Biennial Budgeting: Background and Legislative History in the 106th Congress

Biennial Budgeting: Background and Legislative History in the 106th Congress

Order Code RS20168
Updated May 4, 2000
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Biennial Budgeting: Background and
Legislative History in the 106th Congress
James V. Saturno
Specialist on the Congress
Government and Finance Division
Summary
Proposals to switch the federal budget process to a two-year timetable have been
made several times in recent years. Proponents of biennial budgeting argue that by
considering budgetary legislation less frequently, congressional workload can be
decreased and oversight enhanced. Although biennial budgeting is practiced by a number
of states, questions remain about how such a timetable would operate at the federal level.
Proposals for a two-year budget cycle have previously been reported in the Senate in
1988, 1990, 1994, and 1997. Another such proposal, S. 92, was reported by the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee on March 10, 1999 (S.Rept. 106-12). S. 92 calls for
the House and Senate to use the first year of each Congress to consider a two-year
budget resolution and two-year appropriation bills, and the second year to consider
multiyear authorizations and conduct oversight. More recently, biennial budgeting has
also been a topic of interest in the House where the Rules Committee conducted a series
of hearings on February 16, March 10, and March 16, 2000. This report will be updated
to reflect any further actions concerning biennial budgeting in the 106th Congress.
Introduction
Difficulties in the enactment of budgetary legislation have fueled interest in the idea
that the congressional budget process could be better structured. One of the chief
congressional complaints about the budget process in recent years has been the amount of
time it requires. Despite the perceived or actual permanence of much federal spending,
the process of formulating, enacting, and executing budgets has remained characteristically
annual. This annual budget cycle poses a dilemma for Congress. On the one hand, annual
review of spending legislation can afford Congress the opportunity to maximize its
influence concerning the operation of various programs and policies. On the other hand,
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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many Members feel that annual action on budgetary matters has consumed an increasing
amount of Congress’s time to the detriment of other matters.1
An annual budget cycle, however, is dependent on the timely enactment of budgetary
legislation. Consideration of budget questions in the form of concurrent resolutions on the
budget, authorization measures, regular appropriations, supplemental appropriations,
continuing resolutions, public debt legislation, revenue measures, and reconciliation bills
are often closely linked so that delays in consideration of one measure may have an impact
on all subsequent budgetary legislation. The process has been criticized as being repetitive
as well, with some questions being debated in some form several times a year. Rather than
promote efficient consideration of budgetary legislation, critics contend, the complexity
of the budget process has itself contributed to inefficiency and delay.
One possible reform that has been proposed is to change the budget cycle from one
year to two years. Because budgeting for the federal government encompasses a number
of processes, biennial budgeting can have several meanings. Biennial budgeting can
involve two-year budget resolutions, two-year appropriations, and multiyear
authorizations. Typically biennial budgeting proposals, such as S. 92, include all three
aspects, although proposals embracing only one or two are possible. Biennial budgeting
proposals may focus on enacting budgetary legislation for two-year periods or for two
one-year periods, like S. 92. In addition, biennial budget proposals typically require that
executive branch planning and performance reviews be revised so that they be based on
a two-year cycle.
Advocates of biennial budgeting feel that reducing the number of times that Congress
has to consider budget questions will likewise reduce the amount of time consumed by the
process. Supporters project that the benefits of a two-year cycle would include more time
for agency and program oversight, and more time for budget planning within Congress,
as well as better long-range planning by federal agencies and by state and local
governments. The Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administrations have all supported the idea
of biennial budgeting. In particular, the 1993 report of the National Performance Review
(the Gore report) noted, “Considerable time could be saved—and used more
effectively—in both the executive and legislative branches of government if budgets and
appropriations were moved to a biennial cycle.”2 Supporters point to the multiyear nature
of summit agreements between Congress and the President that have dominated the budget
process for more than a decade as evidence of the efficacy of multiyear budgeting, and as
a major factor in recent years for promoting more efficient consideration of budgetary
legislation. The Clinton Administration reiterated its support for biennial budgeting in its
budget submission for FY2001.3
1
Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress
1997-1998 (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1998), Chapter 7.
2U.S. Office of the Vice President, Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less:
Mission-Driven, Results-Oriented Budgeting, Accompanying Report of the National
Performance Review (Washington: GPO, 1993), p. 59.
3U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2001, Analytical Perspectives (Washington: GPO, 2000), p. 287.

