The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: History, Funding, and Current Issues

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: History, Funding, and Current Issues

Order Code RL34699
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights:
History, Funding, and Current Issues
Updated October 28, 2008
Garrine P. Laney
Analyst in Social Policy
Domestic Social Policy Division

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights:
History, Funding, and Current Issues
Summary
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 was enacted to investigate issues concerning the
civil rights of American citizens. Among other provisions, the act provided for
creation of a United States Commission on Civil Rights (Commission) as an
independent, executive, bipartisan, fact-finding agency. The mission of the
Commission was to inform both the President and Congress on implementation of
civil rights protections. Currently, the Commission is composed of eight members:
four members are appointed by the President and two each by the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House on the recommendations of the
Majority and Minority Leaders in each chamber. No more than four members at any
one time can be of the same political party. Since 1957, the Commission has been
reauthorized a number of times, most recently with passage of the Civil Rights
Commission Amendments Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-419), which expired September 30,
1996. However, Congress has appropriated about $9 million each fiscal year since
1995 for the agency.
On September 30, 2008, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance and
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 was enacted into law (P.L. 110-329; H.R.
2638), which provides for the Commission to be funded in FY2009 at the FY2008
enacted funding level of $8.5 million until March 6, 2009. For FY2009, the Bush
Administration requested $8.8 million for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
which was $300 thousand above the FY2008 funding for the Commission.

According to some observers, discrimination has become more subtle since the
establishment of the Commission and continues to affect women and certain racial
and ethnic minorities, resulting in inequalities that affect income, job status, and
educational attainment. These advocates believe that the Commission’s mandate
allows it to support special legislative measures to overcome these socioeconomic
inequalities. Opponents of this view, however, contend that the purpose of civil
rights laws is to ensure equality of opportunity, not to guarantee actual
socioeconomic equality among racial and ethnic groups and between the sexes. They
state that when the Commission seeks “group preferences and benefits,” it becomes
more of an advocate for special interests rather than an impartial monitor of legal
equality.
For several decades, tensions have increased among advocates of these
fundamentally different approaches to addressing the issue of civil rights. When
determining whether or on what occasion it is appropriate to consider race, gender,
or other factors in forming policy, the issue of civil rights triggers strong beliefs and
emotions, making it extremely difficult to reach a consensus on the Commission. As
a consequence, some allege that the process for appointing members to the
Commission has become a major tool in controlling debate on civil rights and
molding public policy on the issue, leading to partisanship that interferes with the
agency’s effectiveness. This CRS report will be updated to reflect any legislative
activity.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Establishment of the Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Commission Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Reauthorizations and Modifications of the Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Extension of 1959 and 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Additional Civil Rights Authorities, 1965-1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Civil Rights Commission Authorization Act of 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Early 1980s Debate Over the Commission’s Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Approaches to Civil Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
United States Commission on Civil Rights Act of 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Part-Time Commission Provision of 1987; Reauthorization of 1989 . . . . . . 8
Civil Rights Reauthorization Act of 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Civil Rights Commission Amendments of 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authorization and Funding of the Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authorization of the Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Funding of the Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Management of Commission; Government Accountability
Office Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1997 Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2003 Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2006 Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
State Advisory Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Changes in SACs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Controversies Surrounding Commissioners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Kirsanow Appointment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Political Balance on the Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix. Commission Funding History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
List of Tables
Table 1. Funding for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1959-2009 . . . . . . 21

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights:
History, Funding, and Current Issues
Introduction
For some 50 years, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (Commission) has
conducted fact-finding investigations of issues relating to the civil rights of citizens.
During these years, it has investigated written complaints of violations of citizens’
civil rights, held numerous hearings, evaluated federal laws and policies concerning
discrimination or denial of equal protection of the laws, published many reports, and
prepared public service advertisements on various civil rights issues. The
Commission has never had enforcement power; it refers complaints it receives to the
appropriate federal, state, or local governmental agency for remedy. In recent years,
the Commission has investigated, among other issues, affirmative action,
employment discrimination, environmental justice, racial/ethnic profiling, felon
voting rights, the 2000 presidential election, migrants’ civil rights along the
Southwest border, reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
the effectiveness of Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and anti-Semitism
on college campuses.
Presently, the United States Commission on Civil Rights is composed of eight
commissioners: four appointed by the President and two each appointed by the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House on the
recommendations of the Majority and Minority Leaders in each chamber. The
political affiliation of appointees is as follows: Republican — Gerald A. Reynolds
(Chairman), Abigail Thernstrom (Vice Chair), Peter N. Kirsanow, and Ashley L.
Taylor, Jr.; Democratic — Arlan D. Melendez and Michael Yaki; and Independent
— Gail Heriot and Todd F. Gaziano.1
Issues surrounding the Commission today include the status of its authorization,
adequacy of funding, management concerns, and allegations of partisanship. This
report provides a history of the establishment of the Commission, including its
funding, legislation expanding its authorities, and the philosophical differences
concerning civil rights that have evolved during the past few decades that affect the
agency’s independence and effectiveness.
1 See [http://www.usccr.gov/cos/cos.htm].

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Establishment of the Commission
The Civil Rights Act of 1957
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 (P.L. 85-315), among other provisions, established
the United States Commission on Civil Rights as an independent, executive,
bipartisan, fact-finding agency. The Commission’s purpose was to inform the
President and Congress on the implementation of civil rights protections. With the
advice and consent of the Senate, the President appointed six members to the
Commission, with not more than three from the same political party.2 The President
selected the Chairman and Vice Chairman from among the members of the
Commission. Any vacancy in the Commission did not affect its powers and was
filled in the same manner and with the same limitation on party affiliations as an
original appointment. Four members of the Commission constituted a quorum.
There were no provisions on how to remove a commissioner from office.
Congress empowered the Commission to
! investigate allegations of citizens “in writing, under oath or
affirmation,” that they were denied the right to vote based on color,
race, religion, or national origin;
! study and gather information on legal developments constituting a
denial of the equal protection of the laws;
! assess federal laws and policies in the area of civil rights;
! submit interim reports to the President and Congress when the
Commission or the President deemed appropriate; and
! report its final findings and recommendations to the President and
Congress within two years.
Sixty days after submitting its final report and recommendations to Congress, the
Commission was to cease to exist. The Commission was not given enforcement
authority.
Commission Administration. For administrative purposes, the
Commission was to have a full-time paid staff director, appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Before submitting the nomination of a
person for staff director, the President had to consult the Commission. The Civil
Rights Act provided for the Commission to appoint other personnel it deemed
advisable, in accordance with civil service and classification laws. It could constitute
advisory committees within states composed of citizens of that state as well as
consult with officials of state and local government and representatives of private
organizations as it deemed prudent. The Commission was prohibited from accepting
or using the services of voluntary or uncompensated personnel. The act provided for
2 The original Commission members were Chairman John A. Hannah, President of Michigan
State University; Vice Chairman Robert G. Storey, Dean of the Southern Methodist
University Law School; John S. Battle, former Governor of Virginia; Father Theodore M.
Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame University; J. Ernest Wilkins, an Assistant Secretary
of Labor; and Doyle E. Carleton, former Governor of Florida.

