Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the Executive Branch: Issues in the 109th Congress

Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the Executive Branch: Issues in the 109th Congress

Order Code RL32752
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the Executive
Branch: Issues in the 109th Congress
January 31, 2005
R. Eric Petersen
Analyst in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the Executive
Branch: Issues in the 109th Congress
Summary
Spurred in part by occasional warnings of potential terrorist threats in the post-
9/11 era, some policymakers have intensified their focus on continuity of operations
(COOP) issues. COOP planning is a segment of federal government contingency
planning linked to continuity of government (COG). Together, COOP and COG are
designed to ensure survival of a constitutional form of government and the continuity
of essential federal functions. This report focuses primarily on executive branch
COOP activities.
Broadly, COOP planning refers to the internal effort of an organization, such as
a branch of government, department, or office, to assure that the capability exists to
continue essential operations in response to a comprehensive array of potential
operational interruptions. In the executive branch, COOP planning is regarded as a
“good business practice,” and part of the fundamental mission of agencies as
responsible and reliable public institutions.
In the 109th Congress, policy questions and issues might arise as Congress
examines the status of COOP planning within the executive branch of the federal
government and the implications of that planning for overall agency emergency
preparedness. Some of the issues surrounding COOP planning are discussed in this
report, including authority to activate and implement COOP plans; defining essential
activities to be maintained by a COOP plan; budgeting for COOP activities;
congressional committee jurisdiction; and attention to COOP and preparedness
matters.
This report is one of several CRS products related to government contingency
planning, and will be updated as events warrant. Further discussion of executive
branch COOP activities is provided in CRS Report RL31857, Continuity of
Operations (COOP) in the Executive Branch: An Overview, by R. Eric Petersen.
COOP planning in Congress is addressed in CRS Report RL31594, Congressional
Continuity of Operations (COOP): An Overview of Concepts and Challenges , by R.
Eric Petersen and Jeffrey W. Seifert. Contingency planning in the federal judiciary
is discussed in CRS Report RL31978, Emergency Preparedness and Continuity of
Operations (COOP) Planning in the Federal Judiciary, by R. Eric Petersen. CRS
Report RL31739, Federal Agency Emergency Preparedness and Dismissal of
Employees, by L. Elaine Halchin, discusses pre-COOP activities relating to the
safeguarding of federal personnel and evacuation of federal buildings. For a more
comprehensive analysis of continuity of government (COG), see CRS Report
RS21089, Continuity of Government: Current Federal Arrangements and the Future,
by Harold C. Relyea.

Contents
COOP Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Executive Directives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
E.O. 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness
Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
PDD 67, Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity
of Government Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
E.O. 13286, Amendment of Executive Orders, and Other Actions,
in Connection With the Transfer of Certain Functions to
the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
FEMA Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Federal Preparedness Circular 65, Federal Executive Branch
Continuity of Operations (COOP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Issues of Possible Concern for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Essential COOP Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Level of Essential Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
National Essential Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Priority Mission Essential Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Secondary Mission Essential Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Defining Essential Functions of Executive Branch Departments and
Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Executive Branch COOP Budgeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Level of COOP Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Congressional Committee Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Issue Immediacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Related CRS Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Continuity of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Continuity of Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Background Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Acronym Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Continuity of Operations (COOP)
in the Executive Branch: Issues in
the 109th Congress
Spurred in part by occasional warnings of potential terrorist threats in the post-
9/11 era, some policymakers have intensified their focus on continuity of operations
(COOP) issues. COOP planning is a segment of federal government contingency
planning linked to continuity of government (COG). Together, COOP and COG are
designed to ensure survival of a constitutional form of government and the continuity
of essential federal functions. In the executive branch, COG planning efforts focus
on preserving the line of presidential succession, by safeguarding officials who would
succeed the President. This report does not discuss COG planning beyond any direct
relationship to COOP planning.1
Continuity of operations (COOP) planning refers to the internal effort of an
organization, such as a branch of government, department, or office, to assure that
the capability exists to continue essential operations in response to a comprehensive
array of potential operational interruptions.2 In the executive branch, COOP planning
is regarded as a “good business practice,” and part of the fundamental mission of
agencies as responsible and reliable public institutions. Continuity planning
professionals assert that the perception of a changing threat environment and the
potential for no-notice emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents,
technological emergencies, and military or terrorist attack-related incidents, have
increased the need for COOP capabilities and plans that enable agencies to continue
their essential functions across a broad range of potential emergencies. COOP
planning is multi-disciplinary in nature, because it attempts to incorporate all facets
of organizational operation. Professionals in emergency management, information
technology, physical security, human resources, facility management and other
specialities could contribute to COOP planning, or lead recovery efforts during an
incident.
In the executive branch, COOP planning has continued to evolve following the
2001 terrorist attacks, subsequent biological weapon incidents, and occasional
warnings of potential man made or natural threats. In the 109th Congress, policy
1 For a more comprehensive discussion of COG, see CRS Report RS21089, Continuity of
Government: Current Federal Arrangements and the Future, by Harold C. Relyea.
2 For an overview of executive branch COOP activities, see CRS Report RL31857,
Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the Executive Branch: An Overview, by R. Eric
Petersen. Congressional COOP planning is discussed in CRS Report RL31594,
Congressional Continuity of Operations (COOP): An Overview of Concepts and
Challenges, by R. Eric Petersen and Jeffrey W. Seifert. For an overview of COOP issues
related to the federal judiciary see CRS Report RL31978, Emergency Preparedness and
Continuity of Operations (COOP) Planning in the Federal Judiciary, by R. Eric Petersen.

