Retransmission Consent and Other Federal Rules Affecting Programmer-Distributor Negotiations: Issues for Congress

Retransmission Consent and Other Federal Rules Affecting Programmer-Distributor Negotiations: Issues for Congress

Order Code RL34078
Retransmission Consent and Other Federal Rules
Affecting Programmer-Distributor Negotiations:
Issues for Congress
July 9, 2007
Charles B. Goldfarb
Specialist in Industrial Organization and Telecommunications Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Retransmission Consent and Other Federal Rules
Affecting Programmer-Distributor Negotiations:
Issues for Congress
Summary
When conflicts arise between a programmer (a broadcaster or a cable network
owner) and a multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD, usually a cable
or satellite operator) about the carriage of particular video programming, the price for
that programming, or the tier on which the programming is to be offered to the end
user, many consumers can be affected. Recently there have been several incidents
in which a negotiating impasse between a programmer and a distributor has resulted
in the programmer refusing to allow the MVPD to carry, or the MVPD choosing not
to carry, a program network. While contractual terms, conditions, and rates are
determined by private negotiations, they are strongly affected by a number of federal
statutory provisions and regulatory requirements, including the statutory
retransmission consent and must-carry rules, the FCC program exclusivity rules,
local-into-local and distant signal provisions in satellite laws, copyright law
provisions relating to cable and satellite, statutory commercial leased access
requirements and program carriage and nondiscriminatory access provisions, and the
FCC’s media ownership rules.
The recent increase in negotiating impasses appears to be the result of structural
market changes that have given programmers with “must-have” programming much
greater leverage, particularly when they are negotiating with small distributors.
Competitive entry in distribution — almost all cable companies now face
competition from two satellite companies, and are beginning to face competition
from telephone companies — has emboldened programmers with popular
programming to demand cash payment from distributors for the right to carry that
programming. In particular, local broadcasters increasingly are using the statutory
retransmission consent requirement to demand cash payment from small cable
companies who could lose subscribers to the satellite providers and new telephone
entrants if they reach an impasse with the broadcaster and can no longer carry the
local broadcast signals. In the past, the cable companies were the only MVPD in a
market and could use that countervailing power to refuse to pay cash for carriage.
Thus, ironically, competition in the distribution market may be resulting in higher
programming costs that MVPDs may have to pass on to their subscribers.
The small cable companies have argued that some of the existing statutory and
regulatory requirements were implemented at a time when cable was a monopoly and
were intended to protect broadcasters. Now that the market dynamics have changed,
they argue, some of these rules should be changed to allow for more even-handed
negotiations. At the same time, however, as a result of consolidation and clustering
in the cable industry there are a few very large cable companies, which primarily
serve major markets, as well as the two national satellite operators, that appear to
have sufficient market strength to be able to withstand many of the demands of the
programmers with must-have programming and to place small independent
programmers at a negotiating disadvantage. This report will be updated as warranted.
For a condensed version of this report, see CRS Report RL34079.

Contents
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Market Changes Affecting the Programmer-Distributor Relationship . . . . . . . . 11
More Distribution Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Consolidation and Clustering of Cable Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Negotiating with a cable program network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Negotiating with a national broadcast network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Negotiating with a local broadcast station or non-network
broadcast group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
More Program Networks/Fragmented Audiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Cable System Revenue is Growing From High Speed Internet Access
and Telephone Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Specific Examples of Programmer-Distributor Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Nexstar: The First Broadcaster to Aggressively Seek Cash Payments
for Retransmission Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
CBS: The Only Major Broadcast Network to Aggressively Seek Cash
Payments for Retransmission Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
DISH Network/Lifetime/Hearst-Argyle: An Example of the Complexity
of Programmer-Distributor Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Sinclair’s Negotiations with Various MVPDs: A Case Study
of Factors Affecting Negotiating Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Sinclair-Mediacom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Sinclair-Suddenlink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Sinclair-Time Warner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Sinclair-Comcast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Sinclair-Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Measuring Retransmission Consent Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Time Warner: A Large Cable Company Demands Cash Payments
from Broadcasters to Retransmit Their Non-Primary Signals . . . . . . . 54
Issues for Congress: Proposals for Statutory and Regulatory Change . . . . . . . . . 56
Economic Factors Relevant to Analysis of the Proposals for Statutory
and Regulatory Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Specific Proposals to Modify Current Statutes and Regulations . . . . . . . . . 60
Proposal: Allow the importation of distant signals when a
retransmission consent impasse develops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Proposal: Require broadcasters to publish rate cards that would
apply to all MVPDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Proposal: Require parties to submit to binding arbitration to resolve
leased access, program carriage, or retransmission
consent disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Proposal: Strengthen the FCC test for what constitutes
“good faith” retransmission consent negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Proposal: Prohibit tying carriage of popular programming
to carriage of less popular programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Proposal: Require programmers to offer their broadcast and
cable networks to distributors on an à la carte basis . . . . . . . . . . 67
Proposal: Prohibit programmers from requiring their networks
to be placed on the expanded basic service tier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Proposal: Prohibit the ownership or control of more than one
television station in a market or prohibit a “duopoly”
owner from tying retransmission consent for one
station to another . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Proposal: Place set-top boxes in customer premises that pick up
local broadcast station signals off the air without
requiring MVPDs to retransmit
broadcast signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Proposal: Close the “terrestrial loophole” exception to the
requirement for nondiscriminatory access to
programming in which a cable operator
has an attributable interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Proposal: Clarify the definition of a regional sports network . . . . . . . 73
List of Tables
Table 1. Consolidation in the National Market for the Purchase
of Video Programming (Percentage of
MVPD Subscribers), 2002-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Table 2. The 25 Largest Cable Operators as of December 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table 3. Cable Television System Clusters Serving More Than 100,000
Subscribers, as of December 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Table 4. Cable Program Networks with the Largest Number of Subscribers,
as of December 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Table 5. Nielsen Data on Total Television Households, Time Spent
Viewing Per Household, and the Average Number of Video
Channels Received Per Household, 1985-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Table 6. Estimated Share of U.S. Television Home Set Usage by Program
Source (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Table 7. The Average Weekly Cumulative Audience Reach of the Largest
Broadcast and Cable Program Networks, First Quarter 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Table 8. The Individual Television Programs with the Largest Audience
Ratings, 2005-2006 Television Season . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Table 9. The Advertiser-Supported Cable Networks with the Highest
Average License Fees Per Subscriber Per Month, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Table 10. Cable Company Revenues, by Service, 1996-2005, in Millions
of Dollars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Table 11. Estimated Number of Television Program Sources Viewed
per Adult, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Retransmission Consent and
Other Federal Rules Affecting
Programmer-Distributor Negotiations:
Issues for Congress
Overview
Virtually all U.S. households have a television and almost 86% of these
television households get their video programming by subscribing to a multichannel
video programming distributor (MVPD) — in most cases a cable operator or a direct
broadcast satellite (DBS) operator — rather than relying upon “free” over-the-air
broadcast television signals.1 As a result, when conflicts arise between programmers
and MVPDs about the carriage of particular video programming, the price for that
programming, or the tier on which the programming is to be offered to the end user
(for example, on a basic or premium tier, on a “top 60” or a “top 120” tier, or on an
analog or digital tier), many consumers can be affected.
Recently, there have been several incidents in which a negotiating impasse
between a programmer and an MVPD has resulted in the programmer refusing to
allow the MVPD to carry, or the MVPD choosing not to carry, a program network,
forcing the MVPD’s subscribers to choose between foregoing that program network
or switching to a competing MVPD that does carry the program network.2 There also
have been a number of situations in which programmer-distributor negotiations have
been resolved without any disruption in program carriage, but only after the
negotiations played out in public, with subscribers and public officials being warned
of the danger of losing access to particular programming and being encouraged by
1 In the Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, Federal Communications Commission, MB Docket No.
05-255, Twelfth Annual Report, adopted February 10, 2006, released March 3, 2006, at
para. 8. As of June 2005, there were 109.6 million television households, of which
approximately 94.2 million subscribed to an MVPD service. Of the latter, 69.4% received
video programming from a franchised cable operator and 27.7% from a DBS operator.
2 Even where the impasse involves broadcast programming that is transmitted over the air,
most households that subscribe to an MVPD no longer have an antenna and therefore at a
minimum would have to obtain and install an antenna to continue to receive the
programming. In these cases, the MVPD typically has offered to provide a free “rabbit-
ears” antenna, although in many cases a higher quality rooftop antenna is needed to get good
over the air reception, and some households cannot get decent reception even with a rooftop
antenna. Indeed, that inability to receive broadcast signals over the air was the original
impetus for cable television, which was then called community antenna television, or
CATV.

CRS-2
each side to contact the other side in order to place pressure on them to compromise.
Often these public negotiations have occurred when the programming at risk included
upcoming sports events that some subscribers placed a high value on viewing.3 Also,
there have been incidents in which an MVPD has announced a price increase to
subscribers shortly after the conclusion of contentious negotiations with a
programmer, with the MVPD attributing the price increase to higher programming
costs, and the programmer denying the causal connection.
Although the contractual terms, conditions, and rates at which content providers
make their content available to programmers, and at which programmers make their
programming available to distributors, are determined by private negotiations, there
are a number of federal statutory provisions and regulatory requirements that strongly
affect those negotiations.4 These include:
! the retransmission consent and must-carry rules, which govern
the carriage of television broadcast signals by cable operators.5
Under these rules, every three years each local commercial broadcast
television station must choose between (1) negotiating a
retransmission consent agreement with each cable system operating
in its service area, whereby if agreement is reached the broadcaster
is compensated6 by the cable system for the right to carry the
broadcast signal, and if agreement is not reached, the cable system
is not allowed to carry the signal; or (2) requiring each cable system
operating in its service area to carry its signal, but receiving no
compensation for such carriage.7 With this mandatory election,
3 See, for example, Peter Grant and Brooks Barnes, “Channel Change — Television’s
Power Shift: Cable Pays for ‘Free’ Shows; Broadcasters Want Cash to Carry Their Signal;
Super Bowl is Hostage,” Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2007, at p. A1.
4 For a detailed discussion of many of these statutory provisions and regulatory
requirements, see Federal Communications Commission, Retransmission Consent and
Exclusivity Rules: Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 208 of the Satellite Home Viewer
Extension and Reauthorization Act of 2004 (FCC Retransmission Consent Report),
September 8, 2005, available at [http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
260936A1.pdf], viewed on June 28, 2007.
5 The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-385)
established new rules, placed into Sections 325 and 614 of the Communications Act, as
amended (47 U.S.C. 534). These rules apply to all cable operators. AT&T has claimed that,
due to the technology employed, its MVPD service is an information service rather than a
cable service, and thus not subject to cable rules. It views the retransmission consent rules
as part of the copyright licensing framework and has agreed to negotiate for retransmission
consent, but it views the must-carry rules as part of the cable regulatory regime that does not
apply to its service. This is a controversial position.
6 Compensation can take the form of cash payments, the MVPD’s purchase of advertising
time on the broadcast station, the broadcaster being given free advertising time on the
MVPD’s system, the MVPD’s carriage (and tier placement) of other program networks
owned by the broadcaster, or some combination of these.
7 Section 614(b)(3)(A) of the Communications Act states that “A cable operator shall carry
(continued...)

CRS-3
broadcasters with popular programming that are confident the local
cable systems will want to carry that programming can make the
retransmission consent election and be assured compensation for
such carriage, and broadcasters with less popular programming that
the local cable systems might otherwise not choose to carry can
make the must carry election and be assured that their signal will be
carried by all local cable systems. In many cases local broadcasters
that are affiliated with a national broadcast network and have elected
the retransmission consent option have (as part of their affiliation
agreement) assigned to the network the right to negotiate the terms
of retransmission consent.
! a number of Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) exclusivity rules8 that give local broadcasters the
exclusive right to distribute certain programming (the network
program non-duplication rules9 and syndicated exclusivity protection
rules10) or that protect a sports team’s or sports league’s distribution
7 (...continued)
in its entirety, on the cable system of that operator, the primary video ... transmission of each
of the local commercial television stations carried on the cable system....” As broadcasters
have deployed digital technology, they have been able to use their new digital spectrum to
transmit multiple video streams, not just a single stream, and/or to transmit their
programming in high-definition as well as standard format. The broadcasters have sought
an interpretation of the must-carry rule that would require cable operators to carry both their
analog and their digital transmissions and, where they are offering multiple video streams
or high-definition transmissions, that would require cable operators to carry their multiple
streams and high-definition transmissions. To date, the FCC has not adopted that
interpretation, but it is currently under discussion. As a result, carriage of these additional
video transmissions has been subject to retransmission consent negotiations, and is not
mandatory on the part of cable or satellite operators.
8 These rules are found in Part 76 of the FCC’s rules. For a description of these rules, see
the FCC Retransmission Consent Report, at footnote 8 and at paras. 17-30.
9 Commercial television station licensees are entitled to protect the network programming
they have contracted for by exercising non-duplication rights against more distant television
broadcast stations carried on a local cable television system that serves more than 1,000
subscribers. Commercial broadcast stations may assert these non-duplication rights
regardless of whether or not their signals are being transmitted by the local cable system and
regardless of when, or if, the network programming is scheduled to be broadcast. Generally,
the zone of protection for such programming cannot exceed 35 miles for stations licensed
to a community in the Commission’s list of top 100 television markets or 55 miles for
stations licensed to communities in smaller television markets. In addition, a cable operator
does not have to delete the network programming of any station which the Commission has
previously recognized as significantly viewed in the cable community.
10 With respect to non-network programming, cable systems that serve at least 1,000
subscribers may be required, upon proper notification, to provide syndicated protection to
broadcasters who have contracted with program suppliers for exclusive exhibition rights to
certain programs within specific geographic areas, whether or not the cable system affected
is carrying the station requesting this protection. However, no cable system is required to
(continued...)

CRS-4
rights to a sporting event taking place in a local market (the sports
programming blackout rules11). These rules, which tend to mirror
the terms found in most network-affiliate contracts and station-
syndicator contracts, limit the ability of a cable operator that has not
been able to reach a retransmission consent negotiation with a local
broadcaster that transmits network or syndicated programming to
import the same programming from a more distant broadcaster.
! the local-into-local and distant signal provisions in various
statutes that govern the carriage of television broadcast signals by
satellite operators,12 which define which households are eligible to
receive distant broadcast network signals and local network signals
and include several copyright provisions. Under the Satellite Home
Viewer Act, direct-to-home satellite providers were granted a
compulsory copyright license to retransmit television signals of
distant networks stations to unserved households and to retransmit
signals of certain non-network broadcast stations (called
“superstations”) to any household. The Satellite Home Viewer
Improvement Act created a new statutory copyright license for
satellite carriage of stations to any subscriber within a station’s local
market, without distinction between network and non-network
signals or served or unserved households.
10 (...continued)
delete a program broadcast by a station that either is significantly viewed or places a Grade
B or better contour over the community of the cable system.
11 A cable system located within 35 miles of the city of license of a broadcast station where
a sporting event is taking place may not carry the live television broadcast of the sporting
event on its system if the event is not available live on a local television broadcast station,
if the holder of the broadcast rights to the event, or its agent, requests such a blackout. The
holder of the rights is responsible for notifying the cable operator of its request for program
deletion at least the Monday preceding the calendar week during which the deletion is
desired. If no television broadcast station is licensed to the community in which the sports
event is taking place, the 35-mile blackout zone extends from the broadcast station’s
licensed community with which the sports event or team is identified. If the event or local
team is not identified with any particular community (for instance, the New England
Patriots), the 35-mile blackout zone extends from the community nearest the sports event
which has a licensed broadcast station. The sports blackout rule does not apply to cable
television systems serving less than 1,000 subscribers, nor does it require deletion of a sports
event on a broadcast station’s signal that was carried by a cable system prior to March 31,
1972. The rule does not apply to sports programming carried on non-broadcast program
distribution services such as ESPN. These services, however, may be subject to private
contractual blackout restrictions.
12 Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 (SHVA), P.L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, Title II;
Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 (SHVIA), P.L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-526 to 1501A-545; and Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act
of 2004 (SHVERA), P.L. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809. For a discussion of these rules governing
satellite carriage of local and distant signals, see CRS Report RS22175, Satellite Television:
Provisions in SHVERA Affecting Eligibility for Distant and Local Analog Network Signals,
by Julie Jennings.

CRS-5
! cable-related statutory copyright provisions, which set specific
terms, conditions, and rates, including mandatory licenses, for
certain uses of programming.13 For example, cable systems enjoy a
royalty-free permanent compulsory copyright license — that is, do
not have to pay copyright fees — for the carriage of broadcast
signals of stations located in their local market areas (called
“designated market areas” or DMAs). But cable systems are
required to pay royalties under a congressionally granted compulsory
copyright license for the carriage of the signals of broadcasters
located outside the DMA within which the cable system is located.
The royalty-free license extends to the secondary transmission of
out-of-DMA broadcast stations, however, if it can be shown that
those out-of-DMA signals are “significantly viewed” by those
households within the cable system’s service area that only receive
their television signals over-the-air.
! the commercial leased access requirements in section 612 of the
Communications Act, which require a cable operator to set aside
channel capacity for commercial use by video programmers
unaffiliated with the operator.14
13 Copyright Act of 1976 (17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119, and 122).
14 Communications Act of 1934, as amended, Sec. 612 (47 U.S.C. § 532). This statutory
framework for commercial leased access was first established by the Cable Communictions
Policy Act of 1984 (P.L 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779). Cable operators with fewer than 36
channels must set aside channels for commercial use only if required to do so by a franchise
agreement in effect as of the enactment of Sec. 612. Operators with 36 to 54 activated
channels must set aside 10% of those channels not otherwise required for use or prohibited
from use by federal law or regulation. Operators with 55 to 100 activated channels must set
aside 15% of those channels not otherwise required for use or prohibited from use by federal
law or regulation. Cable operators with more than 100 activated channels must designate
15% of such channels for commercial use. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-385) established new rules, modifying Sec. 612, that
required the FCC to (a) determine the maximum reasonable rates that a cable operator may
establish for commercial use of designated channel capacity; (b) establish reasonable terms
and conditions for such use, including those for billing and collections; and (c) establish
procedures for the expedited resolution of disputes concerning rates or carriage. In
implementing the statutory directive to determine maximum reasonable rates for leased
access, the Commission adopted a maximum rate formula for full-time carriage on
programming tiers and for à la carte services, and a prorated rate for part-time programming.
One condition of the FCC’s approval of the transfer of licenses of the bankrupt Adelphia
Communications Corporation to Comcast Corporation and Time Warner Inc., is that if an
unaffiliated programming network is unable to reach an agreement pursuant to the
Commission’s commercial leased access rules with Comcast or Time Warner, that network
may elect commercial arbitration of the dispute, where the arbitrator would be directed to
resolve the dispute using the rate formula specified in the Commission’s rules. Another
condition allows an unaffiliated regional sports network that is unable to reach a carriage
agreement with Comcast or Time Warner to elect commercial arbitration of the dispute. See
In the Matter of Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of
Licenses: Adelphia Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession),
(continued...)

CRS-6
! the program carriage provisions in section 616 of the
Communications Act directing the FCC to establish regulations
governing program carriage agreements and related practices
between cable operators or other MVPDs and programmers that
would prevent an MVPD from requiring a financial interest in a
program service as a condition for carriage, from coercing a
programmer to grant exclusive carriage rights, or from
discriminating against an unaffiliated programmer in a fashion that
unreasonably restrains the ability of that programmer to compete,
when the programming is distributed over satellite.15
! the requirements for nondiscriminatory access to programming
in which a cable operator has an attributable interest in section
628 of the Communications Act, which directs the FCC to establish
rules to prevent a vertically integrated cable operator from
discriminating in the prices, terms, and conditions at which it makes
its programming available to non-affiliated MVPDs or have
exclusive access to the programming in which it has an attributable
interest.16 But these prohibitions do not hold if the vertically
integrated company’s programming is distributed over terrestrial
facilities (for example, over broadband lines), an exception that
frequently applies to regional sports networks and potentially could
14 (...continued)
Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. (subsidiaries), Assignees; Adelphia Communications
Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors and Transferors, to
Comcast Corporation (subsidiaries), Assignees and Transferees; Comcast Corporation,
Transferor, to Time Warner Inc., Transferee; Time Warner Inc., Transferor, to Comcast
Corporation, Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, adopted July 13, 2006, released
July 21, 2006, at paras. 109 and 181.
15 Communications Act of 1934, as amended, Sec. 616 (47 U.S.C. § 536).
16 Communications Act of 1934, as amended, Sec. 628 (47 U.S.C. § 548). When
NewsCorp, which owns many cable networks, acquired from Hughes Electronic Corporation
a large ownership interest in DirecTV, thus creating a vertically integrated programmer-
distributor entity, the FCC conditioned the transfer of the spectrum licenses upon a
agreement to abide by the same non-discrimination requirements, even though the new
company would not have been so required under the existing statutory provisions. (In the
Matter of General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronic Corporation, Transferors,
and the New Corporation Limited, Transferee, for Authority to Transfer Control,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 03-330, Appendix F, 2004.) The FCC imposed a
similar condition on the transfer of the licenses of the bankrupt Adelphia Communications
Corporation to Time Warner and Comcast. See In the Matter of Applications for Consent
to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses: Adelphia Communications
Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors, to Time Warner Cable
Inc. (subsidiaries), Assignees; Adelphia Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries,
debtors-in-possession), Assignors and Transferors, to Comcast Corporation (subsidiaries),
Assignees and Transferees; Comcast Corporation, Transferor, to Time Warner Inc.,
Transferee; Time Warner Inc., Transferor, to Comcast Corporation, Transferee,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, adopted July 13, 2006, released July 21, 2006, at
Appendix B.

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apply to all cable program networks as broadband fiber optic cable
becomes more widely deployed. This exception has been termed by
some the “terrestrial loophole.”
! the broadcast ownership rules17 and cable ownership rules18,
which can affect the relative negotiating strength of programmers
and distributors by restricting or allowing their reach in national or
local markets. For example, some parties have argued that changes
in broadcast ownership rules that allow broadcasters to own more
than one television station in a market has significantly strengthened
the retransmission consent bargaining position of those broadcasters
that own or control more than one station in a local market.19
! certain statutory exemptions from the antitrust laws for sports
leagues.20
In addition to these federal rules, there sometimes is informal government
intervention into programmer-distributor negotiations because of political sensitivity
to consumers losing access to programming — and especially local programming.
Parties involved in negotiating impasses, or consumers affected by those impasses,
often will seek intervention by an elected official or regulatory agency, even where
there is no formal process for such intervention. In some instances, political pressure
17 The FCC has long regulated broadcast ownership as a means of promoting diversity,
competition, and localism in the media without regulating the content of broadcast speech,
pursuant to sections 307, 308, 309(a), and 310(d) of the Communications Act (47 U.S.C. §§
307, 308, 309(a), 310(d)), which authorize the Commission to grant and renew broadcast
station licenses in the public interest.
18 Section 613(f) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
amended the Communications Act of 1934, directing the FCC to conduct proceedings to
establish reasonable limits on the number of subscribers a cable operator may serve
(horizontal limit) and the number of channels a cable operator may devote to its affiliated
programming networks (vertical, or channel occupancy limit). Congress intended the
structural ownership limits mandated by Section 613(f) to ensure that cable operators did
not use their dominant position in the MVPD market, acting unilaterally or jointly, to
unfairly impede the flow of video programming to consumers. (47 U.S.C. § 533(f))
19 See, for example, Linda Moss and Mike Farrell, “Dueling for Dollars,” Multichannel
Newswire, March 5, 2007, available at [http://www.multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=
articlePrint&articleid=CA6421302], viewed on June 28, 2007.
20 In its 1922 ruling in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National Baseball Clubs, the
Supreme Court ruled that baseball is a sport subject to state regulations, not a business
involved in interstate commerce that would be subject to the federal antitrust laws.
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged in its 1953 decision in Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc. and again in its 1972 decision in Flood v. Kuhn that the baseball’s antitrust
exemption was “an anomaly,” it ruled that it is up to Congress to change baseball’s antitrust
exemption. Other sports leagues do not enjoy the same broad antitrust exemption as
baseball. But the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (15 U.S.C. 1291) created a limited
antitrust exemption that allows a league to negotiate the broadcasting rights for all the teams
in a football, baseball, basketball, or hockey league. The Act was amended in 1966 to
exempt the combining of any professional football leagues.