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all federal agencies to cooperate fully with the Commission so that it could
effectively execute its functions and duties. In carrying out the provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1957, the Commission or any subcommittee of two or more
members authorized by the Commission (of whom at least one had to be from each
major political party) could hold hearings and act at such times and places as it
considered wise. The Commission could subpoena witnesses for hearings, but the
act prohibited the Commission from issuing subpoenas to witnesses who were found,
resided, or transacted business outside the state in which a hearing was held.
Reauthorizations and Modifications
of the Commission
Since its creation in 1957, Congress reauthorized the Commission and modified
its rules, procedures, and duties numerous times.
Extension of 1959 and 1963
Between 1959 and 1963, Congress twice enacted legislation to extend the life
of the Commission. In September 1959, it passed the Mutual Security Appropriation
Act (P.L. 86-383) which included a rider that extended the Commission on Civil
Rights for four additional years to November 8, 1963.3 Again, in 1963, Congress
amended the Civil Rights Act of 1957 by extending the Commission for one more
year (P.L. 88-152).
The Civil Rights Act of 1964
In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352, Title V), Congress
amended provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 that related to the Commission
on Civil Rights’ rules of procedure and its duties.
Rules of Procedure. The act required the Commission to publish in the
Federal Register the date, the place, and the subject of a hearing at least 30 days
before a hearing was scheduled. In addition, the act required the Commission to state
and publish in the Federal Register: descriptions of its central and field organization,
including where and how the public could secure information or make requests;
statements on how and the method by which its functions were channeled and
determined; and rules it adopted. No one was subject to rules, organization, or
procedures that were not published.
The act addressed the relationship between a witness and the Commission. It
provided that a witness before the Commission was entitled to a copy of the
Commission’s rules and a witness compelled to appear had to be provided a copy of
the Commission’s rules at the time the subpoena was served. Witnesses appearing
before the Commission had the right to counsel; counsel had the right to make
objections on the record and to argue briefly the basis for such objections.
3 Congressional Quarterly Service, Revolution in Civil Rights, Washington, p. 42.

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The Chairman or Acting Chairman of the Commission could punish breaches
of order by censure and exclusion. The Chairman received requests to subpoena
witnesses, and the Commission disposed of the requests. If the Commission
determined that evidence or testimony at a hearing would defame, degrade, or
incriminate a person, it could hear that evidence or testimony in executive session.
A victim of such evidence or testimony also had an opportunity to appear before the
Commission in executive session and to present witnesses. If the Commission
revealed publicly the evidence or testimony and the identity of the person defamed,
degraded, or incriminated, that person could appear as a voluntary witness or file a
sworn statement in his defense and submit sworn statements of others. No evidence
or testimony or summary of evidence or testimony could be released or used in public
sessions without the Commission’s consent. The penalty for releasing such evidence
was a maximum fine of $1,000 or imprisonment for no more than one year. The
Commission decided if a witness could submit sworn written statements for inclusion
in the record.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 required a transcript of witness testimony at all
hearings, whether public or executive sessions, of the Commission or any
subcommittee of the Commission. The witnesses and the public could obtain
transcript copies of public sessions at cost. Witnesses at an executive session were
limited to inspecting the official transcript of testimony.
Concerning the pay of a commissioner, the act provided that a Commission
member who was also employed by the U.S. government would not receive
additional compensation but was entitled to travel expenses and per diem when the
member was away from his usual place of residence.
Commission Duties. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 added responsibilities
for the Commission. Among other duties, the Commission was also to serve as a
national clearinghouse for information regarding denials of equal protection of the
laws based on race, color, religion, or national origin, including but not limited to the
areas of voting, education, housing, employment, the use of public facilities, and
transportation, or in the administration of justice. Also, the Commission was to
investigate allegations of citizens, made in writing, under oath or affirmation, that
they were illegally denied the right to vote, or accorded the right to vote, or that their
votes were improperly counted, in federal elections because of fraud or
discrimination in the way the election was conducted.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically provided that the Commission, its
Advisory Committees or any person under its supervision or control were not
authorized to inquire into or investigate the membership practices or internal
operations of any fraternal organization, college or university fraternity or sorority,
private club, or religious organization. It also required the Commission to submit a
final report of its activities, findings, and recommendations to the President and
Congress by January 31, 1968.

