The National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress

The National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress

Order Code RL32803
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The National Preparedness System:
Issues in the 109th Congress
March 10, 2005
Keith Bea
Specialist, American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

The National Preparedness System:
Issues in the 109th Congress
Summary
The national preparedness system (NPS) under development within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) holds significant implications for the
operations and priorities of homeland security officials, emergency managers, and
first responders. The NPS documents and the procedures issued in 2004 and 2005
will guide federal funding allocation decisions, direct federal and non-federal efforts
to build emergency response capabilities, establish the means by which homeland
security priorities will be set, and save lives and property when catastrophes occur.
Work on the NPS stems from authority set out in the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-296), the DHS appropriations legislation for FY2005 (P.L. 108-334), and
executive directives issued by President Bush.
Six basic documents comprise the NPS. First, the draft National Preparedness
Goal (NPG) sets a general goal for national preparedness, identifies the means of
measuring such preparedness, and establishes national preparedness priorities.
Second, 15 planning scenarios set forth examples of catastrophic situations to which
non-federal agencies are expected to be able to respond. Third, the Universal Task
List (UTL) identifies specific tasks that federal agencies, and non-federal agencies
as appropriate, would be expected to undertake. Fourth, the Target Capabilities List
identifies 36 areas in which responding agencies are expected to be proficient in
order to meet the expectations set out in the UTL. Fifth, the National Response Plan
(NRP) sets out the framework through which federal agencies (and voluntary
agencies) operate when a catastrophe occurs. Sixth, the National Incident
Management System (NIMS) identifies standard operating procedures and
approaches to be used by respondent agencies as they work to manage the
consequences of a catastrophe. These documents (and other ancillary agreements)
are intended to establish a national system to ensure that the response to a catastrophe
will be as efficient and effective as possible.
The NPS represents the most comprehensive effort taken to develop an
emergency preparedness and response system that relies upon all levels of
government and non-governmental actors. Compliance might be an issue of debate
during the the 109th Congress. In general, agreement appears to exist among federal
and non-federal emergency management officials that standards and objectives are
required. Some express concern, however, that agencies in poor or rural areas may
lack the resources to reach new national standards; these areas could be penalized
through the loss of federal funds if they fail to meet the standards. Issues of
federalism and state sovereignty might be raised as some contend that the national
concern with preparedness for terrorist attacks could subordinate local priorities,
particularly those associated with natural disasters. Accordingly, Members of
Congress might elect to evaluate the reach of the presidential directives that underlie
these documents, and consider legislation to modify or help oversee the policy
changes. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents
The NPS Documents and Issues They Raise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
National Preparedness Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Issues for Congressional Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Planning Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Issues for Congressional Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Universal Task List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Issues for Congressional Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Target Capabilities List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Issues for Congressional Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
National Incident Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Issues for Congressional Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
National Response Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Issues for Congressional Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
List of Tables
Table 1. Homeland Security Planning Scenarios and Summary
Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 2. Target Capabilities and Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table 3. Major Components of the National Response Plan and
the Federal Response Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

The National Preparedness System:
Issues in the 109th Congress
Congressional mandates and administrative directives of recent years have
resulted in policy changes focused on improving the nation’s preparedness for
catastrophes, including terrorist attacks. Within months of enactment of the
Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 (P.L. 107-296)1 President Bush issued
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5) which requires that the
Secretary of Homeland Security develop and administer a National Incident
Management System (NIMS) and a National Response Plan (NRP).2 These two
documents are to be used to “enhance the ability of the United States to manage
domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident
management system.”
The President subsequently issued HSPD 8 to complement HSPD 5.3 HSPD 8
requires development of a national preparedness goal (NPG) applicable to
catastrophes regardless of cause, referred to as “all-hazards.” HSPD 8 requires that
the NPG establish priorities and balance threats with resources.
Congress recently enacted FY2005 appropriations legislation (P.L. 108-334) for
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that followed upon these directives and
established a statutory requirement for DHS officials to develop preparedness goals.
The statute requires the following.
In accordance with the Department’s implementation plan for Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 8, the Office of State and Local Government Coordination
and Preparedness shall provide state and local jurisdictions with nationally-
accepted first responder preparedness levels no later than January 31, 2005;
include in the fiscal year 2005 formula-based grant guidance guidelines for state
and local jurisdictions to adopt national preparedness standards in fiscal year
2005; and issue final guidance on the implementation of the National
Preparedness Goal no later than March 31, 2005.4
1 P.L. 107-296, 6 U.S.C. 101 et. seq., 116 Stat. 2140-2321.
2 U.S. President (Bush), “Management of Domestic Incidents,” Homeland Security
Presidential Directive - 5, Feb. 28, 2003.
3 U.S. President (Bush), “National Preparedness,” Homeland Security Presidential Directive
- 8, Dec. 17, 2003.
4 P.L. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1310.

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The NPS Documents and Issues They Raise
On the basis of the authorities identified above, DHS officials have developed
six documents to be used in building the NPS.5 Background information on each of
these documents is presented in this CRS report at the page noted below.
! National Preparedness Goal (draft) [see page 3]
! Planning Scenarios (15) [see page 7]
! Universal Task List [see page 11]
! Target Capabilities List [see page 14]
! National Incident Management System [see page 19]
! National Response Plan [see page 22]
The texts of these documents, and the manner in which DHS staff use the
documents to implement the NPS and measure state, tribal, and local government
achievements, will influence the homeland security priorities and operations of
federal and non-federal agencies.
State and local government officials have generally supported development of
the NPS, but some have expressed concern about these documents and the NPS,
apparently largely because compliance will be mandatory in order for these units of
government to be eligible to receive “federal preparedness assistance” in FY2006.6
Roughly $3.6 billion has been appropriated for such funding purposes in FY2005; the
Administration has requested slightly less ($3.3 billion) for FY2006.7 The potential
loss of the funds in FY2006 and in subsequent years constitutes considerable
incentive for non-federal units of government to be in compliance with the NPS
standards.
5 A seventh document, not yet available in draft or final form, is the National Preparedness
Guidance, which will provide information on defining and measuring essential capabilities.
This CRS report provides summary information on the six documents (one in draft form)
available at the date of publication. The guidelines for state and local governments for
FY2005 are not reviewed in this report and are found in the following document: U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness, Office for Domestic Preparedness, Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security
Grant Program, Program Guidelines and Application Kit (Washington: 2005), found at
[http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy05hsgp.pdf], visited March 4, 2005.
6 “To the extent permitted by law, federal preparedness assistance will be predicated on
adoption of statewide comprehensive all-hazards preparedness strategies. The strategies
should be consistent with the national preparedness goal.... To the extent permitted by law,
adoption of approved statewide strategies will be a requirement for receiving federal
preparedness assistance at all levels of government by September 30, 2005.” Section (9) of
HSPD-8.
7 CRS Report RS22050, FY2006 Appropriations for State and Local Homeland Security, by
Shawn Reese.

