Military Role in Space Control: A Primer

Military Role in Space Control: A Primer

Order Code RL32602
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Military Role in Space Control: A Primer
September 23, 2004
name redacted
National Defense Fellow
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Military Role in Space Control: A Primer
Summary
This report reviews Department of Defense (DOD) military space control efforts
and related policy and resources. Since the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. military forces have
become increasingly reliant on space resources for communications, intelligence
imagery, weather, warning, navigation, and timing. Asserting that U.S. space assets
have become an integral part of today’s warfare, the Department of Defense (DOD)
has begun to emphasize the importance of protecting these resources. Although U.S.
military space systems have been relatively unchallenged, military leaders anticipate
increasing threats to these systems, because they provide a significant military
advantage.
DOD defines space control as “the combat, combat support, and combat service
support operations to ensure freedom of action in space for the United States and its
allies and, when directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in space.” DOD space
control initiatives are embryonic and mostly represent legacy resources used for
space surveillance. The DOD budget, however, identifies early stages of developing
counterspace measures.
Military space control efforts, like many other facets of military space, are in a
significant phase of transition. The ability of the United States to harness “space
power” may be critical to victory on the battlefield, especially as information
dominance becomes more pervasive in the ensuing evolution of network centric
warfare. Congress might be faced with decisions involving the projection of military
operations into space, survivability of space systems, and DOD programs to promote
a continual awareness of activities in space. This report will not be updated.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Military Reliance on Space Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Vulnerability of U.S. Military Space Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Impacts of Possible Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Possible Threats and Key Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
National Space Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
DOD Space Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Space Control Mission and Counterspace Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
DOD Space Control Initiatives and Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Possible DOD Long-Term Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix 1. Space Control Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix 2. O&M Budget Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix 3. RDT&E Budget Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix 4. Possible Long-term Space Control Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Military Role in Space Control: A Primer1
Introduction
The Secretary of Defense asserts that “Space is the ‘ultimate high ground.’”2
Since the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. military forces have become increasingly reliant on
space resources for communications, intelligence imagery, weather forecasting,
warning, navigation, and timing. Space-based services facilitate rapid collection,
transmission, and dissemination of information to U.S. forces and decision makers.
Consequently, some say, space is becoming an area the United States may have to
protect.
Space control is one of four national security space mission areas defined in the
current National Space Policy (1996).3 DOD defines space control as the “combat,
combat support, and combat service support operations to ensure freedom of action
in space for the United States and its allies and, when directed, deny an adversary
freedom of action in space.”4 Space control describes the means to ensure U.S.
forces have unhampered access to space and space-based services and to deny an
enemy the advantages of space capabilities. Counterspace operations support the
space control mission and consist of “those operations conducted to attain and
maintain a desired degree of space superiority by allowing friendly forces to exploit
space capabilities while negating an adversary’s ability to do the same.5
Congress might be faced with decisions involving the increased projection of
military operations into space, the survivability of space systems, and oversight of
1 Prepared under the supervision of (name r edacted), Specialist in National Defense,
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
2 “Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld prepared for the House
Armed Services Committee hearing on 2003 Defense Budget Request,” February 6, 2002,
p. 11. A copy of the testimony can be found at the website of the House Armed Services
Committee at [http://www.house.gov/hasc].
3 The White House, “Fact Sheet on National Space Policy” (as defined by Presidential
Decision Directive 8/National Science and Technology Council), September 19, 1996, p.
3-4. A copy of the document can be found at the website of the Office of Science and
T e c h n o l o g y P o l i c y , E x e c u t i v e O f f i c e o f t h e P r e s i d e n t , a t
[http://www.ostp.gov/NSTC/html/pdd8.html].
4 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations,
Joint Publication 3-14, August 9, 2002, p. GL-6. A copy of the document can be found at
the Joint Electronic Library at [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpoperationsseriespubs.htm].
5 U.S. Air Force, Space Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, November 27, 2001,
p. 12. A copy of the document (AFDD 2-2) can be found at the official site for Air Force
administrative publications at [http://www.e-publishing.af.mil].

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DOD programs to promote a continual “situational awareness” of activities in space.
This report reviews DOD military space control efforts and related policy and
resources.6
Military Reliance on Space Systems
Military space control seeks to preserve the military advantage the U.S. military
gains from space. Whether in the form of global communications, Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), navigation signals, meteorological
information, or missile warnings, the most important commodity offered from space
may be information. On March 25, 2004, during his testimony to the Senate
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Retired Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski,
Director of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, stated,
Transformation across the force is happening much faster than we expected when
we announced the journey just 28 months ago. Not just a concept and not just
action in the future, transformation is happening today. It’s happening due in
large part to information and power derived from our vital space capabilities.7
Beginning with the Persian Gulf War in 1991, there has been a steady infusion
of space capabilities into virtually all aspects of U.S. military operations —
navigation, communications, meteorology, missile warning, and targeting
information management.8 The most prominent example includes the use of Global
Positioning System (GPS)-guided precision munitions. In 1999, GPS-guided
weapons demonstrated all-weather precision strike capability during Operation Allied
Force in Serbia and in Kosovo. During the Afghanistan conflict in 2001, precision
munitions comprised two-thirds of all the bombs dropped during the first two months
of the war. Of those precision munitions, 64 percent were GPS-guided Joint Direct
Attack Munitions.9
Military reliance on space also extends to commercial and civil space resources.
According to Army General Joseph Cosumano, Commander of U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command and Army Space Command, during Operation Iraqi
Freedom, over 70 percent of military communications were provided by commercial
6 For more information, see CRS Issue Brief IB92011, U.S. Space Programs: Civilian,
Military, and Commercial, by (name redacted).
7 “Statement of Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of Force Transformation, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Armed Services
Committee, United States Senate,” March 25, 2004, p. 2. A copy of the testimony can be
found at the website of the House Armed Services Committee at
[http://www.house.gov/hasc].
8 Preston, Bob, and Baker, John, “Space Challenges “ in Strategic Appraisal: United States
Air and Space Power in the 21st Century, Khalilizad, Zalmay and Shapiro, Jeremy, editors,
Project Air Force, 2002, p. 154-156. Published 2002 by RAND. This document may be
obtained at [http://www.rand.org].
9 Ibid, p. 155, footnote 13.

