{ "id": "RL32874", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL32874", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 306133, "date": "2005-04-20", "retrieved": "2016-04-07T19:46:52.237029", "title": "Standing Order and Rulemaking Statute: Possible Alternatives to the \"Nuclear Option\"?", "summary": "Concern over the Senate\u2019s inability to reach a vote on certain pending nominations has\nled some\nSenators to express an interest in amending or bypassing the supermajority requirement to limit\nconsideration now required by Senate rules. Such an approach to ending filibusters, dubbed the\n\u2018nuclear\u2019 or \u2018constitutional\u2019 parliamentary option, might be\naccomplished in several ways, some of\nwhich, opponents argue, could violate Senate rules or precedents. \n \n It might also be possible to institute new consideration limits on nominations by establishing\na new standing order or by statutory provisions having the force of rules. Action in either of these\nforms might have advantages over both standing rule amendments and precedential action, but might\nalso present special obstacles. \n \n The purpose of this report is to examine advantages and disadvantages of limiting Senate\nconsideration by these forms.\n \n This report will be updated as needed.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL32874", "sha1": "91b2c4defc8d48359b89061fc8fcc965f110e54c", "filename": "files/20050420_RL32874_91b2c4defc8d48359b89061fc8fcc965f110e54c.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL32874", "sha1": "c81968ae39288cdb8cf9e00f7a211dc1dc857c16", "filename": "files/20050420_RL32874_c81968ae39288cdb8cf9e00f7a211dc1dc857c16.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Constitutional Questions" ] }