Homeland Security: Air Passenger Prescreening and Counterterrorism

Homeland Security: Air Passenger Prescreening and Counterterrorism

Order Code RL32802
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Homeland Security:
Air Passenger Prescreening and
Counterterrorism
March 4, 2005
Bart Elias
Specialist in Aviation Safety, Security, and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
William Krouse
Specialist in Domestic Security
Domestic Social Policy Division
Ed Rappaport
Analyst in Social Legislation
Domestic Social Policy Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Homeland Security: Air Passenger Prescreening and
Counterterrorism
Summary
The adequacy of existing systems to screen air passengers against terrorist watch
lists has been questioned, most notably by the 9/11 Commission. Yet, considerable
controversy surrounds air passenger prescreening systems, such as the “No Fly” or
“Automatic Selectee” lists, underscoring that screening passengers for more intensive
searches of their persons or baggage, or to prevent them from boarding an aircraft in
the event of a terrorist watch list hit, is likely to be a difficult proposition for the
federal agencies tasked with aviation security. Today, those agencies principally
include the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-administered Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).
In October 2004, TSA unveiled the Secure Flight test program — the next
generation domestic air passenger prescreening system. Secure Flight consists of
four elements: (1) a streamlined rule for more intensive screening; (2) an identity
authentication process; (3) a passenger name check against the consolidated terrorist
screening database (TSDB); and (4) an appeals process for passengers who may have
been misidentified. The TSC has consolidated the “No Fly” and “Automatic
Selectee” lists with the TSDB. Since CBP has assumed responsibility for
prescreening passengers on inbound and outbound international flights, TSA will
only prescreen domestic flights under Secure Flight. The Administration has
proposed creating an Office of Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO) —
under DHS’s Border and Transportation Security Directorate — to oversee Secure
Flight, among other screening, expedited inspection, and credentialing programs.
Congress included provisions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) requiring: (1) TSA to assume the airline
passenger prescreening function from U.S. air carriers after it establishes an advanced
passenger prescreening system for domestic flights that utilizes the consolidated
TSDB; (2) CBP to prescreen passengers on international flights against the TSDB
prior to departure; and (3) DHS to establish appeals procedures by which persons
who are identified as security threats may challenge such determinations. Also, in
the FY2005 DHS Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-334), Congress prohibited TSA from
spending any appropriated funds on the deployment of CAPPS II, Secure Flight, or
any successor system, until the Government Accountability Office reports that certain
conditions have been met, including the establishment of an appeals process.
Several issues may emerge for Congress. To what extent is the FBI-
administered TSC supporting the air passenger screening activities of both the TSA
and CBP? Has the quality and quantity of the records on the “No Fly” list been
improved? Will the TSA and CBP be able to divide cleanly responsibility for
screening air passengers on domestic and international flights, respectively? Will the
proposed SCO be an effective mechanism to coordinate multiple border and
transportation security screening programs? When will TSA be able to deploy an
advanced air passenger screening system and assume the day-to-day administration
of the “No Fly” lists from the airlines?

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background on Civil Aviation Passenger Prescreening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
“No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” Watch Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Other U.S. Government Terrorist Watch Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Computer-Assisted Aviation Prescreening System (CAPS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II) . . . . . . . . 7
Secure Flight Test Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Streamlined Rule for Automatic Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Identity Authentication (IDA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Watch List Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Proposed TSA Passenger Advocacy and Redress Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Border and Transportation Security Screening Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Key Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Type I and Type II Error Tradeoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
False Negatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
False Positives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Limits of Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Congressional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Balancing Benefits and Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Redress and Remedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Watch List Consolidation at FBI-Administered TSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Which Agency Will Handle Passenger Appeals: TSA, TSC,
or Other? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Disclosure Under FOIA and Privacy Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Other Possible Legal Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Congressional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Systems Integrity, Access, and Data Retention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Systems Platform and Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Registered Traveler Pilot Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Prescreening in Other Transportation Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Avoiding “Mission Creep” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Augmenting Prescreening with Behavioral-Based Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . 22
Fitting into the Larger Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Possible Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. Related Provisions Included in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Advanced Airline Passenger Prescreening System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Prescreening of Airport Employees and Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chartered and Leased Aircraft Customer Prescreening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Appeal Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
International Passenger Prescreening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Report on Effects on Privacy and Civil Liberties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Report on Criteria for Inclusion in the Consolidated TSDB . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Foreign Air Marshal Trainees Prescreening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Maritime Vessel Passenger Prescreening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix B. Frequently Used Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Homeland Security: Air Passenger
Prescreening and Counterterrorism
Introduction
Beginning in the early 1990s, civil aviation passenger prescreening consisted of
the airlines checking the names of passengers against a “No Fly” list of individuals
that posed a “known threat to civil aviation.” This relatively small list — less than
20 individuals on September 11, 2001 — was compiled by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and distributed to U.S. air carriers by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) in the form of security directives. In 1996, in response to the
threat of aircraft bombings, the FAA began developing a computer-assisted aviation
prescreening system (CAPS) to select passengers based on certain characteristics
(which reportedly did not include race, nationality, or religious beliefs) for more
intensive luggage searches. Following the 9/11 attacks, this system was modified to
select passengers for more intensive searches of their persons as well, and it was
renamed the computer-assisted passenger prescreening system (CAPPS). In addition,
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) — established by the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act1 — began developing a second generation computer-
assisted passenger prescreening system (CAPPS II), which has generated
considerable controversy.
More recently, the 9/11 Commission made several recommendations regarding
aviation security and air passenger prescreening. While the Commission did not
comment extensively upon CAPPS or CAPPS II, it did recommend that air
passengers should be more comprehensively screened against terrorist watch lists.
The four related recommendations include the following:
! improving the “no-fly” and “automatic selectee” lists without delay;
! transferring the actual screening process from U.S. air carriers to TSA;
! screening passengers against the larger set of terrorist watch lists; and
! requiring air carriers to supply needed information to test and implement
passenger pre-screening.2
Prompted in part by these recommendations, TSA unveiled plans to discontinue
the development of the controversial CAPPS II system in favor of the test program
1P.L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597.
2The Commission also recommended that the Congress and TSA give priority to screening
passengers for explosives. For further information, see CRS Report RS21920, Detection of
Explosives on Airline Passengers: Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and Related
Issues, by Dana Shea and Daniel Morgan.

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dubbed “Secure Flight.”3 According to TSA, the Secure Flight program is being
designed to better deter, detect, and prevent known or suspected terrorists from
boarding commercial flights. The TSA endeavors to meet this objective by using
Secure Flight as a means to focus its limited screening resources on individuals and
their baggage who are perceived to pose an elevated or unknown risk to commercial
aviation, while reducing the number of passengers screened and wait times at
passenger screening checkpoints. As discussed below, the Secure Flight program is
an amalgam of the existing CAPPS, the proposed CAPPS II system, and consolidated
watch list checks.
To reduce redundant or overlapping passenger processing systems, it appears
that Secure Flight will only be used for prescreening passengers on domestic flights.
DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) currently has responsibility for
checking passenger identities against watch lists and prescreening passengers on
inbound and outbound international flights. It is unclear, however, whether
responsibility for screening domestic and international flights can be clearly divided
between TSA and CBP, as many international flights have domestic legs. The
Administration, meanwhile, has proposed creating an Office of Screening
Coordination and Operations (SCO) — under DHS’s Border and Transportation
Security Directorate — to oversee several screening programs, including Secure
Flight.4
Congress, meanwhile, included several provisions related to air passenger
prescreening in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L.
108-458). Among other things, these provisions require: (1) TSA to assume the
airline passenger prescreening function from U.S. air carriers after it establishes an
advanced passenger prescreening system for domestic flights that utilizes the watch
lists integrated and consolidated in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB);5 (2)
DHS to prescreen passengers on international flights against the TSDB prior to
departure; and (3) TSA and DHS to establish appeals procedures by which persons
who are identified as security threats based on records in the TSDB may appeal such
determinations and have such records, if warranted, modified to alleviate such
occurrences in the future.
Also, in the FY2005 DHS Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-334), Congress
prohibited spending any funding provided under that act for the implementation,
except on a test basis, of CAPPS II, Secure Flight, or any follow on/successor system,
until the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that certain conditions
have been met, including the establishment of an appeals process. GAO is expected
3U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, TSA to
Test New Passenger Pre-Screening System, (Washington, Aug. 26, 2004), 2 p.
4Sara Kehaulani Goo, “Proposed Budget Would Strip TSA of Its Biggest Programs,”
Washington Post, Feb. 9, 2005, p. A06.
5The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) refers to the
“consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list maintained by the Federal Government,”
which generally describes the TSDB maintained by the TSC.

