Gangs in Central America

Gangs in Central America

Order Code RS22141
Updated January 11, 2007
Gangs in Central America
Clare M. Ribando
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The 110th Congress is likely to continue to be concerned about the effects of crime
and gang violence in Central America, and its spillover effects on the United States.
Since February 2005, U.S. officials have arrested more than 1,274 members of the
violent Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang, raising concerns about the transnational
activities of Central American gangs. Governments throughout the region are struggling
to find the right combination of suppressive and preventive policies to deal effectively
with the gang problem. Many analysts predict that illicit gang activities will accelerate
illegal immigration, drug smuggling, and trafficking in persons and weapons to the
United States. Some maintain that tough law enforcement approaches will help solve the
gang problem, while others assert that unless the root causes of gang violence —
poverty, joblessness, ineffective judicial systems, easy access to arms, and the social
exclusion of at-risk youth — are addressed in a holistic way, the problem will continue
to escalate. This report will be updated periodically.
Background
Although many Latin American countries are facing serious crime problems
associated with gangs (maras), the largest and most violent gangs in the region operate
in Central America and Mexico. Some analysts believe these gangs could pose a serious
threat to the region’s stability. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are at the epicenter
of the gang crisis, with some of the highest murder rates in the world. In 2004, the
estimated murder rate per 100,000 people was 45.9 in Honduras, 41.2 in El Salvador, and
34.7 in Guatemala. In the United States, the corresponding figure was 5.7. High murder
rates have persisted in 2005 and 2006, with gang-related violence reportedly accounting
for up to 50% of violent crime in each of those countries. Estimates of the number of
gang members in Central America vary widely, but the U.S. Southern Command has
placed that figure at around 70,000. The gangs are involved in human trafficking; drug,
auto, and weapons smuggling; and kidnaping. In the last two years, more than 1,100 gang
members have been arrested in Mexico, many of whom were charging migrant smugglers
to let their groups pass, or working with Mexican drug cartels. MS-13 members are

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reportedly being contracted on an ad-hoc basis by Mexico’s warring cartels to carry out
revenge killings. Regional and U.S. authorities have confirmed gang involvement in
regional drug trafficking. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has found no
credible evidence of a connection between Central American gangs and Al Qaeda or other
terrorist groups.1
Central American Street Gangs. The major gangs operating in Central
America with ties to the United States are the “18th Street” gang (also known as M-18),
and their main rival, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). The 18th Street gang was formed by
Mexican youth in the Rampart section of Los Angeles in the 1960s who were not accepted
into existing Hispanic gangs. It was the first Hispanic gang to accept members from all
races and to recruit members from other states. MS-13 was created during the 1980s by
Salvadorans in Los Angeles who had fled the country’s civil conflict. Although FBI
officials have described MS-13 as a loosely structured street gang, it is expanding
geographically throughout the region and becoming more organized and sophisticated.
U.S. government figures place the total number of MS-13 and 18th Street gang members
in the United States at roughly 38,000.2
Factors Contributing to the Gang Problem. Several factors have contributed
to the problem of gang violence in Central America. Scholars have identified income
inequality as the strongest predictor of violent crime rates.3 Central American countries
(aside from Costa Rica) have some of the highest income inequality indices in the world.
Some scholars have noted that, particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala, the enduring
effects of prolonged civil conflicts, including the widespread proliferation of firearms and
explosives since those conflicts ended, have contributed to the gang problem. Other
factors that may worsen gang violence in many countries include extreme poverty;
families broken up by violence or migration; growing youth populations facing stagnant
job markets; and an absence of political will to fight crime in a holistic manner.
Some analysts argue that U.S. immigration policy has exacerbated the gang problem
in Central America. By the mid-1990s, the civil conflicts in Central America had ended
and the United States began deporting undocumented immigrants, many with criminal
convictions, back to the region. Between 2000 and 2004, an estimated 20,000 criminals
were sent back to Central America. Others, especially organizations working directly
with gang members, have asserted that social exclusion and a lack of educational and job
opportunities for at-risk youth are perpetuating the gang problem. They assert that
offender reentry is a major problem, as tattooed former gang members, especially
returning deportees from the United States who are often native English speakers, have
difficulty finding gainful employment. Some have also noted that sensationalist media
1 Sources include “Criminal Gangs in the Americas,” Economist, January 5, 2006; “Gangs
Undermine Security, Democracy,” Miami Herald, March 30, 2006; “Marked Men,” Dallas
Morning News, October 29; 2006; Testimony of General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander, U.S.
Southern Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 15, 2005.
2 Arian Campo-Flores, “The Most Dangerous Gang in America,” Newsweek, March 28, 2005;
USAID, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, April 2006. Available at
[http://www2.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/democracy/gangs.html].
3 D. Ledermann et al., “Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World,” World
Bank, October 1998.

