{ "id": "RL34226", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL34226", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 355454, "date": "2010-01-21", "retrieved": "2016-04-07T02:02:34.472544", "title": "Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy: Past, Present, and Prospects", "summary": "The Bush Administration outlined a strategy of \u201ctailored deterrence\u201d to define the role that nuclear weapons play in U.S. national security policy. There has been little discussion of this concept, either in Congress or in the public at large. This leaves unanswered questions about how this strategy differs from U.S. nuclear strategy during the Cold War and how it might advise decisions about the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.\nThroughout the Cold War, the United States relied on nuclear weapons to deter an attack by the Soviet Union and its allies and to forestall the outbreak of a global war between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the broad Cold War-era agreement about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy began to dissolve during the 1990s, after the demise of the Soviet Union. Further, in response to emerging threats to U.S. national security, the Bush Administration argued that the United States must alter its deterrence strategy \u201cfrom \u2018one size fits all\u2019 deterrence to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer competitors.\u201d\nDuring the Cold War, the United States often modified, or tailored, its nuclear targeting doctrine, its nuclear weapons employment policy, and its nuclear force structure to enhance or maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent posture. In some ways, the Bush Administration\u2019s concept of tailored deterrence follows the same pattern, using assessments of an adversary\u2019s society and values to identify a range of targets that might be threatened, and adjusting U.S. war plans and force structure to enhance the credibility of U.S. threats to destroy these targets. However, tailored deterrence differs from Cold War deterrence in that it explicitly notes that U.S. nuclear weapons could be used in attacks against a number of nations that might have developed and deployed chemical and biological weapons, even if they did not possess nuclear weapons. Hence, the new policy seems more of a change in \u201cwho\u201d we will deter than it is a change in \u201chow\u201d we will deter.\nCongress may review the concept of tailored deterrence, either as a part of its oversight of nuclear weapons policies and programs, or as a part of a broader debate about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy. Issues that might come up in such a review are questions about how much U.S. nuclear strategy and weapons employment policy have changed in recent years; questions about whether the new capabilities and war plans will enhance the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats, or, conversely, make the use of nuclear weapons more likely; questions about whether the United States must develop new weapons capabilities to meet the demands of tailored deterrence, or whether it must retain a force structure with thousands of deployed warheads if it no longer uses \u201cthe Russian threat\u201d as the metric for sizing the U.S. force; and questions about whether the new concepts and war plans expand or restrict the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy.\nThe Obama Administration is also likely to review and revise this concept as it conducts its nuclear posture review. It may revise the rationale for why the United States retains nuclear weapons, in accordance with the President\u2019s pledge to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. It may also address questions about U.S. declaratory policy, and the role that other policy options may play in efforts to deter or defend against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.\nThis report will not be updated again; it will be replaced by a new report on U.S. nuclear doctrine after the Obama Administration completes, and reports on, its nuclear posture review.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL34226", "sha1": "8a98fd82b237e3e9b35b8a8e708f7585a77db743", "filename": "files/20100121_RL34226_8a98fd82b237e3e9b35b8a8e708f7585a77db743.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL34226", "sha1": "fa0333a90dc108d6f74c817a0ad2afc9fbcfa590", "filename": "files/20100121_RL34226_fa0333a90dc108d6f74c817a0ad2afc9fbcfa590.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc462806/", "id": "RL34226_2008Dec30", "date": "2008-12-30", "retrieved": "2014-12-05T09:57:41", "title": "Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy: Past, Present, and Prospects", "summary": "This report highlights the differences between the construct of tailored deterrence and the more general concept of strategic deterrence that guided U.S. nuclear policy during the Cold War. It then identifies a number of issues that Congress might address when it reviews these differences, including the question of whether detailed and tailored attack plans are more likely to enhance deterrence or more likely to lead to the early use of nuclear weapons, and the question of whether tailored deterrence provides any guidance about the future size and structure of U.S. nuclear forces.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20081230_RL34226_027778b30d51026bfa66bc6a31edf14f080c1377.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20081230_RL34226_027778b30d51026bfa66bc6a31edf14f080c1377.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Nuclear weapons", "name": "Nuclear weapons" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Military policy", "name": "Military policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Defense policy", "name": "Defense policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Deterrence", "name": "Deterrence" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Military strategy", "name": "Military strategy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Nuclear warfare", "name": "Nuclear warfare" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc812125/", "id": "RL34226_2008Jan28", "date": "2008-01-28", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy: Past, Present, and Prospects", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20080128_RL34226_95f36ae6abc6b0fa570c6b2555ba78a5779d2f28.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20080128_RL34226_95f36ae6abc6b0fa570c6b2555ba78a5779d2f28.html" } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc819281/", "id": "RL34226_2007Oct29", "date": "2007-10-29", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy: Past, Present, and Prospects", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20071029_RL34226_80a0ff5d23ea925791ac8f6f15a753314cac684c.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20071029_RL34226_80a0ff5d23ea925791ac8f6f15a753314cac684c.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }