Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from June 6, 2023 to July 18, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023~~
~~June 6, 2023~~
~~Election Results, and U.S.~~ and U.S. July 18, 2023 Relations
Jim Zanotti
U.S. relations with Turkey U.S. relations with Turkey ~~(Türkiye)~~ take place within a complicated geopolitical environmenttake place within a complicated geopolitical environment, as Turkey
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
~~and with Turkey in economic distress and still recovering~~also faces deep-seated economic problems and continues to recover from disastrous February from disastrous February ~~2023~~
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
2023 earthquakes. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 coup in Turkeyearthquakes. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 coup in Turkey~~—including~~

~~ongoing disagreements over Syrian Kurds~~ highlight uncertainties about the future of bilateral relations. Ongoing disagreements stem from Clayton Thomas U.S. support for Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a Specialist in Middle U.S.-designated terrorist organization), and Turkey’s 2019 procurement of a Russian S-400 and Turkey’s 2019 procurement of a Russian S-400
~~Clayton Thomas~~Eastern Affairs
surface-to-air defense system surface-to-air defense system~~—highlight uncertainties about the future of bilateral relations.~~
~~Specialist in Middle~~
~~Congressional actions have included sanctions legislation and holds on U.S. arms sales.~~
~~Eastern Affairs~~
. Congressional action has included holds and conditions on U.S. arms sales to Turkey, as well as support for certain sanctions against Turkey. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of ~~continued cooperation and~~

~~Turkey’s~~ the bilateral relationship and Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the same time, Turkey apparently seeks to reduce its dependence on the West, as it and other “midsize powers” such as Saudi Arabia and India seek advantages in a global system with growing great-power competition. Turkey’s desire for greater strategic autonomy may partly explain its willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia, though the two countries retain significant differences on Ukraine and other issues. One analyst has argued that most of Turkey’s core security problems around its borders and coastlines—involving Syria, Iraq, Greece, Cyprus, Libya, and the Caucasus—require it to deal with Russia, Iran, and various other actors without much help from the West. Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on its leaders’ willingness to risk breaks in traditional ties with Western powers while building other global relationships. Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its neighboring countries could have implications for bilateral ties and U.S. political-military options in the region, as well as Turkey’s strategic orientation. ~~membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Many observers voice~~
~~concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Despite~~

~~his potential political vulnerability from major inflation and the earthquakes’ aftermath, he~~
~~emerged victorious in May 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. An official international observer mission stated~~
~~that while voters had a “choice between genuine political alternatives,” government actions favoring Erdogan gave him an~~
~~“unjustified advantage,” amid broader debate about the electoral process and how it related to past Turkish elections. Because~~
~~Turkey’s foreign exchange reserves are largely depleted, Erdogan’s new government might face significant decisions~~
~~addressing Turkey’s ongoing financial crisis.~~
~~U.S. relations and F-16s.~~ Under President Joe Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation Under President Joe Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation
on other foreign policy matters. on other foreign policy matters. ~~While~~In a June 2023 CNN interview, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey is “charting an independent foreign policy but one in which we can have a constructive relationship with them.” While Turkey’s deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for U.S. concern, deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for U.S. concern, ~~Turkey’s~~its emergence as a emergence as a
mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasionmediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion~~—including its brokering of a grain export corridor—~~ has has
arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S. policy. U.S.-Turkey relations arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S. policy. U.S.-Turkey relations also have improved have improved ~~somewhat~~ due to Turkey’s due to Turkey’s
support for Ukraine’s support for Ukraine’s defense; its limitation of Russian naval access to and from the Black Sea; and its moves toward~~defense; growing relationships with and arms exports to other countries that seek to counter Russian~~
~~regional power; and openness to~~ rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. Citing the importance of NATO strength and interoperability, President Biden has voiced President Biden has voiced
support for sales that would support for sales that would ~~upgrade~~ revamp Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition.
The Administration reportedly provided informal notification to Congress in January 2023 of a possible sale of F-16s to The Administration reportedly provided informal notification to Congress in January 2023 of a possible sale of F-16s to
Turkey, plus associated equipment and munitions. Factors potentially influencing congressional consideration of the Turkey, plus associated equipment and munitions. Factors potentially influencing congressional consideration of the
proposed sale include whether Turkey proposed sale include whether Turkey might approve of Sweden joining NATO, and Turkey’s tense relations with Greece. Turkey agreed to Finland’s NATO membership in March 2023, but has conditioned approval for Sweden on it taking actions against individuals and groups that Turkey deems to be terrorists. In July 2023, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to send the NATO accession protocol for Sweden to Turkey’s parliament and work closely with it to “ensure ratification,” but the process could extend into the fall and potentially depend on additional action from Sweden, along with assurances of congressional support for the F-16 sale. ~~might agree to have Sweden join NATO before the alliance’s July 11-12, 2023~~
~~summit, and Turkey’s tense relations with Greece. Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its~~
~~neighboring countries could have implications for bilateral ties and U.S. political-military options in the region, as well as~~
~~Turkey’s strategic orientation. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.~~
Turkey’s foreign policy approach. For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense
~~cooperation. Turkish leaders have indicated an interest in reducing their dependence on the West, and that may partly explain~~
~~their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia in~~
~~Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia/Azerbaijan. Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on how willing~~
~~Turkey is to risk tensions or breaks in traditional relationships with Western powers while building other global relationships.~~
Major issues: Russia, Sweden-Finland-NATO, and Greece. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey
~~faces challenges in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-~~
~~Turkey ties. To some extent, Erdogan has sought to reinforce Turkey’s embattled economy by deepening economic and~~
~~energy ties with Russia. Erdogan might assess that Western sanctions against Russia give Turkey increased leverage in these~~
~~dealings. At the same time, Turkey has expanded defense cooperation with Ukraine. Turkey approved Finland’s NATO~~
~~membership in March 2023, but has conditioned final approval for Sweden on it taking action against people that Turkey~~
~~considers to be terrorists. Long-standing disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean and~~
~~Eastern Mediterranean seas spiked in 2022 amid greater U.S. strategic cooperation with Greece, but tensions have somewhat~~
~~subsided in early 2023 after Greece provided some post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.~~
~~Syria: ongoing conflict near borders.~~ Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria have deepened further Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria have deepened further
during Syria’s civil war, due largely to (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the during Syria’s civil war, due largely to (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the
Islamic State by working with Syrian Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the PKK~~Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-~~
~~designated terrorist organization)~~, and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and , and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and
somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of
northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq.northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq.
Domestically, many observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of President Erdogan. Despite major inflation and the earthquakes’ aftermath, he emerged victorious in May 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. An official international observer mission stated that while voters had a “choice between genuine political alternatives,” government actions favoring Erdogan gave him an “unjustified advantage,” amid broader debate about the electoral process and how it related to past Turkish elections. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

link to page 37 link to page 37 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 33

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

link to page link to page 2524 link to page 6 link to page 6 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

Introduction and Key U.S.-Turkey Considerations
This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey
(Türkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and (Türkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and
defense matters. Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense matters. Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
since 1952. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that cooperation on regional security matters since 1952. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that cooperation on regional security matters
remains mutually important,2 despite Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of an S-400 surface-to-air defense remains mutually important,2 despite Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of an S-400 surface-to-air defense
system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and with system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and with
Greece and Cyprus). Greece and Cyprus).
Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside
cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. While continued or cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. While continued or
deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden
Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense and Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense and
openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved
U.S.-Turkey relations.3 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to Turkey, and in U.S.-Turkey relations.3 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to Turkey, and in
January 2023 the Administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a potential F-16 sale, January 2023 the Administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a potential F-16 sale,
plus associated equipment and munitions (see plus associated equipment and munitions (see “Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views”
below). In a June 2023 CNN interview, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey below). In a June 2023 CNN interview, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey
is “charting an independent foreign policy but one in which we can have a constructive is “charting an independent foreign policy but one in which we can have a constructive
relationship with themrelationship with them”..”4 4
Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey. Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey.
Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have
implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s foreign implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s foreign
policy orientation and financial well-being. policy orientation and financial well-being.
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. See Figure 1 for a map and key facts and figures for a map and key facts and figures
about Turkey. about Turkey.

1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or 1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or
other equivalents (e.g., the German “Türkei,” the French “Turquie”) in Turkish government documents and other equivalents (e.g., the German “Türkei,” the French “Turquie”) in Turkish government documents and
communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the
body to “Türkiye.” In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the department would use the revised body to “Türkiye.” In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the department would use the revised
spelling “in most formal diplomatic and bilateral contexts” where appropriate. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names spelling “in most formal diplomatic and bilateral contexts” where appropriate. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names
retained both “Turkey” and “Republic of Turkey” as conventional names, and the spokesperson said that the State retained both “Turkey” and “Republic of Turkey” as conventional names, and the spokesperson said that the State
Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public understanding. State Department Press Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public understanding. State Department Press
Briefing, January 5, 2023. Briefing, January 5, 2023.
2 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and 2 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press
Briefing, January 18, 2023. Briefing, January 18, 2023.
3 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for 3 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign
Relations, June 1, 2023. Relations, June 1, 2023.
4 Transcript of CNN Interview, June 4, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/2023-06-04/segment/01. 4 Transcript of CNN Interview, June 4, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/2023-06-04/segment/01.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1 1

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

Figure 1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 83,593,483. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.8 mil, Ankara 5.4 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil, 83,593,483. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.8 mil, Ankara 5.4 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil,
Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil. Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil.
% of population 14 or younger: 22.1% (2022) 22.1% (2022)
Ethnic groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016) Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2%
Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019) 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
Economy
GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity): $36,786 $36,786
Real GDP growth: 2.7% 2.7%
Inflation: ~~39.6~~38.2% (as of % (as of ~~May~~June 2023) 2023)
Unemployment: 11.0% 11.0%
Budget deficit as % of GDP: 4.4% 4.4%
Public debt as % of GDP: 36.2% 36.2%
Current account deficit as % of GDP: 4.8% 4.8%
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2023 Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2023
projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database;
Economist Intelligence Unit; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Economist Intelligence Unit; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook; and Turkish Statistical ; and Turkish Statistical
Institute. Institute.
Domestic Issues
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pronounced President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pronounced air-doe-wan) has ruled Turkey since becoming ) has ruled Turkey since becoming
prime minister in 2003, and has steadily deepened his control over the country’s populace and prime minister in 2003, and has steadily deepened his control over the country’s populace and
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2 2

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

institutions. Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected institutions. Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected
roughly equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.5 roughly equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.5
After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential
election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential system of election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential system of
governance, which he cemented through victories in a 2017 constitutional referendum and 2018 governance, which he cemented through victories in a 2017 constitutional referendum and 2018
presidential and parliamentary elections. Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation presidential and parliamentary elections. Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation
surfaced after the referendum and the elections.6 In a controversial ruling during the referendum, surfaced after the referendum and the elections.6 In a controversial ruling during the referendum,
Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council (Turkish acronym YSK) decided not to enforce the normal Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council (Turkish acronym YSK) decided not to enforce the normal
requirement that only properly stamped ballots could be counted, leading some observers to requirement that only properly stamped ballots could be counted, leading some observers to
question the outcome’s legitimacy.7 Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the question the outcome’s legitimacy.7 Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the
military, Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym military, Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym
AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly
because of their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish because of their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish
acronym MHP). acronym MHP).
U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian
governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.8 Some leading opposition governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.8 Some leading opposition
figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to
suppress dissent and consolidate power.9 suppress dissent and consolidate power.9
Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have continued efforts to counter militants from the Kurdistan Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have continued efforts to counter militants from the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization). These efforts Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization). These efforts
include Turkish military operations targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in Iraq and include Turkish military operations targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in Iraq and
Syria.10 Syria.10
February Earthquakes and Their Implications
Two major earthquakes (magnitude 7.8 and 7.5) hit southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. Quake Two major earthquakes (magnitude 7.8 and 7.5) hit southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. Quake
damage and its after-effects in areas of Turkey and Syria reportedly killed more than 50,000 damage and its after-effects in areas of Turkey and Syria reportedly killed more than 50,000
people in Turkey and 8,000 in Syria, injured over 100,000 more, and directly affected the living people in Turkey and 8,000 in Syria, injured over 100,000 more, and directly affected the living
situations and daily lives of millions. As Turkish authorities coordinate a humanitarian response situations and daily lives of millions. As Turkish authorities coordinate a humanitarian response
involving significant international assistance, and facilitate access to Syrian border crossings, involving significant international assistance, and facilitate access to Syrian border crossings,
observers have sought to assess (1) factors contributing to the damage and its scope, (2) efforts to observers have sought to assess (1) factors contributing to the damage and its scope, (2) efforts to
help victims and their families, and (3) present and future needs.11 U.S. officials have provided or help victims and their families, and (3) present and future needs.11 U.S. officials have provided or
announced various means of assistance to Turkey, including $235 million in announced various means of assistance to Turkey, including $235 million in ~~urgent~~ humanitarian humanitarian

5 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two 5 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two
Decades in Power?” Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
6 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 6 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final
Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission,
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24,
2018 (published June 25, 2018). (published June 25, 2018).
7 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan’s Russian Victory,” 7 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan’s Russian Victory,” Foreign Affairs, May 29, 2023. , May 29, 2023.
8 State Department, 8 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022, Turkey; Turkey; European Commission, , Turkey; Turkey; European Commission,
Türkiye 2022 Report, October 6, 2022. , October 6, 2022.
9 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,” 9 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,”
Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” , July 15, 2021; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” BBC News, April 7, 2021. , April 7, 2021.
10 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February 10 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February
18, 2022. 18, 2022.
11 See, for example, Nazlan Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims,” 11 See, for example, Nazlan Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims,” Al-Monitor, March , March
20, 2023. 20, 2023.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