CRS-8
can be placed on a party to resolve a contractual conflict in a fashion that it would not
agree to in a strictly private negotiation.21 In at least one situation in which a cable
company and broadcast station reached an impasse in retransmission consent
negotiations and the local broadcast signal was removed from the cable company’s
offering, a city attorney threatened legal action against the cable company unless the
broadcast signal were restored, claiming that not providing the signal was a violation
of the franchising agreement between the city and the cable company.22
Recently, there have been more frequent incidents of programmers and MVPDs
failing to reach contractual agreements, and in several instances one or the other party
— or end users who were affected by the impasse — have sought federal
government intervention either at the FCC or with Congress. The parties seeking
intervention often propose modification of existing statutory provisions or regulatory
requirements that allegedly favor one side in the negotiations or undermine the
successful consummation of negotiations.23 Although these impasses have involved
a number of different issues, the most controversial (and widely publicized) conflicts
have involved unresolved retransmission consent negotiations or agreements that
would award a single distributor exclusive rights for sports programming or that
would require that high-priced sports networks be placed on the expanded basic tier.
There are three basic functional components to the provision of video
programming: producing content; assembling content into a programming package,
such as a network, that can be efficiently distributed; and distributing the
programming to end users. (For convenience, in this report, the content assembler
is called a programmer.)
21 Some cable companies have complained that although, once a broadcast station has
chosen the retransmission consent option rather than the must-carry option, there is no
statutory requirement for a cable company to reach a retransmission consent agreement with
the broadcast station if it is not in the cable company’s interest to do so, in practice the
political pressure placed on the cable company can force it to accept a detrimental contract.
See, for example, the lengthy interview of Fred Dressler, executive vice president of
programming, Time Warner Cable, presented as “Past, Present and Future: An Oral History;
Fred Dressler reflects on his career, the industry and its future,” An Advertising Supplement
to Multichannel News, December 18, 2006, at pp. 18a-36a.
22 See Anne Veigle, “Cox Maneuver Puts TV Stations Back on Cable,” Communications
Daily, February 3, 2005, at pp. 4-5.
23 There is precedence for changing regulations affecting the programmer-distributor
relationship as market conditions change. For example, in 1970, prior to the development
of cable and satellite television, when the then-three major broadcast networks (CBS, NBC,
and ABC) captured approximately 90% of television viewers, the FCC implemented
Financial Interest and Syndication Rules (Fin-Syn Rules) that prohibited the networks from
holding a financial interest in the television programs they aired beyond first-run exhibition
and from creating in-house syndication arms. Consent decrees executed by the Department
of Justice in 1977 solidified the rules and limited the amount of prime-time programming
the networks could produce themselves. In 1991, based in part in the decrease in major
broadcast networks’ audience market share to approximately 65%, the FCC relaxed the Fin-
Syn Rules. Appeals courts later relaxed the rules even further, in effect eliminating the rules
by November 1995.

CRS-9
In most cases, the programmer is a media company that packages individual
programs or program series to create an over-the-air broadcast network or a cable
network. That programmer may or may not own the production studio or sports team
where the creative talent (actors, directors, athletes, etc.) directly produces the
content, that is, may or may not vertically integrate “backwards” into direct
production. On occasion, a sports team or league will vertically integrate forward by
packaging its own games and other programming into a network under its own brand
name (for example, a National Football League, Major League Baseball, or Yankees
network). Also, sometimes a company is both a programmer and a distributor. For
example, while an over-the-air broadcaster is just a programmer for the majority of
households that receive their video programs from an MVPD, it is also a distributor
of that programming to the minority of households that continue to receive their
programming over-the-air. Similarly, most of the large MVPDs have vertically
integrated backward and now have partial or total equity interests in some of the
cable networks distributed over their cable or satellite systems. Several MVPDs also
own sports teams (for example, Cablevision owns the New York Knicks) and thus
are content producers, as well. Moreover, the large media companies that own
broadcast networks also own cable networks and often tie distributor access to their
broadcast networks to agreement to carry some of their cable networks.
Further complicating these relationships, although existing statutory rules give
the local broadcast station the right to negotiate the terms under which it makes its
programming available for retransmission by MVPDs, many of those local
broadcasters are affiliated with a national television network and, in their affiliation
agreements with the national network, give the network the right to negotiate the
terms of retransmission consent. Moreover, increasingly the negotiations between
large programmers and large distributors also involve video-on-demand rights to
large portions of the programmer’s library of content, as well as provisions setting
conditions on how the programmer can make its programming available for Internet,
cellphone, and other new avenues of distribution. In addition, during the transition
from analog to digital transmission and the initial deployment of high definition
technology, programmer-distributor negotiations increasingly involve issues of
whether a program will be carried in multiple formats (analog and digital, high
definition and standard definition) and whether a network will be placed on an analog
or digital tier.
Despite all these complexities, the relationships among content producer,
programmer, and distributor are characterized by mutual need — both the content
producer and the programmer need distributors that have direct contact with the
potential audience; the distributor needs content producers and programmers with
good content to attract subscribers. At the same time, there is an inherent tension as
each seeks to capture the lion’s share of the value that consumers place on the
content. Each must weigh the potential loss if an impasse occurs and the
programmer refuses to permit the distributor to carry the programming or if the
distributor chooses not to carry the programming. For example, for the programmer
that potential loss could take the form of foregone compensation from the MVPD

CRS-10
and/or foregone advertising revenues as advertisers respond to a reduced audience,24
both of which could be substantial if the MVPD’s subscribers represent a significant
portion of the programmer’s total audience and if those subscribers do not switch to
another MVPD that does carry the programmer’s network. For the distributor, that
potential loss could take the form of foregone subscriber revenue if, without the
programming as part of its offering, some end users shift to a competing MVPD, as
well as foregone advertising revenues. The losses could be substantial if many
subscribers switched to a competing MVPD. Given these risks, negotiating impasses
usually are avoided. Over time, market forces have led to the adoption of business
models that serve content providers, programmers, and distributors.
But these business models represent an unstable equilibrium. When market
conditions that affect the relative negotiating strength of content providers,
programmers, and distributors change, the newly strengthened party typically
attempts to change the prevailing business model to its advantage. That is happening
today. Content providers and programmers are taking advantage of structural market
changes favorable to them to pressure MVPDs to make cash payments for
programming that until now was available either for free or for non-cash
considerations (or, where cash payments have been made in the past, to make higher
cash payments). Some MVPDs have had sufficient countervailing market power to
resist, or limit, these changes, but others have not. This had led to calls by the
smaller, often rural, MVPDs for modifications to the retransmission consent rules
and other federal rules that allegedly favor programmers — and, in particular, local
broadcast stations — in their negotiations with distributors.
There is one critical business practice that tends to hold for the contractual
relationships at all levels — the practice of including a strict non-disclosure provision
that prohibits the parties from revealing the terms, rates, and conditions in the
contract. This practice limits the information publicly available to the negotiating
parties and thus tends to favor the larger parties (whether programmers or
distributors) who are involved in more negotiations and thus privy to more
confidential information. This practice also severely limits public policy makers’
access to information, since even parties that would be willing to make such
information available to government agencies are prohibited from doing so.
This report first analyzes the changing programmer-distributor market dynamics
for non-sports programming that are threatening to undermine traditional business
models.25 It then provides examples of recent programmer-distributor conflicts that
24 Kagan Research reported in Economics of Basic Cable Networks, 2006 (at p. 5) that the
advertiser-supported cable networks had gross advertising revenues of $13.7 billion and also
had license fee revenues of $13.7 billion in 2004. Kagan projected that in 2009 those totals
would be $25.4 billion and $24.2 billion, respectively. In contrast, broadcast networks
historically have received almost all of their revenues from advertising, not from per
subscriber fees imposed on MVPDs. Broadcaster attempts to increase those per subscriber
fees have been at the core of the recent broadcaster-MVPD retransmission consent conflicts.
25 This report does not directly address sports programming because there are a number of
factors that are unique to sports programming — such as vertical integration by the content
(continued...)

CRS-11
reflect these market changes. Finally, it discusses proposals made by various parties
to modify current statutory and regulatory rules in light of the market changes.
Market Changes Affecting the Programmer-
Distributor Relationship
The increase in programmer-distributor conflicts is, in large part, the result of
several structural changes in the video market that are affecting the relative
negotiating strengths of the various parties and hence undermining prevailing
business models and affecting the availability and pricing of video programming for
consumers.
More Distribution Options
The most significant structural change in the video market is the increase in the
number of program distribution options. Today, programmers can distribute their
product not only through traditional broadcast television stations and cable operators,
but also through direct broadcast satellite operators and other satellite companies, the
new multichannel video offerings of the major telephone companies, cable
“overbuilders,”26 on-line video streams, and even cellular telephones. As a result,
programmers have more options available to them to reach audiences and are able to
negotiate with distributors from a position of strength, often demanding terms,
conditions, and rates that are more favorable to themselves and less favorable to
distributors than those that have prevailed in the past.27 The market implications are
greatest for “must-have” programming, such as major sports programming and the
programming of the four major broadcast networks, for which a significant portion
of subscribers have a sufficiently strong intensity of demand that they consider
carriage of that programming a prerequisite for subscribing with an MVPD. An
MVPD that does not offer must-have programming may find itself at a significant
competitive disadvantage in the market. By contrast, the prevailing business model
was developed — and some of the programmer-distributor contracts that are
25 (...continued)
providers into distribution, the unique demand characteristics of sports fans, the lack of
close substitutes for major sports leagues, and the seasonal nature of sports — that yield
viable business models that do not apply to non-sports programming. Sports programming
is addressed in this report to the extent it represents “must-have” programming that affects
programmer-distributor negotiations that affect non-sports as well as sports programming.
26 These are companies that have been awarded franchises by local franchising authorities
and have built their own wireline networks in areas already served by an incumbent cable
operator. These overbuilders frequently offer broadband access service as well as cable
service and often serve smaller geographic areas than the incumbent cable operator,
sometimes serving only high-rise buildings.
27 For example, a Sinclair Broadcast Group executive reportedly has stated that as cable,
satellite, and telephone companies all seek to distribute Sinclair’s broadcast signals, Sinclair
has more bargaining power than it had in the past. See Joe Morris, “Cable, WCHA at Odds:
Broadcast Dispute Might Go To Court,” Charleston Gazette, July 7, 2006, at p. 1.C.

CRS-12
currently expiring were negotiated — in the early and mid 1990s, when cable
operators typically were the monopoly MVPD in their service area and therefore had
countervailing market power when negotiating with programmers, including those
programmers with must-have programming.
One group of distributors — small and mid-sized cable companies — has been
placed in a particularly difficult position by this structural market change, while a
second group of distributors — the newly-entering telephone companies — has
hastened this change. And both, in turn, have had an impact on all distributors.
Small and mid-sized cable companies often face direct competition from the two
major satellite companies, DirecTV and DISH Network. These cable companies
have far fewer subscribers than the major satellite companies and thus when
negotiating with programmers typically do not pose a serious risk to the programmers
if there is an impasse and the programming is not carried; a programmer’s foregone
per subscriber fees from these cable companies and foregone advertising revenues
would not be substantial. By contrast, a programmer’s revenues could be
significantly reduced if one of the satellite companies discontinued carriage, since
each of the satellite carriers have more than 13 million subscribers.28 Moreover,
many of the smaller cable companies have limited or no ability to offer telephone and
broadband access services and therefore limited ability to offer bundled
video/telephone/broadband services that tend to foster customer retention even when
favored programming is no longer carried. Thus, if an impasse were to occur, a
smaller cable company would face significant risk of losing subscribers to satellite
companies. In fact, where a smaller cable company has had an impasse with a
programmer, sometimes the programmer — or a satellite operator that has an
agreement with the programmer and is competing with the cable company — has
offered a “bounty” of upwards of $200 to households to switch to the satellite
service, with these offers marketed over the programmer’s network while the
programmer-cable company negotiations are still on-going.29
The telephone company entrants, which are starting to offer multichannel video
service and therefore must offer a wide array of programming to attract consumers
away from incumbent cable and satellite providers, also have very limited leverage
28 This is a greater concern for a national programmer (such as a cable network or a
broadcast network) than for a local programmer (such as a local broadcast station).
29 It is not always clear whether it is the satellite company or the programmer that is actually
paying the customer to switch MVPD. For example, when Sinclair Broadcast Group and
Mediacom Communications were in an impasse in retransmission consent negotiations late
in 2006, Mike Wilson, the general manager of Sinclair’s Fox 17 station in Iowa issued a
statement to viewers, stating in part that “the termination of our relationship with Mediacom
need not limit your ability to continue to watch us.... you may choose to subscribe to either
DirecTV or to the Dish Network, both of which will continue to carry FOX 17. We
particularly encourage you to call DirecTV ... because if you sign up with them prior to
December 1, 2006 and comply with certain requirements, FOX 17 WILL PAY YOU $150
(which will be applied as a rebate against your DirecTV bill, which will be applied as fifteen
$10 rebates against each of your first 15 monthly DirecTV bills)!” The Wilson statement
is available at [http://www.longren.org/2006/10/30/more-on-mediacom-vs-sinclair/], viewed
on June 27, 2007.

CRS-13
in their negotiations with programmers. But this situation may not be particularly
harmful to the telephone companies’ business plans for several reasons. First, they
may be less resistant to a higher per subscriber charge for access to programming
than has previously prevailed in the market because they currently have very few
subscribers and thus this cost represents a very small portion of their market entry
costs. Their costs for programming, even if paying a premium, pale in relation to the
capital investments and operating costs associated with truck rolls to customer
premises needed to bring fiber or other wireline broadband technologies close to the
home. Moreover, in contrast with the smaller cable companies, the telephone
companies have significant revenues streams from telephone and broadband access
services that contribute toward the fixed costs of their infrastructure.
The willingness of the telephone companies to pay more than the previously
prevailing rates for programming and the inability of many smaller cable operators
to withstand programmer demands for higher payments have adversely affected the
ability of the large incumbent MVPDs — cable and satellite — to resist less
favorable terms for programming, despite the countervailing market strengths that
they bring to their negotiations. Although these large MVPDs have rarely had an
impasse in negotiations that resulted in carriage of particular programming being
disrupted, the trade press has noted very contentious negotiations and (despite
contractual language requiring all parties to keep all terms confidential) evidence that
the cash payments that the large cable and satellite companies are paying for popular
programming are increasing.30
Ironically, the market consequence of greater competition in the distribution of
video programming appears to be greater negotiating leverage for programmers with
popular — and especially must-have — programming, resulting in higher
programming prices that MVPDs tend to pass through at least partially to subscribers.
Consolidation and Clustering of Cable Operators
At the same time that additional distribution options have become available to
video programmers, consolidation (acquisitions resulting in a small number of large
firms serving an increasing portion of total subscribers, nationwide) and clustering
(acquisitions resulting in individual firms serving an increasing portion of subscribers
in a particular local market) are occurring among cable operators and the two major
satellite operators are growing, so that the largest video distributors are serving a
higher share of total MVPD subscribers than they have in the past and the large cable
operators’ serving areas have become increasingly concentrated into a small number
of very large clusters. These trends are the result of acquisitions by the large cable
30 The very large cable companies appear to have been more successful than the two large
satellite companies in resisting cash payments, for several reasons. Their strategy to cluster
their systems in a limited number of local markets has given them high subscriber
penetration in those markets, which helps in negotiations with local broadcast stations.
Also, their ability to offer bundles of video, voice, and data services reduces the likelihood
that subscribers will change provider based solely on the loss of a particular video program.
Finally, they are negotiating from a history of not making cash payments (at least to
broadcasters), and this has created an inertia that takes greater effort for the programmers
to overcome.

CRS-14
companies of smaller cable companies, swaps among cable systems of local cable
systems that have allowed single companies to become the dominant cable provider
in metropolitan statistical areas or beyond, and successful market growth by the two
large DBS operators, DirecTV and DISH Network. As shown in Table 1, which
reproduces data provided in the FCC’s most recent report on the status of
competition in the market for the delivery of video services, since 2002 the
percentage of total MVPD subscribers served by the largest MVPDs has grown and
concentration in the market for the purchase of video programming, as measured by
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,31 has increased. These figures do not reflect the
2006 purchase by the two largest cable companies, Comcast and Time Warner, of the
cable operations of Adelphia, which had been the fifth largest cable operator but fell
into bankruptcy. Thus concentration is even greater today, although it is likely that
the trend will be reversed as the two major telephone companies, AT&T and
Verizon, continue to roll out their video service offerings, which currently are
available in only a few geographic markets.
Table 1. Consolidation in the National Market for the Purchase
of Video Programming (Percentage of MVPD Subscribers),
2002-2005
Largest
2002
2003
2004
2005
MVPDs
Top 1
14.75%
22.69%
23.37%
22.99%
Top 2
29.04%
35.01%
35.47%
38.71%
Top 3
41.03%
46.63%
47.34%
50.99%
Top 4
50.48%
55.98%
57.97%
62.67%
Top 10
84.44%
81.95%
84.72%
88.39%
Top 25
90.26%
87.45%
90.41%
94.00%
Top 50
92.05%
89.29%
92.32%
95.73%
HHI
884
1031
1097
1201
Source: Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Twelfth Annual Report, adopted
February 10, 2006 and released March 3, 2006, at p. 119, Table B-4.
Table 2 lists the 25 largest cable operators, which are often referred to as
multiple system operators or MSOs, and the number of subscribers they had as of
December 2006. It is noteworthy that the largest MSO, Comcast, had almost as
many subscribers as numbers 3 through 25 combined.
31 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the most commonly accepted measure of
market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm and then
summing the resulting numbers. The higher the HHI, the more concentrated the market.
The HHI can range from close to zero for a market of many tiny firms to 10,000 for a
monopoly. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission use the HHI when
evaluating mergers. They consider a market with an HHI of 1,000 to 1,800 to be moderately
concentrated and a market with an HHI of 1,800 or greater to be highly concentrated. As
a general rule, if a merger in an already-concentrated market would increase the HHI by
more than 100 points, that would raise antitrust concerns.

CRS-15
Table 2. The 25 Largest Cable Operators as of December 2006
Number of
Number of
Rank
Cable Operator
Rank
Cable Operator
Subscribers
Subscribers
1
Comcast
24,161,000
14
Service Electric
287,800
2
Time Warner
13,402,000
15
Armstrong Group
231,600
3
Charter
5,398,900
16
Atlantic Broadband
231,500
4
Cox
5,395,100
17
Midcontinent
195,900
5
Cablevision
3,127,000
18
Pencor Services
182,900
6
Bright House
2,307,400
19
Knology
178,600
7
Mediacom
1,380,000
20
Millenium Digital
157,100
8
Suddenlink
1,360,000
21
Buckeye
145,500
9
Insight
1,322,800
22
Northland
144,300
10
CableOne
641,500
23
MidOcean
138,400
11
RCN
371,100
24
Grande
137,500
12
WideOpenWest
361,200
25
MetroCast
137,300
13
Bresnan
294,000
Source: Table prepared by National Cable and Telecommunications Association based on data from
Kagan Research, LLC, available at [http://www.ncta.com/ContentView.aspx? contentId=73], viewed
on June 28, 2007.
Had the satellite operators, DirecTV and DISH Network, been included in this
list, they would have ranked second and fourth, respectively.32 But satellite operators
have a somewhat different market impact because they have subscribers dispersed
all around the country, while cable companies tend to cluster their systems in a
limited number of geographic areas. (An individual cable cluster most likely consists
of multiple cable franchises negotiated with many local jurisdictions.) In the early
years of the cable industry, most of the larger firms bidding for cable franchises did
not focus their efforts on narrow geographic regions. As a result, the larger cable
operators tended to have cable franchise that were widely scattered geographically.
Subsequently, many of these large firms traded franchises, to develop clusters in a
smaller number of geographic areas. Clustering provides economies of scale in
operations, marketing, and customer service. It also strengthens a cable operator’s
retransmission consent negotiating position with broadcasters, who are less likely to
risk the foregone subscriber fees and advertising revenues from an impasse with (and
discontinued signal carriage by) a cable operator if that operator serves a large
portion of the broadcaster’s viewing area.
32 According to the 2006 10-K reports filed by DirecTV and EchoStar Communications (the
parent of DISH Network) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as of
December 31, 2006, DirecTV had approximately 16 million subscribers in the United States
(at p. 3) and DISH Network had 13.105 million subscribers (at p. 1).

CRS-16
As shown in Table 3, there are 113 cable clusters serving at least 100,000
subscribers. But reviewing this table in conjunction with Table 2, it is notable that
102 of those clusters are owned by the five largest cable operators and only two are
owned by cable operators that are not among the 10 largest.
Table 3. Cable Television System Clusters
Serving More Than 100,000 Subscribers, as of December 2005
Basic
Rk
Company
Basic Subs
Rk
Company
Subs
1
Cablevision, New York Area
3,026,994
58
Charter, Georgia
298,900
Charter, Los Angeles
2
Comcast, Boston, MA
1,937,802
59
292,500
Metro
3
Time Warner, Los Angeles
1,928,340
60
Charter, North Wisconsin
292,100
4
Comcast, Philadelphia
1,916,460
61
Charter, Northwest
286,900
Time Warner, Syracuse,
5
Comcast, Chicago
1,800,000
62
280,100
NY
6
Comcast, San Francisco Area
1,654,358
63
Insight, Louisville, KY
276,400
Comcast, Richmond-
7
Time Warner, New York
1,400,000
64
272,821
Petersburg
8
Comcast, Seattle, WA
1,032,013
65
Comcast, Indianapolis, IN
270,755
Bright House, Tampa Bay,
9
1,021,281
66
Time Warner, Rochester
264,603
FL
10
Comcast, Washington, DC
1,000,000
67
Cox, Northern Virginia
262,000
11
Comcast, Detroit, MI
962,059
68
Comcast, Ft. Myers-Naples
259,752
Time Warner, Cleveland-
Time Warner, Portland-
12
833,223
69
252,630
Akron- Canton, OH
Auburn, ME
13
Bright House, Central FL
777,428
70
Charter, West Virg.
247,300
Comcast, Salt Lake City,
14
Cox, Middle America Cox
776,000
71
244,680
UT
15
Cox, Arizona
773,000
72
Charter, No. Car./Virginia
239,000
Charter, Southern
16
Time Warner, Houston, TX
754,611
73
229,100
Wisconsin
17
Comcast, Atlanta, GA
733,691
74
Cox, West Texas
219,000
18
Comcast, Miami, FL
740,274
75
Charter, Mid America
217,200
19
Mediacom, South Central
723,000
76
Comcast, Fresno-Visalia
208,386
20
Comcast, New York
705,736
77
Comcast, Tampa/Sarasota
203,947
21
Mediacom, North Central
698,000
78
Cox, Omaha, NE
203,000
22
Comcast, Denver, CO
666,012
79
Comcast, Memphis, TN
201,201
Charter, Northern
23
Comcast, Baltimore, MD
649,366
80
199,600
Michigan
Comcast, Wheeling-
24
Comcast, Pittsburgh, PA
607,574
81
197,660
Steubenville
Comcast, Hartford-New H,
25
546,814
82
Charter, Easter Michigan
195,700
CT
Comcast, St. Paul-
26
539,627
83
Charter, Central California
190,600
Minneapolis
27
Cox, San Diego, CA
538,000
84
Charter, West Michigan
188,900
Comcast, Albuquerque-
28
Comcast, Sacramento, CA
535,294
85
186,533
Sante Fe

CRS-17
Basic
Rk
Company
Basic Subs
Rk
Company
Subs
29
Cox, Oklahoma
501,000
86
Cox, Baton Rouge, LA
180,000
30
Charter, Tennessee/Kentucky
487,700
87
Charter, Louisiana/Miss.
168,400
Time Warner, Raleigh-
31
470,809
88
Cox, Gulf Coast/Florida
168,100
Durham
32
Cox, New England
456,000
89
Charter, Ft. Worth, TX
164,700
Time Warner, Columbia,
33
Charter, St. Louis Metro, MO
452,900
90
163,455
SC
34
Time Warner, Charlotte, NC
426,507
91
Comcast, Eugene, OR
161,308
35
Cox, Hampton Roads, VA
415,000
92
Comcast, Salisbury, MD
159,192
Time Warner, Milwaukee,
36
412,517
93
Comcast, Knoxville, TN
157,693
WI
37
Cox, Las Vegas
410,000
94
Time Warner, Green Bay
146,501
38
Comcast, Portland, OR
398,996
95
Charter, Nevada
145,100
Atlantic Broadband,
39
Time Warner, Hawaii
393,280
96
142,935
Western PA
40
Time Warner, Cincinnati, OH
388,592
97
Charter, Inland Empire
138,900
Comcast, Colorado Spr.-
41
Time Warner, San Antonio
384,400
98
137,121
Pueblo
42
Time Warner, Albany, NY
380,319
99
Comcast, Chattanooga, TN
126,859
Comcast, Harrisbrg-Lncstr-
Buckeye Cable, Toledo,
43
370,267
100
126,150
Leb-York, PA
OH
Comcast, W. Palm Beach-Ft.
Comcast, Burlington-
44
370,216
101
126,013
Pierce, FL
Plattsburgh
45
Time Warner, Columbus, OH
364,608
102
Insight, Peoria, IL
123,000
Comcast, Gand Rapids-
Comcast, Roanoke-
46
362,231
103
121,520
Kalamazoo-B.Cr, MI
Lynchburg, VA
Comcast, Jacksonville,
47
357,707
104
Insight, Northern Illinois
117,000
Brunswick
48
Charter, New England
356,200
105
Insight, Northeast Indiana
116,900
49
Charter, Alabama
350,200
106
Comcast, Orlando, FL
116,081
Time Warner, Greensboro,
Time Warner, Wilmington,
50
348,290
107
115,905
NC
NC
51
Comcast, Nashville, TN
327,920
108
Comcast, Savannah, GA
112,113
52
Charter, Minnesota/Nebraska
327,800
109
Insight, Springfield, IL
111,600
53
Time Warner, Austin, TX
316, 911
110
Comcast, Charleston, SC
109,506
Time Warner, Waco-
54
Cox, Kansas
307,000
111
108,714
Temple-Bryan, TX
Comcast, Johnstown-
55
Charter, South Carolina
302,600
112
107,800
Altoona, PA
56
Time Warner, San Diego, CA
301,656
113
Comcast, Augusta, GA
106,343
Time Warner, Kansas City,
57
300,317
MO
Source: Kagan Research, Broadband Cable Financial Databook, 26th edition, 2006, at pp. 27-28.
Note: Pro forma Comcast/Time Warner acquisition of Adelphia Communications.

