Global Climate Change: Major Scientific and Policy Issues

Global Climate Change: Major Scientific and Policy Issues

Order Code RL33602
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Global Climate Change:
Major Scientific and Policy Issues
August 11, 2006
John R. Justus and Susan R. Fletcher
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Global Climate Change:
Major Scientific and Policy Issues
Summary
There is growing evidence that human activities are affecting the heat/energy-
exchange balance between Earth, the atmosphere, and space through an increase in
“greenhouse gases.” If these gases continue to accumulate in the atmosphere at
current rates, most scientists believe significant global warming would continue to
occur through intensification of Earth’s natural heat-trapping “greenhouse effect.”
Over the past 100 years, particularly in recent decades, there have been measurable
increases in global temperature and sea levels, decreases of sea ice in the Arctic, and
melting among the world’s continental ice sheets and mountain glaciers. A
preponderance of the world’s scientists have concluded that human activities,
particularly the burning of fossil fuels, have increased atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide (CO ) by 36% from pre-industrial levels of 280 parts per million
2
(ppm) to 380 ppm over the past 150 years, leading to an increase in global average
temperature of 0.9oF over the past 100 years. There is broad agreement on those
aspects of climate change, which have been measured and are reflected in global
data. Disagreements focus mainly on the magnitude and rate of change, the severity
of estimated warming, and its projected impacts — both positive and negative.
Moreover, wide variations of scientific opinion accompany model projections of a
warmer world: if these increases in greenhouse gas emissions continue, global
average temperature could rise anywhere from 2.7oF to 10.7oF over the next 100
years. Because the U.S. economy is so dependent upon energy, and so much of U.S.
and worldwide energy is derived from fossil fuels, options for reducing emissions of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases pose major challenges and controversy.
The basic policy question remains: Given scientific uncertainties about the
magnitude, timing, rate, and regional consequences of potential climatic change,
what are the appropriate responses for U.S. and world decision makers?
The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), ratified by the United States , called for a “non-binding,” voluntary aim
for industrialized countries to stabilize their emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990
levels by the year 2000. This was followed by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCCC, which commits the major industrialized nations that have ratified it to
specified, legally binding emissions reductions. On February 16, 2005, the Kyoto
Protocol entered into force without ratification by the United States. As of July 10,
2006, 164 nations and economic regional integration organizations had ratified the
Protocol. In March 2001, the Bush Administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol, and
thus the United States is not party to it (and therefore is not subject to its
requirements). President Bush concluded a cabinet-level climate policy review with
an announcement in 2002 of a “new approach” for the United States based on
reducing the greenhouse gas intensity (greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP)
of the U.S. economy.
This report briefly reviews the status of climate science, international
negotiations, and congressional activity focused specifically on climate change. It
replaces CRS Issue Brief IB89005.

Contents
Global Climate Change Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Greenhouse Gases: Sources and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Climate System Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Policy Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Clinton Administration Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Bush Administration Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
International Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) . . . . . . . . . . 12
COP-1, The Berlin Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
COP-2, Geneva, Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
COP-3, The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
COP-4, Buenos Aires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
COP-5, Bonn, Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
COP-6, The Hague, Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
COP-6 “bis,” Bonn, Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
COP-7, Marrakech, Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
COP-8 (New Delhi, India, 2002), COP-9 (Milan, Italy, 2003),
COP-10 (Buenos Aires, 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
COP-11, Montreal, Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate . . . . . . . . . . 17
Congressional Interest and Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Global Climate Change:
Major Scientific and Policy Issues
The measurable increase in average global temperatures, termed “global
warming” and linked to increases in “greenhouse” gases in the Earth’s atmosphere,
has led to international efforts to achieve reductions of emissions of those gases from
human activities, as well as domestic debates in the United States concerning the
appropriate policies to address related concerns. This report briefly reviews the
status of scientific research on the underpinnings of global climate change, and
briefly outlines both international action and domestic policies, including legislation
in the 109th Congress to address climate change.
Global Climate Change Science
A preponderance of the world’s scientists have concluded that human activities
have contributed to increased atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO )
2
by 36% from pre-industrial values of 280 parts per million (ppm) to 380 ppm over
the past 150 years, leading to an increase in global average temperatures. Global
temperatures have already risen 0.6oC (0.9oF) in the last 100 years, and, according to
model projections, might rise anywhere from as little as 1.8oC to as much as 7.1oC
(2.7oF to 10.7oF) over the next 100 years. However, the science of climate change
is not without challengers, who argue that scientific proof is incomplete or
contradictory, and that there remain many uncertainties about the nature and direction
of Earth’s future climate state. Nevertheless, there is significant concern that human
activities, such as the burning of fossil fuels, industrial production, deforestation, and
certain land-use practices, are increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide (CO ) that, along with increasing concentrations of other trace gases such as
2
methane (CH ), nitrous oxide (N O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons
4
2
(PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF ), may be leading to changes in the chemical
6
composition and physical dynamics of Earth’s atmosphere, including how
heat/energy is distributed between land, ocean, atmosphere, and space.
Greenhouse Gases: Sources and Trends
Scientists have found that the four most important variable greenhouse gases,
whose atmospheric concentrations can be influenced by human activities, are carbon
dioxide (CO ), methane (CH ), nitrous oxide (N O), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).
2
4
2
Historically, CO — which is produced when fossil fuels are burned — has been the
2
most important, but those other atmospheric trace gases are also radiatively active,
in that they can affect Earth’s heat budget and thereby contribute to a greenhouse
warming of the lower atmosphere.

