Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities

Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities

Order Code RS21548
Updated August 23, 2004
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Iran’s extensive inventory of ballistic missiles is considered by some as its primary
means to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to a variety of potential targets
in the region. Recent missile tests and reports that Iran is actively pursuing nuclear
weapons have helped to increase regional tensions. This report will be updated as events
warrant. Additional information is provided in CRS Report RL30427, Missile Survey:
Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries, CRS Report RL30551, Iran: Arms
and Weapons of Mass Destruction Suppliers, and CRS Report RL30699, Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends.
Iran’s Short Range Ballistic Missiles (range < 1,000 km)
Table 1. Short Range Ballistic Missiles
Missile
Range
Payload
CEPa
Estimated
Numbers
CSS-8
150 km
190 kg
unknown
200
M-11
280 km
800 kg
600 m
30-50
SCUD-B
300 km
985 kg
450 m
100-400
SCUD-C
500 km
600 kg
700 m
100-170
Information for this table is from Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Jane’s Information Group, edited by
Duncan Lennox, Issue 37, January 2002.
a CEP is defined as the radius of a circle centered at the target within which 50 % of all missiles aimed at
the target would be expected to impact and is the standard for measuring accuracy for missiles and bombs,
1 kilometer = .62 miles; 1 meter = 39 inches.
CSS-8. Iran is believed to have imported as many as 200 CSS-8 missiles from
China in late 1989.1 This solid-fueled version of the SA-2 surface-to-air missile is
1 “Ballistic Missiles National Briefing: Iran,” Center for Defense and International Security
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CRS-2
designed to be launched from a tracked launcher vehicle.2 Iran is believed to have
received about 35 tracked launchers from China in late 1989.3 The two-staged CSS-8 is
believed to be armed with a 190 kg high explosive warhead and some experts suggest that
there are also submunition and chemical warheads for the CSS-8.4 Other experts believe
that China did not sell chemical or biological warhead technology to Iran for the CSS-8.5
M-11 (CSS-7). Although denied by China, Iran is believed to have received 30 to
50 M-11, 280 km range, single-stage, solid propellant6 missiles and wheeled transporter-
erector-launcher (TEL) vehicles from China in 1995.7 In addition to carrying an 800 kg
high explosive warhead, the M-11 is thought to be capable of delivering a 2, 10, or 20 KT
nuclear device, chemical agents, and also fuel-air explosives or high explosive
submunitions.8
SCUD-B. SCUD-B’s are considered the core of Iran’s ballistic missile forces. The
SCUD-B is a Russian-designed, liquid propellant, single-stage missile which has been
operational in many Middle Eastern countries since 1965.9 Russia developed a number
of different types of warheads for the SCUD-B, including high explosive, chemical, and
nuclear.10 The SCUD-B is believed to be able to accommodate a nuclear warhead with a
5 to 70 KT yield. The SCUD-B is transported on an eight-wheeled MAZ 543 transporter-
erector-launcher (TEL) vehicle with a 650km unrefuelled range on hard roads and, in this
configuration, the SCUD-B can be erected and launched in about one hour.
Some believe Iran received a limited number of SCUD-B’s from Libya in response
to Iraq’s 1980 invasion, and received its first shipment of 100 SCUD-B’s from North
1 (...continued)
Studies, Lancaster, U.K., May 28, 2003, [http://www.cdiss.org/iran_b.htm], p. 3.
2 Duncan Lennox, editor, Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Jane’s Information Group, Issue
37, January 2002, p. 49.
3 “Ballistic Missiles National Briefing: Iran,” p. 3.
4 Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, p. 49. High explosive submunitions are bomblets that are
part of a warhead that are intended to be scattered over a target area and then detonated.
Chemical or biological submunitions allow for a wider and more effective dispersion and
concentration of chemical or biological agents and also permits a larger portion of agent to
survive a missile intercept or release at high speeds and temperatures.
5 Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington D.C., June 16, 2002, p. 47.
6 Solid propellants are generally favored as they are safer to store and easier and quicker to put
into action than liquid propellant-filled missiles. Countries that produce solid propellant missiles
are generally considered to have a more technologically-advanced missile program than those
countries who produce strictly liquid propellant missiles.
7 Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, p. 48.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, p. 136.
10 Discussions in this paragraph on warheads and transporters is taken from Jane’s Strategic
Weapons Systems, p. 134-137.

