9/11 Commission Recommendations: Intelligence Budget

9/11 Commission Recommendations: Intelligence Budget

Order Code RL32609
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
9/11 Commission Recommendations:
Intelligence Budget
Updated October 23, 2004
/name redacted/
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

9/11 Commission Recommendations: Intelligence
Budget
Summary
This report identifies the main recommendations of the 9/11 Commission with
respect to the intelligence budget. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks,
known as the 9/11 Commission, on July 22, 2004 recommended replacing the
Director of Central Intelligence with a National Intelligence Director: (1) to oversee
national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the United States
government; and (2) to manage the national intelligence program and oversee
agencies that contribute to it. The National Intelligence Director would submit a
unified budget for national intelligence and would receive an appropriation for
national intelligence and apportion appropriated funds to appropriate agencies in the
intelligence community.
The Commission also recommended that the top line of the intelligence budget
should be made public and that Congress should pass a separate appropriations act
for national intelligence rather than include funding for intelligence activities in the
appropriations acts for the Department of Defense and those for other departments
that have elements of the intelligence community. In addition, the Commission
proposed that Congress should establish either a joint committee on intelligence or
a single committee in each House of Congress that combines authorizing and
appropriating authorities.
This report also describes the intelligence budget process under current law to
to explain the effect of these recommendations and presents the current budget
authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence, as well as budget provisions in two
bills, S. 2774 and H.R. 5040, that include all Commission recommendations.
The Senate on October 6, 2004 agreed to S. 2845, the National Intelligence
Reform Act of 2004, that would implement many of the Commission’s intelligence
budget recommendations. The Senate later accepted a conference with the Senate.
The House on October 8, 2004 agreed to H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations
Implementation Act, that would grant the National Intelligence Director many of the
budget responsibilities and authorities that the National Security Act of 1947
delegates to the Director of Central Intelligence. After deleting the text of S. 2845
as passed by the Senate, and inserting in lieu thereof the text of the House-passed
H.R. 10, the House agreed to S. 2845 and requested a conference with the Senate.
The Senate on October 9, 2004 passed S.Res. 245, to improve the effectiveness
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and for other purposes, to create the
Subcommittee on Intelligence in the Committee on Appropriations after rejecting an
amendment to grant jurisdiction over intelligence appropriations to the Select
Committee on Intelligence.
The conference committee held a public meeting on October 20, 2004.
This report will be updated to reflect major legislative developments.

Contents
Intelligence Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Intelligence Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Current Intelligence Budget Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Current DCI Budget Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
S. 2447 and H.R. 5040: All Commission Recommendations . . . . . . . . 7
S. 2845 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
H.R. 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
S.Res. 445: Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence . . . 29

9/11Commission Recommendations:
Intelligence Budget
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, known as the 9/11 Commission,
on July 22, 2004 recommended replacing the Director of Central Intelligence with
a National Intelligence Director: (1) to oversee national intelligence centers on
specific subjects of interest across the United States government; and (2) to manage
the national intelligence program and oversee agencies that contribute to it.1 The
National Intelligence Director (NID) would submit a unified budget for national
intelligence that reflects priorities chosen by the National Security Council and an
appropriate balance among the varieties of technical and human intelligence,
collection, and analysis. The NID would receive an appropriation for national
intelligence and apportion the funds to the appropriate agencies, in line with that
budget, and have authority to reprogram funds among the national intelligence
agencies to meet any new priority.2
The Commission also recommended that the overall amount of money being
appropriated for national intelligence no longer should remain secret and that
Congress should pass a separate appropriations act for intelligence.3 It also said that
because it believed that congressional oversight for intelligence is not functioning
adequately, Congress should establish either a joint committee on intelligence based
on the model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or a single committee in each
House of Congress that combines authorizing and appropriating authorities.4
The Commission made this recommendation after it concluded that the Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) has “too many jobs,” i.e., to run the Central Intelligence
Agency; to manage the loose confederation of 15 agencies or parts of agencies that
comprise the intelligence community; and to serve as the analyst in chief for the
government, sifting evidence and directly briefing the President as principal
intelligence advisor.5 Although, the Commission observed, the DCI is responsible
for the performance of the intelligence community, it asserted that the Director lacks
1 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States § 13.2, 411(Official Government Edition 2004) (hereinafter
9/11 Commission Report).
2 Id. at 412.
3 Id. at 416.
4 Id. § 13.4 at 420.
5 Id. at 409; section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343 (1947), 50 U.S.C. 403-
3, grants these three responsibilities to the Director of Central Intelligence.

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authorities critical for any agency head including, among other things, control over
purse strings.6
A brief discussion of the meanings of the terms “intelligence community” and
“intelligence budget” and a description of the current intelligence budget process
helps to explain the effect of these recommendations.
Intelligence Community. Section 3a(3) of the National Security Act of
1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 401a, states that the term “intelligence community”
includes
the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, including the
Office of the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence, the
National Intelligence Council, and such other offices as the
Director may designate; the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA];
the National Security Agency [NSA], the Defense Intelligence
Agency [DIA], the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
[NGA, formerly the National Imagery and Mapping Agency];
the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO]; other offices of the
Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national
intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the intelligence
components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of the Treasury,
Department of Energy, and Coast Guard; the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; the
elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned
with analyzing foreign intelligence information; and such other
elements of any other department or agency as may be
designated by the President, or designated jointly by the Director
of Central Intelligence and the head of the department or agency
concerned, as an element of the intelligence community.
Intelligence Budget. The intelligence budget has three components, the
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)
Program.7 Section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C.
§ 401a, states that the term “National Foreign Intelligence Program ” refers to:
all programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence
community, as well as any other programs of the intelligence
community designated jointly by the Director of Central
Intelligence and the head of a United States department or
agency or by the President. Such term does not include
programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to
6 9/11 Commission Report § 13.2, 409..
7 CRS Report 94-261 F, Intelligence Spending: Should Total Amounts Be Made Public?
at CRS-3, by Richard A. Best, Jr. and (name redacted) (hereinafter
Intelligence
Spending).