CRS-3
to issue a report on the status of the Secure Flight (CAPPS II) program on March 28,
2005.6
Background on Civil Aviation Passenger
Prescreening
Aircraft bombings7 prompted the U.S. government to adopt a classified civil
aviation passenger “No Fly” watch list in 1990, which was initially administered by
the FBI. In late 1996, the FAA funded and oversaw the development of the CAPS
system. In 1999, the FAA mandated that all major domestic and international U.S.
carriers maintain and screen passengers with this system. Both the “No Fly” watch
list and CAPS generally reside on the computer reservation systems used by U.S. air
carriers; however, smaller airlines apparently still use paper lists. Following the 9/11
terrorist attacks, TSA began developing a next generation air passenger prescreening
system known as CAPPS II, which generated considerable controversy.
“No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” Watch Lists
The “No Fly” watch list is a list of persons who were considered to be a direct
threat to U.S. civil aviation. It was administered by the FBI until November 2001,
when it was then transferred to the FAA. The TSA later assumed administrative
responsibility for the list, which was split into the “No Fly” and “Automatic
Selectee” lists. The TSA places persons on these lists based on requests by the
Department of Homeland Security and other members of the Intelligence
Community.8 The TSA distributes these watch lists to the U.S. air carriers. In turn,
the air carriers screen passengers against these watch lists before boarding. In
general, these watch lists are downloaded into a handful of computer reservation
systems used by most U.S. air carriers.9 As the names of these lists imply, passengers
found to be on the “No Fly” list are to be denied boarding and referred to law
enforcement, while those on the “Automatic Selectee” list are selected for secondary
security screening before being cleared to board.
As intelligence and law enforcement officials were concerned about the security
of the “No Fly” list, only a handful of names were on the list prior to the 9/11 attacks
6Chris Strohm, “DHS Budget Puts Administration on Collision Course with Lawmakers,
Airlines,” Government Executive, Daily Briefing, Feb. 9, 2005, go to
[http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0205/020905c1.htm].
7The bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, Dec. 21, 1988 was a decisive event
that prompted FAA officials to explore new options with which to increase U.S. aviation
security.
8Electronic Privacy Information Center, “‘Documents Show Errors in TSA’s ‘No Fly’
Watchlist,” Apr. 2003, go to
[http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/foia/watchlist_foia_analysis.html].
9Ibid.

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(less than 20).10 Since then, the lists reportedly have been expanded almost daily.11
According to one press account, there are more than 20,000 names on the “No Fly”
list today, and TSA has been contacted by air carriers as many as 30 times per day
with potential name matches in the recent past.12 During 2004, the “No Fly” and
“Automatic Selectee” lists were the subject of increased media scrutiny for
misidentifications. In some cases, these misidentifications included Members of
Congress — Senator Edward Kennedy, and Representatives John Lewis and Don
Young.13 In other cases, misidentifications on international flights have led to costly
diversions when air carriers have been prevented from entering U.S. airspace or
continuing to their destinations. Despite problems that accompanied the expansion
of the TSA “No Fly” list, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the “No-Fly” and
“Automatic Selectee” lists be improved without delay.
Congress recently included provisions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) that require the Secretary of Homeland Security to
establish a process by which persons could challenge the inclusion of their name on
either the “No Fly” or “Automatic Selectee” lists, and have their names removed if
warranted.14 Another provision requires the “Security Privacy Officer” of the DHS
to submit a report to certain congressional committees, within 180 days of enactment
(June 15, 2005), assessing the efficacy of the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee”
lists, including the impact of the use of these lists on privacy and civil liberties, and
the ability of the Unites States to protect itself from terrorist attacks.15
Other U.S. Government Terrorist Watch Lists
In addition to improving the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists, the 9/11
Commission recommended that air passengers be prescreened against the larger set
of terrorist watch lists maintained by the U.S. government, which have been
consolidated in a Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) at the FBI-administered
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). Prior to 9/11, domestic air passengers were not
screened against any other terrorist watch lists maintained by the federal government,
10National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The Aviation Security
System and the 9/11 Attacks, Staff Statement no. 3, Jan. 27, 2004, p. 6. Available at
[http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_3.pdf].
11Electronic Privacy Information Center, Documents Show Errors.
12Sara Kehaulani Goo, “Faulty ‘No Fly’ System Detailed,” Washington Post, Oct. 9, 2004,
p. A01.
13Sara Kehaulani Goo, “Committee Chairman Runs Into Watch-List Problem: Name
Similarity Led to Questioning at Anchorage and Seattle Airports, Alaska Congressman
Says,” Washington Post, Sept. 30, 2004, p. A17; and “Hundreds Report Watch-List Trials:
Some Ended Hassles at Airports by Making Slight Change to Name,” Washington Post,
Aug. 21, 2004, p. A08.
14Section 4012(a) of P.L. 108-458.
15Section 4012(b) of P.L. 108-458.

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other than the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists. Reportedly this continued
to be the case as recently as September 2004.16
At the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government’s principal terrorist
watch list known as TIPOFF was maintained by the Department of State.17 TIPOFF
was the foundation of the TSDB.18 At the time the TSC was established in Fall 2003,
TIPOFF included over 120,000 records on terrorists and other criminals, including
81,000 distinct individual terrorist names.19 As of October 2004, the TSC had
downloaded over 102,000 terrorist “lookout” records in the FBI’s National Crime
Information Center (NCIC),20 as compared to the approximately 20,000 names on the
“No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists.21
Also according to the FBI, the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists were
consolidated in the TSDB sometime in the latter half of FY2004.22 It is unknown,
however, whether domestic air passengers are being screened against the entire
TSDB.23 As not all known and suspected terrorists would be considered “threats to
civil aviation,” there could likely be legal and investigative policy considerations that
would bear upon including all such persons who are known and suspected terrorists
on the “No Fly” list and possibly the “Automatic Selectee” list. For example, the
TSC may be reluctant to release the full list of known and suspected terrorists to the
airlines due to data security concerns.
Meanwhile, in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2005
(P.L. 108-458), Congress required the National Intelligence Director, in consultation
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney
General to report to Congress within 180 days of enactment (June 15, 2005) on the
criteria for placing individuals in the integrated and consolidated TSDB watch lists
maintained by the TSC, including minimum standards for reliability and accuracy of
identifying information, the threat levels posed by listed persons, and the appropriate
responses if listed persons are encountered.24
16Leslie Miller, “How Airlines, Government Check Watch Lists,” Associated Press, Sept.
24, 2004.
17Briefing with Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, Oct. 23, 2003.
18Ibid.
19Ibid.
20Briefing with the FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Oct. 15, 2003.
21Sara Kehaulani Goo, “Faulty ‘No Fly’ System Detailed,” Washington Post, Oct. 9, 2004,
p. A01.
22U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information
Services (CJIS) Division, “Terrorist Screening Center Consolidates Data for Law
Enforcement Needs,” The CJIS LINK, vol. 7, no. 4, Oct. 2004, pp. 1-2.
23For further information, see CRS Report RL32366, Terrorist Identification, Screening, and
Tracking Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, by William J. Krouse.
24Section 4012(c) of P.L. 108-458.

CRS-6
Computer-Assisted Aviation Prescreening System (CAPS)
The CAPS system was developed following a known aircraft bombing and
other suspicious incidents. The 1996 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act
authorized the development of the CAPS system.25 The FAA, together with
Northwest Airlines, developed the CAPS system in 1996 and 1997. Additional field
testing continued through 1997 and 1998. The FAA issued a proposed rule directing
all major U.S. air carriers to maintain CAPS on their computer reservation systems
in April 1999.26
The operational concept behind the CAPS system is to select “high-risk”
travelers based on certain characteristics found in Passenger Name Record (PNR)
data elements — like ticket purchasing patterns and the details of their travel
itineraries — for greater scrutiny in terms of baggage screening, while expediting
baggage screening for “low-risk”passengers. In other words, the CAPS system was
designed to determine which passengers were unlikely to have an explosive device
in their checked baggage, so that limited explosive detection capabilities could be
focused on a smaller number of passengers and bags.27 The CAPS system was
reviewed by the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights and Criminal Divisions, along
with the FBI, and was found not to be based on characteristics related to ethnicity,
gender, or religious faith.28 More recently, the CAPS system was renamed CAPPS
(Computer-Assisted Passenger Presceening System).
The CAPPS system is largely invisible to the public, and the federal
government does not control or collect data utilized by CAPPS, as the system itself
resides on airline reservations systems (for example, Sabre and Amadeus).29 While
nine of the 19 hijackers were selected by CAPPS for additional baggage screening,
it is significant that, on September 11, 2001, CAPPS was not used to select
passengers for greater screening at passenger checkpoints.30 While checkpoint
screening was the principal measure to prevent aircraft hijackings, none of the 19
hijackers was prevented from boarding an aircraft following passenger checkpoint
25P.L. 104-264; 110 Stat. 3253. Section 307 of the Act reads: “The Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration, the Secretary of Transportation, the intelligence
community, and the law enforcement community should continue to assist air carriers in
developing computer-assisted passenger profiling programs and other appropriate passenger
profiling programs which should be used in conjunction with other security measures and
technologies.”
26Federal Register, vol. 64, no. 74, Apr. 19, 1999, pp. 19219-19240.
27Statement of Jane Garvey to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, May 22, 2003, p. 11. Available at
[http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing7/witness_garvey.htm].
28Anthony Fainberg, “Aviation Security in the United States: Current and Future Trends,”
Transportation Law Journal, vol 25, spring 1998, p. 200.
29Ibid., p. 200.
30Statement of Cathal L. Flynn to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, Jan. 27, 2004, p. 4. Available at
[http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing7/witness_flynn.htm].

