Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda

Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda

Uganda: Current Conditions and
the Crisis in North Uganda
Ted Dagne
Specialist in African Affairs
June 8, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress

Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda

Summary
In February 2006, Ugandans voted in the first multi-party elections in almost 26 years. President
Yoweri Museveni and his ruling National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) parliamentary
candidates won a decisive victory over opposition candidate Kizza Besigye and the Forum for
Democracy Coalition. Nevertheless, poll results showed a notable decline in support for President
Museveni from previous elections. International election observers did not condemn the election
results, nor did they fully endorse the electoral process. Critics charged the government with
intimidating the opposition during the pre-election period, and Besigye spent much of the
campaign period in jail. The election followed a controversial move by the Ugandan parliament
in July 2005 to remove the constitutional two-term limit on the presidency. In February 2011,
Ugandans voted in presidential and parliamentary elections. President Museveni won 68% of the
vote, while his nearest opponent, Besigye, won 26% of the vote. In April 2011, a number of
opposition leaders, including Besigye, were arrested after multiple “walk to work”
demonstrations.
In the north, the government of Uganda has long fought the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an
armed rebel group backed by the government of Sudan. Through over 20 years of civil war, the
brutal insurgency has created a humanitarian crisis that has displaced over 1.5 million people and
resulted in the abduction of over 20,000 children. In 2006-2008, the government of Uganda and
the LRA were engaged in an effort to resolve the conflict peacefully. The government of Southern
Sudan (GOSS) mediated the talks. In August 2006, the government of Uganda and the LRA
signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. In February 2008, the parties agreed on a Permanent
Ceasefire and amended the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and Agreement on
Comprehensive Solutions. However, the leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony, failed to show up for
the final signing of the agreement on a number of occasions. The cessation of hostilities has
allowed an estimated 1.4 million people to return to their homes. In November 2007, an LRA
delegation went to Kampala for the first time and held talks with senior Ugandan officials. In late
2007, Vincent Otti, the deputy commander of the LRA, reportedly was killed in Uganda by
Joseph Kony, the head of the LRA. In December 2009, the deputy commander of the LRA, Bok
Abudema, was killed by Ugandan forces in Central African Republic. In 2009 and 2010, a
number of senior commanders have been killed or captured or have defected. In late November
2010, the Obama Administration announced a “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the
LRA,” as called for in P.L. 111-172.
In late October 2007, President Museveni visited Washington, DC, and met with President Bush
and other senior Administration officials. President Museveni also met with several Members of
Congress. During his visit, President Museveni discussed a wide range of issues, including U.S.-
Uganda relations, the crises in Somalia and Darfur, trade, and HIV/AIDS. Uganda deployed an
estimated 2,700 peacekeeping troops to Somalia, shortly after Ethiopian forces invaded
Mogadishu and installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). As of June, there are an
estimated 5,000 Ugandan peacekeeping troops in Somalia. As of June 2011, more than 50
Ugandan and Burundian peacekeeping forces have been killed. In early June 2011, six
peacekeepers were killed, including a senior Ugandan officer.
On July 11, 2010, the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab carried out multiple suicide bombings in
Kampala, Uganda. An estimated 76 people, including one American, were killed and more than
80 injured. The United Nations, the African Union, and the United States condemned the terrorist
attacks. More than 20 suspects are currently in prison.
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Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda

Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
The United Nations Report.................................................................................................... 1
The Kampala Terrorist Attacks .............................................................................................. 2
Anti-Homosexual Resolution ................................................................................................ 2
U.S.-Uganda Relations................................................................................................................ 3
The LRA and the Obama Administration Response ............................................................... 3
U.S. Assistance ..................................................................................................................... 4
Uganda: Background and Political Developments ....................................................................... 5
The 2001 Presidential Elections ............................................................................................ 6
The Third-Term Debate and Adoption of a Multi-Party System ............................................. 6
The 2006 Multi-Party Elections............................................................................................. 7
The Situation in Northern Uganda ...............................................................................................7
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) ...................................................................................... 8
Regional Implications and the LRA....................................................................................... 9
Attempts to End the Conflict: Background ............................................................................ 9
Peace Initiative ......................................................................................................................... 10
Operation Lightning Thunder .............................................................................................. 11
Humanitarian Conditions .................................................................................................... 11
Social and Economic Profile ..................................................................................................... 12
Economic Conditions .......................................................................................................... 12
Human Rights Conditions ................................................................................................... 13
HIV/AIDS .......................................................................................................................... 13
Regional Relations .................................................................................................................... 13
Ugandan Troops in Somalia ...................................................................................................... 14
Legislation ................................................................................................................................ 14

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Uganda ............................................................................................. 4

Appendixes
Appendix. Ceasefire Agreement ................................................................................................ 15