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This report provides background information on the six NPS documents, and
identifies related issues that may be the subject of debate during the 109th Congress.
The construction of the NPS is just beginning.8 DHS officials reportedly will seek
and obtain feedback from state and local governments, reconsider the documents, and
modify the NPS. Congressional involvement in the process of building the NPS will
likely have an impact on the development of the NPS components.
National Preparedness Goal. HSPD 8 requires the Secretary of DHS to
develop a national preparedness goal (NPG) to improve the nation’s capabilities and
practices to ensure that adequate resources exist to respond to a catastrophe. The
directive sets forth the following specific task.
The national preparedness goal will establish measurable readiness priorities and
targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies with the resources required to
prevent, respond to, and recover from them. It will also include readiness
metrics and elements that support the national preparedness goal including
standards for preparedness assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing
the nation’s overall preparedness to respond to major events, especially those
involving acts of terrorism.9
DHS has issued a draft NPG and related preparedness standards in accordance
with the statutory mandate in the FY2005 appropriations act and HSPD 8. The
national preparedness goal set out in the draft document is as follows.
To achieve and sustain capabilities that enable the nation to collaborate in
successfully preventing terrorist attacks on the homeland, and rapidly and
effectively responding to and recovering from any terrorist attack, major disaster,
or other emergency that does occur to minimize the impact on lives, property,
and the economy. This state of national preparedness will be achieved by
reaching risk-based target levels of capability, and sustained by measuring
readiness and directing resources to areas of greatest risk and need.10
The roles and responsibilities of federal and non-federal entities are intended to
be clarified through the goal. Preparedness, as noted in the document, is a shared
responsibility of all units of government, and will be measured and directed toward
guidelines to be issued in 2005. “The goal establishes the first truly national
approach to preparedness by encouraging alignment of efforts at all levels of
government to achieve shared goals and priorities.”11
8 Considerable effort has been expended on improving preparedness measures and
evaluating the capabilities of state and local governments. See CRS Report RL32520,
Emergency Management Preparedness Standards: Overview and Options for Congress, by
Keith Bea.
9 Section (6) of HSPD 8.
10 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 8: “National Preparedness,” (Washington: 2005), p. 2. The final
NPG is to be issued before April 1, 2005.
11 Ibid., p. 3.

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The national priorities included in the draft NPG have been identified as
follows.
! Expand regional collaboration
! Implement the National Incident Management System and the
National Response Plan
! Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
! Strengthen Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
Explosives (CBRNE) detection capabilities
! Strengthen interoperable communication capabilities
! Strengthen medical surge capabilities
Like other aspects of the NPS, the NPG will be reevaluated and modified over
time. As part of this process, the draft NPG document notes that the goal will change
operations and procedures at the federal and non-federal level, as follows.
Progress towards implementing the Goal must be assessed in order to monitor
effectiveness and adjust policies, programs, and budgets accordingly. To the
extent permitted by law, requirements in existing federal programs will be
realigned to support the goal, including statewide strategies, first responder
preparedness assistance, first responder equipment standards and research and
development efforts, a national training program, a national exercise program,
federal performance measurements, relevant federal regulatory requirements,
maintenance of specialized federal assets, and an annual status report on the
nation’s level of preparedness.12
Issues for Congressional Consideration. The NPG is arguably one of
the more important documents issued thus far in the attempt to create an effective
system that integrates federal, state and local resources. While the other documents
described in the remainder of this report provide details on operations and
procedures, the NPG is intended to “guide the nation in achieving its vision for
preparedness.”13 Issues that might be explored as the draft NPG is considered and
the final document is readied for release include the following.
State and local governments have been submitting strategies and risk
assessments to DHS in order to receive homeland security preparedness funds.14 As
part of this process, states have identified threats, risks, and critical assets, to an
extent, according to some, without necessary federal guidance.15 For example, a
study released by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that the
lack of preparedness standards presented a “challenge,” and that “efforts by state and
12 Ibid., cover memorandum.
13 Ibid., p. 2.
14 Requirements for FY2005 state strategies are set out in: U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Grant
Program, Appendix D, available at [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy05hsgp.pdf],
visited Dec. 29, 2004.
15 Alice Lipowicz, “Apples to Oranges: State Assessments of Terror Threats are a Subject
in Subjectivity,” CQ Homeland Security, Oct. 12, 2004, available by subscription.

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local jurisdictions to prioritize expenditures to enhance fist responder preparedness
have been hindered by the lack of clear guidance in defining the appropriate level of
preparedness and setting priorities to achieve it.”16
! Have state and local officials determined that the NPG (and related
documents) resolve this problem?
! What consideration has DHS given to the existing state priorities in
preparing the goal?17
Police, fire, rescue, emergency medical, and public works employees frequently
respond to local and relatively minor catastrophes. These “first responders” will be
on the scene when what was first seen to be a relatively minor incident comes to be
recognized as an Incident of National Significance (as defined in the National
Response Plan, discussed on page 22 of this report).
! To what extent will the work and priorities of local responders,
largely oriented toward events of lesser consequence, become more
identified with and responsive to federal needs resulting from major
incidents that rarely occur?
! Will local concerns be relegated to a lower priority as communities
strive to meet NPG standards in order to receive federal funding?
Some might argue that the range of federal response capabilities and the
authorities enacted since 2001 have established the foundation for such an entity, and
have resulted in the federalization of functions previously carried out by state and
local governments.
! Will the NPG presage development of a federal first responder
force?
! Might DHS consider addressing concerns about the federalization of
emergency preparedness and response in the NPG?
The NPG document is not the only federal standard or guidance with which state
and local emergency responders will have to comply. The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) of the Department of Transportation is developing
a “Scope of Practice Model” that will present certification guidelines (not standards)
16 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Management of First
Responder Grant Programs Has Improved, but Challenges Remain, GAO report GAO-05-
121 (Washington: Feb. 2, 2005), p. 18.
17 According to the GAO, some state and local government officials at a workshop held by
DHS expressed concern “that the process, among other things, was moving too fast and did
not consider the state and local needs assessments that had already been done.” Ibid., p. 20.
In commenting on the GAO report, the DHS respondent noted that “officials listened and
responded to the concerns of stakeholders and others as noted in the draft report and will
continue to do so.” Ibid., p. 46.

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for emergency medical technicians (EMTs) throughout the nation.18 Those
guidelines might bear on a community’s efforts to meet NPS requirements.19
According to NHTSA officials, development of the EMT guidelines for
education curricula is coordinated with DHS officials.20
! Two what extent are the NPG scenarios and tasks consistent or
coordinated with NHTSA’s EMT guidelines and other federal
standards pertinent to emergency responders?21
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned preparedness responsibility to the
Under Secretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR).22 According to
the acting executive director of a different unit within DHS, the Office of State and
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness “was assigned lead responsibility
to coordinate implementation of HSPD-8 on behalf of the Department.”23 The draft
NPG document begins with a memorandum from Admiral James Loy, Acting
Secretary of DHS, which notes that “the President tasked me to develop a national
domestic all-hazards preparedness goal.”24
18 For further information on the NHTSA standards see “The National Scope of Practice
Model” available at [http://www.emsscopeofpractice.org/], visited Dec. 29, 2004. Detailed
information is available on the “First Responder National Standard Curriculum” at
[http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/ems/pub/frnsc.pdf], visited Dec. 29, 2004.
19 For example, the different skills and functions for which EMS providers would be
certified or licensed might affect the type of service provided under different scenarios in
the NPG. Communities that rely upon volunteers (emergency medical responders) may not
be certified to provide the medication needed immediately by victims of a bioterrorist attack.
20 Telephone conversation with Drew Dawson and Gam Wijetunge, NHTSA, December 29,
2004.
21 Other references to federal response standards include the identification of common
standards and protocols for “field operators and first responders” [Section 312(c)(4), P.L.
107-296, 6 U.S.C. 192(c)(4)]; standards for public safety officer response to hazardous
material incidents [29 CFR 1910.120]; critical benchmarks for public health systems see
[http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/continuationguidance/pdf/guidance_intro.pdf], visited
March 9, 2005.
22 The responsibilities of the Under Secretary include “building a comprehensive national
incident management system with federal, state, and local government personnel, agencies,
and authorities, to respond to such attacks and disasters;” Sec. 502(5), P.L. 107-296, 6
U.S.C. 312(5).
23 Statement of Matt A. Mayer before the House Homeland Security Committee at the
hearing Enhancing Terrorism Preparedness for First Responders, Feb. 10, 2005, document
available from CQ.com on a subscription basis. According to the draft NPG document then-
Secretary Ridge of DHS “charged the Executive Director of the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness (DHS/SLGCP) with responsibility to lead the
HSPD-8 implementation effort on his behalf. See National Preparedness Goal Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 8: “National Preparedness,” p. 1.
24 National Preparedness Goal Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: “National
Preparedness,”cover memorandum.

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! What role has the Under Secretary for EPR had in development of
the goal, pursuant to the statutory assignment of responsibility?
Planning Scenarios. Fifteen scenarios have been developed to assess the
emergency response and preparedness capabilities of state, local and tribal
governments. These scenarios have not been developed to identify events that are
likely to occur; instead, they facilitate efforts by all government agencies to assess the
full range of needs that might be required if events similar to these scenarios take
place. Table 1, below, summarizes the scenarios.
Table 1. Homeland Security Planning Scenarios and Summary
Descriptions
Threat
Description summary
Projected consequences A
Nuclear detonation
Terrorists detonate a 10-
450,000 or more evacuees;
kiloton nuclear device in a
3,000 square miles
large city
contaminated; hundreds of
billions of dollars in
economic impact
Biological attack
Terrorists spray anthrax
13,000 fatalities and
spores in a city using a
injuries; extensive
concealed spray device
contamination; billions of
dollars in economic impact
Biological disease
Natural outbreak of
87,000 fatalities, 300,000
outbreak — pandemic
pandemic influenza that
hospitalizations; $70 to
influenza
begins in China and spreads
$160 billion impact
to other countries
Biological attack —
Terrorists release pneumonic
2,500 fatalities; 7,000
plague
plague into three areas of a
injuries; millions of
large city
dollars in economic
impact; possible
evacuations
Chemical attack —
Terrorists spray a
150 fatalities; 70,000
blister agent
combination of blister agents
hospitalized; more than
into a crowded football
100,000 persons
stadium
evacuated; $500 million in
economic impact
Chemical attack —
Terrorists use grenades and
350 fatalities, 1,000
toxic industrial
explosive devices at
hospitalizations; 50% of
chemicals
petroleum facilities
facility damaged; up to
700,000 persons evacuated

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Threat
Description summary
Projected consequences A
Chemical attack —
Terrorists sprays Sarin into
6,000 fatalities in
nerve agent
the ventilation system of
buildings, 350 injuries
three commercial buildings
downwind; evacuation of
in a city
unknown number of
people; $300 million in
economic impact
Chemical attack —
Terrorists uses explosives to
17,500 fatalities, 100,000
chlorine tank explosion
release a large quantity of
hospitalizations; up to
chlorine gas
70,000 persons evacuated;
contamination at site and
waterways
Natural disaster —
7.2 magnitude earthquake
1,400 fatalities, 100,000
major earthquake
occurs in a major
hospitalizations; 150,000
metropolitan area
buildings destroyed;
hundreds of billions of
dollars in economic impact
Natural disaster —
Category 5 hurricane strikes
1,000 fatalities, 5,000
major hurricane
a major city
hospitalizations; 1 million
people evacuated; millions
of dollars in economic
impact
Radiological attack —
Terrorists detonate “dirty
180 fatalities, 20,000
radiological dispersal
bombs” in three cities in
detectible contaminations
device (RDDs)
close proximity
in each city; billions of
dollars in economic impact
Explosives attack —
Terrorists detonate IEDs in a
100 fatalities, 450
bombing using
sports arena, use suicide
hospitalizations; local
improvised explosive
bombers in a public transit
economic impact; minimal
device (IED)
concourse, and in a parking
evacuations
facility
Biological attack —
Terrorists contaminate food
300 fatalities, 400
food contamination
with anthrax in processing
hospitalizations; millions
facilities
of dollars in economic
impact
Biological attack —
Terrorists infect livestock at
No casualties; huge loss of
Foreign Animal Disease
specific locations
livestock; hundreds of
(FAD, foot & mouth
millions of dollars in
disease)
economic impact
Cyber attack
Terrorists conduct cyber
No casualties; millions of
attacks on U.S. financial
dollars in economic impact
infrastructure
A. These hypothetical results are among those presented in the scenarios. They are not intended to
be dispositive, but to identify the types of situations responding units should be prepared to address.
Source: The Homeland Security Council (Washington: 2004).

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Each scenario is accompanied by descriptions of impacts and consequences.
Also, eight mission areas are discussed for each scenario in order to outline the types
of responses that might be expected.25
According to the draft NPG, “catastrophic WMD scenarios predominate since
they present the gravest threat to our national interests and generally require
capabilities for which the nation is currently the least prepared.”26 The scenarios
depict events that might require federal involvement and coordination; such events
are referred to as Incidents of National Significance.
Issues for Congressional Consideration. The FY2005 program
guidance issued by ODP states the following: “The scenarios used in [exercises
funded through specified preparedness programs] must be terrorism-related and
based on the State or Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy and plans.”27 The
emphasis upon terrorist attacks in the scenarios appears to have raised concern
among some. This, and other issues related to the scenarios, are outlined below.
Some have questioned whether the emphasis by DHS on terrorist attacks
indicates that the NPG is disproportionately oriented toward enemy attacks and away
from the most frequently occurring catastrophes, natural disasters. Some might argue
that the terrorism focus is a shift from the “all-hazards” approach that has developed
for years. Under “all-hazards” planning, response and preparedness needs common
to all disasters are developed, regardless of the cause of the disaster. Examples
include the need to prepare for surge capacities at medical facilities, ensuring that
safe shelters are available, and distributing essential supplies.
! Is there a conflict between a terrorism focus and all-hazards
planning? To what extent is the “all-hazards” orientation dominated
by terrorism concerns?
State, tribal and local units of government will be expected to respond to all 15
scenarios, whether the disasters are caused by floods, civil unrest, earthquakes,
attacks, or industrial accidents. However, the demands that will result from certain
terrorist attacks present unique circumstances that have little bearing on the responses
to floods, tornados, and similar natural disasters. Examples include the targeting of
first responders and citizens by secondary and tertiary attack teams of terrorists and
the decontamination or isolation requirements associated with chemical attacks.
Also, the environmental and health concerns that remain in New York City years
25 The eight mission areas are: (1) Prevention/Deterrence/Protection; (2) Emergency
Assessment/Diagnosis; (3) Emergency Management/Response; (4) Incident/Hazard
Mitigation; (5) Public Protection; (6) Victim Care; (7) Investigation/Apprehension; and (8)
Recovery/Remediation.
26 National Preparedness Goal Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: “National
Preparedness,” p. 6.
27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness, Office for Domestic Preparedness, Fiscal Year 2005
Homeland Security Grant Program, Program Guidelines and Application Kit, p. 38,
available at [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy05hsgp.pdf], visited March 2, 2005.