3 3

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

assistance.12 With Turkey’s government estimating the economic toll from the earthquakes to be assistance.12 With Turkey’s government estimating the economic toll from the earthquakes to be
around $104 billion—roughly 9% of Turkey’s annual gross domestic product (GDP)—around $104 billion—roughly 9% of Turkey’s annual gross domestic product (GDP)—
international pledges of assistance as of March 2023 totaled nearly $7.5 billion.13 international pledges of assistance as of March 2023 totaled nearly $7.5 billion.13
The disaster has affected Turkey’s politics, society, and economy. The 10 southern Turkish The disaster has affected Turkey’s politics, society, and economy. The 10 southern Turkish
provinces most directly affected account for about 10% of Turkey’s GDP and 15% of its provinces most directly affected account for about 10% of Turkey’s GDP and 15% of its
population, and host thousands of refugees from Syria’s ongoing civil war.14 population, and host thousands of refugees from Syria’s ongoing civil war.14
Analysts have speculated about the extent of the Erdogan government’s responsibility for the Analysts have speculated about the extent of the Erdogan government’s responsibility for the
damage and hardship stemming from the earthquakes,15 with some drawing comparisons to a damage and hardship stemming from the earthquakes,15 with some drawing comparisons to a
major 1999 earthquake in northwestern Turkey that killed approximately 18,000 and prompted major 1999 earthquake in northwestern Turkey that killed approximately 18,000 and prompted
legal and regulatory efforts to improve building safety.16 Some media accounts and opposition legal and regulatory efforts to improve building safety.16 Some media accounts and opposition
politicians have alleged that in the years before the 2023 earthquakes, government officials and politicians have alleged that in the years before the 2023 earthquakes, government officials and
contractors prioritized economic benefits over adherence to construction codes, at least partly contractors prioritized economic benefits over adherence to construction codes, at least partly
contributing to the scope of destruction and fatalities.17 Erdogan has denounced criticism aimed at contributing to the scope of destruction and fatalities.17 Erdogan has denounced criticism aimed at
him or the government as fomenting disunity,18 and Turkey’s justice ministry has ordered him or the government as fomenting disunity,18 and Turkey’s justice ministry has ordered
prosecutors to create “earthquake crimes investigation units” to consider criminal violations for prosecutors to create “earthquake crimes investigation units” to consider criminal violations for
substandard work.19 Erdogan acknowledged some problems with the government’s initial substandard work.19 Erdogan acknowledged some problems with the government’s initial
response,20 while mainly attributing the disaster to the quakes’ size.21 He has announced a response,20 while mainly attributing the disaster to the quakes’ size.21 He has announced a
government-led recovery program, pledging to build 319,000 houses within a year, and 650,000 government-led recovery program, pledging to build 319,000 houses within a year, and 650,000
in total. Some local officials, engineers, and international donors have expressed concern that a in total. Some local officials, engineers, and international donors have expressed concern that a
quick rebuilding effort without detailed planning or clearer accountability measures could leave quick rebuilding effort without detailed planning or clearer accountability measures could leave
the new buildings vulnerable to future seismic activity.22 the new buildings vulnerable to future seismic activity.22
Major Economic Challenges and Options
Ongoing financial problems in Turkey have considerably worsened over the past two years, with Ongoing financial problems in Turkey have considerably worsened over the past two years, with
major inflation occurring in parallel with accelerated depreciation of Turkey’s currency, the major inflation occurring in parallel with accelerated depreciation of Turkey’s currency, the lira. .
After official annual inflation reached a 24-year peak of 86% in October 2022, it was just After official annual inflation reached a 24-year peak of 86% in October 2022, it was just ~~under~~over

12 U.S. Agency for International Development, “The United States Provides Additional $50 Million to Support 12 U.S. Agency for International Development, “The United States Provides Additional $50 Million to Support
Earthquake Affected Communities in Türkiye and Syria,” March 20, 2023. Earthquake Affected Communities in Türkiye and Syria,” March 20, 2023.
13 13 Türkiye Earthquakes Recovery and Reconstruction Assessment, March 2023, at https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/, March 2023, at https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/
uploads/2023/03/Turkiye-Recovery-and-Reconstruction-Assessment.pdf; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, uploads/2023/03/Turkiye-Recovery-and-Reconstruction-Assessment.pdf; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey,
Syria earthquake victims.” Syria earthquake victims.”
14 Nevzat Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group,” 14 Nevzat Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group,” Reuters, February 13, 2023; , February 13, 2023;
Raja Abdulrahim and Emily Garthwaite, “For Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Quake Is a Disaster Within a Disaster,” Raja Abdulrahim and Emily Garthwaite, “For Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Quake Is a Disaster Within a Disaster,” New
York Times, February 13, 2023. , February 13, 2023.
15 Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom,” 15 Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom,” Financial
Times, February 9, 2023; “Earthquake could shake up Turkish election,” , February 9, 2023; “Earthquake could shake up Turkish election,” Al-Monitor, February 10, 2023. , February 10, 2023.
16 Zeynep Bilginsoy and Suzan Fraser, “Turkey’s lax policing of building codes known before quake,” 16 Zeynep Bilginsoy and Suzan Fraser, “Turkey’s lax policing of building codes known before quake,” Associated
Press, February 10, 2023. s, February 10, 2023.
17 Ibid.; Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom”; Ben Hubbard et al., 17 Ibid.; Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom”; Ben Hubbard et al.,
“Turkish Builders Under Intense Scrutiny over Shoddy Work,” “Turkish Builders Under Intense Scrutiny over Shoddy Work,” New York Times, February 24, 2023. , February 24, 2023.
18 Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom.” 18 Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom.”
19 Ben Hubbard, “Quake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration,” 19 Ben Hubbard, “Quake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration,” New York Times, February 12, , February 12,
2023. 2023.
20 Ibid. 20 Ibid.
21 Ben Hubbard et al., “As Public Anger Mounts, Turkey Detains Builders,” 21 Ben Hubbard et al., “As Public Anger Mounts, Turkey Detains Builders,” New York Times, February 12, 2023. , February 12, 2023.
22 Jared Malsin, “Concerns Mount as Erdogan Rebuilds,” 22 Jared Malsin, “Concerns Mount as Erdogan Rebuilds,” Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2023; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 , March 7, 2023; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5
billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims.” billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims.”
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

4 4

link to page link to page 9

19 link to page 19 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

4038% in % in ~~May~~June 2023, 2023,23 while some unofficial estimates in early 2023 have remained at over 100%. while some unofficial estimates in early 2023 have remained at over 100%.2423
The spike in inflation could be linked to the Turkish central bank’s repeated reductions of its key The spike in inflation could be linked to the Turkish central bank’s repeated reductions of its key
interest rate interest rate ~~since~~from September 2021 September 2021 to March 2023—moving it down from 19% to 8.5%. Additional inflationary —moving it down from 19% to 8.5%. Additional inflationary
pressure may have come from external events such as Russia’s war on Ukraine and interest rate pressure may have come from external events such as Russia’s war on Ukraine and interest rate
hikes in the United States and other major economies.hikes in the United States and other major economies.2524 The lira has been trending downward for The lira has been trending downward for
more than a decade (seemore than a decade (see Figure 2)~~, with its~~ Error! Reference source not found.), with its decline probably driven in part by broader concerns decline probably driven in part by broader concerns
about Turkey’s rule of law and economy.about Turkey’s rule of law and economy.26 25 It has lost It has lost more than 80% of its value against the dollar since 80% of its value against the dollar since
2018, with much of the decrease coming after the major rate cuts began in 2021.2018, with much of the decrease coming after the major rate cuts began in 2021.27
~~Figure 2. Turkish Currency Value~~
~~(from 2013 to May 2023)~~

~~Throughout this time,~~ 26 President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic
theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the theory that higher interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the
currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan currency. In replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan
established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan established greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan
~~has~~ argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.argued that lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.2827 Erdogan also Erdogan also
~~has~~ criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap criticized high interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap
between rich and poor.between rich and poor.2928 He has insisted that Turkey will not turn to international financial He has insisted that Turkey will not turn to international financial

~~23 “Turkey inflation dips to 39.6% on relief from free gas,” Reuters, June 5, 2023.~~
24institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance, after Turkey in 2013 paid off loans that—in the aggregate—had been outstanding for 52 years.29 The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private sector companies. The government has sought to lessen the impact of inflation by providing tax cuts, minimum wage increases, greater access to early retirement benefits, and subsidies for basic expenses, along with protection for consumers who keep their bank accounts in liras, and borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.30 Turkey also has sought currency swaps and loans from some Arab Gulf states, and has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows (see “Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation” below).31 Additionally, Russia has reportedly deferred to 2024 at least some of Turkey’s payments for natural gas imports.32 In the wake of Erdogan’s May 2023 reelection (discussed below), the lira’s value has declined further. Turkey’s central bank revealed that as of the week of May 19, official statistics listed its 23 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Erdogan Faces Big Vote Test as Turkish Economy Suffers,” Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Erdogan Faces Big Vote Test as Turkish Economy Suffers,” Wall Street Journal, ,
April 26, 2023. April 26, 2023.
2524 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Bloomberg, April , April
28, 2022. 28, 2022.
2625 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022. , April 25, 2022.
~~27 “Ahead of a critical election Turkey’s economy is running on borrowed time,” Economist, March 26, 2023.~~
2826 Rumeysa Koc, “Why is the Turkish lira’s value still falling?” Al Jazeera, June 18, 2023. 27 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press, December 3, 2021; Carlotta , December 3, 2021; Carlotta
Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” New York Times, December 11, 2021. , December 11, 2021.
2928 “Turkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,” “Turkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,” Daily Sabah, June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s , June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s
Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021. Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

5

~~link to page 20 link to page 20~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance, after Turkey in 2013~~
~~paid off loans that—in the aggregate—had been outstanding for 52 years.30~~
~~The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living~~
~~and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private~~
~~sector companies. The government has sought to lessen the impact of inflation by providing tax~~
~~cuts, minimum wage increases, greater access to early retirement benefits, and subsidies for basic~~
~~expenses, along with protection for consumers who keep their bank accounts in liras, and~~
~~borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.31 Turkey also has sought currency swaps and loans~~
~~from some Arab Gulf states, and has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows (see~~ ~~“Turkey-Russia~~
~~Economic and Energy Cooperation”~~ ~~below).32 Additionally, Russia has reportedly deferred to~~
~~2024 at least some of Turkey’s payments for natural gas imports.33~~
~~In the wake of Erdogan’s May 2023 reelection (discussed below), the lira’s value has declined~~
~~further. Turkey’s central bank revealed that as of the week of May 19, official statistics listed its~~
~~net foreign exchange reserves as negative for the first time in 21 years.34~~29 “Turkey pays off the last installment of its debt to IMF,” Anadolu Agency, May 14, 2013. 30 M. Murat Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs,” Middle East Institute, February 13, 2023; “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” Reuters, April 23, 2023. 31 “Erdogan says Gulf states sent cash in relief for Turkey,” Reuters, May 25, 2023; Natasha Turak, “Saudi Arabia drops $5 billion in Turkey’s central bank to help its struggling economy,” CNBC, March 6, 2023; M. Murat Kubilay, “As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East Institute, November 7, 2022. 32 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why Kilicdaroglu suspects Russian interference,” Middle East Eye, May 12, 2023. Congressional Research Service 5 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations net foreign exchange reserves as negative for the first time in 21 years.33 Thus, with a balance-of- Thus, with a balance-of-
payments crisis possible, Turkish economic policymakers appear to face the following important payments crisis possible, Turkish economic policymakers appear to face the following important
choices: choices:
• • Whether to raise interest rates or maintain them at relatively low levels. A A
more orthodox monetary policy course with higher interest rates might reduce more orthodox monetary policy course with higher interest rates might reduce
inflation and attract more foreign capital via international financial markets, but inflation and attract more foreign capital via international financial markets, but
slow economic growth and exports. Alternatively, Turkish officials could keep slow economic growth and exports. Alternatively, Turkish officials could keep
interest rates low, and use capital controls that limit or restrict the ability of interest rates low, and use capital controls that limit or restrict the ability of
investors to withdraw investments. Capital controls, however, can deter investors to withdraw investments. Capital controls, however, can deter
investment in the long-run. During the May 2023 election campaign, Erdogan investment in the long-run. During the May 2023 election campaign, Erdogan
took some measures aimed at preventing capital flight and providing relief to took some measures aimed at preventing capital flight and providing relief to
Turkish consumers and businesses from the effects of inflation.Turkish consumers and businesses from the effects of inflation.3534 Turkey’s Turkey’s
modest debt-to-GDP ratio of around 36% may give it some space to increase modest debt-to-GDP ratio of around 36% may give it some space to increase
government spending in efforts to relieve inflation, though this flexibility could government spending in efforts to relieve inflation, though this flexibility could
be limited by Erdogan’s be limited by Erdogan’s ~~promises of relief~~ relief measures to date and the estimated $104 billion to date and the estimated $104 billion
cost Turkey faces from the earthquake crisis. cost Turkey faces from the earthquake crisis.
• • Whether to continue central bank interventions to strengthen the Turkish
lira, or allow the lira to depreciate. With Turkey’s foreign currency reserves With Turkey’s foreign currency reserves
mostly depleted, the government’s past strategy of selling reserves to bolster the mostly depleted, the government’s past strategy of selling reserves to bolster the
lira’s value appears less viable. The government could try to support the lira lira’s value appears less viable. The government could try to support the lira
through alternative means, such as additional currency swaps or ad hoc financial through alternative means, such as additional currency swaps or ad hoc financial
arrangements with Russia, Arab Gulf states, and/or other authoritarian regimes. arrangements with Russia, Arab Gulf states, and/or other authoritarian regimes.
One report suggests, however, that Gulf states might balk at bailouts for Turkey One report suggests, however, that Gulf states might balk at bailouts for Turkey
without some policy changes to reduce risks of default, and that Russia’s own without some policy changes to reduce risks of default, and that Russia’s own

~~30 “Turkey pays off the last installment of its debt to IMF,” Anadolu Agency, May 14, 2013.~~
~~31 M. Murat Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs,” Middle~~
~~East Institute, February 13, 2023; “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” Reuters,~~
~~April 23, 2023.~~
~~32 “Erdogan says Gulf states sent cash in relief for Turkey,” Reuters, May 25, 2023; Natasha Turak, “Saudi Arabia~~
~~drops $5 billion in Turkey’s central bank to help its struggling economy,” CNBC, March 6, 2023; M. Murat Kubilay,~~
~~“As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East Institute,~~
~~November 7, 2022.~~
~~33 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why Kilicdaroglu suspects Russian interference,” Middle East Eye, May 12, 2023.~~
~~34 “Turkey central bank’s net forex reserves negative for first time since 2002,” Reuters, May 26, 2023.~~
~~35 “Analysis: Turkish lira’s long decline a symbol of strife,” Reuters, May 28, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

