Foreign Terrorist Organizations

RL32223 -- Foreign Terrorist Organizations

February 6, 2004

CONTENTS

Summary

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Primary Area(s) of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization

Re-Designated

Issues of Interest to Congress

Other CRS Products

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Names(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Primary Area(s) of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-Designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

'Asbat al-Ansar

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Primary Area(s) of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Date added to the FTO list

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Primary Area(s) of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Products

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Communist Party of Philippines/New People's Army

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Primary Area(s) of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Primary Area(s) of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

HAMAS

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

Originally Designated

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Hizballah

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Primary Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Sponsors and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Primary Area(s) of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Jemaah Islamiya (JI)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Al-Jihad

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favorite Tactics

Anti-American Activity

Primary Area(s) of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Products

Kahane Chai (Kach)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Legal Challenges to Designation

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

National Liberation Army (ELN)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Primary Area(s) of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Other CRS Reports

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactic

Anti-American Activity

Primary Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Other CRS Reports

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Primary Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Sponsors, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activity

Primary Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Al Qaeda

Names

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activity

Primary Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Real IRA (RIRA)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Primary Area(s) of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Revolutionary Nuclei

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Primary Area(s) of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding and Constituencies

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November, N17)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F)

Names

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activity

Primary Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Re-designated

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Reports

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

Name(s)

Goals and Objectives

Brief History

Favored Tactics

Anti-American Activities

Primary Areas of Operation

Strength and Composition

Connections with Other Groups

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding

Originally Designated as an FTO

Issues of Concern for Congress

Other CRS Products

Footnotes

Summary

This report analyzes the status of many of the major foreign terrorist organizations that are a threat to the United States, placing special emphasis on issues of potential concern to Congress. The terrorist organizations included are those designated and listed by the Secretary of State as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations." (For analysis of the operation and effectiveness of this list overall, see also The 'FTO List' and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, CRS Report RL32120.) The designated terrorist groups described in this report are:

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

'Asbat al-Ansar

Aum Supreme Truth (Aum) Aum Shinrikyo, Aleph

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

Communist Party of Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)

Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)

HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)

Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)

Hizballah (Party of God)

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)

Jemaah Islamiya (JI)

Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)

Kahane Chai (Kach)

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK, KADEK)

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)

Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)

National Liberation Army (ELN -- Colombia)

Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)

Al Qaeda

Real IRA (RIRA)

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Revolutionary Nuclei

Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)

Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)

Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)]

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL)

United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC)

Source: U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. (Some spellings have been altered.)

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

Name(s). Fatah -- Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, Black June and Black September.

Goals and Objectives. ANO's goal is to destroy the state of Israel and establish a Palestinian state.

Brief History. The ANO was founded in 1974 by Sabri al- Banna whose nom de guerre, Abu Nidal, means "father of the struggle." Abu Nidal was a high-ranking official in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and served as PLO representative to several Arab states. Abu Nidal bitterly opposed the idea of a Palestinian state co-existing with an Israeli state and after the PLO began leaning towards reconciliation with the Jewish state, he split with the group to form the ANO.

The ANO was once one of the most feared transnational terrorist organizations in the world.(1) Its operations, which included kidnapping, murders, bombings and hijackings, have killed approximately 900 people and injured several hundred more across three continents and 20 countries.(2) Over the years, Iraq, Syria, and Libya each reportedly harbored Abu Nidal and often hired the ANO to execute attacks that were in their interests.(3) As a result, the ANO's selection of targets has been diverse and inconsistent, depending largely on the demands of the state sponsor.

The ANO has targeted Jews both inside and outside of Israel, but also targeted moderate Palestinians and Arabs who supported peace talks with Israel. ANO is responsible for the assassinations of senior Jordanian diplomat Naeb Imran Maaytah outside the embassy in Beirut in 1994,(4) Abu Iyyad, the PLO's second-in-command in 1991, and Abu el-Hol, commander of the Western Sector forces of Fatah in 1991.(5) The group is also known for simultaneous attacks on Israeli airline counters in Rome and Vienna which killed 18 people and injured 111. In August 2002 Abu Nidal reportedly killed himself in his apartment in Baghdad where he was being treated for leukemia. However, the multiple gunshot wounds to his head leave unanswered questions surrounding his apparent suicide.(6) The extent to which the ANO is still active is under debate.

Favored Tactics. Its operations include kidnapping, murders, bombings and hijackings.

Anti-American Activities. While the ANO sometimes targeted Western interests, there is only one incident in which it directly targeted a U.S. interest. On July 22, 1985, ANO attempted to bomb the U.S. embassy in Cairo but failed.

Primary Area(s) of Operation. From1974-1980, ANO headquarters were based in Baghdad, where the group reportedly took direction from the Iraqi administration to carry out attacks against primarily Syrian and PLO targets. The ANO later relocated to Syria, then Libya, and finally Lebanon.(7) Today, ANO militants reportedly reside in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, but over the years, the group's activities have reached far beyond the confines of its state sponsors.(8) When the ANO was active in the 1970s and 1980s, it executed attacks in 20 countries, including Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sudan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.

Strength and Composition. According to the State Department, the ANO consists of a few hundred members.(9)

Connections with Other Groups. The ANO does not appear to be connected with any other group.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The ANO received funding and logistical assistance from several state supporters throughout the 1970s and 1980s, including Iraq, Syria and Libya.(10)

Originally Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. October 8, 1997.

Re-Designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Interest to Congress. The mysterious circumstances of Abu Nidal's death beg some questions. If it was a murder, published speculation spans from the killers being agents of Saddam Hussein seeking to eliminate any ties the regime may have had to terrorist groups, to the murderers being henchman of Yasir Arafat carrying out revenge for the murders of PLO officials by Abu Nidal.(11) In addition, the viability of ANO as a terrorist organization is up for debate; some might question whether it should continue on the designated foreign terrorist organization list. Third, it is unclear what impact the sanctions imposed on the ANO had or are having on state sponsorship for the group.

Other CRS Products.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by [author name scrubbed], updated June 10, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Names(s). Abu Sayyaf Group, Abu Sayyaf, ASG

Goals and Objectives. Abu Sayyaf Group is a radical Islamic group in the Philippines. Its stated goal is to establish a separate Islamic state for the minority Muslim population of the Philippines, which is predominantly located in the southern islands of Mindanau and the Sulu Archipelago. Most claim, however, that since the late 1990s ASG has essentially become a violent gang of bandits seeking financial gain.(12)

Brief History. The original leader of ASG, Abubakar Janjalani, fought in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Returning to the Philippines in 1990, he founded Abu Sayyaf on the island Mindanao, the traditional home of Philippine Islamic radicalism, to continue the cause there.(13) In 1998, Janjalani was killed in a shootout with police in Basilan. Since then, a single strong leader has not emerged, and the ASG has become more a confederation of loosely coordinated commands led by the personal power of individual leaders. Khaddafi Janjalani, Abubakar's brother, is the head of one such command in the Basilan province and the closest thing the overall ASG is believed to have to a leader.(14)

In the early 1990s, the group conducted bombings, kidnappings, and executions of Filipino Christians. In 2000, the group apparently changed focus and began to kidnap foreigners, including tourists, journalists, and others to extract ransom payments.(15) In April 2000, a $25 million ransom payment for three French journalists was reportedly funneled from European governments through Libya.(16) In May 2000 Khaddafi Janjalani led a speedboat raid some 300 miles across the Sulu Sea to kidnap 20 tourists from a Palawan island resort, including three Americans (see below).

In October 2001, the U.S. sent military observers to Mindanao to assess the ASG. In November, President Bush extended $93 million in military aid to President Arroyo and offered direct military assistance.(17) In January 2002, the U.S. sent 650 troops (150 special forces and 500 support forces) to the Philippines to operate under strict rules of engagement negotiated in June. Troop strength rose to around 1,300 at the height of operations. The results of Filipino-U.S. cooperation include increased security cooperation with Philippine forces, the apparent erosion of ASG strength from an estimated 850 fighters to around 450, the expulsion of much of ASG from Mindanao to the Sulu island group, the death of ASG leader Abu Sabaya, the rescue of Gracia Burnham, and an apparent decrease in the local population's support for ASG as a result of U.S. led civic action projects.(18) The majority of U.S. forces withdrew by July 31, 2002.

Favored Tactics. The group is renowned for its brutality. It has conducted bombings, kidnappings, and extortion, as well as massacres and beheadings.

Anti-American Activities. In May 2000, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped a group of 20 foreigners that included three Americans, Guillermo Sobero of Corono, California and Martin and Gracia Burnham, Christian missionaries from Wichita, Kansas. In June 2001, Abu Sayyaf announced that Abu Sabaya, who was holding Sobero, had beheaded him. In June 2002, the Philippine military launched a rescue mission based on American intelligence. Martin Burnham and a Filipino nurse, Ebidorah Yap, were killed, but Gracia Burnham was rescued.(19) The three Americans were apparently held for ransom rather than for ideological or political reasons. The Bush Administration reportedly facilitated a $300 million ransom payment to ASG from the Burnham family. The couple was not released after the payment was made.(20)

Areas of Operation. ASG is based in the southern Philippine islands of Mindanao and the Sulu island group and conducts most of its activities there. In 2000, the group abducted tourists and journalists in Malaysia, demonstrating an extended reach. However, since joint U.S.-Philippine operations, most of ASG has been forced off Mindanao and southward to Jolo and other Sulu islands.(21)

Strength and Composition. The group is comprised of Filipino Muslim radicals. The State Department estimates that ASG has between 200 and 500 members.(22) According to the Philippine government, the group's strength reached 1,000 in 2001 as a result of successful kidnappings and the influx of ransom money.(23) That number has dropped as a result of the post-9/11 government crackdown and military assistance from the United States to around 450.(24) The group maintains its own fleet of speedboats to carry out their abductions and move quickly between island bases.

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Links between ASG and Al Qaeda are the subject of debate. It is generally believed that the group received funding from Al Qaeda in the early 1990s through Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda collaborator Ramzi Yousef operated in the Philippines in the mid-1990s and reportedly trained Abu Sayyaf fighters. However, there is little information about recent cooperation between Al Qaeda and ASG. Some have claimed that Abu Sayyaf is subordinate to Al Qaeda, but others contend that because of the group's blatant use of ransom and extortion for profit, a close association between the two is unlikely.(25) The 2002 edition of the U.S. State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism does not mention any ties to Al Qaeda.(26)

Though Janjalani's first recruits were dissidents from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), radical Islamic groups in the Philippines, such as the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the MNLF, deny having links with Abu Sayyaf. Both distance themselves from ASG because of its attacks on civilians and its profiteering. The Philippine military, however, has claimed that elements of both groups provide support to Abu Sayyaf.(27)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The group obtains most of its financing through ransom and extortion. One report estimated its revenues from ransom payments in 2000 alone between $10 and $25 million.(28) According to the State Department, it may also receive funding from radical Islamic benefactors in the Middle East and South Asia.(29) "Libya was a conduit for ransoms paid to Abu Sayyaf and other Filipino Muslim groups...[Libya] also offered money for 'livelihood projects' in its role in the 2000 hostage negotiations...this raises the possibility that Libyan money gets channeled to Abu Sayyaf."(30)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines might raise questions for Congress over their cost, the scope of the war on terrorism, and the rules of engagement for American troops in assisting foreign counter-insurgency campaigns in the context of the war on terrorism. Congressional oversight of the role of the United States in fighting this group may be important. Some have questioned whether this group is appropriately classified as a terrorist group or whether it might be better considered a criminal gang of thugs. If the latter, then its place in the post-9/11 war on terrorism is open to question. The issue of the ASG's ties to Al Qaeda is also relevant here. The role of Libya in providing ransom money to this group may be relevant to future debates about whether Libya should be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)(as amended)). Finally, the relationship between Abu Sayyaf and both the MILF and MNLF is ambiguous and controversial. Given the importance of the Philippines as an ally to the United States, this group will bear watching.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32120, The 'FTO List' and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by [author name scrubbed], October 21, 2003.

CRS Report RL31152(pdf), Foreign Support of the U.S. War on Terrorism, by [author name scrubbed], Huda Allen, [author name scrubbed], updated August 8, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, [author name scrubbed], updated November 18, 2003.

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003.

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

Name(s). al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion

Goals and Objectives. Al-Aqsa aims to expel Israeli soldiers and settlers from the West Bank and Gaza, and to establish a Palestinian state.

Brief History. Al-Aqsa is an offshoot of Yasser Arafat's Fatah, and emerged just after the start of the second Intifada in September 2000. The organization's goals are to create a Palestinian state and eliminate the presence of Israeli soldiers and settlers in the Palestinian- occupied territories. The group is secular in theory, but has been known to recruit young militants espousing Islamic fundamentalism.(31)

Unlike Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa does not claim to be intent on destroying the state of Israel.(32) Initially, al-Aqsa militants exclusively attacked Israeli Defense Force and Israeli settlers, but experts say that by early 2002 al- Aqsa began targeting civilians in Israel.(33) This shift may have been due to the heightened intensity of the Intifada, including the increased death toll of Palestinians and what al- Aqsa militants believe to be Israel's "targeted killing" of the group's West Bank leader, Raed Karmi, on January 14, 2002.(34) Since then, al-Aqsa's attacks have become more severe, and in January 2002 the group introduced the use of female suicide bombers.(35) In January 2003, al-Aqsa militants conducted two suicide bombings in downtown Tel Aviv that killed 23 people and wounded approximately 100.

Since the start of the second Intifada, al-Aqsa militants have executed more attacks than even Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad(36). While other Palestinian groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah agreed to observe a cease-fire in June 2003, al-Aqsa refused to do so. Less than 24 hours after the other groups declared the cease-fire, al-Aqsa killed a Romanian worker on a settlement road near Jenin in the West Bank.(37)

Favored Tactics. Al-Aqsa uses many tactics, including suicide bombings (including by women), knifings, shootings, and kidnappings.

Anti-American Activities. Al-Aqsa does not directly target U.S. interests. However, the State Department has said that at least one U.S. citizen and four U.S.-Israeli dual citizens have been killed in al-Aqsa attacks.(38)

Primary Area(s) of Operation. Al-Aqsa operates in Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The group's bases are said to be in Nablus and Ramallah.(39)

Strength and Composition. According to the State Department, the number of members in al-Aqsa is unknown. Some experts estimate that the group consists of a few hundred young men and women.(40)

Connections with Other Groups. Al-Aqsa's connection with Yasir Arafat's Fatah -- the largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization -- is murky. Some Israeli experts and the government itself assert that al- Aqsa is clearly linked with Yasser Arafat and Fatah.(41) They cite as proof Israeli intelligence acquisition of an apparent al- Aqsa invoice, addressed to the Palestinian Authority (PA) chief financial officer. In their view, this intelligence suggests that al- Aqsa militants are "on the Palestinian Authority's payroll, [al-Aqsa's] activities are financed out of Palestinian Authority coffers, and its attacks are carried out with the knowledge and backing of Yasser Arafat's inner circle."(42)

Al-Aqsa has sometimes cooperated operationally with both Hamas and Palestinian Jihad.(43)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The source of al-Aqsa's funding is unclear. The sophistication of al- Aqsa attacks suggests that the group is well funded. Israeli forces claim to have recovered an invoice from a raid on PLO head Yasir Arafat's compound in April 2002 that outlines the disbursing of funds from the PLO to the al-Aqsa Brigades. Israel claims that the invoice conclusively proves Yassir Arafat's money supports for the group. However, Arafat has dismissed the "invoice of terror" as a forgery.(44) Yasser Arafat has neither "officially recognized nor openly backed" al- Aqsa.(45)

Originally Designated as an FTO. March 27, 2002.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Since early 2002, this group has killed a significant number of civilians in Israel. Its use of suicide attacks has been particularly frequent and deadly. The question of whether or not Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Authority provide money for this group (see above) will continue to be controversial. This group's violent activities, and the Israeli response to them, may continue to affect the viability of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by [author name scrubbed], updated June 10, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 22, 2003.

Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

Name(s). Armed Islamic Group, GIA

Goals and Objectives. GIA is a loose-knit radical Islamic organization in Algeria. While it is unclear whether the group has a central authority or is a collection of smaller affiliated bands, it apparently seeks to overthrow the secular government of Algeria and replace it with a fundamentalist state based on Islamic law.

Brief History. GIA formed in early 1993 after the secular Algerian government cancelled elections apparently because the Islamic party, Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was poised to win. (GIA split from Islamic Salvation Army, the armed wing of FIS.) Returning Algerian veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union united with disparate radical Islamic groups to form GIA. Since 1993, the group has attacked the government and the military, but also conducted brutal massacres of civilians and foreigners in Algeria, sometimes slaughtering entire villages. On December 31, 1997, the group reportedly killed 400 Algerian civilians in a small town in the space of a few hours.(46) Several recent accounts allege, however, that some massacres may have been conducted by, or with the complicity of, the Algerian government.(47) The group's activity has diminished because of a military crackdown and widespread popular revulsion to the killing of civilians. Since 1998, GIA has apparently been eclipsed by the better organized though smaller offshoot called Salafist Group For Call and Combat (GSPC, see below).

Favored Tactics. GIA is best know for slitting the throats of its victims, but it has employed a variety of other methods, including bombs, targeted assassinations, and airline hijackings.

Anti-American Activities. Although GIA targeted French and other European interests in both Europe and Algeria, there is only one instance where the group has directly threatened U.S. interests. In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, a supposed member of the GIA, was arrested while on route from Canada to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport.(48)

Areas of Operation. GIA operates mainly within the borders of Algeria. It has reportedly raised funds and conducted attacks in Western Europe through Algerian expatriate communities. In 2002, a French court convicted two GIA members for a series of bombings that took place in France in 1995.

Strength and Composition. GIA's membership is predominantly Algerian Islamic militants. It is difficult to estimate the size of GIA because it is less cohesive than many other organizations. The group's strength has apparently decreased substantially from its peak in the mid-1990s, but there is disagreement about the current number of members. The State Department estimates that the group's strength is now "probably fewer than 100."(49) The International Institute for Strategic Studies puts its overall strength at "less than 1,500," divided into cohorts of 50-100.(50)

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. There is evidence of connections between GIA and Al Qaeda. In mid-2002, the London-based Arabic newspaper Al Hayat cited Algerian sources alleging that an Al Qaeda operative visited Algeria to arrange cooperation between GIA and GSPC.(51) In September 2002, a captured GIA leader stated that in the mid-1990s, Osama bin Laden provided financial assistance to GIA.(52) It is possible that many Algerian members of Al Qaeda are or have been associated with GIA.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, GIA has no known sources of external support.(53) As noted above, captured GIA members have asserted that bin Laden provided funding to GIA in the mid-1990s. The group reportedly receives aid from Algerian expatriates in Western Europe and Canada.(54)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-Designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The apparent connections between GIA and Al Qaeda make this group of particular importance to the United States in the war on terrorism. The flow of funding to GIA from expatriates in Western Europe and Canada raises questions of whether or not efforts to counter terrorist financing are succeeding.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], updated May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31247(pdf), Africa and the War on Terrorism, by [author name scrubbed], updated January 17, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by [author name scrubbed], updated May 30, 2003.

'Asbat al-Ansar

Name(s). 'Asbat al-Ansar, also spelled 'Osbat al-Ansar or 'Usbat al-Ansar, meaning the "League of Partisans."

Goals and Objectives. 'Asbat al-Ansar aims to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon and to eliminate anti-Islamic and U.S. influences in Lebanon and elsewhere.

Brief History. Established in the 1990s, 'Asbat al-Ansar is a small, relatively new, but highly active Sunni extremist group based primarily in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in the southern port of Sidon, Lebanon. Its leader is Abdel-Karim al-Saade or Abou Mohjen and the group opposes Lebanon's representative government, seeking to replace it with an Islamic state governed by Shari'a law.(55) Its constituents, primarily Palestinian refugees, reject peace with Israel.(56)

'Asbat al- Ansar targets interests and people that it perceives as "un-Islamic," including both soldiers and civilians, Arabs and Westerners. Churches, bars, nightclubs, theaters, liquor stores, and casinos have all been attacked by 'Asbat al- Ansar militants -- as have members of rival militant groups and moderate government officials. In 1999, 'Asbat al-Ansar assailants sprayed gunfire and hurled grenades at a courthouse in Sidon, killing four Lebanese judges. In an attack against an atypical target, in January 2000, militants launched a rocket-propelled grenade at the Russian embassy in Beirut, reportedly as a gesture of solidarity with the Chechen rebels.(57)

Favored Tactics. 'Asbat al-Ansar militants primarily use small bombs and grenades to launch attacks against their targets.

Anti-American Activities. In 2002, 'Asbat al-Ansar stepped up its attacks and rhetoric against U.S. targets. The group is a suspect in the November 2002 killing of Bonnie Penner, an American missionary in Sidon.(58) 'Asbat al-Ansar is similarly suspected in a string of bombings against U.S. restaurants in Lebanon.(59)

Primary Area(s) of Operation. The group is based in Lebanon, primarily in the 'Ain al- Helweh Palestinian refugee camp in Sidon. To a large extent, 'Asbat al- Ansar is able to reign freely in Lebanon's refugee camps -- without repercussions from the Lebanese government -- because of an Arab League law that stripped Lebanon of governmental jurisdiction over the camps. Hence, the camps -- where several militant and guerilla group such as Fatah and 'Asbat al- Nour are also said to be operating -- are "off-limits" to Lebanese law enforcement and security officials.(60) 'Asbat al-Ansar's attacks have so far been limited to targets in Lebanon.

Strength and Composition. The group consists of approximately 300 militants, mostly Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.(61)

Connections with Other Groups. Experts suspect that 'Asbat al-Ansar is affiliated with Osama bin Laden and the al- Qaeda network.(62) The allegation hinges on the connection of an Australian of Lebanese origin named Bilal Khazal who apparently forms a link between Asbat al-Ansar, the Tripoli Cell, and Al Qaeda. Khazal heads Australia's Islamic Youth Movement that is accused of recruiting Islamic fundamentalists. The CIA claims that "the Al Qaeda leadership has allegedly delegated responsibility"(63) to Khazal, and the Australian press claims "Bilal Khazal has been linked to an alleged Spanish Al Qaeda operative Abu Dahdah, who is accused of having strong links with one of the brains behind the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks."(64)

A group known as the Tripoli Cell attempted to assassinate U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Vincent Battle in January 2003. Arrested members of the Tripoli Cell admitted to also being Asbat al-Ansar members and reportedly told a military court in Beirut that the group's leader, Mohammed Ka'aki "received at least $1,800 from Khazal."(65) Some experts believe, then, that Khazal may have formed the linchpin between Asbat al-Ansar, through the Tripoli Cell, to Al Qaeda, although this is subject to dispute.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The State Department says that 'Asbat al- Ansar likely receives aid from extremist Sunni groups as well as Osama bin Laden and the al- Qaeda network.(66)

Date added to the FTO list. March 27, 2002.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group threatens the Lebanese government, rejects peace with Israel and also reportedly tried to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon (see above). It may also have ties to Al Qaeda. Within the context of the war on terrorism, it bears watching in future months.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], updated May 23, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB89118, Lebanon, by Clyde Mark, updated November 19, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, [author name scrubbed], The Middle East Peace Talks, updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Report RL31078(pdf), The Shi'ba Farms Dispute and Its Implications, by Alfred Prados, updated August 7, 2001.

Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)

Name(s). Aum Supreme Truth (Aum), Aum Shinrikyo (means "teaching the supreme truth" on the "powers of destruction and creation in the universe"), Aleph

Goals and Objectives. Aum aimed to control Japan and the world, and subsequently create a global utopian society.

Brief History. Established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, an eccentric, half-blind intellectual, Aum reflects an eclectic and twisted blend of Tibetan Buddhist, Hindu, Taoist and Christian thought. It focuses on spiritual existence in a world that its adherents view as increasingly hedonistic, superficial and materialistic. Asahara claimed that the state of the world indicated that apocalypse was nearing and would begin with a U.S. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on Japan. His group sought to hasten that apocalypse, take over Japan and the globe, and herald a new order from chaos.(67)

To this end, Aum sought to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities.(68) On June 27, 1994 Aum released the nerve agent, sarin, over a district in central Japan, killing seven people and injuring hundreds. In its deadliest and most infamous attack, on March 20, 1995, ten Aum followers punctured bags of diluted sarin in five subway stations located under government offices and the National Police Agency's headquarters. Twelve people were killed and up to 6,000 were injured.(69) In response, Japanese security forces arrested Aum followers, including Asahara, and closed laboratories and production facilities. Nine members of the group have since been sentenced to death and Asahara continues to stand trial. A verdict is expected in Asahara's trial in February 2004.

The group has renamed itself "Aleph," meaning beginning, and is under the new leadership of Fumihiro Joyu.(70) It has issued a public apology and promised at least $2.5 million in reparations for victims of the attack.(71) It has also renounced violence in the political and spiritual processes. Although the group has not been associated with any terrorist act since 1995, Japanese officials are still concerned, saying that it is 'no less dangerous than it was seven years ago.'(72) Security forces closely monitor the group's activities, and under new legislation, are permitted to conduct raids of Aum facilities. The group has reportedly renewed its recruiting activities, disseminating videos and posting web pages in Japanese, English and Russian.(73)

Favored Tactics. Aum has used chemical weapons against civilian and government targets. In 1993 the group attempted to spread anthrax from one of its facilities in Tokyo, and in 1995 Aum punctured bags of sarin with umbrellas in the Tokyo subway that killed 12 and injured up to 6,000.(74) According to one source, "Members had tried on no fewer than eight different occasions between 1990 and 1995 to aerosolize anthrax bacteria and botulinum toxin at locations around Tokyo."(75) According to some experts, Aum produced or acquired enough sarin to kill an estimated 4.2 million people.(76)

Anti-American Activities. Aum has not targeted Americans or U.S. interests in the past. However, Asahara often preached anti-American rhetoric to his constituents, including the sentiment that the United States was at fault for Japan's economic and social ills.(77)

Primary Area(s) of Operation. Aum has solely attacked targets in Japan, but its followers and its administrative offices extend beyond Japan. Analysts suspect that Aum once maintained offices in Australia, Germany, Russia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Ukraine, and the United States.(78) There are still reportedly a large number of members of Aleph in Russia.

Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates that Aum currently consists of 1,500 to 2,000 followers.(79) Some experts say that at its peak, the group had 60,000 followers, including 10,000 in Japan, as many as twenty to thirty thousand in Russia, and an additional ten to twenty thousand worldwide.(80) As recently as August 2003, the Russian Orthodox Church has claimed there are more Aum members in Russia than in Japan.(81) Aum's spiritual message has appealed to young, well-educated individuals characterized as "alienated by society's preoccupation with work, success, technology and making money."(82)

Connections with Other Groups. Unknown.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Reportedly owning nearly $1.4 billion in assets, Aum has proven itself to be a wealthy and self-reliant group.(83) It operates a computer store that reportedly generates annual sales of approximately 7 billion yen (about $63 million).(84) It has been reported that Aum's computer businesses have been highly lucrative because dedicated cult followers work for little or no wages, allowing Aum to undersell its competitors. The sophisticated technical capabilities of many members of Aum give this group the ability to generate robust sources of funds. In addition to high-tech goods, the cult generates revenue through sales of publications and spiritual goods.(85)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Aum was the first terrorist group to have used so-called weapons of mass destruction. The group's willingness to use chemical and biological weapons makes it of special concern, especially considering that Japanese authorities are still very wary of the group's intentions and that it continues to exist.

With a reportedly large contingent of followers in Russia and the group's past record of recruiting educated scientists, attention might be focused on whether Aum/Aleph is seeking to use its Russian members to acquire more weapons and resources from Russian facilities.

Other CRS Products.

CRS Report RS20412, Weapons of Mass Destruction-The Terrorist Threat, by Steven Bowman, updated December 8, 1999.

CRS Report RL31831, Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context, by [author name scrubbed], March 28, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB97004, Richard Cronin, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, updated November 14, 2003.

CRS Report RL31609(pdf), Japan's Economic and Security Challenges, by Richard Nanto, updated October 16, 2002.

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

Name(s). Basque Fatherland and Liberty; Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA

Goals and Objectives. ETA aims to establish a Basque homeland based on Marxist principles in the ethnically Basque areas in northern Spain and southwestern France.

Brief History. ETA was founded in 1959 by Basque Marxist rebels incensed by the efforts of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco to suppress the Basque language and culture. Since then the group has carried out numerous attacks in Spain and some in France. More than 800 people have been killed in ETA attacks since its founding.(86) The group is best known for assassinating high level Spanish officials. In 1973, the group assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, the heir apparent to Franco, and in 1995 Spanish politician and now president Jose Maria Aznar narrowly escaped an attack. Spanish King Juan Carlos was also the target of an unsuccessful plot. In addition, the group has targeted lower-level officials, journalists, and civilians.(87)

In the past two years, the Spanish government has made important breakthroughs against ETA, arresting over 120 suspected members and accomplices, seizing assets, and disrupting planned operations. France has also recently arrested a number of suspected members. ETA apparently does not enjoy broad support among Basques: often its attacks are followed by anti-violence demonstrations, and moderate political parties that reject violence do much better at polls than do parties supportive of ETA.(88) In general, ETA seems to be declining: the number of attacks and killings has fallen (from 43 in 2001 to 20 in 2002), its financial assets appear to have been squeezed through international cooperation, and its reported IRA collaboration has been hurt by the Irish group's cease fire.(89)

Favored Tactics. ETA has conducted bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and assassinations.

Anti-American Activities. ETA has not been known to target Americans or U.S. interests.

Areas of Operation. ETA operates mainly in the Basque regions of Spain and France which include Alava, Guipuzcoa, Navarra and Vizcaya. The group has also carried out attacks throughout Spain.

Strength and Composition. The U.S. State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002 estimates ETA's strength at several hundred members, plus supporters.(90)

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The group apparently has links to the Irish Republican Army, and some believe that it has often followed the IRA's lead in terms of tactics and operations.(91) Terrorism experts believe that ETA may also have helped Colombian terrorists to bomb a social club in Bogota in early 2003.(92)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. ETA members have reportedly received training in Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Nicaragua, as well as sanctuary in Cuba. The ETA finances itself through kidnappings, robberies, and extortion.(93) The group has been known to rob banks, traffic in drugs, and extort money from businesses in the Basque regions.(94)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The measures taken by the United States and its allies to freeze ETA resources have apparently had an effect upon funding for the group. While some Basques in the United States have sympathy for Basque self-determination, it does not appear that expatriates in the U.S. are providing resources for the violent activities of the ETA. Some terrorism experts point to Spanish government measures in dealing with the ETA, especially in recent years, as a case study of effective state counterterrorism, although not all would agree. Others are concerned about the very hard political line that has been taken against further Basque autonomy, including against moderates who are not engaged in violence. Recent cooperation between France and Spain in dealing with the ETA, as well as measures instituted by the European Union, are arguably an example of effective transnational counterterrorism.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31612(pdf), European Counterterrorist Efforts since September 11: Political Will and Diverse Responses, [author name scrubbed], coordinator, October 17, 2002.