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Critics of biennial budgeting have countered with several arguments as to why some
of the projected benefits could prove to be illusory. Reducing the number of times that
Congress considers budget matters, they suggest, may only raise the stakes, and thereby
heighten the possibility for conflict and increased delay. In addition, enacting a budget
resolution and spending legislation every other year could be effective in reducing
congressional workload or aiding longer-term planning only in the second year of the
cycle. With only a limited ability to anticipate future conditions, critics argue that a two-
year cycle could require Congress to choose between allowing the President greater
latitude for making budgetary adjustments in the off-years, or engaging in mid-cycle
corrections to a degree that would nullify any anticipated time savings or planning
advantages. Furthermore, they argue that annual review of appropriations requests is an
important part of oversight that would be lost under a biennial budget with no guarantee
that a separate oversight session would be effective.
Legislative History of Biennial Budgeting
Almost from the time that the Congressional Budget Act was enacted in 1974, budget
process reform has been a topic of congressional interest, and biennial budgeting was
discussed at least as far back as the 95th Congress (1977-1978).4 Hearings on the subject
of budget process reform have often included testimony concerning biennial budgeting.
In addition, on several occasions both the House and the Senate have conducted hearings
specifically on the topic of biennial budgeting.5
In the House, jurisdiction over budget process reform generally is currently shared
jointly by the Committees on Rules and the Budget. Both have considered the issue of
biennial budgeting, but no biennial budget proposal has yet been reported to the House.
In the 106th Congress, four biennial budgeting bills have been introduced: H.R. 232, H.R.
493, H.R. 2985, and H.R. 3586. In addition, the Rules Committee conducted three days
of hearing on the subject of biennial budgeting, on February 16, March 10, and March 16,
2000.6
In the Senate, jurisdiction over the budget process is shared jointly by the Committees
on Governmental Affairs and the Budget under the order of August 4, 1977, which
provides that if one committee reports a measure, the other has 30 days to report or be
discharged from further consideration. Proposals for a two-year budget cycle have
previously been reported by the Governmental Affairs Committee in 1988 (S. 2478,
4For a more detailed discussion of earlier consideration of biennial budgeting see U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Improving the Operation of the
Legislative Branch of the Federal Government, and for Other Purposes, report to accompany
S. 1824, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 103-297 (Washington: GPO, 1994), pp. 10-14.
5Printed hearing specifically addressing the issue of biennial budgeting include: U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Government Operations, The Vice President’s National Performance
Review—Recommending A Biennial Budget Process, hearings, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., October 7,
1993 (Washington: GPO, 1994); and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, S. 261—Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act, hearings, 105th Cong., 1st sess.,
April 23, 1997 (Washington: GPO, 1997).
6For testimony from these hearings, see the House Rules Committee web site at
[http://www.house.gov/rules/rules_hear09.htm], visited May 1, 2000.

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S.Rept. 100-499), 1990 (S. 29, S.Rept. 101-254), and 1997 (S. 261, S.Rept 105-72). All
three of these proposals took a comprehensive approach to biennial budgeting, and
included two-year budget resolutions, two-year appropriations, and multiyear
authorizations.
Also, in 1993, both the Senate and House members of the Joint Committee on the
Organization of Congress included proposals for a two-year budget cycle in their
recommendations to their respective chambers (S.Rept. 103-215, vol. 1, and H.Rept. 103-
413, vol. 1). In the Senate, these recommendations were subsequently introduced as S.
1824, referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, and reported in 1994
(S.Rept. 103-297). It is notable that in contrast to the comprehensive approach to biennial
budgeting taken most biennial budgeting proposals, S. 1824, as reported, included two-
year budget resolutions and multiyear authorizations, but not two-year appropriations.
Major Provisions of S. 92
On January 19, 1999, S. 92, The Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act, was
introduced in the Senate by Senator Pete V. Domenici, and referred to the Committee on
Government Affairs and the Committee on the Budget, jointly, pursuant to the order of
August 4, 1977. The two committees held a joint hearing on January 27, 1999, on the
subject of biennial budgeting. S. 92 was subsequently considered by the Committee on
Governmental Affairs on March 4, 1999, and ordered reported with an amendment (a
complete substitute making a number of technical corrections). A written report was filed
on March 10, 1999 (S.Rept. 106-12).
Table of Contents. As reported, S. 92 is organized into 11 sections (listed below).
These sections can be grouped into four major components that together would establish
a comprehensive biennial budgeting system: (1) a congressional budget process centered
around a two-year budget resolution; (2) two-year appropriations; (3) multiyear
authorizations; and (4) a requirement that the executive branch base planning and
performance reviews on a two-year cycle.
Section 1.
Short Title
Section 2.
Revision of Timetable
Section 3.
Amendment to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974
Section 4.
Pay-As-You-Go in the Senate
Section 5.
Amendments to Title 31, United States Code
Section 6.
Two-Year Appropriations; Title and Style of Appropriations
Acts
Section 7.
Multiyear Authorizations
Section 8.
Government Plans on a Biennial Basis
Section 9.
Biennial Appropriations Bills
Section 10.
Report on Two-Year Fiscal Period
Section 11.
Effective Date
Congressional Budget Process. Sections 2, 3, and 4 of S. 92 all deal with aspects
of the budget process connected to congressional consideration, enforcement, and
implementation of the budget resolution.