6

~~link to page 36~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~financial concerns probably limit its willingness to help.36 Absent central bank~~
~~intervention, the lira is likely to depreciate further, which could boost exports and~~
~~tourism, but might drive domestic consumers to withdraw from the Turkish~~
~~banking system.~~
~~Prospects for Turkey’s manufacturing-based economy, which has been relatively resilient to date~~
~~and is anchored by its customs union with the EU, could remain favorable if Turkey can resolve~~
~~its financial crisis quickly.37 In early June, Erdogan named Mehmet Simsek—a prominent AKP~~
~~figure and professional economist—as Turkey’s finance minister. In previous leadership roles~~
~~under Erdogan (including as finance minister from 2009 to 2015), Simsek generally supported a~~
~~more orthodox approach to monetary policy, and his appointment could increase international~~
~~market confidence in Turkey if Erdogan gives Simsek flexibility to act.38 Some observers assert~~
~~that if Erdogan permits a change of course, it will be mixed or gradual rather than fully returning~~
~~Turkey to orthodox practice on interest rates. Erdogan might seek to avoid austerity measures that~~
~~could increase unemployment and create liquidity problems for businesses in advance of Turkish~~
~~municipal elections scheduled for March 2024.39~~
financial concerns probably limit its willingness to help.35 Absent central bank intervention, the lira is likely to depreciate further, which could boost exports and tourism, but might drive domestic consumers to withdraw from the Turkish banking system. Prospects for Turkey’s manufacturing-based economy, which has been relatively resilient to date and is anchored by its customs union with the EU, could remain favorable if Turkey can resolve its financial crisis quickly.36 In June, Erdogan named Mehmet Simsek—a prominent AKP figure and professional economist—as Turkey’s finance minister. In previous leadership roles under Erdogan (including as finance minister from 2009 to 2015), Simsek generally supported a more orthodox approach to monetary policy, and his appointment could increase international market confidence in Turkey if Erdogan gives Simsek flexibility to act.37 Some observers assert that if Erdogan permits a change of course, it will be mixed or gradual rather than fully returning Turkey to orthodox practice on interest rates. Erdogan might seek to avoid austerity measures that could increase unemployment and create liquidity problems for businesses in advance of Turkish municipal elections scheduled for March 2024.38 33 “Turkey central bank’s net forex reserves negative for first time since 2002,” Reuters, May 26, 2023. 34 “Analysis: Turkish lira’s long decline a symbol of strife,” Reuters, May 28, 2023. 35 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey: Erdogan’s tough options on the economy,” Middle East Eye, June 1, 2023. 36 Alan Beattie, “Erdoğan’s monetary misadventures are pushing Turkey off course,” Financial Times, May 25, 2023. 37 Ezgi Akin, “Meet Turkey’s Mehmet Simsek: Erdogan’s last best hope for economic recovery,” Al-Monitor, June 3, 2023. 38 “Exclusive: Turkey’s new cabinet almost certain to include Simsek,” Reuters, May 31, 2023; Soylu, “Turkey: Erdogan’s tough options on the economy.” Congressional Research Service 6 link to page 36 link to page 36 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations In a sign that Simsek and a new central bank governor may be following a gradual approach on interest rates in an effort to avoid losing Erdogan’s support, the central bank raised rates from 8.5% to 15% in late June.39 After the increase, the rate remained more than 20% less than inflation. The central bank also appears to have stopped selling reserves to backstop the lira’s value, and the currency’s exchange rate has depreciated from around 20 per dollar at Erdogan’s reelection in May to around 26 in mid-July.40 May 2023 Elections: Another Term for Erdogan
Background
On May 14, 2023, Turkey held presidential and parliamentary elections. Largely in the context of On May 14, 2023, Turkey held presidential and parliamentary elections. Largely in the context of
Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls before May 14 fueled Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls before May 14 fueled
speculation that Erdogan and his allies might be vulnerable to a coalition of six opposition parties speculation that Erdogan and his allies might be vulnerable to a coalition of six opposition parties
led by the generally pro-secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the nationalistic Good (led by the generally pro-secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the nationalistic Good (IYI) )
Party (seeParty (see Appendix B for profiles of selected party leaders).for profiles of selected party leaders).4041 Despite Erdogan’s potential Despite Erdogan’s potential
vulnerability, some observers questioned the opposition coalition’s prospects. They cited vulnerability, some observers questioned the opposition coalition’s prospects. They cited
opposition disunity, Erdogan’s political resilience, and the government’s influence over judicial opposition disunity, Erdogan’s political resilience, and the government’s influence over judicial
rulings, ability to provide economic subsidies, and effective control of around 90% of the rulings, ability to provide economic subsidies, and effective control of around 90% of the
media.media.4142
Three main alliances contested the election: Three main alliances contested the election:
• • People’s Alliance, which includes Erdogan’s AKP, the MHP, and a few smaller , which includes Erdogan’s AKP, the MHP, and a few smaller
parties. parties.
• • Nation Alliance (or “table of six”), which includes the CHP, the Good Party, and (or “table of six”), which includes the CHP, the Good Party, and
four smaller parties, including two led by prominent former AKP figures. four smaller parties, including two led by prominent former AKP figures.
• • Labor and Freedom Alliance, which includes a few small parties alongside the , which includes a few small parties alongside the
Kurdish-led Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP). The HDP Kurdish-led Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP). The HDP
arranged to run under the aegis of the Green Left Party (Turkish acronym YSP) arranged to run under the aegis of the Green Left Party (Turkish acronym YSP)

~~36 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey: Erdogan’s tough options on the economy,” Middle East Eye, June 1, 2023.~~
~~37 Alan Beattie, “Erdoğan’s monetary misadventures are pushing Turkey off course,” Financial Times, May 25, 2023.~~
~~38 Ezgi Akin, “Meet Turkey’s Mehmet Simsek: Erdogan’s last best hope for economic recovery,” Al-Monitor, June 3,~~
~~2023.~~
~~39 “Exclusive: Turkey’s new cabinet almost certain to include Simsek,” Reuters, May 31, 2023; Soylu, “Turkey:~~
~~Erdogan’s tough options on the economy.”~~
40to prevent against its exclusion, because a case pending before the Constitutional Court could ban the HDP from future campaigns under its own name. In March 2023, the Nation Alliance nominated CHP party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (kuhl-utch-dahr-oh-loo) as its joint presidential candidate.43 Kilicdaroglu’s most important coalition partner, Good Party leader Meral Aksener (awk-sheh-nar), eventually agreed to support Kilicdaroglu after two other potential candidates who had polled more favorably against Erdogan—Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas—backed Kilicdaroglu in response to Aksener’s last-ditch appeal for one of them to run. Imamoglu’s prospects may have been undermined by a criminal conviction (pending final resolution on appeal) that he and other 39 Natasha Turak, “Turkey’s central bank hikes interest rate to 15% in dramatic U-turn to fight inflation,” CNBC, June 22, 2023. 40 Koc, “Why is the Turkish lira’s value still falling?” 41 See, for example, “Erdogan’s rival boosted by withdrawal, poll lead ahead of Turkey vote,” See, for example, “Erdogan’s rival boosted by withdrawal, poll lead ahead of Turkey vote,” Reuters, May 11, 2023. , May 11, 2023.
4142 Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s Resilient Autocrat,” Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s Resilient Autocrat,” Foreign Affairs, May 4, 2023; Jamie Dettmer, “It’s going to be hard , May 4, 2023; Jamie Dettmer, “It’s going to be hard
to get rid of Turkey’s Erdoğan,” to get rid of Turkey’s Erdoğan,” Politico Europe, March 18, 2023. , March 18, 2023.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

7

~~link to page 13 link to page 36~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~to prevent against its exclusion, because a case pending before the Constitutional~~
~~Court could ban the HDP from future campaigns under its own name.~~
~~In March 2023, the Nation Alliance nominated CHP party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (~~~~kuhl-utch-~~
~~dahr-oh-loo) as its joint presidential candidate.42 Kilicdaroglu’s most important coalition partner,~~
~~Good Party leader Meral Aksener (awk-sheh-nar), eventually agreed to support Kilicdaroglu after~~
~~two other potential candidates who had polled more favorably against Erdogan—Istanbul mayor~~
~~Ekrem Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas—backed Kilicdaroglu in response to~~
~~Aksener’s last-ditch appeal for one of them to run. Imamoglu’s prospects may have been~~
~~undermined by a criminal conviction (pending final resolution on appeal) that he and other~~
~~opposition figures charge is politically motivated.43~~43 For profiles of Kilicdaroglu, see Appendix B and Suzan Fraser, “Challenger in Turkey presidential race offers sharp contrast,” Associated Press, May 2, 2023; Amberin Zaman, “Meet Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Turkey’s long-derided opposition head who could dethrone Erdogan,” Al-Monitor, March 23, 2023; “Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: hope in the man who’s never beaten Erdoğan,” James in Turkey, January 10, 2023. Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 12 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations opposition figures charge is politically motivated.44 While Aksener’s Good Party rejected a formal While Aksener’s Good Party rejected a formal
coalition between the Nation Alliance and the HDP, the HDP decided to support Kilicdaroglu in coalition between the Nation Alliance and the HDP, the HDP decided to support Kilicdaroglu in
the presidential race instead of fielding its own candidate.the presidential race instead of fielding its own candidate.4445
Results and Electoral Process
In the May 14 elections, Erdogan fell just short of the 50% mark he needed to surpass to claim In the May 14 elections, Erdogan fell just short of the 50% mark he needed to surpass to claim
outright victory in the presidential race, leading Kilicdaroglu by 4% as they prepared for Turkey’s outright victory in the presidential race, leading Kilicdaroglu by 4% as they prepared for Turkey’s
first-ever presidential run-off election on May 28. About 87% of registered voters turned out to first-ever presidential run-off election on May 28. About 87% of registered voters turned out to
vote. Erdogan’s People’s Alliance retained its parliamentary majority, even though it slipped from vote. Erdogan’s People’s Alliance retained its parliamentary majority, even though it slipped from
344 seats out of 600 to 323 (344 seats out of 600 to 323 (~~see~~see Figure 32). While Turkey’s economic challenges and the February . While Turkey’s economic challenges and the February
earthquakes may have increased voter dissatisfaction with Erdogan, his firstearthquakes may have increased voter dissatisfaction with Erdogan, his first -round electoral round electoral
performance surpassed many observers’ expectations.performance surpassed many observers’ expectations.4546 Aggregate pre-election polling anticipated Aggregate pre-election polling anticipated
a Kilicdaroglu lead or victory and a hung parliament.a Kilicdaroglu lead or victory and a hung parliament.4647
Erdogan prevailed in the run-off against Kilicdaroglu by a margin of 52%-48%, winning a new Erdogan prevailed in the run-off against Kilicdaroglu by a margin of 52%-48%, winning a new
five-year term. Voter turnout in the run-off was around 84%. Under Turkey’s constitution, five-year term. Voter turnout in the run-off was around 84%. Under Turkey’s constitution,
Erdogan might be entitled to run for one additional term if three-fifths of parliament’s members Erdogan might be entitled to run for one additional term if three-fifths of parliament’s members
vote to schedule early elections.vote to schedule early elections.4748 Erdogan could seek to revise or remove presidential term limits Erdogan could seek to revise or remove presidential term limits
via constitutional amendment. via constitutional amendment.

~~42 For profiles of Kilicdaroglu, see Appendix B and Suzan Fraser, “Challenger in Turkey presidential race offers sharp~~
~~contrast,” Associated Press, May 2, 2023; Amberin Zaman, “Meet Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Turkey’s long-derided~~
~~opposition head who could dethrone Erdogan,” Al-Monitor, March 23, 2023; “Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: hope in the man~~
~~who’s never beaten Erdoğan,” James in Turkey, January 10, 2023.~~
43 Figure 2. Turkish 2023 Parliamentary Election Results (out of 600 total seats) Source: YSK. 44 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” New York Times, December 15, , December 15,
2022. 2022.
4445 Nicolas Camut, “Pro-Kurdish party rallies behind main opposition candidate in Turkish election,” Nicolas Camut, “Pro-Kurdish party rallies behind main opposition candidate in Turkish election,” Politico Europe, ,
April 28, 2023. April 28, 2023.
4546 Peter Kenyon, “Takeaways from Turkey’s election as it heads toward a runoff,” Peter Kenyon, “Takeaways from Turkey’s election as it heads toward a runoff,” NPR, May 15, 2023; Amberin , May 15, 2023; Amberin
Zaman, “Erdogan proves unbeatable as Turkey heads for runoff,” Zaman, “Erdogan proves unbeatable as Turkey heads for runoff,” Al-Monitor, May 15, 2023. , May 15, 2023.
4647 See https://600vekil.com/mayis-2023-secim-ongorusu, accessed on June 2, 2023. See https://600vekil.com/mayis-2023-secim-ongorusu, accessed on June 2, 2023.
4748 Article 116 of Turkey’s constitution. Unofficial English translation available at Article 116 of Turkey’s constitution. Unofficial English translation available at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

8 8

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

~~Figure 3. Turkish 2023 Parliamentary Election Results~~
~~(out of 600 total seats)~~

Source: YSK.
Note: The various alliances and parties that received the remaining votes are unlisted because none of them The various alliances and parties that received the remaining votes are unlisted because none of them
won parliamentary seats. won parliamentary seats.
Observers for Turkey’s elections included representatives from domestic political parties and civil Observers for Turkey’s elections included representatives from domestic political parties and civil
society organizations, as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe society organizations, as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). These observers (OSCE) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). These observers
monitored polling station operations, voting, ballot counting, and the tabulation of results.monitored polling station operations, voting, ballot counting, and the tabulation of results.4849 The The
OSCE-PACE international election observation mission said the following in preliminary OSCE-PACE international election observation mission said the following in preliminary
findings and conclusions it released a day after the May 28 run-off: findings and conclusions it released a day after the May 28 run-off:
The run-off presidential election held on 28 May offered voters a choice between genuine The run-off presidential election held on 28 May offered voters a choice between genuine
political alternatives and voter participation remained high, however, as in the first round, political alternatives and voter participation remained high, however, as in the first round,
biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage
to the incumbent. The election administration technically managed the election efficiently, to the incumbent. The election administration technically managed the election efficiently,
but its lack of transparency and communication largely persisted. While the absence of but its lack of transparency and communication largely persisted. While the absence of
regulation of several aspects of the second round did not provide legal certainty, positively, regulation of several aspects of the second round did not provide legal certainty, positively,
the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) issued multiple regulations to remedy some of these the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) issued multiple regulations to remedy some of these
legal gaps. In the subdued yet competitive campaign, candidates were able to campaign legal gaps. In the subdued yet competitive campaign, candidates were able to campaign
freely. However, harsher rhetoric, inflammatory and discriminatory language by both freely. However, harsher rhetoric, inflammatory and discriminatory language by both
contestants, along with the continued intimidation and harassment of supporters of some contestants, along with the continued intimidation and harassment of supporters of some
opposition parties undermined the process. In an environment with restrictions on freedom opposition parties undermined the process. In an environment with restrictions on freedom
of expression, both private and public media did not ensure editorial independence and of expression, both private and public media did not ensure editorial independence and
impartiality in their coverage of the campaign, detracting from the ability of voters to make impartiality in their coverage of the campaign, detracting from the ability of voters to make
an informed choice. Election day was generally calm and well-administered. However, an informed choice. Election day was generally calm and well-administered. However,
instances of deficient implementation of certain procedures, particularly during the vote instances of deficient implementation of certain procedures, particularly during the vote
count, were noted.count, were noted.49

~~48 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “General Elections, 14 May 2023, and Presidential~~
~~Election, Second Round, 28 May 2023,” at https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkiye/537642; Hurcan Asli Aksoy~~
~~and Salim Cevik, “Is extensive election fraud possible in Turkey’s fiercest elections?” SWP (German Institute for~~
~~International Politics and Security), May 10, 2023.~~
~~49 OSCE,~~ ~~Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Republic of Türkiye – Presidential Election, Second~~
~~Round, 28 May 2023~~ ~~(published May 29, 2023).~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