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 37

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Recent Developments
In April 2011, a number of opposition leaders, including Kizza Besigye, were arrested after
multiple “walk to work” demonstrations. Besigye was later released and put under house arrest in
May 2011. The government of Uganda stated that the demonstrations were illegal and President
Museveni accused Besigye of being behind these “bogus demonstrations.” Since early April,
Besigye had been detained and released three times. The leader of the Democratic Party, Nobert
Mao, was also arrested on April 11 and 18. According to some reports, the government reportedly
placed restrictions on some media outlets in order to block coverage of the demonstrations.
On February 18, 2011, Ugandans voted in presidential and parliamentary elections. President
Museveni won 68% of the vote, while his nearest challenger, Besigye, won 26% of the vote. The
ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) won the majority of seats in parliament. An
estimated 90 members of parliament lost their seats, including some ministers. According to the
Ugandan Electoral Commission, an estimated 59% of the registered voters participated in the
elections. The Obama Administration stated that “the elections and campaign period were
generally peaceful, but we note with concern the diversion of government resources for partisan
campaigning and the heavy deployment of security forces on election day.” The Commonwealth
Observer Group expressed similar concerns. The African Union stated that the elections were
peaceful and transparent, but called for a Review of the Electoral Law. Opposition groups
declared the elections to be fraudulent and rigged.
An estimated 13.4 million Ugandans were registered to vote. There were eight presidential
candidates, although the majority were not considered a serious challenge to President Museveni.
Dr. Besigye was considered by observers a serious challenger. He won 37% of the votes cast in
the 2006 presidential election. Three national opinion polls had given president Museveni a 65-
67% victory. The opposition was unable to field one candidate to run against President Museveni,
and seem weakened by internal divisions. An estimated 300 independents competed in the
parliamentary elections, although many of these independents were seen as allies of the ruling
party. Independent candidates received the largest number of seats in parliament, 37, after the
NRM’s 279-seat victory in the 370-member parliament.
Many observers and some governments were concerned that there might be violence during and
after the elections. In mid-February, President Museveni warned in a speech that his government
will take tough measures in order to maintain security. In late January 2011, the State Department
issued a travel alert cautioning American citizens in Uganda or those planning to travel during the
election period. Mr. Besigye rejected taking his case to court but called for street demonstration
by his supporters. As of early March 2011, there were no reports of violence or demonstration.
The United Nations Report
In September 2010, the government of Uganda issued a strong statement condemning a report by
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) on human rights abuses in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The report accused several DRC neighbors of serious
human rights abuses. The government of Uganda in a letter to the United Nations stated that “the
draft report under reference is a compendium of rumors deeply flawed in methodology, sourcing
and standard of proof. Its timing, scope, motive, and subsequent leakage to the media were all
made in bad taste.”
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The Kampala Terrorist Attacks
On July 11, 2010, the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab carried out multiple suicide bombings in
Kampala, Uganda. An estimated 76 people, including one American, were killed and more than
80 injured. The United Nations, the African Union, and the United States condemned the terrorist
attacks. More than 20 suspects are currently in prison.
The attacks took place at a rugby club and Ethiopian restaurant while people were watching the
final match of the World Cup. The following day, an Al-Shabaab official, Ali Mohamud Rage,
stated that “we are sending a message to Uganda and Burundi, if they do not take out their
AMISOM troops from Somalia, blasts will continue and it will happen in Bujumbura (Burundi’s
capital) too.”1
The international community condemned the attacks. In an interview with the South African
Broadcasting Corporation, President Obama stated that he had called President Museveni to
express “the condolences of the American people for this horrific crime that had been
committed.” The United Nations Security Council in a statement said “members of the Security
Council condemn in the strongest terms the terrorist attacks that occurred in Kampala, Uganda,
on 11 July 2010, causing numerous deaths and injuries.” The African Union also condemned the
attacks.
In late July 2010, at the 15th Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the African
Union in Kampala, Uganda, the African Union agreed to send an estimated 4,000 more troops to
strengthen AMISOM. Guinea and Djibouti pledged a battalion each. Members of the Inter-
Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) also agreed in early July to send an estimated
2,000 troops.
Anti-Homosexual Resolution
In 2009, a member of Parliament from the ruling National Resistance Movement, David Bahati,
introduced a bill that will make it a crime to engage in, promote, or fail to report homosexuality.
President Museveni reportedly has expressed his opposition to the bill. Members of Congress, the
Obama Administration, and others in the international community have condemned the bill. The
draft bill states:
• Any person who engages in homosexuality is liable to a fine not exceeding 500
currency points or imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or both.
• Any person who engages in a homosexual act with someone who is under 18
years old could face the death penalty, if the offender is infected with HIV, the
offender is a parent or guardian, the victim is disabled, and the accused is a serial
offender.
• Any individual who promotes homosexuality will face five years of
imprisonment and fines.
• Any person who fails to report commission of any offense in this act could face
six months imprisonment.