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questions and issues might arise as Congress examines the status of COOP planning
within the executive branch of the federal government and the implications of that
planning for overall agency emergency preparedness. Some of the issues regarding
COOP planning include
! considering authority to activate and implement COOP plans;
! defining essential activities to be maintained by a COOP plan;
! budgeting for COOP activities;
! congressional committee jurisdiction; and
! attention to COOP and preparedness matters.
COOP Authorities
Three presidential documents currently govern contingency planning activity.
The oldest of these, Executive Order (E.O.) 12656, issued in 1988 remains valid,
although it arose from the context of the Cold War. The more recent Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) 67 and Executive Order 13286 were prepared in 1998 and
2003, respectively, within the context of terrorism. Lending further detail to COOP
planning is Federal Preparedness Circular (FPC) 65, issued by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) in 2004.3
Executive Directives
Three executive branch entities appear to oversee COOP planning. Under E.O.
12656, the National Security Council (NSC) oversees consideration of national
security emergency preparedness policy. The Homeland Security Council (HSC)
which was created by executive order4 in the immediate aftermath of the September
11, 2001 attacks, and established as a statutory entity of the Executive Office of the
President (EOP) in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.5 The President, the Vice
President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Secretary
of Defense, and such other individuals as designated by the President comprise the
membership of HSC. The council’s statutory mandate includes the oversight and
3 A more detailed discussion of the requirements of E.O. 12656, PDD 67, and E.O. 13286
is available in CRS Report RL31857, Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the Executive
Branch: An Overview, by Harold C. Relyea.
4 E.O. 13228, October 8, 2001, 66 FR 51812-51817.
5 P.L. 107-296, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2135. A brief discussion of the of HSC prior to
enactment of the Homeland Security Act is available in CRS Report RL31357, Federal
Interagency Coordinative Mechanisms: Varied Types and Numerous Devices, by Frederick
M. Kaiser.

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review of the homeland security policies of the federal government.6 E.O. 12656
mandates the Director of FEMA to “serve as an advisor to the National Security
Council on issues of national security emergency preparedness, including ...
continuity of government, technological disasters, and other issues, as appropriate.”
While it is not a directive issued by the President, Federal Preparedness Circular 65
identifies Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 67 as the authority establishing
FEMA as the lead agency for executive branch COOP activities.
E.O. 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness
Responsibilities. E.O. 12656 was issued by President Ronald Reagan on
November 23, 1988.7 It assigns national security emergency preparedness
responsibilities to federal departments and agencies, subject to policy established by
the President. E.O.12656 defines a national security emergency as “any occurrence,
including natural disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other
emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the
United States.”8 Although the order does not explicitly refer to continuity of
operations, it specifies preparedness functions and activities to include the
development of policies, plans, procedures, and readiness measures that enhance the
ability of the federal government to mobilize for, respond to, and recover from a
national security emergency. E.O. 12656 designates the NSC as the principal forum
for consideration of national security emergency preparedness policy. The order
requires the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to
“serve as an advisor to the National Security Council on issues of national security
emergency preparedness, including mobilization preparedness, civil defense,
continuity of government, technological disasters, and other issues, as appropriate.”
FEMA is also required to assist in the implementation of preparedness policies by
coordinating with the other federal departments and agencies and with state and local
governments.
PDD 67, Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of
Government Operations. PDD 67 was issued by the Clinton Administration on
October 21, 1998, and is classified by the National Security Council (NSC). An
unclassified fact sheet on the directive, prepared by Homeland Security Council
(HSC) staff,9 describes contingency planning efforts as “a top national security
6 6 U.S.C. 494.
7 53 FR 47491; Nov. 23, 1998.
8 While the order defines “national security emergency” broadly, subsequent language
excludes “those natural disasters, technological emergencies, or other emergencies, the
alleviation of which is normally the responsibility of individuals, the private sector,
volunteer organizations, State and local governments, and Federal departments and agencies
unless such situations also constitute a national security emergency.”
9 “Unclassified Provisions of PDD-67 (Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity
of Government Operations),” Homeland Security Council fact sheet, undated. No widely
available official summary or other information about PDD 67 has been released. Some
information regarding the directive may obtained from the Federation of American
Scientists (FAS) Intelligence Resources Program, which provides declassified materials and
summaries of some current national security documents through the Internet. The FAS
(continued...)