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satellites.10 According to a threat analysis from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School,
U.S. military dependence on space systems may continue to outpace DOD budget
and production capability. The analysis concludes that DOD may have to continue
looking to the commercial and civil sectors to satisfy a portion of its space service
requirements.11
Vulnerability of U.S. Military Space Resources
Space systems consist of three segments: the space segment containing
satellites, the ground segment that controls the system operations, and the
electromagnetic links that connect the space segment to the ground segment. The
most significant threats to space systems may be the physical, electronic, and
information warfare threats faced by the personnel, facilities, and equipment
comprising the ground segment and the links to and from the space segment.
However, the possibility also exists for the emergence of threats to U.S. space-based
satellite systems.12 In January 2001, the report of the Commission to Assess United
States National Security Space Management and Organization (the commission is
also called the “Space Commission”), made a statement about the susceptibility of
U.S. space systems. The report states,
The relative dependence of the U.S. on space makes its space systems potentially
attractive targets. Many foreign nations and non-state entities are pursuing
space-related activities. Those hostile to the U.S. possess, or can acquire on the
global market, the means to deny, disrupt, or destroy U.S. space systems by
attacking satellites in space, communications links to and from the ground, or
ground stations that command the satellites and process their data...An attack on
elements of U.S. space systems during a crisis or conflict should not be
considered an improbable act. If the U.S. is to avoid a “Space Pearl Harbor” it
needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on U.S. space systems.13
10 Roosevelt, Ann, “Space Control Vital for Future Operations, General Says,” Defense
Daily, November 3, 2003, p. 11-12.
11 Douglas, Michael L., and Gray, Arlene J., The Warfighters’ Counterspace Threat Analysis
(WCTA): A Framework for Evaluating Counterspace Threats, September 2000, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, p. 16.
12 Baines, Phillip J., “Prospects for Non-Offensive Defenses in Space” in New Challenges
in Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Space Security, James Clay Moltz, editor,
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional Paper No. 12, July 2003, p. 31-33. This
paper may be found at the website of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS),
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), [http://www.cns.miis.edu].
13 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management
and Organization. Pursuant to Public Law 106-65, Washington, D.C., January 11,
2001, p. viii-ix This report is available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/
pubs/spaceintro.pdf]. A synopsis of the report is provided in CRS Report RS20824,
Military Space Activities: Highlights of the Rumsfeld Commission Report and Key
Organization and Management Issues, by (name redacted), February 21, 2001.

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A wide range of military space control options may help mitigate possible
threats. Broad-based space control concepts include offensive and non-offensive
means. Offensive methods may include directed energy weapons (DEW) which
include radio frequency weapons, lasers, and particle beam weapons.14 Offensive
weapons may also include kinetic energy weapons (KEW) which would use the
kinetic energy of a direct impact, or pass close enough to a target for shrapnel from
an exploding device to destroy it.15 Non-offensive techniques include passive
defense methods that protect a satellite from attack or minimize the effects of an
attack, such as hardening, shielding, or redundancy (e.g., fielding many satellites, so
that the loss of one is minimized). Other non-offensive methods may include active
defensive means which avoid or minimize the impact of attack by maneuvering a
space vehicle to avoid damage or rapidly reconstituting a system if it has been
damaged during an attack.16 Refer to Appendix-1 for descriptions of other space
control techniques that may be explored.
Impacts of Possible Attacks
Attacks on U.S. space assets — military, commercial, or civil — may reduce or
eliminate the military effectiveness gained by terrestrial warfighters from space
systems. Tom Wilson, former Space Commission staff member, states, “As harmful
as the loss or degradation of commercial or civil assets would be, an attack on
intelligence and military satellites would be even more serious for the nation in time
of crisis or conflict.”17 In a threat assessment prepared for the Space Commission,
Wilson outlines several scenarios of how an attack on U.S. space assets would affect
military forces. They include:18
! Impairing or eliminating reconnaissance satellites would reduce
situational awareness and could lead to military surprise, an
underestimation of enemy strength and capabilities, less effective
planning, and less accurate targeting and battle damage assessments;
14 Spacy, William, “Assessing the Military Utility of Space-Based Weapons,” in Space
Weapons: Are They Needed? Logsdon, John M. and Adams, Gordon, editors, Space Policy
Institute, Security Policy Studies Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, The
George Washington University, Washington, D.C., October 2003, p. 123. A copy of this
report may be found at the George Washington University, Space Policy Institute website
at [http://www.gwu.edu].
15 Ibid, p. 132.
16 Baines, p. 39-43.
17 Wilson, Tom, Threats to United States Space Capabilities, Prepared for the Commission
to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January
2001, p. 40. This report may be found at the Federation of American Scientists website,
[http://www.fas.org]. The information presented in this paper is based on research done by
the author. Although it was prepared for the Commission in conjunction with its
deliberations, the opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not
represent those of the Commission or any of the Commissioners.
18 Ibid.