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The amount of carbon cycling from naturally occurring processes each year
through the biosphere as CO is enormous — some 800 billion tons. Ice cores and
2
other proxy climate data, which also indicate CO concentrations in the atmosphere,
2
have shown, in general, a relatively stable global climate, at least over the past 10,000
years. As such, many scientists suggest that the amount of CO generated by natural
2
processes is about equal to the amounts absorbed and sequestered by natural
processes. However, human activity since the Industrial Revolution (ca. 1850),
primarily in the form of burning fossil fuels, is now generating some additional 24
billion tons of CO per year. Available evidence shows that about half this amount
2
is absorbed by natural processes on land and in the ocean, and that atmospheric
concentrations of CO are currently about 36% higher at 380 parts per million (ppm)
2
than they were some 150 years ago at 280 ppm. Some scientists believe that a large
amount of CO may be stored in northern latitude soils and in temperate and tropical
2
forests, suggesting a greater importance of the role of natural resources management
and land-use practices in these regions, including burning of biomass and
deforestation. Scientists estimate that anthropogenic emissions of CO alone may
2
account for as much as 60% of the increase in global mean temperatures of 0.9oF,
since 1850.
The combined radiative forcing1 from the other trace gases is approximately
equal to that of CO and, collectively, they are projected to contribute about as much
2
to potential global warming over the next 60 years as CO . Some of the halogenated
2
compounds, while present in the atmosphere at very low concentrations, are of
considerable interest because of their high global warming potentials (GWPs) and
long atmospheric residence times. Methane concentrations had been rising from a
preindustrial value of around 700 parts per billion (ppb) up to the mid-1990s, when
they began to level off to a present value of about 1,766 ppb, a 152% increase.
Nitrous oxide concentrations have been rising from a preindustrial value of around
270 parts per billion (ppb) up to a present value of about 317 ppb, representing a 17%
increase.
The atmospheric concentrations of the chlorofluorocarbons CFC-11, at 268 parts
per trillion (ppt), and CFC-113, at 84 ppt, have been on the decline in recent years in
response to the Montreal Protocol of the late 1980s.2 The concentration of CFC-12
at 533 ppt is also anticipated to decline, but the decline is expected to be delayed due
to (1) a longer atmospheric lifetime than CFC-11 or CFC-113, (2) its use in
long-lasting appliances such as home refrigerators, and possibly (3) particularly
extensive stockpiling at the global scale, due to a perceived lack of suitable
1 As a general concept, the term radiative forcing in climate science means any change in
the radiation (heat) entering or leaving the climate system. It can be due to changes in
sunlight arriving, or to differing amounts of radiatively active gases. A positive forcing
tends to warm the system while a negative forcing tends to cool it.
2 The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer was a landmark
international agreement designed to protect the stratospheric ozone layer. The treaty was
originally signed in 1987 and substantially amended in 1990 and 1992. The Montreal
Protocol stipulated that the production and consumption of compounds that deplete ozone
in the stratosphere — chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl
chloroform — were to be phased out by 2000.

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replacement at the time production decreases were being mandated. The Kyoto
Protocol on Climate Change (discussed in detail in the section on “U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change”) also regulates three other trace gases:
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF ),
6
whose limited concentrations in the atmosphere are anticipated to grow over the long
term. Sulfate aerosols, a byproduct of air pollution, and other natural phenomena are
also viewed as important for their transient and regional “climate cooling” effects in
Earth’s atmosphere.
On a related note, NASA scientist James Hansen has suggested that Earth’s
climate could benefit from near-term regulation of non-CO greenhouse gases. He
2
proposed that reducing emissions of halocarbons (refrigerants), methane, nitrogen
oxides, and carbon-black aerosols (soot) could have the effect of reducing ozone,
itself a greenhouse gas, in the troposphere. Non-CO greenhouse gases have
2
relatively short atmospheric lifetimes compared with CO ; however, most have a
2
much larger global warming potential (gwp). This would suggest that controlling
emissions of these greenhouse gases could reduce the rate and overall amount of
potential climate warming from greenhouse gases, leaving only that projected from
long-term CO emissions whose full effects might not be realized for another 75-100
2
years. Nevertheless, Hansen emphasized that any actions to reduce emissions of
these gases would need to be taken concomitantly with long-term strategies to reduce
CO . Hansen also noted that modest gains from reducing CO and non-CO
2
2
2
emissions in the near term could be achieved primarily through cleaner energy
production.3
Climate System Response
The most recent runs of state-of-the-art computer models of the Earth’s climate
(general circulation models, or GCMs) have projected a globally averaged warming
ranging from almost 3oF to 10.7oF over the next 100 years, if greenhouse gases
continue to accumulate in the atmosphere at the current rate. Many climate scientists
believe that such a warming could shift temperature zones, rainfall patterns, and
agricultural belts and, under certain scenarios, cause sea level to rise. With regard
to sea level rise, over the last 100 years, the global sea level has risen by about 10 to
25 centimeters (4 to 10 inches). It is likely that much of the rise in sea level has been
related to the concurrent rise in global temperature over the last 100 years. On this
time scale, the warming and the consequent thermal expansion of the world ocean
may account for about 0.8 to 3 inches of the observed sea level rise, while the
observed retreat of glaciers and ice caps may account for about 0.8 to 2 inches.
Other factors are more difficult to quantify, including isostatic effects associated
with rising or subsiding coastlines, neotectonics, and sedimentation. The rate of
observed sea level rise suggests a net positive contribution from the huge ice sheets
of Greenland and Antarctica, but observations of the ice sheets do not yet allow
meaningful quantitative estimates of their separate contributions. The ice sheets
3 See Dr. Hansen’s research article, Global Warming in the 21st Century: An Alternative
Scenario, on the website maintained by the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies at
[http://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/features/altscenario/] .