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Section 2 would establish the timetable for a two-year cycle. The timetable for the
first year of a Congress would be similar to the current timetable, with the President’s
budget submission on the first Monday in February,7 consideration of the budget resolution
to be completed by May 15 (rather than April 15), consideration of appropriations bills to
be completed in the House by June 30, and the beginning of the fiscal biennium on October
1. The timetable for the second year does not focus on specific actions or dates. The
President would submit a budget review to Congress by February 15, but the only
congressional requirement for the second year would be to complete action on measures
authorizing new budget authority for the next biennium by the last day of the session. By
not specifying specific actions, the timetable for the second year is intended to allow
Congress the necessary time to conduct program and agency oversight.
Section 3 is designed to make the necessary conforming changes in the provisions of
the Congressional Budget Act. These sections change references from annual or each
fiscal year to biennial or each biennium. Similarly, section 4 changes the Senate’s pay-as-
you-go point of order (provided under H.Con.Res. 67 (104th Congress)) so that rather than
applying to the periods of the first five fiscal years covered by the most recently adopted
budget resolution and the five fiscal years following that, it would apply to periods of six
years and four years, respectively. However, since S.92 was reported this point of order
has been supplanted by a similar provision in section 207 of the budget resolution for
FY2000, H.Con.Res. 68 (106th Congress).
Appropriations. Sections 6 and 9 establish the new requirements for appropriations.
Section 6 amends section 105 of title 1 USC to provide that all regular appropriations for
the support of the federal government be enacted a for two-year period, but also that they
“specify the amount of appropriations provided for each fiscal year in such period.”
Section 9 would add a new section to the Congressional Budget Act to prohibit the
consideration of regular appropriations bills in the budget year of a biennium for only a
single fiscal year, unless the program or activity specified will not last beyond that single
year.
Authorizations. Section 7 would also add a new section the Congressional Budget
Act. The new section would prohibit consideration of measures to authorize
appropriations for periods of less than two fiscal years, or consideration of authorizations
in the budget year of a biennium, unless the budget resolution, all appropriations bills, and
any necessary reconciliation measures are completed. However, this prohibition would not
apply to authorizing or revenue provisions considered in the first year that were included
in either appropriations or reconciliation bills.
Currently, there is no specific requirement for the duration of authorizations.
Although many authorizations are already on a multiyear cycle, the single largest
authorization measure, concerning the Department of Defense, is considered on an annual
cycle.
Executive Budget Processes. Sections 5 and 8 apply to the actions of the executive
branch. Section 5 would amend provisions in title 31 USC applying to the President’s
7Except in the case of a new President, when S. 92 provides for the budget submission by the
first Monday in April, and compresses the congressional timetable to compensate.

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budget submission to make it too reflect a two-year budget cycle. Section 8 would amend
provisions in titles 5, 31, and 39 USC to apply the two-year cycle to agency strategic and
performance plans.
Section 10 would require the Office of Management and Budget to submit a report
to Congress within 180 days after the date of enactment concerning “the impact and
feasibility of changing the definition of a fiscal year and the budget process based on that
definition to a 2-year fiscal period with a biennial budget based on a 2-year period.” That
is, a report on further changes in the budget process to reflect a two-year fiscal period
rather than two one-year fiscal periods as in S. 92.