, February 17,
2011.
23 Ken Parks and Julian E. Barnes, “World News: U.S., Argentina in Tussle Over Seized Cargo,” Wall Street Journal,
February 16, 2011.
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“that it can be resolved in a way that Argentina can return to the international community, that
Argentina can begin to grow and be productive again.”24 Argentine officials, likely attempting to
play to a domestic audience, lashed out at the United States in 2014 regarding the debt issue.25
President Fernández also asserted in a speech on September 30, 2014, that “if anything happens
to me ... look North,” referring to the United States, and alleged that economic sectors in
Argentina wanted to oust her government with outside help.26
Despite the periodic flare-up of tensions in relations, the State Department maintains that bilateral
relations are based on such shared interests as regional peace and stability, nonproliferation,
human rights, education, cultural exchanges, commercial ties, and cooperation on science and
technology initiatives.27 Current U.S. Ambassador to Argentina Noah Mamet maintains that the
United States “wants and needs a strong democratic partner like Argentina to address global
issues,” including working together “to reverse climate change, combat narco trafficking, increase
security, provide peacekeeping, and prevent the spread of dangerous weapons around the
world.”28
U.S. officials commend Argentina’s contributions to international peacekeeping operations.
Because of these contributions, the United States designated Argentina as a major non-NATO ally
in 1997. Argentina has not traditionally received much U.S. foreign assistance because of its
relatively high per capita income, but in recent years it has received small amounts of assistance
for military education and training and assistance to enhance its strategic trade control
compliance and enforcement. An estimated $590,000 was provided to Argentina in FY2014, and
the Administration requested the same amount for FY2015. For FY2016, the Administration
requested $550,000.
Trade and Investment Issues
With regard to U.S.-Argentine commercial relations, the United States ran a $6.6 billion trade
surplus with Argentina in 2014, exporting $10.8 billion in goods to the country (led by oil and
machinery) and importing about $4.2 billion in goods (led by crude oil). In 2014, Argentina was
the 28th-largest export market for the United States. For Argentina, the United States was its third-
largest trading partner (after Brazil and China) in 2014, with imports from the United States
accounting for almost 14% of its total imports and exports to the United States accounting for
almost 6% of its total exports.29
According to the U.S. Trade Representative’s 2015 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign
Trade Barriers
, Argentina imposes a growing number of customs and licensing procedures and
requirements that makes importing U.S. products more difficult. In August 2014, a World Trade

24 U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta S. Jacobson,
“U.S. Priorities in the Western Hemisphere,” September 26, 2014.
25 Taos Turner, “Argentina Warns U.S. Diplomat Over Remarks to Local Newspaper,” Dow Jones Newswires,
September 16, 2014.
26 “Presidenta: ‘Si Me Pas Algo, Que Nadie Mire Hacia el Oriente, Miren Hacia el Norte,’” Agencia Diarios y Noticias
(Buenos Aires), September 30, 2014; Cristina Fernández Says ‘Look North’ If Anything Happens to Her,” Telesur,
October 1, 2014.
27 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Argentina,” Fact Sheet, November 21, 2013.
28 U.S. Department of State, Embassy of the United States, Buenos Aires, Argentina, “Remarks by Ambassador Noah
B. Mamet for Independence Day,” July 3, 2015.
29 U.S. trade statistics are from the Department of Commerce, as presented by Global Trade Atlas. Argentina’s trade
partners were derived from Argentine statistics presented by Global Trade Atlas.
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Organization (WTO) dispute settlement panel ruled that Argentina’s import license restrictions
violated WTO rules. Argentina subsequently lost an appeal to the WTO in January 2015. The case
had been initiated by the United States, the European Union, and Japan. In July 2015, Argentina
agreed that it would comply with the WTO ruling by the end of 2015.30
In another trade case, the WTO ruled in July 2015 that the United States failed to adhere to its
international obligations when it banned imports of beef from northern Argentina because of
concerns over a 2001 foot-and-mouth (FMD) disease outbreak. In late June 2015, however,
before the ruling, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS) announced that it would lift its ban on beef imports from northern Argentina
beginning in September. Both House and Senate FY2016 Agricultural Appropriations bills, H.R.
3049 and S. 1800, have provisions that would prohibit USDA funding to implement, administer,
or enforce its lifting of the ban on beef from Argentina. Some Members of Congress have
concerns about the prospect of FMD threatening the U.S. cattle supply.31
The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in Argentina amounted to $15.2 billion in 2013 (up
from $14.6 billion in 2012), concentrated in manufacturing and nonbanking holding companies.32
Over 500 U.S. companies have invested in the country; in 2013, Chevron announced that it would
invest $1.24 billion in the development of the Vaca Muerta shale oil and gas field in Neuquén
province in southwest Argentina.
While the United States and Argentina have a bilateral investment treaty in place, Argentina has
taken actions in recent years that have dampened the investment climate. In 2013 and 2014,
however, the government of President Cristina Fernández took several positive measures. These
included settling several outstanding international arbitral awards (including, in October 2013,
almost $300 million owed to three U.S. companies in cases that had been brought to the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID, a branch of the World
Bank Group]);33 engaging with the IMF to improve the country’s reporting of its economic
growth and inflation data; and, as noted above and discussed in more detail below, reaching an
agreement with the Paris Club group of official creditors in May 2014 to repay its overdue debt.
Despite these actions, the Department of State maintains that investor confidence in the country
remains low because of long-standing concerns regarding the lack of transparency in government
policymaking; efforts by the government to curb the remittance of profits abroad; currency
controls that delay companies’ access to dollars to pay suppliers; and a comprehensive import

30 Brian Flood, “WTO Dispute Panel Rules Against Argentina in Challenge to Import Licensing Restrictions,”
International Trade Reporter, August 22, 2014; David Haskel, “Argentina to End Import Restrictions by Dec. 31,”
International Trade Reporter, July 24, 2015. Also see CRS Report R43905, Major Agricultural Trade Issues in the
114th Congress
, coordinated by Mark A. McMinimy.
31 Rosella Brevetti, “APHIS to Clear Way for Fresh Beef Imports from Parts of Brazil, Argentina,” International Trade
Reporter
,” July 2, 2015; “WTO Faults Already Repealed U.S. Ban on Beef Imports from Argentina,” Inside U.S.
Trade
, July 31, 2015; “U.S. Compliance with WTO Ruling Threatened by Appropriations Riders,” Inside U.S. Trade,
July 31, 2015. Also see CRS Report R43905, Major Agricultural Trade Issues in the 114th Congress.
32 U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad Tables,” Survey of Current Business, September
2014.
33 U.S. Department of State, 2014 Investment Climate Statement – Argentina, June 2014. In March 2012, the United
States suspended Argentina’s eligibility as a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a preferential
tariff treatment program, because of Argentina’s failure to enforce such arbitral awards. About 11% of U.S. imports
from Argentina benefitted from GSP in 2011. The GSP program, however, expired at the end of July 2013, and
Congress has not renewed it. For more on GSP, see CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences:
Background and Renewal Debate
, by Vivian C. Jones; and CRS Report RS22541, Generalized System of Preferences:
Agricultural Imports
, by Renée Johnson.
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licensing system that makes it difficult to import materials for businesses.34 Argentina also has
been on the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR’s) Special 301 Priority Watch List since 1996
because of problems with intellectual property rights enforcement; USTR’s 2015 report maintains
that Argentina made little progress in this area over the past year and noted particular concern
over high levels of piracy and counterfeiting and the lack of enforcement by the national
government.35
Debt Issues36
Argentina’s default in 2001 has been a long-standing issue in relations with the United States.
Argentina faced an acute economic crisis in 2001 that led to its default on nearly $100 billion of
debt: $81.8 billion owed to private creditors; $6.3 billion owed to other governments, including
the United States; and $9.5 billion owed to the IMF.37 Reaching a resolution to the government’s
default has been a complex process that has taken more than a decade, and some key issues still
remain outstanding. In terms of debt owed to official creditors (other governments and
international organizations), Argentina repaid the IMF in full in 2006, but only reached an
agreement to repay other governments in May 2014. In terms of debt owed to private creditors,
Argentina restructured more than 90% of the debt owed to private bondholders. It has faced legal
challenges from the remaining bondholders—the “holdouts.” Recent court rulings have favored
the holdouts and complicated payments on the restructured bonds. Argentina remains in default
on the holdouts.
Debt Owed to the Paris Club Countries
After more than a decade, Argentina took steps in 2014 to resolve its default on debt owed to the
“Paris Club” countries. The Paris Club is a voluntary, informal group of creditor governments,
including the United States, that negotiates and/or reduces debt owed to them by other countries
on a case-by-case basis.38 After defaulting on its Paris Club debt in 2001, Argentina negotiated
with the Paris Club in 2008 and 2010, but the parties failed to reach an agreement in these talks.
As economic conditions in Argentina became more difficult, including being cut off from
international capital markets and facing a shortage of foreign currencies (particularly dollars),
Argentina again approached the Paris Club countries in January 2014 with a proposal for
repaying its debts to these governments.39 In May 2014, a multilateral agreement was reached
between the Argentine government and the Paris Club countries that set out repayment terms for
the amount outstanding, which had grown to $9.7 billion including the principal and accrued
interest, including $608 million to the United States.40 In addition to the United States, Argentina
owes money to Germany and Japan, which together account for more than half of Argentina’s

34 U.S. Department of State, 2015 Investment Climate Statement – Argentina, May 2015.
35 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2015 Special 301 Report, April 2015.
36 Some of the material in this section is drawn fromCRS Report R41029, Argentina’s Defaulted Sovereign Debt:
Dealing with the “Holdouts”
, by J. F. Hornbeck.
37 See CRS Report R41029, Argentina’s Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the “Holdouts”, by J. F. Hornbeck.
38 For more on the Paris Club, see CRS Report RS21482, The Paris Club and International Debt Relief, by Martin A.
Weiss.
39 Ken Parks, “Argentina to Start Debt Talks with Paris Club on Wednesday,” Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2014.
40 Paris Club press release, May 29, 2014, http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/communication/communiques/
argentine/viewLanguage/en
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Paris Club debt, as well as the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Switzerland.41 Markets responded
positively to the announcement of the agreement.42 Argentina made its first payments under the
agreement in July 2014 and May 2015, and its next payment is due in 2016.
Following the Paris Club agreement, the United States signed a bilateral implementing agreement
with Argentina in February 2015 that entered into force on April 13, 2015. As a result, Argentina
is no longer in default on debt owed to the U.S. government. This lifted restrictions on assistance
to Argentina in place pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Section 620(q)), which
prohibits aid to countries in default to the U.S. government. With Argentina’s first two payments
under the Paris Club agreement, it currently owes some $530 million to the U.S. government.
Debt Owed to Private Bondholders
Argentina remains in default on a portion of its private sector debt, and recent court rulings have
increased pressure on Argentina to reach an agreement with private creditors on this debt. Most of
the defaulted debt held by private creditors was resolved through bond exchanges offered by the
Argentine government in 2005 and, again, in 2010. In the exchanges, the Argentine government
extended a unilateral offer to private bondholders to exchange the defaulted bonds for new bonds
at a steep loss (approximately a net present value loss of 70%). Although the terms were widely
viewed as unfavorable for the bondholders, more than 90% of bondholders agreed to participate
in the exchanges. Until recently, investors holding the restructured Argentine bonds had received
the full payments due on these bonds. Issues have arisen with recent payments, discussed below.
A small group of private investors—the holdouts—did not participate in the exchanges and have
not received any payment from Argentina since the 2001 default. In 2014, Argentina estimated
the claims totaled approximately $15 billion, including principal and past due interest. Most of
the holdouts are hedge funds that bought the bonds in secondary markets at steep discounts after
the default. The holdouts have pursued litigation to seek full repayment from Argentina, primarily
in the United States, since a large proportion of Argentine bonds were issued under New York
law.
Although the legal cases have examined a number of issues, the most consequential ruling relates
to the interpretation of a clause in the bond contracts that dictates creditors be treated equally: the
“pari passu” clause. A smaller group of the holdout creditors, with claims totaling $1.3 billion,
argue that paying the exchange bondholders while repudiating the holdout bonds is a breach of
this provision. In 2012, a New York federal district court judge, Thomas Griesa, ruled in favor of
the holdouts. As a result, if Argentina does not pay the group of litigating holdouts, U.S. financial
institutions legally cannot transfer interest payments from Argentina to the exchange
bondholders.43 In effect, for Argentina to pay the exchange bondholders, it would have to pay the
holdouts as well. The ruling was appealed, eventually reaching the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court announced in June 2014 that it would not hear the case, letting the previous ruling stand.
Following the Supreme Court announcement, the Argentine government faced a difficult
decision. It could either (a) pay the holdouts and the exchange bondholders or (b) pay neither
group, and default on the exchange bonds debt. On one hand, paying the holdouts would be

41 Leigh Thomas, “Paris Club Invites Argentina to Hold Debt Negotiation,” Reuters, March 14, 2014.
42 Leigh Thomas and Sarah Marsh, “Argentina Clinches Landmark Debt Repayment Deal with Paris Club,” Reuters,
May 29, 2014.
43 Richard Deitz, “A Sensible Path for Avoiding an Argentine Default,” Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2014; Alison
Frankel, “The Other Loser in Argentina Debt Saga: U.S. Courts,” Reuters, July 31, 2014.
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financially and politically costly. Financially, the court ruling involved only a small group of
holdouts, with a claim totaling $1.3 billion. However, other holdouts are also now pursuing
similar legal recourse to the initial group that went to court over the “pari passu” clause.44 In
2014, Argentina estimated that paying all remaining holdout creditors would cost $15 billion.45
Politically, paying the holdouts could be seen as the Argentine government “caving” to foreign
investors, and some analysts argue that President Fernández has “staked her political career on
fighting the holdouts.”46 On the other hand, defaulting on its debt would make it difficult for
Argentina to regain access to international capital markets, which many economists believe is
critical for helping the struggling economy.
Last-minute negotiations between Argentina and holdout bondholders failed to reach a settlement.
Argentina was facing a payment on the exchange bonds on July 30, 2014. Argentina transferred
the funds to an intermediary bank (the Bank of New York Mellon) but did not pay the holdouts.
Legally, the intermediary bank could not transfer the funds to the exchange bondholders, and on
July 30, 2014, the credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s declared Argentina to be in default,
for the eighth time in Argentina’s history. Argentine officials argue that because it transferred the
funds, it should not count as a “default.”47
Legal issues on the debt have continued to be an issue for the Argentine government. For
example, Argentina has attempted to circumvent its dilemma by devising a new bond swap that
would offer the holders of Argentine bonds issued under New York jurisdiction the opportunity to
exchange them for new bonds under Argentine or French jurisdiction.48 In response, on
September 29, 2014, the New York federal district court judge in the case held Argentina in
contempt of court, and warned that it would suffer repercussions if it defied his order regarding
payment to bondholders.49 Additionally, Citibank Argentina has become entangled in the dispute,
when the Argentine government demanded that it process coupon payments on exchanged debt in
defiance of U.S. court orders. In April 2015, the Argentine government sued Citibank Argentina
for agreeing to handover the details of Argentina’s accounts and fund movements to the holdout
groups.50
Some analysts speculated that the government could be willing to negotiate with creditors in
2015, after a clause in the exchange bonds expired at the end of 2014. This clause forbids
Argentina from voluntarily offering a better deal to the holdouts than it gave in the 2005 and 2010
exchanges without extending the same deal to all creditors.51 However, the Argentine government
has not come to any agreement with holdout creditors. In June 2015, the Argentine government
announced that it would not negotiate with holdout creditors due to “unwarranted attacks,”
maintaining that “they have sought orders freezing immune diplomatic assets ... and sought to