1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10602791.
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According to the author of the bill, David Bahati, “the pro-gays have made the world believe that
whoever will be found guilty of getting involved in homosexuality will be sentenced to death. No.
Only when an adult forces a child or someone under the age of 18 into homosexuality, that is
where the death penalty should apply.”2 In May 2010, a committee setup by the Ugandan
government reportedly recommended the withdrawal of the bill from parliament. The Ugandan
Parliament adjourned in May 2011 without voting on the bill.
In late January 2011, David Kato, a Ugandan gay rights activist, was beaten to death. Ugandan
authorities have arrested one suspect. President Obama said he was “deeply saddened” about the
death of Mr. Kato.
U.S.-Uganda Relations
Relations between Washington and Kampala are warm. Over the years, successive American
administrations have supported the Museveni government as a reformist regime and a staunch
ally of the United States. In July 2010, President Obama called President Museveni to express his
condolences after the suicide attacks in Kampala, Uganda. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa
Johnnie Carson has visited Uganda several times in 2009-2010. The Clinton Administration
championed the Museveni regime, and President Clinton visited Uganda during his 1998 tour of
Africa. Relations cooled, however, when Ugandan troops intervened in the Congo in 1998.
Clinton Administration officials were also critical of Uganda and Rwanda when the two former
allies clashed in eastern Congo in 1999 and 2000. The Bush Administration restored good
relations with Kampala. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Uganda during his four-
nation trip to Africa in 2001. Secretary Powell met with President Museveni and opposition
leaders to discuss a wide range of issues, including Sudan and DRC. He praised Museveni for
lowering Uganda’s HIV/AIDS infection rate. In 2001, Uganda withdrew several battalions from
the DRC and by May 2003, almost all of Uganda’s troops had been withdrawn. President
Museveni has also been a leading ally of the United States in the fight against international
terrorism and was one of the first African leaders to pledge support in the war against Iraq. In
October 2007, then President Bush assured President Museveni of his commitment to support
Uganda on a wide range of issues, including fighting HIV/AIDS and malaria. The two leaders
discussed regional security issues, including the crises in Sudan and Somalia.
The LRA and the Obama Administration Response
In late November 2010, the Obama Administration announced a policy entitled a “Strategy to
Support the Disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army.” The new strategy calls for support to
“eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the LRA. The strategy has four
objectives: “1. increase protection of civilians; 2. apprehend or remove from battlefield Joseph
Kony and senior commanders; 3. promote defection, disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration of LRA fighters, and 4. increase humanitarian access and provide continued relief to
affected communities.”3

2 Uganda: Bahati defends anti-gay bill. http://en.afrik.com.
3 http://c2050222.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/WhiteHouseLRAStrategy_opt.pdf.
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U.S. Assistance
As outlined in Table 1, the United States provides significant humanitarian and development
assistance to Uganda. In FY2007, the United States provided $332.1 million to Uganda, and $419
million for FY2008. In FY2009, Uganda received $404.1 million and an estimated $456.8 million
in FY2010. The Obama Administration has requested $480.3 million for FY2011 and $527.7
million for FY2012. In 2007, the Millennium Challenge Corporation approved a $10 million
Threshold program to support anti-corruption activities. Moreover, Uganda is eligible for trade
benefits, including textile and apparel benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA). Approximately half of all U.S. non-food aid in Uganda is directed at ameliorating the
crisis in the north. USAID continues its support for the displaced children and orphans in Uganda.
The Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (DCOF) assists war-affected children in northern and
western Uganda by rebuilding traditional community and family structures and working to fight
the spread of HIV/AIDS. The DCOF funded programs such as the Community Resilience and
Dialogue (CRD), which focused on aiding abducted children between 2002 and 2005. The CRD
rehabilitated 7,000 abducted children and reunified and resettled 5,700 with their families. U.S.
funding for northern Uganda was $106.3 million in FY2007. In 2007, USAID opened an office in
Gulu, northern Uganda.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Uganda
($ in thousands)
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012

Actual
Actual
Actual
Request
Request
Total 419,025
404,152
458,100
480,302
527,774
Development Assistance
32,600
45,950
72,025
69,283
77,933
Economic Support Fund
17,500
15,000

Foreign Military Financing

300

300
00
Global Health and Child
255,000 257,550
Survival-State
271,584
294,084 332,906
Global Health and Child
40,451 45,282
Survival-USAID
66,000
89,500 99,500
International Military
625 629
Education and Training
591
600 500
Int. Narcotics Control and

Law Enforcement
235
1,535 1,535
Nonproliferation,
200

Antiterrorism, Demining
1,030
and Related Programs
Public Law 480 (Food Aid)
72,649
25,000
40,335
25,000
25,000
Source: State Department.

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Uganda: Background and Political Developments
Uganda, a country slightly smaller than
Oregon, gained its independence from
Uganda at a Glance
Britain in 1962. Until the mid-1980s,
Population: 32.3 Million
the East African country was mired in
Population Growth: 2.6% (2009)
civil war and ethnic strife, and its people
suffered under a brutal dictatorship. By
Comparative Area: Slightly smaller than Oregon
the time President Yoweri Museveni’s
Infant Mortality Rate: 52.7 deaths/1,000 live births (2007)
National Resistance Army/Movement
Life Expectancy at Birth: 52.34 years
(NRA/M) took power in early 1986, the
country’s economy was in ruins, with an
HIV/AIDS Prevalence Rate: 5.4% (2007)
inflation rate of over 240% and an
HIV/AIDS Deaths: 77,000 (2007)
almost nonexistent economic
Religions: Roman Catholic 42%, Protestant 42%, Muslim 12%,
infrastructure. President Museveni is
Indigenous beliefs 4%.
credited with bringing relative political
Language: English (official)
and economic stability to Uganda,
although he has not been able to end the
GDP (purchasing power parity—PPP): $42.1 billion (2008)
conflict in northern Uganda. His
GDP per capita (PPP): $1,300.00 (2009)
strategy in the late 1980s and 1990s was
Source: CIA, The World Factbook, 2010.
to co-opt his political opponents and,
when necessary, to use military means
to neutralize rebel groups. Museveni’s first government included opposition figures who had
served in previous governments and arch critics of the NRM. Despite efforts aimed at achieving
national reconciliation, armed opposition to his government continued for much of the 1980s and
1990s.
In May 1996, after a long transitional period, President Museveni was elected to a five-year term
in direct presidential elections in what was known until 2005 as a “no-party” system. Museveni
won 74.2% of the votes, while his opponent, Paul Ssmogerere, former deputy prime minister and
longtime rival of the president, received 23.7%. The elections were declared by international
observers to be free and fair. A national referendum on multi-party politics was held in June of
2000. Museveni prevailed, with 90.7% of Ugandans favoring a no-party government system. The
president stated that multi-party politics could only be introduced once a no-party system had
succeeded in eliminating the threat of a return to sectarian politics. In 2005, Museveni changed
his position on this issue (see below). The NRM remains the dominant party, although some of its
members openly express their opposition and frustration about NRM’s leadership. Some party
leaders are also focused on the issue of succession, while new members of parliament challenge
the old establishment of the ruling party. Despite some serious challenges facing the leadership,
Uganda has made and continues to make important progress on a number of fronts. The East
African country is more stable today than a few years ago, and the prospect of a final agreement
with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) could lead to lasting peace in Uganda.
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The 2001 Presidential Elections
On March 12, 2001, Uganda again held national elections, and President Museveni won 69.3% of
the votes cast,4 while his closest challenger, Kizza Besigye, received 27.8%. Besigye, a doctor
and Museveni’s one-time ally, was a member of the NRM and Museveni’s personal physician
during the insurgency in the early 1980s. He ran on an anti-corruption platform, vowing to rid the
government of its excesses. He also raised questions about Uganda’s military involvement in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Election observers, both local and international,
declared the elections to be free and fair, although they acknowledged that the electoral process
and management had many weaknesses. The results of the elections were rejected by Besigye on
the grounds that there were discrepancies and inconsistencies in the electoral process. He filed a
petition at the Supreme Court challenging the declaration of Museveni as president-elect and
sought to annul the elections. Besigye subsequently lost the petition and said he would respect the
Supreme Court verdict. In August 2001, Besigye fled Uganda and later surfaced in South Africa.5
The Third-Term Debate and Adoption of a Multi-Party System
Uganda was ruled under a “no-party” system after Museveni took power in 1986. In March 2003,
President Museveni suggested to his National Executive Committee, the leadership organ of the
NRM, that the Movement should consider lifting the ban on a multi-party system. He and his
supporters also urged a review of the two-term limit for a president. According to the Ugandan
constitution at the time, “A person shall not be elected under this Constitution to hold office as
President for more than two terms as prescribed by this article.”6 Under this provision, President
Museveni’s term would have expired in 2006, but many of his supporters argued that without
Museveni, Uganda might plunge into another civil war. Critics of the president contended that
Museveni did not wish to relinquish power. The president holds most power. In January 2003,
President Museveni told a British reporter “we will follow the Constitution because that is what I
fought for. The present Constitution says not more than two consecutive terms.”7 Those ruling
party members who criticized the president’s third term proposal were removed from power,
including Eriya Katagaya, the then-first deputy prime minister and a longtime ally of President
Museveni.8 The vice president also resigned, reportedly to pursue her academic studies in the
United States. In May 2005, the Ugandan parliament voted to approve a referendum on multi-
party politics. On July 28, 2005, Ugandans voted overwhelmingly in favor of a multi-party
system, after almost 19 years of a “no party” system. Reportedly, more than 92% of the registered
voters said yes to a multi-party system, although the polls were boycotted by the Forum for
Democratic Change, an opposition party. In July 2005, the Ugandan parliament voted to remove
the two-term limit on the presidency.