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priority ... to ensure all three branches of government, individually and collectively,
continues (sic) to preserve the capability to govern; to continue leadership; to
perform essential functions and services required to meet essential defense and
civilian needs; and, if necessary, to reconstitute themselves against the entire range
of evolving post-Cold War threats.”
The PDD 67 fact sheet describes a program designed to ensure survival of
constitutional government and continuity of essential federal functions, centered
around three policy concepts: enduring constitutional government (ECG), continuity
of government (COG), and COOP. ECG is described as “a cooperative effort among
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, coordinated by the
President, to preserve the capability to execute constitutional responsibilities in a
catastrophic emergency.” The fact sheet describes COG as “a coordinated effort
within each branch to ensure the capability to continue its minimum essential
responsibilities in a catastrophic emergency,” to relocate essential personnel and
functions to alternate work sites, and to reasonably sustain the performance of
minimum essential functions at the alternate work site until normal operations can
be resumed.” The PDD 67 fact sheet indicates that COG is dependent on effective
COOP plans and capabilities. COOP is described in fact sheet as “an internal effort
within individual components of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government to assure the capability exists to continue” operations in response to “a
wide range of potential emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents,
and technological and/or attack-related emergencies.
The PDD 67 fact sheet notes that all executive branch departments and agencies,
including those within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), are to establish
a viable COOP capability. Such a capability would provide a continuity program
that, “ensures the emergency delegation of authority (where permissible, and in
accordance with applicable law); the safekeeping of vital resources, facilities and
records; the improvisation or emergency acquisition of the resources necessary for
business resumption; and the capability to perform work at alternate work sites until
normal operations can be resumed.”
E.O. 13286, Amendment of Executive Orders, and Other Actions, in
Connection With the Transfer of Certain Functions to the Secretary of
Homeland Security. E.O. 13286 was issued by President George W. Bush on
February 28, 2003.10 The order specifies the transfer of authorities to the Secretary
of Homeland Security in a variety of policy areas, including those preparedness
responsibilities assigned to the director of FEMA in E.O. 12656.
9 (...continued)
summary for PDD 67 is available at [http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-67.htm],
visited Feb. 1, 2005.
10 68 FR 10619, Mar. 5, 2003.

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FEMA Guidance
Federal Preparedness Circular 65, Federal Executive Branch
Continuity of Operations (COOP). Federal Preparedness Circular (FPC) 65,
issued by FEMA on June 15, 2004, identifies PDD-67 as the authority establishing
FEMA as the “as the lead agency for federal executive branch COOP.”11 According
to the circular, this authority was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) on March 1, 2003, and then delegated to the Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate (FEMA). FEMA’s Office of National Security Coordination
(ONSC) has been designated as the department’s lead agent for the executive branch
COOP program. FPC 65 describes FEMA’s responsibilities to include formulating
guidance and establishing common standards for executive branch agencies to use
in developing viable, executable COOP plans; facilitating interagency coordination;
and overseeing and assessing the status of COOP capabilities in executive branch
agencies. The circular notes that each executive branch agency is responsible for
appointing a senior federal government executive as an emergency coordinator to
serve as the program manager and agency point of contact for coordinating agency
COOP activities, which include planning, programming, and budgeting for a viable
and executable COOP program that conforms to FEMA guidance. The circular does
not appear to carry authority for FEMA to compel action by other executive branch
agencies.
Issues of Possible Concern for Congress
The authorities governing executive COOP planning raise several issues that
might be examined by Congress. These include the capacity of existing executive
authorities to effectively govern COOP planning and the implementation of such
plans.
Authorities governing COOP activities, E.O. 12656, PDD 67 and E.O. 13286
have been issued by three different presidential administrations. Some observers
suggested that each policy directive was issued at different times in response to
disparate threat conditions. For example, E.O. 12656 is a continuation of Cold War-
era contingency policies that assume a nuclear confrontation with a single state, the
former Soviet Union. A continuity planning assumption from this era is the potential
for a decapitating strike on the national leadership, including the President, cabinet,
and congressional leaders.
By contrast, observers note that, when PDD 67 and E.O. 13286 were issued, the
threat environment was evolving from a single state model to one characterized by
the advent of threat from hostile states and loose organizations of non-state actors
with the capacity to launch small scale attacks using non-traditional weapons. Such
attacks may not disrupt senior leadership in its entirety, but have the potential to
impair the operations of key government functions and programs. The PDD 67 fact
11 Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of
National Security Coordination, Federal Preparedness Circular 65, “Federal Executive
Branch Continuity of Operations (COOP),” June 15, 2004, available at
[http://www.fema.gov/onsc/docs/fpc_65.pdf], visited Feb. 1, 2005.

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sheet, as well as guidance issued by FEMA in Federal Preparedness Circular 65,
recognize the enhanced threat of potential attack by hostile states or terrorists, as well
as hazards occasioned by potential natural and technological disasters. A document
that defines the potential threat environment, and that legally compels executive
agencies to prepare plans to withstand such incursions, however, is not evident.
Moreover, it is not clear from publicly available documents what legal authority
exists to implement COOP plans. E.O. 13286 is silent on the matter; section 102 (b)
of E.O. 12656 notes explicitly that the order does not authorize the implementation
of COOP plans, and that any such plans “may be executed only in the event that ...
such execution is authorized in law.”12 The PDD 67 fact sheet notes that “with
warning, the National Security Council process shall be used to reach deliberate
decisions regarding the alerting or activation of government-wide COOP and COG
plans and capabilities.” The fact sheet does not, however, identify the legal authority
under which such a process could be initiated, or by which COOP plans could be
activated.
Observers of presidential powers and authorities suggest that such an
authorization could be found in broad national emergency powers that have been
exercised by the President in times of crisis.. Typically, national emergency powers
have been invoked in response to threats of the loss of life, property, or public
order.13 Following the attacks on Washington and New York on September 11, 2001,
federal government COG and COOP plans were reportedly activated.14 It does not
appear, however, that declarations of emergency pursuant to the National
Emergencies Act15 would necessarily actuate statutory provisions granting the
President the authority to activate COOP plans in response to threats or attack against
government, or detailing the ability of the executive branch to carry out its statutory
missions and programs.16
Finally, experts in public administration and management might suggest that the
attenuated stream of authorities governing executive branch COOP planning could
lead to confusion regarding which agencies of the executive branch oversee planning
activities. E.O. 13286 requires that the Director of FEMA and the heads of
departments and agencies must ensure that their preparedness plans and activities are
“consistent with current presidential guidelines and policies.” Under E.O. 12656, the
NSC was responsible for establishing guidelines and policies. Following the creation
of the Homeland Security Council, it appears that, while the NSC retains broad
national security responsibilities, including those related to COOP, as specified in
12 53 FR 47492.
13 See Harold C. Relyea, “Emergency Powers,” in Katy J. Harriger, ed., Separation of
Powers: Documents and Commentary (Washington: CQ Press, 2003), pp. 80-97.
14 “The Armageddon Plan,” Nightline, ABC News, originally broadcast Apr. 7, 2004,
transcript retrieved through nexis.com.
15 50 U.S.C. 1601-1651.
16 A list of declared national emergencies invoked under the National Emergencies Act is
available in CRS Report 98-505, National Emergency Powers, by Harold C. Relyea.

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PDD 67,17 executive branch COOP activities now are overseen primarily by the HSC.
Notably, guidelines related to essential COOP functions, described below, have
recently been approved by Homeland Security Council staff. The council has
communicated those guidelines directly to executive departments and agencies,18 and
through FEMA. No publicly identifiable document explicitly vesting the council
with such authority over COOP planing has been identified.
The sensitive nature of government contingency planning likely precludes a
public discussion of the criteria for implementing COOP plans. Enactment of
statutory authority to establish an entity to oversee and implement such plans,
however, might address concerns regarding the apparent lack of clear authority to
activate such plans. Any such authority would likely vest the lead executive branch
entity with overall programmatic responsibility. Further, any such authority would
likely be carried out in a timely manner appropriate to the threat environment.
Finally, implementing authority could be publicly available through access to an
executive order or statute. Congress might opt to consider legislative options to
establish clear authorities for the formulation, management, and implementation of
executive branch COOP planning.
Essential COOP Functions
COOP planners suggest that identification and prioritization of essential
functions is a prerequisite for COOP because such an effort establishes the planning
parameters that drive an agency’s efforts in all other planning and preparedness areas.
Essential functions are those that the executive branch agencies must be able to
perform without significant interruption. Homeland Security Council guidance
mandates the development of procedures that must be in place to enable each
function to be performed regardless of the disruption that is occurring or has
occurred.19 If COOP plans are activated, continuous performance of essential
functions should enable agencies to provide vital services, exercise civil authority,
maintain the safety and well being of the general populace, and sustain the industrial
economic base of the nation in an emergency.
Level of Essential Functions
Executive branch COOP planners identify three levels of essential government
functions that are subject to continuity planning: national essential functions (NEF),
priority mission essential functions (PMEF), and secondary mission essential
functions (SMEF). In the event of an emergency that necessitated the activation of
17 For example, the National Security council is the classifying authority for PDD 67.
18 Frances Fragos Townsend, “Continuity Policy/Department and Agency Essential
Functions,” memorandum for distribution from the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security, Jan. 10, 2005.
19 Homeland Security Council, “Background Paper on Essential Functions Concept and
Implementation and Recommended Guidelines for Submitting Department/Agency Priority
Mission Essential Functions Information,” Jan. 10, 2005.