44 Bob Van Voris, “Argentina Faces $4.7 Billion in New Bond Suits, Bloomberg News, November 7, 2014.
45 Richard Deitz, “A Sensible Path for Avoiding an Argentine Default,” Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2014.
46 Thomas Landon, Jr., “Argentine Economist Says Bond Holdouts Should be Paid,” New York Times, September 3,
2014.
47 Fabiana Frayssinet, “Did Argentina Default or Not? It’s More Than Semantics,” Inter Press Service News Agency,
August 4, 2014.
48 “Argentina: Bond Swap Law Approved,” LatinNews Daily, September 12, 2014.
49 Alexandra Stevenson, “Judge Holds Argentina in Contempt of Court,” New York Times, September 30, 2014.
50 Richard Lough, “Argentina Sues Citibank over Deal with Holdout Creditors,” Reuters, April 8, 2015.
51 Charlie Devereux and Pablo Gonzalez, “Argentina Says Willing to Negotiate with Holdouts Next Year,” Bloomberg
News
, September 26, 2014.
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thwart clearly legitimate domestic debt issuances.”52 It is not clear if or when the Argentine
government might reenter negotiations with the holdouts.
Recent developments in the outstanding dispute with the holdouts undermine progress that
Argentina had made in 2013 and the first half of 2014 to repair its decade-long “rogue debtor”
reputation and normalize its status in the international economy. In addition to reaching an
agreement with the Paris Club, Argentina agreed to settle several international investment
disputes that had been brought to the ICSID, including, as noted above, several disputes with U.S.
companies, while in February 2014 it agreed to a $5 billion settlement with Repsol, a Spanish oil
firm, ending a two-year dispute over Argentina’s expropriation of the company’s operations.
AMIA Investigation and Death of Alberto Nisman
Congress has expressed concern over the years about progress into the investigation of the July
1994 bombing in Buenos Aires of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) that killed 85
people. Both Iran and Hezbollah (the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group with strong ties to
Iran) are alleged to be linked to the AMIA bombing as well as to the 1992 bombing of the Israeli
Embassy that killed 30 people.
In 2004, Argentine Special Prosecutor Alberto Nisman was appointed to lead the AMIA
investigation. Until then, progress on the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for
the 1994 bombing had been stymied because of the government’s mishandling of the case. In
September 2004, a three-judge panel acquitted all 22 Argentine defendants in the case and faulted
the shortcomings of the original investigation. With Nisman’s appointment in 2004, however, the
government moved forward with a new investigation. As a result, an Argentine judge issued arrest
warrants in November 2006 for nine foreign individuals: an internationally wanted Hezbollah
militant from Lebanon, Imad Mughniyah (subsequently killed by a car bomb in Damascus, Syria,
in 2008), and eight Iranian government officials.
INTERPOL, the International Criminal Police Organization, subsequently posted Red Notices
(international wanted persons notices) in 2007 for Mughniyah and five of the Iranian officials: Ali
Fallahijan (former Iranian intelligence minister, 1989-1997); Mohsen Rabbani (former Iranian
cultural attaché at the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires); Ahmad Reza Asghari (former third
secretary at the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires); Ahmad Vahidi (who served as Iran’s defense
minister from 2009 to 2013); and Mohsen Rezai (former commander of Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, 1981-1997, and two-time presidential candidate).53 In 2009,
Argentina also issued an arrest warrant for the capture of Samuel Salman El Reda, a Colombian
citizen thought to be living in Lebanon, alleged to have coordinated a Hezbollah cell that carried
out the bombing; he was subsequently added to the INTERPOL Red Notice list.
