Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

April 23, 2015 – August 10, 2023 R44000

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S.
August 10, 2023
Relations
Jim Zanotti
U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated geopolitical environment, as Turkey
Specialist in Middle
also faces deep-seated economic problems and continues to recover from disastrous February
Eastern Affairs
2023 earthquakes. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 coup in Turkey

highlight uncertainties about the future of bilateral relations. Ongoing disagreements stem from
Clayton Thomas
U.S. support for Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a
Specialist in Middle
U.S.-designated terrorist organization), and Turkey’s 2019 procurement of a Russian S-400
Eastern Affairs
surface-to-air defense system. Congressional action has included holds and conditions on U.S.

arms sales to Turkey, as well as support for certain sanctions against Turkey. Nevertheless, U.S.
and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of the bilateral relationship and Turkey’s

membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
At the same time, Turkey apparently seeks to reduce its dependence on the West, as it and other “midsize powers” such as
Saudi Arabia and India seek advantages in a global system with growing great-power competition. Turkey’s desire for greater
strategic autonomy may partly explain its willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia, though the two countries retain
significant differences on Ukraine and other issues. One analyst has argued that most of Turkey’s core security problems
around its borders and coastlines—involving Syria, Iraq, Greece, Cyprus, Libya, and the Caucasus—require it to deal with
Russia, Iran, and various other actors without much help from the West. Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend
partly on its leaders’ willingness to risk breaks in traditional ties with Western powers while building other global
relationships.
Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its neighboring countries could have implications for
bilateral ties and U.S. political-military options in the region, as well as Turkey’s strategic orientation. Under President Joe
Biden, existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation on other foreign policy matters. In a June 2023
CNN interview, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey is “charting an independent foreign policy but one
in which we can have a constructive relationship with them.” While Turkey’s deepening ties with Russia remain a cause for
U.S. concern, its emergence as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion—including with regard
to the shipment of grain to global markets—has arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S. policy. U.S.-Turkey
relations also have improved due to Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense; its limitation of Russian naval access to and
from the Black Sea; and its moves toward rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia.
Citing the importance of NATO strength and interoperability, President Biden has voiced support for sales that would revamp
Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. The Administration reportedly
provided informal notification to Congress in January 2023 of a possible sale of F-16s to Turkey, plus associated equipment
and munitions. Factors potentially influencing congressional consideration of the proposed sale include whether Turkey
might approve of Sweden joining NATO, and Turkey’s tense relations with Greece. Turkey agreed to Finland’s NATO
membership in March 2023, but has conditioned approval for Sweden on it taking actions against individuals and groups that
Turkey deems to be terrorists. In July 2023, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to send the NATO accession
protocol for Sweden to Turkey’s parliament and work closely with it to “ensure ratification,” but the process could extend
into the fall and potentially depend on additional action from Sweden, along with assurances of congressional support for the
F-16 sale.
Turkish concerns regarding its southern border with Syria have deepened further during Syria’s civil war, due largely to (1)
the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the Islamic State by working with Syrian
Kurds linked to the PKK, and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and
somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of
northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq.
Domestically, many observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of President Erdogan. Despite major
inflation and the earthquakes’ aftermath, he emerged victorious in May 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. An
official international observer mission stated that while voters had a “choice between genuine political alternatives,”
government actions favoring Erdogan gave him an “unjustified advantage,” amid broader debate about the electoral process
and how it related to past Turkish elections.
Congressional Research Service

link to page 38 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 34

Congressional Research Service

link to page 27 link to page 6 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Introduction and Key U.S.-Turkey Considerations
This report provides background information and analysis on key issues affecting U.S.-Turkey
(Türkiye)1 relations, including domestic Turkish developments and various foreign policy and
defense matters. Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
since 1952. U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that cooperation on regional security matters
remains mutually important,2 despite Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of an S-400 surface-to-air defense
system from Russia and a number of other U.S.-Turkey differences (such as in Syria and with
Greece and Cyprus).
Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside
cooperation on other matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. While continued or
deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden
Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s defense and
openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved
U.S.-Turkey relations.3 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to Turkey, and in
January 2023 the Administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a potential F-16 sale,
plus associated equipment and munitions (see “Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views”
below). In a June 2023 CNN interview, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Turkey
is “charting an independent foreign policy but one in which we can have a constructive
relationship with them.”4
Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey.
Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have
implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s foreign
policy orientation and financial well-being.
For additional information, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. See Figure 1 for a map and key facts and figures
about Turkey.

1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or
other equivalents (e.g., the German “Türkei,” the French “Turquie”) in Turkish government documents and
communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the
body to “Türkiye.” In January 2023, the State Department spokesperson said that the department would use the revised
spelling “in most formal diplomatic and bilateral contexts” where appropriate. The U.S. Board on Geographic Names
retained both “Turkey” and “Republic of Turkey” as conventional names, and the spokesperson said that the State
Department could use those names if it is in furtherance of broader public understanding. State Department Press
Briefing, January 5, 2023.
2 State Department, “Joint Statement on the U.S.-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism” and “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Before Their Meeting,” January 18, 2023; State Department Press
Briefing, January 18, 2023.
3 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign
Relations, June 1, 2023.
4 Transcript of CNN Interview, June 4, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/2023-06-04/segment/01.
Congressional Research Service

1

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Figure 1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 83,593,483. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.8 mil, Ankara 5.4 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil,
Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil.
% of population 14 or younger: 22.1% (2022)
Ethnic groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2%
Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
Economy
GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity): $39,463
Real GDP growth: 3.3%
Inflation: 47.8% (as of July 2023)
Unemployment: 10.6%
Budget deficit as % of GDP: 4.8%
Public debt as % of GDP: 32.8%
Current account deficit as % of GDP: 5.4%
Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2023
projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database;
Economist Intelligence Unit; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook; and Turkish Statistical
Institute.
Domestic Issues
Political Developments Under Erdogan’s Rule
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pronounced air-doe-wan) has ruled Turkey since becoming
prime minister in 2003, and has steadily deepened his control over the country’s populace and
Congressional Research Service

2

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

institutions. Many observers describe Erdogan as a polarizing figure, and elections have reflected
roughly equal portions of the country supporting and opposing his rule.5
After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential
election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential system of
governance, which he cemented through victories in a 2017 constitutional referendum and 2018
presidential and parliamentary elections. Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation
surfaced after the referendum and the elections.6 In a controversial ruling during the referendum,
Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council (Turkish acronym YSK) decided not to enforce the normal
requirement that only properly stamped ballots could be counted, leading some observers to
question the outcome’s legitimacy.7 Since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements within the
military, Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym
AKP) have adopted more nationalistic domestic and foreign policy approaches, perhaps partly
because of their reliance on parliamentary support from the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish
acronym MHP).
U.S. and European Union (EU) officials have expressed a number of concerns about authoritarian
governance and erosion of rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey.8 Some leading opposition
figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to
suppress dissent and consolidate power.9
Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have continued efforts to counter militants from the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization). These efforts
include Turkish military operations targeting PKK and PKK-aligned personnel in Iraq and
Syria.10
February 2023 Earthquakes and Their Implications
Two major earthquakes (magnitude 7.8 and 7.5) hit southern Turkey on February 6, 2023. Quake
damage and its after-effects in areas of Turkey and Syria reportedly killed more than 50,000
people in Turkey and 8,000 in Syria, injured over 100,000 more, and directly affected the living
situations and daily lives of millions. As Turkish authorities coordinate a humanitarian response
involving significant international assistance, and facilitate access to Syrian border crossings,
observers have sought to assess (1) factors contributing to the damage and its scope, (2) efforts to
help victims and their families, and (3) present and future needs.11 U.S. officials have provided or
announced various means of assistance to Turkey, including $235 million in humanitarian

5 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two
Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021.
6 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final
Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017); OSCE, International Election Observation Mission,
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24,
2018 (published June 25, 2018).
7 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan’s Russian Victory,” Foreign Affairs, May 29, 2023.
8 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022, Turkey; Turkey; European Commission,
Türkiye 2022 Report, October 6, 2022.
9 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,”
Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” BBC News, April 7, 2021.
10 Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February
18, 2022.
11 See, for example, Nazlan Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims,” Al-Monitor, March
20, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

3

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

assistance.12 With Turkey’s government estimating the economic toll from the earthquakes to be
around $104 billion—roughly 9% of Turkey’s annual gross domestic product (GDP)—
international pledges of assistance at a March 2023 donors conference totaled nearly $7.5
billion.13
The disaster has affected Turkey’s politics, society, and economy. The 10 southern Turkish
provinces most directly affected account for about 10% of Turkey’s GDP and 15% of its
population, and host thousands of refugees from Syria’s ongoing civil war.14
Analysts have speculated about the extent of the Erdogan government’s responsibility for the
damage and hardship stemming from the earthquakes,15 with some drawing comparisons to a
major 1999 earthquake in northwestern Turkey that killed approximately 18,000 and prompted
legal and regulatory efforts to improve building safety.16 Some media accounts and opposition
politicians have alleged that in the years before the 2023 earthquakes, government officials and
contractors prioritized economic benefits over adherence to construction codes, at least partly
contributing to the scope of destruction and fatalities.17 Erdogan has denounced criticism aimed at
him or the government as fomenting disunity,18 and Turkey’s justice ministry has ordered
prosecutors to create “earthquake crimes investigation units” to consider criminal violations for
substandard work.19 Erdogan acknowledged some problems with the government’s initial
response,20 while mainly attributing the disaster to the quakes’ size.21
He has announced a government-led recovery program, pledging to build 319,000 houses within
a year, and 650,000 in total. Some local officials, engineers, and international donors have
expressed concern that a quick rebuilding effort without detailed planning or clearer
accountability measures could leave the new buildings vulnerable to future seismic activity.22 In
July 2023, the Erdogan-led AKP proposed a draft law that would partly fund reconstruction via
corporate tax increases.23

12 U.S. Agency for International Development, “The United States Provides Additional $50 Million to Support
Earthquake Affected Communities in Türkiye and Syria,” March 20, 2023.
13 Türkiye Earthquakes Recovery and Reconstruction Assessment, March 2023, at https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/
uploads/2023/03/Turkiye-Recovery-and-Reconstruction-Assessment.pdf; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5 billion for Turkey,
Syria earthquake victims.”
14 Nevzat Devranoglu, “Earthquake could cost Turkey up to $84 billion - business group,” Reuters, February 13, 2023;
Raja Abdulrahim and Emily Garthwaite, “For Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Quake Is a Disaster Within a Disaster,” New
York Times, February 13, 2023.
15 Adam Samson and Ayla Jean Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom,” Financial
Times, February 9, 2023; “Earthquake could shake up Turkish election,” Al-Monitor, February 10, 2023.
16 Zeynep Bilginsoy and Suzan Fraser, “Turkey’s lax policing of building codes known before quake,” Associated
Press, February 10, 2023.
17 Ibid.; Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom”; Ben Hubbard et al.,
“Turkish Builders Under Intense Scrutiny over Shoddy Work,” New York Times, February 24, 2023.
18 Samson and Yackley, “Earthquake tests Erdoğan’s leadership as Turkish elections loom.”
19 Ben Hubbard, “Quake Response Testing Erdogan as Survivors Express Frustration,” New York Times, February 12,
2023.
20 Ibid.
21 Ben Hubbard et al., “As Public Anger Mounts, Turkey Detains Builders,” New York Times, February 12, 2023.
22 Jared Malsin, “Concerns Mount as Erdogan Rebuilds,” Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2023; Ertan, “EU raises $7.5
billion for Turkey, Syria earthquake victims.”
23 “Turkey to raise corporate tax to fund earthquake rebuilding-draft law,” Reuters, July 5, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

4

link to page 20 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Major Economic Challenges and Options
Ongoing financial problems in Turkey have considerably worsened over the past two years, with
major inflation occurring in parallel with accelerated depreciation of Turkey’s currency, the lira.
After official annual inflation reached a 24-year peak of 86% in October 2022, it was just over
47.8% in July 2023. Some unofficial estimates in early 2023 said that inflation was actually over
100%.24 The spike in inflation could be linked to the Turkish central bank’s repeated reductions of
its key interest rate from September 2021 to March 2023—moving it down from 19% to 8.5%.
Additional inflationary pressure may have come from external events such as Russia’s war on
Ukraine and interest rate hikes in the United States and other major economies.25 The lira has
been trending downward for more than a decade, with its decline probably driven in part by
broader concerns about Turkey’s rule of law and economy.26 It has lost more than 80% of its
value against the dollar since 2018, with much of the decrease coming after the major rate cuts
began in 2021.27
President Erdogan has assertively challenged the conventional economic theory that higher
interest rates stem inflation, attract foreign capital, and support the value of the currency. In
replacing Turkey’s central bank governor and finance minister in 2021, Erdogan established
greater control over Turkish fiscal and monetary policy. In public statements, Erdogan argued that
lower interest rates boost production, employment, and exports.28 Erdogan also criticized high
interest rates as contrary to Islamic teachings and as exacerbating the gap between rich and
poor.29 He has insisted that Turkey will not turn to international financial institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance, after Turkey in 2013 paid off loans that—in
the aggregate—had been outstanding for 52 years.30
The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living
and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private
sector companies. The government has sought to lessen the impact of inflation by providing tax
cuts, minimum wage increases, greater access to early retirement benefits, and subsidies for basic
expenses, along with protection for consumers who keep their bank accounts in liras, and
borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.31 Turkey also has sought currency swaps and loans
from some Arab Gulf states, and has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows (see “Turkey-Russia

24 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Erdogan Faces Big Vote Test as Turkish Economy Suffers,” Wall Street Journal,
April 26, 2023.
25 Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts but Won’t Budge on Rates,” Bloomberg, April
28, 2022.
26 Mikolaj Rogalewicz, “Economic crisis in Turkey,” Warsaw Institute Review, April 25, 2022.
27 Rumeysa Koc, “Why is the Turkish lira’s value still falling?” Al Jazeera, June 18, 2023.
28 “EXPLAINER: Turkey’s Currency Is Crashing. What’s the Impact?” Associated Press, December 3, 2021; Carlotta
Gall, “Keeping His Own Counsel on Turkey’s Economy,” New York Times, December 11, 2021.
29 “Turkey will keep lowering interest rates: Erdogan,” Daily Sabah, June 6, 2022; Mustafa Akyol, “How Erdogan’s
Pseudoscience Is Ruining the Turkish Economy,” Cato Institute, December 3, 2021.
30 “Turkey pays off the last installment of its debt to IMF,” Anadolu Agency, May 14, 2013.
31 M. Murat Kubilay, “Already vulnerable, Turkey’s economy now faces massive earthquake recovery costs,” Middle
East Institute, February 13, 2023; “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” Reuters,
April 23, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

5

link to page 20 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Economic and Energy Cooperation” below).32 Additionally, Russia has reportedly deferred to
2024 at least some of Turkey’s payments for natural gas imports.33
In the wake of Erdogan’s May 2023 reelection (discussed below), the lira’s value has declined
further. Turkey’s central bank revealed that as of the week of May 19, official statistics listed its
net foreign exchange reserves as negative for the first time in 21 years.34 Thus, with a balance-of-
payments crisis possible, Turkish economic policymakers appear to face the following important
choices:
• Whether to raise interest rates or maintain them at relatively low levels. A
more orthodox monetary policy course with higher interest rates might reduce
inflation and attract more foreign capital via international financial markets, but
slow economic growth and exports. Alternatively, Turkish officials could keep
interest rates low, and use capital controls that limit or restrict the ability of
investors to withdraw investments. Capital controls, however, can deter
investment in the long-run. During the May 2023 election campaign, Erdogan
took some measures aimed at preventing capital flight and providing relief to
Turkish consumers and businesses from the effects of inflation.35 Turkey’s
modest debt-to-GDP ratio of around 33% may give it some space to increase
government spending in efforts to relieve inflation, though this flexibility could
be limited by Erdogan’s relief measures to date and the estimated $104 billion
cost Turkey faces from the earthquake crisis.
• Whether to continue central bank interventions to strengthen the Turkish
lira, or allow the lira to depreciate. With Turkey’s foreign currency reserves
greatly depleted as of May, the government’s past strategy of selling reserves to
bolster the lira’s value appears less viable. The government could try to support
the lira through alternative means, such as additional currency swaps or ad hoc
financial arrangements with Russia, Arab Gulf states, and/or other authoritarian
regimes. One report suggests, however, that Gulf states might balk at bailouts for
Turkey without some policy changes to reduce risks of default, and that Russia’s
own financial concerns probably limit its willingness to help.36 Absent central
bank intervention, the lira could depreciate further, which could boost exports
and tourism, but might drive domestic consumers to withdraw from the Turkish
banking system.
Prospects for Turkey’s manufacturing-based economy, which has been relatively resilient to date
and is anchored by its customs union with the EU, could remain favorable if Turkey can resolve
its financial crisis quickly.37 In June, Erdogan named Mehmet Simsek—a prominent AKP figure
and professional economist—as Turkey’s finance minister. In previous leadership roles under
Erdogan (including as finance minister from 2009 to 2015), Simsek generally supported a more
orthodox approach to monetary policy, and his appointment could increase international market

32 “Erdogan says Gulf states sent cash in relief for Turkey,” Reuters, May 25, 2023; Natasha Turak, “Saudi Arabia
drops $5 billion in Turkey’s central bank to help its struggling economy,” CNBC, March 6, 2023; M. Murat Kubilay,
“As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East Institute,
November 7, 2022.
33 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why Kilicdaroglu suspects Russian interference,” Middle East Eye, May 12, 2023.
34 “Turkey central bank’s net forex reserves negative for first time since 2002,” Reuters, May 26, 2023.
35 “Analysis: Turkish lira’s long decline a symbol of strife,” Reuters, May 28, 2023.
36 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey: Erdogan’s tough options on the economy,” Middle East Eye, June 1, 2023.
37 Alan Beattie, “Erdoğan’s monetary misadventures are pushing Turkey off course,” Financial Times, May 25, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