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acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of
tactical military operations by the United States armed forces.
The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) consists of intelligence
programs, projects, and activities undertaken in support of decisionmaking at the
national level and conducted by the CIA, DIA, NSA, NRO, NGA, and other agencies
in the Washington area.8 The Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) Program refer to intelligence-
related activities. JMIP supports Defense Department-wide activities. The TIARA
Program includes a “diverse array of reconnaissance and target acquisition programs
which are a functional part of the basic military force structure and provide direct
support to military operations.”9 TIARA programs are conducted by intelligence
components of the Department of Defense in support of unified commanders and
subordinate echelons in conducting military operations in addition to meeting some
national level requirements.10
Current Intelligence Budget Process.11 A large majority of the budget
for the components of the intelligence budget ( NFIP, JMIP and the TIARA Program)
for the CIA, NSA, DIA, NRO, and NGA is hidden in the appropriations act for the
Department of Defense. 12 The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence conduct extensive oversight
hearings, almost always in closed sessions, and report authorization bills and reports
with classified annexes.13 The Intelligence Committees do not have exclusive
jurisdiction over authorizations for intelligence program expenditures; the House and
Senate Committees on Armed Services have jurisdiction over some intelligence
activities in the authorization acts for the Department of Defense and authorizations
for these activities are classified.14

The Subcommittees on Defense of the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations review intelligence budget requests and approve funding levels.15
Funding for most intelligence activities included in the defense appropriations bills
is not identified as such either in legislation itself or in the accompanying reports, but
8 Id.
9 Id. at n. 2, quoting from U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1994, H.Rept. 103-162, pt. 1, p. 12 (1993).
10 Intelligence Spending at CRS-3.
11 See CRS Report RS21945, The U.S. Intelligence Budget: A Basic Overview, by (name r
edacted), for more information.
12 Id.
13 Id. at CRS-8.
14 Id. at CRS-10.
15 Id.

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does appear in classified annexes to the reports which Senators and Members of
Congress can read under guidelines designed to protect secrecy.16
It has been estimated that more than 85% of the intelligence budget is executed
by agencies not under control of the Director of Central Intelligence.17 The
appropriation in the DOD appropriations act for NFIP agencies, including the CIA,
is given directly to the Secretary of Defense, who disburses appropriated funds to the
various agencies, including NFIP’s largest ones, the National Security Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,18
entities located in the Department of Defense.
The remaining portion of the budgets for intelligence elements, such as those
in the FBI in the Department of Justice and in the Departments of State, Treasury,
and Energy, is funded in appropriations acts for the departments of which they are a
part, but all of these combined represent a small percentage of total intelligence
expenditures.19
Current DCI Budget Authorities. The 9/11Commission asserted that, “The
only budget power of the DCI over agencies other than the CIA lies in coordinating
budget requests of the various intelligence agencies into a single program for
submission to Congress.”20 Nonetheless, a recitation of budget authorities that have
been granted to the Director by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and
by Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, as amended by Executive Order
13355 of August 27, 2004, reveals that the DCI has additional budget authorities.
Authorities granted in the National Security Act include:
section 103(c)(1) of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403-
3(c)(1)(A) and (B), which authorizes the DCI “to facilitate the
development of an annual budget for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States by–developing
and presenting to the President an annual budget for the National
Foreign Intelligence Program; and participating in the
development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budgets
for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities Program”;
section 104(b), 50 U.S.C. § 403-4(b), which requires the DCI
“to provide guidance to elements of the intelligence community
for the preparation of their annual budgets and shall approve
16 Id. at CRS-8 and CRS-10.
17 CRS Report RL32506, The Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for
Congress, at CRS-3, by (name redacted), citing Report of the Commission on the Roles and
Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Century:
An Appraisal of the U.S. Intelligence, at. xix (Mar. 1, 1996).
18 Id.
19 Intelligence Spending at CRS-9.
20 9/11 Commission Report § 13.2, 410.

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such budgets before their incorporation in the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP)”;
section 104(c), 50 U.S.C. § 403-4(c), which provides that, “No
funds made available under the National Foreign Intelligence
Program may be reprogrammed [i.e., shifted between programs,
projects, or activities within a single appropriations account] by
any element of the intelligence community without the prior
approval of the Director of Central Intelligence except in
accordance with procedures issued by the Director. The
Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director of Central
Intelligence before reprogramming funds made available under
the Joint Military Intelligence Program”;
section 104(d), 50 U.S.C. § 403-4(d), which provides that the
DCI, “with the approval of the Director of Management and
Budget, may transfer funds [i.e., shift from one appropriations
account to another] appropriated for a program within the
National Foreign Intelligence Program to another such program
and, in accordance with procedures to be developed by the
Director and the heads of affected departments and agencies,
may transfer personnel authorized for an element of the
intelligence community to another such element for periods up
to a year.” This authority is granted subject to some conditions,
such as that no transfer of funds or personnel from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation can be involved and that no transfer can
take place if the secretary or department head objects to the
transfer. Authority to object to a transfer generally may not be
delegated, but the Secretary of Defense may delegate it only to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
On August 27, 2004, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 1335521
“Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community” that amended Executive
Order 12333 “United States Intelligence Activities” of December 4, 1981, as
amended.22 Section 3 “Strengthened Control of Intelligence Funding” of Executive
Order 13355 amended section 1.5 (n), (o), and (p) of Executive Order 12333, to
provide that:
1.5 Director of Central Intelligence. In order to discharge
the duties and responsibilities prescribed by law, the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible directly to the President
and the NSC [National Security Council] and shall: . . .
(n)(1) Develop, determine, and present with the
advice of heads of departments or agencies that have
an organization within the intelligence community,
21 69 Fed. Reg. 53593 (Sept. 1, 2004); also accessible at [http://www.whitehouse.gov].
22 See 50 U.S.C. § 401 nt., for a reprint of the text of Executive Order 12333.

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the annual consolidated NFIP [National Foreign
Intelligence Program] budget. The Director shall be
responsible for developing an integrated and balanced
national intelligence program that is directly
responsive to the national security threats facing the
United States. The Director shall submit such budget
(accompanied by dissenting views, if any, of the head
of a department or agency that has an organization
within the intelligence community) to the President
for approval; and
(2) Participate in the development by the
Secretary of Defense of the annual budgets for the
Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)
Program.
(o)(1) Transfer, consistent with applicable law
and with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, funds from an appropriation
for the NFIP to another appropriation for the NFIP or
to another NFIP component;
(2) Review, and approve or disapprove,
consistent with applicable law, any proposal to: (i)
reprogram funds within an appropriation for the
NFIP; (2) transfer funds from an appropriation for the
NFIP to an appropriation that is not for the NFIP
within the intelligence community; or (iii) transfer
funds from an appropriation that is not for the NFIP
within the intelligence community to an appropriation
for the NFIP; and
(3) Monitor and consult with the Secretary of
Defense on reprogrammings or transfers of funds
within, into, or out of, appropriations for the JMIP
and the TIARA Program.
(p)(1) Monitor implementation and execution of
the NFIP budget by the heads of departments or
agencies that have an organization within the
intelligence community, including, as necessary, by
conducting program and performance audits and
evaluations;
(2) Monitor implementation of the JMIP and the
TIARA Program and advise the Secretary of Defense
thereon;