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coverage of gang violence in the region may have inadvertently enhanced the reputation
of the gangs portrayed. Finally, a recent study by a human rights group argues that, rather
than ameliorating the gang problem, the repressive policing techniques adopted by many
Central American governments have partly contributed to the gangs “becoming more
organized and more violent.”4
Country and Regional Responses to the Gang Problem
Most gang activity in Central America has occurred in El Salvador, Honduras, and
Guatemala. Honduras and El Salvador have enacted aggressive anti-gang laws, whereas
Nicaragua and Panama — two countries in which the gang problem has yet to pose a
major security threat — have adopted youth crime prevention strategies. The Guatemalan
government, which has yet to enact comprehensive gang legislation, supports both
strengthening law enforcement capacity to combat criminal gangs, and expanding gang
prevention programs. An April 2006 USAID assessment found that current country and
regional efforts to address gangs in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, and
Nicaragua are “fragmented, disjointed and [that they] further underscore the need for
coordinated action and leadership.”
Honduras. In 2003, Honduras passed tough anti-gang legislation that established
stiff prison sentences for gang membership. While the initial crackdown reduced crime
significantly and was popular with the public, it was opposed by human rights groups
concerned about abuses of gang suspects by vigilante groups and police forces, and its
effects on civil liberties. There has also been ongoing concern about the laws’ effects on
already poor prison conditions. In May 2004, 104 inmates, predominantly gang members,
were killed in a fire in an overcrowded prison. In January 2005, another 13 inmates were
killed at another prison as a result of clashes between rival gangs. President Manuel
Zelaya initially announced measures to use dialogue to convince gang members to give
up violence and re-integrate into society, but has thus far relied on private groups to run
most rehabilitation and offender reentry programs. Zelaya generally prefers to address
gang violence as part of the overall problem of violence in Honduras. His government
funds a small anti-gang office in the National Police, and has used joint police and
military patrols in high-crime areas. Those patrols arrested more than 1,200 gang
members in early September 2006 alone.5
El Salvador. In July 2004, El Salvador’s Congress unanimously approved President
Tony Saca’s Super Mano Dura (“Super Firm Hand”) package of anti-gang reforms
despite vocal criticisms by the United Nations and others that its tough provisions violate
international human rights standards. In 2005, El Salvador’s legislature tightened gun
ownership laws, especially for youths, and President Saca initiated joint military and
police patrols in high-crime areas. The Saca government also began to allocate 20% of
4 Ana Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005;
Mary Helen Johnson, “National Policies and the Rise of Transnational Gangs,” Migration Policy
Institute, April 1, 2006; USAID, April 2006; “Youth Gangs in Central America,” Washington
Office on Latin America, November 2006.
5 President Softens Stance on Gangs,” Miami Herald, April 13, 2006; “Northern Triangle Faces
Serious Security Threats,” Latin American Caribbean and Central American Report, September
19, 2006.