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after the collapse of the World Trade Center towers represent new areas of concern
to responders. If the scenarios, and the tasks and capabilities associated with the
scenarios, are viewed solely from the “all-hazards” perspective, agencies may not
recognize the differential elements that must be used in saving lives.
! Should the “all-hazards” preparedness goals be modified to include
“some differences” in response needs?
! How could the scenarios, and non-federal preparedness efforts, be
used by Congress to evaluate the need for federal policy
modifications?
The hypothetical results presented in the planning scenarios appear to project
non-specific impacts (e.g. economic impacts in the billions, indeterminate recovery
time-lines, general contamination statements). The unique circumstances of each
locality, local weather conditions, the mitigation efforts undertaken by the area which
suffers the catastrophe, and other factors will be key determinants of the actual losses
incurred.
! How can communities, tribal organizations, and state agencies
present their capabilities and test their preparedness when measured
against such non-specific estimates of losses?
! Should an event similar to that described in the scenario occur,
questions may still remain about capabilities, as the magnitude of the
disaster will dictate whether a unit of government is overwhelmed.
To what extent might the scenarios be adjusted to more specifically
identify impacts and losses to enable state and local governments to
better consider their preparedness level?
! How will DHS evaluate non-federal capabilities when local
conditions vary, and uncertain effects are the basis for measurement?
The FY2006 DHS budget justification submitted to Congress advocates the
distribution of federal preparedness funding according to risk and threat assessments.
DHS has yet to release information on its assessment of risks and vulnerabilities,
relying instead on state assessments that reflect priorities set by non-federal officials
without federal guidance. In testimony before Congress, one DHS official
summarized that “we’re far from finished” when asked about the identification of
threats and vulnerabilities.28 The planning scenarios are described as “key risk
scenarios.”29
28 Testimony of General Pat Hughes, Acting Under Secretary of the Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of DHS before the House Homeland Security
Committee, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment, Feb. 16, 2005, transcript available on a subscription basis from CQ.com.
29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, Universal
Task List 2.0 (Washington: 2005), p. iii.

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! What relationship do the planning scenarios developed by the
Homeland Security Council bear to the threat and vulnerability
assessment process underway within DHS?
Tanker rail cars and trucks that carry hazardous material might be targets of
opportunity for terrorist attacks because the contents of the containers are marked.
Some advocate removal of the signs that identify the load as being a hazardous
material to reduce the threat of attack. Emergency responders, however, have long
sought to have such identifying information on the vehicles so they can respond
appropriately in a safe manner.
! Can the scenarios, and the experiences of state and local responders
in addressing the scenarios, be used to fully assess the competing
challenges of this and similar situations? Is congressional action
required to resolve this point of contention between two public
safety concerns?
DHS may exercise primary responsibility for coordinating the response efforts
if an event presented in the scenarios occurs. Such responsibility for an outbreak of
the pandemic influenza scenario, however, would likely fall primarily to the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).30
! To what extent was HHS involved in the development of the
scenario, and will HHS officials be included in the assessment of
state and local capabilities to respond to such an event?
! Have HHS assessments of the capability of state public health
systems been coordinated with DHS assessment efforts?
Universal Task List. State and local governments must be deemed able to
implement certain tasks involving the delivery of services, needs assessments,
organizational requirements, and other requirements in order to receive federal
preparedness funding in FY2006. These tasks are set out in the Universal Task List
(UTL) prepared by the Office for Domestic Preparedness within DHS.
The UTL identifies the operations and tasks expected to be performed in order
to meet these needs should events similar to those set out in the planning scenarios
occur. Four categories organize the tasks in the UTL — National Strategic Tasks;
Planning, Coordination and Support; Incident Management; and Incident Prevention
and Response. According to the UTL, tasks set out in the first two levels generally
are expected to be performed by federal agencies. Tasks in the second and third
levels generally are performed by state agencies, and those in the second, third and
30 For information on public health threats and response needs see U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, “Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness,” at
[http://www.hhs.gov/ophep], visited March 9, 2005. For information on pandemic influenza
threats see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “National Vaccine Program
Office,” at [http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo], visited March 8, 2005, and University of Minnesota,
Center for Infectious Disease Research &Policy, “Pandemic Influenza,” at
[http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/biofacts/panflu.html], visited
March 3, 2005.

CRS-12
fourth levels fall to local governments. Examples of the tasks and functions within
each of the four levels follow to illustrate the information included in the UTL.
I.
National Strategic Tasks
A.
Develop national strategic intelligence and surveillance
1.
Plan and direct strategic intelligence and surveillance activities
a.
Determine national strategic intelligence and surveillance issues
b.
Determine and prioritize national strategic intelligence and
surveillance requirements
II.
Planning, Coordination, and Support Tasks
A.
Conduct Regional, state, and local intelligence and surveillance operations
1.
Manage intelligence and surveillance activities
a.
Determine intelligence and surveillance issues
b.
Determine and prioritize intelligence and surveillance
requirements
III. Incident Management Tasks
A.
Coordinate transportation operations
1.
Develop transportation infrastructure incident response plan
a.
Identify potential transportation targets
b.
Develop staging areas plan
IV. Incident Prevention and Response Tasks
A.
Provide transportation
1.
Activate approved traffic control plan
a.
Provide evacuation routes from affected area
b.
Identify detours and other alternate routes
Issues for Congressional Consideration. All communities are not
expected to be capable of accomplishing every task. Incidents of National
Significance require coordinated intergovernmental and interjurisdictional responses.
The UTL identifies the range of tasks that responding agencies, in mutual aid
arrangements, are expected to accomplish. Issues that might be explored in
considering the impact of the UTL include the following.
The UTL will be used to assess the capabilities of state and local governments
to meet the needs expected to result from an Incident of National Significance.
! If DHS does not expect individual communities to accomplish all of
the tasks, how will individual communities and states be considered
“capable” if they do not have to comply with the entire list?
! How will ODP determine which communities in a region must be
responsible for certain tasks?

