Intelligence and Information-Sharing Elements of S. 4 and H.R. 1

Intelligence and Information-Sharing Elements of S. 4 and H.R. 1

Order Code RL34061
Intelligence and Information-Sharing Elements of
S. 4 and H.R. 1
June 26, 2007
Todd Masse
Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counterterrorism
Domestic Social Policy Division

Intelligence and Information-Sharing Elements of
S. 4 and H.R. 1
Summary
Title I of S. 4 and Title VII of H.R. 1 include corresponding measures related
to enhancing information and intelligence sharing, both horizontally within the
federal government and vertically between the federal government and state and local
law enforcement and homeland security authorities. The companion bills have two
common subtitles (one each for the Homeland Security Information Sharing
Enhancement and Homeland Security Information Sharing Partnerships) and a
number of unique subtitles. Each of the common subtitles does not necessarily
contain identical language. Three subtitles unique to H.R. 1 are (1) the Fusion and
Law Enforcement Education and Teaming (FLEET) Grant Program, (2) the Border
Intelligence Fusion Center Program, and (3) the Homeland Security Intelligence
Offices Reorganization. One subtitle, the Interagency Threat Assessment
Coordination Group (ITACG), is unique to S. 4.
With respect to Homeland Security Information Sharing Enhancement, at the
most aggregate level, the bills would require the Secretary of Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to integrate and standardize the information of DHS
intelligence components into a Department information-sharing environment.
Among other measures, the bills would require the Secretary of DHS to implement
a Homeland Security Advisory System, which shall provide “... in each warning or
alert specific information and advice on ... appropriate protective measures and
countermeasures that may be taken in response to the threat or risk.” Furthermore,
the responsible DHS official shall, “...whenever possible, limit the scope” of each
advisory or warning “to a specific region, locality, or economic sector believed to be
at risk.” Unique to H.R. 1 is a proposal that would stipulate that DHS “...shall not
... use color designations as the exclusive means of specifying homeland security
threat conditions.” The Department would be required to develop mechanisms to
provide feedback to state, local, tribal, and private sector officials on the utility of
information they gathered. Both bills also include language to provide monetary and
non-monetary information-sharing incentives for employees in federal agencies that
possess or use intelligence or terrorism information.
With respect to unique subtitles within these bills, H.R. 1 proposes the
establishment of a Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program and a FLEET Grant
Program. Each of these programs would authorize funds to hire individuals either
at the federal or state and local level who would replace law enforcement officers or
intelligence analysts assigned to certain fusion centers. H.R. 1 proposes to reorganize
some the intelligence entities within DHS, to include renaming the current Assistant
Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis to an Under Secretary, defining what
constitutes a DHS intelligence component and outlining the roles and responsibilities
of DHS intelligence components. Unique to S. 4 is the proposed codification of the
ITACG, which would “...facilitate the production of federally coordinated products
derived from information within the scope of the information sharing environment
... and intended for distribution to State, local and tribal government officials and the
private sector.” It is proposed that an undetermined number of state and local
intelligence and law enforcement officials would be members of the ITACG.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Fusion and Law Enforcement Education and Teaming (FLEET)
Grant Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Fusion Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Homeland Security Information-Sharing Enhancement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Unique House Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Unique Senate Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
DHS Advisory System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Definition of DHS Intelligence Component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Integration and Standardization of DHS Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Program Manager ISE Term, Functions, and Additional Resources . . . 7
Homeland Security Information-Sharing Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Unique House Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Unique Senate Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Homeland Security Intelligence Offices Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Intelligence and Information-Sharing
Elements of S. 4 and H.R. 1
Introduction
The Final Report of the National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (hereafter the 9/11 Report), was published in July 2004 and included
numerous recommendations to enhance, among other measures, terrorism
information1 and intelligence sharing across the federal government, as well as
between the federal government and state and local governments. The primary
interest of these changes was to deter, detect, and ultimately prevent terrorist attacks
such as that which took place on September 11, 2001. On December 17, 2004,
Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA), P.L. 108-458. The law included many of the initiatives outlined in the 9/11
Report, including the codification of the Director of National Intelligence position
and the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center. The law also created
an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) led by a Program Manager to facilitate
“...the means for sharing terrorism information among all appropriate Federal, State,
local, and tribal entities, and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines
and technologies.”2 While the IRTPA directed substantial changes in the Intelligence
Community, it was perceived that from an information-sharing perspective, more
could be done to enhance vertical and horizontal information sharing.
Title I of S. 4 and Title VII of H.R. 1 include corresponding measures related
to enhancing information and intelligence sharing, both horizontally within the
federal government and vertically between the federal government and state and local
law enforcement and homeland security authorities. The companion bills have two
common subtitles (one each for the Homeland Security Information Sharing
Enhancement and Homeland Security Information Sharing Partnerships) and a
number of unique subtitles. Each of the common subtitles does not necessarily
contain identical language. Three subtitles unique to HR. 1 are (1) the Fusion and
Law Enforcement Education and Teaming (FLEET) Grant Program, (2) the Border
1 Terrorism information is defined as “...all information, whether collected, produced, or
distributed by intelligence, law enforcement, military, homeland security, or other activities
relating to (A) the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities,
means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign or international terrorist groups
or individuals, or of domestic groups or individuals involved in transnational terrorism; (B)
threat posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, United States persons, or
United States interests, or to those of other nations; (C) communications of or by such
groups or individuals; or (D) groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or
associated with such groups or individuals.” P.L. 108-458 § 1016, codified at 6 U.S.C. §
485.
2 See IRTPA, Section 1016, codified at 6 U.S.C. § 485.