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COOP or COG plans, national essential functions would be the primary concern of
the President and the national leadership. Priority mission essential functions would
comprise those department and agency activities that directly support national
essential functions. Secondary mission essential functions responsibilities lie in
departments and agencies. Depending on the nature and duration of the event, some
secondary functions would generally support agency primary mission essential
functions, while others could support some national essential functions.
National Essential Functions. The Homeland Security Council defines
national essential functions as those necessary to lead and sustain the country during
an emergency, and that must be supported through department and agency continuity
capabilities. These functions are expected to be the primary focus of the President
and the national leadership during and following an emergency. National essential
functions might be performed by one or more department or agency, and are not new
authorities, requirements, or functions, but those that are routinely carried out during
normal operating conditions. The Homeland Security Council identifies eight
national essential functions that must be supported throughout an operational
interruption.20 These include the capacity to
! preserve the constitutional form of government. Department and
agency functions should include activities that respect and
implement checks and balances among the three branches of the
federal government. An example is the preservation of essential
communications between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government during an incident.
! provide leadership visible to the nation and the world, and to
maintain the trust and confidence of the American people.
Executive branch departments and agencies are expected to
demonstrate that the federal government is viable, functioning, and
effectively addressing the emergency. Activities in support of this
function could include communicating with the American people
and providing information to state and local governments, or
communicating with foreign leaders.
! defend the country against all enemies, foreign or domestic, and
to prevent or interdict future attacks. In addition to the protection
and defense of the worldwide interests of the United States against
foreign or domestic enemies, departments and agencies are to honor
security agreements and treaties with allies, and maintain military
readiness and preparedness in furtherance of national interests and
objectives.
! maintain and foster effective relationships with foreign nations.
Departments and agencies are responsible for ensuring the ability of
the federal government to communicate and interact with foreign
20 National essential functions definitions and examples are based on Homeland Security
Council, “Background Paper on Essential Functions Concept and Implementation.”

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governments; share intelligence and identify threats in cooperation
with foreign governments; and bring to justice perpetrators of crimes
or attacks against the United States, its citizens or interests.
Examples identified by the Homeland Security Council include
maintaining the security of the nation’s borders against unlawful or
hostile entry; ensuring the safety of commercial transportation; and
conducting law enforcement investigations of federal crimes.
! provide rapid and effective response to and recovery from the
domestic consequences of an attack or other incident. In the
event of an incident, departments and agencies are to implement
response and recovery plans, including, but not limited to, the
National Response Plan (NRP).21 Agency actions could include the
collection and dissemination of incident and threat related
information, or the provision of medical care to populations affected
by the attack or incident.
! protect and stabilize the nation’s economy, and to ensure
confidence in financial systems. It is essential that department and
agency functions minimize the economic consequences of an attack
or other incident both nationally or internationally. Relevant
executive branch department or agency activities could include
coordinating the re-opening of financial markets, or facilitating the
movement of goods and services across borders to support economic
activity.
! provide for critical federal government services that address the
health, safety, and welfare needs of the nation.22 The activities of
departments and agencies must ensure that the critical national needs
of the nation are met during an emergency. Examples could include
maintenance of the safety and efficiency of the nation’s food supply,
air traffic continuance, or the provision of timely and accurate severe
storm warning information to the public.
Priority Mission Essential Functions
Unlike the national essential functions, priority mission essential functions are
to be identified by departments and agencies respectively. The guidance provided by
the Homeland Security Council directs that primary mission essential functions must
be performed to support or implement national essential functions before, during, and
21 According to the Department of Homeland Secuirty, The National Response Plan
(mandated by 6 U.S.C. 312 (6)) establishes a comprehensive all-hazards approach to
enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents. The National
R e s p o n s e P l a n i s a va i l a b l e f r o m t h e d e p a r t me n t ’ s w e b s i t e a t
[http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0566.xml], visited Feb. 1, 2005.
22 HSC guidance notes that “this NEF is strictly limited to critical functions of the federal
government with a national level consequence; it not does apply to general well-being and
welfare of the nation.”

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in the immediate aftermath of an emergency. Generally, these functions are to be
uninterrupted, or resumed, during the first 24-48 hours after the occurrence of an
emergency and continued through full resumption of all government activities.23
Each executive branch department and agency is responsible for identifying its
priority mission essential functions based on the eight national functions; describing
those functions succinctly; determining the associated national essential functions for
each; establishing a minimum time period for performing the function during an
emergency; and identifying other departments and agencies upon which they depend
in order to perform their functions.
Secondary Mission Essential Functions
Those activities that a department or agency determines must be performed in
order to bring about full resumption of its normal functions, but that are not primary
mission essential functions, are defined as secondary mission essential functions.
According to Homeland Security Council guidelines, resumption of secondary
functions “may need to occur within a very short period of time or only after several
days, depending on the nature of the agency mission and the nature of the disruption
to normal agency functions.” As with priority mission essential functions, secondary
mission essential functions are identified by each executive branch department or
agency. They are to be used within their respective organizations for continuity and
related planning. Agency-identified secondary functions will not be collected,
reviewed, or approved at the national level.24
Defining Essential Functions of Executive
Branch Departments and Agencies
In Federal Preparedness Circular 65, FEMA states that the “identification and
prioritization of essential functions is a prerequisite for COOP because it establishes
the planning parameters that drive the agency’s efforts in all other planning and
preparedness areas.”25 The Homeland Security Council has provided guidance on
identifying sources of executive branch department and agency-essential functions,
and has provided several examples of resources that agencies might use to identify
their primary- and secondary-mission essential functions.26 These include the
following:
23 Primary mission essential function definitions and examples are based on Homeland
Security Council, “Background Paper on Essential Functions Concept and Implementation.”
24 Ibid.
25 Department of Homeland Security, Federal Preparedness Circular 65, “Federal Executive
Branch Continuity of Operations (COOP),” p. 5.
26 Homeland Security Council, “Background Paper on Essential Functions Concept and
Implementation,” unnumbered. Also, examples of potential primary and secondary mission
essential functions are found in materials provided in the Essential Functions Workshop,
presented by the Homeland Security Council, FEMA, and Interagency COOP Working
Group staff, Jan. 12, 2005.

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! agency strategic plans that directly support national essential
functions;
! lines of business27 as defined in the business reference model
materials agencies submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) in conjunction with its federal enterprise architecture
planning program;28
! submissions provided to various authorities under the Government
Performance Results Act (GPRA);29
! critical infrastructure protection plans prepared pursuant to
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7;30
! presidential decision directives, executive orders, particularly E.O.
12656; and
! legislation.31
Several observers suggest that in addition to these resources agency-essential
functions could derive from statutory language that establish agencies and define or
modify programs and functions carried out by the agencies, or committee or
conference report language accompanying annual legislation appropriating agency
funds.32 Congress could ultimately act to consider legislative options intended to
27 OMB uses the term “lines of business” to refer to the activities carried out by a
department or agency. External lines of business describe the services and products the
government provides to its customers and stakeholders, while internal lines of business
describe the inter-and intra-agency administrative and support activities that enable the
government to operate.
28 Generally, enterprise architecture refers to a blueprint of the business functions of an
organization and the technology needed to support them. According to its website, the OMB
“is developing the Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA)” as “a business-based framework
for Government-wide improvement” [http://www.feapmo.gov/fea.asp]. The business
reference model is the first component of FEA. “OMB Releases New Business Reference
Model to Improve Agency Management,” July 24, 2002 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
pubpress/2002-50.pdf]. Both sites visited Feb. 1, 2005.
29 P.L. 103-62; 107 Stat. 285.
30 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification,
Prioritization, and Protection, Dec. 17, 2003, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/12/20031217-5.html], visited Feb. 1, 2005.
31 Resources for identifying agency mission essential functions are based on materials
provided in the Essential Functions Workshop, Jan. 12, 2005.
32 See Martha Derthick, Policymaking for Social Security (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1979); I. M. Destler, “Delegating Trade Policy,” in Paul E. Peterson, ed., The
President, The Congress and the Making of Foreign Policy (Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1994), pp. 228-246; and CRS Report 98-558, Appropriations Bills: What
is Report Language?, by Sandy Streeter.

CRS-12
establish clearer understandings of the essential functions of executive branch
departments and agencies related to COOP planning.
Executive Branch COOP Budgeting
The current budgetary environment is characterized by limited resources,
coupled with an increased demand for a variety of homeland security protective
measures, including executive branch COOP planning. Homeland Security Council
and FEMA staff have suggested that, as a consequence of the multi-disciplinary
nature of COOP planning, executive branch agency expenditures for COOP activities
are sometimes spread across several departmental or agency accounts, and data are
not readily available to demonstrate agency COOP funding levels.
On August 6, 2004, OMB issued a budget data request33 that requires executive
branch departments and agencies to submit a summary table for COOP programs that
includes the department or agency name, account title and number, activity, and
budget authority for the enacted and request levels, as appropriate. In addition,
departments and agencies are required to submit a narrative background summary of
their COOP plan and activities as well as an explanation of how the plan, and
resources committed to it, adequately support established COOP standards. OMB
has announced that it will review agency COOP program budget submissions as part
of the FY2006 budget process, in conjunction with the Homeland Security Council.34
A potential consequence of this data gathering is that Congress might consider
specific COOP program expenditures in the FY2006 authorization and appropriations
cycles. Relatedly, Congress might request the Congressional Budget Office to
prepare and analyze data similar to that specified in the budget data request.
A possible effect of the acquisition of technology, infrastructure, and supplies
to be held in reserve for use in an emergency, is the likelihood that such an allocation
might reduce resources available for routine operations. To the extent that COOP
facilities and infrastructure are integrated into daily agency operations, this matter
might be less salient. Access to specific COOP program expenditure data might
provide Congress with tools to determine the utility of executive branch COOP
programs and their integration into routine agency activities.
33 Generally, OMB uses budget data requests to identify budgetary and management
information related to the programs and functions for which departments and agencies are
responsible. According to OMB, the Aug. 6, 2004 budget data request will support review
of executive branch homeland security and overseas combating terrorism funding, and will
be used in developing the President’s FY2006 Budget. The timing of the data submissions
was to be determined in consultation between the departments and agencies and their OMB
representatives.
34 Office of Management and Budget, “Homeland Security (HS)/Overseas Combating
Terrorism (OCT.) Funding Estimates, including Agency Continuity of Operations Program
(COOP) Activities,” Budget Data Request No. 04-41, Aug. 6, 2004.

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Level of COOP Preparedness
A report issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO; formerly
named the General Accounting Office) in February 2004 found that some agencies
had created COOP plans that did not include all of the elements of a viable plan as
defined by previous versions of Federal Preparedness Circular 65.35 Consequently,
GAO concluded that agency efforts to provide services during an emergency could
be impaired. Additionally, GAO found that FEMA did not
! provide specific criteria through FPC 65 for identifying essential
functions, or address interdependencies between agencies;
! review the essential functions identified in its assessments of COOP
planning, or follow up with agencies to determine whether they
addressed previously identified weaknesses; or
! conduct tests or exercises that could confirm that the identified
essential functions were correct.
During the 108th Congress, the House Committee on Government Reform held
an oversight hearing on the GAO report.36 In response to questions from Members,
a GAO representative suggested that the plans departments and agencies had in place
at the time of the study were not fully compliant with the requirements of Federal
Preparedness Circular 65. Consequently, GAO concluded that there is no assurance
that executive branch departments and agencies are prepared for an emergency.37
In his opening statement to the committee, Michael D. Brown, Under Secretary
for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security,
acknowledged that FEMA was designated the lead agency to provide guidance and
assistance to the other Federal departments and agencies for COOP by Presidential
guidance.38 The under secretary also noted that FEMA guidance requires executive
branch departments and agencies to develop COOP plans to support their essential
functions. Through working relationships with other departments and agencies, and
new and ongoing COOP initiatives, he indicated that FEMA was working to ensure
improved coordination and provide enhanced planning guidance.39
35 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Continuity of Operations: Improved
Planning Needed to Ensure Delivery of Essential Government Services, GAO-04-160, Feb.
27, 2004, available at [http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04160.pdf], visited Feb. 1, 2005.
36 The proceedings of the hearing are available in U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Government Reform, A Status Report on Federal Agencies’ Continuity of Operations Plans,
108th Congress, 2nd sess., Apr. 22, 2004, Serial No. 108-184, (Washington: GPO, 2004), at
[http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&doci
d=f:95423.pdf], visited Feb. 1, 2005.
37 Ibid., p. 30.
38 PDD 67.
39 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, Can Federal Agencies
(continued...)

CRS-14
The GAO report was based on COOP plans and materials of several agencies
which were in place on October 1, 2002, and were evaluated on the basis of an earlier
version of FPC 65, issued in July 1999. Some executive branch COOP planners
suggest that the report failed to take into consideration ongoing changes made to the
executive branch COOP program. Moreover, these observers suggest that GAO
failed to acknowledge that FEMA’s advisory role is accompanied by little or no
authority to compel action by other executive branch agencies.
Since the release of the GAO report, the Department of Homeland Security has
sponsored Forward Challenge ‘04, a full-scale, interagency COOP exercise in the
spring of 2004. The exercise was designed to involve all federal executive branch
departments and agencies. It afforded the participants an opportunity to
! execute alert and notification procedures;
! establish operational capability at agency alternate facilities;
! implement agency succession plans and delegations of authority;
! test interoperable communications capabilities; and
! test procedures for receiving, processing, analyzing, and
disseminating information from internal agency assets and from
external entities.40
An after-action report on the exercise issued by FEMA in August 2004 reported
that 45 agencies encompassing more than 300 sub-entities, mobilized to their
alternate COOP locations, or other designated sites, to test the continuation of
essential government services during a national security emergency. Approximately
3,500 — 4,000 staff from participating agencies took part in the exercise, which
required them to move to more than 100 alternate site locations. The FEMA report
concluded that the executive branch had demonstrated its capability to alert and
notify departments and agencies in the National Capital Region of a COOP event.
FEMA found that the exercise improved overall readiness, increased awareness by
senior leadership of succession plans and their responsibilities, and prepared
departments and agencies to provide essential services in the event of an emergency
or disaster, regardless of cause.41
FEMA issued an updated FPC 65 in June 2004. Efforts by FEMA and the
Homeland Security Council to provide guidance regarding the specification of
essential functions continue, and include training to support the development of
39 (...continued)
Function in the Wake of a Disaster? pp. 36-37.
40 Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Exercise
Forward Challenge ‘04: Interagency After Action Report (Washington: 2004), p. iii.
41 Ibid., pp. 1, 31.

CRS-15
clearly defined, and mutually understood essential functions for all agencies.42 Until
those actions are completed, and systematic oversight of COOP activities is
established, however, GAO’s conclusion that agencies are likely to continue to base
their COOP planning on ill-defined assumptions that could limit the effectiveness of
resulting plans, might still be salient.
Congressional Committee Jurisdiction
Government operations in the executive branch are generally overseen by the
House Committee on Government Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs. In the 109th Congress, the House committee has
jurisdiction over government management measures, including the “management of
government operations and activities,”43 which would appear to give it a role in
COOP oversight across the executive branch. At the start of the 109th Congress, the
House converted the Select Committee on Homeland Security into a standing
committee and transferred some, but not all, related legislative jurisdiction to it from
other standing committees. The House Committee on Homeland Security has both
oversight and legislative responsibility regarding the Department of Homeland
Security, including “domestic preparedness for and collective response to terrorism,”
as well as “broad oversight authority over government-wide homeland security
matters.”44 In the Senate, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs has jurisdiction over matters relating to the Department of Homeland
Security, with certain limitations,45 as well as “organization and reorganization of the
executive branch of the government.”46 This would appear to give both panels some
government-wide role in overseeing the guidance and implementation of COOP
planning related to potential interruptions due to attack or other incursion.
Different approaches to homeland security in the House and Senate have
resulted in different committees having different jurisdictions and internal structures.
The Senate, pursuant to S.Res. 445 of the 108th Congress directed its Appropriations
Committee to reorganize its subcommittees to accommodate the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security. What action the Senate panel will take, and
whether the House Committee on Appropriations takes similar action is not yet clear.
Ongoing bicameral coordination of congressional legislative, oversight, and
investigative roles over homeland security might affect congressional attention to
COOP activities in the 109th Congress. Also, the potential publication of COOP
expenditures by OMB in annual budget proposals might encourage authorizing
42 See section on FEMA Guidance and Essential COOP FUnctions, above.
43 House Rule X (h).
44 House Rule X (i) (D).
45 CRS Report RS21955, S.Res. 445: Senate Committee Reorganization for Homeland
Security and Intelligence Matters, by Paul S. Rundquist and Christopher M. Davis. The
limitations do not appear to prevent the committee from exercising jurisdiction over
executive branch COOP programs.
46 Senate Rule XXV (1) (k) (1) (10).

CRS-16
committees and appropriations subcommittees to provide more oversight of COOP
activities in the departments and agencies they oversee.
Issue Immediacy
As the memory of dramatic disruptions, such as the September 11, 2001, attacks
and biological agent incidents, fade, attention to administrative operations like COOP
planning may receive lower priority attention from agency planners. Emergency
preparedness observers note that the success of contingency planning is dependent
on current planning and regular drills, simulations, or other testing. Prior to the
attacks, executive branch COOP management by the National Security Council and
FEMA and guidance for other executive branch agencies were all in place, and that
guidance included requirements for agency-wide staff education, as well as the
testing and drilling of COOP plans. Nevertheless, on September 11, 2001, some
federal employees reportedly were unaware of these plans, and some agencies found
they had no way of accounting for, or communicating with, evacuated staff.
The apparent disparity between the level of planning by senior officials and the
level of readiness and awareness by line managers and agency lead some observers
to maintain that continual drills and educational awareness efforts will be necessary
to achieve and maintain an appropriate degree of COOP capability. The current
relatively low state of alert could offer an opportunity to test readiness during a non-
crisis situation. Congress might elect to prevent miscommunications that occurred
in September 2001 in future events by conducting oversight and exploring potential
legislative options to establish such training.
Related CRS Products
Continuity of Operations
CRS Report RL31857, Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the Executive Branch:
An Overview, by R. Eric Petersen.
CRS Report RL31594. Congressional Continuity of Operations (COOP): An
Overview of Concepts and Challenges, by R. Eric Petersen and Jeffrey W.
Seifert.
CRS Report RL31978. Emergency Preparedness and Continuity of Operations in
the Federal Judiciary, by R. Eric Petersen.
CRS Report RL31739. Federal Agency Emergency Preparedness and Dismissal of
Employees, by L. Elaine Halchin.
Continuity of Government
CRS Report RS21089. Continuity of Government: Current Federal Arrangements
and the Future, by Harold C. Relyea.

CRS-17
CRS Report RL31394. House Vacancies: Selected Proposals for Filling Them After
a Catastrophic Loss of Members, by Sula P. Richardson.
CRS Report RL31761. Presidential and Vice Presidential Succession: Overview and
Current Legislation, by Thomas H. Neale.
Background Issues
CRS Report RS21017. Terrorist Attacks and National Emergencies Act
Declarations, by Harold C. Relyea.
CRS Report 98-505. National Emergency Powers, by Harold C. Relyea.
CRS Report RL31542. Homeland Security — Reducing the Vulnerability of Public
and Private Information Infrastructures to Terrorism: An Overview, by Jeffrey
W. Seifert.
CRS Report RL31787. Information Warfare and Cyberwar: Capabilities and
Related Policy Issues, by Clay Wilson.
CRS Report RS22023. Organization and Mission of the Emergency Preparedness
and Response Directorate: Issues During the 109th Congress, by Keith Bea.

CRS-18
Acronym Glossary
AAR
After Action Report
BDR
Budget Data Request
COG
Continuity of Government
COOP
Continuity of Operations
CWG
Interagency COOP Working Group
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
E.O.
Executive Order
ECG
Enduring Constitutional Government
EOP
Executive Office of the President
FAS
Federation of American Scientists
FC04
Forward Challenge ‘04
FEA
Federal Enterprise Architecture
FEMA
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Preparedness
and Response Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
FPC
Federal Preparedness Circular
FR
Federal Register
FY
Fiscal Year
GAO
Government Accountability Office, formerly General Accounting
Office
GPRA
Government Performance Results Act
HSC
Homeland Security Council
HSPD
Homeland Security Presidential Directive
NCR
National Capital Region
NEF
National Essential Function
NSC
National Security Council
OMB
Office of Management and Budget
ONSC
Office of National Security Coordination, FEMA
PDD
Presidential Decision Directive
PMEF
Primary Mission Essential Function
SMEF
Secondary Mission Essential Function