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! Impairing or eliminating satellite communications systems would
disrupt troop command and control at all force levels;
! Impairing or eliminating weather satellites and earth observation
systems would make it more difficult to plan effective military
operations;
! Impairing or eliminating navigation satellites would make troop
movements more difficult, aircraft and ship piloting problematic,
and could render many precision-guided weapon systems ineffective
or useless; and
! Impairing or eliminating satellites that detect missile launches would
degrade U.S. ability to perform missile launch warning, missile
defense, and could increase the psychological impact of an
adversary’s missile attacks.
Possible Threats and Key Players
In future conflicts, potential U.S. opponents may possess technologies that will
challenge U.S. space-based capabilities. Adversaries might attempt to jam satellite
uplinks or downlinks. This would make commercial systems, wideband services, and
small mobile users most vulnerable.19 In the summer of 2003, a group of Iranians
operating in Cuba disrupted a U.S.-built commercial satellite communications
transponder carrying a broadcast (Voice of America) to the Middle East.20 This
example and the attempted jamming of GPS signals by Iraqi forces in Operation Iraqi
Freedom may suggest that future adversaries are willing and able to attack America’s
military and commercial space capabilities by this method.21
Because of trends in technology proliferation, globalization of space industries,
and commercialization of space systems, many countries may have the capability to
deploy technologies that can impede U.S. space systems and the ground facilities that
command them. An opponent may exploit electronic countermeasures to disrupt
satellite navigation signals or may choose to develop laser-like means to “dazzle”
imagery and sensing systems. More technically sophisticated opponents may choose
19 Preston and Baker, p. 167-170.
20 Department of the Air Force, U.S. Air Force Space Command, “Strategic Master Plan
FY2006 and Beyond,” October 1, 2003, p. 21. This document may be found at the website
of Air Force Space Command at [http://www.peterson.af.mil/hqafspc]. Butler, Amy, “Heavy
DOD Reliance on Commercial SATCOM Prompts Questions of Protection,” Defense Daily,
April 13, 2004, p. 1.
21 Air Force Space Command, “Strategic Master Plan FY2006 and Beyond,” October 1,
2003, p. 21.

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to develop direct ascent anti-satellite interceptors or ground-based high-energy lasers
to use against low altitude satellites.22
National Space Policy
Presidential Decision Directive/National Science and Technology Council
(PDD/NSTC)-8 defines U.S. national space policy. Directed by President Clinton
on September 19, 1996, the policy identifies key space activities to be conducted in
the interest of U.S. national security. It designates the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence as the responsible officials for overseeing these
actions. The policy directs the following national security space activities:23
! Providing support for the United States’ inherent right of self-
defense and for the defense of allies and friends;
! Assuring mission capability and access to space;
! Deterring, warning, and, if necessary, defending against enemy
attack;
! Ensuring that hostile forces cannot prevent the United States from
using space;
! Ensuring that the United States has the ability to conduct military
and intelligence activities in space;
! Enhancing the operational effectiveness of U.S. and allied forces;
! Countering, if necessary, space systems, and services used for hostile
purposes;
! Satisfying military and intelligence requirements during peace,
crisis, and all levels of conflict; and
! Supporting the activities of national policy-makers, the Intelligence
Community, the National Command Authorities (NCA), Military
Services, and other Federal officials.
Addressing military space control, PDD/NSTC-8 directs that “consistent with
treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate, and maintain space control
capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom
of action to adversaries.” The policy directs that space control capabilities may also
be “enhanced by diplomatic, legal, or other military measures to preclude an
22 Preston and Baker, p. 169. The Soviet Union fielded a co-orbital antisatellite system. It
is not currently thought to be operational. See CRS Issue Brief IB85176, ASATs:
Antisatellite Weapon Systems, by (name redacted). This archived issue brief is available on
request from its author.
23 Fact Sheet on National Space Policy (PDD-NSTC-8), p. 3.

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adversary’s hostile use of space systems and services.”24 On June 28, 2002,
President George W. Bush directed the National Security Council (NSC) to chair a
review of national space policies to focus on possible “revision, consolidation, or
elimination of the existing national space policy statements related to space activities,
and report to the NSC Deputies Committee by February 28, 2003.”25 To date, the
NSC has not made any public recommendations to revise the current policy.
DOD Space Policy
Following directly from the 1996 National Space Policy, Secretary of Defense
William S. Cohen issued Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3100.10, “Space
Policy,” on July 9, 1999. Before this directive, the last major revision of DOD space
policy was in 1987. A memo from Secretary Cohen, which accompanies the DOD
directive, states:
Space is a medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall
be conducted to achieve U.S. national security objectives. The ability to access
and utilize space is a vital national interest because many of the activities
conducted in the medium are critical to U.S. national security and economic
well-being.26
Specifically addressing space control and the defense of the United States, Secretary
Cohen stated:
The capability to control space, if directed, will contribute to achieving the full
dimensional protections, battlespace dominance, and information superiority
necessary for success in military operations.27
DODD 3100.10 establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibility for space
activities within DOD. The following are some of the policies that DODD 3100.10
identifies relating to military space control:28
! Ensuring the freedom of space and protecting U.S. national security
interests in the medium are priorities for space and space-related
activities. U.S. space systems are national property afforded the
right of passage through space and the right to operation in space
without interference; and
24 Ibid, p. 4.
25 The White House, Fact Sheet On National Space Policy Review, National Security
Presidential Directive/NSPD-15, June 28, 2002, p. 1.
26 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3100.10, Space Policy,
July 9, 1999, p. 2. This document may be found at the Washington Headquarters Services
website at [http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives].
27 Ibid, p. 3.
28 Ibid, p. 6-7.

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! Purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be viewed as
an infringement on U.S. sovereign rights. The U.S. may take all
appropriate self-defense measures, including, if directed by the
National Command Authorities (NCA), the use of force, to respond
to such an infringement on U.S. rights.
Space Control Mission and Counterspace
Operations
Counterspace operations implement the space control mission. Air Force
Doctrine Document 2-2 (AFDD 2-2), Space Operations, states the purpose of
counterspace operations is to “attain and maintain a desired degree of space
superiority by allowing friendly forces to exploit space capabilities while negating
an adversary’s ability to do the same.”29 AFDD 2-2 further defines counterspace
operations as consisting of three sub-missions: Space Situational Awareness (SSA),
Defensive Counterspace (DCS), and Offensive Counterspace (OCS). The SSA
mission includes “traditional space surveillance, reconnaissance of space assets,
collecting and processing of space intelligence data, and the analysis of the space
environment.” Defensive Counterspace operations serve to safeguard the ability to
“exploit space by protecting space capabilities from enemy attack or interference.”
Offensive Counterspace operations “preclude an adversary from exploiting space to
his advantage.”30
DOD Space Control Initiatives and Priorities
DOD space control initiatives explore a mix of key technological capabilities
and emphasize the protection of national security interests against known
vulnerabilities and credible threats. On February 25, 2004, in his statement before
the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Peter
B. Teets, Under Secretary of the Air Force, described the near and mid-term DOD
space control initiatives and priorities to ensure freedom of action in space. DOD
near-term initiatives investigate new space surveillance capabilities and ways to
integrate them into space systems that enhance space situational awareness. DOD
is investing to improve the ability to detect, track, and characterize objects in space.
By upgrading to new hardware on selected radar and optical sensors, DOD endeavors
to modernize the Space Surveillance Network and establish it as the mainstay for
space situation awareness. DOD seeks to integrate improved SSN sensor data with
space intelligence and environment data to produce a common “space picture” for
military decision-makers.31
29 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, p. 12.
30 Ibid, p.12-14.
31“Statement by the Under Secretary of the Air Force, The Honorable Peter B. Teets, before
the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives Subcommittee
(continued...)

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Space control may also involve the use of “antisatellite” (ASAT) weapons to
prevent a satellite from performing its mission through destroying it or damaging its
sensors. The Army is currently developing a Kinetic Energy Antisatellite (KEAsat)
system, using ground-launched interceptors that would destroy a satellite through
impact, although the program does not have widespread DOD support. In recent
years, for example, Air Force officials have expressed concerns about these types of
weapons because of collateral damage that could be caused to U.S. and allied
satellites from resulting debris. DOD has not requested funding for KEAsat in many
years, but Congress added money for it in FY1996, FY1997, FY1998, FY2000,
FY2001, and FY2004. The KEAsat program was initiated in 1989 after the Air
Force discontinued an earlier ASAT development program in which the interceptor
was launched from an F-15 aircraft. Several tests of that ASAT device were
conducted, but congressional restrictions on tests against objects in space led the Air
Force to cancel the program in 1988.32 Congressional interest in restricting tests
against objects in space has been renewed by the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA’s)
Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) to study exhaust plumes from rockets to
assist in the design of sensors for other MDA systems. NFIRE is designed to carry
one sensor on the main NFIRE spacecraft, and a second sensor on a “Kinetic Kill
Vehicle” (KKV) that would be ejected from the main spacecraft to make very close
observations of a rocket’s plume. MDA’s FY2005 budget documentation noted that
the KKV might impact the rocket, stimulating debate over whether it was a type of
ASAT or space-based weapons test. DOD reportedly is close to deciding to delete
that part of the mission to assuage congressional concerns.33
Under Secretary Teets described DOD near- to mid-term plans to deploy two
new space-based surveillance and characterization sensors: Space Based Space
Surveillance (SBSS) and Orbital Deep Space Imager (ODSI). SBSS would be a
constellation of optical sensing satellites in low-earth orbit designed to provide
timely and accurate information on satellite locations. The first SBSS satellite is
planned to launch in FY2007. Once operational, the system is to improve U.S.
ability to detect deep-space objects by 80 percent over the current system. The
second new system, ODSI, would be a constellation of geo-synchronous orbit
(...continued)
on Strategic Forces regarding the Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization Budget
Request: Status of the Space Programs,” February 25, 2004, p. 7-8. A transcript of this
testimony may be found at the website of the House Armed Services Committee at
[http://www.armedservices.house.gov].
32 The F-15 ASAT program itself was a follow-on to an earlier Air Force ASAT system that
used ground-launched nuclear interceptors based at Johnston Island. That system was
deactivated in 1975. The U.S. also has performed research on other types of ASAT
weapons, such as ground-based lasers. For more information on the history of the U.S.
ASAT program, see CRS Issue Brief IB85176, ASATs: Antisatellite Weapons Systems, by
(name redacted). This archived issue brief is available directly from its author.
33 For information on the KEAsat program, NFIRE, and other space control activities, see
CRS Issue Brief IB92011, U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military and Commercial, by
(name redacted).