CRS-7
screening.31 Since 9/11, CAPPS has been expanded, and the system is also used by
TSA to identify persons based on certain characteristics gleaned from the PNRs who
are selected for not only greater passenger-checked baggage screening, but greater
passenger checkpoint screening as well.
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II
(CAPPS II)
According to TSA, Secure Flight (see below) was developed after a lengthy
review of the proposed and controversial next-generation domestic passenger
screening system known as CAPPS II.32 CAPPS II system was designed to use
sophisticated algorithms to search both government and commercial databases to
acquire limited background information on ticket-buyers to authenticate their
identity. The system would have assigned travelers a color-coded categorical risk
assessment as follows:
! Green-coded passengers would not have been considered a risk and would
only have been subject to basic screening procedures — metal detectors and
baggage x-rays.
! Yellow-coded passengers would have been deemed either an unknown or
possible risk, and would have been subject to extra screening procedures —
bag and body searches.
! Red-coded passengers would have been considered high risk and would not
have been allowed to travel, and law enforcement officials would have been
notified of their attempts to board commercial aircraft.33
In developing CAPPS II, TSA estimated that the total number of passengers
flagged by the system would be reduced from the current rate of about 15% under
existing CAPPS protocols, to about 5%.34 Nevertheless, critics decried the cloak of
secrecy under which TSA developed CAPPS II, and argued that the potential loss of
privacy under such a system would not be counterbalanced by a corresponding
increase in security.35 Some legal scholars also questioned whether it would be
permissible to prevent a person from boarding an aircraft on a mere suspicion of
organizational affiliation.36
31National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The Aviation Security
System and the 9/11 Attacks, Staff Statement no. 3, Jan. 27, 2004, pp. 6-7, available at
[http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_3.pdf].
32Briefing with Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, Oct. 23, 2003.
33Federal Register, Aug. 1, 2003, p. 45266.
34Sara Kehaulani Goo, “U.S. to Push Airlines for Passenger Records,” The Washington Post,
Jan. 12, 2004, p. A1.
35Jill D. Rhodes, “CAPPS II: Red Light, Green Light, or ‘Mother, May I?,’” The Homeland
Security Journal, Mar. 2004, p. 1.
36Ibid., p. 7. Also, see CRS Report RL32664, Interstate Travel: Constitutional Challenges
to the Identification Requirement and Other Transportation Security Regulations, by Todd
(continued...)

CRS-8
In the FY2004 DHS Appropriations Act,37 Congress prohibited the
expenditure of any funding provided under that act, or any prior appropriations, to
deploy or implement this new system until it had been evaluated by GAO.
Furthermore, Congress required TSA to more adequately address eight action items
before the CAPPS II system could be deployed in any manner except testing of the
system. Congress placed similar prohibitions, action items, and GAO reporting
requirements in the Vision 100 — Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act.38 TSA
indicated that it would continue to work closely with GAO, which was charged with
certifying the adequacy of actions taken, to ensure that these requirements are met.
The specific actions required by Congress include:
! establishing an internal oversight board;
! assessing accuracy of databases;
! stress-testing the system and demonstrating efficacy and accuracy;
! installing operational safeguards to protect the system from abuse;
! installing security measures to protect the system from unauthorized access;
! establishing policies for and effective oversight of system use and operation;
! addressing all privacy concerns; and
! creating a redress process for passengers to correct erroneous information.39
In February 2004, GAO found that TSA had only completed one of these eight action
items: TSA had satisfactorily created an internal oversight board.40
GAO also reported that the development of this system was behind schedule,
and TSA encountered major impediments in testing CAPPS II. In particular, the
European Union and commercial airlines had been reluctant to hand over crucial data
because of privacy concerns. Moreover, GAO underscored that CAPPS II, as
designed, would be vulnerable to terrorists who assumed (i.e., stole or borrowed)
another person’s identity.41 TSA anticipated that CAPPS II would have been
integrated with US-VISIT, DHS’s newly developed automated entry/exit control
program.42 Such a measure would have introduced a biometric component into the
CAPPS II process for non-citizens, so that their identities could be confirmed with
greater certainty.
In July 2004, the then acting TSA Administrator, David M. Stone, testified
before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that CAPPS II was being
36(...continued)
B. Tatelman.
37P.L. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137.
38P.L. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2568.
39Section 519 of P.L. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1155.
40U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges, GAO-040–385, (Feb.
2004), p. 4.
41Ibid., p. 4.
42Federal Register, Aug. 1, 2003, p. 45266.

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“reshaped and repackaged” to address privacy issues.43 The reshaped and repackaged
system he spoke of is Secure Flight. In the FY2005 DHS Appropriations Act,44
Congress prohibited the spending of any funds provided under that act for the
deployment or implementation, other than on a test basis, of CAPPS II, Secure Flight,
or other follow on/successor programs. In this act, Congress also revised the action
items and required GAO to report back to the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees by March 28, 2005.45
Secure Flight Test Program
TSA is developing the Secure Flight program — the next generation domestic
passenger prescreening system — under the authority provided by the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act.46 According to TSA, Secure Flight consists of four
elements: (1) a streamlined rule for more intensive screening; (2) a scaled-back
identity authentication process; (3) a passenger name check against the Terrorist
Screening Database; and (4) an appeals process for passengers who may have been
misidentified. Hence, in addition to the appeals process, the Secure Flight test
program is an amalgam of features taken from CAPPS, CAPPS II, and the 9/11
Commission’s recommendation that passengers be screened against the wider set of
terrorist watch lists maintained by the U.S. government. Within TSA, the Office of
National Risk Assessment has responsibility for establishing policy for the Secure
Flight program.
Streamlined Rule for Automatic Screening
Under the Secure Flight test program, TSA intends to assume the role of
conducting behavioral-based prescreening that airlines now perform under the
existing CAPPS system. The test-program, however, will use revised rules for
selecting passengers for additional screening, which have been designed to reduce the
number of passengers selected for secondary screening. Presumably, the specific
factors considered will be continually reviewed and updated in light of changing
threat evaluations and additional intelligence. A factor such as purchase of one-way
tickets has probably lost any predictive value by now — if only because its inclusion
in the program is widely known. In general, such a system must evolve as the
potential strategies of terrorists evolve. In addition, TSA noted that some individuals
will still be randomly selected for secondary screening to prevent terrorists from
learning (through reverse engineering) the specific criteria used to select individuals
under the Secure Flight program.
43Matthew L. Wald, “U.S. ‘Reshaping’ Airport Screening System,” New York Times, (July
16, 2004), Section A, p. 18.
44P.L. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1319.
45Section 522 of P.L. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1320.
46P.L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597.

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Identity Authentication (IDA)
The test program apparently will also access limited commercial data to
verify an individual’s identity — a core concept of the CAPPS II proposed system.
According to the Administration, this data will be evaluated separately and on a
limited basis to determine whether such data can help to verify more accurately
passenger identity during the pre-screening process.47 In the original CAPPS II
program, TSA had envisioned the use of commercial databases to authenticate the
identity of a passenger before that passenger’s information was compared against
government-maintained terrorist and criminal databases. TSA has indicated that the
IDA procedures would only be incorporated into the Secure Flight system if the
following conditions are met:
! such measures do not result in inappropriate differential treatment of any
category of persons;
! robust data security safeguards and privacy protections can be put in place to
prevent unauthorized access to personal information; and
! the system enhances security and does not involve the U.S. government in
storing or accessing commercial data but, rather, relies on commercial data
aggregators to provide IDA services to the TSA.48
TSA has indicated that it will strive to meet the remaining requirements for
CAPPS II implementation in the Secure Flight program, as the agency plans to
establish a redress process for individuals who believe they have been unfairly or
incorrectly singled out for additional screening or experience difficulties obtaining
boarding passes.
Watch List Checks
As recommended by the 9/11 Commission, as part of Secure Flight, TSA will
perform passenger name checks against the TSDB, which is maintained by the FBI-
administered Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). According to the FBI, the “No Fly”
and “Automatic Selectee” lists have been consolidated into the TSDB.49 Due to this
consolidation, it is likely that checks of these lists may be part of the more
comprehensive TSDB check under the Secure Flight program. As part of this
consolidation, it also is plausible that the TSC has assisted TSA in improving the
“No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists by cross-referencing terrorist records on
those lists with other watch list records contained in the TSDB.
TSA will only prescreen domestic flights under Secure Flight, as CBP has
assumed responsibility for prescreening passengers on inbound and outbound
international flights. The TSC is assisting CBP — through the latter’s National
47Briefing with Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, Oct. 23, 2003.
48Federal Register, Sept. 24, 2004, p. 57353.
49U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information
Services (CJIS) Division, “Terrorist Screening Center Consolidates Data for Law
Enforcement Needs,” The CJIS LINK, vol. 7, no. 4, Oct. 2004, pp. 1-2.