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anti-gang funds for prevention and rehabilitation programs. Despite those efforts, El
Salvador recorded 3,697 murders in 2005, 34% more than in 2004. An estimated 10,000
of 14,000 suspected gang members arrested in 2005 were released for lack of evidence,
revealing weakness in the country’s judicial system. In May 2006, President Saca
identified gangs as the principle cause of El Salvador’s high murder rates. In order to
combat gangs and other violent criminals, he has created a new Ministry of Public
Security and Justice, increased joint military and police patrols, and unveiled a draft law
against organized crime.6
Guatemala. In December 2005, President Oscar Berger announced that he would
deploy joint military and police forces to contain gang-related violent crime. These joint
forces were necessitated by rank depletion within the Guatemalan police, as more than
4,000 officers had been dismissed by the end of 2005 for irregular or criminal activities.
The Guatemalan Congress has approved “organized crime” legislation criminalizing
racketeering and enabling law enforcement to use modern investigative tools such as
wiretaps and undercover operations. Other measures pending before the legislature would
reform the penal code and regulate private security firms. Many analysts maintain that
prison reform must also be addressed as gang warfare in the prison system resulted in 53
inmate deaths in August and September 2005. The Guatemalan interior minister has
recently attributed many of the country’s 5,629 murders in 2006 to inter-gang conflict.
While law enforcement solutions have been the immediate focus of the Berger
government, prevention programs are also being created to assist disadvantaged and
vulnerable youth, especially former gang members. 7
Panama and Nicaragua. Although their efforts have received considerably less
international attention than El Salvador and Honduras, several other Central American
countries have developed a variety of programs to deal with the gang problem. In
September 2004, Panamanian President Martin Torrijos launched Mano Amiga (“Friendly
Hand”), a crime prevention program that provides positive alternatives to gang
membership for at-risk youths. Aimed at children aged 14-17, the government program,
which is supported by a number of domestic and international non-governmental
institutions, seeks to provide access to theater and sports activities for some 10,000
Panamanian youth. Nicaragua has also adopted a national youth crime prevention strategy
that, with the active involvement of the police, focuses on family, school, and community
interventions. Some 550 former gang members have successfully reintegrated back into
society with the assistance of another Nicaraguan government intervention.
Regional Efforts. On June 7, 2005, the OAS passed a resolution to hold
conferences and workshops on the gang issue and to urge member states to support the
creation of holistic solutions to the gang problem. Central American leaders and officials
have regularly met, often accompanied by their U.S. counterparts, to improve ways to
coordinate security and information-sharing on gang members. Presidents Saca of El
Salvador and Oscar Berger of Guatemala agreed to set up a joint security force to patrol
6 “El Salvador: Murder Rate Soars in 2005,” Latinnews Daily, Jan. 4, 2006; “Saca: Pandillas Son
Principales Causantes de Homicidios en El Salvador, Agence France Press, May 15, 2006; “El
Salvador: Crime Busted?” Economist Intelligence Unit, Dec. 18, 2006.
7 “Anti-crime Drives Fail to Contain Rising Violence,” Latin American Weekly Report, December
13, 2005; “Ten Years On, Peace Remains Distant,” Latin News Weekly Report, January 4, 2007.