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satellites that is to provide a significant improvement in the ability to track and
characterize objects in space.34
Another defensive counterspace initiative still in development is the Rapid
Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS). Under Secretary
Teets described RAIDRS to have the ability to detect radio frequency interference on
communication satellites and the capacity to locate the attacking source on Earth.
The system will also detect laser attacks attempting to disrupt missile-warning
satellites, such as the Defense Satellite Program (DSP). In addition, offensive
counterspace programs are developing and testing the first counter-communications
systems. The first of these systems has been delivered to the 76th Space Control
Squadron at Peterson AFB, Colorado. The delivery of two more of these first-
generation units is expected in FY2005.35
In the FY2005 DOD appropriations act (P.L. 108-287), Congress fully funded
space control, but made a net cut of $50 million from counterspace systems, leaving
$26 million. The reduction comprised a cut of all $53 million from the Counter
Surveillance Reconnaissance System (the Senate report stated that the Air Force
decided to terminate the program).36
Each military branch has “line items” identified as space control programs in
their budgets. These budgets fund Operations & Maintenance (O&M) costs and
Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts. The Air Force
budget contains most of the DOD space control funds. Appendix-2 and Appendix-3
describe major space control budget activities in the President’s Budget.
Possible DOD Long-Term Programs
In the long-term, DOD envisions a wide range of space superiority programs and
systems. Appendices C and D of the 2003 Air Force Transformation Flight Plan
describe space control initiatives which would explore a wide range of space
situational awareness, offensive counterspace, and defensive counterspace
programs.37 Key unclassified SSA efforts are to include developing on-board space
environment sensors to provide warning of space weather activities, such as solar
flares or winds, to help rule out hostile attack as the cause of a satellite malfunction.38
Key unclassified OCS initiatives are to study developing other counter-
communication, counter-surveillance, and counter-reconnaissance systems. In
34 Peter B. Teets, op.cit., p. 8.
35 Ibid, p. 8-9.
36 S.Rept. 108-284, p. 169.
37 Department of the Air Force. HQUSAF/XPXC. U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight
Plan, November 2003, Appendices C & D, p. C-11-p. D-11. This document was produced
by HQ USAF/XPXC, Future Concepts and Transformation Division. A copy of this
document may be found at the Air Force Link website at [http://www.af.mil/library].
38 Ibid, p. C-12 and p. D-4. See description of the Compact Environmental Anomaly Sensor
II ACTD which is described as a SSA initiative on p. C-12.

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addition, OCS efforts are to explore technology for a short pulse laser, an air-
launched anti-satellite missile, a ground-based laser, a space-based radio-frequency
energy weapons, and other information operations systems.39 DCS efforts are
intended to enhance both active and passive defensive capabilities and explore
various launch concepts to create a more responsive, reliable, and affordable lift
family capability which could be used to launch the next generation of responsive
satellites.40 Appendix-4 provides a summary of key space control programs DOD
described in its transformation plan.
Appendix 1. Space Control Methods

! Hardening. Hardening components on a satellite protects its
receivers, amplifiers, and sensors from directed-energy weapons.
Using filters and optical shutters prevents laser or microwave
weapons from causing harm. Hardening a satellite makes it
increasingly difficult to harm it.41
! Shielding. This technique keeps electromagnetic pulses (EMP)
generated by nuclear detonations or weapons systems from
penetrating satellite cavities and severely damaging a satellite.
Metal shielding and resistant paint coats on the internal surfaces
enhance survivability.42
! Circuit Protection. Another important protection strategy is the use
of “circumvention circuits” in satellite design. During an EMP
event, protective circuits switch off non-essential components to
prevent possible damage by secondary nuclear or EMP attacks.43
! Denial and Deception. Denial prevents an adversary from gaining
information about space systems by reducing the electro-optical and
electro-magnetic signature of satellites. Using thermal blankets and
energy-absorbing materials on satellites makes optical and heat
emissions harder to detect by enemy sensors or radars. Deception is
another technique. This method misleads an adversary into
believing false information about a space system. The use of decoy
satellites is an example of how deception could force an enemy to
waste resources on false targets or withhold fire for fear that it is
“shooting” at a decoy.44
39 Ibid, p. C-12
40 Ibid.
41 Baines, p. 40-41.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid, p. 39-40.

CRS-12
! Maneuvering. Satellites can maneuver to evade enemy surveillance
or targeting. However, most satellites do not carry fuel for this
purpose. A satellite can no longer perform its mission once its
limited supply of propellant is gone. Using maneuvers to avoid
threats would significantly reduce the useful life of a satellite.
Developing an on-orbit refueling capability in the future could
present new opportunities to consider satellite maneuvers as a cost-
effective space control method.45
! Redundancy and Reconstitution. To increase survivability, most
satellites have redundant subsystem packages to prevent single-point
failures, and most system constellations have multiple satellites to
provide system-level redundancy. A Launch-On-Demand (LOD)
capability is another option that could quickly regenerate a
constellation after an attack.46
! Dispersion of Space Systems. Because most satellite orbits are
predictable, scattering them into various orbital altitudes and
positions offers added protection. Dispersion also includes the
building of networks of many smaller satellites, or micro-satellites.
The “micro-sats” would operate collectively to perform the services
of larger and more vulnerable satellites and result in a more
survivable system.47
! Ground Segment Security. Ground control stations provide critical
links used to operate space systems. Since terrestrial targets are
much easier to destroy than targets in space, the ground control
segment is probably the most vulnerable. Protecting the ground
segment not only includes the hardening of facilities to survive
kinetic weapons or EMP attack, but also physical, personnel, and
information security measures. To protect against cyber intrusions
or electronic attacks, firewalls and encryption techniques may be
critical as well. In addition, mobile ground stations could be use to
evade detection and attack, or assume control if a primary facility
were destroyed.48
! Stealth and Cloaking. By minimizing energy reflection and
maximizing the absorption of energy, stealth and cloaking
technologies make satellites difficult to detect through use of radar,
infrared, visual, or acoustic sensors. An option, in the future, may
45 Ibid, p. 41-42.
46 Ibid, p. 43.
47 Ibid, p. 43-44.
48 Ibid, p 45.

CRS-13
be to camouflage a space vehicle in an “adaptive skin” that changes
molecular characteristics and deflects or absorbs incoming energy.49
! Satellite Bodyguards. A large fleet of “satellite bodyguards” in
orbit could protect vital U.S. space assets. Space-based bodyguards
would function as a network of integrated micro-satellites designed
to protect other satellites. These escorts would detect enemy
presence and take actions to negate the threat. A bodyguard system
would likely be costly and require key network components
including sensor detection arrays, high-speed cross-linking
communications, and a robust re-supplying launch capability.50
! Directed Energy Weapons (DEW). This weapon concept involves
projecting intense energy to disable or destroy a satellite. DEWs
would damage a satellite by using lasers, focused radio frequencies,
or particle beams. The notion presents several engineering and
technological challenges. One is trying to solve how to prevent the
loss of energy as the beam travels through the atmosphere. Another
challenge is the need to develop a highly complex targeting solution
to focus a beam on a target for sufficient time to cause damage.51
! Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEW). KEWs generate high-velocity
projectiles to destroy a target. A kinetic energy anti-satellite (ASAT)
weapon may be launched from the ground, air, or space. An ASAT
would approach a satellite and impact, explode, or propel shrapnel
at the intended target to destroy it. “Space mines” employ a
variation of the KEW concept. Pre-positioned near their intended
target well before hostilities break out, a space mine waits in reserve
for a signal to detonate. A significant problem with KEWs is that
they could create debris and possibly present a danger to other space
assets.52
49 Zielinski, Robert H., Worley II, Robert M., Black, Douglas, S., Henderson, Scott A.,
Johnson, David C., “Star Tek-Exploiting the Final Frontier: Counterspace Operations in
2025,” presented as part of Air Force 2025, a study to examine concepts, capabilities, and
technologies, August 1996, p. 28-29. Department of the Air Force. Air Command and Staff
College. Maxwell, AFB. AL. A copy of this report may be found at the website of the Air
University, Air Force 2025 program at [http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025].
50 Ibid.
51 Chun, Clayton K. S., “Striking Out to Space: Technical Challenges to the Deployment of
ASAT Weapons,” p. 28-29. in New Challenges in Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense,
and Space Security, James Clay Moltz, editor, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Occasional Paper No. 12, July 2003. This paper may be found at the website of the
Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), Center for Nonproliferation Studies
(CNS), [http://www.cns.miis.edu].
52 Spacy, p. 133.

CRS-14
Appendix 2. O&M Budget Activities
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
Air Force:
$65.33M
$79.486M
$96.198M
Space Operations —
SPACETRACK
(space)a
Air Force:
$17.668M
$18.275M
$18.985M
Global C3I and Early
Warningb
a Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Operation and Maintenance,
Active Forces, Volume 1, February 2004, p.319. This report may be found at the Defense Link website
at [http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget].
b Ibid, p. 178. This budget activity group includes other space programs that are not part of the space
control mission area, so they have been excluded from the budget numbers represented. “Space
Control” within this budget activity makes up only a small fraction of this budget, which has a baseline
of $.97B in FY2004 and $1.13B in FY2005.
Air Force Space Operations. This funding activity supports the DOD
SPACETRACK program, which is a worldwide network of space surveillance
sensors. The network’s electro-optical and radar sensors provide data for the
following functions: space object identification and cataloging; satellite attack
warning; space treaty monitoring; and scientific and technical intelligence gathering.
Funding in this activity group includes support for Ground-Based Electro-Optical
Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS), HAYSTACK, Millstone, Globus II, Moron
Optical System, and the Maui Space Surveillance Site.53 Also included is the Air
Force Space Surveillance System (formerly the Naval Space Surveillance System
(NSSS)), which includes both the Air Force Space Surveillance Fence and the
Alternate Space Control Center (ASCC). The AFSSS transferred from the Navy to
the Air Force in FY2004.54 The FY2005 request for SPACETRACK was matched
by appropriations conferees.55
Air Force Global C3I and Early Warning. Listed under “Combat Related
Operations,” the Air Force funds counterspace operations in a budget activity
identified as “space control.” The program includes the acquisition of advanced
counterspace systems used for counter-communications, counter-surveillance,
counter-reconnaissance, and attack identification/detection. The Air Force plans to
53 Ibid, p. 318.
54 Department of the Air Force, Procurement Program, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, Budget
Estimates Other Procurement, (February 2004), p. 234. This document provides a
description of the AFSSS. This document can be found at [http://www.
saffm.hq.af.mil/FMB/pb/2005/proc.html]; select “Other Procurement.”
55 P.L. 108-287 (H.Rept. 108-622, p. 113).