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Targeting Center — with screening international air passengers against the TSDB.
Air passengers on international flights are screened against the wider set of U.S.
government terrorist watch lists through CBP’s Advanced Passenger Information
System (APIS), which is part of the Interborder Agency Inspection System (IBIS).
It is unclear, however, as to the level of assistance the TSC is providing TSA with the
day-to-day screening of domestic air passengers, including confirming possible
matches. In addition, it is unclear whether the Administration’s proposed Office of
SCO — to be established under DHS’s Border and Transportation Security
Directorate — will be an effective mechanism to oversee multiple and varied
screening programs.
Under agreement with the European Union, CBP will be provided with data
from 34 specific categories of PNR data for travelers on international flights from EU
countries.50 Currently, a lesser amount of PNR data is transferred to APIS several
times as it becomes available to the airlines on their reservation systems; however,
final PNR data are sometimes not transferred to APIS until after the flight has
departed (wheels up). In several recent cases, known or suspected terrorists have
been allowed to board aircraft at airports abroad; and, subsequently, those flights
were diverted or turned back.51 As described earlier in the report, these cases have
generated significant press coverage. To remedy these difficulties, the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) requires prescreening to be
conducted prior to departure.
As part of Secure Flight, PNR data will be transmitted by the U.S. air carriers
to TSA. These categories include specific ticketing and itinerary information, airfare
data, frequent flier information, form of payment information, special service
requests, among other things. They do not, however, include birth date information,
which is not routinely collected by airlines. Birth date information was considered
by TSA during the development of CAPPS II as an important data element for
authenticating an individual’s identity by comparing personal data provided by the
passenger against records contained in commercial databases that are often used for
conducting credit checks.52
Proposed TSA Passenger Advocacy and Redress Policy
The final element of the Secure Flight program includes the establishment of
an Office of Identification Protection headed by a passenger advocate to provide an
appeals process for possibly misidentified passengers. This new office would be
separate from the TSA Ombudsman and Office of Privacy. As described above, as
50Bill Strassberger, U.S. Federal News, “DHS, EU Sign Agreement to Allow Collection of
Passenger Data,” May 28, 2004.
51See David Leppard, “Terror Plot To Attack US with BA Jets,” Sunday Times (London),
Jan. 4, 2004, p. 1; Sara Kehaulani Goo, “Cat Stevens Held After DC Flight Diverted,”
Washington Post, Sept. 22, 2004, p. A10; and “US-Bound Air France Flight Diverted Due
to Passenger,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 21, 2004.
52Such commercial databases are maintained by private data providers like Acxiom and
ChoicePoint, among others. For further information, see Robert O’Harrow, Jr., No Place
to Hide, (New York, 2005), pp. 214-246.

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part of the Secure Flight program, TSA will take over checking passengers names
against terrorist watch lists, employ a streamlined rule to select certain passengers for
closer examination, and tap commercial data providers to authenticate passenger
identities. Through this Office of Identification Protection, TSA intends to provide
redress to passengers who are possibly misidentified as terrorists, or inordinately
selected for additional screening. According to TSA, the use of IDA will expedite
the resolution of possible misidentifications.
In terms of simple misidentification, the passenger advocate would likely be
able to clear such cases very quickly. Under current practice, persons who feel they
have been misidentified are directed to contact the TSA Ombudsman, and they are
often issued a “cleared” letter.53 However, in cases where TSA believes a person is
a suspected or known terrorist who poses a threat to civil aviation, challenges to such
determinations would likely be much more complicated. The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and privacy advocates have been critical of TSA’s
passenger advocacy proposal, because they maintain that such appeals should be
handled by an adjudicative body that is independent of TSA.54
Border and Transportation Security Screening
Coordination
The 9/11 Commission concluded that the U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement community missed several vital opportunities to watch-list and screen
several conspirators involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.55 In addition, the
Commission recommended that U.S. border and transportation security systems be
integrated with other systems to expand the network of screening points to include
the nation’s transportation system and access to vital facilities.56 To this end, the
President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11 (HSPD-11) on August
27, 2004.57 Among other things, HSPD-11 called for enhanced and coordinated
terrorist screening, while safeguarding civil liberties and privacy.
In its FY2006 budget request, the Administration has proposed creating an
Office of Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO) within DHS’s Border and
53The TSA Office of Ombudsman can be contacted at (571) 227-2383 or
Omubudsman@dhs.gov.
54Caitlan Harrington, “TSA Promises New Advocacy Office to Clear Errors on No-Fly
Lists,” CQ Homeland Security — Border Security, Oct. 26, 2004.
55National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Three 9/11 Hijackers:
Identification, Watchlisting, and Tracking, Staff Statement no. 2, Washington, 2004, p. 1.
56National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report, p. 387.
57The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-11, Subject:
Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures (Washington, Aug. 27, 2004).
Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040827-7.html].

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Transportation Security Directorate.58 The SCO mission would be to improve and
coordinate programs aimed at detecting, tracking, and interdicting people, cargo, and
conveyances that constitute a threat to the homeland; while, at the same time,
facilitating legitimate travel and commerce. Within the SCO, the Administration
proposes consolidating the following programs:
! United States-Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT),
! Secure Flight (formerly known as CAPPS II) and Crew Vetting,
! Free and Secure Trade (FAST driver registration only),
! Nexus/Sentri,
! Credentialing Administration and Operations,
! Transportation Worker Identification Credentialing (TWIC),
! Registered Traveler Program,
! Hazardous Materials Trucker Background Checks, and
! Non-citizen flight school checks.59
The Administration maintains that consolidating these programs under this
office will promote common approaches and standards, and result in increased
efficiencies and reduced redundancies. While the Administration’s budget request
suggests that the SCO will be responsible for the entire program budgets and system
designs, it is unclear what control the office will have over the screening and
credentialing activities of the TSA or CBP. Nevertheless, the Administration has
indicated that the Secure Flight program will work “hand-in-hand” with CBP to
integrate systems and provide “consistent and uniformly effective” domestic and
international passenger prescreening.60
Key Operational Considerations
As described above, the Administration has adopted four approaches to air
passenger prescreening as part of the Secure Flight program. These approaches, or
systems, include (1) profiling passengers for more intensive searches of their persons
and baggage, (2) identity authentication, (3) checks against the consolidated terrorist
watch lists (TSDB), and (4) an appeals process for possibly misidentified passengers.
Under these systems, criteria or rules will probably be developed to determine what
constitutes a terrorist watch list hit, what passenger profiles trigger more intensive
examinations of persons and baggage, or the amounts and types of data that can be
gleaned from commercial data providers to authenticate a person’s identity. The
more robust the intelligence and the greater accuracy with which such rules are
crafted, the more successful these systems will be.
58U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2006 Congressional Justification,
Office of SCO, (Washington, Feb. 2005), p. SCO-2.
59Ibid., p. SCO-2.
60Ibid., p. SCO-9.