4 Ugandan Elections 2001, at http://www.uganda-elections.com.
5 Besigye fled into exile a day after he met with visiting U.S. congressional delegation Members.
6 The Constitution of Uganda can be found at http://www.parliament.go.ug/images/constitution_1995.pdf.
7 John Kakande. “Museveni Speaks on 3rd Term.” The New Vision, January 3, 2003.
8 “President Should Listen to Old Friends, Avoid Disaster (Editorial).” The Monitor, May 3, 2002.
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The 2006 Multi-Party Elections
In February 2006, Ugandans voted in the first multi-party elections in almost 26 years. President
Museveni won 59% of the votes, while the leading opposition candidate, Kizza Besigye, won
37% of the votes. The ruling NRM won 202 seats in parliamentary elections, while the opposition
Forum for Democracy Coalition won 40 seats. The election results show a decline in support for
President Museveni from his 74% and 69% victories in the 1996 and 2001 elections, respectively.
Meanwhile, Besigye’s 37% share represented a 10% gain over his 2001 vote share. International
election observers did not condemn the election results nor did they fully endorse the electoral
process. According to the European Union election monitoring group report, “Uganda’s first
multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections since 1980 have demonstrated significant
improvements in comparison to previous elections.” According to the same report, “Despite a
number of problems experienced by voters on election day, EU Chief Observer Max van den
Berg, who spent the day traveling between Kampala, Gulu and Soroti, noted that voters came out
in large numbers, knew that they had a choice between change or continuity, and made this choice
with calm and dignity.” But the elections were marred by intimidation, counting irregularities,
voter name deletions, and show of force by the government. Harassment by authorities and the
trial of the opposition candidate, Besigye, were seen as part of the overall strategy to secure
victory. Kizza Besigye was charged and imprisoned soon after his return to Uganda to run as a
candidate for president. He was charged with rape, terrorism, and treason. He was released from
prison in January 2006 and challenged President Museveni in the February 2006 presidential
election.
The Situation in Northern Uganda
While much of the country has remained stable since the NRM took power in 1986, civil war has
ravaged northern Uganda for over 20 years. The situation was characterized until recently as one
of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, where civilians, particularly children, are the most
affected, according to the United Nations and numerous reports by non-governmental
organizations. The conflict and the humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda have killed tens of
thousands of civilians due to deliberate targeting of children by the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) (see below), although the actual number of those killed is unknown. In recent years the
LRA has had no active presence in Uganda.
According to a report by the Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda
(CSOPNU), a coalition of 50 Ugandan and international groups, more than 2 million civilians
have been affected. An estimated 90% of the population in the northern region of Acholiland,
particularly in the districts of Gulu, Kitigum, and Pader, have been displaced; and some estimate
that 80% of the forces in the LRA are the abducted children from these areas. For the past two
decades, the victims in this conflict have largely been civilians, although the conflict began as an
effort to overthrow the Museveni regime. The victims reportedly were abused routinely by
security forces, and the government failed to provide adequate protection to civilians, particularly
children in northern Uganda, according to several reports.
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The LRA abducted more than 20,000 children over the past decade for forced conscription and
sexual exploitation.9 According to the United Nations:
the most disturbing aspect of this humanitarian crisis is the fact that this is a war fought by
children on children—minors make up almost 90% of the LRA’s soldiers. Some recruits are
as young as eight and are inducted through raids on villages. They are brutalized and forced
to commit atrocities on fellow abductees and even siblings. Those who attempt to escape are
killed. For those living in a state of constant fear, violence becomes a way of life and the
psychological trauma is incalculable.10
Although the situation in northern Uganda has improved significantly since 2008, the U.N.
Security Council reported in May 2007 that “the LRA has not released any children, women or
non-combatants from its ranks.” Similarly, the U.N.S.C. report voiced deep concern over “the
absence of any concrete signs regarding the release of children associated with various forces,
especially local defense units and LRA.” The U.N.S.C. report also stated that government
security forces continue to occupy schools in abandoned communities, thereby significantly
delaying the reopening of schools.
The LRA: Early Years
In 1985, the Milton Obote regime was ousted in a military coup by General Tito Lutwa Okello and other military
officers from northern Uganda. The coup came at a time when the NRM attacks against the Obote regime threatened
Obote’s hold on power. In 1986, the NRA defeated the Okello regime, forcing the military and their supporters to
flee to northern Uganda. Shortly afterward a rebel alliance was formed, the Uganda People’s Democratic Army
(UPDA). The UPDA began attacks against government military installations primarily in northern Uganda. The same
year, Alice Lakwena, an Acholi spiritual healer, emerged as the dominant leader of the rebel alliance. Lakwena’s
faction, the Holy Spirit Movement, initially dominated the alliance and also began to make its move in Southern Sudan.
After a devastating battle with the Ugandan military in Jinja, 60 miles from the capital of Kampala, in which a large
number of the rebel alliance members were killed or captured, Lakwena fled to Kenya. By the late 1980s and early
1990s, UPDA was no longer active. One of Lakwena’s key members and reportedly a relative, Joseph Kony, then in
his early 20s, emerged as the leader of the remaining forces and later emerged as the LRA leader. A major military
strategy shift took place in the early 1990s with the emergence of Kony. Kony’s group began to primarily target
civilians in northern Uganda and forged a strong alliance with the government of Sudan.
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
The LRA is a Ugandan rebel group active since the mid-1980s. Under the leadership of Joseph
Kony, the LRA has conducted military operations in northern Uganda, the DRC, the Central
African Republic (CAR), and Southern Sudan. The primary targets of the LRA have been the
civilian population, especially women and children. The LRA was given protection, facilities for
training, and supplies by the government of Sudan to wage war in northern Uganda and Southern
Sudan until a few years ago. The takeover of the government in Southern Sudan by the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) curtailed LRA activities in South Sudan. The Sudan
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has a provision that all foreign groups, which include
the LRA, must be forced out of Sudan. In 2005, some LRA units went into DRC, reportedly
looking for a new home after the SPLM took power. Over the past several years, the LRA has
been weakened significantly and has lost a number of its top leaders in battle or defection. The
LRA currently has presence in parts of DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR). The LRA