CRS-3
Korea in 1988.11 Iran is believed to have received another 200 to 300 SCUD-B’s and 15
TELs from North Korea in the early 1990s.12 Because some U.S. experts believe that Iran
can manufacture all but the most sophisticated guidance and rocket motor components
indigenously, it is considered difficult to estimate how many SCUD-B’s Iran currently
possesses.13
SCUD-C. The SCUD-C is a single-stage, liquid-fueled variant of the SCUD-B
developed by North Korea with Chinese assistance.14 Iran’s SCUD-C’s extended range
permits a deeper penetration of target countries within range of Iran’s SCUD-B’s. Some
experts feel that the SCUD-C’s payload capacity is limited in terms of a chemical
payload, but suggest that by using the most lethal chemical agents such as VX nerve agent
or selected biological agents, Iran could employ these missiles effectively out to their
maximum range.15 Some analysts speculate that North Korea may have provided Iran
with chemical and biological warhead technology for its SCUD-C’s and, if so, would have
saved Iran a number of years in terms of developing and testing its own warheads.16 The
SCUD-C is also capable of carrying a variety of high explosive warheads but is not
believed capable of delivering a substantial nuclear payload. The SCUD-C can also be
transported and fired from the MAZ 543 TEL vehicle or fired from a fixed site.17
Iran was reported to have taken delivery of between 100 and 170 SCUD-C’s from
North Korea by 1994, together with related tooling and assembly equipment which was
believed installed in an assembly facility near Hama.18 While some analysts believe that
the provision of such equipment would permit Iran to produce entire SCUD-C’s on its
own, others believe that this capability would permit it to assemble only knock-down kits
while possibly producing a limited number of indigenous components, much like its
SCUD-B’s.19 This assembly capability also makes estimating the number of Iranian
SCUD-C’s a somewhat speculative exercise.
11 “Ballistic Missiles National Briefing: Iran,” p. 3.
12 Ibid.
13 Cordesman, p. 47.
14 “Ballistic Missiles National Briefing: Iran,” p. 3.
15 Cordesman, p. 47.
16 Ibid.
17 Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, p. 134-137.
18 “Ballistic Missiles National Briefing: Iran,” p. 3.
19 Ibid.

CRS-4
Iran’s Longer Range Missiles (range > 1,000 km)
Shahab-3. Iran’s Shahab-3 missile is a road-mobile, single stage, liquid propellant,
single warhead ballistic missile which many experts believe is based on imported North
Korean No Dong-1 missiles.20 The Shahab-3 has a reported range of 1,300 km and a
1,200 kg payload capacity.21 In 1993, some analysts speculated that North Korea, Iran, and
Pakistan entered into a cooperative development agreement. Pressure from several
countries reportedly led to North Korea abandoning its cooperative agreement with Iran
in 1994.22 In 1997, allegations of Russian assistance in providing missile components,
training, and testing assistance for the Shahab-3 program became a prominent topic for
discussion of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.23 United States Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Nonproliferation Center Director John Lauder told Congress in June 1998
that Russian assistance “has helped Iran save years in its development of the Shahab-
3...and is playing a crucial role in Iran’s ability to develop more sophisticated and longer-
range missiles”. One source says the CIA reported that Russia continued to cooperate
with Iran on missile technology as late as July 2001.24
Some experts consider Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure to be more sophisticated
than that of North Korea. Further, they believe that with Russian, North Korean, and
Chinese assistance, it is progressing towards becoming self-sufficient in the production
of medium-range ballistic missiles.25 It has also been reported that Iran has a considerable
network of research institutes and production facilities which has received foreign
assistance, and is dedicated to missile development throughout the country with some of
its facilities hardened or underground to protect them from aerial attack.26
The Shahab-3 is believed to have a 800 kg separating warhead that would be capable
of carrying high explosive submunitions, chemicals, or possibly a nuclear warhead.27 The
Shahab-3's accuracy is rated by some experts at 2,500 m CEP.28 In October of 2001, press
reports stated that Iran had begun serial production of Shahab-3s, using North Korean No
20 Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, p. 94.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 “Russia’s Missile Assistance to Iran,” Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project Brief, Vol III-No.
22, August 7, 2000. p. 1.
24 Paul Kerr, “U.S. Missile Sanctions,” Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, March 2002, p.
3.
25 Unclassified Report on Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997, Director of Central
Intelligence, pp. 2-3.
26 Center for Nonproliferation Studies database abstract from Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 23,
1997, p. 4 and related articles and an abstract of Iran Brief, September 9, 1996, pp. 1-2,
Washington Times, February 24, 1998, p. A3.
27 Ibid.
28 Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, p. 94.

CRS-5
Dong engines, at a rate of 20 missiles a year.29 One recent report suggests that Iran intends
to produce at least 150 Shahab-3s and has presently amassed an arsenal of at least 20
missiles.30
Recent Shahab-3 Activities. On August 11, 2004, Iran’s Defense Minister, Ali
Shamkhani, reportedly stated that Iran had conducted a flight test of its latest version of
the Shahab-3 which some experts believe is capable of striking all of Israel as well as
selected U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf region.31 In early August, Defense Minister
Shamkhani was reported to have claimed that Iran was working on improvements to the
range and accuracy of the Shahab-3, and would not limit future improvements to just its
range – leading some observers to speculate that Iran intends to develop a nuclear payload
for the missile.32
Other Shahab Versions. There has been a great deal of speculation surrounding
upgraded versions of the Shahab - the so-called Shahab-4, 5, or 6. On October 3, 2002,
Iranian Brigadier General Ahmad Vahid, the chairman of the Iranian Aerospace Industries
Organization, told journalists that Iran “had no plans to develop long-range missiles in
order to strike the United States, since the U.S. is not one of Iran’s strategic defense
targets and instead had oriented its ballistic missile development against its principal
regional adversary-Israel.”33 Some believe that this statement suggests that Iran will not
pursue specific Shahab-4,5, and 6 programs as the improved Shahab-3 is capable of
striking Israel and regional targets. One expert postulates that Iran’s previously discussed
“improved Shahab-3" might in fact be Iran’s way of developing more capable, longer
range Shahab missiles without hanging politically contentious Shahab-4, 5, and 6 labels
on such programs.34 Still others suggest that Iran’s space launch program is a surrogate
for longer range versions of the Shahab-3.
Iran’s Space Launch Vehicle Program. On January 5, 2004, Iran’s Defense
Minister, reportedly announced that Iran would launch a satellite within 18 months.35 This
possible June 2005 launch has some analysts concerned. Some experts believe that Iran
could use its space launch vehicle (SLV) program as a technical base for developing
intermediate and intercontinental range ballistic missiles.36 These experts suggest that
29 Ibid., p. 6.
30 “Iran’s Ambitious Missile Programs,” Center for Defense Information Press Release, July 1,
2004, p. 4.
31 Paul Hughes, “Iran Tests Missile Capable of Hitting Israel,” Reuters, August 11, 2004.
32 Ibid.
33 Missile Defense Briefing Report No. 74, American Foreign Policy Council, October 8, 2002,
p. 1.
34 Paul Hughes.
35 “Iran Plans to Launch Satellite Within 18 Months,” CNN.com, January 6, 2004.
36 “Iran Missile Update, 2004,”p. 2.

CRS-6
developing Shahab 4, 5, and 6 missiles under the guise of a SLV program could permit
Iran to avoid the possible political and economic costs of missile testing.37
Operational Considerations
The Shahab-3 and Iran’s Nuclear Program. In July 2004, Iran reportedly
told British, French, and German officials that it could produce enough weapons grade
uranium for a nuclear bomb within one year.38 Some intelligence estimates claim that Iran
is concealing its nuclear capabilities, which it claims are for peaceful purposes, and could
be five years away from constructing a nuclear weapon.39 Iran’s apparent pursuit of a
nuclear weapons capability and reported statements such as “the entire Zionist territory,
including its nuclear facilities and atomic arsenal, are currently in range of Iran’s
advanced missiles,” from the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards political bureau,40 have
served to heighten regional tensions. Some analysts suggest that this is mere “saber
rattling” designed to dissuade pre-emptive strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites by the United
States or Israel.41 Many express concern that Iran, particularly if they receive outside
assistance, may be able to develop a nuclear warhead for its Shahab-3 missile. While Iran
may be on the critical path to developing a nuclear device, others note that developing a
nuclear warhead and reentry vehicle are difficult scientific and technological undertakings
which could take Iran years to accomplish even if they are able to produce a nuclear
device.

The Shahab-3 and Israel’s Arrow-3 Ballistic Missile Defense
System. Some experts believe that the joint U.S./Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defense
system may provide a credible deterrent to the Shahab-3 as well as future improved
versions of the missile. The Arrow has had a number of successful tests against both short
and medium range ballistic missile targets, to include a successful July 29, 2004 intercept
of a Scud-type target over the Pacific Ocean conducted by the U.S. Missile Defense
Agency.42 The Arrow-3 incorporates a number of improvements, specifically designed to
improve the system’s capabilities against medium range missiles like the Shahab-3, and
future versions of the Arrow, are intended to enhance its performance against even longer-
range missiles.43 Some contend the Arrow-3 reduces the threat of an Iranian conventional
or nuclear missile strike against Israel while others suggest that it might cause Iran to
produce even more missiles and perhaps penetration aids to offset the Arrow-3's alleged
capabilities.
37 Ibid.
38 Dafna Linzer, “Iran a Nuclear Threat, U.S. Says,” Washington Post, August 18, 2004, p. 14.
39 Ibid.
40 “Iran:Shihab-3 Can Hit Anywhere in Israel,” Jerusalem Post, August 16, 2004.
41 Ibid.
42 Alon Ben-David, “Arrow Points to Change in Middle East Balance,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
August 4, 2004, p. 5.
43 Ibid.