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Additional Civil Rights Authorities, 1965-1978
In the Older Americans Act of 1965 (P.L. 94-135), Congress prohibited
unreasonable age discrimination in federally funded programs or activities. Within
18 months of enactment of the act, Congress required the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights to identify age discrimination in federally funded programs. In 1967,
Congress extended the termination date of the Commission for four more years to
January 31, 1973 (P.L. 90-198). In passing the Civil Rights Commission Act of
1978, Congress extended the termination date of the Commission to September 30,
1983 and expanded the Commission’s jurisdiction to include discrimination based
on age or handicap (P.L. 95-444). The Commission published a study on
constitutional arguments on abortion in 1975.4 Congress responded by including
provisions in the 1978 Act that for the first time forbade the Commission, its
Advisory Committees, or any person under its supervision or control to appraise,
study or collect information about federal laws and policies or any other
governmental authority on abortion.
Civil Rights Commission Authorization Act of 1979
The Civil Rights Commission Authorization Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-81)
authorized appropriations for the Commission for FY1980 and directed the
Commission to appraise the laws and policies of the federal government to determine
if Americans of eastern- and southern-European ethnic groups were denied equal
protection of the laws, and to report its findings to Congress. The report had to
include an analysis of the “adverse consequences of affirmative action programs
encouraged by the federal government upon the equal opportunity rights of these
Americans.”
Early 1980s Debate Over the Commission’s Independence
Because the Commission was established to apprise the federal government
when denials of constitutional rights occurred, it traditionally was believed that the
Commission should be independent of the President and that its members should be
protected from removal for political reasons. In 1982, a debate developed over the
work of the Commission and the President’s power over it. That year, President
Ronald Reagan nominated Reverend B. Sam Hart to the Commission. Hart was
opposed by some civil rights groups, including the National Urban League, NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, National Organization for Women, Mexican-American Legal
Defense Fund, and National Gay Task Force, because of his opposition to busing for
school desegregation, the Equal Rights Amendment, and the concept of homosexual
rights.5 President Reagan eventually withdrew the nomination of Reverend Hart,6 but
4 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Constitutional Aspects of the Right to Limit
Childbearing: a Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, 1975.
5 Steven R. Weisman, “President Drops Nominee for Post on a Rights Panel,” The New York
Times, February 27, 1982, p. 1.
6 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Civil Rights Commission, 97th Congress, 2nd sess., 1982,
(continued...)

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in 1982 he also replaced two commissioners who had not intended to resign. Again,
in 1983, he sought to replace three more commissioners who had been frequent
critics of his Administration’s civil rights policies. When some Senate opposition
to replacing the commissioners developed, the President fired them rather than
waiting until the Senate confirmed their replacements.7 President Reagan’s firing of
the three commissioners triggered debate on the Commission’s independence, who
should appoint its members, and its mandate.
Approaches to Civil Rights. This debate revealed fundamental differences
in approaches to addressing the issue of civil rights. Some Members of Congress and
civil rights activists charged that President Reagan was undermining the
Commission’s traditional independence. Some members of the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights maintained that despite legal guarantees of equal opportunity,
inequalities persisted between minority groups and women, on one hand, and white
males on the other, in income, job status, and educational attainment. They believed
that the Commission’s mandate allowed it to support special legislative measures to
overcome socioeconomic inequality because such inequality resulted from
discrimination.8 The Administration and its supporters argued that the federal
government’s role in enforcing civil rights should focus on discrimination against an
individual rather than against groups of individuals who historically have been
victims of discrimination. Further, according to this view, the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights mandate did not extend to seeing that equality of opportunity resulted
in actual socioeconomic equality among racial and ethnic groups and between the
sexes.9 Supporters of President Reagan argued that in pressing for what they called
group preferences and benefits, the Commission had become less an impartial
monitor of legal equality and more an advocate of particular interests. Thus, in this
view, the Commission politicized itself and consequently forfeited its traditional
independence from the President.
United States Commission on Civil Rights Act of 1983
Differing views of the Commission led to congressional proposals to allow the
then-existing Civil Rights Commission to expire and to create a new Civil Rights
Commission in the legislative branch. Eventually, Congress and President Reagan
compromised on the issue. The United States Commission on Civil Rights Act of
1983 (P.L. 98-183) was enacted on November 30, 1983. This act, among other
provisions, established a new, eight-member Commission. The life of the
Commission was six years. Four members were appointed by the President and two
6 (...continued)
vol. 38, p.21-A.
7 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Civil Rights Commission Reconstituted, 98th Congress,
2nd sess., 1983, vol. 39, pp. 293-294.
8 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Affirmative Action in the 1980s: Dismantling the
Process of Discrimination, (Washington: GPO, 1981), pp. 11-13; U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights. Civil Rights: A National, Not a Special Interest, Washington: 1981, p. iii.
9 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Consultations on the Affirmative Action Statement of
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, vol. 1, (Washington: GPO, 1981), pp. 30-38.

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each by the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House on the
recommendations of the Majority and Minority Leaders in each chamber. No more
than four members at any one time could be of the same political party. The
President could remove a commissioner only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in
office. Five commissioners constituted a quorum instead of four as previous Acts
provided.
The act provided for the tenure of commissioners. Members of the new
Commission served for six-year terms. The act, however, provided the following
exception for the first appointments after its enactment. The President designated
three-year terms for two of his appointees; two members appointed by the Senate and
the House also served three-year terms. Four other members of the Commission —
two appointed by the President and two members appointed by the Senate and the
House — served terms of six years. No more than two persons of the same political
party could be designated for three-year terms. A member appointed to fill a vacancy
on the Commission served for the remainder of his predecessor’s term. The
President, with the concurrence of a majority of the Commission’s members,
designated a chairman and vice chairman from among Commission members. In the
absence of the chairman, the vice chairman acted as chairman. The act provided that
the powers of the Commission were not affected by any vacancy in the Commission
and that a vacancy was to be filled in the same manner and with the same limitations
regarding party affiliation as the original appointment.
In addition, the act provided for the President, with the concurrence of a
majority of the Commission, to appoint the staff director. Within the limits of its
appropriations, the Commission could appoint personnel at the maximum rate for a
GS-15, provided it observed civil service and classification laws. Although the
Commission could continue to constitute as many advisory committees within states
as it wanted, the act provided that it must constitute at least one advisory committee
within each state. The Commission or any subcommittee of two or more members
that was authorized by the Commission could hold hearings as it deemed advisable.
A majority of the Commission or of members present at a meeting at which at least
a quorum of five members was present must agree to holding a hearing. Each
commissioner had the power and authority to administer oaths or take statements of
witnesses under affirmation. The Commission could make rules and regulations
necessary to carry out its mission.
The act also provided for employees of the previous Civil Rights Commission
to be transferred to the 1983 Commission with all of their benefits. It provided for
a commissioner who was not in the service of the U.S. Government to be paid at
level IV of the Federal Executive Salary Schedule and for travel expenses and per
diem. A commissioner who was already employed by the federal government served
without pay but was compensated for travel expenses and per diem. The
Commission was prohibited from accepting the services of uncompensated
personnel.