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Type I and Type II Error Tradeoffs
In any screening system, including Secure Flight, there are essentially two
classes of errors that can be made. The first class of errors, termed Type I errors or
false positives, occur when a system erroneously signals a match. Such an error
would occur when someone with no affiliation to terrorists is flagged by the system
and either subjected to additional screening measures, detained, and/or denied aircraft
boarding. In other words, a Type I error would occur anytime someone is
misidentified by the system when the individual, in fact, poses no threat to aviation
security. The second class of errors, termed Type II errors or false negatives, occur
when the system fails to detect or identify that which the system has been designed
to look for. In the case of Secure Flight, such an error would occur if a known or
suspected terrorist or someone posing a threat to aviation were not identified by the
system and boarded a flight without additional scrutiny. The costs and benefits of the
Secure Flight program are shaped by the following three factors.
False Negatives. First, Type II errors (false negatives) are potentially
much more costly than Type I errors (false positives). Although difficult to quantify,
the potential costs associated with just one Type II error may far outweigh the costs
of more frequent Type I errors. If another major catastrophe — like the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 or the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland in December 1988 — were to occur, the chain of failures in security leading
up to such events, including the possible failure to detect terrorists during
prescreening, could result in many lives lost, multi-billion dollar direct costs, and
lasting economic impacts to the aviation industry. Reducing Type II errors will be
dependent upon the quality, quantity, and timeliness of the intelligence (terrorist
identities) produced by the U.S. Intelligence Community and law enforcement as well
as issues like system integrity and the accuracy of data entry.
False Positives. Second, Type I errors (false positives) are likely to be
much more frequent than Type II errors. While there are greater than 600 million
passenger boardings on commercial aircraft each year,61 the consolidated terrorist
screening database includes only about 100,000 individual identities.62 Moreover,
many of these known and suspected terrorists probably live and operate outside the
United States, decreasing the likelihood that they would be encountered on a
domestic flight.63 Nevertheless, even if a small percentage (less than 1%) of
passengers were flagged (e.g., for having a name similar to a listed name), this would
likely generate thousands of false positives each year.
61U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Aviation
Policy & Plans, FAA Aerospace Forecasts, Fiscal Years 2004-2015, Mar. 2004.
62Eric Lichtblau, “To Streamline its Response, U.S. Creates a Terror 'Watch List,'”
International Herald Tribune, Sept. 18, 2003.
63 In 2002, it was estimated that only about 5,000 individuals associated with al Qaeda were
operating in the United States. See Bill Gertz, “5,000 in U.S. Suspected of Ties to al
Qaeda,” The Washington Times, July 11, 2002.

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The implications of Type I errors based principally on name-based checks of
the “No Fly” list or the consolidated TSDB are that such persons would possibly be
detained or prevented from boarding an aircraft. Furthermore, a passenger profiling
system that selects an inordinate number of persons for more intensive examinations
would not only inconvenience flagged passengers, but would likely slow the
screening process and consume scarce resources at unacceptable rates. On the other
hand, if system designers were able to craft an effective means for assessing
passenger risk, then, it could be possible to focus limited screening resources more
efficiently on a smaller number of “high-risk” persons. In regard to proposed
procedures under Secure Flight to authenticate a person’s identity, these methods are
untested. Such procedures, however, could plausibly be used to alleviate
misidentifications of persons whose names were similar to those on the “No Fly” list
or in the consolidated Terrorist Screening Database.
Limits of Intelligence. The third factor regarding the Secure Flight
program is that little is known publically about the limitations of the intelligence/data
and rules that are, or will be, used by screening agencies to identify known or
suspected terrorists, or to select persons who fit a particular profile for more intensive
examinations. Regardless, it is possible that adjusting the screening system to reduce
the probability of one of these types of errors will increase the probability of the other
type. Hence, designing prescreening criteria for identifying terrorists or selecting
passengers for greater examination of their persons or baggage involves a balancing
act between the two types of errors. For the near future, screening agencies will
probably err on the side of caution. As one expert surmised, in the current context
of heightened aviation security in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, “... [T]he
growth in danger from Type II errors necessitates altering our tolerance for Type I
errors. More fundamentally, our goal should be to minimize both sorts of errors.”64
Unavoidably, though, tradeoffs must be made in setting operational criteria for the
system.
Congressional Requirements. In the FY2005 DHS Appropriations
Act,65 Congress directed the GAO to report to Congress on whether the Secure Flight
program and its underlying processes to authenticate a passenger’s identity or assign
risk scores will produce a large number of false positives (misidentifications) or an
inefficient diversion of security resources. Also, in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Congress required that the federal databases used
to establish a person’s identity under the Advanced Airline Passenger Prescreening
system not produce a large number of false positives.66 (See Appendix I.)
Balancing Benefits and Risks. TSA will have to weigh potential
benefits and risks in developing the Secure Flight program. Benefits could include
64Testimony of Paul Rosenzweig, Senior Legal Research Fellow, Center for Legal and
Judicial Studies, The Heritage Foundation Before the U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation Regarding the
Transportation Security Administration’s CAPPS II. Mar. 17, 2004.
65Section 522 of P.L. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1319.
66Section 4012(a) amends 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2) — with a new Subparagraph (C).

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preventing known or suspected terrorists from boarding commercial aircraft by
focusing limited passenger screening resources on individuals who are perceived to
pose an elevated or unknown risk to commercial aviation, while reducing the number
of passengers screened and wait times at passenger screening checkpoints. Risks
could include potentially compromising personal data and singling out certain
passengers unfairly, because of a lack of accurate terrorist identities and threat data,
or other system limitations. The balancing of risks and benefits in the Secure Flight
system can be framed in terms of the tradeoffs between falsely flagging passengers
by the system on the one hand, and failing to detect a terrorist before boarding on the
other hand. Hence, finding a balance between the two competing objectives of
minimizing misidentifications, while effectively detecting terrorists is central to the
design of Secure Flight.
Redress and Remedy
As described earlier in this report, when the FAA and TSA expanded the use
of the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists following the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
an increasing number of highly visible and high-profile misidentifications were the
result. It is notable that the TSA did not have adequate manpower to respond directly
to possible matches, since they did not have a large presence across the country.
Also, the FBI had redirected significant resources to ongoing counterterrorism
investigations. Consequently, many misidentifications were not resolved in a timely
manner. Furthermore, there was no formal process by which corrective action could
be taken to alleviate or prevent future misidentifications.
Watch List Consolidation at FBI-Administered TSC. At some point
in FY2004, “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” list checks were integrated (fused)
with the ongoing terrorist screening operations of the FBI-administered TSC. In
large part, this fusion was likely prompted by press accounts that persons on “terrorist
watch lists” had been allowed to board international flights to the United States.
Some of these flights were held on the tarmacs of international airports abroad, as
part of a larger investigation to disrupt an al Qaeda conspiracy to attack U.S. targets
with airliners.67 Other flights, including the flight carrying pop star Cat Stevens
(Yusuf Islam), were diverted to Bangor, Maine.68 In a more recent case, a British
Airways flight returned to Heathrow Airport in London, England, and an unidentified
passenger was taken into custody after his name matched that of a suspected member
of a Moroccan terrorist group.69
67In Dec. 2003, 10 US-bound flights were grounded abroad (two British, six French, and two
Mexican), after intelligence emerged that al Qaeda intended to hijack several commercial
flights and use them in a suicide attack against U.S. targets, following checks of U.S.
terrorist watch lists. See David Leppard, “Terror Plot To Attack US with BA Jets,” Sunday
Times (London), Jan. 4, 2004, p. 1.
68Sara Kehaulani Goo, “Cat Stevens Held After D.C. Flight Diverted,” Washington Post,
Sept. 22, 2004, p. A10; and “U.S.-bound Air France Flight Diverted Due to Passenger,”
Agence France Presse, Nov. 21, 2004.
69Justin Rood, “As Ridge Warns of al Qaeda Determination, British Flight to the United
States Turned Back,” CQ Homeland Security — Intelligence, Jan. 12. 2005, and “U.S.-
(continued...)

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Moreover, as part of the Secure Flight program, the Administration
announced that CBP would assume responsibility for screening international flights,
while the TSA would continue to be responsible for domestic flights. In any case,
whether on international or domestic flights, watch list checks and the resolution of
possible matches were, and have been, assumed by the TSC in coordination with the
CBP and the TSA.
Which Agency Will Handle Passenger Appeals: TSA, TSC, or
Other? As part of Secure Flight, TSA has shouldered the responsibility for
processing complaints about possible and continuing misidentifications. In addition,
a class action suit has been filed by the ACLU concerning the administration of the
“No Fly” list by TSA.70 Previously, however, the TSC Director had been made
responsible for developing policies and procedures related to criteria for inclusion
into the consolidated TSDB; and measures to be taken in regard to misidentifications,
erroneous entries, outdated data, and privacy concerns. At the same time, the
Administration maintains that since the TSC does not collect intelligence, and has no
authority to do so, that all intelligence or data entered into the TSDB has been
collected in accordance with the preexisting authorities of the collecting agencies.
The same could be said for TSA, however. Hence, questions could arise as to
whether TSA is in any better position than TSC to handle matters pertaining to
passenger redress. The issue of redress may be further complicated by the proposed
creation of the SCO. If not properly coordinated, inconvenienced passengers could
face a bureaucratic maze when seeking redress.
Disclosure Under FOIA and Privacy Act. In regard to TSC, Members
of Congress and other outside observers have questioned whether there should be
new policy and procedures at different levels (such as visa issuance, border
inspections, commercial aviation security, domestic law enforcement, and security
of public events) for the inclusion of persons in the TSDB.71 Also, Members have
asked how a person would find out if they were in the Terrorist Screening Database,
and if so, how did they get there? In congressional testimony, TSC Director Bucella
surmised that a person would learn of being in the TSDB when a screening agency
encountered them and, perhaps, denied them a visa or entry into the United States,
or arrested them. Director Bucella also suggested that the TSC would probably be
unable to confirm or deny whether the person was in the TSDB under current law.72
69(...continued)
bound British Jet Returns to London After US Refuses to Admit Passenger,” Agence France
Press, Jan. 12, 2005.
70American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Files First Nationwide Challenge to ‘No-Fly’ List,
Saying Government List Violates Passengers’ Rights, Apr. 6, 2004, go to
[http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=15430&c=272].
71For further information, see CRS Report RL31730, Privacy: Total Information Awareness
Programs and Related Information Access, Collection, and Protection Laws, by Gina Marie
Stevens.
72Donna Bucella, Terrorist Screening Center Director, Testimony Before the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Jan. 26, 2004, p. 1.