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remain a major source of uncertainty in accounting for past changes in sea level
because of insufficient data about them over the last 100 years. Taking into account
the ranges in the estimate of climate sensitivity and ice melt parameters, and the full
set of greenhouse gas emissions scenarios, the models project an increase in global
mean sea level of between 5 and 37 inches by the year 2100. In addition, because of
the thermal inertia of the oceans, sea level could continue to rise for many centuries
beyond 2100 even if concentrations of greenhouse gases were stabilized at that time.
Some climate scientists further project that global warming could have far-reaching
effects — some positive, some negative, depending how it may be experienced in a
given region — on natural resources; ecosystems; food and fiber production; energy
supply, use, and distribution; transportation; land use; water supply and control; and
human health.
Skeptics of the global warming theory have called into question the reliability
of the computer climate models and their output used to make projections of future
warming that supported Kyoto Protocol negotiations. They also challenge some
scientists’ assertions that recent episodic weather events may seem more extreme in
nature, and that this may be indicative of long-term climate change.
Evidence of natural variability of climate is large enough that even the
record-setting warmth at the end of the 20th century has made it difficult for many
climate scientists to state beyond a reasonable doubt that weather extremes
experienced over the past two decades are attributable to “global warming,” at least
at the present time. However, the warming trend at the surface appears to be
continuing. In some cases, causal relationships between seasonal and inter-annual
climate variability and present-day severe weather events are beginning to be
recognized and even predicted, owing to an improved ability to observe such
phenomena as El Nino and La Nina, the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), and the
Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). That notwithstanding, singular extreme weather
events have focused public, academic, and government attention on possible
outcomes of potential long-term climate change and a need for a better understanding
of regional climates on decadal to century time scales.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) researchers
reported that the 12 warmest years (globally averaged) since historical records have
been kept occurred in the past two decades, with 1990 and 1998 among the warmest.
Those records reveal the year 2005 as being slightly warmer than 1998. At least
some of this warming, they concluded, is human-induced. In fact, according to a
report of the National Research Council released June 22, 2006,4 there is sufficient
evidence from tree rings, retreating glaciers, and other “proxies” to say with
confidence that the last few decades of the 20th century were warmer than any
comparable period in the last 400 years; however, there is less confidence in
reconstructions of surface temperatures from 1600 back to A.D. 900, and very little
confidence in findings on average temperatures before then.
4 National Research Council, Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, Committee on
Surface Temperature Reconstructions for the Last 2,000 Years, Surface Temperature
Reconstructions for the Last 2,000 Years (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press,
2006), 141 pp.

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On the other hand, satellite instruments — which, through indirect methods,
measure the average temperature of the atmosphere in a deep column above the
surface — have not demonstrated any positive warming trend over the past 20-year
period, at least until very recently. A report issued in 2000 by the U.S. National
Research Council’s Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, Reconciling
Observations of Global Temperature Change,5 attempted to resolve apparent
disparities between temperature data measured at the surface and those from
satellites. Scientists who question the surface temperature record state that such
disparate trends invalidate the output of general circulation models (GCMs), many
of which demonstrate homogenous warming throughout all the levels of the Earth’s
atmosphere. Panel scientists concluded that there may be a systematic disconnect
between the upper and near surface atmosphere and cited physical processes not
currently accounted for in GCMs that may have a unique impact on the upper
atmosphere. In addition, they acknowledged that only long-term, systematic
monitoring of the upper atmosphere could resolve the differences in temperature
trends.
Scientific work continues in the opposing communities and among government
and university modeling centers, accompanied by analysis of weather balloon and
radiosonde data and re-analysis of surface temperature and satellite data sets, with the
prospect of advancing resolution of this pivotal issue. The most recent entry into this
fray, released May 2, 2006, by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP),
is the first of what will be 21 Synthesis and Assessment Products, this one entitled
Temperature Trends in the Lower Atmosphere — Steps for Understanding and
Reconciling Differences; CCSP Synthesis and Assessment Product 1.1.6 As the
CCSP report recounts the argument: Surface data showed substantial global-average
warming, while early versions of satellite and radiosonde data showed little or no
warming above the surface. According to the CCSP report, however, this significant
discrepancy no longer exists because errors in the satellite and radiosonde data have
been identified and corrected. New data sets have also been developed that do not
show such discrepancies. At the present time, this Synthesis and Assessment Product
is an important revision to the conclusions of earlier reports from the U.S. National
Research Council (2000) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(2001). For recent decades, all current atmospheric data sets now show global-
average warming that is similar to the surface warming. While those data are
consistent with the results from climate models at the global scale, discrepancies in
the tropics still remain to be resolved.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), jointly established in
1988 by the United Nations World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), reported in its Second Assessment
(1996) that “[such] a change is unlikely to be entirely natural in origin ... [and that]
the balance of evidence, from changes in global mean surface air temperature and
5 National Research Council, Climate Research Committee, Panel on Reconciling
Temperature Observations, Reconciling Observations of Global Temperature Change
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2000), 104 pp.
6 This report may be viewed in PDF format on the U.S. Climate Change Science Program
website at [http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap1-1/finalreport/default.htm].

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from changes in geographical, seasonal, and vertical patterns of atmospheric
temperature, suggests a discernible human influence on global climate.”7 Issuing an
updated conclusion in January 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel in its Third
Assessment (2001) reported that a firmer association between human activities and
climate seemed to have emerged, stating that “in the light of new evidence and
improved understanding, and taking into account the remaining uncertainties, most
of the observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the
increase in greenhouse gas concentrations.”8 That was news, because reservations
about the source of the past century’s warming and whether it bore a human
fingerprint are often cited in policy debates, usually in support of deferring actions
aimed at mitigating possible global warming. In addition, the IPCC reported a higher
range of potential warming — roughly between 2.7oF and just under 11oF over the
next 100 years.
In the United States, the national assessment report Climate Change Impacts on
the United States: The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change,
released in November 2000 to the President and the Congress and published under
the auspices of the U.S. Global Research Program, received criticism from many of
those involved in its review. Critics claimed that many of the model-projected
impacts of possible future climate changes were overstated and unsubstantiated.
Additional criticism was leveled at the national assessment report because it was
produced by a National Assessment Synthesis Team, an advisory committee
chartered under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. As such, the report was not
subjected to Office of Science and Technology Policy and Office of Management and
Budget standards for government-issued reports mandated by Information Quality
Act Guidelines. The National Assessment Synthesis Team (NAST), with overall
authority for the report, countered that much of the criticism it had received did not
take into account the time scales upon which the report was based; the report targeted
the effects of climate toward the middle of this century to the end of the next. Also,
seemingly contradictory outcomes were produced by the two climate models selected
for making the climate projections, casting some lingering doubt on the overall value
and utility of the results for decision makers at the local, regional, and national levels.
The full national assessment, plus various regional and resource-focused assessments
are now available at the website maintained by the U.S. Global Change Research
Program.9
On June 6, 2001, a Committee on the Science of Climate Change of the U.S.
National Research Council (NRC) released a report, Climate Change Science: An
Analysis of Some Key Questions, stating that global warming could well have serious
societal and ecological impacts by the end of this century.10 Commissioned by the
7 The IPCC First (1990), Second (1995), and Third (2001) Assessments and IPCC Special
Reports appear in PDF format on the IPCC website at [http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/reports.htm].
8 Ibid.
9 The National Assessment reports may be viewed in PDF format on the U.S. Global Change
Research Program website at [http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/nacc/default.htm].
10 National Research Council, Committee on the Science of Climate Change, Climate
(continued...)