CRS-15
field three mobile counter-communication systems in FY2004.56 Appropriations
conferees cut $20 million from the FY2005 request for Global C3I and Early
Warning, but the space control segment will be unaffected and thus, fully funded.57
56 Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, O&M, Active Forces, Volume 1, p. 176.
57 Public Law 108-287. H.Rept. 108-622, p. 116, and telephone conversation between CRS
and USAF Office of Legislative Liaison.

CRS-16
Appendix 3. RDT&E Budget Activity
Each military service pursues RDT&E activities in space control. The Army
requested, and appropriations conferees matched, $13M in FY2005 to explore space
control surveillance, negation and battle management techniques.58 The Navy is
pursuing space control initiatives in Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW).
Appropriations conferees matched the Navy’s request of $25.9M for FY2005.59 The
Air Force budget funds the majority of space control RDT&E efforts and received
$252.7M in FY2005. Air Force space control initiatives are funded in FY2005 under
three programs: SPACETRACK ($161.8M), Space Control Technology ($15.0M),
and Counterspace Systems ($75.9M).60
SPACETRACK Program. This budget reflects a collection of linked
developmental efforts aimed at accelerating the evolution of the Space Surveillance
Network (SSN). One of the program’s main efforts is to build an operational
architecture capable of disseminating to warfighters a Space Common Operational
Picture (Space COP). The Air Force FY2004/2005 Biennial RDT&E Budget
Estimates identify the following initiatives:61
! Acquiring the Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) system,
which is a constellation of satellites designed to provide timely space
situational awareness. The project follows the successful testing of
optical sensors on the Mid-Course Space Experiment (MSX). MSX
demonstrated the ability to track objects in space from a space-based
platform. The Air Force estimates a budget of $78.9M in FY2004
and $109.5M in FY2005. Appropriations conferees cut $27 million
from this program in FY2005, and added $5.4 million for a radar
58 Department of the Army, Supporting Data FY 2004/2005 President’s Budget Submitted
to OSD, Descriptive Summaries of the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army
Appropriation, Budget Activities 1, 2, and 3, Office of the Secretary of the Army (Financial
Management and Comptroller), February 2003, Army RDT&E Budget Item Justification
(R-2 Exhibit), Budget Activity 3 - Advance technology development, PE 0603006A-
Command, Control, Communications Advanced Technology, p. 394-398. This report may
be found at the Defense Link website at [http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/
fy2005]. Public Law 108-287 (H.Rept. 108-622, p.242).
59 Public Law 108-287 (H.Rpt.108-622, p.278).
60 Department of Defense, Defense Budget Materials, Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense (Comptroller) FY2005 Budget, RDT&E Budget (R-1), February 2004. p. F-4, F-5,
and F-12. This report may be found at the Defense Link website at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2005].
61 Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates,
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), Descriptive Summaries, Volume
III, Part II, Budget Activity 7, February 2003, p. 1737-1767. This report may be found at
the SAF/FM website at [http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/FMB/pb/afpb.html].

CRS-17
upgrade.62 The effort continues past FY2009 and has an
approximate total cost of $801.6M through FY2009.63
! Developing the Orbital Deep Space Imager (ODSI). The system
will provide near-real time, high-resolution imagery of
geosynchronous satellites. This capability will support battle space
awareness and defensive counterspace operations. The Air Force
projects a cost of $3.9M in FY2004 and $8.8M in FY2005.
Appropriations conferees matched the FY2005 request.64 The
development effort will continue past FY2009 and has an estimated
total cost of $499.7M through FY2009.65
! Implementing Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP). The
programs aim to extend the life of SPACETRACK radar systems by
upgrading the hardware and software of equipment located at Eglin
Air Force Base, the Navy Space Surveillance Fence, and at the
HAYSTACK site at Westford, Massachusetts. The estimated
budget is $19.8M in FY2004 and $31.7M in FY2005.
Appropriations conferees matched the FY2005 request.66 The
program will continue through FY2008 and has an estimated total
cost of $116.8M.67
Space Control Technology Program. This program supports a range of
activities including planning, development, demonstrations, prototyping, modeling,
simulations, exercises, and development of counterspace tactics. The Air Force
FY2005 budget request supports two Advanced Component Development and
Prototype (ACD&P) projects that investigate space control technologies. They are
62 Public Law 108-287 (H.Rept. 108-622, p.330).
63 Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates,
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), Descriptive Summaries, Volume
III, Part II, Budget Activity 7, February 2003, p.1749.
64 Public Law 108-287 (H.Rept. 108-622, p.330).
65 Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates,
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), Descriptive Summaries, Volume
III, Part II, Budget Activity 7, February 2003, p. 1737.
66 Public Law 108-287 (H.Rept. 108-622, p.330).
67 Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates,
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), Descriptive Summaries, Volume
III, Part II, Budget Activity 7, February 2003, p. 1759.