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Consequently, persons who have been identified or misidentified as terrorists
or their supporters would have to pursue such matters through the screening agency.
The screening agency, however, might not have been the originating source of the
record in which case, a lengthy process of referrals may have to be initiated. Under
such conditions, persons identified as terrorists or their supporters may turn to the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or the Privacy Act as a last alternative. Under
FOIA,73 any person, including a noncitizen or nonpermanent resident, may file a
request with any executive branch agency or department, such as the State
Department or DHS, for records indicating they are on a watch list. However, under
national security and law enforcement FOIA exemptions, the departments may
withhold records on whether an individual is on a watch list.74 Consequently, a FOIA
inquiry is unlikely to shed any light on these areas.
In addition, a citizen or legal permanent resident may file a Privacy Act75
request with DHS and/or the Department of Justice to discern whether the TSA or
the FBI has records on them. However, the law enforcement exemption under the
Privacy Act may permit the departments to withhold such records. Under the Privacy
Act, a citizen or legal permanent resident may request an amendment of their record
if information in the record is inaccurate, untimely, irrelevant, or incomplete. Under
both FOIA and the Privacy Act, there are provisions for administrative and judicial
appeal. If a request is denied, the citizen or legal permanent resident is required to
exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing an action in U.S. District
Court to challenge the agency’s action.
Other Possible Legal Questions. The Administration has pledged that
terrorist screening information will be gathered and employed within constitutional
and other legal parameters. While the Privacy Act generally does not restrict
information-sharing related to known and suspected terrorists who are not U.S.
persons for the purposes of visa issuance and border inspections, it does restrict the
sharing of information on U.S. persons (citizens and legal permanent residents) for
purely intelligence purposes, who are not the subject of on-going foreign intelligence
or criminal investigations.76 Consequently, legal questions concerning the inclusion
of U.S. persons on various watch lists under criminal or national security predicates
may arise. In addition, questions of compensation for persons mistakenly damaged
by inclusion in these databases will likely be an issue.
Congressional Requirements. As noted earlier in the report, Congress
included provisions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(P.L. 108-458) that require the TSA Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security to
establish a timely and fair process for individuals identified as a threat as part of an
advanced airline passenger prescreening process required to be established under the
same Act. This process would compare passenger names against the “No Fly,”
“Automatic Selectee,” and consolidated terrorist screening database prior to the
735 U.S.C. §522.
745 U.S.C. §§522(b), (c), 522a(j).
755 U.S.C. §522a.
76Department of State, Testimony to the Joint Congressional Intelligence Committee, p. 5.

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aircraft’s departure. The provision requiring the establishment of this process also
requires that the databases used to “verify the identity of passengers” not result in a
large number of false positives.77 (See Appendix I.)
Also, in the FY2005 DHS Appropriations Act,78 Congress prohibited
spending any funding provided under that act, or any prior appropriations, for the
deployment or implementation, except on a test basis, of CAPPS II, Secure Flight,
or any follow on/successor system, until GAO reported that an appeals process (a
system of due process) had been established to allow air passengers either delayed
or prohibited from boarding a flight to challenge TSA determinations that they posed
a threat to civil aviation and correct false information about themselves.
Systems Integrity, Access, and Data Retention
Addressing database accuracy is likely to be an ongoing concern and directly
involves the TSC and potentially the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)79 as
well.80 In essence, at each of these layers in the terrorist information collection,
integration, and dissemination process, adequate quality assurance (QA) mechanisms
will be needed to assure data integrity and accuracy. TSA and the Secure Flight
system can, in large part, be viewed as an end user system or access portal to these
terrorist data. While TSA will need to provide QA to ensure it accurately pulls data
from these sources or pushes PNR data into these systems, QA of the TSDB and TSC
systems will largely be the responsibility of the FBI, as the Bureau administers the
TSC. Likewise, security and access controls and overarching policies regarding
system use and oversight of system operations will likely involve extensive
cooperation between the TSA and the FBI to establish appropriate data access
protocols, data encryption, secure data transmission capabilities, among other
subjects.
Data access and retention has been an ongoing concern regarding CAPPS II
implementation and may well become an even greater concern under the proposed
Secure Flight system since the TSA now proposes directly to receive and control the
PNR data. Secure data transmission between air carriers and reservation systems on
the one end, and the TSA on the other, is also likely to be an area of concern.
Systems Platform and Infrastructure
As discussed above, CAPPS currently runs on the computer reservation
systems used by U.S. air carriers. If the Secure Flight program is adopted, it will
77Section 4012(a) amends 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2) — with a new Subparagraph (C).
78P.L. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1319.
79Under E.O. 13354 and P.L. 108-458, the TTIC has been incorporated into the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Hence, it falls under the purview of the Director of
National Intelligence.
80For further information on the linkages and interactions between the TSC and TTIC, see
CRS Report RL32366, Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking Under Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 6, by William J. Krouse.

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likely require TSA to establish a secure system and telecommunications network to
take in the PNR data, process it at some central locale (or regional locales), and send
the processed results back to the passenger and baggage screening checkpoints.
TSA’s prior work on CAPPS II development may provide a framework for secure
data transfer, data access, and data retention. Nonetheless, costs and logistics for
providing secure interactions with these private computer reservation systems
containing PNR data may be a challenge in terms of policies and procedures as well
as technologies to ensure security and integrity of the data.
Registered Traveler Pilot Program81
TSA has also launched the Registered Traveler Pilot Program to improve and
streamline the screening process for pre-approved travelers. The program was
extended through FY2006.82 Program eligibility was initially limited to U.S. citizens,
U.S. nationals, or legal permanent residents who have been identified by TSA as
frequent fliers and invited to join the program. Program applicants undergo a
security assessment that includes analysis of criminal history and intelligence
databases. Approved program participants are positively identified at designated
home airports through biometric technology, and their security screening is expedited
through dedicated screening lanes. According to TSA, evaluations of the pilot
program being tested at five airports will determine the future of this program. Those
airports are Boston, Houston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Washington,
DC.
The TSA initially indicated that the Registered Traveler program would not
be integrated into the Secure Flight program.83 The Administration’s FY2006 DHS
budget request, however, included a proposal to create an Office of SCO that
suggests these programs will be integrated at some level.84 Also, in January 2005,
DHS expanded the pilot program to include certain European Union travelers
departing from Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam and arriving at John F. Kennedy
Airport in New York City. For international travelers (U.S. citizens, legal permanent
residents, or foreign visitors), this program will likely be integrated with CBP
screening processes, including US-VISIT for non-US citizens. An issue for Congress
will be the coordination between TSA and CBP, and possibly other agencies, in
integrating pilot programs to expedite screening with routine screening processes like
Secure Flight or US-VISIT.
81Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, What is
Registered Traveler? go to [http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Factsheet.pdf].
82Zack Phillips, “TSA Extends Registered Traveler Pilot Program Through September,” CQ
Homeland Security — Transportation & Infrastructure, Jan. 27, 2005.
83Justin Oberman, Director, Office of National Risk Assessment, Transportation Security
Administration, “Secure Flight: Screening for Terrorists on Passenger Planes,” presentation
given at the Heritage Foundation on Oct. 21, 2004, available at
[http://www.heritage.org/Press/Events/ev102104a.cfm].
84U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2006 Congressional Justification,
Office of SCO, (Washington, Feb. 2005), p. SCO-2.