9 Uganda Complex Emergency. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), July 2003.
10 http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/story.asp?storyID=100.
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is not operational in northern Uganda. The government of Uganda has carried out a number of
military operations against LRA forces in CAR and jointly with Congolese forces in DRC.
Regional Implications and the LRA
Under the leadership of Joseph Kony, the LRA has conducted military operations in northern
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Southern Sudan. The regional impact of
the northern Uganda crisis has been particularly hard for Southern Sudan, in part because of its
geographic proximity and also due to the government of Sudan’s support for the LRA rebels. In
Southern Sudan, the LRA allied with the government of Sudan to attack the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA), the liberation movement fighting then successive Sudanese
governments, according to U.S. and regional officials. Southern Sudanese civilians have been
victims of LRA attacks. The LRA was given protection, facilities for training, and supplies by the
government of Sudan to wage war in northern Uganda and Southern Sudan, according to South
Sudan, U.S., and regional officials. The LRA targeted civilians in Eastern and Western Equatoria
and in the Juba region, the regional capital. The LRA leadership and its troops had a permanent
presence in Southern Sudan under the protection of the government of Sudan. In the Juba region,
LRA forces used schools and other government facilities to train and house their troops.11
In late 2005, the LRA intensified its attacks targeting civilians in Southern Sudan, especially in
Yei and Juba areas. However, the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005
between the government of Sudan and the SPLM has threatened the survival of the LRA as a
force in Southern Sudan. The takeover of the government in Southern Sudan by the SPLM has
made LRA activities very difficult. The CPA has a provision in the Security Agreement that all
foreign groups must be forced out of Sudan. The late leader of Southern Sudan, Dr. John Garang,
had the LRA and foreign terrorist groups in mind when he insisted on this provision.12 In 2005,
some LRA units went into DRC, reportedly looking for a new home after the SPLM took power.
Military clashes in DRC in 2006 reportedly led to the killing of eight Guatemalan United Nations
peacekeepers in the DRC. The Congolese government acknowledged the presence of LRA forces
in Garamba National Park in 2007. In early November 2007, President Joseph Kabila stated that
LRA forces will be forced to leave DRC once a peace agreement is reached between the LRA and
the government of Uganda. He also made it clear that the LRA would be expelled from DRC if
they failed to reach an agreement.13
Attempts to End the Conflict: Background
A number of attempts in the past at a negotiated settlement with the LRA failed, in large part due
to LRA intransigence and due to the government of Uganda’s inconsistent positions. The first
serious effort was launched by former Ugandan government minister Betty Bigombe in the early
1990s with the full support of President Museveni. In 1993, Bigombe made contact with the LRA
leadership and the LRA initially expressed interest in a negotiated settlement. Prior to this effort,
the government of Uganda launched what was known as the Operation North campaign.
Operation North campaign was designed to deny the LRA support in the North and to arm the