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Part-Time Commission Provision of 1987;
Reauthorization of 1989
Even after re-creation of the Commission on Civil Rights in 1983, the
controversy surrounding the Commission continued. The House proposed to stop
funding the agency in 1986, but reached a compromise with the Senate that made the
Commission a part-time operation. Congress, in making the Commission part- time,
cut the FY1987 appropriation for the Commission; placed restrictions on how the
money could be spent; and limited the pay of commissioners, the number of
employees they could hire, and the amount of money spent for consulting contracts
(P.L. 99-591).10 With enactment of the Civil Rights Reauthorization Act of 1989,
Congress extended the Commission on Civil Rights for 22 months until September
30, 1991 (P.L. 101-180).11
Civil Rights Reauthorization Act of 1991
For years, there were complaints that the Commission was not carrying out its
fact-finding responsibilities; it was charged that only one report had been produced
in two years. A criticism of the Commission was that it was spending too much time
on divisive rhetoric. Others questioned whether the Commission was even needed.
Civil rights spokesmen attributed the Commission’s drop in production to the Reagan
Administration’s appointment of commissioners who opposed programs such as
busing and affirmative action. The Chair of the Commission, Arthur Fletcher,
however, pointed to the reduction in funding as a contributing factor to the
Commission’s drop in productivity.12 Congress responded in 1991 by enacting the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Reauthorization Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-167; H.R.
3350). Unlike previous Acts that allowed the Commission to submit reports to
Congress and the President at the discretion of either the Commission, Congress or
the President, this act requires the Commission to submit at least one annual report
to the President and Congress that monitors federal civil rights enforcement efforts.
Although President George H. W. Bush requested that the Commission be
reauthorized for 10 years at $10 million for each fiscal year, Congress only extended
it for three fiscal years to September 30, 1994. For FY1992, Congress authorized
$7.16 million for the agency and an additional $1.2 million for relocation of the
Commission’s headquarters office. According to the law at that time, when the
Commission was not authorized appropriations, it had to terminate its operation.
During Senate consideration of S.Amdt. 1276 to H.R. 3350, Senator Simon stated
that if no further legislation enacted a different level of appropriations for fiscal years
1993 or 1994, then the FY1992 authorization would remain in effect for each of
those fiscal years. Such an arrangement enabled Congress to monitor the
10 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 100th Congress, 1st sess., 1987, Commerce, Justice,
State Get 13.9 Billion, vol. 43, (Washington) p. 430.
11 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 99th Congress, 2nd sess., 1986, Commerce, Justice,
State Get $12.9 Billion, vol. 42, (Washington) Congressional Quarterly, Inc., pp. 189-190.
12 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., 1991, vol. 47, Commission
on Civil Rights Extended Three Years, pp. 294-295.

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Commission each year to determine if it was accomplishing its goals, but did not, as
in the past, require the Commission to shut down prior to September 30, 1994. This
final compromise reflected the concerns of some Members of Congress who wanted
to closely monitor the Commission and those who felt that a short reauthorization
would force the Commission to focus too much on its own survival.13 According to
the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Commission officials were unhappy with the
final provisions, believing they needed more money and a longer authorization to
meet congressional goals.14
Civil Rights Commission Amendments of 1994
The Civil Rights Commission Amendments Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-419)
amended the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Act of 1983. Among other
provisions, it reauthorized the Commission until September 30, 1996. Although
authorization for the Commission has expired, other provisions of P.L. 103-419 not
only require that the Commission establish at least one advisory committee in each
state but also require that one be established in the District of Columbia and for an
advisory committee to be composed of citizens of that state or District. The 1994 Act
amended the language of the 1983 Act, which set in place the original staggered term
requirement and specified the manner in which an unexpired term was to be filled.
The 1994 Act directs that “[t]he initial membership of the Commission shall be the
members of the United States Commission on Civil Rights on September 30,
1994.”15 The act further provides that “[t]he term of office of each member of the
Commission shall be six years. The term of each member of the Commission in the
initial membership of the Commission shall expire on the date such term would have
expired as of September 30, 1994.”16 Congress has not passed legislation to
reauthorize the Commission on Civil Rights since 1994, although it has continued
to appropriate funding for the agency.
Issues
Since 1994, a number of concerns have surfaced regarding the Commission,
including its authorization and funding, management, and members. In addition, the
Government Accountability Office (GA0) has issued several reports on the
Commission, which have been critical of its management. The following section
reviews GAO reports on management issues, as well as concerns that have been
raised about state advisory committees, and controversies involving Commission
members. Congress may want to evaluate these concerns in its consideration of the
Commission’s annual appropriations or any reauthorization legislation that it might
consider.
13 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, Vol. 137, Part 19, October 28, 1991, p. 28740.
14 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., 1991, vol. 47, Commission
on Civil Rights Extended Three Years, pp. 294-295.
15 108 Stat 4338.
16 108 Stat. 4338-4339.

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Authorization and Funding of the Commission
Authorization of the Commission. Since the Commission was last
reauthorized in 1994, two bills have been introduced in Congress to reauthorize the
agency — H.R. 117, the Civil Rights Commission Act of 1996 (Canady) and S. 1990,
Civil Rights Commission Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Brown). Both measures,
among other provisions, would have extended the termination date of the
Commission. H.R. 117 would have reauthorized the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights by extending its termination date from 1996 to 2001, whereas S. 1990 would
have extended the date to 1998. The House passed H.R. 117, as amended, by voice
vote on March 18, 1998. On March 19, 1998, H.R. 117 was received in the Senate
and on May 15, 1998 referred to the Subcommittee on Constitution, Federalism and
Property Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary. No further action was taken on
the bill. S. 1990 was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on
Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights where it was approved and sent to the
full committee for consideration. No further action was taken on S. 1990.
Funding of the Commission. Although the Commission has not been
reauthorized for years, Congress has continued to appropriate funding for the agency.
The Appendix provides funding requests and appropriations for the Commission
from FY1959 through FY2009. As the appendix shows, since FY1995,
appropriations for the Commission have remained at approximately $9 million per
year. As mentioned earlier in this report, some have criticized the level of
appropriations for the Commission, attributing its drop in productivity, in part, to a
lack of sufficient funding.
On September 30, 2008, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance and
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 was enacted into law (P.L. 110-329; H.R.
2638), which provides for the Commission to be funded in FY2009 at the FY2008
enacted funding level of $8.5 million until March 6, 2009. For FY2009, the Bush
Administration requested $8.8 million for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
which was $300 thousand above the FY2008 funding for the Commission.
Management of Commission;
Government Accountability Office Reports
Since the mid-1980s, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)17 has
released several investigatory reports on the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. A
GAO report of 1986 that focused on personnel actions of the Commission found
irregularities in the hiring of permanent and temporary staff, the appointment of
consultants, and in the maintenance of personnel records.18 Successive GAO reports
continued to recommend improvements in management of the agency, including
project management, financial activities, the contracting process, and the
Commission’s relationship with the State Advisory Committees (SACs). For
17 Formerly known as the General Accounting Office.
18 U.S. General Accounting Office, The Operations of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
Report Abstract, March 29, 1986.