9

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~
50
Other domestic and international commentators have expressed varying views about the conduct Other domestic and international commentators have expressed varying views about the conduct
of Turkey’s elections. Many have echoed the OSCE-PACE mission’s assessment that Erdogan’s of Turkey’s elections. Many have echoed the OSCE-PACE mission’s assessment that Erdogan’s
control over state resources and institutions gave him an unfair advantage during the campaign.control over state resources and institutions gave him an unfair advantage during the campaign.5051
Despite the high turnout for both electoral rounds, some analysts challenged whether the electoral Despite the high turnout for both electoral rounds, some analysts challenged whether the electoral
process could be characterized as free.process could be characterized as free.5152 Although Kilicdaroglu said the election period was the Although Kilicdaroglu said the election period was the
most unfair in Turkish history, the opposition did not argue that various irregularities alleged by most unfair in Turkish history, the opposition did not argue that various irregularities alleged by
some sources would have changed the results.some sources would have changed the results.5253
Assessment and Implications
After the elections, analysts have sought to explain the outcome and President Erdogan’s abiding After the elections, analysts have sought to explain the outcome and President Erdogan’s abiding
popular appeal. Many have concluded that key nationalistic and religious voter blocs maintain a popular appeal. Many have concluded that key nationalistic and religious voter blocs maintain a
level of ideological devotion or personal attachment to Erdogan—partly based on patronage level of ideological devotion or personal attachment to Erdogan—partly based on patronage
networks or actions he has taken on their behalf—that appear to outweigh economic concerns networks or actions he has taken on their behalf—that appear to outweigh economic concerns
49 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “General Elections, 14 May 2023, and Presidential Election, Second Round, 28 May 2023,” at https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkiye/537642; Hurcan Asli Aksoy and Salim Cevik, “Is extensive election fraud possible in Turkey’s fiercest elections?” SWP (German Institute for International Politics and Security), May 10, 2023. 50 OSCE, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Republic of Türkiye – Presidential Election, Second Round, 28 May 2023 (published May 29, 2023). 51 “Recep Tayyip Erdogan is re-elected as Turkey’s president,” Economist, May 28, 2023; Fatma Tanis, “Erdogan cements his power with a victory in Turkey’s presidential runoff election,” NPR, May 28, 2023. 52 Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan cements his power with a victory in Turkey’s presidential runoff election,” Foreign Affairs, May 29, 2023; Gonul Tol, “Erdogan Won by Exploiting Fear,” Foreign Policy, May 31, 2023. 53 Sources reporting alleged irregularities include Turkey recap, “Forever & All Reis,” June 1, 2023; “Turkey opposition contests thousands of ballots after election,” Reuters, May 17, 2023. Congressional Research Service 9 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations they might have.54~~they might have.53~~ Large numbers of these voters may have been hesitant to empower an Large numbers of these voters may have been hesitant to empower an
opposition with legacy ties to Turkey’s pre-Erdogan secular elite leadership, especially after opposition with legacy ties to Turkey’s pre-Erdogan secular elite leadership, especially after
Kilicdaroglu openly partnered with the Kurdish-led HDP.Kilicdaroglu openly partnered with the Kurdish-led HDP.5455 Some observers argue that Erdogan Some observers argue that Erdogan
also may have benefitted from perceptions that he is more capable of acting swiftly to address also may have benefitted from perceptions that he is more capable of acting swiftly to address
voters’ material concerns—bypassing bureaucratic obstacles or political divisions—than his voters’ material concerns—bypassing bureaucratic obstacles or political divisions—than his
election rivals would have been.election rivals would have been.5556 It is unclear to what extent Erdogan’s resilience shares features It is unclear to what extent Erdogan’s resilience shares features
with that of authoritarian-leaning incumbents in other countries, or stems from socioeconomic with that of authoritarian-leaning incumbents in other countries, or stems from socioeconomic
factors unique to Turkey. factors unique to Turkey.
Erdogan’s reelection and continued parliamentary majority will likely have implications in the Erdogan’s reelection and continued parliamentary majority will likely have implications in the
following areas. following areas.
Economy. As discussed above, Erdogan’s government As discussed above, Erdogan’s government ~~might feel compelled~~has taken some initial post-election measures to address Turkey’s to address Turkey’s
ongoing currency and inflation crisis, given Turkey’s largely depleted foreign exchange reserves. ongoing currency and inflation crisis, given Turkey’s largely depleted foreign exchange reserves.
Domestic politics. While the 2023 presidential election was Erdogan’s most difficult to date, and While the 2023 presidential election was Erdogan’s most difficult to date, and
he won a smaller parliamentary majority than in 2018, he does not appear inclined to change his he won a smaller parliamentary majority than in 2018, he does not appear inclined to change his
general approach to domestic governance, rule of law, and human rights. As he prepares to general approach to domestic governance, rule of law, and human rights. As he prepares to
preside over the Turkish republic’s 100th anniversary in October 2023 and lead the AKP’s March preside over the Turkish republic’s 100th anniversary in October 2023 and lead the AKP’s March
2024 municipal election campaign, Erdogan may return to points he emphasized during his 2024 municipal election campaign, Erdogan may return to points he emphasized during his
reelection campaign that trumpet his accomplishments at home and abroad, and seek to paint his reelection campaign that trumpet his accomplishments at home and abroad, and seek to paint his
domestic rivals as sympathetic to Kurdish militants and LGBTQ causes. Some observers worry domestic rivals as sympathetic to Kurdish militants and LGBTQ causes. Some observers worry
that the inclusion of Islamists from two small parties in Erdogan’s People’s Alliance could push that the inclusion of Islamists from two small parties in Erdogan’s People’s Alliance could push
social policy in a more religiously conservative direction.social policy in a more religiously conservative direction.5657 However, Erdogan’s majority does not depend on these parties, and he may have options to ally with a number of other parties, including some from the opposition.58 The opposition faces a number of questions about its future. It had failed to unseat Erdogan before and after Kilicdaroglu became CHP leader in 2010, but many observers had expressed that Turkey’s economic woes and the February earthquakes made Erdogan uniquely vulnerable in 2023.59 In this context, it is unclear whether Kilicdaroglu can maintain his leadership position, and whether the CHP will continue its current partnerships and its common cause with the HDP. Some observers assess that Istanbul mayor Imamoglu could be Erdogan’s most formidable long-term opponent, but his status could depend on whether he can successfully appeal his criminal conviction and win reelection in 2024.60 U.S. relations and foreign policy. Erdogan appears inclined to pursue a largely transactional foreign policy course that hedges between the United States, Russia, and other international actors, in continuity with his past efforts to pursue greater autonomy for Turkey within an 54 ~~However, Erdogan’s majority does~~

~~50 “Recep Tayyip Erdogan is re-elected as Turkey’s president,” Economist, May 28, 2023; Fatma Tanis, “Erdogan~~
~~cements his power with a victory in Turkey’s presidential runoff election,” NPR, May 28, 2023.~~
~~51 Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan cements his power with a victory in Turkey’s presidential runoff election,”~~ ~~Foreign~~
~~Affairs, May 29, 2023; Gonul Tol, “Erdogan Won by Exploiting Fear,” Foreign Policy, May 31, 2023.~~
~~52 Sources reporting alleged irregularities include Turkey recap, “Forever & All Reis,” June 1, 2023; “Turkey~~
~~opposition contests thousands of ballots after election,” Reuters, May 17, 2023.~~
53 Michael Werz, “Erdoğan’s Reelection Illustrates the Bleak Future of Turkish Democracy,” Center for American Michael Werz, “Erdoğan’s Reelection Illustrates the Bleak Future of Turkish Democracy,” Center for American
Progress, May 31, 2023; Adam Samson, “The patronage network behind Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s bid for third decade Progress, May 31, 2023; Adam Samson, “The patronage network behind Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s bid for third decade
in power,” in power,” Financial Times, May 27, 2023. , May 27, 2023.
5455 Alan Makovsky, “Erdogan Overcomes Opposition – and Economy – to Prevail in Presidential Runoff,” Arab Gulf Alan Makovsky, “Erdogan Overcomes Opposition – and Economy – to Prevail in Presidential Runoff,” Arab Gulf
States Institute in Washington, May 30, 2023. States Institute in Washington, May 30, 2023.
5556 See, for example, Tol. See, for example, Tol.
5657 See, for example, Kamuran Samar and Joshua Askew, “What Erdoğan's re-election means for Turkey and the West,” See, for example, Kamuran Samar and Joshua Askew, “What Erdoğan's re-election means for Turkey and the West,”
Euronews, May 28, 2023. , May 28, 2023.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

10

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~not depend on these parties, and he may have options to ally with a number of other parties,~~
~~including some from the opposition.57~~
~~The opposition faces a number of questions about its future. It had failed to unseat Erdogan~~
~~before and after Kilicdaroglu became CHP leader in 2010, but many observers had expressed that~~
~~Turkey’s economic woes and the February earthquakes made Erdogan uniquely vulnerable in~~
~~2023.58 In this context, it is unclear whether Kilicdaroglu can maintain his leadership position,~~
~~and whether the CHP will continue its current partnerships and its common cause with the HDP.~~
~~Some observers assess that Istanbul mayor Imamoglu could be Erdogan’s most formidable long-~~
~~term opponent, but his status could depend on whether he can successfully appeal his criminal~~
~~conviction and win reelection in 2024.59~~
U.S. relations and foreign policy. Erdogan appears inclined to pursue a largely transactional
~~foreign policy course that hedges between the United States, Russia, and other international~~
~~actors, in continuity with his past efforts to pursue greater autonomy for Turkey within an~~
58 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Erdogan has MPs to play with after strong parliamentary showing,” Middle East Eye, May 26, 2023. 59 See, for example, Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why did Kilicdaroglu lose?” Middle East Eye, May 31, 2023. 60 Nadeen Ebrahim, “Erdogan intent on taking back Istanbul after presidential victory,” CNN, May 31, 2023. Congressional Research Service 10 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations increasingly multipolar global system (discussed further below). During the 2023 election increasingly multipolar global system (discussed further below). During the 2023 election
campaign, Kilicdaroglu pledged to move in a more pro-Western direction,campaign, Kilicdaroglu pledged to move in a more pro-Western direction,6061 prompting Erdogan prompting Erdogan
to say, “Our relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States.”to say, “Our relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States.”6162 Also Also
during the campaign, Erdogan was cited as saying that President Biden had given an order to during the campaign, Erdogan was cited as saying that President Biden had given an order to
topple him,topple him,6263 apparently referring to statements Candidate Biden made in a apparently referring to statements Candidate Biden made in a New York Times
interview during the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign in support of efforts to defeat Erdogan via interview during the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign in support of efforts to defeat Erdogan via
the electoral process.the electoral process.6364 When asked about his campaign comments regarding President Biden in a When asked about his campaign comments regarding President Biden in a
May 19 CNN interview, Erdogan insisted that he would continue to work with Biden if May 19 CNN interview, Erdogan insisted that he would continue to work with Biden if
reelected.reelected.6465 President Biden called Erdogan the day after his reelection to congratulate him, and President Biden called Erdogan the day after his reelection to congratulate him, and
they “expressed their shared commitment to continue working together as close partners to they “expressed their shared commitment to continue working together as close partners to
deepen cooperation between our countries and people.”deepen cooperation between our countries and people.”6566 Given Turkey’s ongoing economic Given Turkey’s ongoing economic
concerns, one analyst has remarked, “Turkey still needs its commerce with the West, and that may concerns, one analyst has remarked, “Turkey still needs its commerce with the West, and that may
impose a certain pragmatism on Erdogan’s foreign policy in the months ahead, whatever his anti-impose a certain pragmatism on Erdogan’s foreign policy in the months ahead, whatever his anti-
Western resentments.”Western resentments.”6667
Turkish Foreign Policy
General Assessment
Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global
and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations

~~57 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Erdogan has MPs to play with after strong parliamentary showing,”~~ ~~Middle East~~
~~Eye, May 26, 2023.~~
~~58 See, for example, Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why did Kilicdaroglu lose?” Middle East Eye, May 31, 2023.~~
~~59 Nadeen Ebrahim, “Erdogan intent on taking back Istanbul after presidential victory,” CNN, May 31, 2023.~~
60with the United States and other countries reflect some change to this orientation within the past decade, as Turkey has sought greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global system. James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, said after President Erdogan’s May 2023 reelection that “he is going to operate independently, and this is a rational decision, given not only their [Turkey’s] size and capabilities—it’s also reasonable from the standpoint of their experiences.”68 Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises involving Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia/Azerbaijan. Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these 61 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Turkey’s Top Election Challenger Pledges Closer Ties to NATO and EU,” Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Turkey’s Top Election Challenger Pledges Closer Ties to NATO and EU,” Wall
Street Journal, May 9, 2023. , May 9, 2023.
6162 “Relations with Russia are no less important than those with US: Erdoğan,” “Relations with Russia are no less important than those with US: Erdoğan,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 13, 2023. , May 13, 2023.
6263 “On final day of campaign, Erdogan accuses Turkish opposition of working with Biden,” “On final day of campaign, Erdogan accuses Turkish opposition of working with Biden,” Reuters, May 13, 2023. , May 13, 2023.
6364 New York Times editorial board interview of Joe Biden, December 16, 2019, published on January 17, 2020 at editorial board interview of Joe Biden, December 16, 2019, published on January 17, 2020 at
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html.
6465 Transcript of CNN interview, May 19, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/ctw/date/2023-05-19/segment/02. Transcript of CNN interview, May 19, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/ctw/date/2023-05-19/segment/02.
6566 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Call with President Erdogan of Türkiye,” May 29, 2023. White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Call with President Erdogan of Türkiye,” May 29, 2023.
6667 Makovsky. 68 Remarks by James Jeffrey, Atlantic Council, “Post election transatlantic relations with Turkey,” May 31, 2023, at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/post-election-transatlantic-relations-with-turkey/ ~~Makovsky~~. .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

11 11

link to page link to page 1817 link to page 32 link to page 32 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~with the United States and other countries reflect some change to this orientation within the past~~
~~decade, as Turkey has sought greater independence of action as a regional power within a more~~
~~multipolar global system. James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, said after President~~
~~Erdogan’s May 2023 reelection that “he is going to operate independently, and this is a rational~~
~~decision, given not only their [Turkey’s] size and capabilities—it’s also reasonable from the~~
~~standpoint of their experiences.”67~~
~~Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging~~
~~Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate~~
~~some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400~~
~~surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—~~
~~with which it has a long history of discord—including in political and military crises involving~~
~~Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia/Azerbaijan.~~
~~Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential~~
~~countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these~~
and U.S. Relations actors and maintain its leverage with them.actors and maintain its leverage with them.6869 Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend
partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and
economic relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks economic relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks
in those relationships while building other global relationships. For example, Turkey appears in those relationships while building other global relationships. For example, Turkey appears
largely aligned with the United States and other NATO allies on their expressed priorities of largely aligned with the United States and other NATO allies on their expressed priorities of
assisting in Ukraine’s defense, and also continues to value NATO security guarantees (as assisting in Ukraine’s defense, and also continues to value NATO security guarantees (as
discussed below). Nevertheless, one analyst has argued that most of Turkey’s core security discussed below). Nevertheless, one analyst has argued that most of Turkey’s core security
problems around its borders and coastlines—involving Syria, Iraq, Greece, Cyprus, Libya, and problems around its borders and coastlines—involving Syria, Iraq, Greece, Cyprus, Libya, and
the Caucasus—require it to deal with Russia, Iran, and various other actors without much help the Caucasus—require it to deal with Russia, Iran, and various other actors without much help
from the West.from the West.6970
U.S./NATO Strategic Relationship and Military Presence
The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the
NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the
West. The State Department’s West. The State Department’s Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Turkey says that its sizable (ICS) for Turkey says that its sizable
military (the second-largest in NATO) and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the military (the second-largest in NATO) and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the
alliance gives it a critical role in regional security.alliance gives it a critical role in regional security.7071 Turkey’s proximity to several conflict areas Turkey’s proximity to several conflict areas
in the Middle East and elsewhere has made the continuing availability of its territory for the in the Middle East and elsewhere has made the continuing availability of its territory for the
stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO.
In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO
sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces
command in Izmir (secommand in Izmir (see Figure 43). Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea through . Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea through
the Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits—sethe Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits—see Figure A-1).
For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about
encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing
leading up to the Cold War. Additionally, NATO security guarantees compensate Turkey for a leading up to the Cold War. Additionally, NATO security guarantees compensate Turkey for a

~~67 Remarks by James Jeffrey, Atlantic Council, “Post election transatlantic relations with Turkey,” May 31, 2023, at~~
~~https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/post-election-transatlantic-relations-with-turkey/.~~
~~68 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021;~~
~~Stephen J. Flanagan et al.,~~ ~~Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the~~
~~U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.~~
~~69 Rich Outzen et al., “Five more years for Erdogan. What’s first on his agenda?” Atlantic Council, May 30, 2023.~~
~~70 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey, May 13, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

12

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~general lack of nationally owned strategic defense and deterrence capabilities.71~~general lack of nationally owned strategic defense and deterrence capabilities.72 In more recent or In more recent or
ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, Turkey’s possible interest in countering ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, Turkey’s possible interest in countering
Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military operations and arms exports.Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military operations and arms exports.7273
Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions
about the continued use of Turkish bases. Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially about the continued use of Turkish bases. Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially
expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be
connected with concerns about Turkey.connected with concerns about Turkey.7374 In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey
expert and former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said that while the expert and former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said that while the
United States should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation United States should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation
~~in recent years” justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria,~~
~~Romania, and Greece to “hedge its bets.”74~~

71 69 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021; Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020. 70 Rich Outzen et al., “Five more years for Erdogan. What’s first on his agenda?” Atlantic Council, May 30, 2023. 71 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey, May 13, 2022. 72 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance’s Relevance and Cohesion, Thierry Tardy, , Thierry Tardy,
ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, p. 97. ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, p. 97.
7273 Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13, Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13,
2022; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” 2022; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” Business Insider, October 22, 2020. , October 22, 2020.
7374 “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020; Joseph , September 16, 2020; Joseph
Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” The
Drive, January 14, 2019. , January 14, 2019.
~~74 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and~~
~~Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs~~
~~Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy,~~
~~the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-~~
~~challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

13

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~Figure 4~~Congressional Research Service 12 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations in recent years” justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece to “hedge its bets.”75 Figure 3. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media
outlets since 2011. outlets since 2011.
Note: All locations are approximate. All locations are approximate.
Russia
Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made
a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could
be motivated by a combination of factors, including Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the be motivated by a combination of factors, including Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the
West, economic opportunism, and chances to increase its regional influence at Russia’s expense. West, economic opportunism, and chances to increase its regional influence at Russia’s expense.
Turkey also has moved closer to a number of countries surrounding Russia—including Ukraine Turkey also has moved closer to a number of countries surrounding Russia—including Ukraine
and Poland—likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power.and Poland—likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power.7576 Turkey continues to 75 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/. 76 ~~Turkey continues to~~
~~rely on Russia for around 40% of its natural gas imports,76 but it may gradually reduce this~~
~~dependence as it begins deliveries from a domestic offshore field in the Black Sea and increases~~
~~liquefied natural gas imports from other countries.77~~

75 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12, Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12,
2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” 2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022. , October 11, 2022.
~~76 Megan Byrne and James Cockayne, “Turkey Gas Imports: Russia Still Dominant,” MEES, March 3, 2023.~~
~~77 “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” Reuters; Rafiq Latta, “Turkey Pivots~~
~~Away From Russia, Towards LNG,” Energy Intelligence Group, June 1, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

14

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~
Congressional Research Service 13 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations rely on Russia for around 40% of its natural gas imports,77 but it may gradually reduce this dependence as it begins deliveries from a domestic offshore field in the Black Sea and increases liquefied natural gas imports from other countries.78
Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and Turkish Mediation Efforts
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its
relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s links with relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s links with
Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 system—have fueled major U.S.-Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 system—have fueled major U.S.-
Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported congressional holds on arms sales (discussed Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported congressional holds on arms sales (discussed
below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests
in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—appear to have in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—appear to have
converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in
parallel with other NATO countries.parallel with other NATO countries.7879 In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion, closing the In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion, closing the
Straits to belligerent warships, opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including Straits to belligerent warships, opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including
Crimea), and serving as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe,Crimea), and serving as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe,7980 Turkey has supplied Ukraine Turkey has supplied Ukraine
with various types of military equipment—including armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant with various types of military equipment—including armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant
ambush-resistant (MRAP) ambush-resistant (MRAP) ~~vehicles80~~vehicles81—as well as humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, Turkey’s —as well as humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, Turkey’s
leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and
this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate
the conflict (discussed below). the conflict (discussed below).
In January 2023, a media outlet reported that Turkey began transferring some dual-purpose In January 2023, a media outlet reported that Turkey began transferring some dual-purpose
improved conventional munitions (or DPICMs, which are artillery-fired cluster munitions) to improved conventional munitions (or DPICMs, which are artillery-fired cluster munitions) to
Ukraine in November 2022. The report cited various observers debating the potential battlefield Ukraine in November 2022. The report cited various observers debating the potential battlefield
impact and humanitarian implications of the weapon’s use.impact and humanitarian implications of the weapon’s use.8182 Turkish and Ukrainian officials have Turkish and Ukrainian officials have
denied that any such transfers have occurred.denied that any such transfers have occurred.8283
Turkey-Ukraine Defense Cooperation
Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014. Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014.8384 In 2017, a In 2017, a
Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in
the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their
~~respective defense industries.84 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer~~
~~cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.85~~
~~In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion~~
~~of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.86 Turkish expertise~~
~~with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing~~

78 77 Megan Byrne and James Cockayne, “Turkey Gas Imports: Russia Still Dominant,” MEES, March 3, 2023. 78 “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” Reuters; Rafiq Latta, “Turkey Pivots Away from Russia, Towards LNG,” Energy Intelligence Group, June 1, 2023. 79 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall
Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022. Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022.
7980 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability,” February 20, 2023. Availability,” February 20, 2023.
8081 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,” Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,” Defense News, August , August
22, 2022; Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” 22, 2022; Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” Oryx, ,
November 21, 2022. November 21, 2022.
8182 Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,” Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, ,
January 10, 2023. January 10, 2023.
8283 Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,” Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,” Middle East Eye, January , January
14, 2023. 14, 2023.
8384 For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and
U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt. , by Cory Welt.
~~84 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017.~~
~~85 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw,~~
~~“Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022.~~
~~86 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.”~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

15

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~aerospace engines and missiles.87~~Congressional Research Service 14 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations respective defense industries.85 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.86 In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.87 Turkish expertise with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing aerospace engines and missiles.88 As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several
Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,8889 and some reports have suggested that the and some reports have suggested that the
manufacturer has delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.manufacturer has delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.8990 Additionally, Additionally,
Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.9091
Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate
access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of
contention. In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with contention. In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with
Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that ~~could~~ partly partly
~~alleviate~~alleviated global supply concerns. global supply concerns.9192 Under the deal, Under the deal, ~~which has been extended until July 2023,92~~
Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. ~~have~~ sent representatives representatives atto a joint coordination center in a joint coordination center in
Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect ships to prevent weapons smuggling.93 Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect ships to prevent weapons smuggling.93 ~~President~~
~~Biden has expressed appreciation for Turkey’s efforts.94~~The arrangement lapsed in July 2023, and it is unclear if it might resume or if Turkey might help facilitate Ukrainian and/or Russian exports in alternative ways. Also in July 2023, Turkey allowed five previously captured Ukrainian military officers to return to Ukraine, triggering protests from Russia. Russian officials claim that under a Turkish-brokered prisoner exchange deal, Turkey had agreed not to return the Ukrainians until the end of the Russia-Ukraine war.
Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation
Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from
the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy
cooperation with Russia.cooperation with Russia.9594 The Turkish government has not joined economic sanctions against The Turkish government has not joined economic sanctions against
Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights. Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights.
~~In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to bolster Turkey-Russia~~
~~cooperation across economic sectors.96 In April 2023, they participated in an event to begin~~
~~operations at Turkey’s first nuclear power plant (at Akkuyu on its Mediterranean coast), which~~
~~was built by Russian state-owned company Rosatom. The plant is scheduled to start domestic~~
~~electricity production in 2025.97 Several months before the event, Rosatom had reportedly wired~~
~~up to $15 billion to a Turkish subsidiary involved in the project, possibly in part to help Turkey~~
~~maintain foreign exchange reserves during its ongoing currency crisis.98~~

~~87 Ibid.~~
88 85 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017. 86 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw, “Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022. 87 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.” 88 Ibid. 89 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4, , February 4,
2022. 2022.
8990 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” Forbes, May 10, 2022. The TB2’s , May 10, 2022. The TB2’s
main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position
within about three years to manufacture the full range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production within about three years to manufacture the full range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production
capacity. Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” capacity. Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” Wall Street Journal, November 7, , November 7,
2022. 2022.
9091 Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Janes
Navy International, October 3, 2022. , October 3, 2022.
9192 “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply,” “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply,” Associated Press,, July 22, July 22,
2022. 2022.
~~92 “Erdogan says Black Sea grain deal extended for two months,” Reuters, May 17, 2023.~~
~~93 See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background.~~
~~94 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkiye,” November~~
~~15, 2022.~~
9593 See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background. 94 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” New York Times, December , December
10, 2022. 10, 2022.
~~96 “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” Agence France Presse, August 5,~~
~~2022.~~
~~97 “Putin hails Turkey ties as first Turkish nuclear plant inaugurated,” Reuters, April 27, 2023.~~
~~98 Ragip Soylu, “Russia plans to buy Turkish treasury bonds via Akkuyu nuclear plant $6bn loan deal,”~~ ~~Middle East~~
~~Eye, July 30, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

16

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~
Congressional Research Service 15 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to bolster Turkey-Russia cooperation across economic sectors.95 In April 2023, they participated in an event to begin operations at Turkey’s first nuclear power plant (at Akkuyu on its Mediterranean coast), which was built by Russian state-owned company Rosatom. The plant is scheduled to start domestic electricity production in 2025.96 Several months before operations began at Akkuyu, Rosatom had reportedly wired up to $15 billion to a Turkish subsidiary involved in the project, possibly in part to help Turkey maintain foreign exchange reserves during its currency crisis.97
Some of Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to Western secondary sanctions Some of Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to Western secondary sanctions
against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. During a February 2023 trip to Turkey against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. During a February 2023 trip to Turkey
and the United Arab Emirates to emphasize U.S. concerns about the dangers of “dark money and the United Arab Emirates to emphasize U.S. concerns about the dangers of “dark money
flowing through their financial systems,” Brian Nelson, Under Secretary of the Treasury for flowing through their financial systems,” Brian Nelson, Under Secretary of the Treasury for
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, delivered the following remarks to leaders of Turkish Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, delivered the following remarks to leaders of Turkish
financial institutions: financial institutions:
We of course recognize Türkiye’s reliance on Russian energy imports and trade in We of course recognize Türkiye’s reliance on Russian energy imports and trade in
agricultural goods, and continue to work to mitigate adverse impacts to these economic agricultural goods, and continue to work to mitigate adverse impacts to these economic
activities. activities.
However, the marked rise over the past year in non-essential Turkish exports or re-exports However, the marked rise over the past year in non-essential Turkish exports or re-exports
to Russia makes the Turkish private sector particularly vulnerable to reputational and to Russia makes the Turkish private sector particularly vulnerable to reputational and
sanctions risks. This is being driven by Moscow.... sanctions risks. This is being driven by Moscow....
In engaging with sanctioned Russian entities, Turkish businesses and banks could put In engaging with sanctioned Russian entities, Turkish businesses and banks could put
themselves at risk of sanctions and a potential loss of access to G7 markets and themselves at risk of sanctions and a potential loss of access to G7 markets and
correspondent relationships. correspondent relationships.
Turkish businesses and banks should also take extra precaution to avoid transactions Turkish businesses and banks should also take extra precaution to avoid transactions
related to potential dual-use technology transfers that could be used by the Russian related to potential dual-use technology transfers that could be used by the Russian
military-industrial complex.military-industrial complex.9998
Some Turkish banks and companies appear to be limiting or considering limits on certain types of Some Turkish banks and companies appear to be limiting or considering limits on certain types of
transactions and services with Russian businesses.transactions and services with Russian businesses.~~100~~99 In February 2023, Turkey’s then Foreign In February 2023, Turkey’s then Foreign
Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu denied that Turkish businesses were exporting electronic or Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu denied that Turkish businesses were exporting electronic or
technological products with potential defense applications to Russia, but publicly welcomed technological products with potential defense applications to Russia, but publicly welcomed
information sharing with U.S. and EU counterparts to ensure that businesses do not use Turkey to information sharing with U.S. and EU counterparts to ensure that businesses do not use Turkey to
bypass Western sanctions.bypass Western sanctions.~~101~~100 Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs on Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs on
sanctioned goods transiting its territory to Russia.sanctioned goods transiting its territory to Russia.~~102~~101 In April 2023, the Department of the 95 “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” Agence France Presse, August 5, 2022. 96 “Putin hails Turkey ties as first Turkish nuclear plant inaugurated,” Reuters, April 27, 2023. 97 Ragip Soylu, “Russia plans to buy Turkish treasury bonds via Akkuyu nuclear plant $6bn loan deal,” Middle East Eye, July 30, 2022. 98 ~~In April 2023, the Department of the~~
~~Treasury placed sanctions on two Turkey-based companies and associated persons for assisting~~
~~Russia or Russian entities.103~~
~~NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland~~
~~Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of~~
~~Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it~~
~~for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies~~
~~requires the unanimous agreement of existing members.~~
~~The Turkish objections centered on claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or harbored~~
~~sympathies for groups that Turkey’s government deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the~~

99 Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023. See also Jared Malsin, “Turkish Exports Aid Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023. See also Jared Malsin, “Turkish Exports Aid
Moscow’s War Effort,” Moscow’s War Effort,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Its Partners to Weed Out , February 4, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Its Partners to Weed Out
Illicit Trade Illicit Trade ~~With~~with Moscow,” Moscow,” New York Times, February 5, 2023. , February 5, 2023.
~~100~~99 Jonathan Spicer, “U.S. warns Turkey on exports seen to boost Russia’s war effort,” Jonathan Spicer, “U.S. warns Turkey on exports seen to boost Russia’s war effort,” Reuters, February 4, 2023. , February 4, 2023.
~~101~~100 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability.” Availability.”
~~102~~101 “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023. , March 10, 2023.
~~103 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Financial Facilitators and Sanctions Evaders Around the~~
~~World,” April 12, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