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(3) After consultation with the heads of relevant
departments, report periodically, and not less often
than semiannually, to the President on effectiveness of
implementation of the NFIP Program by organizations
within the intelligence community, for which purpose
the heads of departments and agencies shall ensure
that the Director has access to programmatic,
execution, and other appropriate information.
S. 2447 and H.R. 5040: All Commission Recommendations. On
September 7, 2004, Senator John McCain and cosponsors introduced S. 2447, 108th
Cong., 2d Sess., the 9/11 Commission Report Implementation Act of 2004, which,
he said, “addresses each of the Commission’s 41 recommendations.”23
Representative Christopher Shays and cosponsors introduced an identical bill, H.R.
5040, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., on September 9, 2004. Section 111 “National
Intelligence Authority” of these bills would create the National Intelligence Authority
as an independent establishment in the executive branch of government. Section 112
“National Intelligence Director” would establish the NID, to be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent fo the Senate. Section 132 “Responsibilities
of the National Intelligence Director” would provide, with respect to the intelligence
budget, that the Director “shall (1) develop and present to the President a unified
budget for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
government; [and] (2) ensure a unified budget for the intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States government that reflects an appropriate balance
among the varieties of technical and human intelligence methods and analysis; . . .”
Section 133 “Authorities of the National Intelligence Director” has a number of
provisions relating to the intelligence budget, but before reciting them it should be
noted that S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 would substitute the “National Intelligence
Program” in place of the “National Foreign Intelligence Program,” which is defined
in 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 401a(6).
Section 102(6) “Definitions” of S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 states that the term “National
Intelligence Program”--
(A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs, projects,
and activities of the elements of the intelligence community; and
(ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities
(whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of
the National Intelligence Authority, the Central
Intelligence Agency [the text gives full names but
acronyms are used here], NSA, NGA, NRO, the
Office of Intelligence of the FBI, and the Directorate
of Information and Infrastructure Protection of the
Department of Homeland Security; but
23 150 Congressional Record S8864 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2004); a reprint of S. 2774 begins at
S8884.

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(B) does not refer--
(i) to any program, project, or activity
pertaining solely to the requirements of a
single department, agency, or element of
the United States government; or
(ii) to any program, project, or activity of
the military departments to acquire
intelligence solely for the planning and
conduct of tactical military operations by
the United States armed forces.
The definition of the “national intelligence program” is more comprehensive than the
current definition of the “national foreign intelligence program” in section 3(6) of the
National Security Act. Section 175 of S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 would amend section
3(6) to substitute the above definition of the NIP in place of the current definition of
the NFIP.
Section 102(1) of S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 would define “intelligence” to include
“foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.” “Foreign intelligence” would be
defined in section 102(2) as “information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or
activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.” “Counterintelligence” would
be defined as “information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or
on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities” in section 102(3). Section 102(5)
would provide that “national intelligence” and “intelligence related to the national
security” (A) each refer to intelligence which pertains to the interests of more than
one department or agency of the government; and (B) do not refer to
counterintelligence or law enforcement activities conducted by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to by the
National Intelligence Director and the Attorney General, or otherwise as expressly
provided for in this title.” These definitions are identical to those in current law at
section (5)3 of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401a(5).
As noted earlier, section 133 of S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 has a number of
subsections that relate to the NID’s authority over the budget for the National
Intelligence Program, specifically:
(b) Determination of budgets for NIP and other
intelligence. -- The NID [except for subsection titles which
generally use acronyms, the bill text uses full words but this
recitation uses acronyms] shall determine the annual budget for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States government by–
(1) developing and presenting to the President an
annual budget for the NIP, including, in furtherance of

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such budget, the review, modification, and approval
of budgets of the intelligence community within the
NIP utilizing the budget authorities in subsection
(d)(1);
(2) providing guidance on the development of
annual budgets for such elements of the intelligence
community as are not within the NIP utilizing the
budget authorities in subsection (d)(2);
(3) participating in the development by the
Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military
intelligence programs and activities outside the NIP;
(4) having direct jurisdiction of amounts
appropriated or otherwise made available for the NIP
as specified in subsection (e);
(5) managing and overseeing the execution, and,
if necessary, the modification of the annual budget for
the NIP, including directing the reprogramming and
reallocation of funds, and the transfer of personnel,
among and between elements of the intelligence
community within the NIP utilizing the authorities in
subsections (f) and (g).
(c) Scope of NIP and JMIP.-- The NID and the
Secretary of Defense shall jointly review the
programs, projects, and activities [ppas] under the
JMIP in order to identify the ppas within the JMIP as
of the date of the enactment of this act that pertain to
national intelligence. Any ppas so identified are to be
carried out instead within the NIP.
Section 184 “Termination of the Joint Military Intelligence Program” of S. 2774
and H.R. 5040 would eliminate the JMIP effective October 1, 2005.
(d) Budget Authorities.–(1)(A) The NID shall
direct, coordinate, prepare, modify, and present to the
President the annual budgets of the elements of the
intelligence community within the NIP, in
consultation with the heads of the elements.
(B) The budget of an element of the
intelligence community may not be
provided to the President for transmission
to Congress unless the Director has
approved such budget.

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(2)(A) The Director shall provide
guidance for the development of the annual
budgets for such elements of the
intelligence community as are not within
the NIP;
(B) The heads of the elements of the
intelligence community referred to in
subparagraph (A) shall coordinate closely
with the Director in the development of the
budgets of such elements, before the
submission of their recommendations on
such budgets to the President.
(e) Jurisdiction of Funds under the
NIP.–Notwithstanding any other provision of law and
consistent with section 504 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 414), any amounts
appropriated or otherwise made available for the NIP
shall be appropriated to, and under the direct
jurisdiction of, the NID.
(f) Role of Reprogramming.–(1) No funds under
the NIP may be reprogrammed by any element of the
intelligence community within the NIP without the
prior approval of the NID except in accordance with
procedures issued by the Director.
(2) The Director shall consult with the
appropriate committees of Congress
regarding modifications of existing
procedures to expedite the reprogramming
of funds within the NIP.
(g) Transfer of funds or personnel within the
National Intelligence Program.– (1)(A) In addition to
any other authorities available under law for such
purposes, the NID, with the approval of the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, may
transfer funds appropriated for a program within the
NIP to another such program and, in accordance with
procedures developed by the NID and heads of the
departments and agencies concerned, may transfer
personnel authorized for an element of the
intelligence community to another such element.
(B) The NID may delegate a
duty of the Director under this
subsection only to the Deputy
National Intelligence Director.