The Argentine government shifted its stance in 2011 with respect to engagement with Iran over
the AMIA bombing issue. President Fernández indicated Argentina’s willingness to enter into a
dialogue with the Iranian government despite its refusal to turn over suspects in the case. Several
rounds of talks with Iran were held in 2012, with Argentine Foreign Minister Hector Timerman
leading the effort. In January 2013, Argentina announced that it had reached an agreement with

52 “Richard Lough, “Argentina Says No Debt Negotiations While ‘Attacks’ Continue,” Reuters, June 1, 2015.
53 INTERPOL, Media Release, “INTERPOL General Assembly Upholds Executive Committee Decision on AMIA
Red Notice Dispute,” November 7, 2007. The three other Iranians wanted by Argentina not included on INTERPOL’s
red notice list are former President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and
former Iranian Ambassador to Argentina Hadi Soleimanpour.
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Iran and signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a joint Truth Commission made up
of impartial jurists from third countries to review the bombing case. After extensive debate,
Argentina’s Congress completed its approval of the agreement on February 28, 2013. Argentina’s
two main Jewish groups, AMIA and the Delegation of Israeli Associations (DAIA), strongly
opposed the agreement because they believe that it could guarantee impunity for the Iranian
suspects.54 Several U.S. Members of Congress also expressed their strong concerns about the
Truth Commission because they believed it could jeopardize Argentina’s AMIA investigation and
charges against the Iranians.
In May 2013, Nisman issued a 500-page report alleging that Iran has been working for decades in
Latin America, setting up intelligence stations in the region by utilizing embassies, cultural
organizations, and even mosques as a source of recruitment. In the report, Nisman highlighted the
key role of Mohsen Rabbani (one of eight Iranian officials wanted by Argentina for the AMIA
bombing) as Iran’s South America “coordinator for the export of revolution,” working in the tri-
border countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay as well as in Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay.55
The Nisman report contended that the 1994 AMIA bombing was not an isolated act but was part
of a regional strategy involving Iran’s establishment of intelligence bases in several countries
utilizing political, religious, and cultural institutions that could be used to support terrorist acts.
In May 2014, an Argentine court declared unconstitutional the agreement with Iran to jointly
investigate the AMIA bombing. Special Prosecutor Nisman had maintained that the agreement
with Iran constituted an “undue interference of the executive branch in the exclusive sphere of the
judiciary.”56 The Fernández government maintained that it would appeal the ruling to Argentina’s
Supreme Court. In a speech before the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 2014,
President Fernández acknowledged the 20th anniversary of the AMIA bombing and expressed
support for the memorandum of understanding with Iran, maintaining that it would enable the
accused Iranian citizens to make statements before an Argentine judge.
On January 14, 2015, Nisman made explosive accusations that President Fernández and other
government officials attempted to whitewash the AMIA investigation in order to secure oil
supplies from Iran and restore Argentina’s grain exports to Iran. However, just four days later, and
one day before he was to testify before Argentina’s Congress, Nisman was found dead in his
apartment from a gunshot wound. While preliminary reports had indicated Nisman committed
suicide, a majority of Argentines, including President Fernández, contend that Nisman was
murdered. The president maintained that Nisman was misled into making the accusations against
her government by elements in Argentina’s Intelligence Secretariat (SI) that had conducted illegal
wiretaps of government officials. Fernández called for the dissolution of the SI, and in February
2015, Argentina’s Congress approved a measure setting up a new intelligence service, the Federal
Agency of Investigations (AFI). Nisman’s death prompted a massive demonstration in Argentina,
with tens of thousands of participants. A federal prosecutor in Argentina pursued Nisman’s case
against President Fernández related to Iran, but it was thrown out by several Argentine courts and
was ultimately dismissed by the country’s highest appellate court in April 2015.57 While the
investigation into Nisman’s death continues, many observers are skeptical that the truth will be
uncovered.