17

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~Fethullah Gulen movement104 (which the government has blamed for involvement in the 2016~~
~~failed coup) and the PKK.105~~ Congressional Research Service 16 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations Treasury placed sanctions on two Turkey-based companies and associated persons for assisting Russia or Russian entities.102 NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies requires the unanimous agreement of existing members. The Turkish objections centered on claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or harbored sympathies for groups that Turkey’s government deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the Fethullah Gulen movement103 (which the government has blamed for involvement in the 2016 failed coup) and the PKK.104 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a terrorist (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a terrorist
group, but not the Gulen movement.) Turkey demanded that Sweden and Finland lift the group, but not the Gulen movement.) Turkey demanded that Sweden and Finland lift the
suspension of arms sales they had maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria suspension of arms sales they had maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria
against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG) against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG)
that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.~~106~~105 Turkey removed its objections Turkey removed its objections
to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June
2022 memorandum between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the trilateral memorandum, the 2022 memorandum between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the trilateral memorandum, the
three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further, three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further,
Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work
against the PKK.against the PKK.~~107~~106
After the accession process began for Sweden and Finland, Turkey continued to press them to After the accession process began for Sweden and Finland, Turkey continued to press them to
extradite people that Turkey considers to be terrorists, though Turkish officials said they were extradite people that Turkey considers to be terrorists, though Turkish officials said they were
more concerned about terrorism-related activities in Sweden than in Finland. Under the June 2022 more concerned about terrorism-related activities in Sweden than in Finland. Under the June 2022
trilateral memorandum, Sweden and Finland agreed to address Turkey’s pending deportation or trilateral memorandum, Sweden and Finland agreed to address Turkey’s pending deportation or
extradition requests in various ways, but did not commit to specific outcomes in those cases.extradition requests in various ways, but did not commit to specific outcomes in those cases.~~108~~107
Various sources, including Sweden’s prime minister, have indicated that neither Sweden nor Various sources, including Sweden’s prime minister, have indicated that neither Sweden nor
Finland would be inclined to make political decisions on extradition that contravene domestic Finland would be inclined to make political decisions on extradition that contravene domestic
judicial findings conducted under due process and the rule of law.judicial findings conducted under due process and the rule of law.~~109~~
~~In line with Turkish official statements differentiating Finland from Sweden, Turkey’s parliament~~
~~approved Finland’s NATO application in March 2023.110 Finland formally joined the alliance in~~
~~April.~~
~~Sweden’s application to join NATO remains pending as of early June, with Turkey and Hungary~~
~~the only alliance members not to have approved it. A new Swedish anti-terrorism law came into~~
~~effect on June 1, 2023.111 While serving as presidential spokesman, Ibrahim Kalin (now Turkey’s~~
~~intelligence chief) anticipated that with the new law Sweden could start taking “more decisive,~~
~~concrete, and fruitful steps to address our security concerns” under this legislation, adding, “we’ll~~
~~see how fast they can move.”112 It is unclear whether and when Turkish approval of Sweden’s~~
~~NATO membership might proceed, and if Turkey’s leadership might demand specific additional~~
~~Swedish actions. In March, President Erdogan said that Turkey had requested that Sweden~~
~~extradite approximately 120 terror suspects, but in May an unnamed senior Swedish official was~~

~~104~~108 102 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Financial Facilitators and Sanctions Evaders Around the World,” April 12, 2023. 103 For more information on Gulen and the movement, see archived CRS In Focus IF10444, For more information on Gulen and the movement, see archived CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey,
and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. , by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
~~105~~104 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Al-Monitor, May 17, , May 17,
2022. 2022.
~~106~~105 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2021, Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak , Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak
Barfi, Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016. , Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016.
~~107~~106 Memorandum text available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat- Memorandum text available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat-
memo.pdf. memo.pdf.
~~108~~107 Ibid. Ibid.
~~109~~108 Steven Erlanger, “Sweden Says Turkey Terms on NATO Bid Go Too Far,” Steven Erlanger, “Sweden Says Turkey Terms on NATO Bid Go Too Far,” New York Times, January 10, 2023; Ben , January 10, 2023; Ben
Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Just
Security, October 28, 2022. , October 28, 2022.
~~110 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey ratifies Finland’s NATO membership,” Al-Monitor, March 30, 2023.~~
~~111 Sune Engel Rasmussen and Jared Malsin, “Sweden’s NATO Membership Hinges on Extraditing Unknown People,”~~
Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2023.
~~112 Filiz Kinik Oz, “Türkiye leaves door open to Sweden’s NATO bid: Turkish presidential spokesperson,”~~ ~~Anadolu~~
~~Agency, March 26, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

18Congressional Research Service 17

link to page link to page 2524 link to page link to page 2224 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

~~cited as saying that Sweden “has neither received a list of names from Turkey, nor is it aware of~~
~~who the individuals might be, making Erdogan’s demands impossible to meet.”113~~
~~When congratulating Erdogan on his reelection in late May, President Biden said that he wanted a~~
~~“deal with Sweden,” and anticipated additional discussions on the subject of its NATO~~
~~accession.114 Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin both have~~
~~expressed hope that Turkey will agree to Sweden joining NATO by the time of the alliance’s July~~
~~11-12 summit in Lithuania.115 During his May 30 visit to Sweden, Secretary~~In line with Turkish official statements differentiating Finland from Sweden, Turkey’s parliament approved Finland’s NATO application in March 2023.109 Finland formally joined the alliance in April. Sweden’s application to join NATO remains pending as of July, with Turkey and Hungary the only alliance members not to have approved it. During a May 30 visit to Sweden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Blinken said that the
accession process has moved rapidly in historic terms, and that Turkey “has rightly focused accession process has moved rapidly in historic terms, and that Turkey “has rightly focused
attention on some of its security concerns that both Sweden and Finland have taken remarkable attention on some of its security concerns that both Sweden and Finland have taken remarkable
steps to address, important ones.... From the perspective of the United States, the time is now to steps to address, important ones.... From the perspective of the United States, the time is now to
~~finalize Sweden’s accession.”116 Secretary General Stoltenberg and some officials from other~~
~~NATO countries have echoed Blinken in supporting the “fastest possible accession” of Sweden~~
~~into the alliance.117~~finalize Sweden’s accession.”110 Blinken also said that while the Biden Administration is not linking the Blinken also said that while the Biden Administration is not linking the
Administration’s proposed F-16 sale to Turkey with Sweden’s NATO accession, some Members Administration’s proposed F-16 sale to Turkey with Sweden’s NATO accession, some Members
of Congress are (seeof Congress are (see “Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views” below).111 After new Swedish anti-terrorism legislation came into effect in June, and two court rulings that anticipate some extradition to Turkey,112 President Erdogan agreed on July 10 to send the NATO accession protocol for Sweden to Turkey’s parliament and work closely with it to “ensure ratification.”113 President Biden and other U.S. officials welcomed Erdogan’s commitment. Erdogan later clarified that Turkey’s parliament might not consider Swedish accession until October (after its summer recess), and that he expected Sweden to provide a roadmap of steps it will take to implement the 2022 trilateral memorandum before sending the accession protocol to parliament.114 Based on statements from Erdogan and other reports, Turkey might also seek the following before its parliament considers Sweden’s NATO application: • At least some assurance of congressional approval of the potential F-16 sale.115 • The lifting of some implicit arms trade restrictions by NATO countries.116 • Increased support among EU countries to expand Turkey’s customs union with the EU and provide Turkish citizens with visa-free travel to EU countries.117 Syria118 Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.119 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved 109 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey ratifies Finland’s NATO membership,” Al-Monitor, March 30, 2023. 110 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press Availability.” 111 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press Availability.” 112 “With NATO membership in mind, Sweden hands over Turkish man convicted of drug offenses at home,” Associated Press, June 12, 2023; “NATO applicant Sweden jails Kurdish man for attempting to finance PKK militants,” Agence France Presse, July 6, 2023. 113 NATO, “Press statement following the meeting between Türkiye, Sweden, and the NATO Secretary General,” July 10, 2023. 114 “Erdogan to put Sweden’s NATO ratification to Turkish parliament in autumn,” Reuters, July 12, 2023. 115 Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Turkey’s F-16s in doubt after Erdogan says no Sweden vote before October,” Al-Monitor, July 12, 2023. 116 “Exclusive: Canada unfreezes talks with Turkey on export controls after NATO move,” Reuters, July 13, 2023. 117 Ibid. 118 See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud. 119 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017. Congressional Research Service 18 link to page 33 link to page 21 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad) since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where U.S. forces have been based. Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.120 The YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner ~~Congressional Views” below).118~~
~~Syria119~~
~~Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly~~
~~and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.120 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved~~
~~during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it~~
~~has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad)~~
~~since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have~~
~~engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where~~
~~U.S. forces have been based.~~
~~Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from~~
~~establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government~~
~~considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major~~
~~threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the~~
~~PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.121 The~~
~~YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group~~
~~including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner~~

~~113 Rasmussen and Malsin.~~
~~114 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before Marine One Departure,” May 29, 2023.~~
~~115 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press~~
~~Availability,” May 30, 2023; Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Joint Press Conference~~
~~with Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson in Stockholm, Sweden,” April 19, 2023.~~
~~116 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press~~
~~Availability.”~~
~~117 Matthew Lee and Lorne Cook, “NATO presses Turkey to approve Sweden’s membership, eyes Ukraine security~~
~~plan as summit looms,” Associated Press, June 1, 2023.~~
~~118 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press~~
~~Availability.”~~
~~119 See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud.~~
~~120 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the~~
~~Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017.~~
~~121 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and~~
~~YPG,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK~~
~~affiliates in Syria), see footnote 106.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

19

~~link to page 33~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas
of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border
area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.~~122~~121 Turkey has set Turkey has set
up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed
opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army
(SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see(SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see Figure A-2). .
Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in
which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. Since late 2022, senior Turkish officials have held which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. Since late 2022, senior Turkish officials have held
a number of meetings with Syrian government counterparts in Russia.a number of meetings with Syrian government counterparts in Russia.~~123~~122 Turkey is seeking Turkey is seeking
Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border and facilitate the return of Syrian Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border and facilitate the return of Syrian
refugees living in Turkey. Asad reportedly wants full Turkish withdrawal in return.refugees living in Turkey. Asad reportedly wants full Turkish withdrawal in return.~~124~~123 It is unclear It is unclear
whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would affect Turkey’s relationship with the whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would affect Turkey’s relationship with the
SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in northern Syria. In response to a question SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in northern Syria. In response to a question
about potential Turkey-Syria rapprochement, the State Department spokesperson said in January about potential Turkey-Syria rapprochement, the State Department spokesperson said in January
2023 that U.S. officials have advised allies against normalizing or upgrading relations with the 2023 that U.S. officials have advised allies against normalizing or upgrading relations with the
Asad regime.Asad regime.~~125~~124
U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues
How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects
Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades, Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades,
Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and
other munitions to maintain military strength.other munitions to maintain military strength.~~126~~
~~Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program,~~
~~U.S. Sanctions, and Congressional Holds~~
~~Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia~~
~~delivered in 2019,127 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United~~
~~States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration~~
~~removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions~~
~~under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on~~
~~Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.128 In explaining the U.S. decision to~~
~~remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, the Defense Department rejected the idea of~~
~~Turkey fielding a Russian intelligence collection platform (housed within the S-400) that could~~

~~122~~125 120 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria), see footnote 105. 121 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Roll Call, October 15, 2019. , October 15, 2019.
~~123~~122 “Moscow hosts more Turkey-Syria rapprochement talks,” “Moscow hosts more Turkey-Syria rapprochement talks,” Associated Press, April 25, 2023. , April 25, 2023.
~~124~~123 “Syria resisting Russia’s efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” “Syria resisting Russia’s efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” Reuters, December 5, 2022. , December 5, 2022.
~~125~~124 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023. State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.
~~126~~125 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany
(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype). (submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).
~~127 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source,~~
~~Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a~~
~~second system to come later.~~
~~128 Archived CRS Insight IN11557,~~ ~~Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under~~Congressional Research Service 19 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program, U.S. Sanctions, and Congressional Holds Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia delivered in 2019,126 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through
~~Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; State Department, “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition~~
~~of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” December 14, 2020. Sanctions were not imposed on other~~
~~Turkish ministries or agencies that might independently conduct defense-related transactions.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

20

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.127 In explaining the U.S. decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, the Defense Department rejected the idea of Turkey fielding a Russian intelligence collection platform (housed within the S-400) that could detect the stealth capabilities of F-35s in Turkey.detect the stealth capabilities of F-35s in Turkey.~~129~~128 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the transfer of F-35s to National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the transfer of F-35s to
Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-
400. Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have made the 400. Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have made the
system generally operational. Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 in order to system generally operational. Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 in order to
have CAATSA sanctions removed. have CAATSA sanctions removed.
An August 2020 article reported that some congressional committee leaders placed holds on An August 2020 article reported that some congressional committee leaders placed holds on
major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. The major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. The
executive branch customarily defers to such holds, though they are not legally binding.executive branch customarily defers to such holds, though they are not legally binding.~~130~~129 Such a Such a
disruption to U.S. defense transactions with Turkey had not occurred since the 1975-1978 disruption to U.S. defense transactions with Turkey had not occurred since the 1975-1978
embargo over Cyprus.embargo over Cyprus.~~131~~130
Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views
Background (Including Turkey-Greece Issues)
In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16 In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16
fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.~~132~~131
President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20 President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20
meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation
and notification process with Congress.and notification process with Congress.~~133~~132 Upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72 126 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source, Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a second system to come later. 127 Archived CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; State Department, “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” December 14, 2020. Sanctions were not imposed on other Turkish ministries or agencies that might independently conduct defense-related transactions. 128 ~~Upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72~~
~~Viper configuration could include a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and~~
~~structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.134~~
~~After Russia’s early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s potential to boost NATO’s strategic and~~
~~military strengths amid an evolving European security crisis may have increased the~~
~~Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey. While Turkey~~
~~has acted more independently of the West under Erdogan, its sizable military and geographic~~
~~location remains important for the alliance.135 Turkey partners in a number of ways with the~~
~~United States and its other allies—including by using F-16s in NATO missions based in the Baltic~~
~~and Mediterranean Sea regions.136~~

~~129~~ Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting
Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019. Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019.
~~130~~129 CRS Report RL31675, CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
~~131~~130 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News, ,
August 12, 2020. August 12, 2020.
~~132~~131 For information on Turkey’s F-16s, see “Turkey – Air Force,” For information on Turkey’s F-16s, see “Turkey – Air Force,” Janes World Air Forces, June 23, 2021 (posted , June 23, 2021 (posted
November 7, 2022); “Turkey” at https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html. November 7, 2022); “Turkey” at https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html.
~~133~~132 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego , October 31, 2021; Diego
~~Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For~~
~~background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.~~
~~134 See description at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/aero/documents/F-16/22-~~
~~06570_F-16-Viper-6Panel_Digital.pdf.~~
~~135 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey.~~
~~136 Ibid.; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Kasapoglu,~~
~~“Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, pp. 103-105; Gareth Jennings, “Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time~~
~~since 2006,” Janes Defence Weekly, July 7, 2021; NATO Allied Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne~~
~~Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein Alloy,” April 14, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