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(2) A transfer of funds or personnel
may be made under this subsection only if–
(A) the funds or personnel
are being transferred to an
activity that is a higher priority
intelligence activity;

(B) the need for funds or
personnel for such activity is
b a s e d o n u n f o r e s e e n
requirements; and
(C) the transfer does not
involve a transfer of funds to the
Reserve for Contingencies of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Section 133(g)(2) of H.R. 2774 and H.R. 5040 would continue in identical
language three conditions on the authority of the NID to transfer funds or personnel
that currently apply to transfers by the DCI in section 104(d)(2) of the National
Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403-4(c), but would omit two conditions, one
relating to the FBI and the other relating to objections to transfers, that now apply.
Section 104(d)(2) of the 1947 Act states that, “A transfer of funds or personnel may
be made under this subsection only if– (i) [the first three conditions are identical to
those in section 133(g)(2)of S. 2774 and H.R. 5040] . . .; (iv) the transfer does not
involve a transfer of funds or personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigations;
and (v) . . . the Secretary or head of the department which contains the affected
element or elements of the intelligence community does not object to such transfer.”
Authority to object to a transfer generally may not be delegated by a secretary or
department head, but the Secretary of Defense may delegate it only to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense.

Section 133(g)(3)(4) and (5), which would relate to the period of availability of
transferred funds and requirements for reporting transfers of funds and personnel to
some congressional committees, would be identical to corresponding sections of
section 104(d)(3), (4), and (5) of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403-
4(d)(3),(4), and (5), that currently apply to the Director of Central Intelligence.
Section 161 “Availability to Public of Certain Intelligence Funding Information”
of S. 2774 and H.R. 5040 would require the President to disclose to the public for
each year after Fiscal Year 2005 (1) the aggregate amount of appropriations requested
in the budget of the President for the fiscal year concerned for intelligence and
intelligence- related activities of the United States government and for each element
or component of the intelligence community. It would direct Congress to disclose
to the public for each year after Fiscal Year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds
appropriated by Congress for the fiscal year concerned for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the U.S. government and for each element or
component of the intelligence community.

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Section 302 “Reorganization of Congressional Jurisdiction” of S. 2774 and H.R.
5040 would provide that the 108th Congress shall not adjourn until each House has
adopted necessary changes to its rules such that, effective at the start of the 109th
Congress jurisdiction over proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials and
other matters related to intelligence shall reside in either a joint Senate-House
authorizing committee using the model of the former Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, or a committee in each chamber with combined authorization and
appropriations authority.24 The proposed Joint Committee on Intelligence or the
House and Senate Committees on Intelligence would be required to have not more
than 9 members who would serve without term limits; at least one member of either
the Joint Committee or House and Senate Intelligence Committees must also serve
on the Committee on Armed Services, Judiciary, and Foreign Affairs and at least one
member must serve on a Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations. The Joint Committee or the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees would have authority to issue subpoenas, would have majority
representation that would not exceed minority party representation by more than one
member in each House; and would have a subcommittee devoted solely to oversight.
S. 2845. The Senate on October 6, 2004 by a vote of 96 to 2 agreed to S. 2845,
108th Cong., 2d Sess., the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, sponsored by
Senators Susan M. Collins and Joseph I. Lieberman with cosponsors.25 The bill
would change many important definitions in section 3 of the National Security Act
of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401a, that would appear to affect the scope of reforms it would
make to implement the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. Section 2 of S. 2845
would slightly modify a portion of the current definitions of the terms “national
intelligence” and “intelligence related to the national security” in section 3(5) of the
National Security Act of 1947. “Intelligence which pertains to the interests of more
than one department or agency of the government” in current law would be replaced
with “intelligence which pertains, as determined consistent with any guidelines
issued by the President, to the interests of more than one department or agency of the
government.”
The terms “intelligence” and “intelligence related to the national security”under
current law “do not refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement activities
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation except to the extent provided for
in procedures agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney
General, or otherwise as expressly provided for in this title.” Section 2 of S. 2845
would amend this exception to provide that these terms “do not refer to law
enforcement activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation except to the
extent provided for in procedures agreed to by the National Intelligence Director and
the Attorney General, or otherwise as expressly provided for in law,” thereby
dropping the exception for counterintelligence.
The definition in section 2 of S. 2845 of the term “counterintelligence” would
vary slightly from the one in current law at section 3(3) of the National Security Act,
24 See CRS Report RL32525, A Joint Committee on Intelligence: Proposals and Options
from the 9/11 Commission and Others by (name redacted).
25 150 Congressional Record S10543 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004).

CRS-13
which provides that it means “information gathered and activities conducted, to
protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations
conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign
organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.” The amended
definition would provide that “counterintelligence” is “foreign intelligence gathered,
and information gathering and other activities conducted, to protect against
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or
on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities, but does not include personnel,
physical document, or communications security programs.” The definition of
“intelligence community” is similar to the one in current law at section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401a, but would add “National
Intelligence Authority” as part of the community, substitute “National Intelligence
Director” in place of “Director of Central Intelligence,” and delete “Office of the
Director of Central Intelligence.”
Section 2 of S. 2845 would replace the current definition of the “National
Foreign Intelligence Program” in section 3(6) of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C.
§ 401(6), with the following one to be designated as the “National Intelligence
Program”:
The term “National Intelligence Program”--
(A)(i) refers to all national intelligence programs,
projects, and activities of the elements of the
intelligence community;
(ii) includes all programs, projects, and activities
(whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of
the National Intelligence Authority, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency,
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, the Directorate of
Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Office of Information Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security; and
(iii) includes any other program, project, or
activity of a department, agency, or element of the
United States government relating to national
intelligence unless the National Intelligence Director
and the head of the department, agency, or element
concerned determine otherwise; but
(B) except as provided in subparagraph (A)(ii),
does not refer to any program, project, or activity of
the military departments, included in any program,
project, or activity of the Defense Intelligence Agency
that is not part of the National Foreign Intelligence
Program as of the date of the enactment of this act, to

CRS-14
acquire intelligence principally for the planning and
conduct of joint and tactical military operations by the
United States armed forces.
Nonetheless, section 338 “Components of the National Intelligence Program,”
of S. 2845 provides that “Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the
National Intelligence Program shall consist of all programs, projects, and activities
that are part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program as of the effective date of
this section.” This section also would require the National Intelligence Director and
the Secretary of Defense within specified time periods jointly to review programs,
projects, and activities of the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) Program as of the effective date
of the section. These officers also would be tasked jointly to review programs,
projects, and activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency that support the
intelligence staff of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the intelligence staffs
of the unified combatant commands, and the portions of the sensitive compartmented
communications systems that support Department of Defense components. Section
338 would mandate that the National Intelligence Director must report to the
President recommendations regarding which of the reviewed programs, projects, and
activities should be included in the National Intelligence Program, together with any
comments that the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate. Section 338 became
part of S. 2845 when the Senate by voice vote adopted a modified floor amendment
offered by Senator John W. Warner.26
In addition to the changes to definitions made by section 2 of S. 2845, the bill
would reform intelligence organizations. Section 101 “National Intelligence
Authority” of S. 2845 would create the National Intelligence Authority as an
independent establishment in the executive branch of government. Section 102
“National Intelligence Director” would establish the position of National Intelligence
Director [NID]. Section 112 “Responsibilities of National Intelligence Director”
would require the NID, with respect to the intelligence budget, to (1) determine the
annual budget for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States; and (2) manage and oversee appropriations for the National Intelligence
Program.
Section 113 “Authorities of National Intelligence Director” of S. 2845 contains
several subsections that relate to the budget. Subsection (b) “Determination of
Budgets for NIP and Other Intelligence Activities” provides that:
The National Intelligence Director shall determine the
annual budget for the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States government under section
112(a)(a) by–
(1) providing to the heads of the departments
containing agencies or elements within the
26 See 150 Congressional Record S10516-S10518 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004), for the text,
debate, and vote on this amendment, No. 3875.

