Ukraine’s Presidential Elections and U.S. Policy

Ukraine’s Presidential Elections and U.S. Policy

Order Code RS21959
Updated December 1, 2004
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Ukraine’s Presidential Elections
and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report discusses Ukraine’s presidential elections, held on October 31 and
November 21, 2004. The report discusses the election’s importance in Ukraine’s
political transition, the conduct of the elections, and the political crisis that emerged
after the elections. It also addresses U.S. policy on the elections, and congressional
action. This report will be updated as needed. Congress has adopted legislation on the
Ukrainian elections. S.Con.Res.106 and H.Con.Res. 415 call on Ukraine to end
violations of democratic standards and hold free and fair elections. S.Res. 473 also
raises these issues and calls on the President to consider sanctions against Ukrainian
leaders if they improperly influence the outcome of the election. For more background
on Ukraine, see CRS Report RL30984, Ukraine’s Future and U.S. Policy Interests.
Ukraine’s Political Transition
Ukraine may be at a key period in its transition that could shape its geopolitical
orientation for years to come, in part due to presidential elections held on October 31 and
November 21, 2004. Ukraine could move closer to integration in Euro-Atlantic
institutions, real democracy and the rule of law, and a genuine free market economy, or
it could move toward a Russian sphere of influence, with a “managed democracy” and an
oligarchic economy.
Ukraine’s current political scene is dominated by President Leonid Kuchma and the
oligarchic “clans” (regionally-based groups of powerful politicians and businessmen) that
have supported him. Kuchma was elected President in 1994, and re-elected in 1999. He
cannot run for a third term under the Ukrainian constitution. His rule has been
characterized by fitful economic reform (albeit with rapid economic growth in recent
years), widespread corruption, and a deteriorating human rights record. The oligarchs
chose Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, a representative of the powerful Donetsk clan
in eastern Ukraine, as their candidate to succeed Kuchma as President. The chief
opposition candidate, former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, is a pro-reform and pro-
Western figure known for his personal integrity. The current regime reportedly fears that
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Yushchenko could move to clean up corruption if elected, which could expose Kuchma
and other current leaders to criminal prosecution. The oligarchs could also lose property
received through privatizations of dubious legality, some occurring in the weeks and
months leading up to the vote.

President Putin and other Russian leaders have made many statements in support of
Yanukovych, and Russian political consultants associated with the Kremlin are advising
Yanukovych’s campaign. President Putin visited Ukraine before each of the two rounds
of the vote and praised the achievements of Yanukovych’s government. For their part,
Yanukovych and other Ukrainian government leaders have called for closer ties with
Moscow and downplayed the prospects for NATO membership and Euro-Atlantic
integration for the foreseeable future. Yanukovych supporters also used anti-American
themes in their campaign.
In September 2004, Yushchenko accused the authorities of trying to poison him. On
September 6, Yushchenko fell seriously ill, shortly after attending a dinner with the chief
of the Ukrainian security services. After his condition worsened, he was rushed to a
medical clinic in Austria. Doctors were unable to determine the cause of the illness.
Yushchenko soon resumed campaigning, but his health remained fragile.
Election Results
On November 10, after a substantial delay, the Ukrainian Central Election
Commission announced the final results of the first round of the election. According to
the CEC, Yushchenko won 39.87% of the vote, while Yanukovych won 39.32%.
Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz won 5.81%, and Communist Party leader Petro
Symonenko received 4.97% of the vote. The remaining 20 candidates split the remaining
vote. According to Ukrainian law, since no candidate received 50% of the vote, the top
two finishers, Yanukovych and Yushchenko, moved on to a November 21 runoff election.
The distribution of the first round vote broke down sharply along regional lines, with the
more nationally-oriented western and central Ukraine supporting Yushchenko and the
more Russified eastern and southern Ukraine supporting Yanukovych. For example,
Yanukovych won 86.94% in his home region of Donetsk, while Yushchenko received
only 2.94%. In the Lviv region in western Ukraine, Yushchenko won 87.25%, while
Yanukovych won 5.81%. Turnout for the first round was an impressive 74.95%.
International observers from the OSCE criticized the first round of the election,
saying that it fell short of international democratic practices in several respects. The
observers noted problems in the campaign including heavy media bias, use of government
resources on behalf of Yanukovych, and government interference with opposition
campaign events. Observers noted significant problems on election day, including a large
number of names missing from voting rolls and the last-minute barring of some members
of local electoral commissions from their posts. Pointing to exit polls and a parallel vote
count conducted by the opposition, the Yushchenko campaign charged that widespread
government fraud and intimidation of voters and local election officials denied
Yushchenko a large lead over Yanukovych, perhaps even outright victory in the first
round. Despite these concerns, Yushchenko said that he was prepared to go forward with
the second round of voting on November 21.