11 The author visited towns in Southern Sudan over the past decade on multiple occasions where the LRA has been
active.
12 Ted Dagne interviewed Dr. John Garang on a number of occasions during the Security Arrangement negotiations.
13 Ted Dagne met with President Kabila and discussed issues related to Uganda and DRC in November 2007.
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civilian population with bows and arrows, known then as the Arrow Group. The operation failed
and created strong animosity between the government and elements in northern Uganda. The
Bigombe initiative ended when President Museveni threatened to use force against the LRA and
demanded its surrender. Other initiatives, both local and regional, failed to produce tangible
results. Bigombe was once again engaged in an effort to bring an end the conflict in northern
Uganda. In late 2004-2005, contacts were made with the leadership of the LRA and the LRA also
had appointed two senior commanders, Vincent Otti and Sam Kolo, as negotiators in this new
initiative. The peace initiative stalled in 2005 when Kolo defected to the government side and the
government of Uganda began its military campaign. Resolution of the conflict through military
means has not been successful, in part due to ineffective operations against the LRA and an
apparent lack of will by the government to end the conflict through a negotiated settlement.
In October 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for five top LRA
leaders, including Kony. Some observers, while supportive of the ICC prosecution of these
leaders, maintain that the ICC action could hinder peace efforts. Other observers argue that
despite the ICC process, the parties were able to reach important agreements for the first time in
decades. Moreover, hundreds of LRA members and leaders have returned to Uganda under a
government amnesty program. According to the peace agreement, traditional justice “shall form a
central part of the alternative justice and reconciliation framework.”
Peace Initiative
After a series of failed peace efforts, the government of South Sudan appears to have made some
significant strides in brokering the conflict. Following months of talks in Juba, Sudan, the two
parties signed a formal cessation of hostilities agreement on August 26, 2006. Under the
agreement, LRA insurgents were expected to gather at assembly points in southern Sudan. The
deadline for assembly was extended after ceasefire observers reported that both sides violated the
agreement that October. The Ugandan army has admitted to approaching a rebel safe haven in
Sudan, claiming it was escorting journalists and diplomats on a fact-finding mission. Meanwhile,
LRA soldiers, claiming they feared attack by the Ugandan forces, violated the agreement by
leaving a designated assembly point in southern Sudan. Many observers remain skeptical that all
of the remaining LRA insurgents will comply with the terms of the agreement.
President Museveni has offered amnesty if the rebels accept a peace agreement. According to
media reports and U.S. officials, there is support among many civilians in northern Uganda for
reconciliation rather than revenge against the LRA leaders. Nevertheless, unless the ICC’s Chief
Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, accepts a local judicial solution, the indicted insurgents would
have to accept asylum in a country not bound by the Rome Treaty. The ICC has announced that it
will not consider any amnesty proposal until after the successful completion of a peace
agreement.
Following speculation that the Ugandan government was going to yield to the LRA’s demand that
ICC arrest warrants be annulled, President Museveni announced on July 19, 2007, that warrants
for the top LRA leaders will remain in place until a peace agreement has been reached: “We are
not going to ask the ICC to lift the arrest warrants. If [the LRA leaders] don’t conclude the peace
talks they could be arrested and taken to the ICC or get killed. If they conclude the peace deal,
that is when the government can write to the ICC to say we have found an alternative solution.”
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In August 2007, he stated that if the parties agreed to resolve their differences peacefully, the
issue of accountability could be addressed through local and traditional mechanisms.14
The Ugandan government’s continued negotiations with the LRA reached the critical question of
how Agenda No. 3 (Reconciliation and Accountability), reached in June 2007, should be
concluded. Uganda. In February 2008, the government of Uganda and the LRA reached several
agreements. The parties agreed on a Permanent Ceasefire, amended the Agreement on
Accountability and Reconciliation, and the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions (see
Appendix). The LRA leadership moved into the Garamba National Park in the DRC and has not
given indication of signing the agreement since April 2008. In late October 2007, the LRA sent a
delegation to Kampala for the first time in almost two decades to meet with senior Ugandan
officials. The LRA delegation also went to northern Uganda to consult with its constituency as the
parties got closer to concluding the peace talks.
Operation Lightning Thunder
In late 2008, the governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Southern Sudan, and
Uganda launched a major military operation against the LRA forces. The operation forced LRA
forces to disperse into other parts of DRC but failed to achieve its military objective of defeating
the LRA. In retaliation, the LRA reportedly killed an estimated 1,000 people in the DRC and
Southern Sudan. More that 180,000 people were displaced in the DRC. The joint military
operation was the first major coordinated attack against the LRA.
Humanitarian Conditions
The overall impact of the crisis in northern Uganda is not clear, although day-to-day life for many
in this region has changed significantly. The economy in northern Uganda has been devastated,
especially in light of the fact that much of the population is displaced internally and some have
left the region. According to various sources, there are an estimated 446,300 internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in northern Uganda as of November 2010. More than 400,000 IDPs have returned
to their home areas in 2009-2010. Children who are not in internally displaced persons camps
often leave their homes at night to sleep in hospitals or churches, although over the past year
conditions have improved. These children were known as “Night Commuters.” Education for
many of these children seems out of reach, since many are unable to stay in one place to attend
school. According to a World Vision report, Pawns of Politics:
The north has suffered insecurity, manifested by violence against civilians, abductions and
displacement. This insecurity has resulted in death, loss of property, and disruption of
development activities. Children are losing vital educational opportunities; they are at greater
risk for contracting HIV/AIDS and other STDs; and they are forced into child prostitution,
child soldiering, and other forms of bondage.15
As a result of the war and perceived ethnic bias and marginalization, the NRM government is
unpopular in northern Uganda. Over the past several years, the government of Uganda has