CRS-15
intelligence community and that have one or more
programs, projects, or activities [ppas] within the
National Intelligence Program [NIP], and to the heads
of such agencies and elements guidance for
development of the NIP budget pertaining to such
agencies or elements;
(2) developing and presenting to the President an
annual budget for the NIP after consultation with the
heads of agencies or elements, and the heads of their
respective departments, under paragraph (1),
including, in furtherance of such budget, the review,
modification, and approval of budgets of the agencies
or elements of the intelligence community with one or
more ppas within the NIP utilizing the budget
authorities in subsection (c)(1);
(3) providing guidance on the development of
annual budgets for each element of the intelligence
community that does not have any ppa within the NIP
utilizing the authorities in subsection (c)(2);
(4) participating in the development by the
Secretary of Defense of the annual budget for military
intelligence programs and activities outside the NIP;
(5) receiving the appropriations for the NIP as
specified in subsection (d) and allotting and allocating
funds to agencies and elements of the intelligence
community; and
(6) managing and overseeing the execution by
the agencies or elements of the intelligence
community [ic], and, if necessary, the modification of
the annual budget for the NIP, including directing the
reprogramming and transfer of funds, and the transfer
of personnel, among and between the elements of the
ic within the NIP utilizing the authorities in
subsections (f) and (g).
Section (c) “Budget Authorities” of section 113 states that:
(1)(A) In developing and presenting an annual
budget for the elements of the ic within the NIP under
subsection (b)(1), the NID shall coordinate, prepare,
and present to the President the annual budgets of
those elements, in consultation with the heads of
those elements.

CRS-16
(B) If any portion of the budget for an
element of the ic within the NIP is prepared
outside the Office of the NID, the Director–
(i) shall approve such
budget before submission to the
President; and
(ii) may modify, or may
require modifications, of such
budget to meet the requirements
and priorities of the Director
before approving such budget
under clause (i).
(C) The budget of an agency or
element of the ic with one or more ppas
within the NIP may not be provided to the
President unless the Director has first
approved such budget as it pertains to those
ppas within the NIP.
(2)(A) The Director shall provide guidance for
the development of annual budgets for each agency or
element of the ic that does not have any ppa within
the NIP.
(B) The heads of the agencies or
elements of the ic, and the heads of their
respective departments, referred to in
subparagraph (A) shall coordinate closely
with the Director in the development of the
budgets of such agencies or elements,
before the submission of their
recommendations on such budgets to the
President.
Section 113(d) “Jurisdiction of Funds Under NIP” provides that:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and
consistent with section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 414) [Funding of Intelligence Activities], any
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the NIP
shall be appropriated to the National Intelligence Authority and,
pursuant to subsection (e), under the direct jurisdiction of the
NID.
(2) The Director shall manage and oversee the execution by
each element of the intelligence community of any amount

CRS-17
appropriated or otherwise made available to such element under
the NIP.
Section 113(e) “Accounts for Administration of NIP Funds” of S. 2845 states
that:
(1) The Secretary of the Treasury shall, in consultation with
the NID, establish accounts for the funds under the jurisdiction
of the Director under subsection (d) for purposes of carrying out
the responsibilities and authorities of the Director under this act
with respect to the NIP.
(2) The National Intelligence Director shall–
(A) control and manage the accounts
established under paragraph (1); and
(B) with the concurrence of the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, establish procedures governing the
u s e ( i n c l u d i n g t r a n s f e r s a n d
reprogrammings) of funds in such accounts.
(3)(A) to the extent authorized by law, a
certifying official shall follow the procedures
established under paragraph (2)(B) with regard to
each account established under paragraph (1).
Disbursements from any such account shall only be
made against a valid obligation of such account.
(B) In this paragraph, the term
“certifying official,” with respect to an
element of the ic, means an employee of the
element who has responsibilities specified
in section 3528(a) [“Responsibilities and
relief from liability of certifying officials”]
of title 31, United States Code.
(4) The NID shall allot funds deposited in an
account established under paragraph (1) directly to the
elements of the ic concerned in accordance with the
procedures established under paragraph (2)(B).
(5) Each account established under paragraph (1)
shall be subject to chapters 13 [“Appropriations”] and
15 [“Appropriation Accounting”]of title 31, United
States Code, other than section 1503 [“Comptroller
General reports of amounts for which no accounting
is made] and 1556 [“Comptroller General: reports on
appropriation accounts] of that title.

CRS-18
(6) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed
to impair or otherwise affect the authority granted by
subsection (g)(3) or by section 5 [General authority of
(Central Intelligence) Agency] or 8 [Central
Intelligence Agency; appropriations; expenditures] of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403f, 403j).
Section 113(f) “Role in Reprogramming or Transfer to NIP Funds by Elements
of the Intelligence Community” provides that:
(1) No funds made available under the NIP may
be reprogrammed or transferred by any agency or
element of the ic without the prior approval of the
NID except in accordance with procedures issued by
the Director.
(2) The head of the department concerned shall
consult with the Director before reprogramming or
transferring funds appropriated or otherwise made
available to an agency or element of the ic that does
not have a ppa within the NIP.
(3) The Director shall, before reprogramming
funds appropriated or otherwise made available for an
element of the ic within the NIP, consult with the
head of the department or agency having jurisdiction
over such element regarding such reprogramming.
(4)(A) The Director shall consult with the
appropriate committees of Congress regarding
modifications of existing procedures to expedite the
reprogramming of funds within the NIP.
(B) Any modification of procedures
under subparagraph (A) shall include
procedures for the notification of the
appropriate committees of Congress of any
objection raised by the head of a
department or agency to a reprogramming
proposed by the Director as a result of
consultations under paragraph (3).
Section 113(g) “Transfers or Reprogramming of Funds and Transfer of
Personnel within NIP” states that:
(1) In addition to any other authorities available
under law for such purposes, the NID, with the
approval of the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget and after consultation with the heads of

CRS-19
the departments containing agencies or elements
within the ic to the extent their subordinate agencies
or elements are affected, with the heads of such
subordinate agencies or elements, and with the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the
extent the Central Intelligence Agency is affected
may–
(A) transfer or reprogram funds
appropriated for a program within the NIP
to another such program;
(B) review, and approve or
disapprove, any proposal to transfer or
reprogram funds from appropriations that
are not part of the NIP to appropriations for
the NIP;
(C) in accordance with procedures to
be developed by the NID, transfer
personnel of the ic funded through the NIP
from one element of the ic to another
element of the ic; and
(D) in accordance with procedures to
be developed by the NID and the heads of
the departments and agencies concerned,
transfer personnel of the ic not funded
through the NIP from one element of the ic
to another element of the ic.
(2) A transfer of funds or personnel may be made
under this subsection only if–
(A) the funds or personnel are being
transferred to an activity that is a higher
priority intelligence activity;
(B) the transfer does not involve a
transfer of funds to the Reserve for
Contingencies; and
(C) the transfer does not exceed
applicable ceilings established in law for
such transfers;
(D) the personnel are not uniformed;
and

CRS-20
(E) uniformed services personnel,
except that the Director may transfer
military positions or billets if such transfer
is for a period not to exceed three years;
and
(F) nothing in section 143(i) [relating
to staff of the National Counterterrorism
Center] or 144(f) [relating to the
Directorate of Intelligence in the National
Counterproliferation Center] shall be
construed to authorize the Director to
specify or require the head of a department,
agency, or element of the United States
government to approve a request for the
transfer, assignment, or detail of uniformed
services personnel, except that the Director
may take such action with regard to military
positions or billets if such transfer is for a
period not to exceed three years.
(3) Funds transferred under this subsection shall
remain available for the same period as the
appropriations account to which transferred.
(4) Any transfer of funds under this subsection
shall be carried out in accordance with existing
procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications
for the appropriate congressional committees. Any
proposed transfer for which notice is given to the
appropriate congressional committees shall be
accompanied by a report explaining the nature of the
proposed transfer and how it satisfies the
requirements of this subsection. In addition, the
congressional intelligence committees shall be
promptly notified of any transfer of funds made
pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the
transfer would not have otherwise required
reprogramming notification under procedures in effect
as of October 24, 1992.
(5)(A) The NID shall promptly submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on any
transfer of personnel made pursuant to this
subsection. The Director shall include in any such
report an explanation of the nature of the transfer and
how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
The succeeding subparagraphs provide that the term “appropriate committees
of Congress” means, regarding a transfer of funds, (i) the Senate and House

CRS-21
Committees on Appropriations and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; (ii) regarding
a transfer of personnel to or from the Department of Defense, the committees and
select committees referred in (i) and the Senate and House Committees on Armed
Services; regarding a personnel transfer to or from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the committees referred to in (i) and the Senate and House Committees
on the Judiciary; and regarding a personnel transfer to or from the Department of
Homeland Security, the committees and select committees referred to in (i) and the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Select Committee on
Homeland Security.
During Senate floor consideration of S. 2845 on October 4, 2004, the Senate by
a vote of 62 to 29 agreed to a motion to table (reject) an amendment offered by
Senator Robert C. Byrd that, among other things, would have limited the authority
of the National Intelligence Director to transfer funds appropriated for a program
within the National Intelligence Program to another such program only if the transfer
(a)(i) would result in a cumulative transfer out of any department, agency, or element,
as appropriate, funded in the NIP in a single fiscal year of less than $100,000,000;
and (ii) less than 5 percent of amounts available to such department, agency, or
element; and (b) the transfer would not eliminate a program. A fund transfer would
have been allowed without regard to this limitation if the head of the department,
agency, or element concerned concurred in it. Authority to concur could have been
delegated only to the deputy of the head of the department, agency, or element
concerned.27 H.R. 10 as passed by the House contains limitations on authority to
transfer personnel and funds that are similar in some respects or identical in others
to those in the Byrd amendment.

Section 201 “Availability to Public of Certain Intelligence Funding Information”
of S. 2845 states that:
(a) Amount Requested Each Fiscal Year. The President
shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year
2005 the aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the
budget of the President for such fiscal year for the National
Intelligence Program.
(b) Amounts Authorized and Appropriated Each Fiscal
Year. Congress shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year
after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds authorized
to be appropriated by Congress for such fiscal year for the
National Intelligence Program.

Section 201(c) “Study of Disclosure of Additional Information” would require
the National Intelligence Director to conduct a study to assess the feasibility of
disclosing to the public the aggregate amount of appropriations requested in the
27 See 150 Congressional Record S10201 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2004) and 150 Congressional
Record S10329-S10329 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 2004), for the text of and vote on this amendment,
No. 3845, respectively.

CRS-22
President’s budget for each element of the intelligence community and the aggregate
amount of funds authorized to be appropriated and the aggregate amount
appropriated by Congress for each fiscal year for each element of the ic. It would
direct that this study must address whether or not disclosure to the public of these
amounts would harm the national security of the United States and take into specific
account concerns relating to disclosing such information for each element of the ic.
The Director would be required to submit a report on this study to Congress not later
than 180 days after the effective date of the section.
Comparing the text of the provisions relating to the intelligence budget of S.
2845 with those of S. 2774 and H.R. 5040, which would address all of the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and which placed them in legislative
language, reveals that S. 2845 appears to have acquiesced in most of these
recommendations.
An October 18, 2004 letter to the chair and vice chair of the conference
committee presented the views of the Bush Administration on S. 2845 and H.R. 10
as passed by the Senate and House. It said that, “The Administration supports the
strong budget authority provided to the NID in S. 2845. To be effective, the NID
must have clear authority to determine the national intelligence budget, strong
transfer and reprogramming authorities, explicit authority to allocate appropriations,
and the ability to ensure execution of funds by national intelligence agencies
consistent with the direction of the NID. S. 2845 would provide such budget
authority.”28 The letter expressed Administration opposition to disclosing
information relating to the amount of the intelligence budget, a provision that appears
in section 201(a) of S. 2845.29
In an October 20, 2004 letter to the chair of the conference committee, the
Chair and Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission said that they agreed generally with
Bush Administration views expressed in the October 18 letter regarding authorities
of the National Intelligence Director. It said that:
The National Intelligence Director must have authority to
approve and submit a unified budget for national intelligence
that reflects priorities chosen by the National Security Council
and a significant role in determining the budgets for intelligence
agencies outside the National Security Program, including those
within the Department of Defense. The NID must also have
authority to apportion funds appropriated for national
intelligence to the national intelligence agencies and authority to
reprogram those funds as needed in accordance with the normal
reviews and approvals of OMB and the appropriate oversight
committees of the Congress.
28 Letter from Joshua B. Bolten, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and
Condoleeza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to Representative
Peter Hoekstra and Senator Susan Collins 2 (October 18, 2004) (White House letter).
29 Id. at 6.

CRS-23
The intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation must be part of the National Intelligence Program
budget under the overall supervision of the National Intelligence
Director. Lack of collaboration between the FBI and other
intelligence agencies crippled pre-9/11 efforts to find eventual
hijackers in the U.S. and recognize their intentions. The
Bureau’s intelligence and counterterrorism efforts must be
conducted as part of a unified national effort.
. . .
We differ with the White House on the question of secrecy
of the aggregate intelligence budget. We believe the overall
budget number should be unclassified. The benefits of
transparency for congressional oversight and public review are
significant. No analysis or testimony provided to the
Commission demonstrates a need for continued classification of
the overall intelligence budget.30
The letter added that, “If the National Intelligence Director does not have strong
authorities, then we do not believe such a position should be created. Half-hearted
reform would leave us worse off than we are today.”31
H.R. 10. On October 8, 2004, the House by a vote of 282 to 134 agreed to H.R.
10, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, sponsored
by Speaker J. Dennis Hastert with cosponsors.32 Pursuant to the special order (rule)
under which H.R. 10 was considered, H.Res. 827, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., the House,
after passing H.R. 10, took S. 2845 as passed by the Senate from the Speaker’s table,
struck all of the text of that bill and inserted in lieu thereof the text of H.R. 10 as
passed by the House, agreed to S. 2845 as so amended, and requested a conference
committee with the Senate.
Section 1011 “Reorganization and Improvement of Management of Intelligence
Community”of H.R. 10 would amend section 102 of the National Security Act of
1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403, to change the caption to “National Intelligence Director,” to
establish the position of National Intelligence Director not located within the
Executive Office of the President, and to grant the Director principal responsibility
to “(1) serve as head of the intelligence community; (2) act as the principal adviser
to the President, to the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security
Council for intelligence matters related to the national security; and (3) through the
heads of departments containing elements of the intelligence community, and the
30 Letter from Thomas H. Kean, Chair, and Lee H. Hamilton, Vice Chair, 9/11 Commission,
to Representative Peter Hoekstra 1-2 (October 20, 2004).
31 Id. at 2.
32 150 Congressional Record H8977 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2004). See H.R. Rept. 108-724, pt.
2, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (House Committee on Armed Services) (2004) for a section-by-
section analysis of intelligence reorganization provisions related to budget responsibilities
and authorities of the National Intelligence Director.

CRS-24
Central Intelligence Agency, manage and oversee the execution of the National
Intelligence Program.”
Section 1012 “Revised Definition of National Intelligence” of H.R. 10 would
amend section 3(5) of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 401a(5), to provide
that:
the terms “national intelligence” and “intelligence related to
national security” refer to all intelligence, regardless of the
source from which derived and including information gathered
within or outside the United States, that–
(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any
guidance issued by the President, to more than one
government agency; and
(B) that involves–
(i) threats to the United
States, its people, property, or
interests;
(ii) the development,
proliferation, or use of weapons
of mass destruction; or
(iii) any other matter
bearing on United State national
or homeland security.
The amended definitions of the terms “national intelligence” and “intelligence
related to the national security” would differ from the current ones in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401a, quoted in the above section entitled
“Legislation Addressing All Commission Recommendations.” The amended
definitions would delete a portion of the current definitions which state that the terms
“national intelligence” and “intelligence related to the national security” “. . . do not
refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement activities conducted by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General, or otherwise as expressly
provided for in this title.”
Section 1074 “Redesignation of National Foreign Intelligence Program as
National Intelligence Program” of H.R. 10 would strike the word “Foreign” from the
definition of the NFIP in section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.
§ 401a, leaving the term “National Intelligence Program,” but retaining the current
text of the definition which states that it refers to--
all programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence
community, as well as any other programs of the intelligence
community designated jointly by the Director of Central

CRS-25
Intelligence [to be replaced in H.R. 10 by the National
Intelligence Director] and the head of a United States
department or agency or by the President. Such term does not
include programs, projects, or activities of the military
departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and
conduct of tactical military operations by United States armed
forces.
Section 1011 of H.R. 10 would amend section 102A(c) of the National Security
Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403-1, with the caption “Budget Authorities” to provide
that:
(1)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall develop and
present to the President on an annual basis a budget for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States.
(B) In carrying out subparagraph (A) for any fiscal year for
the components of the budget that comprise the National
Intelligence Program, the National Intelligence Director shall
provide guidance to the heads of departments containing
elements of the intelligence community, and to the heads of the
elements of the intelligence community, for development of
budget inputs to the National Intelligence Director.
(2)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall participate
in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual
budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities.
(B) The National Intelligence Director shall provide
guidance for the development of the annual budget for each
element of the intelligence community that is not within the
National Intelligence Program.
(3) In carrying out paragraphs (1) and (2), the National
Intelligence Director may, as appropriate, obtain the advice of
the Joint Intelligence Community Council.
(4) The National Intelligence Director shall ensure the
effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities.
(5)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall facilitate the
management and execution of funds appropriated for the
National Intelligence Program.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in
receiving funds pursuant to relevant appropriations acts for the
National Intelligence Program, the Office of Management and

CRS-26
Budget shall apportion funds appropriated for the National
Intelligence Program to the National Intelligence Director for
allocation to the elements of the intelligence community through
the host executive departments that manage programs and
activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program.
(C) The National Intelligence Director shall monitor the
implementation and execution of the National Intelligence
Program by the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community that manage programs and activities that are part of
the National Intelligence Program, which may include audits and
evaluations, as necessary and feasible.
(6) Apportionment and allotment of funds shall be subject
to chapter 13 [“Appropriations”] and section 1517 [“Prohibited
obligations and expenditures’] of title 31, United States Code,
and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.)
(7)(A) The National Intelligence Director shall provide a
quarterly report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April 1,
2007, to the President and the Congress regarding
implementation of this section.
(B) The National Intelligence Director shall report to the
President and the Congress not later than 5 days after learning
of any instance in which a departmental comptroller acts in a
manner inconsistent with the law (including permanent statutes,
authorization acts, and appropriations acts), or the direction of
the National Intelligence Director, in carrying out the National
Intelligence Program.
Section 1011 of H.R. 10 would amend section 102A(d) of the National Security
Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403-1, with the caption “Role of National Intelligence
Director in Reprogramming” to state that:
(1) No funds made available under the National
Intelligence Program may be transferred or reprogrammed
without the prior approval of the National Intelligence Director,
except in accordance with procedures prescribed by the National
Intelligence Director.
(2) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the
National Intelligence Director before transferring or
reprogramming funds made available under the Joint Military
Intelligence Program.
Section 1101 of H.R. 10 would amend section 102(e) of the National Security
Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403-1, with the caption “Transfer of Funds or Personnel
within National Intelligence Program” to provide that:

CRS-27
(1) In addition to any other authorities available under law
for such purposes, the National Intelligence Director, with the
approval of the Office of Management and Budget–
(A) may transfer funds appropriated for a
program within the National Intelligence Program to
another such program; and
(B) in accordance with procedures to be
developed by the National Intelligence Director and
the heads of the departments and agencies concerned,
may transfer personnel authorized for an element of
the intelligence community to another such element
for periods up to one year.
(2) The amounts available for transfer in the National
Intelligence Program in any given fiscal year, and the terms and
conditions governing such transfers, are subject to the provisions
of annual appropriations acts and this subsection.
(3)(A) A transfer of funds or personnel may be made under
this subsection only if–
(i) the funds or personnel are being transferred to
an activity that is a higher priority intelligence
activity;
(ii) the need for funds or personnel for such
activity is based on unforeseen requirements;
(iii) the transfer does not involve a transfer of
funds to the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central
Intelligence Agency;
(iv) in the case of a transfer of funds, the transfer
results in a cumulative transfer of funds out of any
department or agency, as appropriate, funded in the
National Intelligence Program in a single year–
(I) that is less than $100,000,000, and
(II) that is less than 5 percent of
amounts available to a department or
agency under the National Intelligence
Program; and
(v) the transfer does not terminate a program.
(B) A transfer may be made without regard to a
limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of

CRS-28
subparagraph (A) if the transfer has the concurrence
of the head of the department or agency involved.
The authority to provide such concurrence may only
be delegated by the head of the department or agency
involved to the deputy of such officer.
(4) Funds transferred under this subsection shall remain
available for the same period as the appropriations account to
which transferred.
Remaining provisions of the amended section 102(A) of the National Security
Act of 1947 relate to notifying relevant congressional committees of transfers of
funds and personnel and are substantially the same as reporting requirements in
current law at section 104(d), 50 U.S.C. § 403-4(d) that apply to the Director of
Central Intelligence, but would add a new one to require that transfers of personnel
to or from the Department of Justice must be reported to the House and Senate
Committees on the Judiciary.
Generally, the budget provisions in H.R. 10 would grant to the National
Intelligence Director budget responsibilities and authorities that the National Security
Act of 1947 currently delegates to the Director of Central Intelligence.33 The House
appears not to have acquiesced in the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that
Congress should appropriate a single appropriations act for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities in the National Intelligence Program to the National
Intelligence Director, who would apportion funds to appropriate agencies. As noted
earlier, section 1011 of H.R. 10 would amend section 102A(c)(5)(b) of the National
Security Act to provide that, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in
receiving funds pursuant to relevant appropriations acts for the National Intelligence
Program, the Office of Management and Budget shall apportion funds appropriated
for the National Intelligence Program to the National Intelligence Director for
allocation to the elements of the intelligence community through the host executive
departments that manage programs and activities that are part of the National
Intelligence Program.”
As described above, section 1011 of H.R. 10 also would amend section 102(e)
of the National Security Act of 1947 to impose new limitations on the cumulative
amount of funds that may be transferred out of any department or agency, as
appropriate, funded in the National Intelligence Program in a single fiscal year to less
than $100,000,000, and less than 5 percent of amounts available to a department or
agency under the NIP, and a transfer could not terminate a program. A fund transfer
would be allowed without regard to these limitations if the head of a department or
agency involved concurred in it. Authority to provide such concurrence could only
be delegated by the department or agency head to his or her deputy. As noted in the
discussion of S. 2845 above, the Senate rejected an amendment offered by Senator
Robert C. Byrd that would have imposed these limitations.
33 See the above section entitled “Current DCI Authorities” for summaries of and citations
to these provisions.

CRS-29
H.R. 10 does not contain a provision that would make the aggregate amount of
intelligence funding available to the public as recommended by the 9/11
Commission.34
The October 18, 2004 White House letter which presented the views of the Bush
Administration on H.R. 10 and S. 2845 expressed a preference for budget authorities
that S. 2845 would grant to the National Intelligence Director. It added, however,
that, “The Administration is pleased that H.R. 10 would prevent disclosure of
sensitive information relating to the intelligence budget. Disclosing to the nation’s
enemies, especially during wartime, the amounts requested by the President, and
provided by the Congress, for the conduct of the nation’s intelligence activities would
harm the national security.”35
The letter also said that, “The Administration supports the definition of “national
intelligence” contained in H.R. 10. This definition will further strengthen the NID and
help to promote greater information sharing inside and outside the intelligence
community.”36
S.Res. 445: Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence.
The Senate by a vote of 79 to 6 adopted S.Res. 445, to improve the effectiveness of
the Senate Committee on Intelligence and for other purposes, on October 9, 2004.37
Section 402 established the Subcommittee on Intelligence in the Senate Committee
on Appropriations with “jurisdiction over funds for intelligence matters as determined
by the full committee.”
When S. 445 was brought to the Senate floor immediately after passage of S.
2845, it provided that the Subcommittee on Intelligence “. . . shall have jurisdiction
over funding for intelligence matters.”38 On October 7, 2004, the Senate by voice vote
agreed to an amendment offered by Senator Mitch McConnell for Senator Byrd to add
“as determined by the Senate Committee on Appropriations” after “matters.”39
As noted earlier, the 9/11 Commission recommended that Congress should enact
a single appropriations act for intelligence40 and that either a joint committee, on the
model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, or a single committee in each
34 9/11 Commission Report § 13.2, 416.
35 White House letter at 2.
36 Id. at 6.
37 150 Congressional Record S10925 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004).
38 150 Congressional Record S10544 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004).
39 150 Congressional Record S10664 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2004, Book II) (Amendment No.
3986).
40 9/11 Commission Report § 13.2, 416.

CRS-30
chamber should have jurisdiction over intelligence authorizing and appropriating
legislation.41
On October 7, 2004, the Senate by a vote of 23 to 74 rejected an amendment
offered by Senator John McCain, the sponsor of S. 2774, which addressed all
Commission recommendations, that would have amended the Standing Rules of the
Senate to give jurisdiction “over all proposed legislation, messages, petitions,
memorials and other matters relating to appropriation, rescission of appropriations,
and new spending authority related to funding for intelligence matters” to the Select
Committee on Intelligence, which has jurisdiction over intelligence authorizations.42
41 Id. § 13.4, 420.
42 See 150 Congressional Record S10632-S10646 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2004, Book II) for the
text of and debate and vote on this amendment, No. 3999.

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