CRS-11
FY1990 appropriations, Congress restricted how the Commission could spend funds
on regional offices, monitoring of civil rights, contracts, and hiring staff, and directed
GAO to determine if the Commission had complied with the restrictions. In 1992,
GAO reported that the Commission had complied with provisions of the FY1990
Appropriations Act.19
1997 Report. Again, in 1997, GAO found the Commission could not provide
important cost information on aspects of its operations such as regional offices, the
process for referring complaints, public service announcements, and one project. In
addition, key documents on the Commission’s decision-making process were lost,
misfiled, or nonexistent. To correct these managerial problems, GAO made two
general recommendations — that the agency develop and document policies and
procedures that assign responsibility for management functions to the staff director
and other Commission officials, and provide mechanisms to hold them accountable
for proper management of day-to-day operations of the Commission. Three specific
recommendations GAO made to the Commission were to update the Code of Federal
Regulations on the Commission’s operations, update the Commission’s internal
guidance, and establish a management information system. Not all of the
commissioners agreed with GAO’s findings, but all of them agreed to implement its
recommendations.20
2003 Report. More recently, Congress asked GAO to assess the
Commission’s financial activities, its project management procedures, and its
contracting process. In its report of October 2003, GAO found that although the
Commission had improved its operations, it still was not operating in a manner
completely consistent with sound management principles. Specifically, GAO
recommended an external audit of the Commission’s financial statements because
none had been conducted in 12 years. Furthermore, GAO found the project
management procedures followed by commissioners and staff in planning,
implementing, and reporting the results of approved projects did not allow
commissioners to review many Commission reports before they were published.
According to GAO, this significantly reduced commissioners’ influence in shaping
findings and recommendations of a report, and policy implications of civil rights
issues. GAO was concerned about commissioner control over contracting
procedures, as it found key documentation was missing on how the Commission
awarded contracts. Also, it reported that the Commission’s contracting activities did
not comply with established federal regulations.21
These findings were not unchallenged as Les Jin, then Commission staff
director, observed that the Commission had significantly improved its management
19 U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Commission has
Complied with FY90 Appropriation Act Provisions, May 1992, pp. 1-2.
20 U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Agency Lacks Basic
Management Controls, GAO/T-HEHS-97-177, pp. 2, 11-12.
21 U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, More Operational and
Financial Oversight Needed, GAO-04-18, Highlights, pp. 24.

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structure and operational oversight since GAO’s 1986 and 1997 reports.22 He stated
that GAO misinterpreted the purpose and duties of commissioners. According to
him, historically, the Commission’s career civil servants researched and drafted
reports and based conclusions on the facts; however, commissioners have the power
to change this process. Mr. Jin also believed the Commission’s contract practices
were fundamentally sound, noting that any deficiencies that GAO found were not
based on fraud, abuse, or managerial impropriety. Despite disagreeing with GAO
findings, Jin stated that the Commission accepted and had already started to institute
GAO’s recommendations, but would not be able to implement all of them because
of limited funding.23 In its report of 2004, GAO found that the Commission still had
not implemented three of the four recommendations for improving the agency’s
management and procurement practices.24
2006 Report. In 2006, GAO reported on the Commission’s quality assurance
policies for its products. GAO found that the Commission lacked policies for
ensuring the objectivity of national products, reports, briefings, or hearings.25 GAO
reported that the agency lacked a policy for ensuring varied perspectives in its
national office reports; neither did the Commission have a policy for determining
when and how to select external reviewers. The GAO report compared the
Commission’s policy on using external reviewers with the National Academies and
the Congressional Budget Office — agencies that use external reviewers to assess the
completeness, balance, and objectivity of their reports. According to GAO, the
guiding principle used by these agencies is “the more controversial the topic, the
greater the number of reviewers they use.”26
An Inspector General, retained by the Commission, and the staff director of the
Commission recommended several procedures to address these concerns, including
mandatory use of external reviewers (paid or unpaid) to certify that agency
procedures were followed. Projects/reports can be assigned to different responsible
project offices such as the Office of Civil Rights Evaluation, the Office of General
Counsel, or others, which then would ensure that agency procedures are followed.
Each responsible project office would then submit reports to the Commission for
subsequent review and approval. The Office of the Staff Director would certify that
input from program staff, regional offices, SACs and others was sought.27
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., pp. 40-50.
24 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Management Could Benefit from Improved
Strategic Planning and Increased Oversight, GAO-05-77, Highlights.
25 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The
Commission Should Strengthen Its Quality Assurance Policies and Make Better Use of Its
State Advisory Committees, GAO-06-343, Highlights.
26 Ibid. pp. 13-15.
27 Information received from U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Chris Byrnes, Chief,
Regional Programs Coordination Unit, September 23, 2008.

