CRS Insights
Considerations for Possible Authorization
for Use of Military Force Against the
Islamic State
Matthew C. Weed, Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation (mweed@crs.loc.gov, 7-4589)
September 9, 2014 (IN10147)
The armed offensive of the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL or ISIS) in
northern and western Iraq and northeastern Syria has raised significant
concerns for the Middle Eastern governments and the United States. Since
June, President Obama has ordered multiple deployments of U.S. troops to
Iraq to provide security to diplomatic personnel and facilities, advise Iraqi
security forces, and conduct intel igence gathering and reconnaissance. He
has also ordered U.S. military airstrikes on IS forces in Iraq as part of at
least four military operations since August 7. Concerned with a perceived
piecemeal build-up of troops, accumulation of narrowly defined uses of force,
and lack of clearly articulated strategy informed by congressional
consultation and oversight, several Members of Congress have expressed
the view that continued use of military force against the Islamic State
requires congressional authorization. Members differ on whether such
authorization should be provided.
Authority to Deploy Troops and Use Military Force Against the
Islamic State
Although two enacted authorizations for use of military force (AUMFs) might
apply to U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State, the President in
his notifications to Congress of deployments and airstrikes has relied upon
his powers as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive under Article II of
the Constitution. Obama Administration statements regarding the targeting
of the Islamic State as a whole, potentially including elements operating in
Syria, have raised concerns about the President's reliance on his inherent
constitutional powers potentially to expand the use of force into Syrian
territory.
Possible Elements of a New AUMF Targeting the Islamic State
A new AUMF targeting the Islamic State could both authorize presidential
use of military force beyond what is considered valid under the President's

Article II war powers, and circumscribe and limit such use of force. Language
in a new AUMF could either broaden the purpose of military force to include
unspecified U.S. national security interests, or narrow the scope of
authorization to specific objectives related to degrading or destroying the
Islamic State. Congress could limit the AUMF's geographic scope, authorizing
force only in Iraq where hostilities have taken place, or approve an
expansion to Syria. With continued uncertainty surrounding the Iraqi
government, Congress might include authorization to use U.S. Armed Forces
in Iraq in furtherance of political stability objectives. Provisions in any AUMF
targeting the Islamic State might address the possible effect that targeting
the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq could have on theongoing conflict in
Syria.
Other provisions might include
• the requirement that the President certify that use of military force pursuant to the
authorization was necessary and no other course of action was available;
• a provision requiring the President to submit a strategy for conducting the conflict with
the Islamic State;
• a sunset provision, limiting the President's authority to a set period of time, possibly
with the option of extension through a presidential certification process;
• the prohibition on the use of appropriated funds for the use of military force outside the
parameters of the specified authorization;
• congressional notification and reporting requirements on a periodic or incident-specific
basis;
• the requirement that the President identify and certify potential targets of military force
as forces or other elements of the Islamic State; and/or
• language stating that the authorization is intended to supersede other AUMFs.
Application of War Powers Resolution
In the case of strikes against IS forces, the President has cited his Article II
powers, and arguably has not relied on congressional authorization to strike
IS targets. Under the War Powers Resolution (WPR; P.L. 93-148), when the
President introduces U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities, he must usually
withdraw them within 60 days unless Congress authorizes continued action.
If Congress were to decide against passing a new AUMF, it need not enact
any legislation, and the President would be required to cease hostilities and
remove U.S. Armed Forces involved in such hostilities from Iraq within 60
days. There is some question, however, about the determination of when the
60 days is triggered and when it is reset. If the U.S. airstrikes in Iraq could
be deemed a continuous set of hostilities, the 60-day clock might be
considered running since the first airstrikes in August 2014. If each airstrikes
notification, however, is meant to represent a discrete instance of hostilities
lasting a few days with a complete "withdrawal" as soon as the operation
ends, the 60-day clock might be considered reset. This uncertainty over the

operation of the 60-day period might spur legislative action if Congress
decided a cessation of hostilities were desirable. The WPR states that at any
time after U.S. Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities, the President
must withdraw such forces if directed by Congress in a concurrent
resolution.
Current Legislative Proposals
Several legislative proposals have been introduced that relate to the use of
military force against the Islamic State. H.Con.Res. 105 would prohibit
maintaining U.S. Armed Forces in a "sustained combat role" in Iraq without
congressional authorization. H.R. 5415 would authorize the use of military
force "against international terrorism" general y, including force against the
Islamic State. S.J.Res. 42 would authorize force against the Islamic State to
"prevent terrorist attacks on the people and interests of the United States
and our allies," and includes a three-year sunset. H.J.Res. 123 would
authorize force "to defend the national security of the United States against
the continuing threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL)," with a 120-day sunset. The measure would also repeal the 2002
AUMF for Iraq, and contains a number of reporting requirements.
H.J.Res. 58 would prohibit the use of funds by any U.S. government
department or agency for the U.S. use of military force in Syria. Section
9013 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 4870),
prohibits the use of funds with respect to Syria in contravention of the WPR.

Document Outline