21

~~link to page 29~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~
(continued...) Congressional Research Service 20 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations Viper configuration could include a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.133 After Russia’s early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s potential to boost NATO’s strategic and military strengths amid an evolving European security crisis may have increased the Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey. While Turkey has acted more independently of the West under Erdogan, its sizable military and geographic location remains important for the alliance.134 Turkey partners in a number of ways with the United States and its other allies—including by using F-16s in NATO missions based in the Baltic and Mediterranean Sea regions.135
Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022 Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022
letter,letter,~~137~~136 a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an
important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”~~138~~137 While acknowledging that any sale While acknowledging that any sale
would require congressional notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that would require congressional notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that
there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well
as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate
U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”~~139~~138
The modernization of much of Turkey’s F-16 fleet could give Turkey time to acquire or design a The modernization of much of Turkey’s F-16 fleet could give Turkey time to acquire or design a
more advanced fighter,more advanced fighter,~~140~~139 though delivery of new F-16s could face a production backlog. though delivery of new F-16s could face a production backlog.~~141~~140
According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 production rate at the Greenville, South Carolina plant is According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 production rate at the Greenville, South Carolina plant is
four aircraft per month, though it plans to increase this rate with a growing list of buyers.four aircraft per month, though it plans to increase this rate with a growing list of buyers.~~142~~141 Other Other
countries receiving or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16Vs include Greece, Taiwan, countries receiving or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16Vs include Greece, Taiwan,
Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.~~143~~142
Assuming the parties finalize contracts for Jordan and Bulgaria, Lockheed will have a backlog of Assuming the parties finalize contracts for Jordan and Bulgaria, Lockheed will have a backlog of
~~148 aircraft.144 Based on current production rates, it could take three years or more for Turkey to~~
~~start accepting delivery of new F-16Vs.~~
~~If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider~~
~~purchasing Western European alternatives.145 Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter~~
~~Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s,146 but it is unclear if consortium partner Germany~~
~~would approve such a sale.147 Additionally, Turkey’s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a~~
~~non-F-16 platform.148 Moreover, European weapons transfers to Turkey could be subject to the~~
~~congressional review process described below if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin~~
~~defense articles meeting the specified notification threshold.149 Previously, Congress received~~
~~notification in connection with some non-NATO countries’ (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar)~~

~~137~~ Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 133 See description at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/aero/documents/F-16/22-06570_F-16-Viper-6Panel_Digital.pdf. 134 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey. 135 Ibid.; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, pp. 103-105; Gareth Jennings, “Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time since 2006,” Janes Defence Weekly, July 7, 2021; NATO Allied Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein Alloy,” April 14, 2022. 136 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/ Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/
20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf. 20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf.
~~138~~137 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says
potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6, 2022. , April 6, 2022.
~~139~~138 Ibid. Ibid.
~~140~~139 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9, , March 9,
2022. Turkey does have a limited ability to make modifications to some of its F-16s. It has reportedly been working 2022. Turkey does have a limited ability to make modifications to some of its F-16s. It has reportedly been working
with various Turkish domestic contractors to upgrade the avionics in the country’s 36 Block 30 aircraft. It cannot with various Turkish domestic contractors to upgrade the avionics in the country’s 36 Block 30 aircraft. It cannot
domestically upgrade the avionics of its other F-16s—thus explaining its interest in a purchase from the United domestically upgrade the avionics of its other F-16s—thus explaining its interest in a purchase from the United
States—because it only has source codes for Block 30 versions. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to States—because it only has source codes for Block 30 versions. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to
extend life of Turkish F-16 jets,” extend life of Turkish F-16 jets,” Defense News, November 17, 2022; Gastón Dubois, “Project ÖZGÜR: Turkey starts , November 17, 2022; Gastón Dubois, “Project ÖZGÜR: Turkey starts
modernizing its F-16 with indigenous technology,” modernizing its F-16 with indigenous technology,” Aviacionline, June 3, 2022. , June 3, 2022.
~~141~~140 Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,” Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,” Defense
News, January 18, 2023. , January 18, 2023.
~~142~~141 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A, provided to CRS on February 23, 2023. Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A, provided to CRS on February 23, 2023.
~~143~~142 Ibid.; Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Ibid.; Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November , November
22, 2021. 22, 2021.
~~144 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A.~~
~~145 Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,” Forbes, February 6, 2023.~~
~~146 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,” Middle East Eye,~~
~~January 20, 2023.~~
~~147 Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to~~
~~‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?” EurAsian Times, January 29, 2023.~~
~~148 Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.”~~
~~149 See footnote 171.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

22

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~proposed purchases of U.S. equipment for Typhoons.150~~Congressional Research Service 21 link to page 28 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations 148 aircraft.143 Based on current production rates, it could take three years or more for Turkey to start accepting delivery of new F-16Vs. If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider purchasing Western European alternatives.144 Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s,145 but it is unclear if consortium partner Germany would approve such a sale.146 Additionally, Turkey’s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a non-F-16 platform.147 Moreover, European weapons transfers to Turkey could be subject to the congressional review process described below if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin defense articles meeting the specified notification threshold.148 Previously, Congress received notification in connection with some non-NATO countries’ (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar) proposed purchases of U.S. equipment for Typhoons.149 If Turkey cannot procure F-16s and If Turkey cannot procure F-16s and
encounters obstacles to European alternatives, its next steps toward preserving its military encounters obstacles to European alternatives, its next steps toward preserving its military
aviation capabilities and NATO interoperability would be unclear. The State Department’s ICS for aviation capabilities and NATO interoperability would be unclear. The State Department’s ICS for
Turkey states Turkey states
If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey’s pursuit of defense modernization, If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey’s pursuit of defense modernization,
Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfil those defense capability gaps in Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfil those defense capability gaps in
areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability.areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability.~~151~~150
At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden- At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-
Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President
Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as
well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.~~152~~151 However, However,
SFRC Chairman Bob Menendez has consistently expressed disapproval due to what he has SFRC Chairman Bob Menendez has consistently expressed disapproval due to what he has
termed Erdogan’s “abuses across the region.”termed Erdogan’s “abuses across the region.”~~153~~152
In addition to ongoing U.S.-Turkey tensions regarding Syrian Kurdish groups in northern Syria, In addition to ongoing U.S.-Turkey tensions regarding Syrian Kurdish groups in northern Syria,
Turkey-Greece disputes regarding overflights of contested areas and other long-standing Aegean Turkey-Greece disputes regarding overflights of contested areas and other long-standing Aegean
Sea issues (referenced in the text box below) spiked in 2022 and attracted close congressional Sea issues (referenced in the text box below) spiked in 2022 and attracted close congressional
attention.attention.~~154~~153 Erdogan suspended dialogue with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis after Erdogan suspended dialogue with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis after
Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a
~~May 2022 joint session of Congress.155 In December, the final version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L.~~
~~117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to Turkey (Section 1271 of H.R.~~
~~7900) related to potential overflights of Greek territory. However, the joint explanatory statement~~
~~accompanying the NDAA included a provision stating, “We believe that North Atlantic Treaty~~
~~Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial overflights of another~~
~~NATO ally’s airspace.”156 While Turkey-Greece disputes persist, tensions have somewhat~~
~~subsided in early 2023. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have renewed contacts in the context of positive~~
~~diplomatic momentum from Greek post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.157~~
~~With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in~~
~~2017,158 U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for~~
~~the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three~~

~~150~~ 143 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A. 144 Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,” Forbes, February 6, 2023. 145 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,” Middle East Eye, January 20, 2023. 146 Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to ‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?” EurAsian Times, January 29, 2023. 147 Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.” 148 See footnote 170. 149 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal 08-101, September 26, 2008 (73 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal 08-101, September 26, 2008 (73 Federal Register
61399, October 16, 2008); State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Transmittal 17-079, May 61399, October 16, 2008); State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Transmittal 17-079, May
24, 2019 (84 24, 2019 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DSCA Transmittal 20-11, November 4, 2021; DDTC 65608, November 27, 2019); DSCA Transmittal 20-11, November 4, 2021; DDTC
Transmittal 18-014, November 2, 2018 (84 Transmittal 18-014, November 2, 2018 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DDTC Transmittal 20-074, 65608, November 27, 2019); DDTC Transmittal 20-074,
September 2, 2021 (86 September 2, 2021 (86 Federal Register 73075, December 23, 2021). 73075, December 23, 2021).
~~151~~150 State Department, State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey. .
~~152~~151 “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” Reuters, June 30, 2022. , June 30, 2022.
~~153~~152 Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/ Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/
status/1600519759493304321. status/1600519759493304321.
~~154~~153 Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,” Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,” Greece and Turkey in Conflict and
Cooperation, New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek , New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek
Relations in Light of Ukraine,” Relations in Light of Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, June 8, 2022. , June 8, 2022.
~~155 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S.~~
~~Congress,” May 17, 2022. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have spoken in the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, in the~~
~~context of Greek assistance in relief and recovery efforts.~~
~~156 Joint explanatory statement available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20221205/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-~~
~~RCP117-70-JES.pdf.~~
~~157 “Turkey, Greece take strides in Ankara meeting as aid diplomacy continues,” Al-Monitor, March 22, 2023.~~
~~158 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece – Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V~~
~~Configuration,” Transmittal No. 17-54, October 17, 2017.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

23

~~link to page 34 link to page 35~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~countries.159~~ Congressional Research Service 22 link to page 34 link to page 35 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations May 2022 joint session of Congress.154 In December, the final version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to Turkey (Section 1271 of H.R. 7900) related to potential overflights of Greek territory. However, the joint explanatory statement accompanying the NDAA included a provision stating, “We believe that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial overflights of another NATO ally’s airspace.”155 While Turkey-Greece disputes persist, tensions somewhat subsided in early 2023 when Erdogan and Mitsotakis renewed contacts in the context of positive diplomatic momentum from Greek post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.156 At the July 2023 NATO summit in Lithuania, the two leaders met and agreed to build on this momentum with a high-level bilateral meeting in Greece this fall. With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in 2017,157 U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three countries.158 In the past three years, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations In the past three years, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations
with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.~~160~~159
Enhanced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has included an expanded U.S. military presence and Enhanced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has included an expanded U.S. military presence and
increased U.S.-Greece and NATO military activities at Greek installations (see also text box increased U.S.-Greece and NATO military activities at Greek installations (see also text box
below).below).~~161~~160
Turkey-Greece-Cyprus Tensions: Background and Some Ongoing ~~Issues162~~Issues161
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader
Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on
several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around
contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones
(including energy claims), islands (and their use for military purposes), and continental shelves (see(including energy claims), islands (and their use for military purposes), and continental shelves (see Figure A-3
andand Figure A-4 for maps of some of the areas in dispute). for maps of some of the areas in dispute).
These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de
facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces
invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The
internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (sometimes referred to as Cyprus), which has close ties to Greece, internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (sometimes referred to as Cyprus), which has close ties to Greece,
claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-
thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are
backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.~~163~~162 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot 154 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S. Congress,” May 17, 2022. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have spoken in the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, in the context of Greek assistance in relief and recovery efforts. 155 Joint explanatory statement available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20221205/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-RCP117-70-JES.pdf. 156 “Turkey, Greece take strides in Ankara meeting as aid diplomacy continues,” Al-Monitor, March 22, 2023. 157 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece – Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V Configuration,” Transmittal No. 17-54, October 17, 2017. 158 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30, 2022. 159 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 160 State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022. 161 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 162 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between (continued...) Congressional Research Service 23 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~In 1983, Turkish Cypriot~~
leaders proclaimed this part of the island the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” although no country other leaders proclaimed this part of the island the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” although no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot claim than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot claim
to be legally invalid. to be legally invalid.
Turkish officials have complained about a significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of Turkish officials have complained about a significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of
Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.~~164~~163 U.S. officials have U.S. officials have
explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region as explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region as
part of a broader NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.part of a broader NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.~~165~~164 In the March 2022 congressional hearing In the March 2022 congressional hearing
testimony mentioned above, Alan Makovsky said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass testimony mentioned above, Alan Makovsky said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass
logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.~~166~~165 After After
Turkey’s then Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer was Turkey’s then Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer was
maintaining a balanced approach in the Aegean,maintaining a balanced approach in the Aegean,~~167~~166 U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement
saying that there has been no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’ saying that there has been no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’
col ective efforts are focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.col ective efforts are focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.~~168~~

~~159 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30,~~
~~2022.~~
~~160 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.~~
~~161 State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022.~~
~~162 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.~~
~~163 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot~~
~~soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between~~
167 Congressional Notification Process Informal Notification and Review In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed the Biden Administration’s support for and engagement with Congress on a possible sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Turkey.168 One month earlier, media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—reported that the Administration had provided informal notifications to Congress about possible F-16 sales for Turkey and possible sales of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece. According to these reports, the January informal notification on Turkey was for 40 new F-16 Vipers and 79 F-16 Viper upgrade packages, along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total value of $20 billion.169 After the State Department informally notifies the SFRC and House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of major defense equipment, articles, and/or services meeting certain value thresholds, the proposed FMS or DCS requires formal notification to Congress before it can proceed. In most cases, the State Department submits the formal notification 20 to 40 days after informal notification.170 This time 50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” 50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February , February
3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a 3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a
buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000 buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000
personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
~~164~~163 Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American
Military,” Military,” New York Times, August 19, 2022. , August 19, 2022.
~~165~~164 Ibid.; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense Ibid.; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense
Minister,” July 18, 2022. Minister,” July 18, 2022.
~~166~~165 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining
U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.” U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.”
~~167~~166 “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” Kathimerini, October 21, 2022. , October 21, 2022.
~~168~~167 Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/ Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/
1582273449145212928. 1582273449145212928.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

24

~~link to page 23~~ ~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~Congressional Notification Process~~
~~Informal Notification and Review~~
~~In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed the Biden~~
~~Administration’s support for and engagement with Congress on a possible sale of F-16 fighter~~
~~aircraft to Turkey.169 One month earlier, media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—reported~~
~~that the Administration had provided informal notifications to Congress about possible F-16 sales~~
~~for Turkey and possible sales of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece. According to these~~
~~reports, the January informal notification on Turkey was for 40 new F-16 Vipers and 79 F-16~~
~~Viper upgrade packages, along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total~~
~~value of $20 billion.170~~
~~After the State Department informally notifies the SFRC and House Foreign Affairs Committee~~
~~(HFAC) of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of major~~
~~defense equipment, articles, and/or services meeting certain value thresholds, the proposed FMS~~
~~or DCS requires formal notification to Congress before it can proceed. In most cases, the State~~
~~Department submits the formal notification 20 to 40 days after informal notification.171 This time~~
168 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press Availability.” 169 “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” Al-Monitor, January 13, 2023; Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition,” New York Times, January 14, 2023. 170 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. The thresholds for NATO (continued...) Congressional Research Service 24 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations period gives the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential “tiered review” period gives the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential “tiered review”
process. If a Member of Congress places a hold (as mentioned earlier, not legally binding) on the process. If a Member of Congress places a hold (as mentioned earlier, not legally binding) on the
proposed transaction, formal notification usually does not proceed.proposed transaction, formal notification usually does not proceed.~~172~~171 Under provisions of the Under provisions of the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), the executive branch can proceed Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), the executive branch can proceed
with a sale—if not blocked by legislation—15 days (for NATO allies like Turkey and Greece) with a sale—if not blocked by legislation—15 days (for NATO allies like Turkey and Greece)
after formal notification.after formal notification.~~173~~172
As mentioned above, congressional consideration of the potential F-16 sale to Turkey may As mentioned above, congressional consideration of the potential F-16 sale to Turkey may
depend at least to some degree on Turkey’s approval of NATO accession for both Sweden and depend at least to some degree on Turkey’s approval of NATO accession for both Sweden and
Finland.Finland.~~174~~173 With Turkey already having approved Finland’s NATO membership, the U.S. focus With Turkey already having approved Finland’s NATO membership, the U.S. focus
has turned to Turkey’s approach to Sweden’s situation. Shortly after the reported informal has turned to Turkey’s approach to Sweden’s situation. Shortly after the reported informal
notifications of possible aircraft sales to Greece and Turkey, the notifications of possible aircraft sales to Greece and Turkey, the New York Times cited Chairman cited Chairman
Menendez as welcoming the F-35 sale to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey. Menendez as welcoming the F-35 sale to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey.
Regarding the F-16 sale, he said Regarding the F-16 sale, he said

