{ "id": "RL33408", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL33408", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 314828, "date": "2006-05-03", "retrieved": "2016-04-07T19:03:43.477029", "title": "Nuclear Command and Control: Current Programs and Issues", "summary": "The Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) infrastructure supports the President and\nhis\ncombatant commanders when they direct nuclear forces. This report discusses the current role of\nthe NCCS in light of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense\nReview (QDR), examines current issues surrounding the NCCS, reviews modernization initiatives,\nsummarizes NCCS functions and characteristics, and reviews NCCS platforms.\n Key NCCS platforms include fixed locations such as the National Military Command Center\n(NMCC), the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Global Operations Center (GOC), and\nSite-R, and mobile platforms such as the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), the\nE-6B Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), and the Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC).\nThe NCCS must support situation monitoring, tactical warning and attack assessment of missile\nlaunches, senior leader decision making, dissemination of Presidential force-direction orders, and\nmanagement of geographically dispersed forces.\n The Department of Defense's (DOD's) 2001 NPR proposed a \"new triad\" of offensive nuclear\nand conventional forces, passive and active defenses, and a robust infrastructure, tied together by the\ncommand, control, computers, communication, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and\nplanning architecture to confront the new, allegedly unpredictable post-Cold War environment. \nAdapting to non-nuclear responses and active defenses poses additional challenges for the current\nNCCS.\n Some might question the continued relevancy of the legacy Cold War NCCS architecture. It was\ndesigned against a \"decapitation\" threat from the Soviet Union. This threat might not still exist. \nHowever, some believe China is investing in a nuclear capability to compete with the United States. \nIran\nand North Korea might be developing nuclear capabilities that, if not used to strike directly at the\nUnited\nStates or U.S. forces, might be used to generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that could wreck\nU.S.\ninfrastructure. In addition to confronting these potential catastrophic threats, the NCCS could direct\nconventional military operations, aid continuity of government in crises, and support civil authorities\nduring natural disasters or emergencies.\n The Defense Department has proposed several modernization and procurement initiatives in\nits 2007 budget. The DOD budget requests upgrades for the Minimum Essential Emergency\nCommunications Network (MEECN) links to the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),\nbombers, and tanker forces. It incorporates a redesign and consolidation of the NMCC, as part of\nongoing Pentagon renovation efforts. It proposes several communications and aircraft upgrades to\nthe E-4B NAOC and the E-6B ABNCP. It seeks funding for a sweeping upgrade to its satellite\ncommunications capability through the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program and\nits follow-on, the Transformational Communications Satellite (TSAT) program.\n This report will be updated as needed.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL33408", "sha1": "a01ba6fb5b512cabd0a626d50eec9be72f117701", "filename": "files/20060503_RL33408_a01ba6fb5b512cabd0a626d50eec9be72f117701.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL33408", "sha1": "032efcf0d5704be9f9e6ec53dc5c9dfa72199772", "filename": "files/20060503_RL33408_032efcf0d5704be9f9e6ec53dc5c9dfa72199772.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }