{
  "id": "RL33038",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL33038",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 342207,
      "date": "2005-08-17",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-07T19:34:39.465029",
      "title": "Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment",
      "summary": "There is no consensus among experts in and outside the U.S. government about the magnitude of the threat to U.S. national interests posed by the Al Qaeda organization. Virtually all experts agree that Al Qaeda and its sympathizers retain the intention to conduct major attacks in the United States, against U.S. interests abroad, and against Western countries.\nIn assessing capabilities, many believe that the Al Qaeda organization and its leadership are no longer as relevant to assessing the global Islamic terrorist threat as they were on September 11, 2001. Some believe U.S. and allied counter efforts have weakened Al Qaeda\u2019s central leadership structure and capabilities to the point where Al Qaeda serves more as inspiration than as an actual terrorism planning and execution hub. According to this view, the threat from Al Qaeda has been replaced by a threat from a number of loosely affiliated cells and groups that subscribe to Al Qaeda\u2019s ideology but have little, if any, contact with remaining Al Qaeda leaders. Those who take this view believe that catastrophic attacks similar to those on September 11, 2001 are unlikely because terrorist operations on that scale require a high degree of coordination.\nAn alternate view is that the remaining Al Qaeda leadership remains in contact with, and possibly even in control of numerous Islamic militant cells and groups that continue to commit acts of terrorism, such as the July 7, 2005 bombings of the London underground transportation system. According to those who subscribe to this view, Al Qaeda as an organization has not been weakened to the degree that some Administration officials assert, and the global effort against Islamic terrorism would benefit significantly from finding and capturing Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden and his top associate, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Subscribers to this view believe that a coordinated attack on the scale of September 11 should not be ruled out because the remaining Al Qaeda structure is sufficiently well-organized to conduct an effort of that magnitude.\nThis paper will focus on the Al Qaeda organization and its major affiliates, but not the full spectrum of like-minded Islamist cells or groups that might exist. This report will be updated as warranted by developments. See also CRS Report RL32759, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, by Christopher M. Blanchard.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL33038",
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Intelligence and National Security"
  ]
}