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Intelligence Fusion Center Program, and (3) the Homeland Security Intelligence
Offices Reorganization. One subtitle, the Interagency Threat Assessment
Coordination Group, is unique to S. 4. A summary of the common and unique
subtitles follows:
! Fusion and Law Enforcement Education and Teaming (FLEET)
Grant Program (Unique to H.R. 1).
! Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program (Unique to H.R. 1).
! Homeland Security Information Sharing Enhancement.
! Homeland Security Information Sharing Partnerships.
! Homeland Security Intelligence Offices Reorganization (Unique to
H.R. 1).
! Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (Unique to S.
4).
Fusion and Law Enforcement Education and Teaming
(FLEET) Grant Program
H.R. 1 would establish a grant program “...under which the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall make grants to
local and tribal law enforcement agencies....” The proposed purposes for which these
grants would be used include (1) to hire (state or local) personnel or pay existing
personnel to perform the duties of eligible personnel who are detailed to a fusion
center, (2) to provide appropriate training for eligible law enforcement personnel who
are detailed to a fusion center, and (3) to establish communications connectivity
between eligible law enforcement personnel who are detailed to a fusion center and
the home agency or department from which they are detailed. There is no
comparable FLEET provision in S. 4.
Fusion Centers. According to H.R. 1,
the terms State, local, or regional fusion center mean a State intelligence center,
or a regional intelligence center that is the product of a collaborative effort of at
least two qualifying agencies that provide resources, expertise, or information to
such center with the goals of maximizing the ability of such intelligence center
and the qualifying agencies participating in such intelligence center to provide
and produce homeland security information to detect, prevent, apprehend, and
respond to terrorist and criminal activity.
There are approximately more than 40 such fusion centers in operation around the
country.
While the existence of the information fusion function precedes the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, it was not until the post-attack period that the
potential counterterrorism utility of such centers was recognized. In general, these

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centers have been established as initiatives of state and local governments, sometimes
in regional cooperative configurations. Historically, the centers have largely been
financed by participating state and local governments. Recently, the federal
government has provided support for these centers through (1) provision of Fusion
Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New
Era (August 2006; earlier Guidelines were published in July 2005), (2) the detailing
of intelligence analysts and intelligence liaison personnel from the Department and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to these centers;3 (3) “in-kind” support to
include assisting state and local officials assigned to fusion centers in obtaining
security clearances; and (4) start-up financing through the DHS, Homeland Security
Grant Program (HSGP).4 According to DHS, for the time period FY2004 through
FY2006, more than $130 million of actual funding was provided to fusion centers.5
In FY2007, for the first time, “... hiring new staff and/or contractors to serve as
intelligence analysts to support information/intelligence fusion capabilities...” is
allowable under certain conditions.6
Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program
H.R. 1 would establish a Border Intelligence Fusion Center Program “... for the
purpose of stationing Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers or intelligence analysts in the
3 According to information provided at the first annual National Fusion Center Conference,
held March 5-8, 2007, DHS currently has intelligence personnel deployed to 15 state, local,
and regional fusion centers. According to the FBI, it currently has deployed 250 personnel
stationed at 35 fusion centers. See also FBI, Fusion Centers, information provided by the
FBI to CRS, dated May 25, 2007.
4 The Homeland Security Grant Program is composed of five interconnected grant programs:
(1) State Homeland Security Program, (2) Urban Areas Security Initiative, (3) the Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, (4) the Metropolitan Medical Response
System, and (5) the Citizens Corp Program. See DHS, Office of Grants and Training, FY
2007 Homeland Security Grant Program — Program Guidance and Application Kit,
January 2007, p. 1.
5 See DHS, Office of Grants and Training, Fusion Centers: DHS Funded Activities — Fiscal
Years 2004-2006, April 2007, p. 6. This actual amount of total obligations and expenditures
for state and local fusion centers stands in contrast to the “projected” or “requested” amount
of DHS HSGP funds ($380 million) applied for by fusion centers during the 2001-2007 time
period. DHS was created in March 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(P.L.107-296), signed November 7, 2002.
6 These costs are allowable under both the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) and the
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) grant programs. To be hired as
an intelligence analyst, individuals must meet certain training and/or experience criteria.
In terms of sustainment costs, the DHS FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program:
Program Guidance and Application Kit states that “Costs associated with hiring new
intelligence analysts are allowable only for two years, after which the States and Urban
Areas shall be responsible for supporting the sustainment costs for those intelligence
analysts.” See FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidance and
Application Kit, p. 26.

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fusion centers of participating border States.”7 Furthermore, such personnel would
assist state, local and tribal law enforcement in jurisdictions along the northern and
southern borders to “... overlay threat and suspicious activity with Federal homeland
security information in order to develop a more comprehensive and accurate threat
picture.” Funding proposed for this measure would be “... available to hire new CBP
and ICE officers or intelligence analysts to replace CBP and ICE officers and
intelligence analysts who are stationed at border State fusion centers....” S. 4 has no
comparable provision.
Homeland Security Information-Sharing Enhancement
Both bills include a subtitle on the homeland security information-sharing
enhancement, although the provisions are not identical. Much of the responsibility
for the initiatives under the bills would be implemented either by the Secretary of
Homeland Security or by the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, a position also
currently assigned the title of Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis. As
explained below, H.R. 1 recommends that the existing position of Assistant Secretary
for Intelligence and Analysis be changed to an Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis. S. 4 makes no such change and, therefore, refers to either the Secretary of
DHS and/or the Chief Intelligence Officer, sometimes in consultation with other
governmental officials, as being responsible for implementing the initiatives.
At the most aggregate level, the bills would require the Secretary of DHS to
“integrate and standardize the information of the intelligence components of the
Department into a Department information sharing environment....”8 Such an
integration would be administered by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis (H.R. 1) or the Chief Intelligence Officer (S. 4). The two bills define a
DHS intelligence component similarly as “... any directorate, agency, or element of
the Department that gathers, receives, analyzes, produces, or disseminates homeland
security information....”
Furthermore, each of the bills would require the
! Secretary (S. 4) or the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
(H.R. 1) to enhance the Homeland Security Advisory System,9 which
7 A Border State Fusion Center is defined as “... a fusion center located in the State of
Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, California, Arizona, New
Mexico, or Texas.”
8 S. 4 excepts from this integration and standardization “...any internal protocols of such
intelligence components.”
9 See CRS Report RL32023, Homeland Security Advisory System: Possible Issues for
Congressional Oversight, by Shawn Reese, and CRS Report RL32897, Post-9/11 National
Threat Notification Efforts: Issues, Actions, and Options for Congress, by John Rollins and
Lynn J. Cunningham.