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On November 24, the Ukrainian Central Election Commission announced that
Yanukovych had won the second round with 49.46% of the vote, with Yushchenko
receiving 46.61%. Turnout for the election was 80.85%. Yushchenko’s supporters
charged that massive fraud had been committed. They pointed to exit polls that showed
a victory for Yushchenko by a comfortable margin, as well as highly improbable turnout
figures in Yanukovych strongholds, including 96.65% in the Donetsk region. The second
round results showed the same regional split as the first round, with Yushchenko winning
overwhelmingly in western and central Ukraine and Yanukovych winning by massive
margins in eastern and southern Ukraine.1
Election observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
again said that the conduct of the runoff was not consistent with democratic standards.
Fraudulent practices noted by international observers included abuse of absentee ballots,
expulsion of opposition representatives from electoral commissions, violence against
media representatives, inaccurate voter lists, and official pressure on students and
government and private sector workers to vote for Yanukovych.2
Ukraine’s Political Crisis
On November 22, after preliminary results favoring Yanukovych were published,
Yushchenko claimed victory in the election, and his supporters warned that they would
launch court challenges, massive, non-violent street protests and other forms of civil
disobedience to overturn the fraudulent result. On November 23, Yushchenko, in a
symbolic move, took the oath of office of the President of Ukraine in the parliament
chamber, while as many as 200,000 Yushchenko supporters demonstrated outside the
building. Tens of thousands attended protests in other Ukrainian cities, mainly in western
Ukraine. The government of the capital, Kiev, as well as the cities of Lviv, Ivano-
Frankivsk, Vynntsia, and Ternopil in western Ukraine announced that they would
recognize only Yushchenko as President.
On November 25, the Ukranian Supreme Court blocked official publication of the
election result, the last step required before the winning candidate can be inaugurated,
pending its consideration of Yushchenko’s fraud charges. On November 27, the
Ukrainian parliament approved a resolution calling the election invalid and passed a vote
of no confidence in the Central Election Commission. Although neither of these votes
is binding on the government, they denote that the pro-regime majority in the parliament
is fragmenting and represent a severe blow against the regime’s prestige. On December
1, the parliament took a further step by adopting a motion of no-confidence in the
Yanukovych government. Kuchma must decide whether to keep Yanukovych as the head
of a caretaker government or appoint someone else.
Another indication of the erosion of the regime’s support after the second round vote
has been the refusal of journalists at pro-government broadcast stations to continue to
follow regime guidelines on coverage. They have provided more balanced coverage of
1 For the official results of the elections, see the website of the Ukrainian Central Election
Commission, [http://ic2-www.cvk.gov.ua/wp0011e].
2 For the texts of the OSCE observation mission reports on the Ukrainian elections, see the OSCE
website, [http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/field_activities/?election=2004ukraine].

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opposition leaders and the massive opposition demonstrations in Kiev. The opposition
has kept the pressure up on the regime by holding massive rallies in Kiev, in which
hundreds of thousands of people have participated, and by peacefully blockading the
parliament and government offices.
It is unclear whether Ukrainian internal security forces or the army would obey
possible orders to use violence against protesters. A statement by the Ukrainian
prosecutor general, the interior ministry and the security services on November 22 warned
that they would put an end to any “lawlessness” by the opposition “quickly and firmly.”
The leading posts in Ukraine’s internal security services are deemed by analysts to be held
by supporters of an oligarchic group led by Ukrainian Presidential Administration chief
Viktor Medvedchuk. However, the large numbers of people that Yushchenko has
managed to turn out into the streets could make any efforts at repression risky. Moreover,
it appears that Yushchenko and his supporters have made inroads in persuading rank-and-
file police not to obey orders to use violence against protestors. The Defense Minister and
the head of the Ukrainian security service have said that they will not issue orders to use
violence against protesters.
Perhaps fearful of the regime’s loss of control of the situation in Kiev, on November
29 officials from 17 regional governments in southern and eastern Ukraine met in
Yanukovych’s eastern Ukraine power base and adopted a resolution warning that their
regions would seek autonomy within Ukraine if Yushchenko becomes President.
Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov attended the meeting and delivered a speech praising the
group and harshly denouncing Yushchenko. The regional legislature in Donetsk,
Yanukovych’s home region, announced that it would hold a referendum on December 9
on autonomy for the region.
In addition to the activity in the courts and streets, President Kuchma and both
candidates have met with EU and Russian mediators to negotiate a peaceful settlement
to the crisis. Yushchenko has expressed his willingness to participate in a repeat election
on December 19, but only if changes are made to the election laws and the persons
administering the elections to prevent the kinds of fraud that occurred in the previous
vote.
U.S. Policy
The United States has warned Ukrainian leaders that Ukraine’s prospects for Euro-
Atlantic integration will be strongly influenced by whether Ukraine holds free and fair
presidential elections. U.S. officials say the United States could work with either major
candidate, if he is elected fairly. In a October 14 press statement, State Department
spokesman Richard Boucher said that the United States was “deeply disappointed that
the campaign to date has fallen short of international standards,” He warned that the “we
would need to reexamine our relationship with those who are engaged in election fraud
and manipulation.” On November 1, State Department spokesman Adam Ereli said that
the United States agreed with the assessment of the OSCE observers that the conduct of
the first round of the vote fell short of democratic standards, noting particularly flawed
voter lists and arbitrary expulsion of electoral commissioners shortly before the vote.
Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
monitored the November 21 runoff at the request of President Bush. He said after the

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vote that “it is now apparent that there was a concerted and forceful program of election
day fraud and abuse enacted with the leadership or cooperation of the authorities.”
Senator Lugar said that he had carried a letter from President Bush to President Kuchma
that warned that a “tarnished election” will cause the United States to “review” its
relations with Ukraine. Senator Lugar stressed that Kuchma “has the responsibility and
the opportunity for producing even at this point an outcome which is fair and
responsible.”3
President Bush and Administration officials issued sharp criticisms of the conduct
of the second round of the elections. On November 24, Secretary of State Colin Powell
said that the United States could not accept the election results as “legitimate” due to the
“extensive and credible reports of fraud in the election.” Powell called for a “full review
of the conduct of the election and the tallying of election results.” On November 26,
President Bush said that the validity of Ukraine’s elections was “in doubt” and warned
that the “international community is watching very carefully” how the Ukrainian
government responds to “allegations of vote fraud.” On November 29, Secretary Powell
stressed in discussions with Kuchma and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov U.S.
support for a peaceful solution to the crisis that respects Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
Other U.S. officials expressed strong U.S. opposition to any separatist initiatives in
Ukraine.
U.S. officials have said that Ukraine’s troop deployment to Iraq, while appreciated,
will not cause the United States to overlook Ukraine’s democratic shortcomings.
However, some observers are concerned that Ukrainian leaders may still be hoping that
the United States will ignore election irregularities, if Ukraine continues its troop
deployment in Iraq. Recent public opinion polls have found that a majority of Ukrainians
are opposed to the troop deployment in Iraq. Yushchenko pledged to withdraw the troops,
if elected. Yanukovych has supported the deployment, but has raised the possibility that
a continued deployment could be conditioned on such factors as whether Ukraine receives
more reconstruction contracts in Iraq. It is unclear whether Ukraine’s leaders value the
perhaps distant prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration over their immediate political
survival. Some critics argue that the threat of sanctions against the Ukrainian leaders is
the only possible way to influence them.
Another issue is what actions to take if Ukrainian authorities attempt to implement
the fraudulent election results. The United States and its allies could move to isolate the
regime, in order to promote regime change or to convince the regime to change its
policies, such as it has done in the case of Belarus. The United States has so far declined
to pursue this approach with Russia and other CIS countries, perhaps for strategic reasons,
even though their records on democracy and human rights are judged by many observers
to be poorer than Ukraine’s. It could be argued that sanctions against the leadership could
have an impact on Ukraine’s support for the United States on Iraq.
In addition, Kuchma and Yanukovych have made concessions to Russia in recent
months in order to secure Moscow’s support in the elections. It could be argued that
isolating the regime might drive the Ukrainian leadership to an even closer relationship
with Russia and further away from Euro-Atlantic integration. In contrast to Western
3 Text of statement from Sen. Lugar’s website, [http://lugar.senate.gov].