CRS-18
Space Range and Technology Insertion Planning and Analysis (TIPA).68
Appropriations conferees matched the FY2005 request for both of these programs.69
The FY2005 budget for the Space Range Initiative is $6.4M. The program
supports a “virtual” test range at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, which develops
space tactics and conducts operational testing and training of new space systems.
ACD&P efforts include the development of a “Scintillation Phenomonology”
Support Sensor (SPOSS), “Red” UHF testing system, an Adversary Network
Emulator, and a mobile communications analysis and test system.70
TIPA initiatives, appropriated $8.7M in FY2005, include efforts from all
counterspace areas. Space Situational Awareness efforts focus on developing key
enabling technologies — monitoring, detecting, identifying, tracking, assessing,
verifying, categorizing, and characterizing objects and events in space. Defensive
Counterspace (DCS) efforts aim to evaluate the vulnerability of U.S. satellites, space
links, and ground control facilities, by studying protective measures against
numerous threats including optical jammers, radiation effects, kinetic energy impacts,
data fusion, and data mining. The investigation also examines techniques to deny an
adversary the use of U.S. assets, such as GPS. OCS efforts concentrate on the
development of advanced techniques involving operations in counter-
communications, counter-surveillance, and counter-reconnaissance. The current
objective of OCS initiatives is to produce negation capabilities that have temporary,
localized, and reversible effects.71
The Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite (KEAsat) program has had Congressional
support despite no funding requests by DOD in several years. Past ASAT initiatives
include both Air Force and Army programs. See CRS Issue Brief IB92011, U.S.
Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and Commercial, September 8, 2004, pp. CRS-
12 and CRS-13, for a discussion of U.S. ASAT development.
Counterspace Systems Program. This program capitalizes on Space Control
Technology initiatives. The FY2005 budget is $75.9M with estimated total costs
through FY2009 of $361.1M.72 The Air Force FY2005 RDT&E budget identifies the
following three major initiatives:
! Counter-Satellite Communications System (CSCS): The program
FY2005 budget is $6.24M. This request was matched by
68 Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), Descriptive Summaries, Volume II, Budget
Activities 4-6, February 2004, p. 517. This report may be found at the Defense Link website
at [http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2005].
69 Public Law 108-287 (H.Rept. 108-622, p.314).
70 Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), Descriptive Summaries, Volume II, Budget
Activities 4-6, February 2004, p. 524-527.
71 Ibid, 519-523.
72 Ibid, 869.

CRS-19
appropriations conferees.73 It explores the development of mobile
and transportable systems with a capability to disrupt satellite
communications signals. One system was delivered in FY2004 and
two more are scheduled for delivery in early FY2005. Important
acquisition milestones (System Requirements Review and Critical
Design Review) are scheduled to begin in late FY2005 for a second-
generation “Block 20" system.74
! Counter-Surveillance Reconnaissance System (CSRS): This
program had supported concept exploration and follow-on system
development of mobile and transportable systems to counter space-
based surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. In the FY2005
DOD appropriations act (P.L. 108-287), Congress fully funded space
control, but made a net cut of $50 million from counterspace
systems, leaving $26 million. The reduction comprised a cut of all
$53 million from the Counter Surveillance Reconnaissance System
(the Senate report stated that the Air Force decided to terminate the
program.75
! Rapid Identification Detection and Reporting System
(RAIDRS): This system is intended to detect the source of attacks
on space assets and provide decision-makers with near real-time
attack warning, threat identification, and threat characterization.
Current efforts focus on developing target “geo-location” and laser
detection capabilities. Initial system delivery should occur in late
FY2006. The second spiral capability should begin in FY2008 and
will focus on developing “data fusion” capabilities. The FY2005
budget is $16.4M and continues past FY2009.76 Appropriations
conferees matched the FY2005 request.77
73 Public Law 108-287 (H.Rept. 108-622, p.326).
74 Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), Descriptive Summaries, Volume II, Budget
Activities 4-6, February 2004, p. 871-874.
75 S.Rept. 108-284, p. 169.
76 Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), Descriptive Summaries, Volume II, Budget
Activities 4-6, February 2004, p. 879-882.
77 P.L. 108-287 (H.Rept. 108-622, p. 326).

CRS-20
Appendix 4. Possible Long-term Space Control
Initiatives78
! Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missile: This program is to develop
small air-launched missiles capable of intercepting satellites in low-
earth orbit.
! Communication/Navigation Outage Forecasting System: The
system is to combine data from ground-based and sea-based sensors
to provide real-time predictions of disturbances in the ionosphere
that might affect satellite communications and navigation systems.
This would help space forces distinguish between an attack on space
systems and natural phenomena.
! Compact Environmental Anomaly Sensor II: This system is to
be an on-board space environment sensor that would help rule out
hostile attack as the cause of a satellite malfunction and provide
warnings of dangerous space environment conditions.
! Global Launch and Test Range: The program is to provide
necessary Command and Control for the Space Maneuver Vehicle
and the Space Operations Vehicle. The system would be a key
enabler of responsive launch and operation of new space vehicles
and refueling/repair of existing vehicles.
! Ground-Based Laser: The system would propagate laser beams
through the atmosphere to Low-Earth Orbit satellites to provide
robust defensive and offensive space control capability.
! Orbital Transfer Vehicle: This program could significantly
increase the flexibility, warfighting utility, and protection of U.S.
space assets by repositioning and enabling on-orbit servicing of
those assets.
! Space-Based Radio Frequency Energy Weapon: This system
would be a constellation of satellites containing high-power radio-
frequency transmitters that possess the capability to disrupt, destroy,
or disable a wide variety of electronics and national-level command
and control systems. It would be a non-kinetic anti-satellite weapon.
! Space Maneuver Vehicle: This program is to provide a rapidly
reusable orbital vehicle deployed from the Space Operations Vehicle
or Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle. It would be capable of
executing a wide range of Space Control missions.
78Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, Appendices C & D, p. C-11-D-11.

CRS-21
! Space Operations Vehicle: This vehicle would be intended to
provide on-demand spacelift capability with rapid turn-around,
multiple standardized payloads, space vehicle maintenance, ISR,
offensive and defensive counterspace, and space surveillance
capabilities

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