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State Advisory Committees
The Civil Rights Act of 1957, as amended, requires the Commission to establish
an advisory committee in each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia.28 Each
state committee has a charter, valid for a two-year term, which it uses as a basis for
operation and for selecting its members. Members of a State Advisory Committee
(SAC) are recommended by the regional director of their area, approved by the
Commission staff director, and voted on by Commissioners. SAC members serve
without compensation. They may be reimbursed for per diem subsistence allowance
and travel expenses.29 Citizens who volunteer to serve on the committee must be
familiar with local and state civil rights issues. The Commission can renew a state
advisory committee charter.30
The purpose of State Advisory Committees (SACs) is to
! inform the Commission on civil rights matters in their state, such as
denial of the right to vote based on discrimination or fraud and
denial of equal protection of the law; and advise the Commission
concerning the preparation of reports to the President and the
Congress;
! receive reports, suggestions, and recommendations from persons in
both public and private sectors in each state; initiate and offer advice
and recommendations to the Commission when requested; and
! observe open hearings or conferences that the Commission holds
within a state.
SACs hold open forums, public meetings and formal hearings to obtain
information on current civil rights issues in their states.31 Collaborative reports
involving more than one SAC have covered such topics as state enforcement of
nondiscrimination requirements in educational programs, federal affirmative action
efforts in mid-America, the burning of African-American churches in Alabama, the
impact of federal immigration laws on communities in the southwest, participation
of minority and women contractors in the northeast corridor, and energy and civil
rights.32 According to GAO, the Commission expects SACs to complete one project
every two years, provided funding and staff permit. In addition, the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA)33 (which defines how federal advisory committees operate)
requires agencies to ensure that committees have adequate staff, quarters, and funds
for conducting their business. Since 1980, SACs have accounted for 200 of 254
28 P.L. 85-315.
29 45 CFR 703.9.
30 GAO, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, GAO-06-343, p. 9.
31 www.usccr.gov/pubs/sac/in04041/com.htm; GAO, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
GAO-06-343, p. 23
32 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, State Advisory Committee Reports, Joint Reports.
usccr.gov/pubs/pubsndx.htm.
33 5 U.S.C. Appendix, Section 5; also see [http://www.facadatabase.gov].

CRS-14
reports issued by the Commission. However, the productivity of SACs has declined
since 2000.34 In surveys of SACs and interviews with committee members, GAO
heard complaints that (1) reduced funding had resulted in limited meetings and travel
and reductions in regional staff who provide essential operational support, and (2) the
Commission did not review their reports in a timely manner.35
Changes in SACs. Under the old guidelines and policy of the Commission,
SAC members were appointed for a two-year term (the length of the charter) with no
limits on the number of terms. The Commission wanted SAC membership to reflect
the state’s population with respect to ethnicity, race, religion, sex, political affiliation
age, and disability status. It required a minimum minority group membership on the
SACs of 40% or not more than 65% and “a diversity of experience and knowledge
from business, labor, and other perspectives.”36
In its 2006 report, GAO found that members of SACs reflected the state
populations, e.g., political affiliation and sex, although they generally relied more
heavily on minority populations, especially blacks and religious minorities. For
instance, whites comprised 35% of committee positions while constituting 72% of
the national population. Blacks comprised 29% of committee members while
constituting 13.4% of the national population. On the other hand, Hispanics with
membership of 15% were comparable to their national proportion of the population
(15%). Disabled individuals constituted 16% of membership compared to the
proportion of their national population, 19%. Historically, professions of committee
members included state legislators, university professors, lawyers, and ministers,
which allowed them to be influential on local civil rights issues.37
In February 2006, the Commission changed the criteria for membership in
SACs, which affects the term of committee members, their diversity, political
representation, knowledge, and potentially alters committee membership. New rules
limit appointments to a maximum of 10 years or five 2-year terms.38 The
Commission objected to the then-existing regulations and policies on SAC
membership (which were established by members of an earlier Commission) that it
viewed as “highly restrictive,”39 replacing them with ones that emphasize knowledge
of academic technical skills, such as law and statistical analysis. Among other
reasons, the Commission chair explains this change as a response to staff shortages
in regional offices. The Commission intends to have SAC members themselves
34 GAO, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, GAO-06-343, pp. 27-31.
35 GAO, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, GAO-06-343, pp. 32-34.
36 GAO, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, GAO-06-343, pp. 25-26.
37 GAO, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, GAO-06-343, pp. 65-66; [http://www.census.
gov/Press].
38 Ibid.
39 Information received from U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Chris Byrnes, Chief,
Regional Programs Coordination Unit, July 17, 2008 (hereafter, Byrnes).

CRS-15
contribute to the writing of reports; to undertake such a task, the Commission
believes committee members must have expertise.40
Political Representation on SACs. The old criterion for political
representation required SAC membership to reflect the bipartisan character of the
Commission. Although the Commission’s new criteria require SAC members to be
of both political parties, its staff director reportedly informed GAO that having one
minority member on a committee of 11 would fulfill this requirement. This
interpretation appears to conflict with the FACA requirement that SAC members be
fairly balanced both “in points of view and functions to be performed.”41 Also, GAO
found no reference to political independents in the commission’s new criteria on
political representation, although they comprise about a quarter of SAC
membership.42
Problems Concerning the SACs. In its 2006 report, GAO noted the
important, historical relationship between the Commission and the SACs and recent
changes the Commission has made in the criteria for membership on a SAC. GAO
identified several problems concerning the relationship of the Commission with
SACs. According to this report, the Commission had not issued timely renewal of
state advisory committee charters, leaving a majority of SACs without current
charters that authorize them to operate; 38 of the 51 SACs lacked authorizing
charters. Since the GAO publication and institution of the above identified changes,
the Commission has reported that it has rechartered 27 of 51 SACs, leaving 24 state
advisory committees without charters.43 Although SACs, as in the past, have
continued to operate while their applications for renewal are being considered, FACA
prohibits SACs from meeting or conducting business without a charter.44
GAO also found that the Commission had not sought the views of the SACs
when making organizational changes that directly affect the committees or “fully
integrated the committees into the accomplishment of its mission.”45 The report
found that, generally, the Commission had not incorporated the role of the SACs into
its strategic planning and decision-making processes. For example, SAC input was
not sought when the Commission approved the staff director’s proposal to reduce
expenses by closing two regional offices in FY2006. In addition, regional directors,
the liaisons to SACs, were not notified of the closings until three days after the
decision had been made; two regional directors learned of the decision from sources
outside the Commission. The SACs were not involved in development of the
Commission’s draft strategic plan until congressional staff asked about the SACs’
role in it. According to the report, only after several Members of Congress
commented on the lack of SACs’ participation in development of new criteria for
40 GAO, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, GAO-06-343, p. 26.
41 Ibid.
42 GAO, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, GAO-06-343, p. 25.
43 Byrnes, July 17, 2008.
44 GAO, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, GAO-06-343, pp. 23, 27.
45 Ibid., p. 2.