14 Ted Dagne met with President Museveni in Uganda in August 2007 and discussed a wide range of issues.
15 The Pawns of Politics: Children, Conflict and Peace in Northern Uganda. World Vision, 2004.
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expanded civilian protection and significantly increased its budget for reconstruction and
development in northern Uganda.
Social and Economic Profile
Economic Conditions
Uganda is blessed with fertile soils, regular rainfall, and sizable deposits of copper and cobalt. Its
largest sector is agriculture, which employs 78% of the workforce and accounted for about 90%
of export earnings and 23.4% of Uganda’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Coffee exports make
up half of its export earnings, and Uganda is Africa’s largest coffee producer. Other major exports
include cotton, tea, and to a lesser extent, maize. Crop production has been hampered by security
concerns in the northern and western regions of Uganda. To stabilize the economy, Museveni
adopted a policy of reducing inflation while simultaneously increasing production and export
earnings. Uganda raised producer prices on export crops, increased the prices of imported
petroleum products, and boosted civil service wages.
Long periods of forced displacement in northern Uganda have seriously disrupted agricultural
productivity in the region, but USAID reports that recent security improvements have allowed a
number of farmers to return home and resume normal cultivation. According to USAID officials
in Uganda, the restoration of normal farming practices is essential to the recovery process.
Throughout FY2007, USAID contributed significant funds to the U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) to distribute farm equipment and seeds
to Ugandan farmers prior to the Spring 2007 planting season. In 2006-2007, food production was
better than expected, in part due to good weather conditions.
The industrial sector has also expanded, with real output growth approaching 10% a year.
Industry constituted 20.4% of GDP in 2004/2005. The main industries include the processing of
coffee, cotton, tea, sugar, tobacco, edible oils, dairy products, and grain milling as well as
brewing. Other ventures include vehicle assembly and the manufacture of textiles and metal
products. According to the Economic Intelligence Unit (May 2011), real GDP growth is estimated
at 6.3% in 2011, and 7% in 2012.
Obstacles to economic growth remain. Uganda’s heavy reliance on coffee exports makes it
vulnerable to international commodity price fluctuations and poor weather conditions.
Privatization initiatives pose a problem, as they are seen by many to be a scramble for previously
state-owned property. Another problem plaguing Uganda’s economy is corruption. Uganda relies
upon international donors for 41% of its national budget. Those donors, in particular Ireland,
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, have become increasingly critical of governance
issues and a rise in defense spending.
The late June 2009 discovery of an oil reserve in the fields of western Uganda much larger than
initially estimated has many speculating about the potential implications for Uganda’s economy.
The oil was discovered in an exploratory mission by oil and gas groups Heritage and Tullow. The
oil reserve is located in the Albertine Basin, close to Uganda’s border with the Democratic
Republic of Congo.
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Human Rights Conditions
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2010,
Serious human rights problems in the country included arbitrary killings; vigilante killings;
mob and ethnic violence; torture and abuse of suspects and detainees; harsh prison
conditions; official impunity; arbitrary and politically motivated arrest and detention;
incommunicado and lengthy pretrial detention; restrictions on the right to a fair trial and on
freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association; restrictions on opposition parties;
electoral irregularities; official corruption; violence and discrimination against women and
children, including female genital mutilation (FGM), sexual abuse of children, and the ritual
killing of children; trafficking in persons; violence and discrimination against persons with
disabilities and homosexual persons; restrictions on labor rights; and forced labor, including
child labor.16
HIV/AIDS
In the 1980s and early 1990s, Uganda was one of the African countries most devastated by the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Over the past decade, however, Uganda has made significant progress in
the fight against HIV/AIDS, and the Museveni government is widely credited for implementing a
sweeping reform to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic. According to USAID, the prevalence of
HIV has dropped over 50% in the last 15 years. Today the overall prevalence rate is 6.7%.
Moreover, prevalence among pregnant women declined significantly. Despite these impressive
declines, HIV/AIDS is still a serious problem in Uganda. An estimated 91,000 Ugandans died in
2005, and there are over 1 million orphans from the AIDS crisis. Uganda’s HIV/AIDS prevention
program known as ABC (Abstinence, Be Faithful, or Use Condoms) is credited for the reduction
in HIV infections and has been viewed by the U.S. Administration as a model for the rest of sub-
Saharan Africa. In 2007, the United States provided $188 million to support Uganda’s fight
against HIV/AIDS (see Table 1 for a summary of U.S. assistance to Uganda).
Regional Relations
Uganda is a member of the East African Community and enjoys friendly relations with fellow
members Kenya and Tanzania. Uganda has at times had tense relations with two of its other
neighbors, Rwanda and, more recently, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), resulting from
its 1998 troop deployment into eastern Congo. While the Ugandan government claimed the troop
presence was aimed at discouraging attacks from Ugandan rebels based in the region, there were
widespread allegations of natural resource exploitation, and Uganda eventually removed its
troops under international pressure in 2003. In 2005, Museveni threatened to send troops back to
the region when LRA forces moved from Sudan to the DRC if Congo failed to deny them
sanctuary, although the current peace talks may avert further contention.

16 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154375.htm.
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Ugandan Troops in Somalia
As of May 2011, an estimated 5,000 Ugandan troops are deployed in Somalia in an effort to
increase security and put a stop to the violent conflict in Mogadishu. The Ugandan troops
(members of the Uganda People’s Defense Forces) are serving with forces from Burundi in the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). As of May 2011, there were an estimated 9,000
AMISOM peacekeeping forces in Somalia. Other AU countries (Nigeria, Burundi, Ghana, and
Malawi) that pledged a combined total of 6,500 troops to AMISOM have attributed their delayed
deployment to logistical and financial issues. The Peace and Security Council of the African
Union announced in mid-July 2009 that Ugandan troops would remain in Somalia for another six
months. Army spokesman Major Felix Kulayigye announced the extension and argued that it does
not make sense to withdraw Ugandan troops simply because the Reconciliation Congress is
underway. As of July 2010, an estimated 26 Ugandan peacekeepers and 29 peacekeepers from
Burundi have been killed. In early June 2011, six peacekeepers were killed, including a senior
Ugandan officer. In late November 2010, President Museveni visited Mogadishu and met with
Somali officials and AMISOM forces.
Legislation
S. 1067, Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009.
Introduced May 19, 2009; passed the Senate on March 10, 2010; passed the House on May 12,
2010; signed into law (P.L. 111-172) on May 24, 2010.
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Appendix. Ceasefire Agreement

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Author Contact Information

Ted Dagne

Specialist in African Affairs
tdagne@crs.loc.gov, 7-7646

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