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concerns about the election, Russian President Putin quickly congratulated Yanukovych
on his alleged victory in what Putin called a fair election. Russian officials have
condemned Western charges of electoral fraud as unsubstantiated and motivated by a
desire to increase Western influence in Ukraine at Moscow’s expense. Some observers
assert that Luzhkov’s support for separatism in eastern Ukraine could be a sign that
Russia is willing to go so far as to threaten to destabilize Ukraine in order to retain its
influence there. Another issue is whether increasing tensions between Western countries
and Russia on Ukraine could have a negative impact on U.S.-Russian relations in general,
including in such key areas as the global war on terror.
Some experts say that one positive aspect of the Ukrainian election is the emergence
of a broad, pro-democratic, civil society in Ukraine that appears willing to stand up to
corrupt and self-serving leaders. They call on the United States and other Western
countries to increase support for these forces, no matter what the outcome of the electoral
crisis.
Congressional Action
Congress has considered legislation on the Ukrainian elections. On July 22, 2004,
the Senate passed S. Con. Res.106 by unanimous consent. The resolution, introduced by
Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, notes the violations against OSCE standards for free
and fair elections that have taken place during past elections and during the present
Ukrainian election campaign. The resolution pledges Congress’s support for Ukraine’s
establishment of a democracy, free market and a place in the Western community of
democracies. H.Con.Res. 415, introduced by Representative Henry Hyde, was passed
by the House on October 4. It is identical to S.Con.Res. 106, except that it adds two
clauses that “strongly encourage” the President to fully employ U.S. government
resources to ensure a free and fair election and to stress to the Ukrainian government that
the conduct of the elections will be “a central factor in determining the future relationship
between the two countries.”
Representative Dana Rohrabacher introduced H.R. 5102 on September 15, 2004.
The bill details the failures of the Ukrainian government to uphold democratic standards
in the past and during the present campaign, and calls on it to ensure that a free and fair
election takes place. However, it also includes provisions for sanctions on Ukrainian
leaders and the Ukrainian government if the President does not certify that Ukraine has
implemented free and fair elections, and stopped harassment of the opposition,
independent media and other groups. The President would have the authority to waive
the sanctions if he certifies that it is in the “national security interest of the United States”
to do so. The bill would require a report from the President on the personal assets of the
Ukrainian leadership and on whether Ukraine has supplied weapons or weapons-related
technologies to regimes supporting terrorism. Representative Rohrabacher introduced a
modified version of the bill on October 7 as H.R. 5247. A companion Senate bill, S.
2957, was introduced by Senator Jon Kyl on October 8.
On November 18, the Senate passed S.Res. 473 by unanimous consent. As in the
case of H.Con.Res. 415, it warns Ukrainian leaders against conducting a fraudulent
election. However, it goes further than H.Con.Res. 415 in that it “strongly encourages”
the Administration to impose sanctions, including visa bans, against those encouraging
or participating in fraud.