Communist Party of Philippines/New People's Army

Name(s). Communist Party of Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA).

Goals and Objectives. To establish a Marxist state in the Philippines via a violent uprising against the Philippine government.

Brief History. The New People's Army (NPA) is the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. It was established in 1969 by Jose Sison and is recognized as Southeast Asia's longest-running Marxist insurgency.(95) This Marxist group has remained active over the course of 34 years in spite of major shifts in global politics, including the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new ideological players such as Al Qaeda. In June 2003, the NPA executed its deadliest attack in more than a decade when 200 of its militants raided a Philippine army camp, killing 17 people.(96) In response, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo condemned the attack and ordered an urgent crackdown on the group. Prior to this attack, the Philippine government had tried twice to engage the group in peace talks. Peace talks were in progress in 2001, but were halted after the NPA assassinated two Philippine congressman. Talks were resumed in 2003, but NPA rebels rejected a peace accord with the government, claiming that they are under extreme duress after being listed on European and U.S. terrorist lists.(97)

Favored Tactics. The NPA primarily targets Philippine citizens and interests. It has been known to use a variety of methods, including kidnapping, assassinations, and arson. It also has front groups in the labor and university sectors of Philippine society.

Anti-American Activities. The NPA was responsible for attacks against U.S. military interests in the Philippines prior to the closure of the U.S. military bases there (Clark and Subic) in 1992. Since then, the NPA has continued to oppose the presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines and has demanded that the U.S. military stay out of domestic affairs. In 2002, the NPA objected to being designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and threatened retaliatory attacks against Americans and U.S. interests. In 2003, the NPA threatened to target U.S. troops in the Philippines who have been participating in a joint military exercise to train Philippine soldiers with the skills to combat the Abu Sayyaf Group.(98)

Primary Area(s) of Operation. The NPA operates solely in the Philippines, particularly in rural Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. It also reportedly has cells in Manila.(99)

Strength and Composition. The NPA consists of 10,000 to 13,500 members.(100) According to the State Department, the group had reached an armed strength of over 25,000 in mid-1985. The NPA went into a steep decline due to Corazon Aquino's restoration of democracy, more effective Philippine military operations, and, perhaps most decisive, internal divisions and purges within the Communist Party in the context of the international decline of their ideology. By 1993-94, NPA strength fell to an estimated 5,000. Since then, however, there has been slow growth up to an estimated 11,000 members. The reasons for the resurgence appear to be continued economic hardships in the rural areas and the restoration of a more monolithic leadership of the Communist Party (CPP) under the exiled Jose Sison.(101) Sison and other CPP leaders are living in the Netherlands.

Connections with Other Groups. Unknown.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. NPA raises money through several mechanisms. It reportedly collects "revolutionary taxes" from rural communities by taxing food and other items.(102) The group also raises money by engaging in criminal activities such as extortion. Philippine officials estimate that the group gathers about $1.8 million each year.

Originally Designated as an FTO. August 9, 2002.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group is a threat to a major U.S. ally, the Philippines. It has threatened to renew attacks against U.S. citizens and it may be growing in numbers.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and [author name scrubbed], updated November 18, 2003.

CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003.

al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)

Name(s). al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, also spelled al- Jama'a al-Islamiyya, (Islamic Group, IG).

Goals and Objectives. The IG aims to overthrow the secular Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state, governed by Shari'a law and devoid of "un-Islamic" influences.

Brief History. Established in the late-1970s, the IG, an Islamic militant group, was one of the largest and most active Islamic groups in Egypt. Several key events and phenomena served as catalysts for the group's formation and the beginning of its violent attacks. The most notable event occurred in 1978 when Egypt, under President Anwar Sadat's leadership, became the first Arab country to sign a peace accord with Israel (the Camp David Accords). At about the same time, Sadat introduced progressive social legislation, including measures to strengthen the rights of women. Sadat also began cracking down on and imprisoning members of militant Islamic groups -- a shift in policy from years of practicing a more tolerant approach towards them. These policies prompted the IG's spiritual leader, Sheikh Omar Abdel al- Rahman,(103) to issue a fatwa calling for the assassination of Sadat, who was killed in 1981.(104) Although another Egyptian group, al- Jihad, was primarily responsible for the assassination, several IG militants were involved and were convicted in connection with the crime.(105)

The IG is likewise suspected of a 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while traveling in Addis Ababa.(106) In general, the organization has targeted people and interests that they believe obstruct its vision of an Islamic state, including government personnel, police officers, tourists, Coptic Christians, secular intellectuals, and employees in banks, video stores, and theaters. The Egyptian government blames the group for the deaths of over 1,300 people.(107)

In recent years, the IG is probably best known for the 1997 massacre of 58 foreign tourists at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor, Egypt.(108) Since the Luxor attack, the IG has split unofficially into two different ideological camps.(109) The goal of both groups remains the attainment of an Islamic state. However, one faction, led by Rifa'i Taha Musa, condones the use of violence to achieve these ends, and the other, led by Mustafa Hamza, condemns the use of violence.(110)

The IG has not apparently engaged in a terrorist attack inside Egypt since 1998.(111)

Favored Tactics. The IG employs several different tactics, using car bombs, suicide bombs, and gunfire.

Anti-American Activities. The IG has not directly targeted U.S. citizens or interests, although the assassination of Sadat was considered a severe blow to U.S. foreign policy interests in the region. However, the group has previously threatened violence against American interests and reportedly considered kidnapping Americans to use as leverage to win the freedom of its leader Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman."(112) In 1998, the group's current operational leader, Rifa'i Taha Musa, signed Osama bin Laden's proclamation that calls for attacks against U.S. citizens.(113)

Primary Area(s) of Operation. The IG is based in southern (Upper) Egypt, primarily in the regions of al- Minya, Assiut, Qina, and Sohaj. The organization reportedly has some support in Cairo and Alexandria, and also boasts a presence in Afghanistan, Austria, Sudan, United Kingdom, and Yemen.(114)

Strength and Composition. The IG has an unknown number of followers, but at its peak it consisted of several thousand militants. Experts suspect that the group has lost members since the 1990s, a phenomenon that may be attributable to a 1999 cease-fire, as well as a government crackdown on militant groups since the 1997 attacks on tourists at Luxor and the September 11 attacks.(115) The group has tended to attract disenfranchised university graduates who may be frustrated by widespread unemployment in the country.

Connections with Other Groups. The IG allegedly maintains close contact with the Egyptian Islamic extremist group, al- Jihad. The two groups share members and reportedly jointly planned and carried out the assassination of Sadat and the attempted assassination of Mubarak.(116) IG may also have a connection with Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network. Dr. Ayman al- Zawahiri, a leader within the IG and al-Jihad movement, is a close associate of bin Laden (see al-Jihad below). Considering the close connections between al-Jihad and the IG, Zawahiri provides a key link between IG and Al Qaeda.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the Egyptian government, the IG receives aid from Iran, bin Laden and Afghan militant groups.(117) The organization may also receive some funding from Islamic non-governmental organizations.(118)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group's potential threat to the Egyptian government and murky funding sources (see above) make it a serious concern in the war on terrorism. Its link to Al Qaeda make it a potential threat to the United States.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31247(pdf), Africa and the War on Terrorism, by [author name scrubbed], updated January 17, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB93087, Egypt-United States Relations, by Clyde Mark, updated October 10, 2003.

HAMAS

Name(s). Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia; Islamic Resistance Movement; HAMAS; Hamas.

Goals and Objectives. Hamas is a radical Islamic Palestinian organization that initially sought to expel Jews and the state of Israel from Israel/Palestine, and to establish an Islamic Palestinian state based on Islamic law. These goals appear to have been moderated somewhat in recent years, however, with indications that the group would likely accept a favorable Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

Brief History. Hamas split off from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood organization in 1987, taking a much more militant line than its parent organization in terms of both Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in Israel/Palestine. The group maintains both a social services wing that reportedly runs "clinics, kindergartens, orphanages, colleges, summer camps and even sports clubs,"(119) and a terrorist wing that carries out attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets. Its social services wing has been very popular and important among Palestinians. Hamas has carried out scores of bombings and has been among the most vigorous participants in the first (1987-1990)and second (2000-present) Intifadas (or Palestinian uprisings against Israel). The group has opposed the Middle East peace process and has positioned itself as a challenger to the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip, which it criticizes for making concessions to Israel and for corrupt and ineffective government.(120)

Recently, Ariel Sharon's government has become much more aggressive in targeting Hamas leaders for assassination, including Hamas founder Sheikh Salah Shehada (killed July 2002), bomb-maker Muhammed Deif (killed September 2002), Abdel Aziz Rantisi (June 2002) and most notably spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin (September 2002).(121) Yassin and Rantisi are still alive.

Favored Tactics. Since 1994, the primary terrorist tactic of Hamas has been suicide bombings.(122) Hamas bombers have not generally fit the expected profile, sometimes including older men and people with relatively well-paying jobs and families. The group has also employed car bombings, mortar attacks, and assassinations.(123)

Anti-American Activities. According to the State Department, the group has not targeted U.S. interests. Several U.S. citizens have died as a result of Hamas bombings in Israel, although Americans do not appear to have been intentional targets.(124) Most notably, five American citizens were among 65 killed in a series of four joint Hamas-Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ, see entry below) bombings in 1996.

Areas of Operation. Hamas operates in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but is strongest in the latter. The group also has presences in Syria, Lebanon, and the Gulf States.(125)

Strength and Composition. The members of Hamas are Palestinian Islamic radicals. The number of official members is unknown. According to some estimates, the group has "tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers" for its uncompromising anti-Israel position and its attacks against Israel, its opposition to corruption in the Palestinian Authority, and its network of social services.(126)

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Hamas' closest ally is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ-See below). Initially, PIJ and Hamas did not maintain ties; in fact, some analysts viewed them as rivals.(127) Since 1994, the two groups have apparently collaborated on several fronts: they have conducted joint attacks and planned simultaneous bombings. In 2000, Time Magazine reported that Hamas and the PIJ were being courted by Iran to coordinate their efforts and derail the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Time also reported that Hizballah, a group deeply connected to Iran, was the intermediary that facilitated this process.(128) There have also been numerous reports that Hamas members received training and logistical support from Hizballah facilities in southern Lebanon.(129) In June 2003, PIJ and Hamas published a joint statement declaring a cease-fire to end attacks on Israelis and Israeli interests.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Hamas reportedly receives some aid from Iran (10% of its budget by some estimates) but apparently derives most of its financing from Palestinian expatriates around the world, private sympathizers in Arab states, and legitimate businesses in Palestinian controlled areas.(130)

The Bush Administration accuses Syria and Iran of harboring and supporting Hamas.(131) Both states are opposed to Israel and the peace process, and both claim that Hamas and other Palestinian groups opposed to Israel are legitimate freedom fighters.(132) During the Second Intifada, which began in late 2000, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein reportedly gave money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, including Hamas members. Furthermore, Israel has accused Saudi Arabia of allowing money raised in state-run telethons to go to support Hamas.(133) Secretary of State Colin Powell implied sympathy for that allegation by stating, "There are some troubling aspects as to how that telethon money would be distributed."(134) Hamas reportedly also runs money-generating businesses in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and abroad.(135)

Finally, Hamas is known to acquire money from charities operating in the West, reportedly including The Palestinian Relief Development Fund (U.K.); the Holy Land Foundation (U.S.-assets currently frozen); Al Aqsa Foundation (Germany with branches in Holland and Belgium); and Comite de Bienfaisance et Solidarite avec la Palestine (France).(136)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group apparently has significant financial resources and extensive international ties. The combination of strong social services and brutal terrorist attacks makes Hamas highly influential and dangerous. Hamas is crucial to the future prospects of any Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Recent U.S. efforts at curtailing terrorist financing have targeted charitable foundations that help support the activities of Hamas. The role of Saudi Arabian citizens in supporting Hamas, directly or indirectly, has been subject to much scrutiny and criticism in the United States.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 23, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by [author name scrubbed], updated June 10, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB93113, Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations, by Alfred Prados, updated November 14, 2003.

Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM)

Name(s). Jamiat ul-Ansar; Party of the Volunteers; Movement of Holy Warriors; formerly Harakat -ul-Ansar.

Goals and Objectives. HUM is a Pakistan-based Islamic militant organization that seeks to wrest Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control and create an Islamic state encompassing Pakistan and these territories.

Brief History. Founded by Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the HUM was initially founded to fight the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union in the 1980's. After the Soviet pullout, HUM turned its focus on Kashmir, where it has carried out attacks against Indian interests in the Indian-controlled territory of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1998, Khalil signed Osama bin Laden's fatwa calling for attacks on Americans and other Western targets. In December 1999, HUM hijacked an Indian airliner which resulted in the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, who had been imprisoned by India since 1994 for association with HUM attacks.(137)

After his release, Ahzar broke with the HUM and formed the new Jaish-e-Muhammad, taking many HUM members with him (Jaish-e-Muhammad, see below). In recent years, HUM activities have decreased significantly, and crackdowns on Islamic militants in Pakistan have left the group under-funded and under-supported.(138) In February 2000, longtime leader Khalil handed control of the group over to Farooq Kashmiri Khalil, and in 2001, after the HUM was banned by President Pervez Musharraf, Khalil renamed the group Jamiat ul-Ansar.(139)

Favored Tactics. HUM has attacked Indian military, government, and civilian targets in Kashmir with bombs and various other means. The group has also highjacked airliners.

Anti-American Activities. Despite signing Osama bin Laden's 1998 declaration against the United States, the group has not been known to target U.S. interests primarily. HUM remains focused on Kashmir and Jammu. However, in 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested three members of an HUM subgroup, the al-Almi faction, which admitted to the June 14, 2002 bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Karachi that killed 11 people.(140)

Areas of Operation. HUM is based in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and conducts insurgent and terrorist operations in Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir. In the past, the group has operated training camps in Afghanistan.(141) Members of HUM have reportedly participated alongside other Islamic militants in operations in Central Asia, Bosnia, and Burma.

Strength and Composition. HUM is comprised of Islamic radicals from Pakistan and Kashmir, as well as some Arab veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. The group is believed to have several thousand armed supporters. The group lost much of its strength in 2000 in defections to the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM, see below), and its activities have decreased since.(142)

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The leader of HUM signed Osama bin Laden's 1998 fatwa calling for attacks against American soldiers and civilians. The group is believed to have maintained ties with bin Laden and Al Qaeda, but the nature of these ties is unclear.(143) HUM has also cooperated with other Islamic militant groups operating in Kashmir and Pakistan.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. HUM receives financial support from sympathizers not only in Pakistan and Kashmir, but also in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.(144) The group allegedly also raises funds among Pakistani and Kashmiri expatriates in Europe, primarily Britain.(145) Its fund-raising in Pakistan has been largely curtailed since the government crackdown on extremists following 9/11. The government of India has long accused Pakistan of supporting and encouraging militant Islamic groups operating in Kashmir, to include HUM.