CRS-16
state committee membership were they included in discussion on the proposal. In
reply to this charge, the staff director stated that the perspectives of 13 SACs with
active charters were sought and about half of them agreed to extend SACs’ charters
and the chairs to four years.46
GAO recommended that the Commission modify its review process to ensure
that various and balanced perspectives were included in final products. According
to a GAO spokesperson, the Commission has implemented all of the
recommendations included in the GAO 2006 report.47
Controversies Surrounding Commissioners
Kirsanow Appointment. President Bush’s nomination in 2001 of Peter
Kirsanow to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights was opposed by some
commissioners and some civil rights advocates for two primary reasons. First, some
commissioners said they did not believe that a vacancy existed on the Commission.
In November 1995, President Clinton appointed Judge Leon Higginbotham to a six
year term on the Commission. Judge Higginbotham died in December 1998, before
the expiration of his term of service, which would have been November 29, 2001.
On appointing Victoria Wilson to the vacancy in December 1998, President Clinton,
in his appointment certificate, indicated that her term would expire on November 29,
2001. However, her attorney, Leon Friedman, claimed this was a clerical error.
Friedman was reported in the Washington Post as stating that statutes governing the
Commission did not allow for the appointment of members to interim or acting status
and that all terms were for six years.48
On December 6, 2001, President Bush appointed Peter Kirsanow, a labor lawyer
and former chairman of the Center for New Black Leadership, to replace Victoria
Wilson on the Commission. According to an article in the Washington Post,
Kirsanow’s appointment was opposed by some civil rights advocates and
commissioners.49 Moreover, some commissioners did not believe that a vacancy
existed on the Commission.50 Because the Commission on Civil Rights Act of 1994
provides that all commissioners serve six-year terms, Commission Chairperson Mary
Frances Berry insisted that Wilson’s term did not expire for six years. According to
newspaper accounts, Berry and other commissioners charged that President Bush’s
appointment of a new commissioner was intended to “muzzle” the Commission
46 GAO, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, GAO-06-343, pp. 32-34.
47 Telephone conversation with a GAO spokesperson on September 24, 2008.
48 Darryl Fears, “Lawsuit Is Filed to Seat Bush Rights Panel Choice,” The Washington Post,
December 11, 2001.
49 Darryl Fears, “A Deepening Divide on U.S. Civil Rights Panel; Controversy Over
Appointment Highlights Historical Disagreements Over Commission’s Role,” The
Washington Post, December 18, 2001, p. A03.
50 Sabrina Eaton, “Cleveland Lawyer Fights for Seat on Rights Board,” Plain Dealer,
December 17, 2001, p. 28.

CRS-17
because it released a report concluding that minority rights had been violated in the
2000 presidential election in Florida.51
In establishing the Commission as an independent entity, insulated from
political influence, Congress, through the act of 1983, provided for lengthy, fixed,
staggered terms of office, political balance in the membership of the Commission,
and protection of Commission members from presidential removal by limiting
removal only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office. On the basis of provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1983 that related to the terms of commissioners, the Bush
Administration maintained that Commissioner Wilson’s appointment ended on
November 29, 2001, because she was appointed to fill the vacancy caused by Judge
Higginbotham’s death. It argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1994 intended to
preserve the same staggered six-year term for commissioners that was provided in the
1983 Act. Otherwise, it would allow a president before leaving office to appoint a
majority of his people to the Commission.52 In 2001, when Peter Kirsanow appeared
at a meeting of the Commission, it refused to seat him by a vote of 5-3.53 The Bush
Administration responded by filing a federal suit seeking removal of Commissioner
Wilson and the seating of Kirsanow. U.S. District Judge Gladys Kessler ruled in
Wilson’s favor. On appeal, a three judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit unanimously ruled for Kirsanow, “holding that the 1994 Act did not
disrupt the staggering of terms of Commission members established in the 1983
Act.”54
The second reason voiced for opposition to the appointment of Kirsanow
reportedly was his perceived hostility to civil rights policies supported by many black
Americans. Critics charged that Kirsanow opposes affirmative action and, with no
history in the struggle for civil rights, was appointed to the Commission largely
because of his race. According to critics, his mission is “to lobby against the policies
responsible for [his] prominence.”55 In appointing Peter Kirsanow to the
51 Hanna Rosin, “Bush Swears In Disputed Choice for Rights Panel,” The Washington Post,
December 7, 2001, p. A39; Katharine Q. Seelye, “U.S. Rights Commission Blocks Seating
of Bush Nominee,” The New York Times, December 8, 2001 (nytimes.com); Darryl Fears,
“Rights Panel Spurns Bush Choice,” The Washington Post, December 8, 2001, p. A2.
52 Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum
Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President, “Terms of Members of the Civil Rights
Commission,” November 30, 2004; Rosin, “Bush Swears In Disputed Choice for Rights
Panel,” The Washington Post, December 7, 2001, p. A39.
53 Fears, “ A Deepening Divide on U.S. Civil Rights Panel,” The Washington Post, p. A03;
Katharine Q. Seelye, “U.S. Rights Commission Blocks Seating of Bush Nominee,” The New
York Times, December 8, 2001 (nytimes.com); Fears, “Rights Panel Spurns Bush Choice,”
The Washington Post, December 8, 2001, p. A2
54 United States v. Wilson, 351 U.S. App. D.C. 261 (D.C. Cir. 2002) cert denied, 537 U.S.
1028 (2002).
55 Trevor Coleman, New Civil Rights Official Out of Touch with Black America, Detroit Free
Press, May 17, 2002.