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! To what extent will federal capabilities (generally listed in the
“National Strategic Tasks” section) supplement or possibly replace
state or local resources?
! How will mutual aid agreements that facilitate the sharing of
resources and information across political boundaries be evaluated?
Would the experiences gained by the DHS Office of National
Capital Region Coordination serve as a pilot for other interstate
regions?
Training and exercise programs are expected to be based upon the UTL and
related mission requirements.31 The enumeration of “standard” tasks will enable
administrators to focus curricula and training components on perceived gaps in
capabilities.
! Will DHS or state agencies have primary responsibility for
identifying the areas that require priority in training efforts?32
One researcher has posited that responses to events such as terrorists attacks are
best managed through flexible management structures that allow or emphasize
participants to gain new information, evaluate developing needs, and reconsider
“normal” responses to meet different challenges. “For threats of unbounded
certainty, such as terrorism, the preferred type of adaptation is an auto-adaptive
system that is able to learn from incoming information, reallocate its resources and
attention, reorder its relationships with other entities, and act promptly to reduce the
threat or respond to destructive acts.”33 Many of the tasks in the UTL center on
coordinating activities and improving information flows among levels of
government.
! As the UTL is revised and reconsidered, what tasks might be added
or modified to enable federal and non-federal agencies to work with
systems and plans that facilitate auto-adaptive decisionmaking;
rather than forcing existing practices on an evolving and disastrous
situation?
! How might training and exercise programs built upon the UTL be
modified to encourage officials to build auto-adaptive capabilities?
31 Universal Task List 2.0, p. iv.
32 One publication urged that state strategies and assessments, within the context of “a
nationwide plan,” be used to ensure coordination of homeland security functions, including
the improvement of response capabilities. See Donald F. Kettl, The States and Homeland
Security: Building the Missing Link (The Century Foundation: New York, 2003). Others
may contend that the federal government should prioritize training needs as federal funds
are the primary means of funding such training programs.
33 Louise K. Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Responses to Terrorism,” Publius, vol.
32, Fall 2002, p. 37.

CRS-14
Target Capabilities List. State and local governments seeking to accomplish
the tasks set out in the UTL should have the capability to do so. The Target
Capabilities List (TCL) identifies and describes the “critical” capabilities that must
be performed during Incidents of National Significance in order to reduce losses and
successfully respond to a disaster, regardless of cause.34 Like the UTL, the TCL
document is based upon the 15 planning scenarios discussed previously in this report.
The capabilities, however, are expected to be used for all catastrophes, not just those
identified in the scenarios.
Version 1.0 of the TCL identifies 36 target capabilities, each of which is
associated with the tasks set out in the UTL. As stated in the UTL, each unit of
government is not expected to exercise all components of the 36 target capabilities.
Instead, responsibility for the capabilities is assigned (at least initially) based on the
size of the units of local government, according to the following breakdown.
Larger jurisdictions (those counties or contiguous counties with over a million
people, an urban core of at least 50,000, and a population density of more than
1,000 per square mile).
Medium jurisdictions (those counties or contiguous counties with less than a
million people and with a large urban core).
Small jurisdictions (counties or contiguous counties that do not meet the
thresholds for medium or larger jurisdictions).
Responsibility for capabilities are also made within the TCL for tribal and state
governments and the federal government. The labels for the 36 target capabilities
and their description (excerpted from the TCL) are provided in Table 2, below.
34 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness, Target Capabilities List: Version 1.0 (Washington: 2005).

CRS-15
Table 2. Target Capabilities and Descriptions
Capability
Description
All hazards planning
“...develop integrated plans, policies, and procedures to coordinate response and prevention activities across
jurisdictions, and to allocate resources to match priorities identified in plans to maximize the effectiveness of
prevention and response activities.”
Animal health emergency support
“...identify and eradicate outbreaks of animal diseases ... includes the prompt response to animal related illnesses as a
result of ... emergencies ...”
Criminal investigation and
“...represents the broad range of activities undertaken by law enforcement and related entities ... with a special
intervention
emphasis on ... antiterrorism activities ...”
Critical infrastructure protection and
“...involves public and private entities preparing and protecting those systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so
risk management
vital to the U.S. that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact across
infrastructure sectors.”
Critical resource logistics and
“...identify, dispatch, mobilize and demobilize available resources throughout all emergency management phases of an
distribution
incident.”
Economic and community recovery
“...implement short-term and long-term recovery processes after an incident ...”
Emergency evacuation
“...plan for and execute an organized movement, and relocation of the at-risk population ...”
Emergency operations center
“...provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management through the activation and operation of the
emergency operations center (EOC).”
Emergency public education
“...develop and implement a public education program that provides consistent and coordinated threat-related
information to the public prior to an emergency.”
Emergency public information
“...develop and coordinate the release of accurate alerts, warnings, and other emergency information to the public ...
includes being able to respond to public inquiries in an appropriate manner.”
Emergency response
“...provide uninterrupted flow of critical information among responding multi-disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional
communications
agencies ...”

CRS-16
Capability
Description
Engineering
“...conduct situation and damage assessment, perform mitigation activities, and provide technical assistance ...”
Environmental health and vector
“...provide ground and aerial vector control and environmental health services in support of public health protection.”
control
Explosive device detection and
“...coordinate, direct, and conduct explosive device operations.”
response operations
Fatality management
“...perform recovery, identification, isolation, decontamination, transport, storage, determination of cause and manner
of death, process and return human remains and personal belongings, as well as interact with families of deceased.”
Firefighting operations/support
“...support and conduct fire suppression operations ... establishing an incident command system consistent with NIMS.”
Food and agriculture safety and
“...ensure food safety and security through the development and adoption of agriculture and food safety programs ...”
security
Hazard and vulnerability analysis
“identify and prioritize hazards, assess vulnerabilities, and determine risks prior to and during an emergency.”
Hazardous materials (HAZMAT)
“assess the incident, including testing and identifying all likely hazardous substances onsite; provide protective clothing
...; conduct rescue operations ...; manage site restoration operations ...”
Information collection and threat
“gathering, consolidation, and retention of raw data from sources including human-source intelligence, observation ...
recognition
see in this data the potential indications and/or warnings of terrorist activities ...”
Information sharing and
“...exchange and dissemination of information and intelligence among the federal, state, local and tribal layers of
collaboration
government, the private sector, and citizens.”
Intelligence fusion and analysis
“...merger of data and information for the purpose of analyzing, linking, and disseminating timely and actionable
intelligence.”
Isolation and quarantine
“...protect the health of the population through the use of isolation and/or quarantine measures ... require that sufficient
legal, logistical and information support exists to maintain these measures.”
Mass care
“...provide mass care services, to include shelter, feeding, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items and related
services to incident victims.”

CRS-17
Capability
Description
Mass prophylaxis and vaccination
“...protect the health of the population through a mass prophylaxis and vaccination campaign following an event.”
Medical supplies management and
“...securely transport, manage, and distribute medical supplies during an incident.”
distribution
Medical surge
“...provide triage and adequate medical care.... The capabilities apply to an event resulting in a number or type of
patients that outstrip the day-to-day acute-care medical capacity in a given area.”
On-site incident management
“...direct and control the incident site through the use of Incident Command System (ICS)/Unified Command (UC)
system consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS).”
Pre-hospital triage and treatment
“...provide care to casualties prior to arrival at treatment hospital or facility through triage, stabilization, and rapid/safe
transportation from the incident scene to treatment facilities.”
Public health epidemiological
“...conduct epidemiological investigations and public health laboratory testing.”
investigation and laboratory testing
Public safety and security response
“...reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area in coordination with
HAZMAT, fire/rescue, and law enforcement disciplines.”
Restoration of lifelines
“...manage clearing and restoration activities ... includes the removal and disposal of debris.”
Urban search and rescue
“...coordinate and conduct urban search and rescue (USAR) response efforts for all hazards including locating,
extricating, and providing on-site medical treatment to victims trapped in damaged or collapsed structures.”
Volunteer management and
“...manage volunteers and donations in support of domestic incident management ... includes verification of volunteer
donations
credentials ... and management of delayed health and behavioral consequences.”
Water search and rescue
“...provide water search and rescue response, including monitoring distress calls ...”
Worker health and safety
“...protect the health of on-scene first responders ... and other emergency workers through effective medical care ...
adequate work schedule relief, psychological support ... and follow-up assessments.”
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, Target Capabilities List: Version 1.0 (Washington: 2005).

CRS-18
Issues for Congressional Consideration. The TCL establishes expected
qualifications to be possessed by state and local governments. For some, these
federal standards may be among the more controversial aspects of the NPS. Related
issues are discussed below.
The TCL document notes that “The UTL and TCL will be enhanced, revised,
and strengthened with periodic input from all levels of government....”35 This
statement indicates that the expected levels of attainment may shift and be subject to
negotiation.
! To what degree is the “initial” assignment of capabilities in the 1.0
version of the TCL suggestive rather than mandatory?
! To what extent will jurisdictions be expected to be competent in
specific capabilities?
! On what basis will states and communities be deemed eligible for
FY2006 preparedness funding if the target capabilities and task list
are part of a dynamic process?
The TCL document notes that a “detailed training analysis for the target
capabilities” will be conducted.36
! To what extent will such an analysis consider the existence of
seemingly redundant training programs?
! Which training programs will be considered acceptable in order for
a jurisdiction to be deemed “capable” in a target area?
The grouping of jurisdictions by size may be crucial factors in developing
judgments on whether communities meet the TCL requirements.
! On what basis is population size the determinant factor in assessing
responsibility for certain capabilities? What other indicators or
characteristics were considered?
The introductory section of the TCL notes as follows: “The UTL and TCL
provide an improved means of determining required levels of task proficiency and
the resources required for each capability. They identify levels and measures against
which the quality, level, or degree of preparedness can be measured.”37 Many, but
not all, of the capability measures in the TCL are evaluated in a dichotomous
framework, “yes” or “no.” The criteria used to determine whether a capability exists
are not clearly stated. Many of the capabilities will likely be addressed by state and
local governments to degrees of completion, some better and some marginal.
35 Target Capabilities List: Version 1.0, p. 5.
36 Ibid., p. 6.
37 Ibid., p. 4-5.

CRS-19
! How will “marginally” compliant jurisdictions be rated? Will the
TCL be revised to include criteria for measurement?
National Incident Management System. The absence of standardized
procedures, operating systems, and terminology complicated response efforts at the
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.38 In response to calls for a standardized
system that would speed and not impede response efforts, Congress required
development of such a system in the Homeland Security Act.39 In February, 2003,
President Bush set out details to this requirement through HSPD 5, which required
the Secretary of DHS to develop the National Incident Management System (NIMS),
pursuant to the following mandate.
To provide for interoperability and compatibility among federal, state, and local
capabilities, the NIMS will include a core set of concepts, principles,
terminology, and technologies covering the incident command system; multi-
agency coordination systems; unified command; training; identification and
management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources);
qualifications and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of
incident information and incident resources.40
On March 1, 2004, then-DHS Secretary Tom Ridge announced the release of
the framework to be followed by federal and non-federal entities in responding to
emergencies of all types and sizes. The NIMS document presents standard
operational components and procedures to ensure that emergency responders
communicate and cooperate to achieve the best response to disasters.41
Responsibility to implement NIMS has been assigned to the National Incident
Management System Integration Center (NIC) within the Emergency Preparedness
and Response Directorate (EPR) of DHS.
The major components of NIMS include five topics: (1) command and
management; (2) preparedness; (3) resource management, communications, and
information management; (4) supporting technologies; and (5) ongoing management
and maintenance.42 Regardless of the type of disaster, its location, or complexity,
38 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report (Washington: 2004), pp. 278-323.
39 The statute required that the Secretary of DHS build “a comprehensive national incident
management system with federal, state, and local government personnel, agencies, and
authorities, to respond to such attacks and disasters ... See Section 502(5), P.L. 107-296, 6
U.S.C. 312(5).
40 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html], visited Dec.
29, 2004.
41 The NIMS document is available at [http://www.nimsonline.com/nims_3_04/index.htm],
visited December 29, 2004. A range of information on NIMS is available online at
[http://www.nimsonline.com/], visited Dec. 29, 2004. An on-line course on NIMS is
available at [http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/IS/is700.asp], visited Feb. 28, 2005.
42 Testimony of Gil Jamieson, Acting Director, NIMS Integration Center, DHS, before: U.S.
Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency
(continued...)

CRS-20
NIMS is intended to minimize operational failures at large events that require
commitments from multiple agencies and levels of government.
A key element of NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS). The ICS
concept reportedly was first developed in the 1970s by firefighting officials who
recognized that responding to wildfires required flexibility as well as standard
operating procedures and common language. ICS was created to enable responding
agencies to shift and adapt to such environments. For example, a wildfire that begins
in one jurisdiction might defy control efforts and spread to a multi-state area. A
terrorist attack that begins with a conventional explosion may subsequently involve
weapons of mass destruction or complex response assignments.
ICS operates in the framework of five functional areas: (1) command (either
single command involving one jurisdiction or agency, or area command involving
multiple agencies and jurisdictions); (2) operations; (3) planning; (4) logistics; and
(5) finance/administration. By adopting and training on ICS standards, agencies use
a system that ideally facilitates communication, consolidates information and
intelligence analysis operations, and eliminates inefficient management practices.
ICS requires the identification of responsible officers and staff prior to the occurrence
of a disaster to ensure that functions and assignments are carried out during the
response.
Issues for Congressional Consideration. NIMS was the first NPS
document issued by the Administration. Some questions have been raised, but there
is general agreement that the establishment of a standard operational framework is
necessary. Some of the issues related to the NIMS document follow.
HSPD 5 requires that states and localities use the NIMS structure and
procedures in order to be eligible to receive funds in FY2005.43 This requirement
was echoed and supported by the members of the 9/11 Commission.44 Many
communities and emergency response agencies are familiar with the ICS framework
and other NIMS components, particularly fire departments involved in suppressing
wildfires and emergency management agencies. However, law enforcement
agencies, small, rural emergency response departments, private health care facilities,
42 (...continued)
Preparedness and Response, The National Incident Management System: Enhancing
Response to Terrorist Attacks, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., hearing, Sept. 29, 2004 (Washington:
not yet printed).
43 “Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, federal departments and agencies shall make adoption
of the NIMS a requirement, to the extent permitted by law, for providing federal
preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, or other activities. The Secretary shall
develop standards and guidelines for determining whether a state or local entity has adopted
the NIMS.” Section 20 of HSPD-5.
44 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report (Washington: GPO, 2004), p. 397.