6

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

confidence in Turkey if Erdogan gives Simsek flexibility to act.38 Some observers assert that if
Erdogan permits a change of course, it will be mixed or gradual rather than fully returning Turkey
to orthodox practice on interest rates. Erdogan might seek to avoid austerity measures that could
increase unemployment and create liquidity problems for businesses in advance of Turkish
municipal elections scheduled for March 2024.39
U.S.-Turkey Economic Cooperation40
Turkey’s economy—the 19th-largest in the world—is attractive to many U.S. companies for trade and investment.
The two countries have various bilateral agreements to promote economic cooperation, though no free trade
agreement. Total bilateral trade volume for 2022 (per data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and U.S.
Census Bureau) was $42 bil ion, up from $33 bil ion in 2021, and the countries have set a goal to increase trade
volume to $100 bil ion.
U.S.-Turkey economic ties only account for a small fraction of U.S. international trade and investment. Turkey has
a far closer economic relationship with the EU (with which it has had a customs union on manufactured goods
since 1995). Turkish foreign policy tensions with the United States and other NATO allies, discussed elsewhere in
this report, may complicate efforts to expand trade ties.
In 2021, for merchandise trade, the United States comprised 6.5% of Turkey’s exports and 4.8% of its imports
(per WTO data). For purposes of comparison, in the same year the EU bloc comprised 41.9% of Turkey’s exports
and 31.5% of its imports. From 2003 to 2021, EU countries provided more than 50% of Turkey’s foreign direct
investment, with the United States supplying 8.1%.41
In a sign that Simsek and a new central bank governor may be following a gradual approach on
interest rates in an effort to avoid losing Erdogan’s support, the central bank raised rates from
8.5% to 15% in June, and then to 17.5% in July.42 After the increases, the rate remained more than
30% less than inflation. The central bank also appears to have stopped selling reserves to
backstop the lira’s value,43 and the currency’s exchange rate has depreciated from around 20 per
dollar at Erdogan’s reelection in May to around 27 as of early August.
Turkish officials also are continuing efforts to bolster trade and foreign direct investment.
Erdogan reached a reported $50 billion in agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in
July, and Turkey has signed deals with multiple Arab Gulf states to sell armed drones.44

38 Ezgi Akin, “Meet Turkey’s Mehmet Simsek: Erdogan’s last best hope for economic recovery,” Al-Monitor, June 3,
2023.
39 “Exclusive: Turkey’s new cabinet almost certain to include Simsek,” Reuters, May 31, 2023; Soylu, “Turkey:
Erdogan’s tough options on the economy.”
40 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10961, U.S.-Turkey Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar. For
information on issues of U.S.-Turkey interest regarding energy, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye):
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
41 Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, “FDI in Türkiye,” available at
https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/whyturkey/pages/fdi-in-turkey.aspx.
42 Natasha Turak, “Turkey’s central bank hikes interest rate to 15% in dramatic U-turn to fight inflation,” CNBC, June
22, 2023.
43 Koc, “Why is the Turkish lira’s value still falling?”
44 Andrew England and Adam Samson, “UAE and Turkey sign multibillion-dollar agreements,” Financial Times, July
19, 2023; Paul Iddon, “How Saudi Arabia and UAE learned to stop worrying and love Turkey’s Bayraktar drones,”
Business Insider, August 6, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

7

link to page 37 link to page 37 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

May 2023 Elections: Another Term for Erdogan
Background
On May 14, 2023, Turkey held presidential and parliamentary elections. Largely in the context of
Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls before May 14 fueled
speculation that Erdogan and his allies might be vulnerable to a coalition of six opposition parties
led by the generally pro-secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the nationalistic Good (IYI)
Party (see Appendix B for profiles of selected party leaders).45 Despite Erdogan’s potential
vulnerability, some observers questioned the opposition coalition’s prospects. They cited
opposition disunity, Erdogan’s political resilience, and the government’s influence over judicial
rulings, ability to provide economic subsidies, and effective control of around 90% of the
media.46
Three main alliances contested the election:
• People’s Alliance, which includes Erdogan’s AKP, the MHP, and a few smaller
parties.
• Nation Alliance (or “table of six”), which includes the CHP, the Good Party, and
four smaller parties, including two led by prominent former AKP figures.
• Labor and Freedom Alliance, which includes a few small parties alongside the
Kurdish-led Peoples’ Democratic Party (Turkish acronym HDP). The HDP
arranged to run under the aegis of the Green Left Party (Turkish acronym YSP)
to prevent against its exclusion, because a case pending before the Constitutional
Court could ban the HDP from future campaigns under its own name.
In March 2023, the Nation Alliance nominated CHP party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (kuhl-utch-
dahr-oh-loo) as its joint presidential candidate.47 Kilicdaroglu’s most important coalition partner,
Good Party leader Meral Aksener (awk-sheh-nar), eventually agreed to support Kilicdaroglu after
two other potential candidates who had polled more favorably against Erdogan—Istanbul mayor
Ekrem Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas—backed Kilicdaroglu in response to
Aksener’s last-ditch appeal for one of them to run. Imamoglu’s prospects may have been
undermined by a criminal conviction (pending final resolution on appeal) that he and other
opposition figures charge is politically motivated.48 While Aksener’s Good Party rejected a formal
coalition between the Nation Alliance and the HDP, the HDP decided to support Kilicdaroglu in
the presidential race instead of fielding its own candidate.49

45 See, for example, “Erdogan’s rival boosted by withdrawal, poll lead ahead of Turkey vote,” Reuters, May 11, 2023.
46 Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s Resilient Autocrat,” Foreign Affairs, May 4, 2023; Jamie Dettmer, “It’s going to be hard
to get rid of Turkey’s Erdoğan,” Politico Europe, March 18, 2023.
47 For profiles of Kilicdaroglu, see Appendix B and Suzan Fraser, “Challenger in Turkey presidential race offers sharp
contrast,” Associated Press, May 2, 2023; Amberin Zaman, “Meet Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Turkey’s long-derided
opposition head who could dethrone Erdogan,” Al-Monitor, March 23, 2023; “Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu: hope in the man
who’s never beaten Erdoğan,” James in Turkey, January 10, 2023.
48 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” New York Times, December 15,
2022.
49 Nicolas Camut, “Pro-Kurdish party rallies behind main opposition candidate in Turkish election,” Politico Europe,
April 28, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

8

link to page 13

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Results and Electoral Process
In the May 14 elections, Erdogan fell just short of the 50% mark he needed to surpass to claim
outright victory in the presidential race, leading Kilicdaroglu by 4% as they prepared for Turkey’s
first-ever presidential run-off election on May 28. About 87% of registered voters turned out to
vote. Erdogan’s People’s Alliance retained its parliamentary majority, even though it slipped from
344 seats out of 600 to 323 (see Figure 2). While Turkey’s economic challenges and the February
earthquakes may have increased voter dissatisfaction with Erdogan, his first-round electoral
performance surpassed many observers’ expectations.50 Aggregate pre-election polling anticipated
a Kilicdaroglu lead or victory and a hung parliament.51
Erdogan prevailed in the run-off against Kilicdaroglu by a margin of 52%-48%, winning a new
five-year term. Voter turnout in the run-off was around 84%. Under Turkey’s constitution,
Erdogan might be entitled to run for one additional term if three-fifths of parliament’s members
vote to schedule early elections.52 Erdogan could seek to revise or remove presidential term limits
via constitutional amendment.
Figure 2. Turkish 2023 Parliamentary Election Results
(out of 600 total seats)

Source: YSK.
Note: The various alliances and parties that received the remaining votes are unlisted because none of them
won parliamentary seats.
Observers for Turkey’s elections included representatives from domestic political parties and civil
society organizations, as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). These observers
monitored polling station operations, voting, ballot counting, and the tabulation of results.53 The

50 Peter Kenyon, “Takeaways from Turkey’s election as it heads toward a runoff,” NPR, May 15, 2023; Amberin
Zaman, “Erdogan proves unbeatable as Turkey heads for runoff,” Al-Monitor, May 15, 2023.
51 See https://600vekil.com/mayis-2023-secim-ongorusu, accessed on June 2, 2023.
52 Article 116 of Turkey’s constitution. Unofficial English translation available at https://www.constituteproject.org/
constitution/Turkey_2017.pdf?lang=en.
53 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “General Elections, 14 May 2023, and Presidential
Election, Second Round, 28 May 2023,” at https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkiye/537642; Hurcan Asli Aksoy
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