CRS-18
Commission, the Bush Administration described Mr. Kirsanow as an “extraordinarily
well-qualified individual”56 who practiced labor and employment law.
With the appointment of Kirsanow to the Commission, the panel was evenly
divided ideologically between members who tended to agree with Mr. Kirsanow that
“all civil rights legislation that can be passed has been passed and it is time to go in
a new direction”57 and those who wanted to continue the traditional approach of
pointing out civil rights violations and pursuing policy changes.58
Political Balance on the Commission. The most recent controversy
concerning appointees to the Commission involved two current commissioners who
reportedly changed their party affiliation. As noted earlier, no more than four
members of the same political party can serve on the Commission at any one time.59
The vote of five commissioners is needed to approve a report or make a
recommendation.
Abigail Thernstrom and Gail Heriot. On December 6, 2004, President
Bush appointed two Republicans to the Commission, Gerald A. Reynolds (as chair)
and Ashley L. Taylor, bringing the total number of Republican commissioners to
four. Abigail Thernstrom was originally a congressional appointee to the
Commission as a Republican.60 However, The Boston Globe asserts that in October
2004, six weeks before President Bush appointed her to the Commission as vice-
chairwoman (and also before the Reynolds and Taylor appointments), she changed
her political affiliation to Independent. According to this same report, Gail Heriot
changed her party affiliation from Republican to Independent in 2007, seven months
before Senate Republicans appointed her to the Commission. Further, the report
asserts that when questioned about the switch in parties, both Thernstrom and Heriot
denied that their change in registration had anything to do with the Commission.61
The current website of the Commission indicates that Thernstrom’s political
affiliation is Republican and Heriot is an Independent.62
56 Congressional Record, Concern for the Integrity and Reputation of the United States Civil
Rights Commission, December 6, 2001, pp. S12530-S12531.
57 Steve Miller, Bush’s Choice to Join Civil Rights Panel; High Court Won’t Review Ruling
Upholding Appointment, The Washington Times, November 19, 2002, p. A05.
58 Facts on File World News Digest, Civil Rights: Court Rejects Bush Pick for U.S.
Commission, February 2, 2002, p. 91B3.
59 P.L. 98-183.
60 On January 6, 2001, House Majority Leader Tom DeLay had appointed Thernstrom to the
Commission to complete the term of Carl Anderson. She was reappointed to the
Commission in February 2002.
61 Savage, “Maneuver Gave Bush a Conservative Rights Panel,” The Boston Globe,
November 6, 2007, p. A1.
62 Although the website of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights indicates that
Commissioner Thernstrom’s political affiliation is Republican, efforts to determine if or
when she changed her political affiliation to Republican have been unsuccessful. As of this
date, Commissioner Thernstrom has not responded to an inquiry from CRS seeking
(continued...)

CRS-19
Russell Redenbaugh. In another potential example of changing party
affiliation, Charles Savage, of The Boston Globe, reports that former commissioner
Russell Redenbaugh (who resigned in 2005) appears to have changed party affiliation
twice during his tenure on the Commission, most recently in 2003, when he switched
from Republican to Independent. This move created a Republican opening on the
Commission.63
Party Affiliation Provisions. The political balance provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 198364 do not address whether the party affiliation of a commissioner
is considered only at the time of appointment or whether a commissioner who
changes party identification would be bound by the old party affiliation ceiling or not.
In December 2004, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a memorandum to the
White House, in response to a request for an interpretation of this issue. The DOJ
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) wrote:
Specifically, you have asked whether, in the appointment of a new member to the
Commission, the relevant consideration is the party affiliation of the other
members at the time the new member is appointed (which would take into
account any changes in party affiliation by those other members after their
appointment to the Commission), or whether it is the party affiliation of the other
members at the time those other members were appointed (which would not take
into account any such post-appointment changes in party affiliation). We
conclude that the plain language of the statute makes clear that the relevant
consideration is the party affiliation of the other members at the time the new
member is appointed.65
Critics of this interpretation charge that it violates the spirit of the law, which
intended to achieve a bipartisan approach to investigating alleged violations of civil
rights by limiting the number of commissioners affiliated with a particular party.66
Through the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and Citizens for Responsibility
and Ethics in Washington, some civil rights groups (including the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Mexican American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, National Women’s Law Center, and National
Congress of American Indians) also challenge OLC’s interpretation of the statutory
provision concerning the political affiliation of commissioners. These groups argue
that when sitting commissioners are allowed to switch party-affiliation, it undermines
62 (...continued)
clarification of her political affiliation.
63 Charles Savage, “Maneuver Gave Bush a Conservative Rights Panel,” The Boston Globe,
November 6, 2007, p. A1.
64 42 U.S.C. 1975(b)
65 Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Office of Legal
Counsel, “Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President,” December 6,
2004.
66 Charles Dervarics, “President Bush Seeks Sweeping Changes on Civil Rights Panel:
Gerald Reynolds to Replace Outgoing Chairwoman Mary Frances Berry,” Black Issues in
Higher Education, December 30, 2004.

CRS-20
congressional intent to maintain political balance on the Commission. They have
requested Attorney General Mukasey to rescind the OLC opinion.67
Over the past 20 years, some allege that partisanship on the Commission has
increased. As civil rights issues have become more complex, ideological differences
among commissioners contribute to disputes over how to identify and address a civil
rights concern. In addition, it has been charged that partisanship interferes with the
basic operation of the Commission.
67 Wade Henderson, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and Melanie Sloan, Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, et al., letter to Department of Justice, Attorney
General Michael B. Mukasey, January 29, 2008.

CRS-21
Appendix. Commission Funding History
Table 1. Funding for the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1959-2009
($ in millions)
Fiscal Year
Budget Request
Appropriations
1959
0.75
0.78
1960
0.29
0.78
1961
0.99
0.89
1962
0.30
0.89
1963
0.99
0.96
1964
0.99
0.99
1965
0.99
1.28
1966
1.72
1.91
1967
2.70
2.49
1968
2.79
2.65
1969
2.65
2.65
1970
2.65
2.70
1971
3.20
3.39
1972
3.80
3.82
1973
4.65
4.94
1974
5.81
5.90
1975
6.91
7.00
1976
7.84
8.05
1977
9.54
10.07
1978
10.54
10.85
1979
10.75
10.85
1980
11.37
11.72
1981
12.14
12.15
1982
12.96
12.32
1983
11.63
11.98
1984
12.18
12.01
1985
12.75
12.87

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Fiscal Year
Budget Request
Appropriations
1986
12.06
11.77
1987
12.58
7.52
1988
9.80
5.71
1989
13.38
5.71
1990
7.86
5.71
1991
10.15
7.08
1992
10.78
7.00
1993
9.00
7.78
1994
8.00
7.78
1995
10.20
9.00
1996
11.40
9.00
1997
11.40
9.00
1998
11.00
8.74
1999
11.00
8.90
2000
11.00
8.90
2001
11.00
8.90
2002
9.10
9.10
2003
9.58
9.10
2004
9.00
9.10
2005
9.00
9.10
2006
9.00
9.05
2007
9.31
8.80
2008
9.00
8.46
2009
8.80
8.46
Source: For each year, the Budget of the U.S. Government, Appendix, and the
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act,
2009 (P.L. 110-329).