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Prescreening in Other Transportation Modes
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-
458) includes a provision that would require the DHS to implement a process for
vetting the names of passengers and crew carried on cruise ships against the
consolidated terrorist watch list. Again Secure Flight or a similar system may
provide the capabilities to meet such a mandate. If a single system such as Secure
Flight is to be used to meet these requirements, a key system design issue will be
whether the system can handle the extensive and varied demands that will be placed
on it by the aviation and cruise ship industries, and whether it can provide
uninterrupted data access to meet these requirements. While not formally proposed,
some may also consider whether it would be beneficial to expand prescreening
practices into additional transportation modes such as passenger rail and intercity bus
operations.
Avoiding “Mission Creep”
While proposing to expand prescreening beyond commercial airline travel
may be viewed by some as a form of “mission creep” that could introduce significant
system design challenges to meet these varied objectives, it is fundamentally different
than the controversial “mission creep” that some critics of the CAPPS II development
have warned against.85 In the case of CAPPS II, there was significant concern that
proposals to use that system for other law enforcement purposes, such as comparing
names against available criminal information databases to evaluate the risk posed by
a passenger,86 would detract from the system’s principal objective of identifying
known or suspected terrorists that attempt to infiltrate the aviation system.87
These concerns focused on how doing so could overly burden the TSA and
significantly expand its role, and how widespread inaccuracies in these criminal
databases could create significant hassles for air travelers as well as for the TSA.
Another form of “mission creep” rebuffed by critics was the concept of data mining
commercially available information on a traveler to devise a tailored risk score for
that individual which could then be used to determine the level of screening or
scrutiny for that passenger.88 Both of these concepts have been abandoned in the
85American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Comments to Department of Homeland Security
on the ‘Passenger and Aviation Security Screening Records,’ Sept. 30, 2003, available at
[http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=13847&c=206].
86While the plan for CAPPS II was expanded to consider checking PNR data against
government-maintained criminal records, such as the NCIC database, the TSA has limited
the scope of the Secure Flight program to focus solely on comparing PNR data to available
data on suspected and known terrorists. According to the TSA, the system will not be used
for other law enforcement purposes such as checking passengers for outstanding law
enforcement “wants and warrants,” or other “hot files” resident on the NCIC.
87Deborah Charles, “Critics Say U.S. Airlines Screening Plan Intrusive,” Washington Post,
Aug. 25, 2003.
88Joan M. Feldman, “Mission Creep,” Air Transport World, May 2004, pp. 48-50.

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development of the Secure Flight program, and TSA has indicated that its sole focus
in Secure Flight is vetting passenger data against the consolidated watch list.89
Augmenting Prescreening with Behavioral-Based Evaluations
While the TSA has apparently abandoned integrating data mining and the use
of non-terrorism-related databases such as criminal history databases in the
architecture of Secure Flight, TSA is apparently still mulling concepts of how to
integrate behavioral-based evaluations into the passenger prescreening process.
Behavioral-based evaluations — examining factors such as ticket purchasing patterns
or flight activity — are a core concept of the existing CAPPS program run by the
airlines under their individual security programs. The TSA has indicated that it will
refine and integrate these behavioral evaluation methods in Secure Flight and will
also integrate a random selection process for additional screening, a recommended
practice to ameliorate terrorists from reverse-engineering the system to determine
what behavioral factors it considers.
It has also been reported that the TSA plans to train screeners to use
observational techniques to single out individuals for additional scrutiny based on
unusual or anxious behavior exhibited at screening checkpoints.90 Screeners will be
trained in the technique, known as Screening of Passengers by Observation
Techniques (or SPOT) which is based on an ongoing program called the Behavior
Assessment Screening System (or BASS) developed by the Massachusetts State
Police for use at Boston Logan International Airport. This program is not a part of
Secure Flight, but is being explored as an additional tool for assessing passenger risk
characteristics. While this program implements a technique based on behavioral-
based evaluations, it is likely that its implementation may become controversial and
could generate additional oversight including of how the technique is applied and
whether it differentially targets individuals from any particular racial, religious, or
ethnic group.
Fitting into the Larger Strategy
Finally, in adjusting the decision criteria in Secure Flight, it must be
remembered that the pre-screening step is just one element in a larger, multiple-layer
security strategy. All passengers will go through some inspection of their person and
luggage; the pre-screening step determines only which will be selected for more
intense scrutiny (and the relatively few who will be denied boarding altogether).
Thus, the cost of a Type II error — allowing a terrorist to board a passenger flight
undetected — depends critically on the performance of the other layers in the aviation
security system. If there is relatively high confidence that the screening process is
capable of detecting and preventing the carriage of dangerous items (weapons,
explosives, and other threat objects), and that in-flight security measures — such as
89U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Press Office, TSA To Test New Passenger Pre-
Screening System, Aug. 26, 2004.
90Sally B. Donnell, “Spotting the Airline Terror Threat,” Time (Online Edition), Oct. 2,
2004. [http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,708924,00.html].

CRS-23
air marshals, hardened cockpit doors, trained flight attendants and armed pilots —
are believed to be effective, then the potential cost of failing to detect a terrorist in
the prescreening process may be offset by these additional layers of security. If so,
then it may be reasonable to establish somewhat more lenient criteria for selecting
passengers for additional scrutiny, reducing the frequency and total cost of Type I
errors. Still, despite the layered strategy, it would be prudent to keep in mind that,
in the safety field, virtually all accidents in complex systems can be traced to multiple
failures in redundant layers of safety.91
Possible Issues for Congress
As described above, certain steps taken by the Administration regarding the
Secure Flight program, CBP prescreening of passengers on international flights, and
the consolidation of the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists in the consolidated
terrorist screening database, have raised issues for Congress. In addition, Congress
has included air passenger prescreening provisions in two recently enacted laws.
These actions may generate the following oversight issues for Congress:
! To what extent has the screening of domestic air passengers by TSA, and
international air passengers by CBP, been integrated with the operations of the
TSC? In other words, has TSA’s day-to-day administration of the “No Fly”
and “Automatic Selectee” lists been adequately integrated with the TSC’s
operations? How has this integration benefitted the day-to-day operations of
the TSA and the CBP?
! Have the terrorist name records on the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee”
lists been adequately improved by cross-referencing, and possibly expanding,
them with the records in the TSDB maintained by the FBI-administered TSC?
! If the TSA and CBP manage to negotiate the transfer of the final passenger
manifests and name records from domestic and international airlines in a
fashion that allows those agencies to complete a final TSDB check prior to
departure (wheels up), will the watch list screening under Secure Flight be
sufficient to meet the advanced airline passenger prescreening system required
by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004?
! In regard to shared jurisdictions, will it be possible to cleanly divide
responsibility for screening air passengers on both arriving and departing
domestic and international flights between TSA and CBP?
! How will the proposed creation of the SCO, at DHS’ Border and
Transportation Security Directorate, delineate the roles and responsibilities of
the office, TSA, and CBP with regard to passenger prescreening?
! How quickly can TSA develop and deploy an advanced air passenger
prescreening system that, among other things, will assume the day-to-day
administration of the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists from the
airlines?
! What agency will be responsible for setting out the data elements needed for
inclusion in the passenger name record to effectively screen known and
91James Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents (Burlington, Vermont:
Ashgate, 1997).

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suspected terrorists, as well as others who may credibly present a known threat
to civil aviation?
! Will such data elements be different for domestic flights as compared to
international flights?
! In regard to the administration of the “No Fly” list by TSA, will it be possible
for TSA to implement an appeals process that will provide adequate redress
and remedy to those persons mistakenly identified as a “threat to civil
aviation?” What impediments to redress exist? Multiple agencies?
Restricted access to information?
! Will the Registered Traveler pilot program be integrated into the TSA Secure
Flight program and the CBP international air passenger prescreening program?
Conclusion
In the current aviation security environment, some believe that a terrorist
attack involving a civilian aircraft remains a grave concern. The adequacy of current
security measures — including existing systems used to screen air passengers against
terrorist watch lists — has been questioned, most recently by the 9/11 Commission.
At the same time, considerable controversy surrounds existing air passenger
prescreening systems, such as the TSA’s “No Fly” list. Such controversy underscores
that screening air passengers for more intensive searches of their persons or baggage,
or to prevent them from boarding an aircraft in the event of a terrorist watch list hit,
is likely to be a very difficult proposition for the federal agencies tasked with
providing aviation security — namely the TSA, CBP, and the FBI-administered
Terrorist Screening Center.
Despite the controversial nature of air passenger prescreening, most would
agree that the federal government should prevent a person for whom there was
sufficient intelligence available to the U.S. government (through its intelligence and
law enforcement agencies) to consider them a suspected terrorist and a threat to civil
aviation from boarding a commercial aircraft. Consequently, policy makers and
system developers are tasked with designing a system that will be sufficiently
sensitive to detect known and suspected terrorists (based in large part on timely and
accurate intelligence) and specific enough not to misidentify others as terrorists. At
the same time, only an extremely small percentage of air passengers will actually be
terrorists. Hence, misidentifications (false positives) could be more frequent than
desired. Moreover, misidentified persons could be sorely inconvenienced or, worse,
possibly having their civil rights infringed upon. Such events could likely be highly
visible to the public and could undermine public confidence in these aviation security
measures.
If newly implemented screening systems should fail on either count — failing
to detect terrorists or producing an unacceptably large number of misidentifications
— public support for such aviation security systems may erode rapidly and severely
undermine the public standing of agencies tasked with administering such systems.
In other words, the tradeoff between the relatively low probability of encountering
and detecting terrorists and the high probability of frequent misidentifications poses
a persistent challenge to effectively implementing passenger prescreening.