9

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

OSCE-PACE international election observation mission said the following in preliminary
findings and conclusions it released a day after the May 28 run-off:
The run-off presidential election held on 28 May offered voters a choice between genuine
political alternatives and voter participation remained high, however, as in the first round,
biased media coverage and the lack of a level playing field gave an unjustified advantage
to the incumbent. The election administration technically managed the election efficiently,
but its lack of transparency and communication largely persisted. While the absence of
regulation of several aspects of the second round did not provide legal certainty, positively,
the Supreme Electoral Council (SEC) issued multiple regulations to remedy some of these
legal gaps. In the subdued yet competitive campaign, candidates were able to campaign
freely. However, harsher rhetoric, inflammatory and discriminatory language by both
contestants, along with the continued intimidation and harassment of supporters of some
opposition parties undermined the process. In an environment with restrictions on freedom
of expression, both private and public media did not ensure editorial independence and
impartiality in their coverage of the campaign, detracting from the ability of voters to make
an informed choice. Election day was generally calm and well-administered. However,
instances of deficient implementation of certain procedures, particularly during the vote
count, were noted.54
Other domestic and international commentators have expressed varying views about the conduct
of Turkey’s elections. Many have echoed the OSCE-PACE mission’s assessment that Erdogan’s
control over state resources and institutions gave him an unfair advantage during the campaign.55
Despite the high turnout for both electoral rounds, some analysts challenged whether the electoral
process could be characterized as free.56 Although Kilicdaroglu said the election period was the
most unfair in Turkish history, the opposition did not argue that various irregularities alleged by
some sources would have changed the results.57
Assessment and Implications
After the elections, analysts have sought to explain the outcome and President Erdogan’s abiding
popular appeal. Many have concluded that key nationalistic and religious voter blocs maintain a
level of ideological devotion or personal attachment to Erdogan—partly based on patronage
networks or actions he has taken on their behalf—that appear to outweigh economic concerns
they might have.58 Large numbers of these voters may have been hesitant to empower an
opposition with legacy ties to Turkey’s pre-Erdogan secular elite leadership, especially after
Kilicdaroglu openly partnered with the Kurdish-led HDP.59 Some observers argue that Erdogan
also may have benefitted from perceptions that he is more capable of acting swiftly to address

and Salim Cevik, “Is extensive election fraud possible in Turkey’s fiercest elections?” SWP (German Institute for
International Politics and Security), May 10, 2023.
54 OSCE, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Republic of Türkiye – Presidential Election, Second
Round, 28 May 2023 (published May 29, 2023).
55 “Recep Tayyip Erdogan is re-elected as Turkey’s president,” Economist, May 28, 2023; Fatma Tanis, “Erdogan
cements his power with a victory in Turkey’s presidential runoff election,” NPR, May 28, 2023.
56 Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan cements his power with a victory in Turkey’s presidential runoff election,” Foreign
Affairs, May 29, 2023; Gonul Tol, “Erdogan Won by Exploiting Fear,” Foreign Policy, May 31, 2023.
57 Sources reporting alleged irregularities include Turkey recap, “Forever & All Reis,” June 1, 2023; “Turkey
opposition contests thousands of ballots after election,” Reuters, May 17, 2023.
58 Michael Werz, “Erdoğan’s Reelection Illustrates the Bleak Future of Turkish Democracy,” Center for American
Progress, May 31, 2023; Adam Samson, “The patronage network behind Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s bid for third decade
in power,” Financial Times, May 27, 2023.
59 Alan Makovsky, “Erdogan Overcomes Opposition – and Economy – to Prevail in Presidential Runoff,” Arab Gulf
States Institute in Washington, May 30, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

10

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

voters’ material concerns—bypassing bureaucratic obstacles or political divisions—than his
election rivals would have been.60 It is unclear to what extent Erdogan’s resilience shares features
with that of authoritarian-leaning incumbents in other countries, or stems from socioeconomic
factors unique to Turkey.
Erdogan’s reelection and continued parliamentary majority will likely have implications in the
following areas.
Economy. As discussed above, Erdogan’s government has taken some initial post-election
measures to address Turkey’s ongoing currency and inflation crisis, given Turkey’s largely
depleted foreign exchange reserves at the time of his reelection.
Domestic politics. While the 2023 presidential election was Erdogan’s most difficult to date, and
he won a smaller parliamentary majority than in 2018, he does not appear inclined to change his
general approach to domestic governance, rule of law, and human rights. As he prepares to
preside over the Turkish republic’s 100th anniversary in October 2023 and lead the AKP’s March
2024 municipal election campaign, Erdogan may return to points he emphasized during his
reelection campaign that trumpet his accomplishments at home and abroad, and seek to paint his
domestic rivals as sympathetic to Kurdish militants and LGBTQ causes. Some observers worry
that the inclusion of Islamists from two small parties in Erdogan’s People’s Alliance could push
social policy in a more religiously conservative direction.61 However, Erdogan’s majority does
not depend on these parties, and he may have options to ally with a number of other parties,
including some from the opposition.62
The opposition faces a number of questions about its future. It had failed to unseat Erdogan
before and after Kilicdaroglu became CHP leader in 2010, but many observers had expressed that
Turkey’s economic woes and the February earthquakes made Erdogan uniquely vulnerable in
2023.63 In this context, it is unclear whether Kilicdaroglu can maintain his leadership position,
and whether the CHP will continue its current partnerships and its common cause with the HDP.
Some observers assess that Istanbul mayor Imamoglu could be Erdogan’s most formidable long-
term opponent, but his status could depend on whether he can successfully appeal his criminal
conviction and win reelection in 2024.64
U.S. relations and foreign policy. Erdogan appears inclined to pursue a largely transactional
foreign policy course that hedges between the United States, Russia, and other international
actors, in continuity with his past efforts to pursue greater autonomy for Turkey within an
increasingly multipolar global system (discussed further below). During the 2023 election
campaign, Kilicdaroglu pledged to move in a more pro-Western direction,65 prompting Erdogan
to say, “Our relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States.”66 Also
during the campaign, Erdogan was cited as saying that President Biden had given an order to
topple him,67 apparently referring to statements Candidate Biden made in a New York Times

60 See, for example, Tol.
61 See, for example, Kamuran Samar and Joshua Askew, “What Erdoğan’s re-election means for Turkey and the West,”
Euronews, May 28, 2023.
62 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Erdogan has MPs to play with after strong parliamentary showing,” Middle East
Eye, May 26, 2023.
63 See, for example, Ragip Soylu, “Turkey elections: Why did Kilicdaroglu lose?” Middle East Eye, May 31, 2023.
64 Nadeen Ebrahim, “Erdogan intent on taking back Istanbul after presidential victory,” CNN, May 31, 2023.
65 Jared Malsin and Elvan Kivilcim, “Turkey’s Top Election Challenger Pledges Closer Ties to NATO and EU,” Wall
Street Journal, May 9, 2023.
66 “Relations with Russia are no less important than those with US: Erdoğan,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 13, 2023.
67 “On final day of campaign, Erdogan accuses Turkish opposition of working with Biden,” Reuters, May 13, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

11

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

interview during the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign in support of efforts to defeat Erdogan via
the electoral process.68 When asked about his campaign comments regarding President Biden in a
May 19 CNN interview, Erdogan insisted that he would continue to work with Biden if
reelected.69 President Biden called Erdogan the day after his reelection to congratulate him, and
they “expressed their shared commitment to continue working together as close partners to
deepen cooperation between our countries and people.”70 Given Turkey’s ongoing economic
concerns, one analyst has remarked, “Turkey still needs its commerce with the West, and that may
impose a certain pragmatism on Erdogan’s foreign policy in the months ahead, whatever his anti-
Western resentments.”71
Turkish Foreign Policy
General Assessment
Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global
and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations
with the United States and other countries reflect some change to this orientation within the past
decade, as Turkey has sought greater independence of action as a regional power within a more
multipolar global system. James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, said after President
Erdogan’s May 2023 reelection that “he is going to operate independently, and this is a rational
decision, given not only their [Turkey’s] size and capabilities—it’s also reasonable from the
standpoint of their experiences.”72
Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging
Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate
some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400
surface-to-air defense system. Turkey and other “midsize powers” such as Saudi Arabia and India
seek advantages in a global system with growing great-power competition, thus partly explaining
their tendency to hedge between the United States and other great powers.73 Nevertheless, Turkey
retains significant differences with Russia—with which it has a long history of discord—
including in political and military crises involving Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and
Armenia/Azerbaijan.
Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential
countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these
actors and maintain its leverage with them.74 Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend
partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and
economic relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks
in those relationships while building other global relationships. For example, Turkey appears

68 New York Times editorial board interview of Joe Biden, December 16, 2019, published on January 17, 2020 at
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html.
69 Transcript of CNN interview, May 19, 2023, at https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/ctw/date/2023-05-19/segment/02.
70 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Call with President Erdogan of Türkiye,” May 29, 2023.
71 Makovsky.
72 Remarks by James Jeffrey, Atlantic Council, “Post election transatlantic relations with Turkey,” May 31, 2023, at
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/post-election-transatlantic-relations-with-turkey/.
73 Stephen Kalin and Summer Said, “Saudi Prince Tests Nonaligned Policy,” Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2023.
74 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021;
Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the
U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

12

link to page 18 link to page 34 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

largely aligned with the United States and other NATO allies on their expressed priorities of
assisting in Ukraine’s defense, and also continues to value NATO security guarantees (as
discussed below). Nevertheless, one analyst has argued that most of Turkey’s core security
problems around its borders and coastlines—involving Syria, Iraq, Greece, Cyprus, Libya, and
the Caucasus—require it to deal with Russia, Iran, and various other actors without much help
from the West.75
U.S./NATO Strategic Relationship and Military Presence
The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the
NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the
West. The State Department’s Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for Turkey says that its sizable
military (the second-largest in NATO) and its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the
alliance gives it a critical role in regional security.76 Turkey’s proximity to several conflict areas
in the Middle East and elsewhere has made the continuing availability of its territory for the
stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO.
In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO
sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces
command in Izmir (see Figure 3). Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea through
the Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits—see Figure A-1).
For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about
encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing
leading up to the Cold War. Additionally, NATO security guarantees compensate Turkey for a
general lack of nationally owned strategic defense and deterrence capabilities.77 In more recent or
ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, Turkey’s possible interest in countering
Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military operations and arms exports.78
Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions
about the continued use of Turkish bases. Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially
expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be
connected with concerns about Turkey.79 In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey
expert and former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky said that while the
United States should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation
in recent years” justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria,
Romania, and Greece to “hedge its bets.”80