CRS-18
Cable system consolidation and clustering have different programmer-
distributor negotiating implications when the programmer has national reach (for
example, a national cable program network or a national broadcast network) vs. local
reach (for example, a local broadcast station). As explained below, consolidation
increases the leverage of a cable system relative to national program networks, while
clustering increases the leverage of a cable system relative to local broadcast stations.
Negotiating with a cable program network.
Cable program networks get approximately half their revenues from per
subscriber fees imposed on MVPDs and half from advertising.33 And those
advertising fees depend on the number of subscribers reached, so the more
subscribers an MVPD reaches, the more valuable that MVPD is to the program
network. Cable program networks that fail to achieve substantial penetration on
MVPD systems face financial peril. In recent proceedings at the FCC, parties have
filed comments asserting that in order to generate the advertising revenues necessary
for success, a national program network must reach between 40 and 60 million, and
perhaps as many as 75 million, subscribers.34 Carriage on the major MVPD systems
— Comcast, Time Warner, DirecTV, and DISH Network — therefore is key to cable
program network success. Cable program network business strategies therefore focus
on obtaining and retaining such carriage. For a new cable program network, that
might involve giving one of the major MVPDs an equity interest in exchange for
carriage. For an established cable network with a strong brand identity, that might
involve creating a sister network and demanding MVPDs to carry the new network
in lieu of cash for carriage of the established network. But even an established
program network is unlikely to risk a negotiating impasse that results in discontinued
carriage by any of those large MVPDs.
As shown in Table 4, the 20 most widely distributed advertiser-supported cable
program networks each are available to more than 90,000,000 households vias
MVPD subscription. Comparing Table 2 to Table 4, it is clear that the cable
program networks that have achieved penetration rates of 90,000,000+ enjoy carriage
on each of the four largest MVPD systems — the systems of the two largest cable
operators as well as on the systems of the two major DBS operators.35 As shown in
Table 2, subscriber reach falls quite quickly beyond those large MVPDs. While
cable program networks will seek carriage on all MVPDs, as the subscriber reach of
33 See footnote 24 above.
34 See In the Matter of Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of
Control of Licenses: Adelphia Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-
possession), Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. (subsidiaries), Assignees; Adelphia
Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors and
Transferors, to Comcast Corporation (subsidiaries), Assignees and Transferees; Comcast
Corporation, Transferor, to Time Warner Inc., Transferee; Time Warner Inc., Transferor,
to Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, adopted July 13,
2006, released July 21, 2006, at para. 101 and fn. 354.
35 Moreover, these cable program networks most likely have attained carriage on the most
basic tier offered by these MVPDs — that is, the one with largest number of subscribers, for
example, the “top 60” tier, rather than the “top 120” tier.

CRS-19
the MVPD falls, the financial risk to a cable program network provider of failing to
reach a carriage arrangement with the MVPD falls. This may make it easier for the
cable network provider to push harder for a high per subscriber fee from a smaller
MVPD. From the perspective of a small or mid-sized cable operator, however,
failing to reach a carriage arrangement for a relatively popular cable program network
that is carried by DirecTV and/or DISH Network can be risky. Thus, a cable
operator’s negotiating position vis-a-vis cable network programmers will be
strengthened by consolidation.
Table 4. Cable Program Networks with the Largest Number
of Subscribers, as of December 2006
Rank
Network
Subscribers
Rank
Network
Subscribers
1
Discovery
92,500,000
10
A&E
91,800,000
2
ESPN
92,300,000
12
TBS
91,700,000
2
CNN
92,300,000
12
Learning Channel
91,700,000
4
TNT
92,100,000
12
Spike TV
91,700,000
4
Lifetime
92,100,000
15
CNN Headline News
91,500,000
4
USA
92,100,000
16
ABC Family Channel
91,300,000
7
Weather Channel
92,000,000
16
MTV
91,300,000
8
Nickelodeon
91,900,000
18
Home and Garden
91,200,000
8
History Channel
91,900,000
19
Food Network
91,100,000
10
ESPN2
91,800,000
19
Cartoon Network
91,000,000
Source: Table prepared by National Cable and Telecommunications Association based on data from
Kagan Research, LLC, available at [http://www.ncta.com/ContentView.aspx? contentId=74], viewed
on June 28, 2007.
Negotiating with a national broadcast network.
When a local broadcast station that is affiliated to a broadcast network has
assigned its retransmission consent rights to the network, the negotiations between
the network and the MVPDs are likely to be somewhat akin to those between large
cable programmers and MVPDs — with the national subscriber reach of the MVPD
an important factor. The major broadcast networks own both multiple broadcast
streams and cable networks, and are likely to seek compensation in some
combination of: the MVPD’s carriage (and tier placement) of other program
networks owned by the broadcaster, the MVPD’s purchase of advertising time on the
broadcast station, the broadcaster being given free advertising time on the MVPD’s
system, and cash payments. The broadcast networks, in offering the most popular
programming, enjoy an even stronger negotiating position than most cable program
networks, but even the major broadcast networks are unlikely to want to risk an
impasse with a large MVPD that serves 10 million or more subscribers.

CRS-20
Negotiating with a local broadcast station or non-network
broadcast group.
The negotiating dynamic may be quite different when a broadcast station is
conducting its own negotiations with MVPDs — which appears to be happening
more often these days. In this situation, the broadcaster’s reach is limited to the local
market (DMA) in which its station is located or, in the case of a station that is part
of a non-network broadcast group, the local markets in which the group has stations.
Its concern will not be with the total subscriber reach of the MVPDs with which it
is negotiating, but rather with the subscriber reach of those MVPDs within the local
markets in which the group has stations. DBS operators are likely to offer service in
many or all of those markets, but an individual cable company, even one as large as
Comcast or Time Warner, is unlikely to operate in all those local markets. What
becomes most important, then, is whether the cable company is clustered in the
market or markets in which the broadcaster has stations. Comparing the subscriber
reach of cable clusters presented in Table 3 to the populations of the markets covered
by those clusters, it is clear that there are many cable clusters that serve a substantial
portion of the households in the local broadcast markets in which they are located.
In these situations, the local broadcasters are less likely to risk a negotiating impasse
with the clustered cable company and therefore likely to face constraints on the
demands they can make for retransmission consent compensation.
Charter Communications CEO Neil Smit has stated that actions it has taken to
increase the densities of its existing clusters have strengthened its position in
retransmission consent negotiations, making it more difficult for station groups to
play hardball given that they would put greater portions of their ad revenues at
stake.36 One industry observer has described this negotiating situation as follows:
Cable operators have more clout than telcos and even DBS. Cable operators are
big enough in major markets to take a broadcaster dark in 60%-80% of local
homes overnight. That would guarantee immediate pain as major advertisers
cancel. But a DBS operator might serve just 10%-20% of local homes so it can
inflict far less pain. Telcos are in the weakest position.37
More Program Networks/Fragmented Audiences
Another major structural market change has been the dramatic expansion in the
number of program networks (sometimes referred to as channels) available to
consumers, with a resulting fall in average audience size per channel. As shown in
Table 5, the number of video channels received by the average U.S. household
increased from 18.8 channels in 1985 to 104.2 channels in 2006, but neither the
number of television households nor the average household viewing time per day
increased nearly so dramatically during that period. Thus the average audience size
36 See Mike Farrell, “Smit: Charter System Sales Could Help Retrans Talks,” Multichannel
Newswire, March 7, 2007, available at [http://www.multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=
articlePrint&articleid=CA6422613], viewed on June 27, 2007.
37 John M. Higgins, “Money Talks: CBS Braces for Cable Showdown,” Broadcasting &
Cable, March 27, 2006, at p. 10.

CRS-21
per program network has fallen substantially. Although the rapid growth in the
number of channels received by the average household has slowed in recent years,
channel availability continues to grow faster than total viewing hours. Moreover,
even the largest MVPD networks, which offer customers more than 200 channels,
cannot carry all available cable networks, which now number more than 500 national
networks as well as numerous regional networks.38
Table 5. Nielsen Data on Total Television Households,
Time Spent Viewing Per Household, and the Average Number
of Video Channels Received Per Household, 1985-2006
Average Number of
Television
Time Spent Viewing
Year
Video Channels
Households in
Television, Per Day,
Received
the U.S. (millions)
Per Household
2006
104.2
110.2
8 hrs 14 mins
2005
96.4
109.6
8 hrs 11 mins
2004
92.6
108.4
8 hrs 01 mins
2000
61.4
100.8
7 hrs 35 mins
1995
41.1
95.4
7 hrs 17 mins
1990
33.2
92.1
6 hrs 53 mins
1985
18.8
84.9
7 hrs 10 mins
Sources: All data from Nielsen Media Research, as follows — number of channels received, National
People Meter Sample, presented in a press release dated March 19, 2007, available at
[http://www.nielsenmedia.com] (under “Latest News,” then “More,” then “Last Six Months,” the
March 19, 2007), viewed on June 27, 2007; television households, NTI, September each year,
available at [http://www.tvb.org/rcentral/mediatrendstrack/tvbasics/02_TVHouseholds.asp], viewed
on June 27, 2007; time spend viewing television, per day, per household, NTI annual averages,
Audimeter sample for 1985, People Meter Sample for all other years, available at [http://www.tvb.org/
rcentral/mediatrendstrack/tvbasics/08_TimeViewingHH.asp], viewed on June 27, 2007.
This proliferation in program networks has had two general market implications.
On the one hand, the typical program network has an audience share of less than 1%,
and unless its programming has very strong appeal to a subset of subscribers who
would be willing to pay separately for that programming, is not likely to command
much compensation from MVPDs for carriage rights. It may well be that if such a
program network is not affiliated with an MVPD or with a major programmer it will
have to rely on the commercial leased access rules and pay to gain access to an
MVPD.39
On the other hand, the relatively few program networks that attract larger
audiences are valuable to MVPDs for two reasons. First, a program network that
attracts a larger audience is, other things equal, likely to have more viewers who
38 National Cable and Telecommunications Association, 2007 Industry Overview, at p. 7,
available at [http://i.ncta.com/ncta_com/PDFs/NCTA_Annual_Report_04.24.07.pdf],
viewed on June 27, 2007.
39 See footnote 14.

CRS-22
might choose among competing MVPDs based on the availability of that network’s
programming; there is greater business risk to MVPDs not to carry that program
network. Second, larger audiences tend to attract more advertising revenues for the
MVPD.
According to Kagan Research, in 2005, of the several hundred advertising-
supported cable networks, only 8 received from MVPDs average monthly license
fees of 40 cents or more per subscriber, only 24 received fees of 20 cents or more,
only 51 received fees of 10 cents or more, and only 112 received fees of 2 cents or
more.40 Clearly, the current price-driven programmer-distributor impasses do not
directly involve the vast majority of program networks; programmers cannot
command significant price increases for them and, in any case, losing the right to
carry such a program network is unlikely to result in significant subscriber migration
to competing MVPDs.
Some program networks, however, remain extremely valuable to MVPDs and,
in fact, in some ways network proliferation has increased the value of these networks,
even if their audience share has shrunk over time. Table 6 shows that although the
major broadcast networks’ share of U.S. television household usage has fallen
substantially over time, they continue to capture relatively large audiences. More
than 25% of all television usage (including usage to watch VCRs and to play video
games) is spent viewing the national programming offered by the four major
broadcast networks and the local and syndicated programming offered by those
networks’ local broadcast station affiliates, and that is projected to continue to
approach 25% of all usage at the end of the decade. Since both the national
programming and the local programming offered by these major network affiliates
attract such relatively large audiences, an MVPD in a market where there is
competition from other MVPDs could find itself at risk of losing substantial numbers
of subscribers if a contract negotiation impasse resulted in it not carrying the
programming of one of those affiliates.41 Interestingly, recent reports that the four
major broadcast networks lost 2.5 million viewers during the spring of 2007
specifically raised the impact that this might have on the advertising rates charged by
the networks, but did not address the potential impact on the broadcast networks’
negotiations with MVPDs.42
40 Kagan Research, The Economics of Basic Cable Networks, 2006, 12th Annual Edition,
2005, at pp. 58-60.
41 As will be discussed below, where a broadcaster owns or controls two major network
affiliated stations in a local market, it is likely to wield significant leverage in retransmission
consent negotiations with local cable systems because the latter would not want to risk
losing carriage of the programming of two major networks and two local stations.
42 See, for example, David Bauder, “Data Says 2.5 Million Less Watching TV,” Associated
Press wire, May 8, 2007.

CRS-23
Table 6. Estimated Share of U.S. Television Home Set Usage
by Program Source (%)
Early
Early
Early
Early
Early
Early
Mid
Late
Source
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
2000s
2000s
ABC/CBS/
60
58
55
49
31
19
17
15
NBC
DuMont
4
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Fox/WB/
—
—
—
—
2
4
5
5
UPN/Paxnet
Network
30
29
25
23
18
10
7
6
Affiliates
Independent
6
11
16
20
16
12
11
10
Stations

PBS Statio

ns
—
2
4
3
3
3
2
2

Pay Cabl

e
—
—
—
4
4
5
4
4
Ad-
Supported
—
—
1
3
20
38
44
48
Cable
Other Cable
—
—
—
—
1
3
4
4
VCR Play
—
—
—
—
5
5
3
3
Video Gam

es
—
—
—
1
1
2
3
3
Average
Hours of Set
35
39
46
51
55
63
65
67
Usage
Weekly
Source: Media Dynamics, Inc., TV Dimensions 2006, Annual Report. The usage shares attributed to
broadcast networks covers their network-originated programming. The usage shares attributed to
network affiliates covers their locally-originated programming plus syndicated programming. The
average hours of set usage weekly counts multiple-set usage to different sources at the same time as
separate exposures.
The data in Table 7 on the cumulative weekly reach of various program
networks also show the breadth of viewership enjoyed by the major broadcast
networks. In any given week each of the four major networks is viewed (for at least
one ten-minute segment) by more than 70% of all U.S. television households, almost
double the viewership of the largest cable network.43
43 If the recent decreases in major broadcast network audiences persist, however, the gap
between broadcast network reach and cable network reach may shrink.

CRS-24
Table 7. The Average Weekly Cumulative Audience Reach
of the Largest Broadcast and Cable Program Networks,
First Quarter 2007
Program Network
Average Weekly Cumulative Market Reach
Broadcast Networks
CBS
74.5%
NBC
72.8%
ABC
72.6%
FOX
70.6%
CW
44.1%
MNT
29.8%
Cable Networks
USA
37.7%
TBS
37.1%
TNT
36.6%
A&E
29.5%
FX
28.9%
DISCOVERY
28.2%
LIFETIME
27.2%
COMEDY CENTRAL
27.2%
NICKELODEON
26.9%
SPIKE
26.8%
HISTORY
26.7%
AMC
25.9%
ESPN
25.1%
Source: Nielsen Media Research Television Activity Report, NHI First Quarter 2007, available at
[http://tvb.org/rcentral/mediatrendstrack/tvbasics/ 10_Reach_BdcstvsCable.asp], viewed on June 27,
2007.
Moreover, the four major broadcast networks provide almost all of the most
popular television programs. As shown in Table 8, during the 2005-2006 television
season, the 100 individual television programs with the largest audiences all were
major broadcast network programs. Although other broadcast programmers provided
shows that ranked among the second one-hundred in ratings, the highest-rated
advertiser-supported cable network program was ranked 236, the second highest-
rated cable network program was ranked 389. This table slightly overstates the
dominance of broadcast programming because it does not include premium cable
programming, such as The Sopranos, which despite seeing its audience size fall from

CRS-25
a high of 13 million households for some episodes in 2002 to 9 million household for
some episodes in 2006, still would have had some episodes among the 100 most
highly watched programs.44 Nonetheless, and despite the recent fall in the major
broadcast networks’ audiences, for the foreseeable future those broadcast networks
are likely to continue to provide the lion’s share of the most popular television
programs.
Table 8. The Individual Television Programs
with the Largest Audience Ratings,
2005-2006 Television Season
RK
PROGRAM
NW
%
RK
PROGRAM
NW
%
1
SUPER BOWL XL (6:26P)
ABC
41.62
56
WNTR OLYM FRI PRIME 2
NBC
9.74
2
ACADEMY AWARDS
ABC
23.08
57
TWO AND A HALF MEN
CBS
9.73
3
ROSE BOWL
ABC
21.71
58
WNTR OLYM SAT PRIME 3
NBC
9.68
4
FOX NFC CHAMP (6:47P)
FOX
20.77
59
FOX NFC CHAMP-POST
FOX
9.64
5
AMERICAN IDOL-TUESDAY
FOX
17.72
60
DANCING W STARS RSLTS
ABC
9.57
6
AMERICAN IDOL-WEDNESDAY
FOX
17.24
61
DEAL OR NO DEAL-MON
NBC
9.48
7
AFC DIVISIONAL PLAYOFF- SA
CBS
16.14
62
FOX WORLD SERIES GAME 1
FOX
9.47
8
DANCING WITH STARS-2/26
ABC
16.02
63
CSI: THU 8P SPECIAL
CBS
9.47
9
WNTR OLYM THU PRIME 2
NBC
15.77
63
CSI MIAMI SPECIAL
CBS
9.47
10
CSI
CBS
15.68
65
FOX MLB NLCS GAME 6
FOX
9.41
11
AMERICAN IDOL THU SP-3/9
FOX
15.52
66
COLD CASE
CBS
9.36
12
WNTR OLYM TUE PRIME 2
NBC
15.48
67
LOST
ABC
9.29
13
AMERICAN IDOL THU SP-3/2
FOX
15.29
68
BARBARA WALTERS PRES
ABC
9.28
14
CSI - THANKSGIVING
CBS
14.62
69
CSI-THU 8P SPECIAL
CBS
9.26
15
GREY’S ANATOMY SP 2-5/15
ABC
14.23
70
CSI: MIAMI - SPCL
CBS
9.25
16
AFC/NFC PLAYOFF GM2
ABC
13.95
71
CSI: NY
CBS
9.24
17
DESPERATE HOUSEWIVES
ABC
13.86
71
LAW AND ORDER: SVU
NBC
9.24
18
WNTR OLYM MON PRIME 2
NBC
13.59
73
DESTINATION LOST
ABC
9.22
19
WNTR OLYM PRIME 1
NBC
13.46
74
SURVIVOR: PANAMA-EX FIN
CBS
9.21
20
AMERICAN IDOL THU SP-2/23
FOX
13.38
75
SURVIVOR: GUAT REUNION
CBS
9.18
21
WNTR OLYM SUN PRIME 1
NBC
13.3
76
FOX MLB LCS: GMS 1&2
FOX
9.1
22
FOX WORLD SERIES GAME 4
FOX
12.96
77
DEAL OR NO DEAL - WED
NBC
9.04
23
WNTR OLYM MON PRIME 1
NBC
12.86
78
SUGAR BOWL
ABC
8.99
24
WNTR OLYM OPEN CEREM
NBC
12.81
79
60 MINUTES
CBS
8.97
25
GREY’S ANATOMY
ABC
12.58
80
BARBARA WALTERS PRES
ABC
8.96
26
CRIMINAL MINDS PREVIEW SP
CBS
12.48
81
FOX MLB DIV: AL GM 5
FOX
8.95
27
GOLDEN GLOBE AWARDS
NBC
12.46
82
24 PRVW SP-1/15 9P
FOX
8.94
28
WITHOUT A TRACE
CBS
12.38
83
WNTR OLYM CLOSE CEREM
NBC
8.88
29
ORANGE BOWL
ABC
12.25
84
HOUSE SP-2/20 8P
FOX
8.83
30
DANCING WITH THE STARS
ABC
11.98
85
CSI THU 8P-SPECIAL
CBS
8.75
31
WITHOUT A TRACE-THANKS
CBS
11.93
86
TWO AND A HALF MEN SPL
CBS
8.74
32
WNTR OLYM THU PRIME 1
NBC
11.92
87
ABC PREMIERE EVENT-4/10
ABC
8.68
44 The Television Advertising Bureau, which tabulates these ratings based on data collected
by Nielsen, explains that it does not include ratings data for the premium cable programs
because those programs are aired multiple times in a week, but the Nielsen data are
presented as the average audience, per showing, and therefore fails to measure the audience
size for the initial showing of each episode.

CRS-26
RK
PROGRAM
NW
%
RK
PROGRAM
NW
%
33
CSI: MIAMI
CBS
11.88
88
WILL & GRACE CLIP SPCL
NBC
8.57
34
SURVIVOR: GUATEMALA FIN
CBS
11.85
90
RUDOLPH-RED NOSE-RNDEER
CBS
8.57
35
WNTR OLYM SUN PRIME 2
NBC
11.6
90
NCIS 9P SPECIAL
CBS
8.56
37
WNTR OLYM SAT PRIME 2
NBC
11.33
92
EXT MAKEOVER: HOME ED.
ABC
8.56
37
WNTR OLYM WED PRIME 1
NBC
11.27
93
CSI: MIAMI - SPECIAL
CBS
8.55
38
WNTR OLYM FRI PRIME 1
NBC
11.27
93
LOST SP-1/11
ABC
8.53
39
WNTR OLYM TUE PRIME 1
NBC
11.26
95
COLD CASE-SPECIAL
CBS
8.53
40
CBS NCAA BSKBL CHAMP
CBS
11.17
96
CHARLIE BRWN CHRISTMAS
ABC
8.51
41
CMA AWARDS
CBS
11.08
97
24 PRVW SP-1/16
FOX
8.49
42
FOX WORLD SERIES GAME 2
FOX
11.06
98
CROSSING JORDAN 4/16
NBC
8.45
43
FOX WORLD SERIES GAME 3
FOX
11.01
99
DEAL OR NO DEAL 12/21
NBC
8.4
44
GRAMMY AWARDS
CBS
10.95
99
TWO AND HALF MEN-SPCL
CBS
8.39
45
SURVIVOR: GUATEMALA
CBS
10.87
99
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
ABC
8.39
46
OSCAR COUNTDOWN 2006 PT 2
ABC
10.86
236
NFL REGULAR SEASON L
ESPN
5.66
47
HOUSE SP-5/3 8P
FOX
10.6
389
MLB DIVISIONAL SERIES L
ESPN
4.43
47
HOUSE
FOX
10.6
419
2006 NBA ALLSTAR GAME
TNT
4.26
49
SURVIVOR: GUATE THNKSGV
CBS
10.59
476
STATE OF THE UNION 2006
FXN
3.8
49
NFL MON NIGHT FOOTBALL
ABC
10.16
487
S JIMMY TIMMY PWRHR2
NICK
3.73
51
24 PRVW SP-1/15 8P
FOX
9.99
49
NBA PLAYOFF-CONF FINALS L
ESP
3.6
52
WNTR OLYM WED PRIME 2
NBC
9.79
526
S KIDS CHOICE 06
NICK
3.51
53
NCIS
CBS
9.77
562
WWE ENTERTAINMENT
USA
3.28
54
UNIT, THE
CBS
9.76
569
FOP MOVIE FAIRY IDOL
NICK
3.21
55
SURVIVOR: PANAMA-EXILE IS.
CBS
9.75
586
NBA ALLSTAR SAT NIGHT
TNT
2.94
Source: Television Bureau of Advertising, Viewer Track, “Top-rated programs of 2005-06 in
Households,” based on data from Nielsen Galaxy Lightning 9/19/05-5/24/06, Advertising-Supported
Subscription TV only, available at [http://www.tvb.org/rcentral/ViewerTrack/FullSeason/05-06-
season-hh.asp], viewed on June 27, 2007.
Table 8 highlights another key factor in programmer-distributor negotiations.
There often is a timing element to must-have programming that programmers can use
strategically in their negotiations with distributors. Television households are far
more likely to switch MVPD providers if they fear the loss of particular time-
sensitive programming, such as the Super Bowl, the Olympic Games, the National
Football League season, or the finale of American Idol or some other extremely
popular series. Some programmers have effectively timed their negotiations with
distributors to take advantage of such program schedules.45 In some cases,
programmers with the rights to sports events have agreed to month-to-month
extensions of lapsed agreements with MVPDs until a time when a key sports event
was imminent and then used the threat of lost access to that sports event as leverage
to complete a more favorable distribution agreement with the MVPDs.46
Table 7 shows that, despite the dominance of the four major broadcast
networks, at least a dozen cable networks have succeeded in attracting more than
45 See, for example, Linda Moss and Mike Farrell, “Dueling for Dollars,” Multichannel
Newswire, March 5, 2007, available at [http://www.multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=
articlePrint&articleid=CA6421302], viewed on June 27, 2007, which includes a discussion
of how broadcasters have used timing to their negotiating advantage.
46 Id.