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shall, among other functions, provide in each warning or alert10
specific information and advice on “... appropriate protective
measures and countermeasures that may be taken in response” to the
threat or risk. Furthermore, the responsible DHS official shall,
“...whenever possible, limit the scope” of each advisory or warning
“to a specific region, locality, or economic sector believed to be at
risk.” Unique to H.R. 1 is a proposal which would stipulate that the
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis “... shall not, in
issuing any advisory or alert, use color designations as the exclusive
means of specifying homeland security threat conditions.”
! Department to designate information-sharing and knowledge
management officers for each intelligence component with respect
to “...coordinating the different systems used in the Department to
gather and disseminate homeland security information.”
! Secretary to establish business processes to review and analyze
information gathered from state, local, and tribal government
officials and private sector sources. DHS would be required to
develop mechanisms to provide feedback on the utility of such
information to state, local, tribal and private sector officials.
! Training and evaluation of DHS employees to understand the
definition of homeland security information, how information
available to them as part of their duties might qualify as homeland
security information, and how such information available to them
might be relevant to the Department’s Office of Intelligence and
Analysis (H.R.1) or intelligence components of the Department (S.
4).
Unique House Provisions. One proposal unique to H.R. 1 is the
requirement that the Secretary, acting through the Chief Intelligence Officer,
establish a comprehensive information technology network architecture for the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis. The bill would provide that “... to the extent possible
(the architecture) incorporate the approaches, features, and functions of the network
proposed by the Markle Foundation ... known as the System-wide Homeland Security
Analysis and Resource Exchange (SHARE) Network.”
Unique Senate Provisions. S. 4 proposes adding a category of information
that will be shared by DHS-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) information. The
10 As terms of art, “warning” and “alert” terms are often used interchangeably. At the most
basic level, the difference between the two terms turns on at least the following three
factors: (1) accuracy and validity/reliability of the intelligence, (2) extent to which
intelligence indicates that a threat is imminent, and (3) extent and specificity of federally
recommended remedial actions to combat the threat. If the terms are viewed on a spectrum,
with the far left being advisory and the far right being a warning, it could be argued that as
information or intelligence moves from left to right, the confidence in the intelligence may
become greater, the threat may become more imminent, and the security recommendations
from the federal government may become more specific.

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bill defines WMD information as that “... which could reasonably be expected to
assist in the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction ... that
could be used by a terrorist ... against the United States.” Moreover, the bill
proposes eliminating the two-year tenure for the ISE’s Program Manager by making
it permanent. S. 4’s proposed language would amend Section 1016 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) to read,
“...The individual designated as the program manager shall serve as the program
manager until removed from service and replaced by the President....” S. 4 would
also authorize $30 million for each of fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for the ISE Program
Manager to hire “not more than 40 full-time employees to assist the program
manager” in numerous information-sharing functions. In two other unique measures,
S. 4 would require the Secretary and Chief Intelligence Officer to (1) develop
intelligence training curriculum for state, local, and tribal officials, and (2) develop
financial and other incentives for employees to share information.
DHS Advisory System. With respect to the Homeland Security Advisory
System, the bills would provide greater congressional direction to the Secretary in the
administration of this program by responding to often-heard criticisms directed at the
system and the Department by first responders, state and local law enforcement, and
some private sector entities. The sections of the bills which would require the
Department to provide enhanced advice regarding protective measures and
countermeasures may prove difficult to implement, if enacted, as some might
question whether the Department has, in each situation, a sufficient understanding
of the “ground truth” or current risk profile in order to recommend such measures.
State and local authorities may be more familiar with the resources they have at their
disposal to take protective actions against any potential threat. If DHS has any
specific information about the types of threat directed against a particular asset, this
information could prove highly useful, if provided to first responders before
(emphasis added) the threat is imminent. With regard to the geographic scope of
warnings, the measures outlined in the bills appear to be consistent with ongoing
efforts between the FBI and DHS to provide such targeted warnings to conserve first
responder resources.11
Definition of DHS Intelligence Component. With respect to the
definition of what constitutes a DHS intelligence component, H.R. 1’s proposed
definition codifies activities as intelligence related in a manner that appears to go
beyond how the Department has defined its Intelligence Enterprise. It stipulates that
a DHS intelligence component is defined as “... any directorate, agency, or element
of the Department that gathers, receives, analyzes, produces or disseminates
homeland security information....”12 According to the DHS Intelligence Enterprise
Strategic Plan (January 2006), the DHS Intelligence Enterprise includes “... all those
component organizations within the Department that have activities producing
(emphasis added) raw information, intelligence-related information, and/or finished
11 See CRS Report RL32897, Post 9/11 National Threat Notification Efforts: Issues,
Actions, and Options for Congress, by John Rollins and Lynn J. Cunningham. See also CRS
Report RL32023, Homeland Security Advisory System: Possible Issues for Congressional
Oversight, by Shawn Reese.
12 See H.R. 1 RFS, Title VII, § 723.

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intelligence.” Such an extension beyond production may expand the universe of
entities within the Department that are considered by the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis as part of the intelligence enterprise.
Integration and Standardization of DHS Intelligence. It would appear
that, given the current state of homeland security intelligence within the Department,
these measures might facilitate a more corporate approach to intelligence at DHS.
According to DHS Management Directive 8110, Intelligence Integration and
Management (January 2006), the Chief Intelligence Officer does not have (1) formal
budget formulation and execution authority over the DHS intelligence elements
outside of the largely headquarters-based Office of Intelligence and Analysis, (2) an
established and integrated management information system into which all DHS-
collected intelligence and information is entered, or (3) the ultimate authority to
recruit and select the leaders of the DHS intelligence components. In the absence of
these three tools, it could be argued that developing a sense of “what the Department
knows” collectively and, perhaps more importantly, “what it doesn’t know” could be
problematic. Moreover, recent CRS research has indicated that, at least with respect
to risk assessment and how such assessments flow through the Homeland Security
Grant Program, state and local threat information is not considered in any meaningful
and systematic manner.13 Feedback provided to state, local, and private sector
partners could go a long way toward building goodwill and more effectively targeting
their information and intelligence collection activities.
Program Manager ISE Term, Functions, and Additional Resources.
Given the complexities of the functions associated with this position, and the long-
term nature of enhancing intelligence and information sharing across all levels of
government, it would seem reasonable that the program manager position be a
permanent position. Uncertainty of the permanence of this position might undermine
the development of a new “culture” within the Intelligence Community based on
sharing, institutional knowledge, and the building of broad-based relationships to
implement the ISE’s Implementation Plan (published in November 2006). It also
appears that S. 4 would provide the ISE Program Manager with additional powers to
“... identify and resolve information sharing disputes between Federal departments,
agencies and components....” How this will be implemented in practice is an open
question. When possible differences on information-sharing issues are raised, for
example, between the FBI and DHS, the authority of the ISE Program Manager to
direct each or both of these agencies to change their internal information-sharing
practices is questionable. Are the ISE Program Manager’s authorities commensurate
with the position’s responsibilities?
Homeland Security Information-Sharing Partnerships
Each of the bills would require the Secretary (in consultation with the ISE
Program Manager, the Attorney General, and others according to S. 4 provisions) to
establish a State, Local, and Regional Information Fusion Center Initiative to
13 See CRS Report RL33858, The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment
Methodology: Evolution, Issues and Options for Congress, by Todd Masse, John Rollins,
and Siobhan O’Neil.

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“...establish partnerships with State, local and regional fusion centers.” Through this
DHS initiative, the Secretary would carry out 13 functions, including, but not limited
to (1) coordinating with the principal official of each fusion center, and the official
designated as the State Homeland Security Advisor; (2) providing DHS operational
and intelligence advice and assistance to these centers; (3) conducting table-top and
live training exercises to regularly assess the capability of individual and regional
networks; (4) provide analytic and reporting advice and assistance to the centers; and
(5) review homeland security information gathered by state, local, and regional fusion
centers and incorporate relevant information with homeland security information of
the Department. Both bills would require the Secretary to draft a fusion center
“Concept of Operations Report” to be submitted by the Secretary to the House and
Senate Homeland Security Committees. Such a report would
! include a clear articulation of the purposes, goals, and specific
objectives for which the program is being developed;
! identify stakeholders in the program and provide an assessment of
their needs;
! contain a developed set of quantitative metrics to measure, to the
extent possible, program output; and

! include a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment.14
Each of the bills would also establish a Homeland Security Information Sharing
Fellows Program for the purpose of “... detailing State, local and tribal law
enforcement officers and intelligence analysts to the Department (emphasis added)
to participate in the work of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis....”
Unique House Provisions. With respect to the aforementioned Homeland
Security Information Sharing Fellows Program, H.R. 1 would condition participation
in the program on the agreement of the state, local or tribal entity to “...continue to
pay the individual’s salary and benefits during the period for which the individual is
detailed.” However, it would also provide for a “... stipend to cover the individual’s
reasonable living expenses ...” during the period for which they are detailed to the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, subject to the availability of appropriations.
Unique Senate Provisions. S. 4 would provide that the Chief Intelligence
Officer “...may, to the extent practicable, assign officers and intelligence analysts
from...” DHS intelligence elements to state, local, and regional fusion centers. S. 4
also proposes a requirement that before being assigned to a fusion center, DHS
intelligence analysts must undergo analysis, privacy, and civil liberties training.
Moreover, S. 4 outlines the responsibilities of DHS intelligence analysts detailed to
state, local, and regional fusion centers, and would require that these individuals have
14 See “State, Local and Regional Information Fusion Center Initiative,” in S. 4 RS, Title I,
section 206. While H.R. 1 RFS, Title VII, section 732 also requires a concept of operations
for the fusion center initiative, it is limited to “...a privacy and civil liberties impact
assessment.”

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access to “...all relevant Federal databases and information systems, consistent with
any policies, guidelines, procedures, instructions, or standards established by the
President or, as appropriate, the program manager of the information sharing
environment for the implementation and management of that environment.” S. 4
would authorize to be appropriated $10 million for each of fiscal years 2008 through
2012 for the fusion center initiative, “... for hiring officers and intelligence analysts
to replace officers and intelligence analysts who are assigned to fusion centers....”
Finally, S. 4 proposes the creation of the Rural Policing Institute, which would
“...develop expert training programs designed to address the needs of rural law
enforcement agencies regarding combating methamphetamine addiction and
distribution, domestic violence, law enforcement responses related to school
shootings and other topics....”
To some extent these legislative initiatives would codify nascent, yet ongoing,
activities in the Department. Currently, there exists within DHS a State and Local
Fusion Center Program Office, which performs some of the missions outlined in
these bills. For example, the office is responsible for recruiting, from both within
DHS and externally, intelligence analysts and intelligence liaison officers to be
detailed to state, local, and regional fusion centers. DHS currently has 15 such
intelligence personnel assigned to fusion centers. According to Charles Allen, DHS
Chief Intelligence Officer, by the end of FY2008, DHS plans to embed intelligence
officers in more than 35 fusion centers.15 However, codification of this initiative may
provide a sense of greater congressional support for and direction to such a program.
Under S. 4, DHS personnel eligible to be assigned to fusion centers, “...in
consultation with the respective component head” under the proposed fusion center
initiative would include the following:
! Office of Intelligence and Analysis, or its successor;
! Office of Infrastructure Protection;
! Transportation Security Administration;
! United States Customs and Border Protection;
! United States Coast Guard; and
! Other components of the Department as determined by the Secretary.
This S. 4 proposal does not specify whether the eligible individuals from the
aforementioned DHS components must be federal employees, or whether contractors
serving in these entities may also be eligible. This could have implications for the
extent to which the DHS individuals may be granted access to statewide criminal
intelligence and information systems resident in most fusion centers.
Homeland Security Intelligence Offices Reorganization
H.R. 1 would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) by
replacing the “Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection”
with a proposed “Office of Intelligence and Analysis.” Moreover, the “Under
15 See testimony of Charles Allen, DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, Before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, January 25, 2007.

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Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection” would be replaced
with an “Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis.” The responsibilities of the
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis would be adjusted, with new statutory
responsibilities including (1) coordinating and enhancing integration among
intelligence components of the Department, (2) establishing structure and process to
support the mission and goals of the Department, and (3) ensuring that unclassified
reports based on open source information “...are produced and disseminated
contemporaneously with reports or analytic products concerning the same or similar
information that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis produces and
disseminates in a classified format.” The bill also proposes the Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis establish an Internal Continuity of Operations Plan. The
bill would also codify, for the first time, the responsibilities of the intelligence
components of the Department, including “to ensure that duties related to the
acquisition, analysis, and dissemination of homeland security information are carried
out effectively and efficiently in support of the Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis.” Finally, the bill would also codify an Office of Infrastructure Protection,
which would be headed by an Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection and
would enumerate the proposed responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary. S. 4 does
not have a comparable provision.
To a certain extent, these H.R. 1 measures would codify existing practices and
positions within the Department. Secretary Chertoff’s Second Stage Review of the
Department made numerous changes in the DHS intelligence structure. For example,
the erstwhile Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection was
disbanded, and the Office of Information Analysis was renamed the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis and became a stand alone entity. The Office of
Infrastructure Protection was placed within the Directorate for Preparedness. The
Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Analysis was also provided the title of the
Department’s Chief Intelligence Officer.16
With respect to the responsibilities of the DHS intelligence components, those
proposed in H.R. 1 are largely consistent with those outlined in DHS Management
Directive 8110 Intelligence Integration and Management (January 2006). Under
existing law and internal DHS regulation, it appears that the DHS Chief Intelligence
Officer continues to have no budget execution authority with respect to the DHS
intelligence components. Under the aforementioned DHS management directive, the
Chief Intelligence Officer provides written performance objectives to the heads of the
DHS intelligence components, and subsequently provides input and feedback to the
component rating official for the component’s accomplishment of those objectives.
Moreover, the Chief Intelligence Officer analyzes “... workforce requirements for
intelligence functional personnel to establish recommended staffing and resource
level parameters and guidelines for each Component to consider.” In short, the Chief
Intelligence Officer, while responsible for intelligence integration across the
Department, has direct budgetary control over only the largely headquarters-based
Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
16 See DHS Management Directive 8110, Intelligence Integration and Management, January
30, 2006.

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Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group
While S. 4 refers to the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group, the
group has alternatively been referred to as the “Federal Coordination Group”
(FCG).17 As mentioned above, section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established the Information Sharing Environment,
led by a Program Manager. Part of the ISE Program Manager’s statutory
responsibility is to provide and facilitate “... the means for sharing terrorism
information among all appropriate Federal, State, local and tribal entities.” In
November 2006, the Program Manager’s Office published the Information Sharing
Environment Implementation Plan. The report recommended the establishment of
an Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG), to be located at the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and managed by a senior level official
from DHS. According to the November 2006 ISE report, “A primary purpose of the
ITACG will be to ensure that classified and unclassified intelligence produced by
Federal organizations within the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland
security communities is fused, validated, de-conflicted, and approved for
dissemination in a concise and, where possible, unclassified format.”18 Although the
ITACG is not yet operational, space at the NCTC has been designated, and the
nomination process for state and local detailees to the ITACG is in process.19
S. 4 would codify the existence of an ITACG, which would “... facilitate the
production of federally coordinated products derived from information within the
scope of the information sharing environment ... and intended for distribution to
State, local and tribal government officials and the private sector.” The Secretary of
Homeland Security would designate a senior official who would “... manage and
direct the administration of the ITACG.” The Secretary of DHS, in consultation with
the Attorney General, Director of National Intelligence, and the Program Manager
for the ISE would “establish standards for the admission of law enforcement and
intelligence officials from a State, local or tribal government into the ITACG
(emphasis added). H.R. 1 has no comparable provision.
There was some reported controversy over the extent to which DHS initially
supported the detailing of state, local, and tribal government officials to the FCG.20
17 See testimony of Charles Allen, DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, Before the House
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, March 14, 2007.
18 See Information Sharing Environment: Implementation Plan, November 2006, p. 29. See
also PM-ISE, Guideline 2 — Develop a Common Framework for the Sharing of Information
Between and Among Executive Departments and Agencies and State, Local, and Tribal
Governments, Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Private Sector, available at
[http://www.ise.gov/docs/guideline%202%20-%20common%20sharing%20framework.pdf]
(accessed June 25, 2007).
19 Conversation with PM-ISE officials, June 26, 2007.
20 See Siobhan Gorman, “Out of the Loop on Terror Threats: Homeland Security Excludes,
State, Local Officials from Group that Shares Data, Baltimore Sun, February 2. 2007. See
also Siobhan Gorman, “State, Local Officials to Get Security Data,” Baltimore Sun,
(continued...)

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However, according to Charles Allen, DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, “...we are
working to include additional people in the State and local governments.... In fact,
in the initial standup staff, I envision two or three officers ... and I want to ensure
you that there’s going to be growth in the State and local government
representation.”21 It appears that the measures outlined in the ISE Program
Manager’s November 2006 report and those in S. 4 pertaining to the potential
codification of such a body are largely consistent.
Historically, there has been some level of distrust between some federal
agencies and some state and local governmental entities engaged in law enforcement
and homeland security activities. It could be argued that part of this distrust may be
a result of a lack of mutual understanding with respect to the inherent limitations of
intelligence — with federal officials not understanding entirely the demands of state
and local consumers of intelligence, and state and local officials believing that the
federal government possesses specific intelligence which they refuse to share. In this
context, programs such as the ITACG that involve an exchange of personnel may be
positive insofar as they allow for enhanced mutual understanding of the true role
intelligence can play in countering terrorism.
20 (...continued)
February 15, 2007.
21 See testimony of Charles Allen, DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, Before the House
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment, March 14, 2007.