CRS-21
or public health and emergency medicine agencies, reportedly have less experience
with ICS.45
! Is legislation or other congressional action needed to forestall the
deadline for NIMS compliance or ease the fiscal condition
requirements set out in HSPD 5?
According to the Acting Director of the NIMS Integration Center (NIC), all
federal agencies must have submitted a NIMS implementation plan to DHS. Each
plan “must reflect full NIMS implementation within the department or agency by
September 30, 2005.”46 It may be argued that state and local government efforts to
meet NIMS standards should not be confounded by a lack of support by all relevant
federal agencies, particularly those in the National Capital Region.
! To what extent have federal agencies met this requirement?
! Do federal agency plans truly reflect indicators of commitment and
capabilities?
! Is there a need for Congress to oversee agency implementation of the
plans?
HSPD 5, “pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002,” directs the Secretary
of DHS to coordinate federal operations concerning “terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies.”47 Four conditions specify the grounds upon which
the Secretary is to coordinate federal resources: (1) a request from a federal agency
“acting under its own authority;” (2) overwhelmed state and local authorities have
requested federal assistance; (3) more than one federal agency is responding to an
“incident”; and (4) the President directs the Secretary to assume management
responsibility. Implementation of this directive through NIMS standards, under the
conditions specified in HSPD 5, might result in an increase in federal responses to
disasters, attacks or catastrophes that might be addressed without federal
involvement.
! Under what conditions would federal officials invoke this authority?
! Does sufficient statutory authority exist for the obligation of federal
funds under all four of these conditions?
45 See, for example, testimony of Steve Lenkart, International Brotherhood of Police
Officers and Dr. Joseph A. Barbera, The Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk
Management, The George Washington University, before: U.S. Congress, House Select
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and
Response, The National Incident Management System: Enhancing Response to Terrorist
Attacks, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., hearing, Sept. 29, 2004 (Washington: not yet printed).
46 Testimony of Gil Jamieson, p. 6, Ibid.
47 Section (4) of HSPD-5.

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! Are existing federal emergency response authorities sufficient to
enable officials to legally take such action?48
The health and safety of workers (paid and volunteer) at the site of the World
Trade Center collapse in 2001 has been an issue of debate.49
! Should NIMS be revised to clearly enunciate the responsibility for,
and limits of, worker protection at the site of future terrorist attacks
or other disasters that pose health risks to responders?
According to the FY2006 budget justification for DHS, plans are underway to
establish a unified set of regional offices. Ten Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) regional offices have operated for years building relationships with
state and local governments. Other legacy components of DHS have built similar
relationships through regional offices that support different combinations of states.
! To what extent will state and local efforts to incorporate ICS and
NIMS requirements be affected by the DHS regional office plan?
Conferees on the FY2005 appropriation for DHS directed that DHS “implement a
program concept for [NIC] that is anchored in multiple locations serving regional
interests. As part of the NIMS mission the conferees strongly encourage the
Department to establish regional centers to facilitate the development and
deployment of NIMS training, education, and publications.”50
! Will the new regional office configuration be consistent with the
congressional requirement?
National Response Plan. Section 502(6) of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under
Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, to “consolidat[e] existing
Federal Government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national
response plan.” Section 16 of HSPD-5 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security
to “develop, submit for review to the Homeland Security Council, and administer
a National Response Plan (NRP).” This plan must integrate federal domestic
48 Congress has authorized the President to exercise certain emergency authority “with
respect to an emergency when he determines that an emergency exists for which the primary
responsibility for response rests with the United States because the emergency involves a
subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the United States
exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority.” See 42 U.S.C. 5191(b).
By comparison, the President cannot issue a “major disaster” declaration unless the
governor requests federal assistance and meets indicators of need. See 42 U.S.C. 5170.
49 This issue is also discussed in the National Response Plan section, below.
50 U.S. Congress, Conference Committees, 2004, Making Appropriations for the Department
of Homeland Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005, and for Other
Purposes, conference report to accompany H.R. 4567, H.Rept. 108-774, 108th Cong., 2nd
sess. (Washington: 2004).

CRS-23
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-
hazard plan.
On January 6, 2005, then-DHS Secretary Tom Ridge released the NRP.51 The
structure of the NRP is similar in some respects to the Federal Response Plan (FRP)
which it supersedes. Both include emergency support functions assigned to federal
agencies (and the American Red Cross), interagency organizational frameworks, and
annexes for certain types of catastrophes. The NRP differs from the FRP in that it
includes additional emergency support functions, support annexes, and incident
annexes. Table 3, below, presents summary comparisons of the NRP to the FRP.
Table 3. Major Components of the National Response Plan
and the Federal Response Plan
Federal Response Plan components
National Response Plan components
Relationship to other federal plans
Did not supplant other federal plans,
The NRP serves as the core plan always
but was used to supplement other
used for Incidents of National Significance.
plans and authorities.
Other federal plans (see Appendix 4 of the
NRP) provide detailed guidances on
responses to specific situations and, if the
NRP is invoked, are subordinate to the NRP.
Selected organizational elements and officials
1.
Catastrophic Disaster Response
1.
Interagency Incident Management
Group
Group
2.
Federal Incident Response Support
2.
Emergency Support Team
Team
3.
Federal Coordinating Officer
3.
Federal Coordinating Officer
4.
Emergency Response Team
4.
Emergency Response Team
5.
Regional Response Coordination
5.
Regional Operations Center
Center
6.
Disaster Field Office
6.
Joint Field Office
7.
Homeland Security Council
8.
National Security Council
9.
Homeland Security Operations Center
10.
White House Policy Coordinating
Committees
11.
Strategic Information and Operations
Center
12.
National Counterterrorism Center
13.
National Response Coordination
Center
14.
Principal Federal Official
51 The text of the NRP is available at “Emergencies & Disasters, National Response Plan,”
[http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=14&content=4264], visited March 1, 2005.