~~169 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press~~
~~Availability.”~~
~~170 “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” Al-Monitor, January 13, 2023; Malsin and Salama, “Biden~~
~~Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “U.S. Plan to~~
~~Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition,” New York Times, January 14, 2023.~~
~~171 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. The thresholds for NATO~~
President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.174 In a March SFRC hearing featuring Secretary Blinken, Chairman Menendez elaborated on objections he had against various Turkish foreign and domestic policies, and opined that Turkey does not deserve to receive F-16s unless it addresses some of the issues he mentioned.175 The Administration’s reported informal notifications of potential sales to Turkey and Greece come amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over maritime boundaries and U.S. regional involvement (as mentioned above).176 By harmonizing the informal notification on F-35s for Greece with the one on F-16s for Turkey, the Administration may be seeking to reassure Greek leaders and popular opinion that the United States is not favoring Turkey over Greece.177 One journalist has argued A Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5-generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F- allies (and Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand) are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or allies (and Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand) are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or
upgrading of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and upgrading of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and
defense services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. For all defense services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. For all
other countries, the thresholds are $14 million, $50 million, and $200 million, respectively. other countries, the thresholds are $14 million, $50 million, and $200 million, respectively.
~~172~~171 CRS Report RL31675, CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. , by Paul K. Kerr.
~~173~~172 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF11533, Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF11533, Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and , by Paul K. Kerr and
Liana W. Rosen. Liana W. Rosen.
~~174 See footnote 118.~~ 173 See footnote Error! Bookmark not defined.. Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking ~~Member~~Member Jim Risch and the 29 who Jim Risch and the 29 who
wrote a February 2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to wrote a February 2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to
Turkey if accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it Turkey if accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it
blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 , February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023
letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
~~turkiye_f16s3.pdf.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

25

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and~~
~~democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and~~
~~against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human~~
~~rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and~~
~~begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.175~~
~~In a March SFRC hearing featuring Secretary Blinken, Chairman Menendez elaborated on~~
~~objections he had against various Turkish foreign and domestic policies, and opined that Turkey~~
~~does not deserve to receive F-16s unless it addresses some of the issues he mentioned.176~~
~~The Administration’s reported informal notifications of potential sales to Turkey and Greece~~
~~come amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over maritime boundaries and U.S.~~
~~regional involvement (as mentioned above).177 By harmonizing the informal notification on F-35s~~
~~for Greece with the one on F-16s for Turkey, the Administration may be seeking to reassure~~
~~Greek leaders and popular opinion that the United States is not favoring Turkey over Greece.178~~
~~One journalist has argued:~~
~~A Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5-~~
~~generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F-~~
turkiye_f16s3.pdf. 174 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” Alexander Ward et al., “Menendez vows to block plan to sell fighter jets to Turkey,” Politico, January 13, 2023. 175 SFRC Hearing, March 22, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558656174?0&deliveryId=105309916&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7694906. 176 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 177 Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” Congressional Research Service 25 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations 16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configuration—will give the Hellenic Air Force a 16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configuration—will give the Hellenic Air Force a
technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even
if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.~~179~~178
In response to the news of a possible F-35 sale to Greece, In response to the news of a possible F-35 sale to Greece, then Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu
called on the United States to “pay attention” to the balance of power in the region.called on the United States to “pay attention” to the balance of power in the region.~~180~~179
Developments After Turkey’s May 2023 Elections
Following the end of Turkey’s May 2023 election cycle, congressional committee leaders’ Following the end of Turkey’s May 2023 election cycle, congressional committee leaders’
concerns regarding a possible F-16 sale may have softened somewhat. In April 2023, these concerns regarding a possible F-16 sale may have softened somewhat. In April 2023, these
leaders apparently acquiesced to the Administration providing formal notification of a possible leaders apparently acquiesced to the Administration providing formal notification of a possible
sale of avionics that Turkey had requested in 2019 to increase the NATO interoperability of its F-sale of avionics that Turkey had requested in 2019 to increase the NATO interoperability of its F-
16s (on certain information sharing and flight safety issues).16s (on certain information sharing and flight safety issues).~~181~~180 A few days before President A few days before President
Erdogan’s reelection, HFAC Chairman Michael McCaul was cited as saying that he believes he Erdogan’s reelection, HFAC Chairman Michael McCaul was cited as saying that he believes he
and the other three Members who oversee major possible arms sales (SFRC Chairman Menendez and the other three Members who oversee major possible arms sales (SFRC Chairman Menendez
and Ranking Member Jim Risch, and HFAC Ranking Member Gregory Meeks) “will approve the and Ranking Member Jim Risch, and HFAC Ranking Member Gregory Meeks) “will approve the
transfer once Turkey ratifies Sweden’s membership in NATO, and after recent approvals for transfer once Turkey ratifies Sweden’s membership in NATO, and after recent approvals for
Greece to buy U.S.-made F-35 warplanes and to get upgrades to its F-16s.”Greece to buy U.S.-made F-35 warplanes and to get upgrades to its F-16s.”~~182~~181 McCaul also said, “We’ve been assured that after the [Turkish] election, regardless of the winner, that Sweden will be recognized as a NATO ally.”182 As of June, these four Members have reportedly expressed support for the Administration to provide formal notification to Congress of the potential F-35 sale to Greece.183 After Erdogan’s victory in May, President Biden said that Erdogan “wants to work on something on the F-16s. I told him we wanted a deal with Sweden, so let’s get that done.”184 Chairman Menendez has said that Sweden might be the “whole equation” for some Members of Congress,185 but is only “part of the equation” for him.186 He suggested in May that if Turkey approves Sweden’s NATO membership and ends “belligerence” toward Greece and perhaps other neighbors such as Armenia, as manifested by “substantive commitments and various indications that would actually take place, there’s a path forward—at least for me.”187 178 ~~McCaul also said,~~

~~175 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” Alexander Ward et al.,~~
~~“Menendez vows to block plan to sell fighter jets to Turkey,” Politico, January 13, 2023.~~
~~176 SFRC Hearing, March 22, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558656174?0&deliveryId=~~
~~105309916&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7694906.~~
~~177 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.~~
~~178 Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Crowley and Wong,~~
~~“U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.”~~
~~179~~ Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,” Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,”
Forbes, January 16, 2023. , January 16, 2023.
~~180~~179 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Al-Monitor, January , January
17, 2023. 17, 2023.
~~181~~180 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Türkiye – F-16 Avionics Upgrade,” Transmittal No. 21-34, April 17, 2023; Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Türkiye – F-16 Avionics Upgrade,” Transmittal No. 21-34, April 17, 2023;
CRS correspondence with Turkish official, April 17, 2023; “Menendez reiterates opposition to sale of F-16 fighters to CRS correspondence with Turkish official, April 17, 2023; “Menendez reiterates opposition to sale of F-16 fighters to
Turkey,” Turkey,” Kathimerini, April 22, 2023. , April 22, 2023.
~~182~~181 Joe Gould et al., “McCaul open to selling F-16s to Turkey — even if Erdoğan wins,” Joe Gould et al., “McCaul open to selling F-16s to Turkey — even if Erdoğan wins,” Politico, May 25, 2023. , May 25, 2023.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

26

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results, and U.S. Relations~~

~~“We’ve been assured that after the [Turkish] election, regardless of the winner, that Sweden will~~
~~be recognized as a NATO ally.”183 As of early June, these four Members have reportedly~~
~~expressed support for the Administration to provide formal notification to Congress of the~~
~~potential F-35 sale to Greece.184~~
~~After Erdogan’s victory in late May, President Biden said that Erdogan “wants to work on~~
~~something on the F-16s. I told him we wanted a deal with Sweden, so let’s get that done.”185 With~~
~~the Administration calling for Sweden to join NATO by the time of the alliance’s July 11-12~~
~~summit in Lithuania, Chairman Menendez has said that Sweden might be the “whole equation”~~
~~for some Members of Congress,186 but is only “part of the equation” for him.187 He has suggested~~
~~that if Turkey approves Sweden’s NATO membership and ends “belligerence” toward Greece and~~
~~perhaps other neighbors such as Armenia, as manifested by “substantive commitments and~~
~~various indications that would actually take place, there’s a path forward—at least for me.”188~~
~~HFAC Ranking Member Meeks may be roughly aligned with Menendez, based on his late May~~
~~statement that he wants Turkey to approve Sweden’s NATO accession and take additional actions,~~
~~including with regard to Greece.189~~182 Gould et al. 183 “F-35 deal comes closer within Greece’s reach,” Kathimerini, June 1, 2023. 184 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before Marine One Departure,” May 29, 2023. 185 Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February 2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf. 186 “Senior US lawmaker wants change from Turkey before F-16 sale approval,” Reuters, May 30, 2023. 187 Ibid.; “Bob Menendez still opposes sending F-16 jets to Turkey, even as Washington and Ankara negotiate on the matter,” Politico Congress Minutes, May 31, 2023; Gould et al. Congressional Research Service 26 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations After Erdogan agreed in July to send Sweden’s accession protocol to Turkey’s parliament and work toward its ratification, National Security Advisor Sullivan said that the Administration would move forward with the F-16 sale in consultation with Congress.188 Menendez called for additional assurances from the Administration to enhance Greece’s security in the region before approving the sale.189 While stopping short of expressing assent to the sale, Risch, McCaul, and Meeks voiced general optimism on a path forward, with Meeks saying that Turkey cannot resume its violations of Greek airspace.190 Erdogan said on July 12 that Turkish F-16s have never been used against Greece and “we do not plan on using them.”191
The Administration may consider whether, when, and how to address congressional concerns, The Administration may consider whether, when, and how to address congressional concerns,
and/or move forward with a formal notification of the sale. and/or move forward with a formal notification of the sale.

~~183 Gould et al.~~
~~184 “F-35 deal comes closer within Greece’s reach,” Kathimerini, June 1, 2023.~~
~~185 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before Marine One Departure,” May 29, 2023.~~
~~186 Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February~~
~~2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if~~
~~accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks~~
~~Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter~~
~~from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf.~~
~~187 “Senior US lawmaker wants change from Turkey before F-16 sale approval,” Reuters, May 30, 2023.~~
~~188 Ibid.; “Bob Menendez still opposes sending F-16 jets to Turkey, even as Washington and Ankara negotiate on the~~
~~matter,” Politico Congress Minutes, May 31, 2023; Gould et al.~~
~~189 Gould et al.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

27

~~Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues, May 2023 Election Results,~~188 Nazlan Ertan, “US to advance Turkey's F-16 sales as Sweden's NATO bid moves forward,” Al-Monitor, July 11, 2023. 189 David Sivak, “Bob Menendez says there ‘may be a pathway’ for sale of F-16s to Turkey,” Washington Examiner, July 11, 2023. 190 Joe Gould, “F-16s for Turkey aren’t a done deal until these lawmakers say it’s OK,” Politico, July 11, 2023. On July 8, six Representatives sent a letter to Secretary Blinken requesting that any U.S.-Turkey sales agreement for F-16s include “mechanisms that provide for the pause, delay, or snapback of the transfer of American weapons to Turkey if it resumes its destabilizing actions in the Eastern Mediterranean that threaten or undermine U.S. national security interests or NATO security architecture.” Text of letter available at https://pappas.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/pappas.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/07.08.23-letter-to-secretary-blinken-on-turkey-f-16-sale-snapback-mechanisms.pdf. 191 “Erdogan claims F-16s have not been used against Greece, no plans to do so,” Kathimerini, July 12, 2023. Congressional Research Service 27 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Appendix A. Maps
Figure A-1. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits

Source: Nikkei Asia, March 2022. , March 2022.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

28 28

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

Figure A-2. Syria Conflict Map

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

29 29

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

Figure A-3. Some Areas of Aegean Dispute

Source: Greek Reporter, June 2022, at https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-, June 2022, at https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-
sovereignty-16-maps/. sovereignty-16-maps/.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

30 30

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

Figure A-4. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean

Source: Main map created by Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS. , with slight modifications by CRS.
Note: As stated elsewhere in this report, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots administering a portion of the island of As stated elsewhere in this report, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots administering a portion of the island of
Cyprus proclaimed that portion to be the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” though no country other Cyprus proclaimed that portion to be the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” though no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot
claim to be legally invalid. claim to be legally invalid.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

31 31

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

Appendix B. Profiles of Selected Turkish Party
Leaders
Recep Tayyip Erdogan—President of Turkey and Leader/Co-Founder of
the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
(pronounced (pronounced air-doe-wan) )
Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on
the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious imam hatip secondary school in Istanbul. secondary school in Istanbul.
In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a
business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different
Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan. Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan.
Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office, Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office,
imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious
incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After
Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party
was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP

won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After
the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special
election. After he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister. election. After he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister.
Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of
the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to
power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and
won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018. He won another won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018. He won another
presidential term in May 2023. Many observers assess that he seeks to consolidate presidential term in May 2023. Many observers assess that he seeks to consolidate
power and to avoid the reopening of corruption cases that could implicate him and power and to avoid the reopening of corruption cases that could implicate him and
close family members or associates. close family members or associates.
Kemal Kilicdaroglu—Leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP)
((kuhl-utch-dahr-oh-loo)
Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi (religious minority Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi (religious minority
with some relation to Shia Islam) background. Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP, with some relation to Shia Islam) background. Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP,
which is the main opposition party and traditional political outlet of the Turkish which is the main opposition party and traditional political outlet of the Turkish
nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the party has also attracted various liberal and nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the party has also attracted various liberal and
social democratic constituencies. social democratic constituencies.
After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara, After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara,
Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the
director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil
service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to
parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to
root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara. root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara.
Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has faced criticism for the CHP’s Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has faced criticism for the CHP’s
failure to make electoral gains at the national level, especial y as Erdogan’s opponent in failure to make electoral gains at the national level, especial y as Erdogan’s opponent in
the 2023 presidential race. The CHP made notable gains—particularly in Istanbul and the 2023 presidential race. The CHP made notable gains—particularly in Istanbul and
Ankara mayoral races—in 2019 local elections.Ankara mayoral races—in 2019 local elections.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

32 32

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

Devlet Bahceli—Leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)
((bah-cheh-lee) )
Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the
MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for
opposing political accommodation with the Kurds. opposing political accommodation with the Kurds.
Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher
education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a
career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a
leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997 leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997
and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He
was initially elected to parliament in 2007. was initially elected to parliament in 2007.
Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017 Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017
constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018. constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018.
Meral Aksener—Founder and Leader of the Good (IYI) Party
((awk-sheh-nar) )
Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from
Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party
in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s
alliance with Erdogan. alliance with Erdogan.
Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from
Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was
first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior
minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by
a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from

2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker. 2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker.
Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to
provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum
establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned
vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the
controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its
presidential candidate in the 2018 elections. presidential candidate in the 2018 elections.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
R44000 R44000 · VERSION ~~108~~111 · UPDATED
33 33

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues~~, May 2023 Election Results,~~ and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
R44000 R44000 · VERSION ~~108~~111 · UPDATED
34 34