54 “A Perverse Manoeuvre in Argentina,” LatinNews Daily, February 28, 2013.
55 Alberto Nisman, Fiscal General, Ministerio Público de la Nación, Argentina, Dictamina, May 29, 2013.
56 “Argentine Court Declares Bombing Probe with Iran Unconstitutional,” Agence France Presse, May 16, 2014.
57 Jonathan Gilbert, “Federal Prosecutor Drops Kirchner Conspiracy Case,” New York Times, April 21, 2015.
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In the aftermath of Nisman’s death, Argentina’s Attorney General appointed a team of four
lawyers in February 2015 to continue the work of the AMIA investigation. Court proceedings
began in Buenos Aires during the first week of August 2015 against 13 former officials alleged to
be involved in efforts to cover up the 1994 bombing investigation. The suspects include former
President Carlos Menem (1989-1999), former judge Juan José Galeano, two former prosecutors
who conducted investigations during the 1990s, three former intelligence officials, two former
police officials, a former head of DAIA, and the owner of a van used in the AMIA bombing.58
Outlook
President Fernández is approaching the end of her second term in early December 2015, and the
country’s 2015 presidential race is well underway with three leading candidates. At this juncture,
while Argentina is facing a difficult economic situation (with slow or little growth), the
government’s expansionary fiscal policy ahead of the elections reportedly has contributed to an
increase in consumer confidence. While the government took significant actions since late 2013
to repair its international economic relations (including resolving investment disputes and
reaching a deal with Paris Club creditors), its outstanding dispute with holdout creditors is
impeding the country’s access to international credit markets. Some observers had speculated that
the government would make efforts to resolve the dispute in 2015, but no action has been taken
and it appears that the Fernández government will leave the issue for the next government to
resolve. Many observers believe that any of the leading candidates for president would espouse
more market-friendly policies than the current government.
U.S.-Argentine relations generally are characterized by robust commercial relations and
cooperation in a number of areas, including nonproliferation, human rights, education, and
science and technology. There have, however, been tensions at various times in the bilateral
relationship, including the current U.S. judicial case regarding the holdouts, and Argentine
officials at times have lashed out at the United States. Resolution of the issue would likely lead to
improvement in the tenor of relations. Moreover, the 2015 presidential election will also likely
bring to power a government more committed to maintaining constructive bilateral relations.


58 “Trial on Cover-Up of Bombing Set to Begin Next Week,” Buenos Aires Herald, July 30, 2015; “AMIA Cover-Up
Case Reaches Trial Phase,” Buenos Aires Herald, August 2, 2015.
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Appendix. Selected U.S. Executive Branch Reports
Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, U.S. Relations with Argentina, State Department, November 21,
2013.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26516.htm
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2016, Annex 3: Regional
Perspectives
(pp. 363-364), State Department, February 27, 2015.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238222.pdf
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2014, Argentina, State Department, June 25, 2015.
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2014&dlid=236660
Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 (Western Hemisphere Overview), State Department, June
2014.
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239409.htm
Doing Business in Argentina, U.S. Department of Commerce, 2014.
http://www.export.gov/argentina/doingbusinessinargentina/index.asp
International Religious Freedom Report 2013, Argentina, State Department, July 28, 2014.
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=222351
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2015, Vol. I, Argentina, State Department, March
2015.
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol1/238942.htm
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2015, Vol. II, Argentina, State Department,
March 2015.
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol2/239053.htm
Investment Climate Statement, 2015, Argentina, State Department, May 2015.
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/241462.htm
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 2015, Argentina, Office of the United
States Trade Representative, March 2015.
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2015/NTE/2015%20NTE%20Argentina.pdf

Author Contact Information

Mark P. Sullivan
Rebecca M. Nelson
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689
rnelson@crs.loc.gov, 7-6819

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