75 Rich Outzen et al., “Five more years for Erdogan. What’s first on his agenda?” Atlantic Council, May 30, 2023.
76 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey, May 13, 2022.
77 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey,” The Nations of NATO: Shaping the Alliance’s Relevance and Cohesion, Thierry Tardy,
ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, p. 97.
78 Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13,
2022; Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” Business Insider, October 22, 2020.
79 “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020; Joseph
Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” The
Drive, January 14, 2019.
80 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and
Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy,
the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-
challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/.
Congressional Research Service

13

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Figure 3. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Created by CRS using data gathered from the Department of Defense, NATO, and various media
outlets since 2011.
Note: All locations are approximate.
Russia
Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made
a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could
be motivated by a combination of factors, including Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the
West, economic opportunism, and chances to increase its regional influence at Russia’s expense.
Turkey also has moved closer to a number of countries surrounding Russia—including Ukraine
and Poland—likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power.81 Turkey continues to
rely on Russia for around 40% of its natural gas imports,82 but it may gradually reduce this
dependence as it begins deliveries from a domestic offshore field in the Black Sea and increases
liquefied natural gas imports from other countries.83

81 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12,
2022; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022.
82 Megan Byrne and James Cockayne, “Turkey Gas Imports: Russia Still Dominant,” MEES, March 3, 2023.
83 “Erdogan offers free gas pre-election after first Black Sea field shipment,” Reuters; Rafiq Latta, “Turkey Pivots
Away from Russia, Towards LNG,” Energy Intelligence Group, June 1, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

14

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and Turkish Mediation Efforts
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its
relations with the two countries, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s links with
Russia—especially its 2019 acquisition of a Russian S-400 system—have fueled major U.S.-
Turkey tensions, triggering sanctions and reported congressional holds on arms sales (discussed
below). However, following the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests
in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—appear to have
converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in
parallel with other NATO countries.84 In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion, closing the
Straits to belligerent warships, opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including
Crimea), and serving as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe,85 Turkey has supplied Ukraine
with various types of military equipment—including armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant
ambush-resistant (MRAP) vehicles86—as well as humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, Turkey’s
leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and
this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate
the conflict (discussed below).
In January 2023, a media outlet reported that Turkey began transferring some dual-purpose
improved conventional munitions (or DPICMs, which are artillery-fired cluster munitions) to
Ukraine in November 2022. The report cited various observers debating the potential battlefield
impact and humanitarian implications of the weapon’s use.87 Turkish and Ukrainian officials have
denied that any such transfers have occurred.88
Turkey-Ukraine Defense Cooperation
Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014.89 In 2017, a
Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in
the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their
respective defense industries.90 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer
cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.91
In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion
of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives.92 Turkish expertise
with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing

84 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall
Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022.
85 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability,” February 20, 2023.
86 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,” Defense News, August
22, 2022; Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, “The Stalwart Ally: Türkiye’s Arms Deliveries to Ukraine,” Oryx,
November 21, 2022.
87 Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,” Foreign Policy,
January 10, 2023.
88 Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,” Middle East Eye, January
14, 2023.
89 For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and
U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt.
90 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017.
91 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw,
“Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022.
92 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.”
Congressional Research Service

15

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

aerospace engines and missiles.93 As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several
Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,94 and some reports have suggested that the
manufacturer has delivered additional TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.95 Additionally,
Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.96
Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate
access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of
contention. In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with
Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that partly
alleviated global supply concerns.97 Under the deal, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. sent
representatives to a joint coordination center in Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect
ships to prevent weapons smuggling.98 The arrangement lapsed in July 2023, and Russia has
demanded the lifting of Western sanctions that impede Russian fertilizer exports before it would
return to the deal.99 Turkish officials are engaging in efforts to revive the arrangement, and
Erdogan has said that Western countries bear significant responsibility for its resolution.100
Turkish leaders have dismissed a potential alternative—a proposal by Ukraine to ship its grain to
world markets via Romanian, Bulgarian, and Turkish waters—as “far fetched” and likely to
endanger security.101
Also in July 2023, Turkey allowed five previously captured Ukrainian military officers to return
to Ukraine, triggering protests from Russia. Russian officials claim that under a Turkish-brokered
prisoner exchange deal, Turkey had agreed not to return the Ukrainians until the end of the
Russia-Ukraine war.
Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation
Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from
the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy
cooperation with Russia.102 The Turkish government has not joined economic sanctions against
Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights.

93 Ibid.
94 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4,
2022.
95 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” Forbes, May 10, 2022. The TB2’s
main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 million factory in Ukraine that could be in position
within about three years to manufacture the full range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production
capacity. Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” Wall Street Journal, November 7,
2022.
96 Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Janes
Navy International, October 3, 2022.
97 “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply,” Associated Press, July 22,
2022.
98 See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background.
99 For background on Russian demands, see “Explainer: Have Western sanctions on Russia impacted its fertiliser
exports?” Reuters, May 11, 2023.
100 Ezgi Akin, “Erdogan: Revival of Russia-Ukraine grain deal hinges on West,” Al-Monitor, August 8, 2023.
101 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey's Fidan says no solution without Russia to grain deal impasse,” Al-Monitor, July 21, 2023.
102 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” New York Times,
December 10, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

16

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to bolster Turkey-Russia
cooperation across economic sectors.103 In April 2023, they participated in an event to begin
operations at Turkey’s first nuclear power plant (at Akkuyu on its Mediterranean coast), which
was built by Russian state-owned company Rosatom. The plant is scheduled to start domestic
electricity production in 2025.104 Several months before operations began at Akkuyu, Rosatom
had reportedly wired up to $15 billion to a Turkish subsidiary involved in the project, possibly in
part to help Turkey maintain foreign exchange reserves during its currency crisis.105
Some of Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to Western secondary sanctions
against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. During a February 2023 trip to Turkey
and the United Arab Emirates to emphasize U.S. concerns about the dangers of “dark money
flowing through their financial systems,” Brian Nelson, Under Secretary of the Treasury for
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, delivered the following remarks to leaders of Turkish
financial institutions:
We of course recognize Türkiye’s reliance on Russian energy imports and trade in
agricultural goods, and continue to work to mitigate adverse impacts to these economic
activities.
However, the marked rise over the past year in non-essential Turkish exports or re-exports
to Russia makes the Turkish private sector particularly vulnerable to reputational and
sanctions risks. This is being driven by Moscow....
In engaging with sanctioned Russian entities, Turkish businesses and banks could put
themselves at risk of sanctions and a potential loss of access to G7 markets and
correspondent relationships.
Turkish businesses and banks should also take extra precaution to avoid transactions
related to potential dual-use technology transfers that could be used by the Russian
military-industrial complex.106
Some Turkish banks and companies appear to be limiting or considering limits on certain types of
transactions and services with Russian businesses.107 In February 2023, Turkey’s then Foreign
Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu denied that Turkish businesses were exporting electronic or
technological products with potential defense applications to Russia, but publicly welcomed
information sharing with U.S. and EU counterparts to ensure that businesses do not use Turkey to
bypass Western sanctions.108 Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs on
sanctioned goods transiting its territory to Russia.109 In April 2023, the Department of the

103 “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” Agence France Presse, August 5,
2022.
104 “Putin hails Turkey ties as first Turkish nuclear plant inaugurated,” Reuters, April 27, 2023.
105 Ragip Soylu, “Russia plans to buy Turkish treasury bonds via Akkuyu nuclear plant $6bn loan deal,” Middle East
Eye, July 30, 2022.
106 Department of the Treasury, “Remarks by U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson in Türkiye,” February 3, 2023. See also Jared Malsin, “Turkish Exports Aid
Moscow’s War Effort,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2023; Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Presses Its Partners to Weed Out
Illicit Trade with Moscow,” New York Times, February 5, 2023.
107 Jonathan Spicer, “U.S. warns Turkey on exports seen to boost Russia’s war effort,” Reuters, February 4, 2023.
108 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability.”
109 “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, US to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

17

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Treasury placed sanctions on two Turkey-based companies and associated persons for assisting
Russia or Russian entities.110
NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland
Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it
for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies
requires the unanimous agreement of existing members.
The Turkish objections centered on claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or harbored
sympathies for groups that Turkey’s government deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the
Fethullah Gulen movement111 (which the government has blamed for involvement in the 2016
failed coup) and the PKK.112 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a terrorist
group, but not the Gulen movement.) Turkey demanded that Sweden and Finland lift the
suspension of arms sales they had maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria
against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG)
that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.113 Turkey removed its objections
to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June
2022 memorandum between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the trilateral memorandum, the
three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further,
Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work
against the PKK.114
After the accession process began for Sweden and Finland, Turkey continued to press them to
extradite people that Turkey considers to be terrorists, though Turkish officials said they were
more concerned about terrorism-related activities in Sweden than in Finland. Under the June 2022
trilateral memorandum, Sweden and Finland agreed to address Turkey’s pending deportation or
extradition requests in various ways, but did not commit to specific outcomes in those cases.115
Various sources, including Sweden’s prime minister, have indicated that neither Sweden nor
Finland would be inclined to make political decisions on extradition that contravene domestic
judicial findings conducted under due process and the rule of law.116

110 Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Russian Financial Facilitators and Sanctions Evaders Around the
World,” April 12, 2023.
111 For more information on Gulen and the movement, see archived CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey,
and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
112 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Al-Monitor, May 17,
2022.
113 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2021, Syria; Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux”; Barak
Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016.
114 Memorandum text available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/220628-trilat-
memo.pdf.
115 Ibid.
116 Steven Erlanger, “Sweden Says Turkey Terms on NATO Bid Go Too Far,” New York Times, January 10, 2023; Ben
Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Just
Security, October 28, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

18

link to page 27 link to page 27 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

In line with Turkish official statements differentiating Finland from Sweden, Turkey’s parliament
approved Finland’s NATO application in March 2023.117 Finland formally joined the alliance in
April.
Sweden’s application to join NATO remains pending as of August, with Turkey and Hungary the
only alliance members not to have approved it. During a May 30 visit to Sweden, Secretary of
State Antony Blinken said that the accession process has moved rapidly in historic terms, and that
Turkey “has rightly focused attention on some of its security concerns that both Sweden and
Finland have taken remarkable steps to address, important ones.... From the perspective of the
United States, the time is now to finalize Sweden’s accession.”118 Blinken also said that while the
Biden Administration is not linking the Administration’s proposed F-16 sale to Turkey with
Sweden’s NATO accession, some Members of Congress are (see “Possible F-16 Sale and
Congressional Views” below).119
After new Swedish anti-terrorism legislation came into effect in June, and two court rulings that
anticipate some extradition to Turkey,120 President Erdogan agreed on July 10 to send the NATO
accession protocol for Sweden to Turkey’s parliament and work closely with it to “ensure
ratification.”121 President Biden and other U.S. officials welcomed Erdogan’s commitment.
Erdogan later clarified that Turkey’s parliament might not consider Swedish accession until
October (after its summer recess), and that he expected Sweden to provide a roadmap of steps it
will take to implement the 2022 trilateral memorandum before sending the accession protocol to
parliament.122 Based on statements from Erdogan and other reports, Turkey might also seek the
following before its parliament considers Sweden’s NATO application:
• At least some assurance of congressional approval of the potential F-16 sale.123
• The lifting of some implicit arms trade restrictions by NATO countries.124
• Increased support among EU countries to expand Turkey’s customs union with
the EU and provide Turkish citizens with visa-free travel to EU countries.125
Syria126
Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly
and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.127 Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war have evolved

117 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey ratifies Finland’s NATO membership,” Al-Monitor, March 30, 2023.
118 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press
Availability.”
119 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson at a Joint Press
Availability.”
120 “With NATO membership in mind, Sweden hands over Turkish man convicted of drug offenses at home,”
Associated Press, June 12, 2023; “NATO applicant Sweden jails Kurdish man for attempting to finance PKK
militants,” Agence France Presse, July 6, 2023.
121 NATO, “Press statement following the meeting between Türkiye, Sweden, and the NATO Secretary General,” July
10, 2023.
122 “Erdogan to put Sweden’s NATO ratification to Turkish parliament in autumn,” Reuters, July 12, 2023.
123 Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Turkey’s F-16s in doubt after Erdogan says no Sweden vote before October,” Al-Monitor,
July 12, 2023.
124 “Exclusive: Canada unfreezes talks with Turkey on export controls after NATO move,” Reuters, July 13, 2023.
125 Ibid.
126 See CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Carla E. Humud.
127 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the
Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017.
Congressional Research Service

19

link to page 25 link to page 22 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

during the course of the conflict. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it
has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad)
since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have
engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where
U.S. forces have been based.
Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from
establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government
considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major
threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the
PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.128 The
YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group
including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner
against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas
of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border
area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.129 Turkey has set
up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed
opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army
(SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see Figure 4).

128 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and
YPG,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK
affiliates in Syria), see footnote 113.
129 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Roll Call, October 15, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

20

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Figure 4. Syria Conflict Map

Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in
which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. Since late 2022, senior Turkish officials have held
a number of meetings with Syrian government counterparts in Russia.130 Turkey is seeking
Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border and facilitate the return of some of the
approximately four million Syrian refugees living in Turkey.131 Asad reportedly wants full
Turkish withdrawal in return.132 It is unclear whether the two leaders can compromise and how
that would affect Turkey’s relationship with the SNA and the overall dynamic with other
stakeholders in northern Syria. In response to a question about potential Turkey-Syria
rapprochement, the State Department spokesperson said in January 2023 that U.S. officials have
advised allies against normalizing or upgrading relations with the Asad regime.133

130 “Moscow hosts more Turkey-Syria rapprochement talks,” Associated Press, April 25, 2023.
131 For background on the refugees, see, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations.
132 “Syria resisting Russia’s efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” Reuters, December 5, 2022.
133 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

21

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

In 2023, Turkish forces have undertaken drone and artillery strikes against targets they deem to be
part of or affiliated with the PKK in Syria and Iraq.134 These strikes highlight persistent
challenges that Turkey, various Kurdish groups, other militias, the United States, Russia, Iran, and
the Asad regime face in tensions associated with:
• control over key border areas of northern Syria and Iraq,
• the nature of the SDF and its continuing partnership with the United States
against the Islamic State,
• the potential for negative spillover effects into Turkey, and
• efforts toward lasting political outcomes relevant to the humanitarian needs and
human rights of affected populations.
U.S.-Turkey Arms Sales Issues
How Turkey procures key weapons systems is relevant to U.S. policy in part because it affects
Turkey’s partnerships with major powers and the country’s role within NATO. For decades,
Turkey has relied on certain U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and
other munitions to maintain military strength.135
Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program,
U.S. Sanctions, and Congressional Holds
Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia
delivered in 2019,136 has significant implications for Turkey’s relations with Russia, the United
States, and other NATO countries. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration
removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions
under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on
Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.137 In explaining the U.S. decision to
remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, the Defense Department rejected the idea of
Turkey fielding a Russian intelligence collection platform (housed within the S-400) that could
detect the stealth capabilities of F-35s in Turkey.138 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the transfer of F-35s to
Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-
400. Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have made the

134 Amberin Zaman, “US, Russia mum as Turkey escalates attacks against Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq,” Al-
Monitor, July 31, 2023.
135 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany
(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).
136 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source,
Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a
second system to come later.
137 Archived CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; State Department, “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition
of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” December 14, 2020. Sanctions were not imposed on other
Turkish ministries or agencies that might independently conduct defense-related transactions.
138 Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting
Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

22

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

system generally operational. Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 in order to
have CAATSA sanctions removed.
An August 2020 article reported that some congressional committee leaders placed holds on
major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. The
executive branch customarily defers to such holds, though they are not legally binding.139 Such a
disruption to U.S. defense transactions with Turkey had not occurred since the 1975-1978
embargo over Cyprus.140
Possible F-16 Sale and Congressional Views
Background (Including Turkey-Greece Issues)
In the fall of 2021, Turkish officials stated that they had requested to purchase 40 new F-16
fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.141
President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20
meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation
and notification process with Congress.142 Upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72
Viper configuration could include a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and
structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.143
After Russia’s early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s potential to boost NATO’s strategic and
military strengths amid an evolving European security crisis may have increased the
Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey. While Turkey
has acted more independently of the West under Erdogan, its sizable military and geographic
location remains important for the alliance.144 Turkey partners in a number of ways with the
United States and its other allies—including by using F-16s in NATO missions based in the Baltic
and Mediterranean Sea regions.145
Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022
letter,146 a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an
important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”147 While acknowledging that any sale
would require congressional notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that

139 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
140 Valerie Insinna et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News,
August 12, 2020.
141 For information on Turkey’s F-16s, see “Turkey – Air Force,” Janes World Air Forces, June 23, 2021 (posted
November 7, 2022); “Turkey” at https://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html.
142 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego
Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For
background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
143 See description at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/aero/documents/F-16/22-
06570_F-16-Viper-6Panel_Digital.pdf.
144 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey.
145 Ibid.; “U.S. Relations with Turkey (Türkiye),” Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, January 9, 2023; Kasapoglu,
“Turkey,” The Nations of NATO, pp. 103-105; Gareth Jennings, “Turkey joins NATO Baltic Air Policing for first time
since 2006,” Janes Defence Weekly, July 7, 2021; NATO Allied Air Command, “Turkish E-7T Provides Airborne
Command and Control for Exercise Ramstein Alloy,” April 14, 2022.
146 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/
20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf.
147 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says
potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

23

link to page 31 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well
as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate
U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”148
The modernization of much of Turkey’s F-16 fleet could give Turkey time to acquire or design a
more advanced fighter,149 though delivery of new F-16s could face a production backlog.150
According to Lockheed Martin, the F-16 production rate at the Greenville, South Carolina plant is
four aircraft per month, though it plans to increase this rate with a growing list of buyers.151 Other
countries receiving or possibly receiving new or upgraded F-16Vs include Greece, Taiwan,
Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.152
Assuming the parties finalize contracts for Jordan and Bulgaria, Lockheed will have a backlog of
148 aircraft.153 Based on current production rates, it could take three years or more for Turkey to
start accepting delivery of new F-16Vs.
If unable to upgrade their F-16 fleet, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider
purchasing Western European alternatives.154 Turkey is reportedly exploring Eurofighter
Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s,155 but it is unclear if consortium partner Germany
would approve such a sale.156 Additionally, Turkey’s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a
non-F-16 platform.157 Moreover, European weapons transfers to Turkey could be subject to the
congressional review process described below if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin
defense articles meeting the specified notification threshold.158 Previously, Congress received
notification in connection with some non-NATO countries’ (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar)
proposed purchases of U.S. equipment for Typhoons.159 If Turkey cannot procure F-16s and
encounters obstacles to European alternatives, its next steps toward preserving its military

148 Ibid.
149 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9,
2022. Turkey does have a limited ability to make modifications to some of its F-16s. It has reportedly been working
with various Turkish domestic contractors to upgrade the avionics in the country’s 36 Block 30 aircraft. It cannot
domestically upgrade the avionics of its other F-16s—thus explaining its interest in a purchase from the United
States—because it only has source codes for Block 30 versions. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Locally made AESA radar to
extend life of Turkish F-16 jets,” Defense News, November 17, 2022; Gastón Dubois, “Project ÖZGÜR: Turkey starts
modernizing its F-16 with indigenous technology,” Aviacionline, June 3, 2022.
150 Bryant Harris and Stephen Losey, “Turkey F-16 sale in congressional limbo amid Lockheed backlog,” Defense
News, January 18, 2023.
151 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A, provided to CRS on February 23, 2023.
152 Ibid.; Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November
22, 2021.
153 Lockheed Martin: F-16 Production Q&A.
154 Paul Iddon, “Turkey Questions the Wisdom of Having an All-American Air Force,” Forbes, February 6, 2023.
155 Ragip Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines,” Middle East Eye,
January 20, 2023.
156 Tanmay Kadam, “Can Russian Su-35 Fighters Triumph Eurofighter Typhoons as Turkey Explores Alternative to
‘Backlog-Ridden’ F-16 Jets?” EurAsian Times, January 29, 2023.
157 Soylu, “Turkey exploring massive UK arms deal involving planes, ships and tank engines.”
158 See footnote 180.
159 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Transmittal 08-101, September 26, 2008 (73 Federal Register
61399, October 16, 2008); State Department Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Transmittal 17-079, May
24, 2019 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DSCA Transmittal 20-11, November 4, 2021; DDTC
Transmittal 18-014, November 2, 2018 (84 Federal Register 65608, November 27, 2019); DDTC Transmittal 20-074,
September 2, 2021 (86 Federal Register 73075, December 23, 2021).
Congressional Research Service

24

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

aviation capabilities and NATO interoperability would be unclear. The State Department’s ICS for
Turkey states
If NATO and the West continue to not support Turkey’s pursuit of defense modernization,
Turkey may be forced to turn to Russia or China to fulfil those defense capability gaps in
areas where its indigenous defense industry cannot produce the required capability.160
At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-
Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President
Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as
well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.161 However,
SFRC Chairman Bob Menendez has consistently expressed disapproval due to what he has
termed Erdogan’s “abuses across the region.”162
In addition to ongoing U.S.-Turkey tensions regarding Syrian Kurdish groups in northern Syria,
Turkey-Greece disputes regarding overflights of contested areas and other long-standing Aegean
Sea issues (referenced in the text box below) spiked in 2022 and attracted close congressional
attention.163 Erdogan suspended dialogue with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis after
Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a
May 2022 joint session of Congress.164 In December, the final version of the FY2023 NDAA (P.L.
117-263) excluded a House-passed condition on F-16 sales to Turkey (Section 1271 of H.R.
7900) related to potential overflights of Greek territory. However, the joint explanatory statement
accompanying the NDAA included a provision stating, “We believe that North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial overflights of another
NATO ally’s airspace.”165
While Turkey-Greece disputes persist, tensions somewhat subsided in early 2023 when Erdogan
and Mitsotakis renewed contacts in the context of positive diplomatic momentum from Greek
post-earthquake relief assistance to Turkey.166 At the July 2023 NATO summit in Lithuania, the
two leaders met and agreed to build on this momentum with a high-level bilateral meeting in
Greece this fall.
With U.S. officials already having notified a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece to Congress in
2017,167 U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for
the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three
countries.168 In the past three years, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations

160 State Department, Integrated Country Strategy: Turkey.
161 “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” Reuters, June 30, 2022.
162 Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/
status/1600519759493304321.
163 Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,” Greece and Turkey in Conflict and
Cooperation, New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek
Relations in Light of Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, June 8, 2022.
164 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S.
Congress,” May 17, 2022. Erdogan and Mitsotakis have spoken in the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, in the
context of Greek assistance in relief and recovery efforts.
165 Joint explanatory statement available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20221205/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-
RCP117-70-JES.pdf.
166 “Turkey, Greece take strides in Ankara meeting as aid diplomacy continues,” Al-Monitor, March 22, 2023.
167 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Government of Greece – Upgrade of F-16 Aircraft to F-16 Block V
Configuration,” Transmittal No. 17-54, October 17, 2017.
168 Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30,
2022.
Congressional Research Service

25

link to page 35 link to page 36 Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.169
Enhanced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation has included an expanded U.S. military presence and
increased U.S.-Greece and NATO military activities at Greek installations (see also text box
below).170
Turkey-Greece-Cyprus Tensions: Background and Some Ongoing Issues171
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader
Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, bringing the sides close to military conflict on
several occasions. The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around
contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones
(including energy claims), islands (and their use for military purposes), and continental shelves (see Figure A-2
and Figure A-3 for maps of some of the areas in dispute).
These tensions are related to and further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de
facto political division of Cyprus along ethnic lines that dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces
invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece. The
internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (sometimes referred to as Cyprus), which has close ties to Greece,
claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-
thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are
backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.172 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot
leaders proclaimed this part of the island the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” although no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot claim
to be legally invalid.
Turkish officials have complained about a significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of
Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.173 U.S. officials have
explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region as
part of a broader NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.174 In the March 2022 congressional hearing
testimony mentioned above, Alan Makovsky said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass
logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.175 After
Turkey’s then Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer was
maintaining a balanced approach in the Aegean,176 U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement
saying that there has been no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’
col ective efforts are focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.177

169 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations.
170 State Department, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece,” October 31, 2022.
171 See CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations.
172 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot
soldiers). This presence is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between
50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February
3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a
buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000
personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
173 Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American
Military,” New York Times, August 19, 2022.
174 Ibid.; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense
Minister,” July 18, 2022.
175 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining
U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.”
176 “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” Kathimerini, October 21, 2022.
177 Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/
1582273449145212928.
Congressional Research Service

26

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Notification Process
Informal Notification and Review
In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed the Biden
Administration’s support for and engagement with Congress on a possible sale of F-16 fighter
aircraft to Turkey.178 One month earlier, media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—reported
that the Administration had provided informal notifications to Congress about possible F-16 sales
for Turkey and possible sales of up to 40 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece. According to these
reports, the January informal notification on Turkey was for 40 new F-16 Vipers and 79 F-16
Viper upgrade packages, along with 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total
value of $20 billion.179
After the State Department informally notifies the SFRC and House Foreign Affairs Committee
(HFAC) of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) or Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) of major
defense equipment, articles, and/or services meeting certain value thresholds, the proposed FMS
or DCS requires formal notification to Congress before it can proceed. In most cases, the State
Department submits the formal notification 20 to 40 days after informal notification.180 This time
period gives the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential “tiered review”
process. If a Member of Congress places a hold (as mentioned earlier, not legally binding) on the
proposed transaction, formal notification usually does not proceed.181 Under provisions of the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320), the executive branch can proceed
with a sale—if not blocked by legislation—15 days (for NATO allies like Turkey and Greece)
after formal notification.182
As mentioned above, congressional consideration of the potential F-16 sale to Turkey may
depend at least to some degree on Turkey’s approval of NATO accession for both Sweden and
Finland.183 With Turkey already having approved Finland’s NATO membership, the U.S. focus
has turned to Turkey’s approach to Sweden’s situation. Shortly after the reported informal
notifications of possible aircraft sales to Greece and Turkey, the New York Times cited Chairman
Menendez as welcoming the F-35 sale to Greece while strongly opposing the F-16 sale to Turkey.
Regarding the F-16 sale, he said
President Erdogan continues to undermine international law, disregard human rights and
democratic norms, and engage in alarming and destabilizing behavior in Turkey and

178 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu at a Joint Press
Availability.”
179 “US working with Congress towards Turkey F-16 sale,” Al-Monitor, January 13, 2023; Malsin and Salama, “Biden
Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “U.S. Plan to
Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition,” New York Times, January 14, 2023.
180 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. The thresholds for NATO
allies (and Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand) are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or
upgrading of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and
defense services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services. For all
other countries, the thresholds are $14 million, $50 million, and $200 million, respectively.
181 CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
182 Ibid.; CRS In Focus IF11533, Modifying or Ending Sales of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles, by Paul K. Kerr and
Liana W. Rosen.
183 Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February
2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if
accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks
Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter
from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

27

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

against neighboring NATO allies. Until Erdogan ceases his threats, improves his human
rights record at home—including by releasing journalists and political opposition—and
begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.184
In a March SFRC hearing featuring Secretary Blinken, Chairman Menendez elaborated on
objections he had against various Turkish foreign and domestic policies, and opined that Turkey
does not deserve to receive F-16s unless it addresses some of the issues he mentioned.185
The Administration’s reported informal notifications of potential sales to Turkey and Greece
come amid ongoing tensions between the two countries over maritime boundaries and U.S.
regional involvement (as mentioned above).186 By harmonizing the informal notification on F-35s
for Greece with the one on F-16s for Turkey, the Administration may be seeking to reassure
Greek leaders and popular opinion that the United States is not favoring Turkey over Greece.187
One journalist has argued
A Greek acquisition of F-35s—coupled with the ongoing procurement of two dozen 4.5-
generation Dassault Rafale F3R fighters from France and the upgrade of the bulk of its F-
16 fleet to the most advanced Block 72 configuration—will give the Hellenic Air Force a
technological edge over its much larger Turkish counterpart. That will remain the case even
if Turkey secures this F-16 deal.188
In response to the news of a possible F-35 sale to Greece, then Turkish Foreign Minister
Cavusoglu called on the United States to “pay attention” to the balance of power in the region.189
Developments After Turkey’s May 2023 Elections
Following the end of Turkey’s May 2023 election cycle, congressional committee leaders’
concerns regarding a possible F-16 sale may have softened somewhat. In April 2023, these
leaders apparently acquiesced to the Administration providing formal notification of a possible
sale of avionics that Turkey had requested in 2019 to increase the NATO interoperability of its F-
16s (on certain information sharing and flight safety issues).190 A few days before President
Erdogan’s reelection, HFAC Chairman Michael McCaul was cited as saying that he believes he
and the other three Members who oversee major possible arms sales (SFRC Chairman Menendez
and Ranking Member Jim Risch, and HFAC Ranking Member Gregory Meeks) “will approve the
transfer once Turkey ratifies Sweden’s membership in NATO, and after recent approvals for
Greece to buy U.S.-made F-35 warplanes and to get upgrades to its F-16s.”191 McCaul also said,
“We’ve been assured that after the [Turkish] election, regardless of the winner, that Sweden will

184 Crowley and Wong, “U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.” Alexander Ward et al.,
“Menendez vows to block plan to sell fighter jets to Turkey,” Politico, January 13, 2023.
185 SFRC Hearing, March 22, 2023, transcript available at https://plus.cq.com/alertmatch/558656174?0&deliveryId=
105309916&uid=congressionaltranscripts-7694906.
186 CRS Report R41368, Turkey (Türkiye): Background and U.S. Relations.
187 Malsin and Salama, “Biden Administration to Ask Congress to Approve F-16 Sale to Turkey”; Crowley and Wong,
“U.S. Plan to Sell Fighter Jets to Turkey Is Met with Opposition.”
188 Paul Iddon, “Balance of Power: Why the Biden Administration Wants to Sell Turkey F-16s and Greece F-35s,”
Forbes, January 16, 2023.
189 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish FM travels to Washington seeking to seal deal for F-16 fighter jets,” Al-Monitor, January
17, 2023.
190 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Türkiye – F-16 Avionics Upgrade,” Transmittal No. 21-34, April 17, 2023;
CRS correspondence with Turkish official, April 17, 2023; “Menendez reiterates opposition to sale of F-16 fighters to
Turkey,” Kathimerini, April 22, 2023.
191 Joe Gould et al., “McCaul open to selling F-16s to Turkey—even if Erdoğan wins,” Politico, May 25, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

28

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

be recognized as a NATO ally.”192 As of June, these four Members have reportedly expressed
support for the Administration to provide formal notification to Congress of the potential F-35
sale to Greece.193
After Erdogan’s victory in May, President Biden said that Erdogan “wants to work on something
on the F-16s. I told him we wanted a deal with Sweden, so let’s get that done.”194 Chairman
Menendez has said that Sweden might be the “whole equation” for some Members of
Congress,195 but is only “part of the equation” for him.196 He suggested in May that if Turkey
approves Sweden’s NATO membership and ends “belligerence” toward Greece and perhaps other
neighbors such as Armenia, as manifested by “substantive commitments and various indications
that would actually take place, there’s a path forward—at least for me.”197
After Erdogan agreed in July to send Sweden’s accession protocol to Turkey’s parliament and
work toward its ratification, National Security Advisor Sullivan said that the Administration
would move forward with the F-16 sale in consultation with Congress.198 Menendez called for
additional assurances from the Administration to enhance Greece’s security in the region before
approving the sale.199 While stopping short of expressing assent to the sale, Risch, McCaul, and
Meeks voiced general optimism on a path forward, with Meeks saying that Turkey cannot resume
its violations of Greek airspace.200 Erdogan said on July 12 that Turkish F-16s have never been
used against Greece and “we do not plan on using them.”201
The Administration may consider whether, when, and how to address congressional concerns,
and/or move forward with a formal notification of the sale.

192 Gould et al.
193 “F-35 deal comes closer within Greece’s reach,” Kathimerini, June 1, 2023.
194 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before Marine One Departure,” May 29, 2023.
195 Several Senators from both parties, including SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who wrote a February
2023 letter to President Biden, have indicated that they may only consider supporting an F-16 sale to Turkey if
accession moves forward for both Sweden and Finland. Marc Rod, “Turkey risks ‘serious consequences’ if it blocks
Sweden, Finland NATO accession, Risch warns,” Jewish Insider, February 6, 2023; Text of February 2, 2023 letter
from 29 Senators to President Biden available at https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/turkiye_f16s3.pdf.
196 “Senior US lawmaker wants change from Turkey before F-16 sale approval,” Reuters, May 30, 2023.
197 Ibid.; “Bob Menendez still opposes sending F-16 jets to Turkey, even as Washington and Ankara negotiate on the
matter,” Politico Congress Minutes, May 31, 2023; Gould et al.
198 Nazlan Ertan, “US to advance Turkey’s F-16 sales as Sweden’s NATO bid moves forward,” Al-Monitor, July 11,
2023.
199 David Sivak, “Bob Menendez says there ‘may be a pathway’ for sale of F-16s to Turkey,” Washington Examiner,
July 11, 2023.
200 Joe Gould, “F-16s for Turkey aren’t a done deal until these lawmakers say it’s OK,” Politico, July 11, 2023. On July
8, six Representatives sent a letter to Secretary Blinken requesting that any U.S.-Turkey sales agreement for F-16s
include “mechanisms that provide for the pause, delay, or snapback of the transfer of American weapons to Turkey if it
resumes its destabilizing actions in the Eastern Mediterranean that threaten or undermine U.S. national security
interests or NATO security architecture.” Text of letter available at https://pappas.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/
pappas.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/07.08.23-letter-to-secretary-blinken-on-turkey-f-16-sale-snapback-
mechanisms.pdf.
201 “Erdogan claims F-16s have not been used against Greece, no plans to do so,” Kathimerini, July 12, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

29

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Appendix A. Maps
Figure A-1. Map of Black Sea Region and Turkish Straits

Source: Nikkei Asia, March 2022.

Congressional Research Service

30

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Figure A-2. Some Areas of Aegean Dispute

Source: Greek Reporter, June 2022, at https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-
sovereignty-16-maps/.

Congressional Research Service

31

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Figure A-3. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean

Source: Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS.
Note: As stated elsewhere in this report, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots administering a portion of the island of
Cyprus proclaimed that portion to be the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” though no country other
than Turkey recognizes it, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) considered the Turkish Cypriot
claim to be legally invalid.
Congressional Research Service

32

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Appendix B. Profiles of Selected Turkish Party
Leaders
Recep Tayyip Erdogan—President of Turkey and Leader/Co-Founder of
the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
(pronounced air-doe-wan)
Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on
the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious imam hatip secondary school in Istanbul.
In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a
business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different
Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan.
Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office,
imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious
incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After
Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party
was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP
won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After
the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special
election. After he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister.
Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of
the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to
power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and
won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018. He won another
presidential term in May 2023. Many observers assess that he seeks to consolidate
power and to avoid the reopening of corruption cases that could implicate him and
close family members or associates.
Kemal Kilicdaroglu—Leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP)
(kuhl-utch-dahr-oh-loo)
Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi (religious minority
with some relation to Shia Islam) background. Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP,
which is the main opposition party and traditional political outlet of the Turkish
nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the party has also attracted various liberal and
social democratic constituencies.
After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara,
Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the
director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil
service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to
parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to
root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara.
Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has faced criticism for the CHP’s
failure to make electoral gains at the national level, especial y as Erdogan’s opponent in
the 2023 presidential race. The CHP made notable gains—particularly in Istanbul and
Ankara mayoral races—in 2019 local elections.
Devlet Bahceli—Leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)
(bah-cheh-lee)
Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the
MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for
opposing political accommodation with the Kurds.
Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher
education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a
career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a
leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997
and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He
was initially elected to parliament in 2007.
Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017
constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018.
Congressional Research Service

33

Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Meral Aksener—Founder and Leader of the Good (IYI) Party
(awk-sheh-nar)
Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from
Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party
in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s
alliance with Erdogan.
Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from
Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was
first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior
minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by
a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from

2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker.
Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to
provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum
establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned
vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the
controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its
presidential candidate in the 2018 elections.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R44000 · VERSION 114 · UPDATED
34

Download PDF

Download EPUB

Revision History

Aug. 10, 2023

HTML · PDF

<1% changed

Jul. 18, 2023

HTML · PDF

3% changed

Jun. 6, 2023

HTML · PDF

1% changed