CRS-7
Bush White House and prepared by 11 of the nation’s leading climate scientists, the
report summarized the current state of knowledge on climate change and confirmed
that the climatic changes observed during the past several decades were most likely
due to human activities. The committee members warned, however, that they could
not rule out the possibility that the climate’s natural variability could be responsible
for a significant portion of that trend. The authors agreed that human-induced
warming and sea level rise were expected to continue through the 21st century and
beyond, but they emphasized that current predictions of the magnitude and rate of
future warming “should be regarded as tentative and subject to future adjustments
(either upward or downward).”
The NRC report generally concurred with the latest conclusions of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which found that the Earth warmed by
about 1oF during the 20th century, and that most of the warming of the past 50 years
was probably due to increases in greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.
President Bush made a speech on global climate change from the Rose Garden
on June 11, 2001, following release of that NRC Key Questions report and
completion of a cabinet-level review of climate change options. In that speech,
timed just before his trip to Europe to meet with leaders there, the President
acknowledged that the world has warmed and that greenhouse gases have increased,
largely due to human activity, but emphasized that the magnitude and rate of future
warming are unknown.
The Policy Context
Since the conclusion of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, U.S. climate
policy has been evolving through several different stages, first under the Clinton
Administration, and then under a very different approach taken by the Bush
Administration. This history is reviewed briefly below. (For more information on
U.S. Climate Policy and how it has developed, see CRS Report RL31931, Climate
Change: Federal Laws and Policies Related to Greenhouse Gas Reductions.)
Clinton Administration Policies. Taking office the year after the UNFCCC
was completed, the Clinton Administration presided over early U.S. efforts to deal
internationally with climate change, and to participate in formulation of the Kyoto
Protocol to the UNFCCC. On October 19, 1993, President Clinton released his
Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP), which proposed voluntary domestic measures
to attain greenhouse gas emissions stabilization as outlined by the UNFCCC, to
stabilize U.S. emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.11 The CCAP called for
comprehensive voluntary measures by industry, utilities, and other large-scale energy
users. CCAP stressed energy-efficiency upgrades through new building codes in
10 (...continued)
Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions (Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 2001), 42 pp.
11 This plan may be viewed in HTML format on a website maintained by the U.S. Global
Change Research Information Office (GCRIO) at [http://gcrio.gcrio.org/USCCAP/toc.html].

CRS-8
residential and commercial sectors, and other improvements in energy-generating or
-using technologies. Large-scale tree planting and forest reserves were encouraged
to enhance sequestration of carbon dioxide and to conserve energy. Other aspects of
the plan addressed mitigation of greenhouse gases other than CO . The CCAP
2
avoided mandatory command and control measures.
On November 12, 1998, President Clinton instructed a representative to sign the
legally binding Kyoto Protocol that established mandatory reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions for the 38 industrialized nations in Annex I of the UNFCCC. This
drew protest by some in Congress. Some Members claimed Clinton action was in
violation of the June 1997 Byrd/Hagel Resolution (S.Res.98) that required an
economic analysis of legally binding emission reductions on the United States, as
well as binding obligations for all UNFCCC parties, including developing countries.
The President announced he would continue to pursue “meaningful” commitments
from key developing countries — which have no binding obligations to reduce or
restrain greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol — before he would send
the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent (which is required to enable U.S.
ratification of any treaty).
The Clinton Administration released an economic analysis in July 1998,
prepared by the Council of Economic Advisors, that concluded that with emissions
trading among the Annex B/Annex I countries, and participation of key developing
countries in the “Clean Development Mechanism” — which grants the latter
business-as-usual emissions rates through 2012 — the costs of implementing the
Kyoto Protocol could be reduced as much as 60% from many estimates.12 Other
economic analyses, however, prepared by the Congressional Budget Office and the
DOE Energy Information Administration (EIA), and others, projected a potentially
large declines in GDP from implementing the Protocol.
On November 11, 2000, President Clinton issued a statement on “Meeting the
Challenge of Global Warming” in response to the results of the report Climate
Change Impacts on the United States: The Potential Consequences of Climate
Variability and Change.13 In his statement, President Clinton said his Administration
would promulgate new regulations for U.S. electric power plants, imposing
emissions caps on sulphur, nitrogen oxides, mercury, and CO . He also called for
2
establishment of a domestic emissions trading program and promised a continued
U.S. leadership role in climate change to set an example for other industrialized
countries. President Clinton announced he would take such steps as necessary to
keep the United States on target for meeting Kyoto Protocol goals, if certain
concessions were made regarding international adoption of flexible mechanisms such
as emissions trading, the clean development mechanism (CDM), credit for carbon
sinks, and accountable, legally-binding, compliance mechanisms.
12 U.S., Executive Office of the President, President’s Council of Economic Advisers, The
Kyoto Protocol and the President’s Policies to Address Climate Change: Administration
Economic Analysis, prepared for the Council by the Interagency Analytical Team,
Washington, July 1998 (various pagings).
13 Footnote 9, op.cit.

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Bush Administration Policies. Soon after taking office, the Bush
Administration had asked for a delay in resumption of the negotiations that had
collapsed in November 2000 at the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change (see COP-6 discussion later in this
report), in order to allow time for consideration of its approach and policies. Talks
were accordingly scheduled for the second half of July 2001. However, in late March
2001, the Bush Administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol — causing widespread
dismay among the nations of the European Union — citing lack of developing
country participation and possible harm to the U.S. economy. This followed
extensive press attention to, first, statements by the EPA Administrator that —
pursuant to her understanding of a campaign statement by then-candidate George W.
Bush — carbon dioxide would be included in a multi-pollutant regulatory effort; and
then a repudiation of that position and clarification by President Bush and
Administration spokespersons that carbon dioxide would not be regulated.
President Bush made a policy statement in mid-June 2001, resulting from a
continuing cabinet-level review of climate change options, in which he outlined the
U.S. approach as rejecting the Kyoto Protocol and favoring voluntary actions,
increased scientific research, and market mechanisms. As noted above, this preceded
his trip to Europe for meetings with European heads of state, which ended with
statements that Europe and the United States “agree to disagree” on climate change
approaches. President Bush also outlined a Climate Change Research Initiative
(CCRI) and a National Climate Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI), along with
a new Cabinet-level Committee on Climate Change Science and Technology
Integration to oversee their implementation. The CCRI and the NCCTI focus on
short-term, policy-relevant objectives of climate change science and climate change
technology applications, respectively. A previously established U.S. Global Change
Research Program (USGCRP) supports long-term, fundamental, scientific research
objectives, and a Climate Change Technology Program (CCTP) supports the federal
government’s broader portfolio of climate change technology R&D.
Both the new CCRI and the existing USGCRP were combined for the first time
into the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) in the FY2004 budget. The
FY2007 budget requested a total spending level of $1.717 billion for research
managed by the CCSP, which is $4 million (+0.2%) above the FY2006 funding
estimate of $1.713 billion. Included in the $1.717 billion CCSP funds are $200
million for the CCRI. While funding for the embedded CCRI experienced growth
over two fiscal years from FY2003 to FY2005, the FY2007 funding request for CCRI
at $200 million is level with the FY2006 funding estimate of $200 million. That
leaves the FY2007 funding requested for the embedded USGCRP standing at $1.517
billion, which is $4 million (+0.3%) above the FY2006 funding estimate of $1.513
billion. Some $2.98 billion is in the requested FY2007 funding profile for
technology research and development in the Climate Change Technology
Program(CCTP) and its embedded NCCTI, an amount $207 million (+7.5%) above
the FY2006 funding level of $2.773 billion.
Two issues of concern to Congress are the extent to which spending for the
CCRI and CCTP represents new money, versus how much is attributable to the
reclassification of ongoing research and technology programs, and whether reduced
funding in some cases, or virtually level funding in most other cases, might be

CRS-10
deemed necessary or sufficient to accomplish the work of the CCSP and the CCTP.
Five reports currently serve as guidance documents for CCSP and CCTP activities.
The Administration released a Climate Change Science Program Strategic Plan on
July 24, 2003.14 The plan included five major research goals and dozens of specific
research targets as well as 23 written synthesis and assessment products with
deadlines. The National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences
conducted an independent review of the CCSP Strategic Plan and in April 2004
published its overall assessment in a 51-page report, Implementing Climate and
Global Change Research: A Review of the Final U.S. Climate Change Science
Program Strategic Plan.15 To complement the CCSP Strategic Plan, the Department
of Energy has released four guidance documents for Climate Change Technology
Program activities: Results of a Technical Review of the U.S. Climate Change
Technology Program’s R&D Portfolio (May 2006), Climate Change Technology
Program Strategic Plan Public Review Draft (January 2006), U.S. Climate Change
Technology Program: Technology Options for the Near and Long Term (September
2005), and U.S. Climate Change Technology Program: Vision and Framework for
Strategy and Planning (August 2005).16 Release by the CCTP of the completed final
Strategic Plan on Climate Change Technology is expected late in 2006.
In June 2001, the Europeans announced their intentions to proceed with
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, while President Bush indicated the United States
would continue to participate in negotiations of the UNFCCC parties in order to
pursue its own objectives, but would not participate directly in Kyoto Protocol
negotiations. When talks resumed among UNFCCC parties at “COP-6 resumed” in
mid-July in Bonn, Germany, and continued in the fall of 2001 in Marrakech,
Morocco at COP-7, the United States delegation did not make new proposals and
declined to participate in negotiations on issues of the Kyoto Protocol. Agreement
among the other parties was found on the remaining Protocol issues at COP-7, and
they announced that they would seek ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and its entry
into force — even without the participation of the United States.
On February 14, 2002, apparently concluding the cabinet-level review of climate
change underway since early 2001, President Bush announced a U.S. policy for
climate change: a “new approach for meeting the long-term challenge of climate
change.”17 The centerpiece of this announcement was the plan to reduce greenhouse
14 The Strategic Plan may be viewed in PDF format on a website maintained by the U.S.
Climate Change Science Program at [http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/stratplan2003/
default.htm]
15 National Research Council, Committee to Review the U.S. Climate Change Science
Program Strategic Plan, Implementing Climate and Global Change Research: A Review of
the Final U.S. Climate Change Science Program Strategic Plan (Washington, The National
Academies Press, 2004), 51 pp.
16 Each of these four technology reports may be viewed in PDF format on a website
maintained by the U.S. Climate Change Technology Program at [http://www.
climatetechnology.gov/].
17 “President Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives,” remarks during
a visit February 14, 2002, to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration campus
(continued...)

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gas intensity of the U.S. economy by 18% over the next 10 years. Greenhouse gas
intensity measures the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to economic output, and has
been declining in the United States over the past several years. The Administration
stated that the goal, to be met through voluntary action, is to achieve efficiency
improvements that would reduce the 183 metric tons of emissions per million dollars
of gross domestic product (GDP) expected under “business as usual” to 151 metric
tons in 2012. The plan noted that “if, in 2012, we find that we are not on track
toward meeting our goal, and sound science justifies further policy action, the United
States will respond with additional measures that may include a broad, market-based
program” and other incentives and voluntary measures to accelerate technology
development.
In addition, the policy directed the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with
other key agencies, to “substantially improve the emission reduction registry” to
upgrade the voluntary emission reduction program under Section 1605(b) of the 1992
Energy Policy Act, to bring about enhanced measurement accuracy, reliability, and
verifiability. Other measures included providing for protected, transferable emission
reduction credits, increased funding of $700 million in total climate-related spending,
and a new management structure to coordinate climate change and technology
research. Domestic policies such as tax incentives for renewable energy and new
technology, development of fuel-efficient vehicles and cleaner fuels, and carbon
sequestration were also proposed, along with several international bilateral initiatives
and relatively modest increases in foreign assistance.
Some observers praised the plan for taking a practical, conservative approach
to government action and for relying on voluntary measures. Critics observed that
voluntary approaches by themselves have not historically often been effective, and
noted that the reductions in energy intensity are very little different from current
trends and would allow for significant increases in overall greenhouse gas emissions
rather than reductions.
Continuing to encourage voluntary action rather than mandatory requirements,
the Administration detailed on February 12, 2003, a set of voluntary agreements by
various industry groups under an umbrella initiative titled Climate VISION
(Voluntary, Innovative Sector Initiatives: Opportunities Now). These initiatives by
sectoral groups involve actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve
energy efficiency.18
International Action
The United States was involved in negotiations and international scientific
research on climate change prior to ratifying the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention
17 (...continued)
in Silver Spring, Maryland. Remarks and fact sheet may be viewed on the White House
website at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020214-5.html].
18 For a fuller description, see the “Global Climate Change Policy Book” on the White
House website at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html].