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Federal Response Plan components
National Response Plan components
Emergency Support Functions
Transportation
Transportation
Communications
Communications
Public works and engineering
Public works and engineering
Firefighting
Firefighting
no similar function
Emergency management
Mass care
Mass care, housing, and human services
Resource support
Resource support
Health and medical services
Public health and medical services
Urban search and rescue
Urban search and rescue
Hazardous materials
Oil and hazardous materials response
Food
Agriculture and natural resources
Energy
Energy
no similar function
Public safety and security
no similar function
Long-term community recovery and
mitigation
Information and planning
External affairs
Support annexes
Financial management
Financial management
no similar annex
International coordination
Logistics management
Logistics management
no similar annex
Private-sector coordination
Public affairs, community relations
Public affairs
and congressional affairs annexes
no similar annex
Science and technology
no similar annex
Tribal relations
Donations management
Volunteer and donations management
Occupational safety and health
Worker safety and health

CRS-25
Federal Response Plan components
National Response Plan components
Incident annexes
no similar annex
Biological incident
no similar annex
Catastrophic incident
no similar annex
Cyber incident
no similar annex
Food and agriculture incident
no similar annex
Nuclear/radiological incident
no similar annex
Oil and hazardous materials incident
Terrorism
Terrorism incident and law enforcement and
investigation
Sources: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington: 2004).
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Response Plan: Interim, 9230.1-PL (Washington:
2003).
Issues for Congressional Consideration. The National Response Plan
has generated little, if any, debate since its release on January 6, 2005. This may be
due to the fortunate circumstance that no Incidents of National Significance have
occurred since its release. Issues that might be discussed by Members of Congress
include the following.
The absence of a unified set of regional offices within DHS could complicate
efforts to implement the NRP should a massive catastrophe occur.
! To what extent have DHS officials considered how state, local, and
tribal organizations will implement the NRP while the regional
office framework is being developed?
The NRP notes that it is “applicable to incidents that may occur at sites under
the control of the legislative or judicial branches of the federal government.”52 The
application of the NRP, and the presence of executive branch officials at legislative
and judicial branch office sites, might raise concerns regarding the protection and
access to information and facilities normally outside the jurisdiction of executive
branch staff.
! What understandings have been reached between executive branch
officials and those responsible for legislative and judicial branch
facilities? What are the concerns that have to be addressed to
preserve the separation of powers among the branches of federal
government?
52 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington: 2005), p.
3.

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The NRP notes that Defense Department (DoD) resources “may be available to
support the federal response to an Incident of National Significance.”53 According
to the Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, DoD is the “lead federal agency” for
homeland defense (defined as the “protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic
population and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression.”)54
! What steps have been taken by DHS and DoD to ensure that
coordination, and not conflict, occurs when a terrorist attack results
in a determination that an Incident of National Significance has
occurred?
The NRP “incorporates relevant portions of” and supersedes the Federal
Response Plan, the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, and the
Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (referred to as the
CONPLAN). The NRP does not supersede the National Contingency Plan (NCP)
and other federal plans specific to certain regions or threats.55 According to the NRP,
national interagency plans “are incorporated as supporting and/or operational plans”
when the NRP is activated.56
! What mechanisms have been established to integrate NRP
operations and assumptions into situations that require the
implementation of the other interagency plans?
DHS officials, notably then-Secretary Ridge, have stressed that state and local
government officials have been consulted throughout the process of developing the
NRP. The preface to the NRP includes a summary statement concerning the effort
by DHS to reach all stakeholders, as follows.
The NRP represents a true “national” framework in terms of both product
and process. The NRP development process included extensive vetting and
coordination with federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, nongovernmental
organizations, private-sector entities, and the first-responder and emergency
management communities across the country.57
While this statement indicates that widespread consultation occurred, a finding by the
authors of a Government Accountability Office report noted that other perspectives
have been found among stakeholders from one sector (agriculture), as noted in the
following excerpt.
53 Ibid., p. 10.
54 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security (Washington: 2005),
p. vi.
55 National Response Plan, p. 1. See Appendix 4 of the National Response Plan for a
compendium of interagency plans.
56 National Response Plan, p. 61.
57 Ibid., p. i.

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While efforts have been made to include agricultural stakeholders in the
development of national guidance through various working groups, state and
industry officials told us they were not given sufficient time to review and
comment on key draft national guidance from DHS pertaining to protecting
infrastructure and preparing for emergencies. Specifically, officials said that
they had as little as three days to review and submit comments on both the draft
National Response Plan and the draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
even though they will be expected to implement critical sections of these plans.
As a result, state and industry officials we spoke with are concerned that these
plans may set unrealistic expectations. Although we asked, DHS officials did not
explain to us how they distributed the National Response Plan to stakeholders.58
! If questions remain about the consultation process used by DHS in
developing the NRP, what actions might Members of Congress
consider in evaluating whether a sufficient cross section of parties
in the homeland security arena have been included? Is additional
information required by Congress in assessing whether the NRP, and
other NPS components, are sufficiently developed to use in
determining the eligibility of units of government for federal
funding?
Conclusion
The development of the six documents, which comprise the essential elements
of the national preparedness system, increases federal involvement in emergency
preparedness and response. State, tribal, and units of local government will have to
increase training, dedicate resources, and possibly shift priorities as they work to
comply with the standards. The NPS, still under development, constitutes the most
formal effort to date to fully integrate the emergency preparedness and response
operations and policy in the nation.
Members of the 109th Congress might elect to monitor the degree to which
adoption of the NPS helps or aggravates problems in their constituent homeland
security agencies. In addition to the specific issues noted previously in this report
some of the broad issues that might be explored by the 109th Congress include the
following.
! State standards generally guide preparedness and training efforts at
the non-federal level. The establishment of federal standards will
likely result in a reconsideration of the state standards, possibly their
preemption, and an increase in costs associated with training and
education. Such expectations will likely pose most difficult burdens
on rural and poor communities with few resources. How will the
national needs be balanced against the new demands to be placed
upon state and local agencies? What issues, other than funding, are
most pertinent to state and local agencies?
58 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Much is Being Done to
Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain, (GAO report
GAO-05-214 (Washington: March 8, 2005), p. 47-48.

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! Many emergency response units in rural areas depend upon
volunteers or part-time employees to provide the necessary services
on emergency medical squads, fire department staffs, or other public
safety units. In order to receive federal funds and meet the standards
set out in the NPS some communities may impose requirements and
duties on volunteer or part-time staff that might discourage the
participation of such individuals.
! Historically, state, local and tribal emergency response agencies
have been recognized as the primary resources in the event of a
catastrophe. The creation of the NPS documents, and the
establishment of federal standards, will have a positive impact on the
ability of these agencies to work together and with federal agencies.
However, since the standards and operations procedures have been
developed at the federal level (albeit with considerable input from
non-federal entities), will a “national corps” of emergency
responders grow from this effort? To what extent will the model
presented by the Urban Search and Rescue teams (local government
units subject to call-up by a federal agency) be carried into other
emergency response units?
! To what extent is the NPG goal, and the associated activities and
objectives, consistent with those established in the strategic plan for
DHS? The strategic plan, issued in 2004, identified six goals, each
associated with specific objectives.59 The six goals are as follows.
1.
Awareness. Identify and understand threats, assess vulnerabilities, determine
potential impacts and disseminate timely information to our homeland security
partners and the American public.
2.
Prevention. Detect, deter and mitigate threats to our homeland.
3.
Protection. Safeguard our people and their freedoms, critical infrastructure,
property and the economy of our nation from acts of terrorism, natural disasters,
or other emergencies.
4.
Response. Lead, manage and coordinate the national response to acts of
terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies.
5.
Recovery. Lead national, state, local and private sector efforts to restore
services and rebuild communities after acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or
other emergencies.
6.
Service. Serve the public effectively by facilitating lawful trade, travel and
immigration.
59 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Securing Our Homeland (Washington: 2004), p.
9.

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7.
Organizational excellence. Value our most important resource, our people.
Create a culture that promotes a common identity, innovation, mutual respect,
accountability and teamwork to achieve efficiencies, effectiveness and
operational synergies.