CRS-27
25% of all television households for at least one 10-minute segment each week. Not
surprisingly, these cable networks generally have been able to command larger than
average per subscriber fees from MVPDs, as shown in Table 9. Those networks
commanding high per subscriber license fees that did not have broad reach into
households tended to fall into one of two categories — sports networks or news
networks — that have unique demand characteristics.47
Table 9. The Advertiser-Supported Cable Networks with the
Highest Average License Fees Per Subscriber Per Month, 2005
Network
Monthly Fee
Network
Monthly Fee
ESPN
2.60
Discovery
0.24
Fox Sports
1.68
ESPN2
0.23
TNT
0.86
AMC
0.22
Disney Channel
0.78
ABC Family
0.22
USA
0.45
A&E
0.21
CNN
0.44
Golf Channel
0.21
Nickelodeon
0.40
Independent Film
0.21
NBA TV
0.34
Lifetime
0.21
Sundance
0.29
Fox Soccer
0.20
TBS
0.29
E!
0.19
Turner Classic Movies
0.28
NFL Network
0.19
MTV
0.28
Natl. Geographic
0.19
FX
0.27
Spike TV
0.18
Fox News
0.25
History Channel
0.18
CNBC
0.25
Source: Kagan Research, Economics of Basic Cable Networks, 2006, 12th Annual Edition,
2005, at p. 58.
The proliferation of program networks may be having another market impact.
In the early and mid 1990s, the average U.S. television household received 41
channels; with the lesser audience fragmentation that existed then, a larger proportion
of networks could expect to capture enough audience share to be profitable. The key
strategic element was to gain a threshold penetration level on basic cable tiers. With
such penetration, there was a reasonable chance to become profitable. Thus one
strategy attractive to large programmers whose existing programming had already
gained some brand identity was to introduce additional program networks under the
47 For example, in an interview that appeared in the May 7, 2007 edition of Broadcasting
& Cable (at pp. 14-16), Jim Bewkes, president and chief operating officer of Time Warner,
stated that about half of CNN’s viewers do not watch any other television, “so if you’re
trying to reach that audience, you want to reach them there.”

CRS-28
corporate brand umbrella, such as Disney, Discovery, ESPN, or Fox. Since then, the
increase in the number of channels available to households and continued
competitive entry by new program networks has resulted in more and more video
networks being only marginally profitable; most program networks do not generate
revenues in excess of production costs and the likelihood of a new program network
proving very popular and profitable is diminishing. This may be constraining the
incentive, which has been strong in the past, of large programmers to introduce
additional program networks, sometimes even when they can use their entrenched
successful networks to cross-market their new networks.48 Thus, although it has been
common for distributors to compensate a programmer for carriage of that
programmer’s popular programming by agreeing also to carry the programmer’s new
program networks, that is becoming a less attractive form of compensation unless the
programmer has an extremely strong brand identity to exploit. It appears that
increasingly a more attractive alternative is for the programmer to extract the value
from its popular programming directly, by demanding cash payment from distributors
for carriage of that popular programming.
Audience fragmentation also appears to be affecting the relationship between
the large broadcast networks and their affiliated broadcast stations. Traditionally,
under the network-affiliate contracts, the networks assumed the retransmission
consent rights of their affiliates, in exchange for making cash payments to the
affiliates. The broadcast networks then typically negotiated retransmission consent
agreements in which the MVPDs agreed to carry new, or less popular, cable program
networks owned by the broadcast networks (for example, MSNBC or ESPN Classic)
as partial compensation for carrying the broadcast network. Recently, the broadcast
networks seem to be changing their business strategy, giving back to their affiliate
broadcast stations the right to negotiate retransmission consent compensation from
MVPDs in exchange for reducing or eliminating the cash payments they make to
their affiliate stations. According to a report in Multichannel Newswire:
And during the past several years, the “Big Four” networks have renegotiated
affiliate deals to eventually eliminate once-lucrative network compensation fees
paid to stations to carry programming from ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC.
Perhaps not coincidentally, those fees began to decline precipitously in 2005,
right around the time that retransmission consent revenue [for the affiliate
stations] began to rise. For example, in 2005, network compensation at Hearst-
Argyle fell 35.9% from $28.8 million to $19.1 million and dipped another 48.7%
in 2006 to $9.8 million.
At Nexstar, network compensation dipped 22.4% in 2005, to $6.6 million, and
fell 36.4% to $4.2 million in 2006. At Sinclair, the drop-off was less dramatic
— 7% in 2005, from $14.3 million to $13.3 million (the company has not yet
48 However, despite the fact that most advertising-supported cable network are not able to
command substantial per subscriber fees from MVPDs, in The Economics of Basic Cable
Networks, 2006, 12th Annual Edition, 2005, at p. 3, Kagan Research concluded:
There’s no question why so many want to enter this business — the economics
are very attractive if one is successful. The industry posted an estimated $9.0
billion in cash flow in 2004, with an enviable margin of 34.1%.

CRS-29
released 2006 network compensation) — but the station owner expects more
dramatic declines in the coming years.
In its 2005 annual report, Sinclair even went so far as to say that retransmission
consent fees have “replaced the steady decline in revenues from television
network compensation.”49
The trend toward greater program network proliferation and fragmented
audiences is complicated by several significant technologically-driven forces. During
the transition from analog to digital technology, programmers of both cable networks
and broadcast networks are trying to get MVPDs to carry their programming in both
analog and digital format — and to carry their digital programming in high definition
as well as standard format. Thus, a single program network now might seek multiple
channels on an MVPD system to offer analog, digital, and high-definition feeds. At
the same time, the deployment of digital technology is allowing broadcasters to
provide multiple digital signals (that is, multiple video programs) on their licensed
spectrum, not just a single signal. A broadcaster that previously provided
programming for one channel on an MVPD system now may seek multiple channels,
which, depending on how the FCC ultimately implements the must-carry and
retransmission consent rules in a multicast digital environment, could result in a
larger portion of an MVPD’s system being set aside exclusively for broadcast
program networks. Whether these technological changes strengthen the negotiating
positions of programmers or distributors may well depend almost entirely on how the
FCC, or Congress, adopts the must-carry and retransmission consent rules for this
new environment. In the short run, however, to obtain carriage of multiple signals
in their retransmission consent negotiations with MVPDs, broadcasters may have to
compromise on other objectives, such as higher cash payments.
Cable System Revenue is Growing From High Speed Internet
Access and Telephone Services
Most cable operators have upgraded their systems over the past decade and now
are able to offer a wide array of services over their broadband networks, including
high speed data, telephone, and digital video services, as well as traditional analog
video services. As shown in Table 10, the revenue base of the cable system
operators is diversifying, with fastest growth occurring in high speed data, telephone,
and digital tier video services. Most subscribers who select these newer services
purchase them as part of a bundled package with basic cable service. This trend is
helping cable operators in their negotiations with programmers in two ways. First,
subscribers who purchase service bundles are less likely to switch to a competing
MVPD if their current provider were to lose carriage of a particular program network,
even a popular network. This is particularly the case if the competing MVPD cannot
offer the full array of services that the cable company does; for example, satellite
companies often cannot offer high speed data and telephone services at a price or
uplink speed that is competitive with cable companies. Second, if a cable company
49 Linda Moss and Mike Farrell, “Dueling for Dollars,” Multichannel Newswire, March 5,
2007, available at [http://www.multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleid=
CA6421302], viewed on June 27, 2007.

CRS-30
is enjoying rapid revenue growth from non-video services, it may be more willing to
hold the line in its negotiations with programmers because it is easier to absorb a
potential loss of video revenues stemming from an impasse and loss of program
carriage when other revenues are growing. On the other hand, the additional
revenues generated by these “triple play” offerings may allow a cable operator to pay
more for programming.
Table 10. Cable Company Revenues, by Service,
1996-2005, in Millions of Dollars
High
Basic
Premium
Digital
Telephone
Net Local
Year
Speed
Miscellaneous
Service
Channels
Tier
Service
Advertising
Data
1996
18,249
4,359
0
—
—
1,413
1,894
1997
20,213
4,616
3
—
8
1,636
2,164
1998
21,574
4,858
98
103
26
1,898
2,333
1999
22,732
5,025
443
386
78
2,267
2,850
2000
24,142
5,259
588
751
275
2,447
2,968
2001
26,324
5,756
1,763
1,870
713
2,431
3,049
2002
27,690
5,963
2,693
4,525
1,265
2,800
3,359
2003
29,000
5,891
3,396
6,772
1,499
2,851
4,237
2004
30,080
6,225
3,966
8,965
1,623
3,236
5,091
2005
31,075
6,389
4,563
11,245
2,158
3,381
6,514
Source: Kagan Research, Broadband Cable Financial Databook, 26th Edition, 2006, at p. 8.
Miscellaneous revenues include commercial revenue, pay-per-view, advanced analog, home shopping,
equipment charges, home networking, pay installation, NVOD, VOD/SVOD, interactive, games,
DVRs, and high definition services.
There has been an interesting market response to the growth in cable system
revenues from non-video services. As these new revenue sources have increased the
average revenue generated per subscribing household (known in the industry as
average revenue per unit, or ARPU), the value of existing cable systems has grown
and this has been reflected in the price per subscriber at which cable systems have
been sold. This, in turn, has affected at least one programmer-distributor negotiation.
On July 1, 2006, Suddenlink Communications completed the purchase from Charter
Communications of cable systems in West Virginia with 240,000 subscribers,
200,000 of whom live in the Charleston, WV service area of a Sinclair Broadcast
Group-owned television station (WCHS, an ABC affiliate) and another television
station (WVAH, a Fox affiliate) for which Sinclair has a local marketing agreement.
The retransmission consent agreement between Charter and Sinclair had expired
prior to the Suddenlink purchase,50 so Suddenlink entered retransmission consent
50 See Mike Farrell, “Suddenlink, Sinclair in Retrans Clash,” Multichannel News, July 5,
2006, available at [http://www.multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint
(continued...)

CRS-31
negotiations with Sinclair before the purchase was completed. Sinclair had sought
$4 million in cash payments over three years. But when Sinclair learned that the
purchase price was $800 million, it raised its demand to more than $42 million.
Sinclair’s vice president and general counsel reportedly stated that, “If they’re paying
$3,200 per sub[scriber], why shouldn’t a piece of that be coming to us?”51 This
raises an interesting issue. To the extent the high cable system valuation is a function
of the programming provided by Sinclair, Sinclair would seem to have a strong claim
for larger cash payments. But to the extent the valuation is not related to Sinclair’s
programming, if Sinclair were nonetheless able to command larger cash payments
that might suggest that the current retransmission consent process may be allowing
programmers to siphon off funds that might, from a public policy perspective, be
better left to cable operators to expand their broadband infrastructure capabilities.
Specific Examples
of Programmer-Distributor Conflicts
As early as 2005, broadcasters announced their intentions to receive cash
payments from MVPDs for retransmission of their broadcast signals that are
comparable to the payments MVPDs make for cable program networks.52 It
generally has not been the mega-programmer broadcast networks (that also own cable
networks) that have been most aggressive in the pursuit of cash payments; rather it
has been the larger non-network station groups (such as Sinclair, Nexstar, and Belo)
and the lone broadcast network that no longer has cable network interests (CBS was
spun off from Viacom in 2005, with the latter retaining such cable networks as
MTV). In the past two years, despite the confidentiality under which contracts are
negotiated, parties have frequently reported to the trade press the difficulties they
were having in their on-going negotiations. This section does not attempt to provide
an exhaustive recitation of recent programmer-distributor conflicts. Rather, it
presents five exemplary cases in an attempt to reflect how the market currently is
operating and explore the factors (including federal rules) that tend to influence
negotiations.
Nexstar: The First Broadcaster to Aggressively Seek
Cash Payments for Retransmission Consent
In January 2005, Nexstar Broadcasting Group, which owns and operates 27
stations in medium sized markets, and provides management, sales, and other
services to an additional 15 stations owned by Mission Broadcasting, sought a
monthly 30 cents per subscriber cash payment fee from Cox Communications and
50 (...continued)
&articleID=CA6349903], viewed on June 27, 2007.
51 Mike Farrell, “Suddenlink in Retrans Row,” Multichannel News, July 10, 2006, at p. 8.
52 See, for example, Linda Moss, “MSOs See Rough Road to Retransmission Deals,”
Multichannel News, July 25, 2005, at p. 1, and Tania Pancyk-Collins, “Viacom Plans
Carriage Fees for CBS Programming,” Communications Daily, September 16, 2005, at p.
7.

CRS-32
Cable One (the fourth and tenth largest cable operators, respectively), for the right
to retransmit the signals of each of the Nexstar/Mission broadcast stations in the Cox
and Cable One franchise areas. Cox filed a complaint with the FCC on January 19,
2005, alleging that Nexstar and Mission refused to budge from their cash demands
and therefore had not negotiated in good faith.53 Cox alleged that Nexstar was
demanding that Cox pay $8.9 million for the next three years “for the privilege of
retransmitting the signals of 5 television stations that are free over-the-air in these
communities.” Cox sought an expedited Commission order setting relief and
sanctions and requiring that the parties resume negotiations.54 Nexstar responded that
Cox was refusing to consider making any cash payments.55
When it filed the petition, Cox had already been required to discontinue carrying
KLST, the CBS affiliate in San Angelo, TX, and KRBC, the NBC affiliate in
Abilene, TX, on Cox cable systems with 72,500 customers, and if there were no
agreement by the end of January 2005, Cox systems with 45,230 customers would
be forced to stop carrying KSNF, the NBC affiliate in Joplin, MO, KODE, the ABC
affiliate in Joplin, and KTAL, the NBC affiliate in Shreveport, LA-Texarkana, TX.
When it had to discontinue carriage of the broadcast stations, Cox provided the HBO
Family networks in their place.
Nexstar had grown rapidly through acquisitions earlier in the decade, but lost
more than $140 million between 2001 and 2005 and was trying to pay down $600
million in debt, which was greater than its revenues over those four years.56
Nexstar’s chief operating officer, Duane Lammers, reportedly stated that his company
faced costs associated with the digital transition and if cable companies take his
stations’ signals and resell them to viewers, “it’s only fair we get a piece.”57
On February 2, 2005, Cox prevented the loss of carriage of the two Joplin, MO
broadcast stations for which the retransmission agreement had expired by using a
“management reorganization” that combined the Missouri systems with Kansas
systems and folded them into a retransmission agreement for its Kansas cable
systems.58 But Cox did lose carriage of Nexstar’s KTAL station in Shreveport-
Texarkana on February 1, 2005. Moreover, Bossier City, LA City Attorney James
53 After the fact, the Nexstar position was described in Broadcasting & Cable as “a take-it-
or-leave-it demand: Pay 30¢ monthly per subscriber, or we’ll yank our signals.” See John
M. Higgins, “Cable, Broadcast Battles End,” Broadcasting & Cable, February 6, 2006,
available at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&article
ID=CA6304947], viewed on June 27, 2007.
54 Anne Veigle, “Cox Asks FCC to Order Nexstar to Retransmission Negotiating Table,”
Communications Daily, January 21, 2005, at pp. 4-5.
55 “Mass Media Notes,” Communications Daily, February 2, 2005, at p. 9.
56 “Texas broadcaster pulls stations off cable,” BroadcastEngineering, January 23, 2005,
available at [http://broadcastengineering.com/news/texas-cable-broadcaster-20050123/],
viewed on June 27, 2007.
57 Id.
58 Anne Veigle, “Cox Maneuver Puts TV Stations Back on Cable,” Communications Daily,
February 3, 2005, at pp. 4-5.

CRS-33
Hall sent Cox a letter threatening legal action unless KTAL were restored to cable
carriage, claiming that not providing KTAL “is a violation of the franchise agreement
between the City of Bossier City and Cox Communications.”59
The dispute in Joplin also involved Cable One, which lost carriage of the two
Nexstar broadcast stations on January 1, 2005. The dispute benefitted satellite
operators, who reported a big upsurge in service orders; Express Cellular & Satellite
in Joplin reported an increase from approximately four installations a day to 20.60
Both Cable One and Cox responded to the lost carriage of the Nexstar broadcast
stations by holding special events at which they gave away old fashioned “rabbit-ear”
television antennas that would allow their subscribers to receive the Nexstar signals
free over-the-air. Cox said it handed out 800 antennas in Abilene, TX, and 2,800 in
San Angelo, TX. Cox also said that it had lost 1,000 subscribers (out of a total of
105,000 subscribers) during the period the Nexstar stations — all affiliates of major
broadcast networks — were removed from its cable systems.61
According to the trade press, with the loss of cable carriage, Nexstar stations’
ratings plunged and their advertising revenues fell accordingly.62 Nexstar
acknowledged losing several million dollars in revenues. With all three parties
harmed by the impasse, after 10 months, on October 20, 2005, Cox, Nexstar and
Mission signed a retransmission consent agreement for analog and digital carriage
rights, covering 12 Nexstar and 9 Mission station serving Abilene-Sweetwater, San
Angelo, Lubbock, Amarillo, Odessa-Midland, and Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX,
Shreveport, LA, Fort Smith, Little Rock, and Monroe-El Dorado, AK, Springfield
and Joplin, MO, and Pittsburg, K63S. The agreement allowed Cox to again carry
KLST/CBS in San Angelo; KTAL/NBC in Bossier City and Minden, LA, and in
Magnolia, AK and Mt. Pleasant, TX; and KRBC/NBC (a Mission station) in Abilene,
Sweetwater, and Snyder, TX. These stations had been removed from the Cox lineup
in January 2005.
The FCC did not act upon the Cox complaint during the 10 months that the
negotiating impasse resulted in the Nexstar stations not being carried on the Cox
systems. When the new retransmission consent agreement was reached, the FCC
dismissed the complaint as moot.
The terms of the retransmission consent agreement between Cox and Nexstar
were not disclosed, but industry executives say Cox and Cable One did not pay the
straight license fees Nexstar was demanding; rather they agreed to buy a certain
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 “Cox Tries a Rabbit Punch,” Broadcasting & Cable, February 21, 2005, at p. 8.
62 John M. Higgins, “Cable, Broadcast Battles End,” Broadcasting & Cable, February 6,
2006, available at [http://www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&article
ID=CA6304947], viewed on June 28, 2007.
63 “Cox Communications, Nexstar Broadcasting and Mission Broadcasting Reach
Retransmission Consent Agreement,” Business Wire, October 20, 2005.

CRS-34
amount of advertising on the Nexstar broadcast stations.64 But smaller cable
operators appear to have capitulated to Nexstar’s willingness to go dark. At the end
of 2005, Nexstar reached a number of retransmission consent agreements with these
smaller cable operators that Nexstar said included cash payments. DBS operators
already had agreed to make cash payments because they needed the local broadcast
signals to be able to compete with cable. In February 2006, Nexstar CEO Perry Sook
said the company expected to collect around $12 million per year from its recent
round of negotiations with cable and DBS operators.65 It was estimated that 15 to
20% of those revenues came from satellite companies and about 30% of those
revenues were in the form of payments for advertising.
Nexstar reported a huge increase in retransmission consent revenues from cable
and satellite companies in 2006. CEO Sook reportedly said these revenues were
$13.7 million in 2006, nearly five times the $2.8 million the broadcaster recorded in
2005.66 Of that 2006 revenue, $8.7 million was cash compensation and $5 million
was from advertising agreements. The revenues came from agreements struck with
150 cable operators, DISH Network, DirecTV, and all the overbuilders in its
territories. Sook said the company expects these revenues to increase in 2007 from
agreements with telephone companies, the expansion of the satellite local-into-local
service, and escalator clauses in existing agreements with cable operators. He said
many existing Nexstar retransmission consent agreements expire in 2008 and 2009,
which will provide an opportunity to further increase retransmission consent
revenues then.
Nexstar appears to have succeeded in its strategy of suffering short-term
advertising revenue losses in order to create the precedent of obtaining cash payments
from MVPDs for carriage of its broadcast signals. It is possible that this strategy
could work because there was little overlap between the mid-sized cities it served and
the generally larger cities served by the two most formidable cable companies —
Comcast and Time Warner.
64 John M. Higgins, “Cable, Broadcast Battles End,” Broadcasting & Cable, February 6,
2006, available at [http://www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&article
ID=CA6304947], viewed on June 28, 2007.
65 John M. Higgins, “Cable, Broadcast Battles End,” Broadcasting & Cable, February 6,
2006, available at [http://www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&article
ID=CA6304947], viewed on June 28, 2007.
66 Mike Farrell, “Nexstar: Retrans Revenues Up,” Multichannel News, March 1, 2007,
available at [http://multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA6420695],
viewed on April 20, 2007.

CRS-35
CBS: The Only Major Broadcast Network to Aggressively
Seek Cash Payments for Retransmission Consent
In 2005, when it still owned the CBS and UPN networks but had already
announced plans to spin off its broadcast assets, Viacom publicly announced its
intention to obtain the same retransmission fees from cable operators for carriage of
its broadcast networks as it received for carriage of its USA cable network; this
would have made it the first broadcast network owner to receive cash payments.67
Industry observers indicated that CBS might be able to do this because in its
retransmission consent negotiations, post-spin off, when it no longer had cable
program networks, it would not have to consider the impact of pushing for cash
payments for its broadcast network on its ability to obtain carriage and cash for its
cable networks. (During the period, it was public knowledge that MTV, which is
owned by Viacom, wanted to introduce several new MTV-branded cable networks.)
Industry observers also indicated that if CBS were to succeed, this might set a
precedent that would help non-network station groups, such as Gannett, Tribune, and
Belo, in their retransmission consent negotiations, but would have less impact on the
negotiations involving the other major broadcast networks, which still have cable
networks.
A number of larger cable operators — Charter, Cox, Insight, and Time Warner
— publicly responded that they would not pay cash for broadcast carriage, though
some did not rule out the possibility of non-cash payments.68 (The largest cable
operator, Comcast, had signed a long-term carriage contract with Viacom at the end
of 2003, and thus would not have been affected by the Viacom proposal.) The cable
operators argued that the broadcast networks continue to lose audience share and
therefore could not demand cash payments, and also that broadcasters were given
spectrum for free and that cable companies should not have to pay for broadcast
signals that customers can get off the air for free. CBS argued that its broadcast
network audience share continued to far exceed that of any cable network and
MVPDs should pay for any programming that they provide their subscribers.
In early March 2006, CBS president Leslie Moonves predicted that CBS would
eventually get “hundreds of millions of dollars” from retransmission consent
agreements covering the 60 million households reached by the CBS and CW stations
owned and operated by CB69S. Later that month, CBS successfully negotiated its first
retransmission consent agreement involving cash payments — with Verizon, the new
telephone company entrant into the MVPD industry, for carriage of CBS’s owned-
and-operated stations. Although the terms were not announced, industry sources said
they were “similar to Hearst-Argyle’s recent breakthrough agreement with DBS
67 See, for example, “Mass Media Notes,” Communications Daily, June 7, 2005, at p. 9, and
Tania Panczyk-Collins, “Viacom Plans Carriage Fees for CBS Programming,”
Communications Daily, September 16, 2005, at p. 7.
68 Jonathan Make, “Cable Won’t Pay Cash for Carriage, Despite Viacom Demands,”
Communications Daily, September 19, 2005, at pp. 3-4.
69 John Eggerton, “Moonves Sees Nine-Figure Retrans Pot,” Broadcasting & Cable, March
6, 2006, at p. 27.

CRS-36
service Echostar” under which Echostar (DISH Network) paid 50 cents per month
for each of its subscribers in the station group’s markets.70
In February 2007, CBS announced that it had successfully negotiated
retransmission consent agreements with cash payment provisions with nine small
cable operators, covering a total of one million cable television subscribers who can
watch CBS owned-and-operated stations.71 But CBS provided no public
confirmation of the exact amount of cash being paid by the cable companies, or even
of the identities of the cable companies, citing confidentiality provisions in the
agreements. Industry observers had differences of opinion on the terms of the
agreements; some thought CBS was receiving 50 cents per subscriber per month ($6
million per year), or even more, while others thought some of the compensation was
in the form of barter advertising time. Wall Street analysts estimated that cash
payments of 50 cents per subscriber per month could generate between $155 million
and $240 million in annual revenues for CBS. A Bank of America report, however,
stated that “the market value for broadcast retransmission rights won’t really be
determined until CBS’s agreements with the largest cable operators come up for
renewal starting in ‘09-‘10.”72
DISH Network/Lifetime/Hearst-Argyle: An Example of the
Complexity of Programmer-Distributor Negotiations
DISH Network has attempted to differentiate itself from other MVPDs in part
by being the low-price provider, offering packages at lower prices than its
competitors, though sometimes not offering on its more basic tiers certain high-cost
networks that are provided on its competitors more basic tiers.73 (In contrast,
DirecTV has differentiated itself in part by having the most sports programming,
including some sports programming for which it is the exclusive provider.) Given
70 John M. Higgins, “Money Talks: CBS Braces for Cable Showdown,” Broadcasting &
Cable, March 27, 2006, at p. 10. See the discussion of the DISH Network/Lifetime/Hearst-
Argyle negotiations in the next section of this report.
71 Linda Moss, “CBS Eyes New Deals,” Multichannel News, February 26, 2007, at p. 3.
72 See Linda Moss, “CBS Eyes New Deals,” Multichannel News, February 26, 2007, at p.
3, and also Michael Malone, “CBS Demands — And Gets — Cash,” Broadcasting & Cable,
February 26, 2007, at p. 43.
73 One of the key elements in programmer-distributor negotiations is the tier that the
network(s) will be placed on. Most MVPDs offer several tiers — a most basic tier with
perhaps 60 program channels, and progressively higher-priced tiers with perhaps 120 and
180 program channels. Programmers, of course, typically seek placement of their networks
on the most basic tier, which will be purchased by the most households and thus generate
higher revenues in the form of greater per subscriber fees and more advertising revenues.
Industry analysts and the trade press often report the subscriber levels for each of these tiers,
but rarely agree on those particular levels. The discussion in this section cites a number of
different sources with inconsistent subscriber figures and thus there are some
inconsistencies about the gain or loss in subscribers as a particular network is moved from
one tier to another. This section seeks to show the general impact of a change in tier, not
to present a quantitative impact calculation, and thus accepts those inconsistencies.

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its business strategy, DISH Network has had more carriage disputes than other
MVPDs with programmers that have sought to raise per subscriber charges.74
On December 31, 2005, DISH Network removed the Lifetime and Lifetime
Movie networks, which target women audiences, from the DISH Network “top 60”
package (its most basic package, variously estimated to have 11 million or 12 million
subscribers) over a carriage dispute. DISH Network and Lifetime each alleged that
the other was making unreasonable demands in their negotiations and then publicly
distorting and mischaracterizing the other’s most recent offer.75 Lifetime’s press
release included quotes of concern from non-profit organizations that serve women
and partner with Lifetime. DISH Network claimed that its contractual arrangements
with 180 networks had been scheduled to expire on December 31, 2005, but it only
experienced an impasse in re-negotiations with Lifetime.76 DISH Network also
claimed that it wanted to return the Lifetime network to DISH Network, but not at
the 76% price increase it alleged Lifetime was seeking. Lifetime claimed it was
seeking a much smaller price increase. Lifetime was the fourth-most-viewed
advertising-supported cable network in the fourth quarter of 2005.
To replace the Lifetime networks, DISH Network temporarily carried
Cablevision’s WE:Women’s Entertainment network on the channel it had used for
Lifetime and the Encore Love Movie network on the channel it had used for the
Lifetime Movie network. In mid-January 2006, DISH Network worked out a carriage
arrangement with Oxygen Media, another network targeting women audiences, to fill
the channel slot previously held by Lifetime Movie network on DISH Network’s “top
120” package, which is received by an estimated 9 or 10 million DISH Network
subscribers. This appeared to be a straight-forward contractual impasse between an
MVPD and a cable programmer — with DISH Network risking losing subscribers
74 For example, in addition to the dispute with Lifetime described in this section, DISH
Network has had a highly publicized dispute with Court TV. When renegotiating carriage
terms for the period beginning January 1, 2007, DISH Network sought to move Court TV
from its “top 60” tier, which one observer estimated to have 11 million subscribers, to its
“top 120” tier, which was estimated to have only 8 million subscribers. Court TV responded
by seeking a 70% increase in its per subscriber fee. DISH Network refused to pay the higher
fee and removed Court TV from its tier, replacing it with The Biography Channel. On
February 9, 2007, DISH Network and Court TV announced a new carriage agreement under
which Court TV was carried on DISH Network’s “top 120” tier, but other terms of the
agreement were not disclosed. See Linda Moss, “Dish Drops Court TV from Lineup,”
Multichannel News, January 8, 2007, at p. 40, and Linda Moss, “Court TV Returns to Dish
Network,” Multichannel Newsline, February 9, 2007, available at
[http://www.multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA6415345],
viewed on June 28, 2007. In recent years, DISH Network has also been involved in carriage
disputes with OLN (now Versus) and Viacom. See Linda Moss and Mike Reynolds, “Dish
Sets a Date: Feb. 1,” Multichannel News, January 29, 2007, at p. 3.
75 Anne Becker, “Lifetime, Echostar Carriage Dispute Rages,” Broadcasting & Cable,
January 4, 2006, available at [http:www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=article
Print&articleID=CA6296491], viewed on June 28, 2007.
76 Adrianne Kroepsch, “EchoStar Pulls Plug on Lifetime After Failed Carriage
Negotiations,” Communications Daily, January 4, 2006, at p. 3.

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to DirecTV and cable operators and Lifetime losing revenues as Oxygen takes
advantage of the gap in women’s networks in the DISH Network line-up.
But, as described in several trade press news analyses, in fact the negotiating
mechanics were more complex.77 Lifetime is 50% owned by Hearst Corp., the
controlling shareholder of Hearst-Argyle Television, which owns 28 broadcast
television stations. Hearst-Argyle therefore had the right to negotiate retransmission
consent agreements with the cable and satellite companies operating in those local
broadcast markets; there were about 16 million television households in those local
markets, approximately 14 million of which subscribed to MVPDs. But Hearst-
Argyle traditionally had made Lifetime its “agent” in the retransmission consent
negotiations with the MVPDs, and in those negotiations Lifetime had successfully
secured carriage of, and higher cash payments for, the various Lifetime cable
networks — rather than seeking cash payments from the MVPDs for carriage of the
Hearst-Argyle broadcast signals. In exchange, Lifetime compensated Hearst-Argyle
$1.8 million in 2004 and $5 million in the first nine months of 2005, or
approximately 4 cents per month for each MVPD subscriber in the local markets
served by Hearst-Argyle broadcast stations.
However, instead of continuing to use Lifetime as its retransmission consent
agent in its negotiations with DISH Network, just as the December 31, 2005 deadline
was approaching, Hearst-Argyle itself undertook retransmission consent negotiations
directly with DISH Network, and accepted DISH Network’s offer of $11 million a
year to carry the Hearst-Argyle broadcast stations to DISH Network’s 1.8 million
subscribers in the Hearst-Argyle markets.78 This represented approximately 50 cents
per subscriber per month, more than 10 times what Hearst-Argyle had been receiving
from Lifetime. But it meant that Lifetime would have to negotiate its own carriage
agreement with DISH Network, without the leverage of being able to deny DISH
Network access to the Hearst-Argyle broadcast programming if an agreement were
not reached.
For its part, DISH Network appears to have believed it was in its financial
interest to break tradition and make a cash payment to Hearst-Argyle on the
expectation that it would save more than that amount in its negotiations with
Lifetime. Presumably it believed that Lifetime, if forced to negotiate carriage on its
own outside the context of retransmission consent negotiations, would lack market
leverage and would have to accept a lower cash payment, since its programming,
although popular, does not represent the sort of must-have programming whose
absence would lead to significant desertion by DISH Network subscribers. A
77 See John M. Higgins, “Money Talks: Deal of a Lifetime,” Broadcasting & Cable,
January 16, 2006, at p. 17, and Mike Reynolds, “Hearst Key to Lifetime-Dish,”
Multichannel Newswire, February 2, 2006, available at [http://www.multichannel.com/
index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleid=CA6303719], viewed on June 28, 2007.
78 This apparently had not been announced publicly, but rather reported in a December 30,
2005 8-K filing that Hearst-Argyle made to the Securities and Exchange Commission. See
Mike Reynolds, “Hearst Key to Lifetime-Dish,” Multichannel Newswire, February 2, 2006,
available at [http://www.multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleid
=CA6303719], viewed on June 28, 2007.

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Broadcasting & Cable analyst concluded that if DISH Network could succeed in
obtaining a reduction of 8 cents per month in cash payments to Lifetime for all 11 or
12 million DISH Network subscribers that would more than make up for a net
increase of 46 cents per month in cash payments to Hearst-Argyle for the 1.8 million
DISH Network subscribers located in local markets served by Hearst-Argyle
broadcast stations.79 But this raised a strategic market question that was widely
discussed in the trade press: would DISH Network lose, nonetheless, because it had
set the precedent of paying cash for carriage of a broadcast network?
In any case, DISH Network could not accomplish its objective if it made cash
payments to Hearst-Argyle and also agreed to a higher — rather than lower —
payment to Lifetime, so an impasse with Lifetime may have been inevitable, even if
Lifetime only sought a nominal price increase.
A month later, on February 1, 2006, Lifetime was back on DISH Network’s “top
60” tier.80 In an amended submission to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
dated January 31, 2006, Hearst-Argyle stated that it had revoked its December 2005
agreement with DISH Network and instead signed a “replacement agreement” that
was “substantially similar to the previous contract,” except that DISH Network
would not pay Hearst-Argyle cash consideration. Hearst-Argyle also indicated that
it amended its compensation agreement with Lifetime — apparently with Lifetime
(instead of DISH Network) compensating Hearst-Argyle for the value of the
retransmission consent rights in the negotiations, around $11 million. That is, DISH
Network would pay Lifetime an unstated amount for carriage of the Lifetime cable
networks and Hearst-Argyle broadcast networks, and then Lifetime would pay
Hearst-Argyle $11 million. In this fashion, DISH Network could claim it was no
longer making cash payments to Hearst-Argyle, even though in effect it was paying
Hearst-Argyle for carriage of the broadcast signals. There was no public
announcement of how much DISH Network was paying Lifetime, thus fostering
debate in the trade press whether DISH Network had been able to reduce the payment
to Lifetime sufficiently to make up for the $11 million payment that flowed through
from DISH Network to Lifetime to Hearst-Argyle.81
79 John M. Higgins, “Money Talks: Deal of a Lifetime,” Broadcasting & Cable, January
16, 2006, at p. 17.
80 Mike Reynolds, “Hearst Key to Lifetime-Dish,” Multichannel Newswire, February 2,
2006, available at [http://www.multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleid
=CA6303719], viewed on June 28, 2007. As explained earlier, there is inconsistency in the
trade press about the number of subscribers receiving the various DISH Network packages.
The Reynolds article refers to unnamed sources that estimated that the “top 60” package
only reaches 8.5 million subscribers, but given that it is the most basic DISH Network
offering, that the same sources estimated there are 7.8 million subscribers to DISH
Network’s “top 120” offering, and that DISH Network has in total 13 million subscribers,
the 8.5 million estimate appears to be low.
81 See John M. Higgins, “Money Talks: Cable, Broadcast Battles End,” Broadcasting &
Cable, February 6, 2006, at p. 10, and Linda Moss, “DirectTV’s Turn to Fork Over
Documents,” Multichannel Newswire, November 29, 2006, available at
[http://www.multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleid=CA6395717],
(continued...)

CRS-40
Although DISH Network again carried the Lifetime Movie Network, it was
placed in the “top 180” package, with an estimated 4.5 million subscribers, rather
than the “top 120” package, with an estimated 7.8 million subscribers. Also, as a
result of the dispute, Oxygen, Lifetime’s strongest competitor in the market for
women’s programming, was able to secure long-term carriage on DISH Network’s
“top 120” package.
It appears that neither DISH Network nor Lifetime benefitted from this
retransmission consent impasse. Despite the modified agreement, DISH Network
gave the appearance of setting a precedent by paying cash for broadcast signals and
also reinforced its image as an MVPD that periodically failed to reach a carriage
agreement without first removing programming from its tiers. Lifetime, by letting
its networks be removed from a major MVPD’s tier, gave its closest competitor,
Oxygen, an opening onto that major MVPD’s tier.
This dispute, and its resolution, had another market impact. In 2006, DirecTV
filed a breach of contract suit against Lifetime, alleging that Lifetime reneged on a
deal to pay $200 to DISH Network subscribers who switched over to DirecTV during
the Lifetime-DISH Network impasse.82 Lifetime subsequently filed a countersuit
against DirecTV, which had been withholding license fees from Lifetime. In this
panoply of suits, DirecTV alleged that Lifetime violated a most-favored-nation clause
in their carriage contract in that DISH Network ultimately paid what amounts to a
lower license fee, or effective rate, for Lifetime programming than DirecTV. Thus,
the DISH Network-Lifetime dispute eventually affected DirecTV-Lifetime
negotiations.
Sinclair’s Negotiations with Various MVPDs:
A Case Study of Factors Affecting Negotiating Strength
Sinclair Broadcast Group perhaps has been the most aggressive of all broadcast
companies seeking cash payments for retransmission consent. Its negotiations with
a number of MVPDs have received wide coverage in the trade press.
Sinclair-Mediacom.
This has been the “poster child” of difficult retransmission consent negotiations
played out in public, and has involved federal regulatory agencies, state legislatures,
courts, and Members of Congress. Sinclair Broadcast Group owns or is otherwise
involved in the operations83 of 58 television stations (more than any other U.S.
81 (...continued)
viewed on June 28, 2007.
82 Linda Moss, “DirectTV’s Turn to Fork Over Documents,” Multichannel Newswire,
November 29, 2006, available at [http://www.multichannel.com/index.
asp?layout=articlePrint&articleid=CA6395717], viewed on June 28, 2007.
83 By providing programming and operating services pursuant to local marketing agreements
or by providing sales services pursuant to outstanding agreements.

CRS-41
broadcast company) in 36 markets, with a mid-size market focus.84 It owns and
operates two or more stations in 11 of those markets. Nineteen of its stations are
affiliated with Fox, 17 with MyNetworkTV, 10 with ABC, 9 with the CW, 2 with
CBS, and 1 with NBC. Sinclair’s stations reach approximately 13% of all U.S.
households. Mediacom, the eighth largest cable television company in the U.S.,
served 1.38 million basic cable subscribers in 23 states, and 105,000 telephone
customers, as of December 31, 2006.85 It primarily serves non-metropolitan areas.
Retransmission consent negotiations between Sinclair and Mediacom began in
the fall of 2005, while the two companies were still operating under an existing
month-to-month retransmission consent agreement that allowed either party to
terminate the agreement at any time upon 45 days prior written notice.86 It appears
that under that old contract Mediacom did not have to make any cash payments to
Sinclair for carriage of its signals, but that in the negotiations Sinclair was demanding
substantial cash payments for all of its signals.
On October 11, 2006, Mediacom filed an antitrust suit in U.S. District Court in
Des Moines, Iowa, seeking a court injunction against Sinclair’s alleged attempt to tie
retransmission consent agreements for carriage of its popular ABC, NBC, CBS, and
Fox affiliates to the payment of retransmission consent fees for some of its less-
watched CW and MyNetworkTV affiliates.87 Mediacom claimed that it was
interested in entering into retransmission consent agreements for the carriage of
signals of 13 Sinclair “major network stations” (that is, stations that are affiliated
with one of the four major television networks) located in 12 designated market areas
(DMAs) where Mediacom operates cable systems, but not interested in entering into
retransmission consent agreements for the carriage of signals of 9 “other network
stations” owned or operated by Sinclair located in DMAs where Mediacom operated
cable systems, if such agreements required cash payments. Mediacom alleged that
Sinclair maintained a single and non-negotiable demand that Mediacom consent to
a global agreement encompassing all 22 Sinclair stations located in DMAs where
Mediacom provided cable service, that Sinclair required Mediacom to pay the same
carriage rates for the 9 Sinclair stations that Mediacom did not want to carry as for
those it did want to carry, that Sinclair rejected alternative arrangements proposed by
Mediacom, and that Sinclair issued a terminating notice on September 28, 2006,
84 Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. Form 10-K, received by the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission March 9, 2007, at p. 5.
85 Mediacom Communications Corp. Form 10-K, dated March 8, 2007
86 In the Matter of: Mediacom Communications Corporation v. Sinclair Broadcast Group,
Inc. Emergency Retransmission Consent Complaint and Complaint for Enforcement for
Failure to Negotiate Retransmission Consent Rights in Good Faith, CSR-7058-C,
Memorandum Opinion and Order by the Chief, Media Bureau, Federal Communications
Commission (hereinafter “FCC Mediacom-Sinclair Order”), adopted and released January
4, 2007, at para. 19.
87 See Josh Wein, “Stop Sinclair Retransmission Consent Tactics, Mediacom Urges,”
Communications Daily, October 10, 2006, at pp. 5-6.

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which ended Mediacom’s right to carry the stations effective December 1, 2006.88
Mediacom also alleged that Sinclair chose to pull the signals during football season,
when Mediacom would be most vulnerable to losing subscribers to competing
satellite providers if it no longer carried the football games aired on Sinclair’s
broadcast signals. In addition, Mediacom alleged that an unnamed satellite operator
agreed to pay Sinclair a “bounty” for any customers it gained if and when Sinclair
pulled its stations’ signals off of Mediacom, which according to Mediacom
represented a conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Sinclair responded that it had negotiated in good faith and was open to
individual carriage arrangements for its stations in Mediacom’s operating area, but
had not negotiated on a station-by-station basis because it did not know that
Mediacom sought an alternative to a group deal.89 Sinclair publicly provided a list
of prices it wanted for each station in Mediacom’s service area — 35-38¢ a month
per subscriber for its CBS, ABC, NBC, and Fox affiliates and 9-11¢ for CW and
MyNetworkTV affiliates this year, as part of a three-year contract with some prices
reaching 42¢ in 2008. Sinclair also filed motions in court to dismiss Mediacom’s
complaint on technical grounds.
The court denied Mediacom’s injunction motion on October 24, 2006.
Mediacom appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, but dropped
the appeal on December 13, 2006.
On October 31, 2006, Mediacom filed at the FCC an Emergency Retransmission
Consent Complaint and Complaint for Enforcement for Failure to Negotiate
Retransmission Consent Rights in Good Faith against Sinclair, requesting that the
Commission find Sinclair in violation of its obligations to negotiate in good faith for
retransmission consent, direct Sinclair to immediately commence negotiations in
good faith for retransmission consent, and impose appropriate relief and sanctions.90
Sinclair filed an Answer and Mediacom filed a Reply and both parties also filed
numerous pleadings, motions, and ex parte presentations. In its complaint,
Mediacom argued that because Mediacom’s systems represented less than 3% of
Sinclair’s aggregate audience, but approximately 50% of Mediacom’s systems were
located in a DMA served by a Sinclair station, Sinclair was in the position to impose
uncompromising and harsh proposals that represented a substantial departure from
the retransmission consent terms and conditions that Sinclair has offered other
similarly-sized cable operators or that Mediacom had been offered by other
88 Id. Mediacom alleged that Sinclair strategically timed its termination notice to coincide
with a Mediacom effort to sell $300 million in debt, in order to undermine Mediacom’s
access to capital. See Peter Grant and Brooks Barnes, “Channel Change — Television’s
Power Shift: Cable Pays for ‘Free” Shows; Broadcasters Want Cash to Carry Their Signal;
Super Bowl Is Hostage,” Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2007, at p. A1.
89 Josh Wein, “Sinclair Rebuts Mediacom Antitrust Claim, Discloses Subscriber Fee
Demands,” Communications Daily, October 17, 2006, at p. 6.
90 FCC Mediacom-Sinclair Order at para. 1.

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broadcasters in these same markets.91 This information was intended to demonstrate
that Sinclair enjoyed great leverage in the retransmission consent negotiations
because it would lose very little from an impasse but Mediacom would be very
vulnerable, and thus Sinclair did not have the incentive to negotiate in good faith.
As the December 1, 2006 deadline approached, Sinclair gave Mediacom a short-
term extension to continue carrying its stations, while negotiations continued, after
the CEOs of the two companies met with FCC Commissioner McDowell.92 The
companies agreed to a new January 5, 2007 deadline. At the same time, both
companies attempted to strengthen their negotiating positions — Mediacom by
sending antennas to subscribers who stood to lose Sinclair station signals if the
carriage agreement were terminated, so they could continue to receive the Sinclair
signals over-the-air; Sinclair by offering viewers a $100-$150 rebate to switch to
DirecTV (with which Sinclair had a retransmission consent agreement). One
industry analyst wrote that Mediacom would be vulnerable to subscribers switching
over to satellite service if it lost carriage of the Sinclair stations because it had low
penetration for VoIP and broadband services that might help retain subscribers.93
Mediacom responded to this weakness by introducing a six-month $60 per month
cable, broadband, and VoIP promotion in areas where Sinclair has television stations,
though it did not publicize the promotion but rather offered it to customers who
contacted Mediacom about the potential loss of the Sinclair signals.94
On January 4, 2007 the FCC Media Bureau (acting on delegated authority from
the full Commission) denied the Mediacom complaint, concluding that the dispute
arose from a fundamental disagreement between the parties over the appropriate
valuation of Sinclair’s signals, which is not indicative of a lack of good faith.95 It
strongly encouraged the two parties to engage in hard bargaining to achieve an
agreement. It recognized the cost to consumers if Mediacom and Sinclair failed to
reach an agreement by January 5th, but stated that the Commission does not have the
authority to require the parties to submit to binding arbitration. It could only
“strongly encourage them to submit to binding arbitration,”96 either through the
Media Bureau or through the American Arbitration Association. Although
Mediacom sought such binding arbitration, Sinclair refused to arbitrate.
On January 5, 2007, Sinclair pulled 22 stations’ signals from Mediacom’s cable
systems, affecting 700,000 subscribers. Mediacom continued distributing antennas
91 FCC Mediacom-Sinclair Order at para. 9.
92 Josh Wein, “Sinclair May Extend Mediacom Carriage,” Communications Daily,
December 1, 2006, at pp. 3-5.
93 Id.
94 Josh Wein, “Mediacom Woos Sinclair-Market Customers with $60 Bundle,”
Communications Daily, December 8, 2006, at p. 5.
95 FCC Mediacom-Sinclair Order at para. 24.
96 FCC Order at para. 25.

CRS-44
to its affected customers, who were primarily in Iowa and Florida.97 Media analysts
did not agree about the long-term consequences to Mediacom of the loss of carriage.
One analyst, Jason Bazinet of Citigroup, reportedly did not expect it to have
significant impact, but Rich Greenfield of Pali Research thought Mediacom would
be harmed because it would have to reach agreement with Sinclair to retain
subscribers, but those subscribers had been inconvenienced and that would make it
difficult for Mediacom to recover its higher payments to Sinclair by raising
subscriber rates.98
On January 11, 2007, the Iowa congressional delegation — two senators and
five representatives — asked Mediacom and Sinclair to end the carriage dispute,
supporting the FCC Media Bureau’s recommendation that they submit to binding
arbitration.99 But Sinclair responded by letter that it was not ready to submit to
binding arbitration. Mediacom also took its case to the Iowa General Assembly’s
Joint Government Oversight Committee. Reportedly, some Iowa legislators were
critical of Sinclair, but at least one agreed with Sinclair that the dispute was a private
contractual issue.100 FCC Chairman Martin also stated that he supported binding
arbitration. But when Mediacom filed an emergency petition at the FCC, citing
comments made by Senator Inouye in 1992 (when he was manager of the 1992 Cable
Act that included the retransmission consent provisions in current law) that the FCC
does have the authority to require binding arbitration, the Commission did not modify
the Media Bureau opinion that the FCC does not have such jurisdiction.101 On
January 30, 2007, Senators Inouye and Stevens, chair and co-chair of the Senate
Commerce Committee, urged the FCC to take action to resolve the Sinclair-
Mediacom dispute, stating that the FCC had the authority to intervene and arguing
that at a minimum carriage of the signals should be continued while the parties
continued to negotiate.102 They expressed concern that the on-going impasse would
keep some households from viewing the Super Bowl. Sinclair reportedly rejected
their position in a letter in which it stated that “Any suggestion, such as the one
contained in your letter, that government intervention will be forthcoming has had
a chilling effect on the ability of the parties to reach a mutually acceptable agreement
on their own.”103
On February 2, 2007, just before the airing of the Super Bowl, Sinclair and
Mediacom finally reached a retransmission consent agreement, in which Mediacom
97 Josh Wein, “Comcast Doesn’t Want to Pay to Carry Sinclair Stations,” Communications
Daily, January 9, 2007, at pp. 5-6.
98 Id.
99 Untitled article, Communications Daily, January 12, 2007, at p. 12.
100 Linda Moss and Mike Farrell, “Sinclair Settles with TWC,” Multichannel News, January
29, 2007, at p. 3.
101 Although Chairman Martin tried to get the Commission itself to vote in support of the
Media Bureau opinion, no item ever came up for a formal vote.
102 Josh Wein, “Martin Should Facilitate Mediacom Customer Relief, Say Inouye, Stevens,”
Communications Daily, February 1, 2007, at pp. 3-5.
103 Id.