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on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This included passage of a National Climate
Program Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-367). (These activities are discussed in CRS Report
RL30522, Global Climate Change: A Survey of Scientific Research and Policy
Reports, which covers early aspects of the scientific debate and contains a chronology
of U.S. government involvement in climate change policy before 1992.)
U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC)19
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
was opened for signature at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) conference in Rio de Janeiro (known by its popular title, the
Earth Summit). On June 12, 1992, the United States, along with 153 other nations,
signed the UNFCCC, that upon ratification committed signatories’ governments to
a voluntary “non-binding aim” to reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases with the goal of “preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with Earth’s
climate system.” These actions were aimed primarily at industrialized countries, with
the intention of stabilizing their emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by the
year 2000; and other responsibilities would be incumbent upon all UNFCCC parties.
The parties agreed in general that they would recognize “common but differentiated
responsibilities,” with greater responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
in the near term on the part of developed/industrialized countries, which were listed
and identified in Annex I of the UNFCCC and thereafter referred to as “Annex I”
countries.
On September 8, 1992, then-President George H. W. Bush transmitted the
UNFCCC for advice and consent of the U.S. Senate to ratification. The Foreign
Relations Committee approved the treaty and reported it (Senate Exec. Rept. 102-55)
October 1, 1992. The Senate consented to ratification on October 7, 1992, with a
two-thirds majority vote. President Bush signed the instrument of ratification
October 13, 1992, and deposited it with the U.N. Secretary General. According to
terms of the UNFCCC, having received over 50 countries’ instruments of ratification,
it entered into force March 24, 1994.
Since the UNFCCC entered into force, the parties have been meeting annually
in conferences of the parties (COP) to assess progress in dealing with climate change,
and beginning in the mid-1990’s, to negotiate the Kyoto Protocol to establish legally
binding obligations for developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
After completion of the Protocol in 1997, COP meetings focused on formulating the
operational rules that would prevail as nations attempted to meet their obligations to
reduce emissions. These rules were essentially agreed upon at COP-7 (see below)
in 2001. A number of difficult issues were under discussion at these annual
meetings, including how emissions trading rules would be set, how to count elements
in a nation that absorb carbon (carbon “sinks”) such as forests, and the continuing
question of “next steps” that might focus on how to proceed in the period following
19 For current information, status of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and extensive
background on the UNFCCC and the annual meetings of the UNFCCC parties, see the
Secretariat website at [http://www.unfccc.int].

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the year 2012, which concludes the “commitment period” during which emissions
reductions were to be achieved by those countries with reduction obligations. (For
detailed discussion of the key issues being negotiated at these annual meetings, see
CRS Report RL30692, Global Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol.)
On February 16, 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. At that time, 141
nations had ratified it, including 35 of the 38 Annex B industrialized countries.
Those Annex B parties to the UNFCCC that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol
continue to express hope that the United States will re-engage in international efforts
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As of July 10, 2006, some 164 nations had
ratified or accepted the Kyoto Protocol.
COP-1, The Berlin Mandate
The UNFCCC Conference of Parties met for the first time in Berlin, Germany
in the spring of 1995, and voiced concerns about the adequacy of countries’ abilities
to meet commitments under the Convention. These were expressed in a U.N.
ministerial declaration known as the “Berlin Mandate,” which established a two-year
Analytical and Assessment Phase (AAP), to negotiate a “comprehensive menu of
actions” for countries to pick from and choose future options to address climate
change which for them, individually, made the best economic and environmental
sense. The Berlin Mandate exempted non-Annex I countries from additional binding
obligations, in keeping with the principle of “common but differentiated
responsibilities” established in the UNFCCC — even though, collectively, the larger,
newly industrializing countries were expected to be the world’s largest emitters of
greenhouse gas emissions 15 years hence.
COP-2, Geneva, Switzerland
The Second Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-2) met in July 1996
in Geneva, Switzerland. Its Ministerial Declaration was adopted July 18, 1996, and
reflected a U.S. position statement presented by Timothy Wirth, former Under
Secretary for Global Affairs for the U.S. State Department at that meeting, which (1)
accepted the scientific findings on climate change proffered by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its second assessment (1995); (2) rejected
uniform “harmonized policies” in favor of flexibility; and (3) called for “legally
binding mid-term targets.”
COP-3, The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change was adopted by COP-3, in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, after intensive
— and tense — negotiations. Most industrialized nations and some central
European economies in transition (all defined as Annex B countries in the Protocol,
a list that closely resembles Annex I of the UNFCCC) agreed to legally binding
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of an average of 6%-8% below 1990 levels
in the years 2008-2012, defined as the first emissions budget period. The United
States would be required to reduce its total emissions an average of 7% below 1990
levels. (For more details, see CRS Report RL30692, Global Climate Change: The

CRS-14
Kyoto Protocol.) The Protocol provided that it would enter into force when it had
been ratified by 55 countries, accounting for 55% of developed country emissions in
1990. In 1997, prior to the completion of the Protocol, the U.S. Senate passed S.Res.
98, which urged the President not to agree to a treaty that did not include binding
commitments for developing countries, or that would cause harm to the U.S.
economy. As noted above, although President Clinton did sign the Protocol in 1998,
it was never submitted by his administration to the Senate because it would not have
met the conditions of S.Res. 98.
The Clinton Administration initiated funding efforts to address climate change;
in the FY2001 budget request funding was included for a Climate Change
Technology Initiative (CCTI) first introduced in his FY1999 budget. Somewhat
reduced funding for the climate technology initiatives was provided through
appropriations in previous years.