CRS-25
In response to misidentifications based on the “No Fly” list, Congress has
recently required the Department of Homeland Security to develop an appeals
process for persons who are denied the ability to board a flight, because their names
or names similar to theirs, were on that list. To some extent, a viable and
comprehensive appeals process that provides redress and remedy to persons
misidentified as terrorists may be one way to compensate for an inevitable level of
misidentifications.

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Appendix A. Related Provisions Included in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (P.L. 108-458)
While the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L.
108-458) does not include provisions that directly address the Terrorist Screening
Center’s mission of establishing a consolidated Terrorist Screening Database, the act
includes several provisions that require the TSA to: (1) assume the airline passenger
prescreening function from U.S. air carriers after it establishes an advanced passenger
prescreening system for domestic flights that utilizes the watch lists integrated and
consolidated in the TSDB;92 (2) prescreen airport personnel against the TSDB prior
to allowing them access to secure/operational airport areas; (3) prescreen persons
seeking to lease or rent aircraft over 12,500 pounds (at the operator’s request); (4)
establish an appeals process by which persons who are identified as security threats
based on TSDB watch lists may challenge such determinations to TSA and, if
warranted, have such records modified to alleviate such occurrences in the future;
(5) prescreen passengers on international flights against the TSDB prior to departure;
(6) report to Congress on (a) the criteria used to place persons in the TSDB and (b)
the privacy and civil liberty implications of the further use of the “No Fly” and
“Automatic Selectee” lists; (7) prescreen foreign law enforcement officers against the
TSDB prior to providing them with air marshal training; and (8) prescreen maritime
vessel passengers.
Advanced Airline Passenger Prescreening System93
Section 4012(a) of P.L. 108-458 required the Transportation Security
Administration Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security to begin testing by January
1, 2005 an advanced airline passenger prescreening system that will allow DHS to
compare air passenger information against the “No Fly,” “Automatic Selectee,” and
TSDB. Within 180 days of the successful testing of this system, DHS is required to
assume the air passenger prescreening function from U.S. air carriers. The following
system requirements are set out:
! establish a procedure for airline passengers, who are delayed or prohibited
from boarding, because they were identified by the system as posing a security
threat, to appeal such determinations and, if warranted, have the system’s
records modified to alleviate future delays and inconveniences;
! ensure that federal government databases used by the system to verify the
identity of passengers will not result in large number of false positives;
! establish an internal oversight board to oversee and monitor the manner in
which the system is being implemented;
! establish sufficient operational safeguards to reduce opportunities for abuse;
! implement substantial system security measures to prevent unauthorized
access;
92The bill refers to the “consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list maintained by the
Federal Government,” which generally describes the TSDB maintained by the TSC.
93Section 4012(a) amends 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2) — with a new Subparagraph (C).

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! adopt policies for effective oversight of the use and operation of the system;
and
! ensure that there are no specific privacy concerns with the technological
architecture of the system.
In addition, the TSA Assistant Secretary is authorized to require air carriers,
and those providing booking services and systems to air carriers, to supply the
necessary passenger information to begin implementing this system within 180 days
of the completion of testing.
Prescreening of Airport Employees and Others94
Section 4012(a) requires the TSA Assistant Secretary, in coordination with
the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA Administrator, to screen all persons
allowed unescorted access to certain secure/operational areas of airports against the
consolidated TSDB prior to being granted such access. In addition, the law requires
that anyone seeking FAA certification (e.g., a pilot or mechanic’s license) also be
screened against the TSDB.
Chartered and Leased Aircraft Customer Prescreening95
Section 4012(a) requires the TSA Assistant Secretary to establish a process
by which operators of charter and leased aircraft may request that persons seeking to
lease or rent aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of greater than 12,500 pounds
be screened against the consolidated TSDB prior to being allowed access to such
aircraft. If such persons are identified as posing a security threat following screening,
then the operators are authorized to refuse service. In regard to such screening, the
operating requirements set out for the airline passenger screening system (listed
above) are applicable.
Also, under this provision, the Secretary for Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Terrorist Screening Center, is required to develop guidelines
and procedures for the collection, removal, and updating of data maintained in the
“No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists.
Appeal Procedures96
Section 4012(a) requires the TSA Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security
to establish a timely and fair process for individuals identified as a threat under
provisions described above — regarding airline passengers, airport access, or
chartered and leased aircraft customers — to appeal such determinations and correct
any erroneous information in those records (if warranted). The TSA Assistant
Secretary is required further to maintain records on misidentified and delayed
94Section 4012(a) amends 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2) — with a new Subparagraph (D).
95Section 4012(a) amends 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2) — with a new Sbparagraph (E).
96Section 4012(a) amends 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2) — with a new Subparagraph (G).

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persons, so that such records include corrected/updated information as well as
information to authenticate their identity.
International Passenger Prescreening97
Section 4012(a) requires the Secretary for Homeland Security to issue
proposed regulations that will allow the DHS to attain passenger information for all
international flights and compare it to the consolidated TSDB prior to the flight’s
departure. It also requires that the Secretary establish a “timely and fair” process by
which persons identified as a security threat based on information contained in the
TSDB watch lists be allowed to appeal such determinations to DHS and to correct
any erroneous information. As under the TSA advanced airline passenger
prescreening system (for domestic flights), the Secretary for Homeland Security is
required to maintain records on misidentified and delayed persons, so that such
records include corrected information as well as information to authenticate their
identity. For international flights, it is likely that CBP, in coordination with the TSC,
would maintain such records as part of their responsibilities to screen international
flights.
Report on Effects on Privacy and Civil Liberties
Section 4012(b) of P.L. 108-458 requires the Security Privacy Officer of the
DHS to submit, within 180 days of enactment (June 15, 2005), a report assessing the
impact of the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists on privacy and civil liberties
to the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Governmental Affairs and
Homeland Security, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
in the Senate; and to the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Government
Reform, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Committee on
Homeland Security in the House of Representatives. It also requires that this report
include recommendations to eliminate or minimize the adverse effects these watch
lists may have on privacy, due process, and civil liberties, as well as on the possible
application of these lists to other modes of transportation. Furthermore, it requires
that the report include analysis on the extent to which the use of these lists may
increase the ability of the Unites States to protect itself from terrorist attacks.
Report on Criteria for Inclusion in the Consolidated TSDB
Section 4012(c) of P.L. 108-458 requires the National Intelligence Director,
in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and
the Attorney General to report to Congress within a 180 days of enactment (June 15,
2005) on the criteria for placing individuals in the integrated and consolidated TSDB
watch lists maintained by the TSC, including minimum standards for reliability and
accuracy of identifying information, the threat levels posed by listed persons, and the
appropriate responses if listed persons are encountered.
97Section 4012(a) amends 49 U.S.C. 44909(c) — with a new Paragraph (6).

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Foreign Air Marshal Trainees Prescreening
Section 4018 requires that foreign law enforcement officers be screened
against the TSDB before receiving air marshal training from DHS.
Maritime Vessel Passenger Prescreening
Section 4071 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, within 180 days
of enactment (June 15, 2005), to implement a procedure by which passengers and
crew members on cruise ships embarking or disembarking passengers at U.S. ports
of entry would be (1) compared with the TSDB to prevent known or suspected
terrorists from boarding such vessels, and (2) selected for additional security
screening through the use of “no transport” and “automatic selectee” lists. For
passengers embarking at foreign ports of entry, this provision provides a waiver for
the use of “no transport” and “automatic selectee” lists if the Secretary deems that use
of such lists is impracticable. It would also authorize the Secretary to require the
necessary information from cruise ship operators in order to comply with the above
requirement.
Furthermore, this provision would require the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the FBI Director, to design guidelines, policies, and
procedures regarding the maintenance of the watch list database to ensure accuracy
and integrity. Section 4071 would also require the Secretary of Homeland Security
to establish a simple and timely method for correcting erroneous entries and adding
clarifying information to minimize or eliminate false hits and misidentifications.

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Appendix B. Frequently Used Abbreviations
To aid the reader, the following list of abbreviations is provided.
APIS
Advanced Passenger Information System
CAPS
Computer-Assisted Aviation Prescreening System
CAPPS
Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
CBP
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DOJ
Department of Justice
DOS
Department of State
FAA
Federal Aviation Administration
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOIA
Freedom of Information Act
HSPD-11
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11
IBIS
Interagency Border Inspection System
NCTC
National Counterterrorism Center
NCIC
National Crime Information Center
NTC
National Targeting Center
PNR
Passenger Name Record
SCO
Office of Screening Coordination and Operations
TSA
Transportation Security Administration
TSC
Terrorist Screening Center
TSDB
Terrorist Screening Database
TTIC
Terrorism Threat Integration Center
U.S.-VISIT
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program