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reportedly paid cash fees for carriage of Sinclair’s stations, which were restored to
the cable company’s tiers.104 Mediacom agreed to drop all FCC and legal matters and
to pay for Sinclair’s legal fees from the dispute. Mediacom CEO Rocco Commisso
reportedly admitted that he “caved in”; Mediacom lost 7,000 subscribers in the fourth
quarter of 2006 (before losing carriage of the Sinclair signals) and is expected to
report even greater subscriber losses for the period when it lost the carriage.105
Sinclair-Suddenlink.
Suddenlink Communications is the eighth largest cable television company in
the United States, with 1,377,000 subscribers and operations in more than 20 states,
primarily in suburban, small town, and rural communities. On July 1, 2006,
Suddenlink completed an $800 million purchase from Charter Communications of
cable systems in West Virginia with 240,000 subscribers, 200,000 of whom are
located in the Charleston, WV designated market area of a Sinclair-owned television
station (WCHS, an ABC affiliate) and another television station (WVAH, a Fox
affiliate) for which Sinclair has a local marketing agreement. The remaining 40,000
subscribers are located in the neighboring Bluefield-Beckley-Oak Hill, WV and
Parkersburg, WV designated market areas. The transaction represented a strategic
decision on the part of both cable operators to cluster their systems — it allowed
Suddenlink to expand its presence in the West Virginia-Ohio-Kentucky-Virginia
region and allowed Charter to divest itself of systems that were distant from its larger
holdings in the northeast and west, as well as receive $800 million to buy down its
debt.
The retransmission consent agreement between Charter and Sinclair had expired
prior to the Suddenlink purchase.106 Suddenlink began negotiating a retransmission
consent agreement with Sinclair in May 2006, before its purchase was completed.
On June 30, 2006, Sinclair announced that it had not been able to reach an agreement
with Suddenlink to continue carrying WCHS and WVAH, claiming that
Suddenlink’s retransmission consent offer included no compensation and that there
had been no response to a Sinclair counteroffer.107 Without a retransmission
agreement, WCHS and WVAH would no longer be carried by any Suddenlink cable
system when the transfer was completed. Suddenlink’s subscribers in Charleston
would no longer receive the ABC and Fox programming provided over those
stations. Suddenlink’s subscribers in Beckley would continue to get ABC
104 Linda Moss, “Sinclair’s Retrans Cash Rises 90%,” Multichannel News, February 19,
2007, at p. 40.
105 Linda Moss and Mike Farrell, “Dueling for Dollars,” Multichannel Newswire, March 5,
2007, available at [http://www.multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleid=
CA6421302], viewed on June 28, 2007.
106 See Mike Farrell, “Suddenlink, Sinclair in Retrans Clash,” Multichannel News, July 5,
2006, available at [http://www.multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint
&articleID=CA6349903], viewed on June 28, 2007.
107 Sarah K. Winn, “Spat imperils city TV viewing,” Charleston Gazette, July 1, 2006,
available at [http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/-spat-imperils-city-tv-viewing-
/2006/07/01/1702516.htm], viewed on June 28, 2007.

CRS-46
programming from the local ABC broadcast affiliate located in Beckley, but would
lose the Fox programming that Charter had been importing from the Sinclair station
in Charleston (in the absence of any local ABC broadcast affiliate in Beckley).
Similarly, Suddenlink’s subscribers in Parkersburg would continue to get Fox
programming from the local Fox broadcast affiliate located in Parkersburg, but would
lose the ABC programming that Charter had been importing from the Sinclair station
in Charleston (in the absence of any local ABC broadcast affiliate in Parkersburg).
A letter was posted on Sinclair’s WCHS and WVAH websites asking viewers to
contact Suddenlink or to switch to a satellite provider, but although the satellite
providers carried Sinclair’s ABC and Fox programming in Charleston (as part of
their local-into-local service), they did not provide those stations’ signals to their
subscribers in Beckley or Parkersburg.108
On July 5, 2006, Suddenlink filed an Emergency Retransmission Consent
Complaint with the FCC, alleging that Sinclair had violated its duty to negotiate
retransmission consent in good faith for the two Charleston stations and that Sinclair
had demanded that Suddenlink terminate retransmission of the stations during the
Nielsen Media Research rating “sweeps” week ending July 26.109 On July 6, 2006,
Sinclair filed an Emergency Petition for Declaratory Ruling and for Immediate
Injunctive Relief with the FCC, arguing that Suddenlink had no authority to carry the
signals of the Charleston stations and requesting that the Commission order
Suddenlink to immediately cease its carriage of those signals. Suddenlink then filed
a supplement to its complaint stating that Sinclair informed it in an e-mail that
continuing to carry the two stations constituted an acceptance by Suddenlink of
Sinclair’s retransmission consent offer.110 Both parties made subsequent filings with
the FCC.
Suddenlink alleged that one week prior to the closing of the Charter purchase,
Sinclair had asked for $4 million in fees over the three-year life of the retransmission
consent agreement, but when Sinclair subsequently learned how much Suddenlink
had paid for the cable systems it instead demanded a one-time up-front fee of $200
per subscriber ($40 million for the 200,000 Suddenlink subscribers in those broadcast
areas) plus a $1 per month subscriber fee ($2.4 million annually) for the right to carry
the stations. Suddenlink alleged that Sinclair threatened to pull the stations from
Suddenlink and notified Suddenlink customers that the stations would not be
available after July 1, 2006. Reportedly, Suddenlink provided the FCC with an e-
mail from Sinclair stating, “Without the right to carry these stations, at least 25% of
recently acquired subscribers will discontinue service, resulting in loss of value of
more than $150 million.... Paying $40 million to ... avoid such a loss seems to us a
108 Fred Pace, “No NFL, Simpsons or 24?,” The Register-Herald, July 2, 2006.
109 FCC Public Notice DA 06-1454, released July 20, 2006.
110 Mike Farrell, “Sinclair E-mail Fires up Suddenlink,” Multichannel News, July 6, 2006,
available at [http://www.multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID
=CA6350010], viewed on June 28, 2007.

CRS-47
reasonable price to pay.”111 (The $40 million+ fee would be more than double the
total company retransmission consent revenues Sinclair reported in 2005.)
Suddenlink also claimed that when it informed Sinclair that it was obligated to
carry the stations at least through the Nielsen sweeps (an FCC requirement that
Sinclair disputed was applicable), Sinclair responded that another MVPD had agreed
to pay $200 per defecting Suddenlink subscriber. But Sinclair disputed that
Suddenlink was obligated to maintain its carriage and it may well be that Sinclair’s
reference to another MVPD being willing to pay for defecting Suddenlink subscribers
was intended to support its view that the sweeps requirement was created to protect
broadcasters during sweeps week, not MVPDs, and that such a requirement would
not be binding if the affected broadcaster did not seek such protection.
Sinclair alleged that in the negotiations Suddenlink had proposed payments that
were lower than those Sinclair received from Suddenlink in other markets. Sinclair
also claimed that before the Charter-Suddenlink sale was completed, but while
Suddenlink-Sinclair retransmission consent negotiations were occurring, it had
received a letter from Charter stating that a lack of a retransmission consent
agreement could jeopardize the Suddenlink purchase, indicating the value of the
Sinclair signals; when Sinclair learned how much Suddenlink had paid for the
Charter systems, it reconsidered upward the value of its broadcast signals to
Suddenlink.112 Sinclair vice president and general counsel Barry Faber was quoted
as stating, “If they’re paying $3,200 per sub, why shouldn’t a piece of that be coming
to us?”
Sinclair pulled the WCHS and WVAH signals from Suddenlink’s cable system
in Beckley on July 3, 2006,113 but did not pull the signals from Suddenlink’s
Charleston cable system, presumably in deference to the FCC rule about
discontinuing service during a Nielsen ratings sweep, despite its claim that the rule
did not apply in this situation.
Barry Faber, Sinclair vice president and general counsel, reportedly said that he
was prepared to take the two Charleston stations off Suddenlink’s cable systems
“forever” if his company did not receive adequate compensation.114 He also
reportedly said that Suddenlink made a bad deal with Charter because retransmission
consent for Sinclair’s two stations was not covered in the transfer of assets and
Suddenlink stands to lose more than $125 million of its investment if 20% of its
subscribers defect to DBS providers because Sinclair withholds the signals of its two
major network affiliated stations.
111 Peter Grant and Brooks Barnes, “Channel Change — Television’s Power Shift: Cable
Pays for ‘Free’ Shows; Broadcasters Want Cash to Carry Their Signal; Super Bowl is
Hostage,” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 5, 2007, at p. A1.
112 Id.
113 Joe Morris, “Cable, WCHS at odds: Broadcast dispute might go to court,” Charleston
Gazette, July 7, 2006.
114 Josh Wein, “Suddenlink, Sinclair Prepare for Long Retransmission Consent Fight,”
Communications Daily, July 7, 2006, at pp. 4-5.

CRS-48
Robert Prather, president of Gray Television, the owner of the NBC affiliates
in the Charleston and Parkersburg markets, reportedly stated that if Suddenlink ended
its dispute with Sinclair by paying cash for carriage, Suddenlink would have to give
Gray’s Charleston station the same terms because “We’ve got a most favored nation
clause in our deal. If they pay them, they would have to pay us, too.”115 Nexstar
COO Duane Lammers said that Suddenlink is particularly vulnerable to broadcasters
seeking to extract cash for carriage because it had recently borrowed a lot of money
to acquire rural systems that are “not big enough to be able to sustain a protracted
battle.”116
Suddenlink was especially sensitive to subscriber interest in the upcoming
Major League Baseball All-Star game to be broadcast over the Fox broadcast
network and attempted to make Fox programming available to its subscribers. It did
not have any options in the Charleston market, because the combination of
retransmission consent, network non-duplication, and syndicated exclusivity rules
prohibited it from importing network or syndicated programming without Sinclair’s
permission. But it was able to continue to provide Fox and ABC programming in the
Beckley market. It received permission from the Fox network to retransmit a
national Fox station to replace Sinclair’s Charleston Fox affiliate.117 And Suddenlink
already had a retransmission consent agreement with WOAY, the local ABC affiliate
in Beckley. However, Suddenlink’s subscribers in Beckley no longer had access to
the local news broadcasts on Sinclair’s WVAH and WCHS stations.
In mid-July 2006, Sinclair announced that it made a new negotiation proposal
to Suddenlink — a month to month agreement of 47 cents per station with no upfront
fee or a three-year agreement for $6 million.118 Sinclair claimed that Suddenlink had
not been responsive and that Suddenlink continued to refer publicly only to the
earlier $40 million proposal — which Sinclair said it had made only in response to
Suddenlink’s proposal that there be no charge — as if that was Sinclair’s most recent
offer. Sinclair also ran a crawl message during certain broadcasts informing
customers that its stations might be unavailable soon on their cable system and
providing contact information for DirecTV and DISH Network.
On July 25, 2006, Sinclair and Suddenlink reached an agreement to extend cable
carriage of the Sinclair stations through August 7, 2006, while negotiations
continued.119 In an ex parte filing at the FCC, Suddenlink stated that it had “steadily
increased the overall value of [its] offer.” When the extension was announced,
Charleston, WV, city council member Harry Deitzler voiced concern that the not-yet-
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Fred Pace, “Still no agreement in cable, TV stations’ brawl,” The Register-Herald, July
13, 2006.
118 Fred Pace, “Sinclair makes offer to settle dispute with Suddenlink cable,” The Register-
Herald, July 19, 2006.
119 Josh Wein, “Suddenlink, Sinclair Extend Carriage Talks on W.Va. Stations,”
Communications Daily, July 27, 2006, at p. 6.

CRS-49
finalized agreement could include a confidentiality clause that would hide the terms
of the agreement.120
The question I want answered is whether or not Suddenlink is paying the
channels to put them on the air and, if they are, are they going to absorb the costs
or pass it on to customers.
If the cable company and the local television stations enter into an agreement
whereby the television stations will effectively be charging the city residents to
watch their stations, we are not going to be happy.
On August 7, 2006, Suddenlink and Sinclair reached a three-year retransmission
consent agreement. Terms were not disclosed but Michael Keleman of Suddenlink
stated that the agreement did not include the $40 million upfront payment and
monthly fees that Sinclair had initially sought that would have forced Suddenlink to
impose steep monthly rate increases on subscribers.121 Keleman said the contract
terms would not result in any viewer rate increases, although rates might go up over
the course of the contract for other reasons. Charleston city councilman Deitzler,
chairman of the council’s cable television committee, had warned Suddenlink that
any rate increase stemming from payments to Sinclair could jeopardize Suddenlink’s
franchising agreement with the city. With the new agreement, Suddenlink and
Sinclair withdrew their FCC petitions on August 8, 2006
On September 12, 2006, West Virginia Media, a station group with four
network affiliated stations in the state, including a CBS affiliate (WVNS) in the
Beckley designated market area, announced that it was using the multicast capability
of that station to start up its own Fox affiliate in Beckley.122 West Virginia Media
said the idea came from the Sinclair-Suddenlink retransmission consent impasse,
which threatened to leave Beckley’s residents without access to Fox programming.
By September 19th, the new station was up and running on digital multicast and was
already being carried by most local cable systems, including Suddenlink (on channel
10).123 West Virginia Media was able to move so quickly because WVNS had
previously been a Fox affiliate and Beckley was one of only six designated market
areas, nationally, without a Fox affiliate. The new station planned to offer a 10 p.m.
local news broadcast daily, the first by a local Beckley station, using the WVNS news
team.
120 Sarah K. Winn, “Councilman keeps eye on cable deal,” Charleston Gazette, July 29,
2006.
121 See Joe Morris, “WCHS, WVAH to stay on cable: Rates won’t rise over deal official
says,” Charleston Gazette, August 12, 2006, and Mike Farrell, “Suddenlink, Sinclair Settle
Retrans Flap,” Multichannel News, August 10, 2006, available at [http://www.
multichannel.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA6361496], viewed on June
28, 2007.
122 Fred Pace, “Beckley to have its own FOX affiliate,” The Register-Herald, September 12,
2006.
123 Fred Pace, “West Virginia Media starts FOX station in Beckley market,” The Register-
Herald, September 19, 2006.

CRS-50
On October 20, 2006, West Virginia Media filed for both non-duplication and
syndicated exclusivity protections for the Fox programming on its WVNS Fox digital
station in the Beckley designated market area.124 Under these rules, cable companies
could no longer import Fox programming from distant broadcast stations without
West Virginia Media’s approval. As a result, on December 18, 2006, Suddenlink’s
Beckley cable system blacked out the Fox programming on Sinclair’s WVAH-Fox
station out of Charleston, but continued to carry the local news and other
programming produced locally by WVAH.125
Suddenlink’s cable franchise agreement with Beckley expired in December
2006. Since Suddenlink had only recently acquired the franchise from Charter and
there had been little time for franchise agreement negotiations, the city and the
company agreed to extend the existing agreement for four months.126
On February 14, 2007, Suddenlink announced cable system rate changes, most
of which were increases, for both Charleston and Beckley area subscribers.127
Suddenlink spokesperson Keleman stated: “This is the first increase in rates since
2004.... The cost of programming overall has increased as well as labor costs and
certainly fuel costs.”128 It also announced that six new high-definition channels
would be launched on March 15, 2007 and the implementation of capital upgrades
to increase bandwidth capabilities, increase Internet access speeds, and build a
platform for telephone service.
Sinclair-Time Warner.
In July 2006, the FCC approved Time Warner’s acquisition from the bankrupt
Adelphia of cable systems that served 3.5 million subscribers.129 One million of
those subscribers were located in local broadcast markets in which Sinclair owned
or operated one or more broadcast television stations. Adelphia’s agreement with
Sinclair to retransmit those 24 stations’ signals expired on December 31, 2006 and
therefore Sinclair and Time Warner had to negotiate a new contract. As that deadline
124 Fred Pace, “Suddenlink blacks out Charleston FOX,” The Register-Herald, December
18, 2006.
125 Id.
126 Fred Pace, “Franchise agreement with cable company extended,” The Register-Herald,
December 13, 2006.
127 Fred Pace, “Suddenlink cites higher costs in announcing cable rate hikes,” The Register-
Herald, February 14, 2007.
128 Id.
129 In the Matter of Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control
of Licenses: Adelphia Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-
possession), Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. (subsidiaries), Assignees; Adelphia
Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors and
Transferors, to Comcast Corporation (subsidiaries), Assignees and Transferees; Comcast
Corporation, Transferor, to Time Warner Inc., Transferee; Time Warner Inc., Transferor,
to Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, adopted July 13,
2006, released July 21, 2006.

CRS-51
approached and passed, Sinclair and Time Warner agreed three times to extend
carriage while continuing to seek a negotiated agreement.130 On January 22, 2007,
Sinclair and Time Warner reached a three-year agreement under which Time Warner
agreed to carry Sinclair’s digital signals to most of its customers, to carry Sinclair’s
HDTV signals as they became available, and to carry Sinclair’s MyNetwork TV
affiliates in Columbus and Dayton, Ohio, both of which are transmitted as digital
multicast stations.131 The agreement extended beyond the cable systems purchased
from Adelphia. According to Sinclair, “The agreement allows Time Warner to carry
the analog and digital signals of 35 television stations owned and/or operated by
Sinclair in 22 markets to approximately six million of Time Warner’s subscribers,
many of whom receive two stations owned and/or operated by Sinclair.... Time
Warner ... carries our stations to more subscribers than any other cable company.”132
The financial terms of the agreement were kept confidential and thus it is not
possible to determine whether and to what extent Time Warner agreed to make any
cash payments for carriage of Sinclair’s broadcast signals. But the inclusion of
provisions for the carriage of Sinclair’s digital and HDTV signals and the digital
multicast signals of a non-major broadcast network, as well as Sinclair’s silence
about cash payments, would suggest that a significant portion of the retransmission
consent compensation took the form of carriage of less popular programming or
program formats rather than cash payments.
Sinclair-Comcast.
The retransmission consent agreement between Comcast and Sinclair’s 37
owned or operated stations (mostly affiliates of Fox, MyNetworkTV, and The CW,
in markets as large as Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, Nashville, Richmond, and
Tampa), which covered more than 3 million Comcast subscribers in 23 markets, was
scheduled to expire on February 5, 2005. Sinclair’s stations represented just 15% of
Comcast’s 24.2 million subscriber footprint, while Comcast’s markets represented
30% of Sinclair’s total advertising revenue.133
Comcast claimed that it was required, by FCC rule, to continue to carry
Sinclair’s analog broadcast signals through March 1, 2007, the end of the ratings
130 See, for example, Linda Moss, “TW, Sinclair Keep Talking,” Multichannel News,
January 22, 2007, at p. 2. In contrast, during that same time period, Sinclair refused to
continue negotiating with Mediacom beyond an initial extension of time and instead pulled
its broadcast programming from Mediacom’s cable tiers when the deadline was reached.
131 Linda Moss and Mike Farrell, “Sinclair Settles with TWC,” Multichannel News, January
29, 2007, at p. 3.
132 “Sinclair Announces Analog and Digital Carriage Agreement with Time Warner Cable,”
Press Release, January 22, 2007, available at [http://www.sbgi.net/press/release_2007122_
201.shtml], viewed on June 28, 2007.
133 Mike Farrell and Linda Moss, “Retransmission — Cash or Not: Sinclair, Comcast Settle
Up,” Multichannel News, March 12, 2007, at p. 8.

CRS-52
sweeps period.134 When the March 1st date approached, Comcast and Sinclair agreed
to extend the existing agreement through March 9, 2007, and finally reached a new
four-year retransmission consent agreement the day before that deadline. Under the
agreement, Comcast agreed to carry multiple digital channels Sinclair currently is
broadcasting in Richmond, VA and Baltimore, as well as certain other multicast
channels that Sinclair may broadcast in Comcast markets in the future.135 The new
contract also involved advertising and co-marketing agreements, as well as
advertising and cross-promotion opportunities on both companies’ properties. The
exact terms of the agreement were not disclosed.
As soon as the retransmission consent agreement was announced, however,
Comcast and Sinclair sparred publicly about whether Comcast was making any cash
payments for carriage of the Sinclair broadcast signals.136 In a statement and
interview, Comcast executive vice president David Cohen said:
Comcast has achieved its objective of not paying cash for broadcast carriage that
would need to be passed on to our customers. Consistent with our existing
agreement with Sinclair, and all of our other retransmission consent agreements,
comparable value is being exchanged.
We have always been willing to discuss exchanges of value with broadcasters.
We have had with Sinclair an existing exchange of value of where we’re paying
cash but receiving marketing and advertising benefits back from Sinclair that are
of comparable value to the payments that we’re making. We were able to make
a deal consistent with that model.

Sinclair general counsel Barry Faber quickly disputed the Comcast claim that it did
not make cash payments, claiming that Cohen had
seriously mischaracterized the deal.... No way does what we gave them equal the
value of what they’re giving us. Our policy is that we get paid for retransmission
consent, and simply giving us cash in exchange for inventory worth the same
amount of cash, I wouldn’t have gotten anything.
Faber added that Comcast may have been correct that it did not pay cash that it would
have to pass on to its customers through higher rates, but it did pay cash. He also
said that Sinclair updated its projections for revenue from retransmission payments
from Comcast and other cable operators in 2007 to $53 million from the original
134 Josh Wein, “Comcast Doesn’t Want to Pay to Carry Sinclair Stations,” Communications
Daily, January 9, 2007, at pp. 5-6. But Comcast said the FCC rule does not cover the small
number of Comcast subscribers receiving out-of-market or HD signals from Sinclair
stations, which were therefore scheduled to be discontinued on February 5th.
135 Mike Farrell and Linda Moss, “Cashing In or Out: Sinclair, Comcast Settle,”
Multichannel Newswire, March 9, 2007, available at [http://www.multichannel.com/index.
asp?layout=articlePrint&articleid=CA6423098], viewed on June 28, 2007.
136 See, for example, Mike Farrell and Linda Moss, “Retransmission — Cash or Not:
Sinclair, Comcast Settle Up,” Multichannel News, March 11, 2007, at p. 8, and P.J.
Bednarski, “Comcast, Sinclair Agree on Retrans,” Broadcasting & Cable, March 12, 2007,
at p. 22.

CRS-53
projection of $48 million, partly as a result of the agreement with Comcast — but
would not state how much of the additional $5 million was attributable to the
Comcast agreement.137
This war of words was not unexpected. It was widely viewed in the industry
that if Comcast agreed to pay cash for the Sinclair signals, it would have represented
a fundamental shift in retransmission consent negotiations industry-wide. Thus it
was very important for Comcast to claim that it received advertising and marketing
services of comparable value to the cash payments it made and for Sinclair to claim
that the cash payments far exceeded the value of the advertising and marketing
services it provided.
Sinclair-Charter.
In April 2007, Charter Communications became the third major cable company
to reach a retransmission consent agreement with Sinclair; the three-year agreement
covered the analog and HDTV signals of 28 television stations reaching 1.9 million
subscribers, including 19 owned-and-operated Sinclair stations. Although the
contract terms were kept confidential, two Wall Street analysts speculated that the
terms included some kind of cash payments to Sinclair — perhaps in the range of 15-
20 cents per subscriber per month — as well as some form of barter advertising.138

Measuring Retransmission Consent Revenues.
In its 2006 10-K annual report, Sinclair reported $25.4 million in retransmission
consent revenues for the year, $20.5 million in cash and $4.9 million in local and
regional advertising.139 In February 2007, after negotiating the Mediacom and Time
Warner agreements, Sinclair announced that it expected to generate nearly $48
million in retransmission consent revenues in 2007,140 and then in March 2007, after
negotiating the Comcast agreement, increased that estimate to $53 million.141 But
there remained a lot of debate about how these retransmission consent revenue
estimates were calculated and, in particular, how to determine the cash portion.
Consider, for example, a complex retransmission consent agreement in which the
cable company (Comcast) agrees to make a single overall payment to the broadcaster
(Sinclair) in exchange for the following package: (1) the right to retransmit Sinclair’s
broadcast signals, (2) a certain amount of advertising time on Sinclair’s broadcast
137 See Mike Farrell and Linda Moss, “Retransmission — Cash or Not: Sinclair, Comcast
Settle Up,” Multichannel News, March 12, 2007, at p. 8, and Mike Farrell, “Defining When
Cash is Cash — and Isn’t,” Multichannel News, June 28, 2007, at p. 6.
138 Linda Moss, “Charter Renews with Sinclair,” Multichannel News, April 16, 2007, at p.
8.
139 Mike Farrell, “Defining When Cash is Cash — and Isn’t,” Multichannel News, March
19, 2007, at p. 6.
140 Linda Moss, “Sinclair’s Retrans Cash Rises 90%,” Multichannel News, February 19,
2007, at p. 40.
141 Mike Farrell and Linda Moss, “Retransmission — Cash or Not: Sinclair, Comcast Settle
Up,” Multichannel News, March 12, 2007, at p. 8.