COP-4, Buenos Aires
COP-4 took place in Buenos Aires in November 1998. It had been expected
that the remaining issues unresolved in Kyoto would be finalized at this meeting.
However, the complexity and difficulty of finding agreement on these issues proved
insurmountable, and instead the parties adopted a two-year “Plan of Action” to
advance efforts and to devise mechanisms for implementing the Kyoto Protocol, to
be completed by 2000.
COP-5, Bonn, Germany
The 5th Conference of Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change met in Bonn, Germany, between October 25 and November 4, 1998. It was
primarily a technical meeting, and did not reach major conclusions.
COP-6, The Hague, Netherlands
When COP-6 convened November 13-25, 2000, in The Hague, Netherlands,
discussions evolved rapidly into a high-level negotiation over the major political
issues. These included major controversy over the United States’ proposal to allow
credit for carbon “sinks” in existing forests and on agricultural lands, satisfying a
major proportion of the U.S. emissions reductions in this way; disagreements over
consequences for non-compliance by countries that did not meet their emission
reduction targets; and difficulties in resolving how developing countries could obtain
financial assistance to deal with adverse effects of climate change and meet their
obligations to plan for measuring and possibly reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
In the final hours of COP-6, despite some compromises agreed between the United
States and some EU countries, notably the United Kingdom, the EU countries as a
whole, led by Denmark and Germany, rejected the compromise positions, and the
talks in The Hague collapsed. Jan Pronk, the President of COP-6, suspended COP-6
without agreement, with the expectation that negotiations would later resume. It was
later announced that the COP-6 meetings (termed “COP-6 bis”) would be resumed
in Bonn, Germany, in the second half of July. The next regularly scheduled meeting
of the parties to the UNFCCC — COP-7 — had been set for Marrakech, Morocco,

CRS-15
in October-November 2001. (For more detailed discussion of COP-6 issues, see
CRS Report RL30692, Global Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol.)
COP-6 “bis,” Bonn, Germany
When the COP-6 negotiations resumed July 16-27, 2001, in Bonn, Germany,
little progress had been made on resolving the differences that had produced an
impasse in The Hague. However, this meeting took place after President George
Bush had become the U.S. President and had rejected the Kyoto Protocol in March.
As a result, the U.S. delegation to this meeting declined to participate in the
negotiations related to the Protocol, and chose to act as observers. As the other
parties negotiated the key issues, agreement was reached on most of the major
political issues, to the surprise of most observers given the low level of expectations
that preceded the meeting. The agreements included:
(1) Mechanisms — the “flexibility” mechanisms which the United States had
strongly favored as the Protocol was initially put together, including emissions
trading; joint implementation; and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
which provides funding from developed countries for emissions reduction
activities in developing countries, with credit for the donor countries. One of
the key elements of this agreement was that there would be no quantitative limit
on the credit a country could claim from use of these mechanisms, but that
domestic action must constitute a significant element of the efforts of each
Annex B country to meet their targets.
(2) Carbon sinks — credit was agreed to for broad activities that absorb carbon (
carbon sinks) from the atmosphere or store it, including existing forest and
cropland management, and revegetation, with no overall cap on the amount of
credit a country could claim for sinks activities. In the case of forest
management, an Appendix Z establishes country-specific caps for each Annex
I country; for example, a cap of 13 million tons could be credited to Japan
(which represents about 4% of its base-year emissions). For cropland
management, countries could receive credit only for carbon sequestration
increases above 1990 levels.
(3) Compliance — final action on compliance procedures and mechanisms that
would address noncompliance with Protocol provisions was deferred to COP-7,
but broad outlines of consequences for failing to meet emissions targets would
include a requirement to “make up” shortfalls at 1.3 tons to 1; suspension of the
right to sell credits for surplus emissions reductions; and a required compliance
action plan for those not meeting their targets.
(4) Financing — three new funds were agreed upon to provide assistance for needs
associated with climate change; a least-developed-country fund to support
National Adaptation Programs of Action; and a Kyoto Protocol adaptation fund
supported by a CDM levy and voluntary contributions.
A number of operational details attendant upon these decisions remained to be
negotiated and agreed upon; these were the major issues of the COP-7 meeting that
followed.

CRS-16
COP-7, Marrakech, Morocco
At the COP-7 meeting in Marrakech, Morocco, October 29-November 10, 2001,
negotiators in effect completed the work of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action,
finalizing most of the operational details and setting the stage for nations to ratify the
Protocol. The United States delegation continued to act as observers, declining to
participate in active negotiations. Other parties continued to express their hope that
the United States would re-engage in the process at some point, but indicated their
intention to seek ratification of the requisite number of countries to bring the Protocol
into force (55 countries representing 55% of developed country emissions of carbon
dioxide in 1990). A target date for bringing the Protocol into force was put forward
— the August-September 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development
(WSSD) to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa — but this target was not met.
The main decisions at COP-7 included operational rules for international emissions
trading among parties to the Protocol and for the CDM and joint implementation; a
compliance regime that outlines consequences for failure to meet emissions targets
but defers to the parties to the Protocol after it is in force to decide whether these
consequences are legally binding; accounting procedures for the flexibility
mechanisms; and a decision to consider at COP-8 how to achieve a review of the
adequacy of commitments that might move toward discussions of future developing
country commitments.
COP-8 (New Delhi, India, 2002), COP-9 (Milan, Italy, 2003),
COP-10 (Buenos Aires, 2004)
At these three meetings of the conference of parties to the UNFCCC, attempts
were made to consider next steps after the 2008-2012 commitment period, but these
attempts encountered resistance from developing countries and some other parties.
The announced reluctance of Russia at the Milan COP-9 to undertake ratification of
the Kyoto Protocol called into question whether or when the Protocol might enter
into force. Without U.S. participation, the required 55% of baseline emissions of
parties would not be achieved if Russia did not ratify. However, just before the COP-
10 meeting, Russia did ratify the Protocol on November 18, 2004. Thus it became
possible for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force 90 days later, on February 16,
2005. All three of these meetings centered on largely technical issues, and avoided
major substantive declarations; what “next steps” involving developing countries
should be remained a controversial issue, and was not resolved.
COP-11, Montreal, Canada
COP-11 was held in Montreal, Canada, November 28 - December 9, 2005. This
was a concurrent meeting — the 11th meeting of the parties to the UNFCCC, and the
first meeting of the parties (MOP-1) to the Kyoto Protocol. One of the key outcomes
of the Kyoto Protocol MOP was adoption of the “Marrakech Accords,” which outline
what the Secretariat terms the “rule book” for the Protocol. Among other things, it
formally launches emissions trading by providing rules for trading, and outlines the
operational rules for the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation,
both of which provide for credit to developed countries for projects to reduce
emissions or augment sinks in developing or other eligible countries. Other rules

CRS-17
adopted include how emissions are accounted for, guidelines on data systems needed,
rules for a compliance system, and rules governing how absorption of carbon dioxide
by agricultural soils and forests is to be measured. Discussions of “next steps” were
considered under both the Protocol and the Convention. Negotiations under the
Protocol were agreed upon that could lead to new binding commitments for Kyoto
Protocol parties after 2012; and a decision under the Framework Convention was
made to open a non-binding “dialogue on long-term cooperative action,” which could
include all parties to the Convention, including the United States.
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
On July 27, 2005, a six-nation partnership was announced at the South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) forum — the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate (APP). This partnership agreement included six nations
— the United States, Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The
participants described the focus of the partnership as technology development and
reduction of greenhouse gas intensity, with voluntary participation. Representatives
of the six nations met in Sydney, Australia, in early January 2006, and spelled out the
purpose and provided a work plan for the partnership in statements on January 12,
2006. The purposes that have been identified include to “Create a voluntary, non-
legally binding framework for international cooperation to facilitate the development,
diffusion, deployment, and transfer of existing, emerging and longer-term cost-
effective, cleaner, more efficient technologies and practices among the Partners
through concrete and substantial cooperation so as to achieve practical results.” The
charter for the partnership states: “The partnership will be consistent with and
contribute to our efforts under the UNFCCC and will complement, but not replace,
the Kyoto Protocol.”20
Eight task forces were established to review the status of their sectors with
regard to clean development and climate, to identify cost and performance objectives
and realistic goals, and report on recommended actions within their sectors. The 8
sectors are: (1) Cleaner Fossil Energy, (2) Renewable Energy and Distributed
Generation, (3) Power Generation and Transmission, (4) Steel, (5) Aluminum, (6)
Cement, (7) Coal Mining, and (8) Buildings and Construction.
Congressional Interest and Activities
The prospect of global warming, and questions about what the United States
could or should do about it have yielded, over the last several years, a range of
legislative proposals in the U.S. Congress. Issues dealt with in bills that have been
introduced in the 109th Congress include regulating emissions of carbon dioxide
along with emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury in so-called
20 See a comprehensive Fact Sheet and other information on the APP at [http://www.
asiapacificpartnership.org ].

CRS-18
“multi-pollutant” legislation;21 greenhouse gas reduction and carbon dioxide
emissions trading systems;22 energy issues relevant to climate change, especially
those associated with encouraging or authorizing energy efficiency and alternative
energy sources23; carbon sequestration technologies and methodologies; federal and
national research concerning the prospect of abrupt climate change, climate change
impacts, and climate system surprises; federal spending on climate change science
programs and climate change technology programs and, more broadly, on global
change monitoring and research programs; and long-term research and development
programs to develop new technologies to help stabilize greenhouse gas emissions.
(For an overview, summary, and comparison of key climate change legislation, see
CRS Report RL32955, Climate Change Legislation in the 109th Congress.)
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), enacted in August 2005, included
among its provisions programs to promote the development and deployment of
technologies to reduce greenhouse gas intensity. The Senate voted to include a Sense
of the Senate resolution — which was not included in the final legislation — stating
that human activities are a substantial source of greenhouse gas accumulations in the
atmosphere that are causing temperatures to increase, and that “Congress should
enact a comprehensive and effective national program of mandatory market-based
limits and incentives on greenhouse gases that slow, stop and reverse the growth of
such emissions at a rate and in a manner that — (1) will not significantly harm the
United States economy; and (2) will encourage comparable action by other nations
that are major trading partners and key contributors to global emissions.”24
On May 18, 2006, the House of Representatives in H.R. 5386, the FY2007
Interior-Environment appropriations bill, considered sense-of-the-Congress language,
similar to that of the Senate, stating that there should be enacted a comprehensive and
effective national program of mandatory, market-based limits and incentives on
emissions of greenhouse gases that slow, stop, and reverse the growth of such
emissions.25 That language called for limits and incentives that did not significantly
harm the U.S. economy and that would encourage comparable action by our major
trading partners and key contributors to global emissions. The language was rejected,
however, on a parliamentary point of order as constituting legislation in an
appropriations bill, and, as such, violating clause 2 of rule XXI of House Rules.26
21 See CRS Report RL32755, Air Quality: Multi-Pollutant Legislation in the 109th Congress.
22 See CRS Report RS21581, Climate Change: Senate Proposals to Reduce Greenhouse Gas
Emissions; and CRS Report RS21067, Global Climate Change: Controlling CO2 Emissions
Cost-Limiting Safety Valves.
23 See CRS Report RL33588, Renewable Energy Policy: Tax Credit, Budget, and
Regulatory Issues; and CRS Report RL33599, Energy Efficiency Policy: Budget, Electricity
Conservation, and Fuel Conservation Issues.
24 Section 1612 of the Senate version of H.R. 6.
25 H.R. 5386, Title IV, Section 425, as reported in the House, H.Rept. 109-465.
26 For the floor debate see pp. H2826-2829 in the May 18, 2006, daily edition of the
Congressional Record, v. 152, no 62.

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Congressional hearings on climate change in the 109th Congress included seven
in the Senate by four committees: Commerce, Science and Transportation; Energy
and Natural Resources; Environment and Public Works; and Foreign Relations. In
the House, committee hearings included four hearings by three committees: Energy
and Commerce; Government Reform; and Science. These were for the most part
overview or oversight hearings, and were not focused on specific legislation.