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gang activity along their common border. Berger and other leaders have also called for
assistance from the United States to create a regional “rapid-reaction force” to tackle drug
traffickers and gangs. Regional law enforcement efforts are already underway. In
September 2005, 6,400 law enforcement officers from the United States, Mexico, and
Central America carried out a coordinated gang raid that resulted in the arrest of 650
suspects.8 In October 2006, the governments of the Central American Integration System
(Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic
proposed legislation to make a local felony into a regional felony and pledged to improve
intelligence-sharing within the region.
U.S. Efforts
Over the past two years, Congress has expressed ongoing concerns about the
problem of transnational gangs. In the 109th Congress, legislation was introduced — S.
853 (Lugar) and H.R. 2672 (Harris), the North American Cooperative Security Act — that
included provisions to increase cooperation among U.S., Mexican, and Central American
officials in the tracking of gang activity and in the handling of deported gang members.
Similar provisions were included in both House and Senate versions of broader
immigration legislation, H.R. 4437 (Sensennbrenner) and S. 2611 (Specter), which were
considered but not enacted.
Several U.S. agencies have been actively engaged on both the law enforcement and
preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs. On the law enforcement side,
the FBI created a special task force focusing on MS-13 in December 2004, and, in April
2005, it opened a liaison office in San Salvador to coordinate regional information-
sharing and anti-gang efforts. The gang task force has introduced new regulations that
would allow U.S. officials to provide information to Central American authorities about
the criminal records of future deportees. In the Department of Homeland Security, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has created a national anti-gang initiative
called “Operation Community Shield” that, in addition to arresting suspected gang
members in the United States, works through its offices overseas to coordinate with
foreign governments that are also experiencing gang problems. Since February 2005, ICE
has arrested more than 1,274 suspected MS-13 members. These law enforcement agencies
have coordinated their efforts with State Department officials responsible for supporting
law enforcement and counter-narcotics programs in Central America.
On the preventive side, USAID worked with the Department of Justice’s
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to create a
community policing program in some 200 municipalities in El Salvador, and is
implementing a similar community crime prevention program in Villa Nueva, Guatemala.
In Guatemala, USAID is funding the creation of a model “youth home” for disadvantaged
youth, including former gang members, and providing educational and employment
opportunities for at-risk youth. In April 2006, USAID published an assessment of the
gang problem and programming initiatives needed to confront its root causes throughout
Central American and Mexico. The assessment found that “donors and local service
providers are absent in neighborhoods that...pose high security risks ... [resulting in] huge
8 “Central America’s Crime Wave Spurs Plan for a Regional Force,” Los Angeles Times, August
16, 2005; “Gang Crackdown Nets 650 Suspects,” Los Angeles Times, September 9, 2005.

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gaps in service provision...”9 USAID and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) are part of the Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence (IACPV).
The IACPV is a multilateral group that has helped municipalities in Central America
develop violence prevention plans, hosted a major conference on gang prevention, and
helped form the Central American Coalition for the Prevention of Youth Violence. The
U.S. State Department has also launched a school-based “culture of lawfulness” program
to help youth resist gangs and drugs. Finally, the IDB is executing significant violence
reduction loans in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In Honduras, a $32 million
IDB loan has provided support for infrastructure, as well as micro-entrepreneurship
training for former gang members.
The National Security Council (NSC) created an inter-agency task force to develop
a comprehensive, three-year strategy to deal with international gang activity. The strategy,
which is now being implemented, states that the U.S. government will pursue coordinated
anti-gang activities in five broad areas: diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity
enhancement, and prevention.
Policy Approaches and Concerns
Most analysts agree with the March 15, 2005 testimony of General Bantz Craddock,
Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, that finding regional solutions to the gang problem is “absolutely essential.”
At the same time, many analysts argue that in order to effectively reduce gang-related
crime, a holistic approach to the problem must be developed that addresses its root social,
political, and economic causes. Analysts disagree, however, as to what mix of preventive
and suppressive policies needs to be put in place in Central America to deal with the
gangs, and what U.S. agency is best equipped to oversee those anti-gang efforts.
Proponents of law enforcement solutions maintain that Central American law
enforcement officials lack the capacity and the resources to target gang leaders effectively,
conduct thorough investigations that lead to successful prosecutions, and share data.
While most U.S. observers argue that the State Department and the FBI should take the
lead in assistance to improve law enforcement capacity, others see a possible role for the
U.S. Southern Command in training regional security forces. Critics of U.S. military
involvement in anti-gang efforts have noted that it is the State Department’s role to
provide security assistance to foreign governments, subject to human rights and
democracy concerns. Other proposals for increased U.S. involvement in police training
are likely to contain significant anti-gang components.
Proponents of prevention assert that USAID and the Inter-American Foundation
(IAF) could take the lead on increasing gang-prevention programs in the region. Both
agencies’ efforts have been hindered in recent years, however, by limited budgets for
development programs. Further, some assert that, regardless of U.S. efforts, gang
prevention programs may not show immediate results, and will require a sustained high-
level commitment by Central American leaders to attack the underlying factors of poverty
and unemployment that have contributed to the rise in gang activity.
9 USAID, April 2006.