CRS-54
stations, and (3) the right to offer Sinclair’s broadcast programming as part of its
video on demand service. How do you value the advertising and VOD
programming? Suppose, for example, that Comcast purchases $100 of advertising
time on a Sinclair station. That advertising has a value of $100 to Comcast and
Comcast would attribute the full $100 to the advertising. But if, in the absence of the
agreement, Sinclair would have sold that advertising time to someone else, then the
incremental value to Sinclair of that advertising time would be less than $100,
perhaps $30. Sinclair might then attribute only $30 to advertising and $70 to cash
payment for retransmission consent.142 Similarly, Sinclair might place a low value
on the video on demand rights to its programming, but Comcast, which is attempting
to retain subscribers while competing with satellite by creating a large VOD library,
might place a higher value on the programming. For example, it might be important
to Comcast that its subscribers have the ability to watch the 6 o’clock local news at
8 o’clock. Thus, a cable company might argue that a $10 million retransmission
consent payment consists of $1 million in advertising payments and $9 million in
payment for VOD rights, while the broadcaster might attribute all or most of the $10
million to cash payment for retransmission consent.
Time Warner: A Large Cable Company Demands Cash
Payments from Broadcasters to Retransmit Their Non-
Primary Signals
In retransmission consent negotiations in 2006 with a number of broadcast
stations that are located in relatively small markets and affiliated with the CW
broadcast network (which is not a major broadcast network), Time Warner, the
second largest cable operator, used its strong market position to demand
compensation from those broadcasters in exchange for carrying their signals.143 It
could do so because these signals were not the primary signal of the broadcast
stations, but rather digital multicast signals. Nonetheless, agreement was reached
within the context of retransmission consent negotiations.
In late September 2006, the signals of 20 CW station affiliates either were not
carried on Time Warner systems or were being carried on a narrow digital tier not
seen by half the subscribers. The markets involved included Palm Springs, CA;
Lima, OH; and Waco, El Paso, Corpus Christi, and Wichita Falls, TX. Time Warner
said that, in contrast to many other retransmission consent negotiations where
broadcasters were trying to demonstrate the value of their programming to MVPDs,
these negotiations demonstrated the value created by MVPDs by extending the
broadcast network’s (and local network affiliate’s) reach.
142 For a more complete discussion, see Mike Farrell, “Defining When Cash is Cash — and
Isn’t,” Multichannel News, March 19, 2007, at p. 6.
143 The discussion in this section is based on John M. Higgins, “Time Warner Squeezes CW
Stations,” Broadcasting & Cable, October 2, 2006, available at
[http://www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=
CA6376892.html], viewed on May 30, 2007.

CRS-55
Time Warner succeeded in securing cash payment from one station, WKRC,
Cincinnati, owned by a major broadcaster group (Clear Channel Television). Time
Warner received $350,000 — $1 per subscriber — for carriage of a digital CW feed
on the local cable system’s basic tier. The payments were in part for advertising on
the Time Warner cable system promoting the broadcast station. Time Warner had
a particularly strong negotiating position in Cincinnati because CW officials were
worried about the network not being carried in the homes of marketing executives
at Cincinnati-based Procter & Gamble who were in charge of purchasing advertising
for that company. A CW executive acknowledged that the network was partly
reimbursing Clear Channel as part of co-operative advertising efforts with its
affiliates. Time Warner said the company was not receiving cash payments for
carriage but would not comment on whether it was receiving “launch support” that
included buying promotional spots on a cable system, which is common among cable
networks but previously unheard of among broadcast networks.
The CW needs wide cable carriage to reach enough audience to attract
advertisers. Cable companies do not automatically carry digital broadcast channels
such as the CW channel. When they do, they often place those digital programs on
a digital tier that is purchased by only 30% to 50% of the cable system’s total
subscribers. Broadcasters must negotiate to gain carriage on the more valuable basic
cable tier available to all cable subscribers. The CW has had reasonably good
success in its negotiations with MVPDs, but Time Warner has demanded
compensation for carrying the CW signal. Demands have included giving
commercial time on the stations to promote Time Warner Cable and rights to offer
the station’s local news via video-on-demand.
Some industry observers warned that the Time Warner strategy might help the
broadcasters in their attempt to gain “digital multicast must-carry.” Currently, cable
operators are required to carry only the primary signal of each local broadcaster that
chooses the must-carry (vs. retransmission consent) option. But as they deploy
digital technology, in the transition from analog to digital transmission of broadcast
signals, broadcasters are able to transmit multiple signals simultaneously and are
seeking to widen the must-carry requirement to cover all of their signals. Cities
outside the 100 largest U.S. markets typically have only three or four broadcast
television stations and those broadcasters would not drop an affiliation with a major
broadcast network to carry the CW network. CW thus was attempting to get those
local broadcast stations, which had space on their digital signals for a few additional
channels, to carry the CW network on a digital slot. Currently, stations in 49 markets
use a digital slot for the CW. Broadcasters might argue that Time Warner’s alleged
recalcitrance demonstrates the need for multicast must-carry.
Ironically, CW is 50% owned by Time Warner Inc., the parent of Time Warner
Cable. But the other 50% of CW is owned by CBS, which has been aggressively
seeking cash payments in its retransmission consent negotiations with cable systems,
and industry observers viewed Time Warner’s actions as a warning that in some
circumstances the MVPD enjoys the upper hand. In another irony, at approximately
the same time that Time Warner was demanding payment for carriage of CW
broadcast network signals, it was in a retransmission consent dispute with KAYU-
TV, the Fox affiliate in Spokane, WA, and the broadcaster removed its signal from
Time Warner cable systems serving 25,000 subscribers in Pullman, WA, Libby, MT,

CRS-56
and Coeur d’Alene and Moscow, ID, because Time Warner was refusing to make
cash payment for carriage.144
Issues for Congress:
Proposals for Statutory and Regulatory Change
The negotiations between programmers and distributors, although private, are
strongly affected by statutory and regulatory requirements and cannot be properly
characterized as free-market. Those requirements were enacted to foster the three
pillars of U.S. media policy — localism, diversity of voices, and competition.
Congress tried to craft them in a fashion that would minimize — but not eliminate
— government intrusion in the market. The specific public policy objectives they
were intended to further include: fostering local programming, especially local
broadcast programming; fostering diversity of news and public affairs voices and
entertainment choices; fostering competition in all media markets; encouraging
innovative programming; keeping cable and satellite subscription rates affordable;
and fostering infrastructure investment. Sometimes government intervention to
foster one of these objectives will impede another.
It is possible that, as market conditions have changed, statutes or regulations that
did not unduly favor one party over another when they were enacted, or that were
intended to favor a party that was viewed as being in a disadvantageous position, now
affect negotiations in an unintended fashion. For example, the various rules relating
to cable carriage of broadcast signals — retransmission consent, network non-
duplication, and syndicated exclusivity rules — were developed at a time when the
local cable operator typically was the only MVPD in a broadcaster’s service area and
there was concern that cable operators might refuse to carry local signals or in some
other way threaten the viability of local broadcasting. Today, with competitive
provision of multichannel video services by satellite and telephone systems, the
tables are somewhat turned, and broadcasters with must-have programming often can
negotiate from a position of strength, especially with cable systems whose
subscribers do not represent a significant portion of a broadcaster’s audience.
The earlier discussions of market trends and of specific programmer-distributor
disputes showed there is great variability in the negotiating strength of both
individual programmers and individual distributors. They also showed that almost
all impasses that resulted in MVPDs not carrying particular programming occurred
outside major markets. Despite the trend toward greater programmer negotiating
strength, in major markets distributors tend to have enough market clout to be able
to reach agreements they can live with. This is not the case in smaller markets. In
this new market environment, it is possible that the “one size fits all” regulations
currently in place may no longer be fostering the public policy objectives they were
intended to advance — especially outside major markets. Most of the proposals for
modification of the current statutory and regulatory framework have come from
144 Anne Becker, “Northwest Station Pulls Signal in Retransmission Battle,” Broadcasting
& Cable, January 1, 2007, at p. 5.

CRS-57
parties that operate in smaller markets. In reviewing these proposals, it is important
to consider their potential impact on large markets as well as smaller markets and to
try to determine whether any changes should and could be limited to those markets
where the current statutory and regulatory framework may be failing to safeguard the
public against lost programming or higher prices. Also, it is important to note that
the parties that have been proposing statutory or regulatory changes often cite the
combined impact of multiple rules — for example, the impact of retransmission
consent and program exclusivity rules in markets where a broadcaster owns multiple
stations that are affiliated to two or more major broadcast networks. Would changing
just one of the existing rules resolve alleged existing problems or create new ones?
Would changing multiple rules represent overkill?
Economic Factors Relevant to Analysis of the Proposals for
Statutory and Regulatory Change
In addition to the various market trends that were discussed in detail earlier,
there are three economic factors that might be relevant to specific proposals that have
been made for statutory and regulatory change. These are: the substantial economic
rents earned by some factors of program production; how to divide the value of must-
have programming — and the rents it generates — among programmers, distributors,
and subscribers; and the extent of consumer demand for program diversity.
Successful existing network programs that have demonstrated the ability to
generate larger audiences than the average program — hit programs such as
American Idol and certain sports events — become more expensive to produce
precisely because they are successful. Costs increase as the talent associated with
those programs (athletes, actors, directors, producers) are able to renegotiate
contracts to command a larger portion of the revenues they generate. Popular
programming that attracts a large audience (or perhaps attracts a somewhat smaller
audience that has a high intensity of demand) typically generates large revenues,
either from advertisers or from direct subscriber charges. These higher than average
revenues are shared by the owners of the programming and the program distributors,
in the form of profits, and by the talent (actors, directors, athletes), in the form of
high renegotiated salaries that include what economists call “economic rent.”
Economic rent, which some view as a measure of market power, is the difference
between what a factor of production is paid and how much it would need to be paid
to remain in its current use. A star in a successful television program might be paid
$500,000 per episode when his next best employment opportunity might be to sign
up for a new, untested series for $100,000 per episode. If the ratings for the
successful program were to fall, or for some other reason the programmer could no
longer command as much compensation from distributors and subscribers as it had
been receiving, the star would likely continue to act but his salary would likely fall
substantially. Reducing rent does not change production decisions, so economic rent
can be reduced without any adverse impact on the real economy.145
145 See [http://www.economist.com/research/ Economics/alphabetic.cfm?letter=R], viewed
on June 28, 2007.

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These economic rents become part of the cost of the programming. The costs
associated with each episode of a successful network program at the peak of that
program’s popularity therefore could be many times the average costs of all
programming.
From the perspective of the viewing public, the substantial advertising and
subscriber fee revenues generated by popular programming — both of which
ultimately are passed on to consumers — are beneficial if they generate additional
programming of the sort that the public prefers. To the extent these “windfalls” are
ploughed back into the production of equally popular programming, or innovative
programming that might not otherwise be produced, the public benefits. But to the
extent most talent — athletes, writers, directors, producers, etc. — would continue
to perform at the same level even if they could not command such high prices for
their services, the public does not benefit from a system that fosters extremely high
economic rents. For example, whenever a sports league has negotiated a new
contract with a broadcast or cable network that substantially increases the revenues
flowing to the league, the athletes in those leagues are able to command significantly
higher salaries. It is unlikely that the quality of those athletes’ performances would
fall, or those athletes would choose not to continue to play, if their salaries were $1
million per year rather than $10 million. But the level of these economic rents will
affect the prices that subscribers pay for their MVPD service.
It is important to distinguish between economic rents, which if reduced would
not affect production, and compensation, profits, or earnings that are needed to attract
factors of production. For example, it will be necessary for programmers to earn high
profits on their successful programming in order to cover their losses from their
unsuccessful programming. This often leads to debate about the amount of revenue
that programmers need to generate in order to continue to provide quality
programming and, beyond that, when a program is highly popular and can generate
large revenues, how those additional revenues should be distributed among the talent
(as salaries or other compensation), programmers and distributors (as profits), and
subscribers (through charges that are less than their full valuation of the
programming). This inevitably has been an area of conflict in retransmission consent
negotiations. Broadcast signals typically consist of national network programming,
nationally syndicated programming, and locally produced programming.
Broadcasters argue that their stations have high audience ratings, are more highly
valued than cable networks, and therefore they should receive the bulk of the
revenues generated by their programming. MVPDs argue those signals are provided
free over-the-air, broadcasters get compensated by the advertising revenues
generated, MVPD carriage increases the size of broadcast audiences and therefore
increases broadcasters’ advertising revenues, and therefore MVPDs should not be
required to pay cash to carry the broadcast signals to their subscribers. Subscribers
complain to their elected officials about increasing MVPD rates, and may switch to
a lower-cost provider, but rarely discontinue service entirely in response to price
increases.
There is market evidence about how subscribing households value these
broadcast signals. In 1999, Congress enacted the Satellite Home Viewer

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Improvement Act (SHVIA),146 which allowed satellite operators to carry the signals
of their subscribers’ local broadcast television stations. The two major satellite
operators — DirecTV and DISH Network — began offering “local-into-local”
service in some markets, charging their subscribers a separate $5 per month to
receive the local signals in their market. (That charge is no longer separated out.)
The vast majority of their subscribers chose to receive the local broadcast signals —
showing a willingness to pay for the combination of network, syndicated, and local
programming provided by their local broadcast stations.
That does not answer the question, however, of how to distribute that value of
that programming between the broadcaster and the MVPD — or to allow the
subscribers to pay less than their full valuation of the programming. Since economic
rents do not generate additional productive value, however, it is in the public interest
not to generate economic rents, which ultimately are borne by consumers.
There also has been some discussion of the extent to which households value
having access to one hundred or more channels when the average household only
watches a small portion of those channels. This could be useful information to help
assess the impact on consumers of offering programming in tiered service offerings
that bundle many networks together or in an à la carte basis. According to Media
Dynamics, Inc.,147 although the average television household can now receive 106
channels, a typical adult watches only 13 to 14 of those channels on a weekly basis.
Over longer periods of time, however, the number of program sources the average
viewer samples grows significantly. As shown in Table 11, the average adult cable
subscriber watches at least 10 minutes of programming on 16 to 17 different channels
in a week, on 31 different channels in four weeks, and on 43 channels in 13 weeks.
These data do not provide information on the value consumers assign to additional
choices, but do suggest that they take advantage of the availability of such choices.
Table 11. Estimated Number of Television Program Sources
Viewed per Adult, 2005
All
All
All
Homes with
Homes with
Homes with
Program Sources
Adults
Adults
Adults
Cable
Cable
Cable
1 Week
4 Weeks
13 Weeks
1 Week
4 Weeks
13 Weeks
Major Networks
2.0
2.7
2.9
1.7
2.6
2.8
Local Shows on Affiliates
1.0
1.7
2.1
0.9
1.6
2.0
Independent Stations
1.3
1.6
1.8
1.4
1.7
1.9
PBS Stations
0.4
0.6
0.7
0.4
0.6
0.7
Pay Cable
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.8
Basic Cable
8.7
19.9
29.2
11.5
23.7
35.1
Total
13.9
27.1
37.3
16.6
31.0
43.3
Source: Media Dynamics, Inc.
146 P.L. 106-113.
147 Media Dynamics, Inc., TV Dimensions 2006, at pp. 26-28.

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Specific Proposals to Modify Current Statutes and
Regulations
The first two sections in this report described recent structural market changes
that have altered the relative negotiating strength of programmers and distributors
and showed that, in general, this has occurred to the detriment of smaller cable
companies. Most of the federal statutes and regulations affecting programmer-
distributor negotiations were enacted before these recent market changes and, indeed,
several were specifically intended to strengthen the negotiating position of
broadcasters. Not surprisingly, then, most of the proposals to modify current statutes
and regulations have come from small distributors.
Proposal: Allow the importation of distant signals when a
retransmission consent impasse develops.
Currently, a cable operator that reaches a retransmission consent impasse with
a local broadcaster is prohibited under the network program non-duplication and
syndicated exclusivity rules from importing the same network and syndicated
programming provided by that local broadcaster from a distant broadcaster without
the permission of the local broadcaster. For example, a cable operator experiencing
a retransmission consent impasse with its local ABC broadcast affiliate cannot import
the ABC network programming transmitted by a more distant ABC affiliate. Thus,
even though the network and syndicated programming is not produced by the local
broadcaster, that broadcaster has control over its distribution in its designated market
area.
Some small cable companies have proposed modifying these exclusivity rules
to allow distributors to import distant network and syndicated programming when a
retransmission consent impasse develops.148 This would allow an MVPD to
negotiate with multiple providers of network and syndicated programming for the
carriage of that programming if the MVPD reaches an impasse with its local
broadcaster. Carriage of such distant signals would allow subscribers to continue to
receive the network and syndicated programming.149
There appear to be two aspects to this proposal: to prohibit broadcast networks
and their affiliates from employing exclusive arrangements that do not allow cable
148 See, for example, the opinion piece by Rocco Commisso, Mediacom Communications
CEO, entitled “Rx for Retransmission,” in Multichannel News, February 1 2, 2007, at p. 27.
149 Of course, even if the MVPD were to import distant network and syndicated
programming signals, without a retransmission agreement with the local broadcaster, the
MVPD would not be allowed to carry the local broadcaster’s local programming. Whether
or not the MVPD imported those signals, however, subscribers could use “rabbit ear” or
rooftop antennas to receive their local broadcaster’s signals off the air — and thus receive
the network, syndicated, and locally produced programming — and, in fact, in cases where
impasses have developed cable operators typically have offered subscribers free rabbit ear
antennas. In some situations, however, subscribers are not able to receive the local
broadcast station’s signal with rabbit ears, or even with a rooftop antenna, because they are
too far away from the broadcaster or unusual terrain intrudes blocks signal transmission.

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companies to seek alternative sources of broadcast network and syndicated
programming and to deny the local affiliates the ability to get a “windfall” from
popular network programming. (The proposal’s proponents claim that the local
broadcaster has not produced the network and syndicated programming but the
exclusivity rules allow it to act like a monopoly producer and extract all the
economic rents from the programming, which only forces up subscriber rates.)
Although it is true that exclusivity arrangements are intended to allow the
broadcast network and its affiliates to maximize their revenues from the network
programming, it is not clear that elimination of the FCC’s exclusivity rules would
have any market impact. Virtually the same exclusivity terms and conditions are
included in the contracts that local broadcasters have with their affiliated networks
and with their providers of syndicated programming. Indeed, the FCC rules
specifically were constructed to mirror the language that already existed in most
broadcaster-program owner contracts. So unless such contract terms were prohibited,
elimination of the rules would have no practical impact. Similar types of exclusive
distribution territories are common throughout the U.S. economy and pass antitrust
muster.
With respect to the concern about the exclusivity rules allowing local affiliates
to earn “windfalls,” it is not clear to what extent recent market changes have created
windfalls or simply changed the form of compensation. As was discussed earlier, in
the past most local broadcast stations that were affiliated with a major broadcast
network made that network its agent to negotiate retransmission consent terms with
MVPDs and thus the networks received the bulk of the retransmission consent
compensation, often in the form of agreement by the MVPD to carry other (broadcast
or cable) program networks produced by the major broadcast network. But in
exchange, the major broadcast networks made major cash payments to their local
broadcast affiliate stations. In recent years, however, the major networks have agreed
to allow their local broadcast affiliates to directly negotiate their own retransmission
consent compensation with MVPDs, while substantially decreasing the cash
payments from the broadcast networks to their local affiliates. Thus, even if
retransmission consent negotiations result in direct cash payments to the local
broadcast affiliates, at least some of the compensation received by those local
broadcasters is, indirectly, being passed through to the program producers in the form
of lower payments to affiliates.
The proposal to allow the importation of distant network and syndicated
programming could have an impact beyond an impasse situation. It could strengthen
the negotiating position of MVPDs by potentially allowing them to bargain among
alternative providers of the same must-have network programming — to the extent
that the local broadcast stations’ existing network and syndication contracts did not
already prohibit this. But giving all MVPDs the ability to negotiate with any network
affiliate would strengthen the negotiating leverage of large as well as small MVPDs,
and might have the unintended consequence of fostering retransmission consent
impasses in larger markets.

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Proposal: Require broadcasters to publish rate cards
that would apply to all MVPDs.
The smaller independent cable companies complain that, due to their lack of
negotiating power, broadcasters have demanded higher per subscriber fees from them
than from the large cable and satellite companies in retransmission consent
compensation. One has proposed a “nondiscrimination” requirement that
broadcasters publish rate cards that would apply to all distributors of a broadcaster’s
programming.150 Since the rate would apply to large and small distributors alike, and
the broadcaster would have to take into account the negotiating strength of the large
distributors when setting its rate, the purpose of this proposal is to give small
distributors the same negotiating leverage as the larger ones. This might help keep
small cable systems’ programming costs down and thus reduce upward pressure on
their retail charges to subscribers.
One problem with this proposal, however, is that most retransmission consent
negotiations involve a large number of parameters, not just the per subscriber fee.
A broadcaster might be willing to accept a lower per subscriber fee from a large
distributor in exchange for some other form of compensation, such as the MVPD
agreeing to carry the broadcaster’s multiple digital signals, but smaller cable
companies might not have the capacity on their networks to offer similar carriage.
Similarly, a large distributor might partially compensate the broadcaster by
purchasing advertising time on the broadcast station, but a small distributor might not
be willing or able to do so. In these situations, requiring all distributors to pay the
same per subscriber charge would represent discrimination against the larger
distributors who also are providing the broadcaster alternative forms of compensation
for the programming.
Proposal: Require parties to submit to binding arbitration to
resolve leased access, program carriage, or retransmission consent
disputes.
In a recent opinion and order relating to a retransmission consent complaint, the
FCC’s media bureau concluded that the “Commission does not have the authority to
require the parties to submit to binding arbitration.”151 The Order “strongly
encouraged” the two parties to submit to binding arbitration in recognition of “the
cost to consumers if Mediacom and Sinclair do not reach an agreement” by the
deadline. But Sinclair refused to do so and the Commission did not choose to take
action.
This has led to proposals that, rather than allowing a local broadcast station’s
signal to be dropped from a cable or satellite system if a retransmission consent
negotiation reaches an impasse, the parties should be required to submit to binding
150 Id.
151 In the Matter of Mediacom Communications Corporation v. Sinclair Broadcast Group,
Inc. Emergency Retransmission Consent Complaint and Complaint for Enforcement for
Failure to Negotiate Retransmission Consent Rights in Good Faith, CSR-7058-C,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, adopted and released January 4, 2007, at para. 25.

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arbitration to resolve the rates, terms, and conditions of carriage. The arbitration
might be performed by the FCC staff or by a recognized arbitration organization,
such as the American Arbitration Association. This might involve a “baseball-style”
winner-take-all process, in which each party submits a complete contract and the
arbitrator choose between the two, or some other arbitration process.
Mandatory binding arbitration would assure that subscribers continue to receive
the local broadcast programming, consistent with the public policy objective of
fostering localism. It also might encourage the negotiating parties to avoid starting
negotiations with extreme positions that they know would never survive an
arbitration process, which in turn might expedite the negotiations process and
discourage impasses. But some have opposed mandatory binding arbitration on the
grounds that it represents very intrusive government intervention, and denies a party
the right to choose, given the contractual terms demanded by the other party or
dictated by the arbitration decision, simply not to make the programming available
or simply not to carry the programming.
Although the Commission has chosen not to address the use of mandatory
arbitration to resolve programmer-distributor impasses in retransmission consent
negotiations, it recently included a commercial arbitration remedy for programmer-
distributor disputes as a condition for approving the transfer of licenses from
Adelphia to Comcast and Time Warner,152 and in two separate notices of proposed
rulemaking (NPRMs) has sought comment on implementing an arbitration process
for resolving programmer-distributor disputes.153 The Adelphia/Comcast/Time
Warner order included a detailed commercial arbitration remedy with explicit
arbitration rules. In the first NPRM, the Commission sought comment on whether
it should adopt procedures or remedies such as mandatory standstill agreements
and/or arbitration to resolve program access complaints, as it has done in the form
of conditions to specific mergers. In the second NPRM, the Commission sought
comment on the application of arbitration procedures to resolve leased access and
program carriage disputes, whether such arbitration procedures should be specific to
these types of complaints, what the procedures should be, whether they should be
152 See In the Matter of Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of
Control of Licenses: Adelphia Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-
possession), Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. (subsidiaries), Assignees; Adelphia
Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors and
Transferors, to Comcast Corporation (subsidiaries), Assignees and Transferees; Comcast
Corporation, Transferor, to Time Warner Inc., Transferee; Time Warner Inc., Transferor,
to Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, adopted July 13,
2006, released July 21, 2006, at Appendix B, pp. 2-4, and Appendix C.
153 In the Matter of Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992; Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming
Distribution: Section 628(c)(5) of the Communications Act; Sunset of Exclusive Contract
Prohibition, MB Docket No. 07-29, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, adopted February 7,
2007, released February 20, 2007, at para. 15, and In the Matter of Leased Commercial
Access; Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming Distribution and
Carriage, MB Docket No. 07-42, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, adopted March 2, 2007,
released June 15, 2007, at para. 19.

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elective or mandatory, who should bear the costs of arbitration, and what standard of
review should the Commission employ in reviewing an arbitration decision.
Thus, at this time, the Commission is considering arbitration procedures in
leased access and program carriage disputes in which the programmer tends to be the
aggrieved party bringing a complaint against a distributor to the Commission but not
in retransmission consent disputes in which the distributor — most frequently a cable
company — tends to be the aggrieved party bringing a complaint against broadcast
programmer. It appears that the FCC believes it has the authority to require
arbitration for the former, but not for the latter.
Proposal: Strengthen the FCC test for what constitutes “good faith”
retransmission consent negotiations.
The Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act (SHVIA),154 enacted in 1999,
required the FCC to revise the rules surrounding retransmission consent agreements
between television broadcast stations and multichannel video programming
distributors (MVPDs), such as cable and satellite companies. The law prohibits a TV
station that “provides retransmission consent from engaging in exclusive contracts
for carriage or failing to negotiate in good faith.” In March 2000, the FCC adopted
rules for good faith negotiations for retransmission consent agreements involving
broadcast television stations and cable or satellite companies.155 The FCC
established a two-part test for good faith negotiations.
The first part of the two-part good faith test consists of a brief, objective list of
procedural standards applicable to broadcast stations negotiating retransmission
consent agreements:156
! a broadcaster may not refuse to negotiate with an MVPD;
! a broadcaster must appoint a negotiating representative with the
authority to bargain;
! a broadcaster must agree to meet at reasonable times and locations
and cannot delay the course of negotiations;
! a broadcaster may not offer a single, unilateral proposal;
! in responding to an offer proposed by an MVPD, a broadcaster must
provide reasons for rejecting any aspects of the offer;
154 P.L. 106-113.
155 In the Matter of Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999;
Retransmission Consent Issues: Good Faith Negotiation and Exclusivity, CS Docket No. 99-
363, First Report and Order, adopted March 14, 2000 and released March 16, 2000.
156 Id. at Appendix B, pp. 1-2.

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! a broadcaster is prohibited from entering into an agreement with any
party conditioned upon denying retransmission consent to any
MVPD; and
! a broadcaster must agree to execute a written retransmission consent
agreement that sets forth the full agreement between the broadcaster
and the MVPD.
Under the second part of the good faith test, an MVPD may present facts to the FCC
which, even though they are not a specific violation listed above, given the totality
of the circumstances constitute a failure to negotiate in good faith.157
In its order, the FCC concluded that it is not possible to identify objective
competitive marketplace factors that broadcasters must use in negotiating. To provide
guidance, the FCC listed some conditions that are potential competitive marketplace
considerations and some that are not. For instance, the order notes that any effort to
stifle competition through the negotiation process would not meet the good faith
negotiation requirement. The order directs the Commission staff to expedite
resolution of good faith complaints and notes that the burden of proof is on the
MVPD complainant. The order also allows parties to pursue voluntary mediation and
the FCC will consider favorably a broadcaster’s willingness to participate, but non-
participation will not constitute a violation of good faith.
Subsequent to adoption of these rules, several MVPDs have filed complaints
against broadcast stations. The Commission, itself, has not acted on any of these
complaints, but rather has given the Media Bureau delegated authority to reach
determinations. The Bureau generally has not responded quickly to these complaints;
in most cases the parties have reached agreement before the Bureau has taken action,
and the complaints were then retracted. Where it has made determinations, the
Bureau has not found the broadcasters in violation of the good faith rules. Typically
the Bureau has found these impasses represented a difference of opinion about the
value of the broadcast signals under dispute, not a refusal by the broadcaster to
negotiate in good faith.
Since the Commission, itself, has chosen not to get involved in any of these
complaints and therefore there has not been any commission-level order identifying
what constitutes good faith negotiations, some MVPDs have proposed that the FCC’s
good faith standards be revisited and strengthened to prohibit any form of
discriminatory pricing, abusive practices, and anti-competitive behavior by
broadcasters.158 As explained earlier, retransmission consent compensation often is
made in both cash and non-cash form. It therefore often may be difficult, if not
impossible, to identify what would constitute discriminatory pricing. Abusive
practices and anti-competitive behavior often are subject to antitrust scrutiny. Absent
a specific list of actions that would represent bad faith negotiations, it is not possible
to fully evaluate the proposal to strengthen the FCC’s good faith rules.
157 Id. at Appendix B, p. 2.
158 See, for example, the opinion piece by Rocco Commisso, Mediacom Communications
CEO, entitled “Rx for Retransmission,” in Multichannel News, February 1 2, 2007, at p. 27.

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At the same time, the Commission has recently adopted a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking seeking comment on the effectiveness of leased access enforcement and
the costs and burdens associated with the complaint process,159 and also on whether
and how its processes for resolving carriage disputes should be modified.160 It might
be reasonable for the FCC to undertake an analogous review of its retransmission
consent complaint process.
Proposal: Prohibit tying carriage of popular programming to
carriage of less popular programming.
Although most recent retransmission consent impasses have centered on
unresolved conflicts about cash payments for carriage, the smaller cable operators
have long sought limitations on another form of compensation — the practice of the
large broadcast networks that also own cable networks of tying retransmission
consent for a particular broadcast station’s signal to carriage of an entire suite of
cable and broadcast networks.161 These tie-ins sometimes extend beyond carriage on
the local cable system and may require multi-system operators to carry the suite of
cable networks on all their cable systems and/or for time periods that extend far
beyond the three-year period covered by the broadcast station retransmission consent
agreement being negotiated.162 The American Cable Association (ACA) claims that
such tie-ins can result in cable system operators providing programming their
customers do not prefer or passing through high programming charges to customers.
The ACA therefore has proposed a prohibition on programmers requiring
distributors to carry less popular programming in order to gain access to more
popular programming, which it claims would give cable and satellite operators —
especially small cable operators whose systems have limited capacity — greater
discretion in choosing cable networks that meet their subscribers’ tastes, to the
benefit of those subscribers, and also would help independent cable networks gain
access to cable systems.
The programmers that own broadcast stations have responded that, in some
cases, it was cable operators not programmers who initially proposed that their
compensation for retransmission consent take the form of carrying the programmers’
cable networks (as well as the broadcast signal) at a low charge or no charge, rather
than paying a high price for the retransmission rights to the broadcast signal. At the
time, the cable operators had available capacity on their systems but not much cash
to pay for programming. Now the situation is reversed; many cable operators have
limited available capacity for additional cable networks and some would prefer to pay
159 In the Matter of Leased Commercial Access; Development of Competition and Diversity
in Video Programming Distribution and Carriage, MB Docket No. 07-42, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, adopted March 2, 2007, released June 15, 2007, at para. 7.
160 Id. at para. 6.
161 See, for example, the American Cable Association Petition for Inquiry into
Retransmission Consent Practices, filed with the FCC on October 1, 2002.
162 Id.

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higher prices for the broadcast programming and free up scarce capacity on their
systems.
A prohibition on tie-ins would strengthen the negotiating position of distributors
and independent networks relative to the large programmers that own multiple cable
networks and broadcast networks. But it might have other impacts — or little
impact.
Under a prohibition, the large programmers that could no longer tie
retransmission consent for their popular broadcast networks to carriage of their other
program networks would seek an alternative form of compensation from MVPDs for
retransmission consent. The most likely alternative would be to increase the cash
payment demanded for carriage of the popular broadcast network, which could lead
to an increase in the number of negotiation impasses. In general, the fewer the
number of parameters involved in a retransmission consent negotiation, the fewer the
areas where compromise can be reached, and the higher the likelihood of unresolved
conflict. While many small cable operators have sought a prohibition on tie-ins, the
larger MVPDs (many of whom are, themselves, large programmers) have supported
that form of compensation, in part because they like to tie their own cable networks
but also in part because it provides more opportunity for give and take in the
negotiations.
Under a prohibition on tying, several business strategies at the heart of the
current cable programmer business model would be constrained. The large
programmers have followed the business strategy of creating multiple networks
because of the efficiencies they can gain by cross-marketing one network on another
and developing a strong brand identity. If distributors can choose not to carry the
large programmers’ less popular networks, the programmers’ efficiencies from cross-
marketing and branding would be diminished. At the same time, if their strategy of
proliferating their own branded networks were curtailed, it might become easier for
new independent networks to enter the market, which might increase the diversity of
independent voices.
Proposal: Require programmers to offer their broadcast and cable
networks to distributors on an à la carte basis.
A less intrusive and restrictive government intervention would not prohibit
programmers from offering their popular networks as part of a tie-in with less
popular networks, but would require the programmers also to offer each of their
program networks to MVPDs on an à la carte basis. This could include a
requirement for nondiscriminatory pricing of the à la carte offerings but, as discussed
earlier, carriage agreements often include other forms of compensation or services
and therefore it would be difficult to determine what constituted discriminatory
pricing.
It is not clear what impact this requirement would have, however, for two
reasons. First, tying more popular program networks to less popular ones has been
at the core of the cable industry for more than a decade because in most situations it
is beneficial to the MVPD as well as the programmer. Consumer demand for a large
tier of program networks tends to be far less price elastic — far less sensitive to

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increases in price — than demand for individual program networks. Thus in most
situations the MVPD is not harmed by having to purchase a bundle of program
networks from a broadcast or cable programmer. There are some exceptions — for
example, a small cable operator whose system has limited channel capacity or an
MVPD with relatively few subscribers demanding sports programming facing a
bundle of networks that includes one or several very high-priced sports programming.
Second, it is likely that the large programmers would price an à la carte offering
in a fashion that took into account both the lost marketing efficiencies from tying less
popular programming to popular programming and the lost revenues if network
proliferation had been a successful way to forestall competitive entry. Thus the rates
for à la carte offerings are likely to be very high, which might discourage most
MVPDs from choosing that option. The exceptions might be small cable operators
whose systems have such limited channel capacity that their only viable choice would
be the à la carte offerings of at least some programmers and programming for which
there is an audience with a high intensity of demand that the MVPD intends to offer
on a premium tier — assuming the programmer allowed the MVPD to offer the
programming on a premium tier. (See the next proposal.)
Proponents of à la carte pricing of retail MVPD service have been among the
strongest proponents of mandatory à la carte pricing at the wholesale level, since they
believe the latter would foster the former. These proponents argue that à la carte
pricing gives subscribers the greatest control over their video purchases. It allows
them to pay only for the programming that they want and also allows them to keep
programming that they find offensive out of their home. In addition, noting that
subscribers’ price elasticity of demand (sensitivity to price increases) tends to be
greater for individual networks than for large tiers, they argue that requiring an à la
carte option would place downward pressure on both wholesale and retail prices.
Opponents of mandatory à la carte pricing argue that the current system of large
tiers allows both programmers and distributors to take advantage of the significant
economies in cross-marketing and fosters diverse programming by giving new
networks the opportunity to build audiences (how would subscribers even learn about
the existence of new networks in an à la carte environment, unless those new
networks were owned by one of the large programmers who could continue to cross-
market?) and supporting minority and independent networks that might not attract
enough subscribers in an à la carte environment to survive. The data in Table 11,
showing that over a 13 week period most viewers watch programming on far more
networks than they do in a week, suggests that there likely are many casual and
infrequent viewers of any individual network that now are part of that network’s
audience but would be unlikely to subscribe to that network in an à la carte
environment. This might require the network and MVPD to set high à la carte price
for the diminished audience. Of course, as long as subscribers continue to have
tiered options as well as the à la carte option they need not change their behavior, but
it is likely that many subscribers that currently take advantage of channel surfing
would choose the à la carte option.

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Proposal: Prohibit programmers from requiring their networks to
be placed on the expanded basic service tier.
Often, when a major programmer with must-have programming is negotiating
with a distributor, it not only seeks to tie carriage rights to that programming to
carriage of its less popular program networks, it also seeks to require the distributor
to place the less popular networks on its most widely subscribed to tier — the
enhanced basic service tier. That will maximize the number of households receiving
the programming and will help in ratings and hence advertising revenues. But the
secondary or tertiary networks of that programmer may not be the program networks
most sought by subscribers and thus the MVPD sometimes will prefer not to place
them on its expanded basic service tier.
The ACA therefore has proposed prohibiting programmers from requiring cable
and satellite operators to offer the programmers’ cable networks only on the
expanded basic service tier and instead allow the MVPDs to determine program
placement on their network tiers. In most situations, distributors share the large
programmers’ preference for a single large expanded basic service tier, and thus the
impact of this proposed prohibition might be limited. But there may be situations in
which programmer and distributor interests diverge and, more generically, the
prohibition could create an opportunity for distributors to experiment with their cable
tiers.
For example, while cable programmers receive about half their revenues from
advertising and half from per subscriber fees assessed on cable and satellite
operators, cable and satellite operators get almost 90% of their revenues from
subscribers and only a little more than 10% from advertisers.163 An optimal tiering
strategy for programmers therefore might not be optimal for distributors. Moreover,
cable and satellite operators do not have a retail layer to insulate them from
subscribers, and therefore may be more responsive to consumer complaints about the
placement of specific networks on tiers.
Cable and satellite operators may be more willing than programmers to take
particular cable networks off the expanded basic service tier and place them on
premium tiers because they only indirectly benefit from the strategies of cross-
promotion of networks and network proliferation that directly benefit programmers,
which depend heavily on a single large expanded basic service tier.
Cable and satellite operators also may choose to experiment with cable tiers —
and even with à la carte pricing — if they perceive that these additional offerings
might increase their profits. When the per subscriber license fee for a cable network
does not appear to be in equilibrium with subscriber viewing patterns,164 then the
163 See footnote 24 and also Table 10 in this report.
164 For example, in 2003 Cox Cable alleged that ESPN represented 18% of Cox’s total
programming costs but only 4% of Cox’s viewing audience. (See Chris Isidore, “Sports’
main event: ESPN-cable bout,” CNNMoney.com, October 23, 2003, available at
[http://money.cnn.com/2003/10/23/commentary/column_sportsbiz/sportsbiz/index.html],
(continued...)

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operator will have the incentive to either decrease payments to the programmer or
increase revenues from end users or both. By placing a high-cost network on a
separate tier, the operator might be able to reduce payments to the programmer by
only paying for those subscribers who actually desire that network while maintaining
(or at least not decreasing by as much) the revenues received from subscribers. If the
operator were able to take a high-cost cable network off its expanded basic service
tier, place it on a separate tier, and then re-price the expanded basic service tier in a
way that did not lower revenues from that tier by as much as it gained revenues from
the new separate tier, it would benefit from having the discretion to place cable
networks on tiers as it saw fit.
Some observers have questioned whether giving distributors greater control over
the tier placement of cable networks would yield lower prices for subscribers. They
cite the most recent FCC report on cable industry prices — which found that satellite
operators do not provide sufficiently strong competitive constraints on cable
operators to restrain prices165 — and suggest that the shift of control over the
placement of networks on tiers from programmers to distributors is less likely to
reduce rates to subscribers than to redistribute the profits from programmers to
distributors. But even if the price effect were small, distributor control over network
placement on tiers would improve the ability of distributors to base placement on
their subscribers’ preferences rather than the negotiating strength of the
programmers.
Proposal: Prohibit the ownership or control of more than one
television station in a market or prohibit a “duopoly” owner from tying
retransmission consent for one station to another.
In the earlier section presenting specific examples of programmer-distributor
conflicts, it was striking how often the broadcaster involved in a dispute owned or
controlled more than one broadcast station in a small or medium sized local market.
It appears that where a broadcaster owns or controls two stations that are affiliated
with major networks, that potentially gives that broadcaster control over two sets of
must-have programming and places a distributor, especially a relatively small cable
operator, in a very weak negotiating position since it would be extremely risky to lose
carriage of both signals. Alternatively, when a broadcaster owns or controls one
station that is affiliated with a major broadcast network and a second station that is
affiliated with a weaker broadcast network, it may be able to tie carriage of the major
broadcast network to a demand that the cable operator also carry — and perhaps pay
for carriage of — the signals of the weaker broadcast network, which otherwise the
164 (...continued)
viewed on June 28, 2007.) ESPN responded that Cox fails to take into account additional
local advertising revenues Cox receives by carrying the ESPN networks.
165 In the Matter of Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992; Statistical Report on Average Rates for Basic
Service, Cable Programming Service, and Equipment, MM Docket No. 92-266, Report on
Cable Industry Prices, adopted December 20, 2006, released December 27, 2006, at para.
14.

CRS-71
cable company would refuse to pay for or only carry for free as part of a must-carry
arrangement.
The FCC’s media ownership rules, including its local television multiple
ownership rule, currently are in flux, as a major order that it adopted on June 2,
2003,166 modifying five rules was remanded by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in June 2004.167 Thus the rules currently in place are those that
existed prior to June 2, 2003, while the Commission completes work on a proceeding
to adopt new rules (or provide stronger support for the June 2, 2003 rules) that will
meet the Court’s concerns.168 Under current rules, a company can own two television
stations in the same designated market area if the stations’ Grade B contours169 do not
overlap or if only one is among the four highest-ranked (in terms of audience) in the
market and at least eight independent television stations would remain in the market
after the proposed combination.170 An existing licensee of a failed, failing, or unbuilt
television station can seek a waiver of the rule if it can demonstrate that the “in-
market” buyer is the only reasonably available entity willing and able to operate the
subject station, and that selling the station to an out-of-market buyer would result in
an artificially depressed price for the station.171 The rule that the FCC had adopted
in June 2003 would have provided a lower threshold for such “duopoly”
ownership.172
166 Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review
— Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted
Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, MB Docket 02-277; Cross-
Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers, MM Docket 01-235; Rules and Policies
Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets, MM Docket
01-317; Definition of Radio Markets, MM Docket 00-244; Definition of Radio Markets for
Areas Not Located in an Arbitron Survey Area, MB Docket 03-130, adopted June 2, 2003
and released July 2, 2003
167 Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal Communications Commission, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12720 (3rd Cir. 2004).
168 A detailed discussion of the FCC’s media ownership rules is provided in CRS Report
RL31925, FCC Media Ownership Rules: Current Status and Issues for Congress, by
Charles B. Goldfarb.
169 Grade B is a measure of signal intensity associated with acceptable reception. The
FCC’s rules define this contour, often a circle drawn around the transmitter site of a
television station, in such a way that 50 percent of the locations on that circle are
statistically predicted to receive a signal of Grade B intensity at least 90 per cent of the time.
Although a station’s predicted signal strength increases as one gets closer to the transmitter,
there will still be some locations within the predicted Grade B contour that do not receive
a signal of Grade B intensity.
170 47 C.F.R. 73.3555(b).
171 47 C.F.R. 73.3555 n. 7.
172 In markets with five or more TV stations, a company could own two TV stations, but
only one of these stations could be among the top four in ratings; in markets with 18 or more
stations, a company could own three TV stations, but only one of these stations could be
among the top four in ratings; in deciding how many stations are in the market, both
commercial and non-commercial TV stations were counted. There was an eased waiver
(continued...)

CRS-72
The FCC record developed when constructing the 2003 rules did not take into
account the impact of duopoly control of television stations on retransmission
consent because at that time the market changes that were strengthening the
negotiating position of broadcasters had not yet occurred — or had not yet been
affecting negotiations. Rather the focus of the analysis of the local television
multiple ownership rule was on the number of independent voices and competition
in the market for advertising. The Commission concluded that the old rule (which
is now again in place) could not be justified on diversity or competition grounds.
While those remain important bases for analysis, it appears from recent
retransmission consent negotiations that in its current proceeding, the FCC might also
want to look at the effect of duopoly ownership on retransmission consent
negotiations since any impact on broadcaster-distributor negotiations may also affect
the availability and price of programming to MVPD subscribers. For example, in
comments filed in the current proceeding, Suddenlink argued that common
ownership of two or more of the top four stations in a local market places cable
operators at a disadvantage in retransmission consent carriage negotiations and
therefore should be prohibited.173
This may become a more complex issue as broadcast stations begin to use their
digital multicast capability to offer multiple signals that may include the signals of
more than one network. As explained earlier, tying these secondary or tertiary digital
signals to retransmission consent negotiations involving the broadcaster’s primary
signal might prove the most effective way for smaller broadcast networks to obtain
carriage on cable systems. It is unlikely that the local affiliates of these new
networks will become one of the four top stations in local markets in the near future,
but a multicasting broadcaster may try to tie MVPDs’ rights to carry its major
network signal to carriage of its multicast signals.
Proposal: Place set-top boxes in customer premises that pick up
local broadcast station signals off the air without requiring MVPDs to
retransmit broadcast signals.
The cable industry appears to be seeking a technological fix that might allow
it to escape retransmission consent requirements, at least in those areas where
subscribers are able to obtain broadcast signals off the air. CableLabs says it is
developing specification for an interface that would let set-top boxes in a subscriber’s
172 (...continued)
process for markets with 11 or fewer TV stations in which two top-four stations sought to
merge. The FCC would evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether such stations would better
serve their local communities together rather than separately. Under the waiver standard
that applied for all markets, the FCC would consider permitting otherwise banned two-
station combinations or three-station combinations if one station was “failed, failing, or
unbuilt.” The standard was liberalized by removing the requirement that an applicant for
such a waiver “demonstrate that it has tried and failed to secure an out-of-market buyer for
the failed station.”
173 See Ted Hearn, “Broadcast-Station Cap Sought,” Multichannel News, October 30, 2006,
at p. 51.

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home receive digital broadcast signals off the air.174 In effect, the set-top box would
incorporate the equivalent of the old rabbit-ears or rooftop antenna that allow
households to receive broadcast signals free off the air. This technology would allow
households to see broadcast television signals alongside cable programming “as an
integrated viewing experience.” This appears to be an attempt to improve cable
systems’ bargaining position with broadcast television stations operators by
providing set-top boxes to their customers that would receive all the local
broadcasters’ digital signals “for free” without the cable companies having to pay for
the right to retransmit the signals.
Since this could be a threat to the retransmission consent/must-carry regime set
up by Congress, and since broadcasters are seeking modification of the must-carry
option to require MVPDs to carry local broadcasters’ multiple digital signals, not just
the primary signal (as currently required by law), it is likely that this technological
development will play a role in any attempt to modify the current statute.
Proposal: Close the “terrestrial loophole” exception to the
requirement for nondiscriminatory access to programming in which a
cable operator has an attributable interest.
Section 628 of the Communications Act, which directs the FCC to establish
rules to prevent a vertically integrated cable operator from discriminating in the
prices, terms, and conditions at which it makes its programming available to non-
affiliated MVPDs or have exclusive access to the programming in which it has an
attributable interest, applies only if the vertically integrated company’s programming
is transmitted to distributors via satellite. It does not apply to programming that is
transmitted to distributors over terrestrial facilities (for example, over broadband
lines), an exception that frequently applies to regional sports networks and potentially
could apply to all cable program networks as broadband fiber optic cable becomes
more widely deployed. Some parties have proposed closing this “terrestrial
loophole.” There does not appear to be any basis for treating programming that is
transmitted terrestrially differently from programming that is transmitted by satellite.
Proposal: Clarify the definition of a regional sports network.
Based on its concern that Comcast and Time Warner, after acquiring the cable
systems of the bankrupt Adelphia and exchanging systems among themselves to
increase their cluster sizes, might have the market power to “make or break”
unaffiliated regional sports networks (RSNs) by choosing not to carry them, the FCC
conditioned approval of the license transfers on allowing unaffiliated RSNs to use
commercial arbitration to resolve disputes regarding carriage on Comcast or Time
Warner cable systems.175
174 Todd Spangler, “Trying to Beat Broadcast Over the Ears,” Multichannel News, March
12, 2007, at p. 6.
175 See In the Matter of Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of
Control of Licenses: Adelphia Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-
possession), Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. (subsidiaries), Assignees; Adelphia
(continued...)

CRS-74
For the past two years, The America Channel (TAC) has attempted without
success to gain carriage of its programming on the cable systems of Comcast, Time
Warner, and other large MVPDs, though it has reached carriage agreements with
some overbuilders and new telephone company entrants into the MVPD market. Its
announced programming format was uplifting programming that would profile
ordinary people doing extraordinary things, but it did not have actual programming
available. It sought carriage agreements to use as the basis for gaining the necessary
financing, reportedly stating that “Without a carriage deal, or at least a placeholder
that signifies carriage will be forthcoming upon launch, financial investors are
reluctant to commit capital.”176
After the FCC adopted its order approving the Adelphia/Comcast/Time Warner
license transfers, TAC modified its programming format, combining regional
broadcasts of more than 600 NCAA Division I women’s and men’s sports games and
matches “with real-life drama about the aspirations, achievements, challenges,
adventures, community service, and lifestyles of students and student athletes.”177
In so doing, TAC sought confirmation by the FCC that it met the definition of a
regional sports network in the FCC’s Adelphia order and therefore could demand
arbitration if either Comcast or Time Warner refused to carry its programming.178
The right to go to arbitration would not necessarily result in an arbitration
decision requiring Comcast and Time Warner to carry TAC. But it would create the
possibility of such an outcome, which might in turn encourage other program
networks to include in their programming the minimum amount of sports
programming needed to meet the definition of an RSN, in order to gain the right to
demand arbitration with Comcast and Time Warner. Based on the concern that such
an outcome could be expanded to cover other MVPDs, a number of MVPDs have
filed at the FCC oppositions to the TAC filing, based on the argument that they do
not sign carriage agreements with networks before the networks start programming.
TAC has responded by providing examples meant to demonstrate “that it is common
industry practice for a network to launch and produce programming only after a
foundational carriage agreement” has been reached.179
Although parties on both sides of this issue have met with FCC commissioners,
the Commission has not yet formally addressed this issue. Some have proposed that
175 (...continued)
Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors and
Transferors, to Comcast Corporation (subsidiaries), Assignees and Transferees; Comcast
Corporation, Transferor, to Time Warner Inc., Transferee; Time Warner Inc., Transferor,
to Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, adopted July 13,
2006, released July 21, 2006, at para. 181.
176 See Jonathan Make, America Channel’s Carriage Quest Spurs Pay-TV Concern,”
Communications Daily, May 25, 2007, at pp. 3-5.
177 See [http://www.americachannel.us/overview.php], viewed on June 29, 2007.
178 See Jonathan Make, America Channel’s Carriage Quest Spurs Pay-TV Concern,”
Communications Daily, May 25, 2007, at pp. 3-5.
179 Id.

CRS-75
the FCC hold a proceeding in which it could review the current definition of regional
sports network and make any modifications needed to block a failed program
network from demanding arbitration just by offering some minimum amount of
sports programming.