Originally Designated. as an FTO October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. An important concern for the United States in its war on terrorism is the apparent cooperation between HUM and Al Qaeda. The convergence of a local, territorially-based agenda aimed at Jammu and Kashmir with a global, anti-American, "international jihad" focus is worrisome. Having its major locus of operations in Pakistan, a nuclear state that is allied with the United States but potentially unstable, is also a serious concern. Finally, attacks by the HUM exacerbate the tensions between India and Pakistan, two nuclear states apparently often on the brink of war.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed],, updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], updated May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], updated March 8, 2004.

CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by [author name scrubbed], updated March 28, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed], , updated November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL31587(pdf), Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], updated September 30, 2002.

Hizballah

Name(s). Hezbollah, Party of God, Islamic Jihad, The Revolutionary Justice Organization, The Islamic Resistance, Organization for the Oppressed on Earth.

Goals and Objectives. According to its manifestos, Hizballah is dedicated to the liberation of Jerusalem, the destruction of Israel, and the ultimate establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon.(146)

Brief History. Established in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics and ideologically inspired by the Iranian revolution, Hizballah was formed in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The group was the principal supporter of anti-Western and anti-American terrorism in the 1980's and is directed by its Majlis al-Shura, or Consultative Council. Since 1992, Hizballah has participated in Lebanon's political system and currently holds 12 seats, with its allies, in parliament.(147) Other terrorist activities include the highjacking of TWA Flight 847 (1985), the detention of 18 American hostages in Lebanon throughout the 1980's and 1990's, the bombing of Israel's Embassy in Argentina (March 1992), and the bombing of the Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association in Bueno Aires (July 1994).(148) During its 15-year military insurgency campaign against Israeli and Israeli-aligned forces in Southern Lebanon, Hizballah carried out rocket attacks that killed Israeli civilians.(149)

Favored Tactics. Hizballah has engaged in kidnappings, bombings, and highjackings, as well as rocket strikes against Israeli settlements and the firing of surface-to-air missiles at Israeli jets.(150)

Anti-American Activities. Hizballah's most active period of anti-American targeting occurred during the 1980's and resulted in a very large number of U.S. casualties. Under the alias Islamic Jihad,(151) Hizballah has been implicated in or is known to have carried out the truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut (April 1983), the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut (October 1983, killing 220 Marine, 18 Navy, and 3 Army personnel), and the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut (September 1984).(152) Hizballah also claimed responsibility for an April 1984 bombing that killed 18 people in Torrejon, Spain. An additional 82 persons, including 15 Americans, were wounded. Of their strictly terrorist acts between 1994 and 2002, however, none has been directly targeted at U.S. citizens or assets. However, some experts believe there may be a resurgence in anti-American activity. For example, Singapore's Internal Security Department claims to have foiled a Hizballah plot to attack U.S. shipping interests in the 1990's.(153) Moreover, Hizballah has pledged retaliation for the death of Ali Hussein Saleh, a Hizballah security official, for which the group blames both the United States and Israel.(154) Finally, some experts have warned of Hizballah's potential for "wreaking havoc" in post-war Iraq, although there is no direct evidence of a Hizballah role there so far.(155)

Primary Areas of Operation. Hizballah operates in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Bekaa valley, and southern Lebanon. It has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North American, and Asia.(156)

Strength and Composition. The group is believed to have two to five thousand supporters and a few hundred terrorist operatives.(157)

Connections with Other Groups. Saudi and Bahraini investigations claim that Hizballah maintains connections with other Shiite groups bent on anti-regime activity throughout the Gulf region. Furthermore, portions of the U.S. government's indictment against bin Laden for the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 state that "Al Qaeda also forged alliances with... Hezbollah (variant spelling), for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies in the West, particularly the United States."(158)

State Sponsors and Other Sources of Funding. Iran supports Hizballah with financial, political, and organizational aid, while Syria provides diplomatic, political, and logistic support.(159) In May 1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher testified that Iran provides "up to $100 million a year in the case of Hezbollah [sic]."(160)

The group also seeks financial aid from overseas, as evidenced by the U.S. arrest in 2002 of Chawki and Muhamod Hammoud, who are accused of using a cigarette smuggling operation to generate funds for Hizballah.(161)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The U.S. approach to Hizballah is complex. Hizballah has adopted a political role within Lebanon and is represented in the Lebanese Parliament, with 12 seats (with its allies) out of 128. Apparently mainly because it forced Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, Hizballah is popular in the Arab world. Hizballah is a designated foreign terrorist organization and has global assets. The Lebanese government has refused to freeze the financial assets of Hizballah. Hizballah has killed a large number of Americans, especially during the 1980s, and has apparently cooperated with Al Qaeda on training and logistics;(162) however, it has apparently not carried out attacks directly against Americans in recent years. Some experts claim that the group is a growing threat to the United States, potentially comparable to Al Qaeda; others dispute this assessment and argue that failing to distinguish between the groups will increase their incentives to cooperate, ultimately increasing the threat to the United States.(163)

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB89118, Lebanon, by Clyde Mark,,updated October 21, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Report RL31078(pdf), "The Shi'ba Farms Dispute and its Implications," by Alfred Prados, updated August 7, 2001.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Name(s). Islamic Party of Turkestan.

Goals and Objectives. The IMU is a radical Islamic organization seeking to overthrow secular rule in Uzbekistan. The group reportedly also seeks Islamic rule in other Central Asian countries and to fight against those it deems enemies of Islam.(164)

Brief History. The IMU was formed in Afghanistan by radical Islamic opponents of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who is accused of brutally repressing opposition to his rule and suppressing Islam. However the roots of the IMU go back as far as December 1991, when the mayor of the eastern city of Namangan refused to grant a group of young Muslims land on which to build a Mosque, and the men seized the Communist Party headquarters. The men were led by Tohir Abdouhalilovitch Yuldeshev, and Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev (alias Juma Namangani). Yuldeshev was a 24-year-old college drop-out and mullah in the Islamic underground movement. Khojaev was a former Soviet paratrooper who apparently had his Muslim faith revitalized while fighting against the mujahidin while he served in Afghanistan.(165)

Under intense government pressure, Yuldashev fled Uzbekistan, was given refuge in Afghanistan by the Taliban, and began networking with Islamic groups. Namangani made a name for himself as a bold fighter in the Tajik civil war.(166) In 1996, the two men announced the formation of the IMU, and reportedly helped the Taliban against the Northern Alliance, even leading troops in battle. From bases in Tajikistan, the group launched a terror campaign against the Uzbek government.

Because of tight security, the group has generally been unable to operate in Uzbekistan and has been more active in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Many of the group's leaders, including Namangani, were killed or captured during the U.S.-led war against the Taliban in 2001.(167)

Favored Tactics. The IMU has primarily used bombings and armed guerilla warfare.

Anti-American Activities. In August 2000, the IMU kidnapped four American mountain climbers, who escaped after pushing their IMU guard off a cliff.(168) The IMU also fought alongside the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan in late 2001.

Areas of Operation. The IMU operates throughout Central and South Asia, especially in the Ferghana Valley, where the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik borders converge.(169) The group is known to have operated in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan.(170)

Strength and Composition. The U.S. State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, estimates that the IMU probably now has fewer than 1,000 militants.(171) Before the U.S.-led war against the Taliban, which badly hurt the group, the IMU was believed to have had closer to 2,000 members.(172)

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. IMU leaders are believed to have formed ties to Al Qaeda while both were based in Afghanistan in the late 1990s.(173) IMU members are believed to have trained at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan before the fall of the Taliban.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The IMU received support from other Islamic extremist groups as well as from sympathizers in the Middle East and South Asia. Before the post-9/11 crackdown, Al Qaeda is believed to have been a major supporter of the IMU.(174) The group is reportedly heavily involved in the Central Asian opium trade; by one account, the group handles 70 percent of opium trafficking in the region.(175)

Originally Designated as an FTO. September 25, 2000.

Re-designated. September 25, 2002.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group could play a role in impeding the success of the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the future stability of a post-Taliban state. Although the IMU was seriously damaged during military hostilities against the Taliban regime, its role in the drug trade is of growing concern, as are its very close ties to Al Qaeda.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL31213, China's Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], updated October 7, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB93108, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, by [author name scrubbed], updated November 6, 2003.

CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia's Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol, updated April 3, 2003.

CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], updated January 9, 2003.

CRS Report RS21041(pdf), Taliban and the Drug Trade, by Raphael Perl, updated October 5, 2001.

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)

Name(s). Army of Mohammed; Khaddam ul-Islam.(176)

Goals and Objectives. The JEM aims to end Indian rule in disputed Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), expel Indian security forces from the region, and unite J&K with Pakistan.

Brief History. The JEM is a Pakistan-based, militant Islamic group founded by Maulana Masood Azhar in March 2000. Indian authorities arrested Azhar in February 1994 in connection with terrorist activities perpetrated by Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM).(177) Azhar was released from prison in December 1999 in exchange for 155 hostages aboard an Indian plane that had been hijacked by HUM militants.(178) Azhar established JEM shortly after his release from prison in India with the express purpose of attacking Indian targets and liberating J&K from Indian rule.

The JEM has targeted Indian officials, government buildings, and soldiers as well as non-Muslim civilians in Pakistan and in J&K.(179) The JEM is suspected of executing a suicide bomb attack outside the J&K state assembly building on October 1, 2001, killing up to 38 people.(180) The group initially claimed credit for the attack, but later denied involvement. The Indian government has also accused the JEM, in conjunction with Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, of carrying out a deadly attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001.(181) Armed with explosive materials and firearms, five assailants stormed the Parliament and "fired indiscriminately," killing nine security guards and one civilian bystander.(182) In January 2002, the government of Pakistan banned JEM and several other groups (see also Lashkar-e-Tayyiba entry, below).

The JEM is viewed by some as the "deadliest" and "principal terrorist organization in Jammu and Kashmir."(183) As of September 2003, crackdowns on the JEM have resulted in the deaths of 555 militants so far this year, including Gazi Baba, operations chief of the group (Aug 30, 2001), and Nasir Mehmood Ahwan, second in command (September 17, 2003).(184) After President Musharraf outlawed the group in January 2002, JEM changed its name to Khaddam-ul Islam. At the same time, JEM's leader and founder, Azhar, was placed under house arrest, but then he was released in December 2002.(185)

Favored Tactics. Experts describe JEM strategies and attacks as fidayeen (suicide terrorist) in nature.(186) In this type of operation, a terrorist launches an attack with the intention to kill as many people as possible and the expectation of being killed at the scene of the attack in retaliation.(187) In this fashion, JEM militants allegedly stormed the Indian Parliament building, proceeded to engage the security personnel in a firefight, and killed 10 people. All five terrorists in this attack were killed. The JEM use a variety of firearms, including light and heavy machine guns, and assault rifles. JEM assailants have also used mortars, improvised explosive devices, and rocket grenades.(188)

Anti-American Activities. The JEM was implicated in the February 2002 kidnapping and execution of journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Pearl, 38, worked as the South Asia Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal. He was on assignment in Karachi to interview members of militant groups and trace their possible links with alleged shoe-bomber Richard Reid.(189) (See also Lashkar I Jhangvi entry, below.)

Primary Area(s) of Operation. The JEM is based in Pakistan and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Most of its supporters are in Azad, Kashmir, Pakistan and India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions. The JEM primarily launches attacks in Indian-controlled J&K. The attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 is the only recorded instance in which the JEM attacked a target outside of the J&K.

Strength and Composition. The JEM consists of several hundred armed supporters.(190) Most of its members are Kashmiris and Pakistanis. By some accounts, up to 75% of JEM are former HUM members.(191) The JEM is said to have supporters and sympathizers in Afghanistan, including former Taliban associates and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Until the fall of 2001, the JEM reportedly "maintained training camps in Afghanistan."(192)

Connections with Other Groups. The JEM is reportedly linked with the former Taliban regime and is believed to receive funding from Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network.(193) The connection with the Taliban was apparently established and maintained through madrassahs (religious schools) in Karachi and Afghanistan. JEM leader Azhar has reportedly met with leaders and key figures in both the former Taliban and Al Qaeda. Analysts believe that JEM maintains ties with other Sunni Muslim groups in Pakistan, including Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Lashkar I Jhangvi (LIJ), and Sipahi-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).(194)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Experts believe that JEM has received some monetary support from bin Laden and Al Qaeda as well as HUM and Harakat ul-Jihad al- Islami (HUJI).(195) Indian officials claim that the JEM has also received support from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence in an attempt to undermine Indian security forces and bolster Pakistan's position in the dispute over Kashmir. Those claims remain in dispute.(196)

Originally Designated as an FTO. December 24, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group is potentially a serious threat to stability in South Asia. Its ties to Al Qaeda and the former Taliban regime make it a significant concern for the United States. Its murder of Daniel Pearl and targeting of U.S. facilities may indicate that JEM will continue to target other American citizens and interests in the future. Attacks by JEM exacerbate the tensions between India and Pakistan, two nuclear states apparently often on the brink of war.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21654, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasahs: Background, by Febe Armanios, updated October 29, 2003.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed], updated November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], updated March 8, 2004.

CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by [author name scrubbed], updated March 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31587(pdf), Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], updated September 30, 2002.

Jemaah Islamiya (JI)

Goals and Objectives. Jemaah Islamiya is a radical Islamic group that aims to create a strict Islamic state in place of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippine islands, and southern Thailand.

Brief History. The group's roots trace back to Darul Islam, a violent Islamic group that opposed Dutch rule in Indonesia in the 1940s. After the Dutch left, the movement opposed the new independent government of Sukarno for being too secular. The name Jemaah Islamiya (JI) emerged in the 1970s, during the Suharto era, but it is unclear whether the name referred to an organized group or an informal gathering of anti-government Islamic militants.(197) The co-founders of JI, clerics Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar, established a boarding school in Solo, on the main island of Java. Many suspected JI activists have been alumni of that school.(198) In 1985, the two co-founders fled to Malaysia, where they began to send Indonesians and Malaysians to Afghanistan, initially to fight the Soviet occupation and then to train in Al Qaeda camps.(199) Apparently some time in the mid-1990s, Baasyir and Sungkar merged their evolving network into Al Qaeda and began preparing for attacks in Southeast Asia. Bombings in Jakarta, Manila, and Thailand started in 2000.(200) JI is linked to a wave of attacks in December 2000 against Christian churches in Indonesia, for example, and aborted plots to bomb Western embassies in Singapore.

The group is most infamous for the October 12, 2002 suicide bombing of a night club on the Indonesian island of Bali that killed 200 people, many of them young Australian tourists. Abu Bakar Bashir, arrested one week after the Bali bombing, is believed to be the group's spiritual leader, though he denies it. An Indonesian court convicted Bashir of plotting to overthrow the government, but dropped more serious charges. His four-year jail sentence was later reduced to three years by an appellate court. Riduan bin Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, is reportedly JI's chief of operations and was arrested in mid-August 2003 in connection with the Bali bombing. The CIA has dubbed Hambali "Asia's bin Laden."(201)

Other specific evidence of JI's shared origins with Al Qaeda has come out in the aftermath of the Bali tragedy. During the trial of Bali bomber Ali Gufron (also known as Mukhlas), the defendant claimed that he had fought alongside Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in the Battle of the Lion's Den (Battle of Jaji), which occurred in 1987 during the war against the Soviet Union. It is known that Osama bin Laden's recruitment center (Maktab al-Khidmat - see below) provided logistical support for non-Afghan mujahedin, including Indonesians, during that period; and Mukhlas has testified that he met bin Laden while the Saudi was leading troops at Jaji.(202) Building on Mukhlas' testimony, further specific research has shown that the senior leadership of JI, including Hambali, camped, trained, and got their education in the Afghan war against the Soviets.(203)

Authorities in the region state that JI has continued to plot attacks against Western targets in Southeast Asia.(204) On August 5, 2003, JI militants are suspected of having bombed a J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta killing 14 and wounding 148.(205)

Favored Tactics. Most of Jemaah Islamiya's attacks have involved bombings of varying degrees of sophistication.

Anti-American Activities. In December 2001, JI was linked to plans to bomb the U.S. embassy and other locations frequented by American businesspeople and military personnel in Singapore. In mid-2002, a captured Al Qaeda operative revealed a joint Al Qaeda/Jemaah Islamiya plot to attack U.S. interests in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Cambodia with car bombs on the anniversary of 9/11.(206) On August 5, 2003, Jemaah Islamiya was linked to a car bombing at a J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta that killed 14 and injured 148.(207)

Areas of Operation. JI operates throughout Southeast Asia, although Indonesia has traditionally been its primary area of operation. The group has also operated in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and possibly the Philippines. It may also have a presence in neighboring Southeast Asian countries and in Australia.

Strength and Composition. The numerical strength of JI is unknown. Some believe that the majority of JI leaders were either part of a close group which traces their relationship back to fighting the Soviets together in Afghanistan,(208) or former trainees of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front who got to know each other in the terrorist camps in southern Philippines.(209) Some intelligence reports say that up to 700 Indonesians trained in the camps from 1997 to 98.(210) The State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002 estimates that the group probably has several hundred operatives, but also cites Singaporean officials who put the group's strength around 5,000.(211) It is unclear how crackdowns on the group in various countries since 9/11, and especially since the Bali nightclub bombing, have affected the group.

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. JI is alleged to have extensive ties to Al Qaeda, but the precise nature of those ties is in dispute. Some contend that the group is essentially subordinate to Al Qaeda, while others argue that Al Qaeda acts more like a funding agency that approves grants for independent JI proposals.(212) Captured Al Qaeda operatives have reportedly asserted that JI leaders have been involved in various Al Qaeda plots.(213) Two of the 9/11 hijackers and imprisoned accused operative Zacarias Moussaui allegedly visited Malaysia and met with JI members in 2000, and JI members reportedly sent money to them.(214) Furthermore, in January of 2003, Singapore's Internal Security Department released a report based on interviews with detained JI militants that outlines the close operational links between JI and Al Qaeda.(215)

Furthermore, the 13 suspects arrested in Singapore for the foiled plot against U.S. shipping interests in December 2001 are also believed to be connected to Al Qaeda.(216) JI is also believed to have operational links to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines and the Malaysian Kampulan Mujihhedin Malaysia (KMM).(217)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the U.S. State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, JI receives funding and logistical help from Middle Eastern and South Asian contacts, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Al Qaeda. The group also raises funds from sympathizers in the Southeast Asian region.

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 23, 2002.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Although there have been important arrests of JI members, some terrorism experts worry that Jemaah Islamiya is still a serious threat to stability in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. Members of the group continue to plot against Americans and American interests, as well as the citizens and assets of U.S. allies. Jemaah Islamiya's apparently extensive ties to Al Qaeda make it a particular concern for the United States. Indonesia's reluctance to crack down on JI for domestic political reasons could complicate U.S. policy if another anti-Western attack occurs. Additionally, the growing evidence of ties between JI and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, a radical Islamic separatist group in the Philippines),(218) may soon force the United States and the Philippines to decide whether they must confront the MILF militarily.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31152(pdf), Foreign Support of the U.S. War on Terrorism, by [author name scrubbed], Huda Allen, [author name scrubbed], updated August 8, 2003.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and [author name scrubbed], updated November 18, 2003.

CRS Report RL31265, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation," by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003.

CRS Report RS20572, Indonesian Separatist Movement in Aceh, by Larry Niksch, updated September 25, 2002.

Al-Jihad

Name(s). Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad, Vanguards of Conquest.

Goals and Objectives. Al-Jihad is committed to the violent overthrow of the Egyptian government, to the establishment of an Islamic regime in Egypt, and to attacking American and Israeli interests in Egypt.

Brief History. Founded in the late 1970s, al-Jihad is a violent offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in 1928 by Hasan al Banna seeking a return to the original precepts of the Qu'ran and opposed to the secular rule and Western influence. Known for high profile assassinations and bombings, al-Jihad is responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (October 1981), the death of the People's Assembly Speaker Rifaat el-Mahgoub (October 1990), and attempts on the lives of Interior Minister Al-Alfi (August 1993), Prime Minister Atef Sedky (November 1993), and President Hosni Mubarak (1995).(219)

In the early 1980s, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ruthlessly cracked down on al-Jihad, forcing a split in the group.(220) One faction, led by the imprisoned Abbud al-Zumar, has called for peaceful negotiation; but his faction has apparently withered. The other faction, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, became even more violent, and around 1987 moved al-Jihad's base of operations to Afghanistan.(221) Al-Zawahiri has moved further away from the Egyptian cause and has embraced Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda quest to target American interests directly. In 1998 al-Jihad joined, and al-Zawahiri reportedly leads, Al Qaeda's so-called International Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. Then, in 2001, al-Jihad apparently merged with Al Qaeda. There have been no attacks inside Egypt attributed to al-Jihad since 1998.(222)

Favorite Tactics. Al-Jihad has engaged in assassinations, bombings, and suicide attacks.(223)

Anti-American Activity. Since the mid-1990s, al-Jihad has been shifting its focus from Egyptian to American targets. Commandos for al-Jihad were linked to a foiled attack on the U.S. Embassy in Albania in August 1998.(224) As part of Al Qaeda, al-Jihad members are believed to have been involved in the bombings of the American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998.(225) They are also implicated in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in port at Aden, Yemen,(226) and the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.(227)

Primary Area(s) of Operation. Historically, al-Jihad operated in the Cairo area; but most of its network is now outside Egypt, in places such as Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom.(228) After the external component of al-Jihad merged with Al Qaeda, the group's areas of operation may have expanded.

Strength and Composition. Unknown. It is likely that al-Jihad has several hundred hard-core militants and possible several thousand supporters. After merging with Al Qaeda, distinguishing between members of the groups became more difficult.

Connections with Other Groups. In June 2001 al-Jihad allegedly merged with Al Qaeda after a decade of increasing cooperation.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Uncertain. Egypt has claimed that al-Jihad is supported by Iran and Sudan, accusations that those states' governments have denied.(229) In 2002 U.S. intelligence claimed that Iran was harboring Saif al-Adl, Osama bin Laden's security chief and an Egyptian national with links to al-Jihad.(230) However, Iran claims to have prosecuted or deported all Al Qaeda related persons within its borders as of October 2003.(231) In view of al-Jihad's apparent merger with Al Qaeda, the groups are likely cooperating on sources of revenue. Other sources of revenue may include non-governmental Islamic agencies and criminal acts.(232)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has engaged in violent attacks against the United States and its interests. It is closely associated with Al Qaeda and, with that organization, has apparently evolved from a territorially-based threat to a truly global network.

Other CRS Products.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31247(pdf), Africa and the War on Terrorism, by [author name scrubbed], updated January 17, 2002.

CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Policy Concerns and Responses, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 24, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

Kahane Chai (Kach)

Goals and Objectives. Kach and Kahane Chai are radical Jewish groups that aim to restore the Biblical state of Israel by annexing the West Bank and Gaza as well as parts of Jordan, and expelling all Arabs from this territory. These groups also seek the strict implementation of Jewish law.(233)

Brief History. Kach was founded in 1971 by Meir Kahane, an Israeli-American Rabbi who was assassinated in New York in 1990 by El Sayyid Nosair, an Islamic radical also connected to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.(234) Kahane's son, Binyamin, then founded Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives), although Kach appears to have continued to operate as an independent organization. Binyamin and his wife were killed in a 2000 drive-by shooting by a Palestinian group in a West Bank settlement.(235)

Beginning with the 2002 edition of Patterns of Global Terrorism, the State Department has listed the two groups as one entry, suggesting that the two have essentially merged. In 1994, Baruch Goldstein, a radical Jewish settler and U.S. immigrant to Israel, attacked a mosque in Hebron with a machine gun, killing 29 worshippers and wounding about 150. Goldstein was reportedly associated with Kach and other Jewish militant groups. Both Kach and Kahane Chai publicly supported the attack, leading Israel to declare them both terrorist organizations.(236)

The groups have conducted numerous attacks against Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem with rocks, grenades, and firearms, including a failed attempt to assassinate several Palestinian mayors.(237) Since the beginning of the second Intifada in September, 2000, at least seven Palestinians have been shot in the West Bank by Jewish settlers believed by Israeli police to be associated with Kahane Chai.(238) In 2002, they were suspected of involvement in several attacks against Palestinians, but neither group claimed responsibility.

Favored Tactics. Kach and Kahane Chai have attacked Palestinian targets with guns, grenades, bombs, and other weapons.

Anti-American Activities. Neither Kach or Kahane Chai is known to have attacked U.S. interests. However, in December 2001 several members of the Jewish Defense League, a group associated with Kahane, were arrested by the FBI in California and charged with plotting to bomb the offices of Representative Darrell Issa, as well as a mosque and a Muslim advocacy group in Los Angeles.(239)

Areas of Operation. Both groups operate primarily in Israel and the West Bank, but recent arrests have led to concern that they could be planning attacks in the United States.

Strength and Composition. The groups' strength is unknown, according to the State Department.(240) Estimates by other organizations place the groups' strength at around several dozen.(241)

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Neither Kach nor Kahane Chai is known to have ties to other designated foreign terrorist organizations. Both are believed to be linked to various militant Jewish groups in Israel and the West Bank.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Kach and Kahane Chai receive support from sympathizers in Europe and the United States. Within Israel, the groups receive funding and other support from various sympathizers, particularly members of settler communities in the West Bank.

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has allegedly plotted a violent attack against a Member of Congress, as well as a mosque and a Muslim advocacy group in Los Angeles. Its alleged activities lead to concern about the potential for future violence against civilians and property within the United States

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 22, 2003.

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

Name(s). Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress; Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan, KADEK, KONGRA-GEL.

Goals and Objectives. The PKK is a secular, leftist insurgent group that originally aimed to establish an independent Kurdish homeland in the ethnically Kurdish regions of the Middle East, which overlap the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. More recently, the group has claimed to be seeking greater political and cultural rights for Kurds within Turkey rather than a separate homeland.(242)

Brief History. The PKK was founded in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist group seeking to establish a Marxist Kurdish state in Southeast Turkey. The group launched a guerilla war against the Turkish government beginning in 1984 that claimed as many as 35,000 lives. After a brutal crackdown by the Turkish military in the early 1990s, the group shifted from a rural insurgency strategy to urban terrorism. In 1999, Turkish authorities, acting on a tip from U.S. intelligence, captured the PKK's charismatic leader, Abdullah Ocalan, striking a major blow against the group.(243) Ocalan's arrest sparked riots among Kurdish populations in parts of Europe.

Under threat of a death sentence, Ocalan advised his followers to refrain from violence and to pursue Kurdish rights peacefully. The PKK has essentially ceased its attacks as a result, and in 2000, the group formally announced its intention to use only political means to achieve the goal of rights for Turkish Kurds. The armed wing of the PKK (called the People's Defense Forces) did not, however, disarm. The PKK first renamed itself the KADEK and then the KONGRA-GEL. In November 2003, the KADEK announced plans to dissolve itself and, according to reports, establish a "new group that would likely be pan-Kurdish and would pursue Kurdish rights through negotiations."(244) On November 14, 2003, the U.S. State Department stated, "The PKK/KADEK, under any alias, is a terrorist organization, and no name change or press release can alter that fact."

Favored Tactics. Many PKK attacks targeted Turkish military and security forces. In addition, however, the PKK used suicide bombings, car bombings, kidnappings of foreign tourists, and attacks against Turkish diplomats in Europe.(245) There were also attacks on symbolic representatives of the Turkish state in the Southeast, such as teachers.

Anti-American Activities. The PKK has not directly attacked or targeted U.S. citizens or interests.

Areas of Operation. The PKK has operated primarily in Turkey. The armed wing of the group apparently took refuge in the Kurdish areas of Iraq. In the past, the group maintained bases in Syria and Lebanon.(246)

Strength and Composition. The PKK is comprised mainly of Turkish Kurds and has approximately 4,000 to 5,000 fighters, according to the State Department and other sources.(247)

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. In the early 1980's, when the PKK fled to Lebanon's Syria-controlled Beka'a Valley, the group reportedly got its first real training alongside various Palestinian groups and with the help of Syrian intelligence.(248) Later, the PKK reportedly provided a safe haven for the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F), another Turkish group, in Southeast Anatolia in the Black Sea region. The two groups signed a protocol in 1996 that would deepen cooperation between the two groups(249) However, cooperation has apparently since broken down. (See RPLP/F entry below.)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. During its history, PKK reportedly received support and safe haven from Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Greece.(250) The group also raises funds in Europe among Kurdish expatriates, some of whom accuse the Turkish government of human rights violations in its campaign against the PKK.(251)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Turkey's treatment of its Kurdish minority has been a significant issue in its efforts to join the European Union. The European Union only named the PKK a foreign terrorist organization in May 2002 and has not similarly identified KADEK. With its leader Ocalan in jail, it is unclear whether the PKK, in its evolving form, will continue to be a violent group. The Kurdish population in northern Iraq may play a role: for example, actions by Iraqi Kurds against PKK guerrillas remaining in Iraq could affect the future of PKK/KADEK/KONDRA-GEL.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL31794(pdf), Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of U.S. Forces, and Related Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated May 2, 2003.

CRS Report RL32071, Turkey: Update on Selected Issues, by [author name scrubbed], updated September 8, 2003.

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)

Name(s). Army of the Righteous/Pure, Jamaat al-Dawat.

Goals and Objectives. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) is a radical Islamic group in Pakistan that seeks to establish Islamic rule throughout South Asia. Although primarily focused on freeing Kashmir from Indian control and establishing an Islamic state there, the group has also suggested that it aims to establish Islamic rule over all of India as well.

Brief History. Formed in 1990, LT is the military wing of the Pakistani radical Islamic organization Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI, or Center for Islamic Call and Guidance), which itself formed in 1989. Since 1993, LT has become one of the largest and best organized groups fighting in Kashmir against India.(252) The group has conducted a number of attacks against Indian troops and civilians in Kashmir.

The Indian government accused the group of involvement in the December 2001 bombing of the Indian parliament and charged the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) with supporting the group.(253) President Musharraf banned the LT and several other groups (see Jaish-e-Mohammed entry, above) in January 2002, and the LT renamed itself Jamaat al-Dawat.(254) The LT's leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, was arrested in Pakistan in January 2002 but then released in December 2002.(255)

In May and June 2003, the FBI arrested 11 men in Virginia on charges of training with and supporting Lashkar e Tayyiba. The 11 are to face trial in the U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Virginia.(256) In July, a federal judge ordered four of the eleven suspects released from custody until their trial begins.(257)

Favored Tactics. In its attacks, LT has used various types of firearms, machine guns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades.

Anti-American Activities. Lashkar e Tayyiba is not known to have conducted attacks against American citizens or American interests. The group remains focused on Kashmir.

There is, however, possible cooperation between LT and Al Qaeda (see below).

Areas of Operation. LT is based near Lahore in Pakistan and, according to the State Department, operates mobile training camps in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.(258) The group also had training camps in Afghanistan until the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. LT is believed to have conducted operations not only in Indian-controlled Kashmir, but also in other regions of India.

Strength and Composition. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is comprised mainly of Pakistani Islamic radicals, although some Afghan veterans of the Afghan wars are also members. The State Department estimates a total of several hundred members.(259)

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. In March 2002, senior Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah was captured in an LT safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, indicating that the group may be helping Al Qaeda members to move through Pakistan.(260) There are also reports that members of LT have participated in conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Philippines, suggesting that the group may have links to various other radical Islamic organizations.(261)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the State Department, LT collects donations from Pakistani expatriates in the Persian Gulf and the United Kingdom.(262) The group also reportedly receives support from Arab sympathizers in the Persian Gulf states.(263) Prior to a crackdown by the Pakistani government against anti-Indian groups operating in Kashmir, the group invested in various business enterprises in Pakistan.

Originally Designated as an FTO. December 24, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The LT's activities directed against India pose a threat to the stability of South Asia. The group may also be helping members of Al Qaeda in their anti-American activities. Its apparent links to other radical Islamic organizations lead to concern about the degree to which the LT is part of an evolving globalized network of terrorist organizations. Within the United States, this group's alleged training and fund-raising activities in Alexandria, Virginia, if proven true, are also cause for concern (see above).

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], updated March 8, 2004.

CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by [author name scrubbed], updated March 28, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed], updated November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL31587(pdf), Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], updated September 30, 2002.

Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)

Name(s). Army of Jhangvi.

Goals and Objectives. Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) is a radical Sunni group that has primarily targeted Shi'a Muslims in Pakistan. The group apparently aims to establish Pakistan as a Sunni Islamic state based on Islamic law. The group has close links to Al Qaeda and has adopted that organization's anti-Western, anti-U.S. ideology.

Brief History. LJ arose in 1996 out of sectarian conflicts in Pakistan between radical Sunni Muslim and Shi'a Muslim factions. LJ's members belong to the radical Deobandi sect of Sunni Islam, and have carried out numerous attacks against the minority Shi'a population, which they consider apostate. LJ reportedly killed 25 Shi'a and wounded 50 others in Lahore in 1998 and attempted to assassinate then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999.(264) The group has also been connected to attacks against Christian groups in Pakistan.(265) In mid-2001, Pakistani President Musharraf outlawed the group, which took refuge in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.(266) Since the fall of the Taliban, the group has presumably returned to Pakistan, but several leaders have been captured or killed by the Pakistani government.(267)

Favored Tactics. The group has conducted a variety of armed attacks and bombings, including several suicide bombings.

Anti-American Activities. Lashkar I Jhangvi has carried out several attacks against Americans in Pakistan, most notably the kidnapping and subsequent murder of journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002 in conjunction with Al Qaeda. (See also Jaish-e-Mohammed entry, above.) The group also reportedly killed four American oil workers in 1997(268) and attacked the Protestant International Church in Islamabad with grenades in 2002, killing two Americans.(269)

Areas of Operation. The group operates mainly in Punjab and Karachi in Pakistan, and some members reportedly travel in Afghanistan. Its strength is most manifest in urban areas.

Strength and Composition. The members of Lashkar I Jhangvi are militant Sunni Muslims of the Deobandi sect. The State Department estimates their strength at fewer than 100.(270)

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. LJ's leaders participated in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and are believed to have connected with bin Laden during that time. LJ members reportedly trained at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Al Qaeda is also believed to have provided key support to the group in several of its attacks against Western targets since 2002. Pakistani authorities believe that LJ has formed a partnership with two other Islamic militant groups in Pakistan, Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM, see entry above), to form Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO), also called al-Qanoon.(271)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Beyond support from Al Qaeda, it is not known how the group funds its activities.

Originally Designated as an FTO. January 30, 2003.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has engaged in serious anti-American violence in Pakistan, including apparently participating in the kidnapping and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl. (See also Jaish-e-Mohammed entry, above.) Its activities may threaten the stability of Pakistan and the South Asian region. Its connections with Al Qaeda make it a serious concern.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed], updated November 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], updated March 8, 2004.

CRS Report RL31587(pdf), Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], updated September 30, 2002.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Name(s). Tamil Tigers.

Goals and Objectives. The LTTE is a Tamil separatist group in Sri Lanka that initially aimed to establish an independent state including the ethnically Tamil regions of the island. Recently the group has softened its insistence on an independent Tamil state, declaring that it will accept a solution that respects the principle of self-determination, possibly an autonomous area for Tamil-speaking peoples within a federal structure (see below).

Brief History. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were founded by the charismatic Vellupillai Prabhakaran and arose in the 1970s as the strongest of a number of Tamil groups opposing discrimination against Tamils by the dominant Sinhalese ethnic group. In 1983, in retaliation for the deaths of thirteen Sinhalese soldiers, several thousand Tamils were killed in riots that marked the beginning of full scale separatist war. In the ensuing 20-year war, an estimated 64,000 people were killed and between 800,000 and 1.6 million persons were displaced.

The Tamil Tigers have gained control of portions of the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka and have a substantial arsenal including artillery, mortars, and anti-aircraft weapons. They also have a naval component with speedboats, demolition teams, and fishing boats.(272) The LTTE's most infamous element is the Black Tigers, the 500 plus member highly-trained unit that carries out the group's suicide attacks. The LTTE has engaged in a large number of political terrorist attacks and killings, most notably including the assassinations of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa. It is the only terrorist group ever to have assassinated two heads of state. And in December 1999, three days before re-election, current President Chandrika Kumaratunga lost vision in one eye to a LTTE suicide attack that killed 26.

Citing fundamental changes in international attitudes towards violence for political ends after the September 11 attacks, experts say support and funding for the LTTE from the Tamil diaspora fell off dramatically. This was apparently a factor bringing this group to the negotiating table.(273) Since December 2001, the LTTE has largely respected a cease fire negotiated with the Sri Lankan government. In September 2002, the LTTE and the Columbo government held their first peace talks in seven years. In December 2002 both sides made what could be the most important breakthrough by issuing a statement saying, "The parties have agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in the areas of historical habituation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka."(274) Such a statement marks significant concessions from the LTTE who have always sought independence rather than autonomy, and from the government in Colombo, which would be accepting the idea of federalism for the first time.

On the 4th and 5th of November 2003, Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga removed three top cabinet officials, suspended parliament, and deployed troops around the Sri Lankan Capital of Colombo. The political crisis apparently was a result of a power struggle between President Kumaratunga, who represents the more hardline faction within the government, and the more conciliatory elements led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. After reviving the Norwegian brokered peace talks in late 2001 Wickremesinghe has made significant gains, including a permanent cease-fire established and more-or-less respected since February 2002 and several rounds of successful talks. However, fearing Kumaratunga could veto any agreement, Wickremesinghe proposed a constitutional amendment (the 19th) that would eliminate the President's power to dissolve the parliament. Kumaratunga and her supporters are opposed to any settlement that would establish a federal system and infringe on Sri Lankan sovereignty. They believe the Norwegian mediators are biased in favor of the rebels.(275) This crisis is as yet unresolved.

Favored Tactics. The LTTE's tactics have ranged from full military operations to terrorist attacks against civilian centers and political assassinations. Inspired by the apparent success of suicide bombings by Hizballah in the latter's campaign against foreign occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s, the LTTE launched its first suicide attack in 1987.(276) The group subsequently conducted the bloodiest suicide campaign on record, involving more than 150 attacks.(277) The LTTE is also noted for the first and most active use of female suicide bombers, who have carried out 30-40% of the suicide attacks of the LTTE.(278)

Anti-American Activities. The LTTE has not targeted or attacked U.S. interests.

Areas of Operation. The LTTE operates mainly in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, but has also operated throughout the island and in India.(279) Most notably, there was the assassination of Rajiv Ghandi on May 22, 1991 while he was attending an election rally in Sriperambudur, India.

Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates that LTTE has between 8,000 and 10,000 armed combatants plus substantial numbers of supporters within Sri Lanka and overseas.(280) The Black Tigers, which are the elite unit believed responsible for most of the suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks, reportedly have some 500 members.(281)

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The Tamil Tigers are not believed to have connections to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. LTTE suicide bombing tactics have been copied by various groups, however. For instance, Soosai, the head of the Sea Tigers, who carry out the LTTE's naval attacks, claimed in a November 2002 interview that Al Qaeda's attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 had been inspired by LTTE naval operations.(282)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. LTTE has raised funds among the Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe, and Asia, and from smuggling and businesses in Sri Lanka.(283) The most common estimates state that before 2001, the Tigers collected up to $1 million a month from expatriates in Canada, Britain, Switzerland and Australia, making it among the most well-funded terrorist groups in the world.(284) This flow of funds was apparently significantly reduced after the September 11th, 2001 attacks.

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Although it is still early to be certain, this extremely violent, territorially-based group may be an example of a group that has been moved by the war on terrorism (among other things) toward negotiation and peaceful resolution. The apparently dramatic fall-off in funding after September 11th was an important development. The evolution of the LTTE and its relationship to the Sri Lankan government bears close scrutiny in future months. For example, the extremely authoritarian nature of Prabhakaran's rule over the LTTE realm may pose difficulties for trying to reach a settlement on northern Sri Lanka that would be at all democratic.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, "Terrorists and Suicide Attacks," by [author name scrubbed], August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], updated March 8, 2004.

CRS Issue Brief IB93097, India-U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed], updated November 7, 2003.

CRS Report RL31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed], November 5, 2003.

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)

Name(s). People's Mujahedeen of Iran; PMOI; The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK), National Council of Resistance (NCR); the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI); Muslim Iranian Student's Society.(285)

Goals and Objectives. The MEK is an Iranian dissident group whose ideology originally blended Marxism with a moderate interpretation of Islam. In the 1970s, the group opposed the regime of the Shah for its corruption and perceived susceptibility to U.S. and Western influence. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, MEK has opposed the religious Iranian regime, favoring a secular government in Iran. The group apparently supports the Arab-Israeli peace process and the rights of Iran's minorities, although some believe the group takes these positions only to improve its image in Western countries.(286)

Brief History. The MEK was founded in the 1960s by leftist college students in Iran opposed to the Shah, who they believed was corrupt and too open to Western influences. During the 1970s, the group conducted several attacks against U.S. military personnel and civilians working with the Shah, as well as attacks against the Iranian government. The MEK participated in the 1979 revolution against the Shah, but quickly fell out of favor with Ayatollah Khomeini. Some of its original leadership was executed by the Khomeini regime.

In 1981, the MEK bombed several important government buildings, killing as many as 70 high-ranking Iranian officials. Under pressure from the government in Tehran, the group fled to France from 1981 to 1986, after which it took refuge in Iraq. While in Iraq, Saddam Hussein armed the group and sent it into battle against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. The group also provided various security services for the Saddam Hussein regime, including helping with the suppression of Kurdish and Shi'a revolts after the first Gulf War in 1991. It continued to attack the Iranian regime, conducting a 1992 bombing campaigning of Iranian embassies in 13 different countries. In early 2000, the group used mortars to attack the leadership complex in Tehran that houses the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the group has represented an important security threat to the Iranian regime.(287)

U.S. and international policy toward the MEK has been ambivalent and controversial. Some see the group as a legitimate, pro-democracy resistance to the illiberal Iranian government, while others condemn the group's earlier anti-Western attacks and regard the group as an anti-Western cult with a pro-democracy facade. French authorities arrested more than 160 members, including the group's leader Maryam Rajavi, in Paris in 2003, reversing the longstanding French policy of giving asylum to the group.(288) Several high-profile figures have opposed the arrests.(289) During the 2003 Iraq war, U.S. forces bombed MEK bases in Iraq but later signed a cease-fire with the group. Finally in May 2003, the U.S. military disarmed the group.(290)

Favored Tactics. The MEK's tactics range from bombings to organized guerilla warfare.

Anti-American Activities. The MEK has not attacked or targeted U.S. interests since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. During the 1970s, it conducted several attacks against American military and civilian targets and participated in the capture of the U.S. embassy during the revolution.(291)

Areas of Operation. The MEK is primarily based in Iraq, near the border with Iran, but it has a global presence. The group conducted attacks in Iran and has also attacked Iranian interests in Europe and elsewhere. The group has affiliated lobbying organizations in the United States and Europe, and prior to a French crackdown in 2003, its members took refuge in France.

Strength and Composition. The MEK is comprised of Iranian dissidents opposed to the Islamic regime in Iran. According to the State Department, the group possesses several thousand fighters in Iraq and additional members operating overseas. Within Iraq, the group has until recently controlled aging military equipment given to it by Saddam Hussein, including tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles.(292) The U.S. military in Iraq recently disarmed the group.

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. MEK has no known connections with other terrorist groups.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Until the recent war to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the MEK received all of its military assistance and much of its financial support from the Iraqi regime. The group apparently uses front organizations to solicit contributions from Iranian expatriates and others, and may also raise funds among sympathizers within Iran.(293)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Legal Challenges to Designation. In 1998, a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives signed a letter challenging the State Department's designation of MEK as an FTO. Some Members have suggested that the United States should support the group as an alternative to the Islamic regime in Iran.(294) The debate over designation of the group has resurfaced in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war. Some believe that the group represents legitimate opposition to the regime in Iran, while others contend that the group is essentially a fanatical cult with a sophisticated public relations wing and that its pro-Western, pro-democracy overtures should not be trusted.(295) The State Department continues to resist pressure to remove the MEK from the FTO list. On August 15, 2003, the State Department added the group's political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR)(296) to the group's designation.(297) Previously, the NCR had operated in the United States as a legitimate, registered lobbying organization.

Issues of Concern for Congress. In the recent past, this group has actively lobbied on Capitol Hill. Its political/lobbying arm is now also specifically cited by name as an alias for the MEK (and thus a foreign terrorist organization), and its assets have been frozen as a specially designated entity by the Treasury Department under Executive Order 13224.(298) (See also Legal Challenges to Designation, above.) American treatment of this group in the aftermath of active hostilities in Iraq was at first ambivalent, but the group is currently disarmed. The status of this group is an important issue in the relationship between the United States and Iran.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32120, The 'FTO List' and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by [author name scrubbed], October 21, 2003.

CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Policy Concerns and Responses, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 24, 2003.

CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf States: Post-War Issues for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, updated July 14, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

National Liberation Army (ELN)

Name(s). National Liberation Army; ELN.

Goals and Objectives. The founders of ELN hoped to emulate Cuba's Marxist revolution in Colombia. The group's objectives are to overthrow the government of Colombia and replace the capitalist economy with a socialist system. The group claims to represent the oppressed poor in Colombia against the wealthy classes, and it opposes privatization and U.S. influence in Colombia.(299)

Brief History. ELN was formed in 1964 by a group of students, Catholic radicals, and leftist intellectuals inspired by Che Guevara and trained in Cuba. For many years, the group was led by priests who opposed drugs and drug trafficking on moral grounds. Experts contend that this influence accounts for a relatively low level of drug-related activity within ELN, in comparison, for example, to FARC (see entry below).(300) ELN and FARC, despite similar Marxist ideologies, have become rivals.

Favored Tactics. ELN relies on kidnapping and extortion for funding, reportedly taking more than 800 hostages for ransom in 2001.(301) ELN has also conducted bombing campaigns against multinational and domestic oil companies, including attacking oil pipelines.(302)

Anti-American Activities. The group opposes U.S. influence in Colombia and has attacked U.S. interests, particularly energy companies. In 1998, ELN activists bombed and ransacked a Dole-owned subsidiary and attacked the Ocensa pipeline, which is jointly owned by a consortium of American, British, French, Canadian, and Colombian companies.(303) The group has also kidnapped Americans for ransom.

Areas of Operation. ELN is based in rural and mountainous areas of north, northeast, and southwest Colombia and in border areas of Venezuela. The group has also reportedly used Bolivian territory.(304)

Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates ELN strength between 3,000 and 5,000 armed militants, plus an unknown number of active supporters.(305) It thus appears to be roughly one third the size of Colombia's other leftist militant group FARC (see entry below).

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. There are no known connections between ELN and other terrorist organizations.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Most of ELN's funding comes from kidnapping and extortion against wealthy Colombians, government officials, and employees of multinational corporations, particularly oil companies. In addition, the group has now reportedly entered the illegal drug trade.(306) Until the early 1990s, ELN received support from Cuba. However, in recent years Castro has attempted to broker peace agreements between the ELN and the Colombian government. It is unclear whether the group continues to receive support from Castro.(307)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group poses a serious threat to U.S. citizens and interests in Colombia and is apparently now involved in drug trafficking. It is a threat to the stability of the Colombian government.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Issue Brief IB88093, Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches, by Raphael Perl, October 16, 2003.

CRS Report RS21242(pdf), Colombia: The Uribe Administration and Congressional Concerns, by Nina Serafino, updated June 14, 2002.

CRS Report RL32021, The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by [author name scrubbed], updated November 14, 2003.

CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by [author name scrubbed], updated June 11, 2003.

CRS Report RL32052, Colombia and Aerial Eradication of Drug Crops: U.S. Policy and Issues, by [author name scrubbed], updated August 28, 2003.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Name(s). Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Goals and Objectives. PIJ's goal is to establish an Islamic Palestinian state and topple the state of Israel.

Brief History. PIJ is a highly active Palestinian organization founded in 1979 by Palestinian students in Egypt. PIJ's founding members -- Fathi Shiqaqi, Abd al- Aziz Odah, and Bashir Musa -- were once members of the Muslim Brotherhood (see also al-Jihad entry), but split from the group because of what they perceived as a moderate stance within the group and a diluted focus on the Palestinian issue.(308) The founding members were inspired by the Iranian revolution and espoused several of its tenets.

PIJ's sole focus is to defeat the state of Israel (using "violence as a legitimate means") and establish an Islamic Palestinian state. To this end, PIJ militants have perpetrated suicide bomb attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets throughout Israel and the Palestinian territories. Since the start of the second Intifada (September 2000), PIJ has conducted attacks that have killed more than 100 people.(309) On June 29, 2003, after 33 consecutive months of violence, the radical group ceded to Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas' appeal for a cease-fire.(310) However, only about a week later, the group called off the cease-fire, complaining that Israel failed to fulfill aspects of the agreement, including the release of several jailed Islamic militants. The cease-fire is "effectively over" and 'attacks will resume,' said the Jenin leader of the PIJ Bessam Sa'adi.(311) And the attacks did resume: on July 8, 2003, PIJ claimed a suicide bomb attack in central Israel that killed a 65-year old woman as well as the perpetrator.

Favored Tactics. The PIJ engages in suicide attacks against Israeli targets. Occasionally, the PIJ also uses gunfire in its operations.

Anti-American Activities. The PIJ does not directly target U.S. interests; however, Americans have died in PIJ attacks. For example, in November 2001, Shoshani Ben-Yishai, a 16-year old New York-born American student in Jerusalem died after a militant sprayed gunfire on the city bus she and her classmates were riding. Alisa Flatow, 20, was similarly killed in a bus attack in April 1995.(312) In February 2003, PIJ asserted that it would not target Americans in spite of a U.S. indictment of eight PIJ activists (four of whom were living in the United States).(313) PIJ claimed that it would stay focused on its fight against Israel and that it wished not to 'open any new fronts' by targeting U.S. interests.(314)

Primary Area(s) of Operation. PIJ conducts its attacks in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, PIJ leader Ramadan Abdallah Shallah reportedly lives in and operates from Damascus, Syria.(315) (Shallah took over the leadership when Israeli forces killed Shiqaqi in 1994.) The PIJ also has a presence in Beirut, Tehran, and possibly Khartoum, where it raises money.(316)

Strength and Composition. The exact number of PIJ members is unknown. At the beginning of the first Intifada (1987-1990), PIJ reportedly consisted of as few as 250 militants.(317) The group has, however, increased its recruiting base over the course of the 1990s and may now have more members, including students.

Connections with Other Groups. The PIJ's closest ally is Hamas (see entry above). Initially, PIJ and Hamas did not maintain ties, and in fact, some analysts viewed them as rivals.(318) Since 1994, the two groups have apparently collaborated on several fronts: they have conducted joint attacks and planned simultaneous bombings. In 2000, Time Magazine reported that Hamas and the PIJ were being courted by Iran to coordinated their efforts and derail the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Time also reported that Hizballah, a group deeply connected to Iran, was the intermediary that facilitated this process.(319) There have also been numerous reports that Hamas provided training and logistical support from Hizballah facilities in southern Lebanon.(320) In June 2003, PIJ and Hamas published a joint statement declaring a cease-fire to end attacks on Israelis and Israeli interests. Some analysts still see a rivalry between the groups, as both groups compete to launch suicide attacks against Israeli targets.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The State Department has said that PIJ receives financial support from Iran and logistical support from Syria.(321) PIJ leader Shallah has reportedly taken refuge in Syria.(322)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Syria's role in aiding this group may be an issue of relevance to the Syrian Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175. This group has killed American civilians, and eight of its members are under U.S. indictment; however, it has claimed that it does not want to attack U.S. citizens and interests directly. The PIJ is an extremely violent group that uses suicide attacks and has killed a large number of Israeli civilians.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by [author name scrubbed], updated June 10, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred Prados, updated November 13, 2003.

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

Goals and Objectives.The PLF is committed to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state on its territory.

Brief History. Originally formed in 1959 by Ahmed Jibril (PLFP-GC, see entry below), the PLF has gone through several periods of splits and mergers. In 1977, Jibril split off from the PFLP-GC and re-established the PLF as an independent organization. The group's most recent fissure occurred in the 1980's when the PLF split along pro-Syrian, pro-Libyan, and pro-PLO lines. While all three groups claim to represent the PLF, the pro-PLO faction of Muhammed Zaidan, known as Abu Abbas, is responsible for the PLF's most prominent terrorist acts.

On October 7, 1985 four PLF terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro on its way from Egypt to Israel and became infamous for the murder of wheelchair-bound US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. In response to PLF demands, Italian authorities released Abu Abbas from prison, later sentencing him to life in prison in absentia. After the Achille Lauro incident, Tunisian authorities expelled the group which then moved its headquarters to Iraq. The group has not been blamed for a terrorist attack since 1990, when it attempted a seaborne-commando raid of Israeli beaches at Nizanim in an attempt to kill tourists and Israelis. Israeli forces foiled the attack, meant to avenge the deaths of seven Palestinian workers on May 20, killing four of the twelve militants with no Israeli casualties. At the time, Abu Abbas was a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) executive committee member, and Israeli officials used the raid to put pressure on the U.S. dialogue with the PLO, claiming the raid was proof the PLO still engaged in terrorism.(323)

The PLF became active again in the al-Aqsa Intifada. In November 2001, 15 Iraqi trained PLF militants were arrested by Israeli authorities for plotting attacks inside Israel. Israeli authorities claimed the group was linked to Iraqi intelligence, and trained and supported by Baghdad(324) On April 16, 2003, U.S. Special Forces captured Abu Abbas in southern Baghdad.(325) The Italian government has requested his extradition so he may serve his sentence for the Achille Lauro incident.(326)

Favored Tactic. The PLF has engaged in bombings, kidnappings, and murders. The group has also used hang gliders and hot-air balloons to attack Israel.(327) The PLF has also attempted at least one seaborne assault on Israel, the 1990 attack on the beach at Nizanim.(328)

Anti-American Activity. The PLF does not focus its energies on attacking the United States or U.S. interests. The exception was the murder of American citizen Leon Klinghoffer on the Achille Lauro.

Primary Areas of Operation. Abu Abbas has been based in Iraq since 1990 and the PLF has a presence in both Lebanon and the West Bank.(329) While the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq did result in the capture of Abu Abbas, it remains unclear what effect the occupation will have on PLF operations.

Strength and Composition. The State Department lists the PLF's strength as unknown. However other estimates place the Abu Abbas faction at around 300 to 500 members.(330)

Connections with Other Groups. Abu Abbas has close relations to Yasir Arafat and, consequently, close links with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).(331) There are no known links between the PLF and Al Qaeda. Abu Abbas condemned the September 11 attacks and stated Al Qaeda's cause is separate from the Palestinian cause.(332)

State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies. Before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the PLF received most of its financial and logistical support from Iraq. Also, the $25,000 rewards Saddam Hussein was paying out to the families of suicide bombers in Palestinian territories were allegedly disbursed by the PLF.(333)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. It is unclear what the status of the PLF is. Its leader Abu Abbas was captured during the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It may be in a period of disarray or transition.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by [author name scrubbed], updated June 10, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bi-Lateral Issues, by Alfred Prados, November 13, 2003.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Goals and Objectives. The PFLP seeks the destruction of the State of Israel, the establishment of a socialist Palestinian state and the end to American influence in the region.

Brief History. After the 1967 Israeli victory over its Arab neighbors, George Habash, a medical doctor and a Christian, founded the PFLP as a more leftist leaning organization bent on the destruction of Israel. In the 1970's the PFLP became one of the first Palestinian movements to use terrorism to further its agenda and was the second largest organization under the PLO.(334) Unlike the PLO, the PFLP sought support from the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the USSR's client state Syria. Funding for the PFLP diminished with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the group's headquarters remain in Damascus.(335)

The PFLP conducted numerous terrorist attacks in the 1970's. In its most infamous attack, PFLP members highjacked a TWA Boeing 747, a Swissair DC-8, and a BOAC VC-10, flew them all to Dawson Airfield outside Amman, Jordan, and blew them up on the ground after unloading the hostages.(336) In June of 1972, three members of the Japanese United Red Army opened fire with machine guns and killed 26 people at Lod airport at the behest of the PFLP.(337)

In May of 2000, the ailing founder of the PFLP, George Habash, handed his authority over to Abu Ali Mustafa, originally named Mustafa al-Zibri. Since the Palestinian-Israeli peace process floundered in September 2000 and the Al-Aqsa Intifada erupted, the PFLP has carried out ten car bombings and numerous other attacks. In August 2001, Israeli helicopters launched a rocket attack against PFLP headquarters and killed Mustafa.(338) The PFLP retaliated by killing Rehavam Zeevi, Israel's Tourism Minister. Mustafa was succeeded by Ahmed Saadat who was arrested by the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2002. Followers of the PFLP have threatened to kill PA figures if Saadat is not released.(339)

Favored Tactics. The PFLP is most famous for its plane highjackings. More recently, the group has turned to car bombings, assassinations, and guerilla tactics.(340)

Anti-American Activities. The PFLP has not engaged in any direct attacks on U.S. citizens or interests.

Primary Areas of Operation. Headquarters for the PFLP are in Damascus, Syria, and the group is believed to keep support bases in Lebanon. They carry out operations in Israel and the Palestinian territories.(341)

Strength and Composition. The PFLP reportedly has around 800 to1,000 members.(342)

Connections with Other Groups. The PFLP rejected the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO and joined the Damascus-based Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF). Within the APF, the PFLP enjoyed good relations with other groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP-General Command (see entries). However, the PFLP showed a willingness to negotiate with Arafat by attending the 1996 Palestinian National Council, and thereby effectively sealed a split between the PFLP and the APF. Bilateral relations with individual APF members continue, especially with the more violent elements of the Fatah movement.(343)

State Sponsors, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies. The PFLP receives safe haven and logistical support from Syria, and some financial support from Iran.(344)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Syria's role in aiding this group may be an issue of relevance to the Syrian Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175. This group has violently attacked Israeli civilians and will play a role in the viability of any Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by [author name scrubbed], updated June 10, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bi-Lateral Issues, by Alfred Prados, November 13, 2003.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)

Goals and Objectives. The PFLP-GC is a Marxist-Leninist group with Islamic beliefs committed to the establishment of a Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel. The group has been opposed to any negotiation with Israel and believes only in a military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.(345)

Brief History. The history of the PFLP-GC is convoluted. In 1959, Ahmed Jibril, a former engineering captain in the Syrian army, founded the Palestine Liberation Front, only to merge his group with George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1967. In 1968, finding himself at odds with both Habash's willingness to negotiate with Israel and his leanings away from Syria, Jibril broke away from the PFLP to form the PFLP-GC with headquarters in Damascus. During the 1970's, the PFLP-GC became more a proxy for Syria than an organization of freedom fighters for the Palestinians, even going so far as to support Syria against rival Palestinian factions in the Lebanese civil war in 1976.(346) (During that fighting, Abu Abbas broke away from the PFLP-GC to form the Palestine Liberation Front in 1977 - see entry above). Furthermore, in 1983 the PFLP-GC sided again with Syria and aligned with a renegade Fatah element to drive Arafat from Tunisia .(347)

In the 1990s, with the decline of the Soviet Union and a tightening of Syria's budget, the PFLP-GC limited its activities to training and equipping other Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In May 2001, the PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for the attempted smuggling of 40-tons of weapons to the Palestinian territories that were intercepted by Israel's navy.(348) Most recently, the PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for the killing of two Israeli soldiers in the West Bank on November 18, 2003.(349)

Favored Tactics. Known for its unusual tactics, the PFLP-GC has used hot air balloons and hang-gliders to attack inside Israel. Recently it has reverted to bombings and guerilla tactics.(350)

Anti-American Activity. The PFLP-GC has not specifically targeted American interests or citizens. However, the group considers the United States an enemy for its support of Israel.

Primary Areas of Operation. The PFLP-GC operates in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian territories.(351)

Strength and Composition. The Department of State estimates the group's strength at between 500-1,000, while other sources place the number of members closer to 500.(352)

Connections with Other Groups. The PFLP-GC is committed to the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) and has aligned itself more closely with the fundamentalist Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas than other secular-leaning groups. This factor allows the PFLP-GC to act as a go-between for Islamist and secular elements seeking to collaborate.(353)

The PFLP-GC prefers ties with states over other groups. However, some experts have reported varying connections with other Leftist and nationalist groups in the 1980s including the Japanese Red Army, The Red Army Faction, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army.(354)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Western intelligence sources are convinced the PFLP-GC is principally supported and directed by Syria.(355) However, while Syria is by far the group's closest state sponsor, in the mid-1980s, pilots from the PFLP-GC reportedly flew in the Libyan air force in Chad,(356) and the Libyan government supplied hang gliders the PFLP-GC used in aerial raids on northern Israel.(357) It is also reported that because of the PFLP-GC's connections, the group serves as a liaison between secular governments and fundamentalist movements.

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Syria's role in aiding this group may be an issue of relevance to the Syrian Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175. Its apparent ties with Libya and possible role in the bombing of Pan Am 103 may also have implications for U.S. interests. This group has violently attacked Israeli civilians and may play a role in the viability of any Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31247(pdf), Africa and the War on Terrorism, by [author name scrubbed], updated January 17, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by [author name scrubbed], updated June 10, 2002.

CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21601, Libya: Pan Am 103 Settlement, by Clyde Mark, updated August 27, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB93109, Libya,,by Clyde Mark, updated October 21, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 22, 2003.

CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bi-Lateral Issues, by Alfred Prados, November 13, 2003.

Al Qaeda

Names. The Base, Qa'idat al-Jihad, Maktab al-Khidamat, International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyyah al-`Alamiyyah li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin, Group for the Preservation of Holy Sites, Islamic Army of the Liberation of Holy Places, Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Shrines, Islamic Sal.(358)

Goals and Objectives. Al Qaeda is an umbrella organization that carries out its own terrorist acts as well as providing logistical and training support to other extremist groups. Al Qaeda seeks to destroy the regimes of Muslim countries it deems as "non-Islamic" in order to establish a worldwide Islamic religious government based on the ancient model of the Caliphates. The groups believe the United States and its allies are the single greatest roadblock to that goal and therefore issued a proclamation calling for all Muslims to kill Americans - military or civilian - in order to secure the expulsion of Western influence from the Muslim world.(359) Following is a selection from the second fatwa (1998):

<blockquote>The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God...We -- with God's help -- call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.(360)</blockquote>

Brief History. The origins of Al Qaeda are rooted in the Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion from 1979-1989. Believing that the war with the atheistic Soviets was a holy battle between Islam and the infidel, Osama bin Laden, the son of a wealthy Saudi contractor, traveled to Afghanistan to aid the fight. At the time, Afghanistan lacked both the infrastructure and manpower for a protracted war. Bin Laden joined forces with Sheikh Dr. Abdullah Azzam, leader of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, to establish the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK- Afghan Services Bureau) whose goal was to recruit Muslim fighters from around the world to fight in Afghanistan. Bin Laden paid for their transportation and training (he imported specialists in guerilla warfare and other professionals), while Afghan local leaders contributed land and resources.

Anywhere from 20,000 to 60,000 people, most of whom were not native Afghans, received training and combat experience in Afghanistan.(361) During the Afghan war, the Central Intelligence Agency provided roughly $500 million a year in material support to the Mujahedin, though there is no evidence that U.S. aid was given to bin Laden himself. In 1988, bin Laden, believing Azzam's perspective to be too narrow and limited, broke with his ally to form Al Qaeda (The Base) and carry on his jihad on a worldwide scale. Azzam died in a car bombing in 1989, ostensibly carried out by his Afghan rivals.(362)

With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia to combat what he saw as an infidel Saudi government. Further angered by the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia accompanying the Gulf War, bin Laden became even more outspoken in his anti-regime rhetoric. With his immediate family and a band of followers, he moved to Sudan. His Saudi citizenship was revoked in 1994 for his opposition to the Saudi government. In Sudan, bin Laden established businesses, paved roads, built an airport, and created training camps to supply out-of-work mujahedin with jobs.(363) In 1996, as Sudanese relations with the United States improved, the government of Sudan asked bin Laden to depart. He then returned to Afghanistan where he established his ties with the Taliban movement, followed by training camps and a terrorist infrastructure. This infrastructure supported a number of plots against the United States and its citizens, including the bombings of the African Embassies in 1998 and the September 11th, 2001 attacks. Also in 2001, Al Qaeda officially merged with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (see entry above).

In 2001, American-led forces toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Approximately half of the senior Al Qaeda leadership have been captured, the group's previous communications network has apparently been crippled, and its Afghanistan base has been largely eliminated. But Al Qaeda appears to have gone through a transition, from a territorially-based, centrally-directed structure to a more decentralized, mission-driven organization. Attacks in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and elsewhere have reportedly demonstrated the involvement of indigenous groups linked to Al Qaeda and supported by its resources and/or technical advice. Osama bin Laden remains at large, and Al Qaeda is still considered a major threat to the United States.

Favored Tactics. Al Qaeda is most famous for its elaborate large-scale bombings, although the group has also engaged in assassinations, guerilla warfare, and suicide attacks. The group also provides support to other terrorist organizations and violent individuals throughout the world in the form of training, logistics, and financial grants.(364) Al Qaeda has also shown interest and some capability in chemical and biological weapons, and interest in nuclear and radiological weapons.(365)

Anti-American Activity. In February 1998, bin Laden issued a proclamation announcing the creation of his new organization The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, which called on all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens and their allies (see above).(366) Al Qaeda has been held directly responsible for or variously linked with numerous terrorist attacks against United States citizens and interests. These include but are not limited to: the August 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (at least 301 killed, 5,000 injured); the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen (17 killed, 39 injured); and the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania (approximately 3,000 people dead or injured).(367)

Primary Areas of Operation. Al Qaeda is a network with global reach. Until the U.S.-led attack on Afghanistan, that country was Al Qaeda's base of operation and held its logistical and training facilities. Many of Al Qaeda's leaders have either been captured or have apparently fled to areas along the western border of Pakistan. Al Qaeda cells or collaborators have also been found in south Asia, southeast Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.(368)

Strength and Composition. The exact size of Al Qaeda is unknown, though the group likely has several thousand fighters. The estimated number of people who trained in camps or fought in Afghanistan ranges from 20,000(369) to 60,000,(370) but these are not all Al Qaeda "members." Many of Al Qaeda's top leadership have been killed, and some estimates put the number of killed or captured Al Qaeda operatives since September 11, 2001 at around 3,000.(371) Some experts further believe Al Qaeda can best be described as an organization in transition. The losses of many of the group's leaders and their base in Afghanistan have disrupted the organization, but experts fear that Al Qaeda's structure, which fostered an entrepreneurial spirit in its lower-level fighters, can sustain the loss of senior leaders.(372)

Connections with Other Groups. Groups known to have connections with Al Qaeda include Islamic Group (Egypt), al-Jihad (Egypt), Armed Islamic Group (Algeria), Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Algeria), Abu Sayyaf Organziation (Philippines), Harakat al-Mujahedin (Pakistan), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen), Asbat al-Ansar (Lebanon), al Ittihad Islamiya (Somalia), Jemaah Islamiya, and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, among others.(373)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Afghanistan under the Taliban was the primary state supporter of Al Qaeda that provided a safe-haven and allowed training camps to be established on its territory.

Pakistan's Interservice Intelligence Agency (ISI), through the support it gave to the Taliban, can be said to have provided indirect support for Al Qaeda activities; however, there is no evidence of direct support from the ISI to Al Qaeda.(374) The Bush administration has also claimed that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had direct links to Al Qaeda, though their leverage and significance is subject to dispute.

During its early stage, Al Qaeda was funded by bin Laden's personal fortune, estimated by Swiss sources at between $50-300 million.(375) Today, Al Qaeda maintains legitimate businesses, solicits donations from supporters, and receives funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations.(376) Some front businesses date back to bin Laden's time in the Sudan and include a construction company, el-Hijrah for Construction and Development Ltd., that built a highway linking Khartoum to Port Sudan,(377) and the el-Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum.(378) Also, Al Qaeda is believed to have used ostrich farms and shrimp boats in Kenya, tracts of forest in Turkey, diamond trading in Africa and farms in Tajikistan to finance its operations.(379)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1999.

Re-designated. October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group continues to be an extremely serious threat to the United States and its allies. Given the global reach of Al Qaeda and its network, Congressional oversight of U.S. counterterrorism policy will continue to be important, not only in the military and intelligence fields, but also in foreign policy, law enforcement, international cooperation, public diplomacy, foreign homeland security, and other areas.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31831, Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context, by [author name scrubbed], March 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Current Issues, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed], updated November 4, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003..

CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], updated March 8, 2004.

CRS Report RL31587(pdf), Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], updated September 30, 2002.

CRS Report RL31658, Terrorist Financing: The U.S. and International Response, by Rensselaer Lee, December 6, 2002.

CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and [author name scrubbed], updated November 18, 2003.

Real IRA (RIRA)

Goals and Objectives. The Real IRA is dedicated to expelling British troops from Northern Ireland, which is part of the United Kingdom, and unifying the island of Ireland. RIRA split off from the original Irish Republican Army in 1997 because the leadership of that group declared a cease fire and engaged in the peace process in Northern Ireland. RIRA opposes the peace process, and many believe its aim is to embarrass the original IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, by derailing negotiations and the peace process.(380)

Brief History. RIRA was formed in 1997-1998 by hardliners within the IRA who opposed the peace process in Northern Ireland that was being negotiated by more moderate members of the IRA and Sinn Fein. The group conducted a series of attacks in 1998. In August 1998, the group bombed the marketplace in Omagh, in Northern Ireland, killing 29, including 9 children, and injuring over 200.(381) The bombing was so shocking and so widely condemned that the group declared a cease fire, and claimed that it had not deliberately set out to kill civilians.

In 2000, however, the group resumed its attacks, focusing on government and military targets rather than civilians. In 2000 and 2001, the group conducted numerous attacks in Northern Ireland and London. In March 2001, the group's leader, Michael (Mickey) McKevitt, was arrested. In October 2002, McKevitt and 40 other imprisoned members declared that further armed resistence was futile and that the RIRA was "at an end." Other members vowed to continue the group's efforts, however, and RIRA attacks continue sporadically.(382)

Favored Tactics. The Real IRA has conducted bombings, assassinations, and robberies. One tactic the group has employed is the bombing of town centers in an effort to disrupt business and maximize the shock value of its attacks. Since the public outrage caused by the Omagh bombing, however, the group has tended to focus its attacks on police and military targets in Northern Ireland as well as in England.(383)

Anti-American Activities. The Real IRA has not directly targeted or attacked U.S. interests.

Areas of Operation. RIRA operates in Northern Ireland, other parts of the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland.

Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates RIRA's strength at 100 to 200 activists, plus possible support from members of the IRA who are dissatisfied with the cease fire.(384)

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Irish and Middle Eastern terrorist groups have a long tradition of exchanging expertise in bomb and weapon-making, and the Real IRA is suspected to have continued this tradition.(385)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. RIRA is suspected of receiving support from sympathizers in the United States and of attempting to purchase weapons from U.S. dealers. RIRA is also believed to have bought sophisticated weapons in the Balkans(386) and to have engaged in drug trafficking.(387)

Originally Designated as an FTO. May 16, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Alleged support for the RIRA from sympathizers in the United States may be a concern for Congress. Also, according to the State Department, the RIRA has attempted to buy weapons from U.S. gun dealers.(388)

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21333, Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, by [author name scrubbed], updated December 3, 2003.

CRS Report RL30368, Northern Ireland: Implementation of the Peace Agreement during the 106th Congress, by Karen Donfried, updated January 5, 2001.

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Name(s). Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Goals and Objectives. FARC's goal is to establish a Marxist state in Colombia. On its website, the groups says it aims "to overcome the great economic, social, cultural, ethnic and political inequalities" in Colombia.(389)

Brief History. FARC was established in 1964 after a particularly bloody period in Colombia's history known as La Violencia (1948-1958).(390) The violence ended in 1958 with a reconciliation between key parties in the government. Meanwhile, landless rebels banded together under FARC, which was formally established as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. FARC has emerged to be what the State Department describes as Colombia's "oldest, largest, most-capable, and best-equipped Marxist insurgency."(391) It has targeted both Colombian and foreign interests (including U.S.), as well as military and civilian targets.

FARC's original leader, Manuel "Tirofijo" Marulando, still controls the group, and has in the past agreed to negotiate cease-fire terms with the Colombian government. In 1999, these negotiations led President Andres Pastrana to grant FARC autonomy over a Switzerland-size zone in southern Colombia. Experts say that FARC engaged in illicit behavior, including kidnapping, extortion, and drug operations, and that this behavior proliferated in the autonomous area. In 2001, the FARC killed 197 civilians.(392) President Pastrana called off peace talks with FARC in February 2002, after the group failed to cease attacks. The president ordered Colombian armed forces to reclaim the FARC-controlled area. Peace talks between FARC and the government have not progressed since the last failed attempt in 2002.

Favored Tactics. FARC practices a variety of tactics, including bombings, kidnappings, hijackings, and mortar attacks.(393)

Anti-American Activities. FARC has been known to target U.S. citizens. Experts say that since 1980, FARC (together with the National Liberation Army (ELN)) has kidnapped more than 100 Americans, 13 of whom have been killed. As recently as February 2003, FARC rebels claimed to have shot down a U.S. plane carrying four Pentagon contractors and a Colombian on an anti-drug operation. The rebels kidnapped three of the Americans and executed the fourth after their plane crash-landed near a site where FARC commanders were holding a meeting.(394) FARC has said that it will release the remaining hostages under the condition that Colombia also release jailed FARC guerillas.

On March 4, 1999, FARC assailants abducted and later killed three U.S. humanitarian workers. In a landmark decision, in May 2003, the Colombian government extradited to the United States one of six FARC rebels suspected of committing the murders.(395) At this writing, Nelson Vargas Rueda is awaiting trial in the United States.

Primary Area(s) of Operation. FARC operates mainly in Colombia. According to some analysts, FARC operates in about 40% of the country, and it has recently claimed responsibility for terrorist activity in the capital city of Bogota. There are also reports that FARC has encroached upon the borders of Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador. It also reportedly maintains offices in Cuba, Mexico, and Europe.(396)

Strength and Composition. The State Department has said that the FARC consists of 9,000 to 12,000 armed combatants.(397) Some observers put the number much higher at as many as 18,000 members.(398)

Connections with Other Groups. Some experts suspect that FARC may have a connection with the Irish Republican Army. This suspicion arose on August 11, 2001, when three of the IRA's best explosives experts were caught traveling with false passports in Bogotá, Colombia. The three men claimed that they were visiting FARC's autonomous region in Colombia to observe the peace process; but traces of explosives were found on their belongings and they were subsequently charged with training FARC operatives.(399) FARC has subsequently displayed more agility with the use of bombs and its tactics and targeting have changed. For example, the FARC increased its use of car bombs and began attacking more economic and urban targets.(400) The FARC also increased the number and lethality of its attacks in 2001 and 2002, killing more than 400 Colombian soldiers and police in an 18 month-span.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Some analysts claim that FARC may very well be "one of the richest, if not the richest, insurgent group in the world."(401) FARC uses a variety of mechanisms to raise funds, including kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and drug trafficking. Drug operations may have yielded from $100 million upwards to $1 billion.(402) There is no public evidence to suggest that FARC receives funding, arms, or training from foreign governments.(403)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has kidnapped and killed numerous American citizens and poses a serious threat to U.S. interests in Colombia. It is also very actively involved in drug trafficking and extortion, earning large amounts of money. It is a threat to the stability of the Colombian government.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Issue Brief IB88093, Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches, by Raphael Perl, October 16, 2003.

CRS Report RS21242(pdf), Colombia: The Uribe Administration and Congressional Concerns, by Nina Serafino, updated June 14, 2002.

CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, [author name scrubbed],, updated June 11, 2003.

CRS Report RL32021, The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by [author name scrubbed], updated November 14, 2003.

CRS Report RL32052, Colombia and Aerial Eradication of Drug Crops: U.S. Policy and Issues, by [author name scrubbed], updated August 28, 2003.

Revolutionary Nuclei

Name(s). Revolutionary Nuclei/Epanastatiki Pirines.

Goals and Objectives. The Revolutionary Nuclei is a leftist terrorist group opposed to the current Greek government, the European Union, NATO and the United States.(404)

Brief History. Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) is a small, leftist, urban guerilla group based in Greece. The similarities in modus operandi between RN and another now apparently dormant Greece-based group, the Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA), have led analysts to believe that RN may have succeeded ELA. ELA emerged in the 1970s in opposition to the military junta governing Greece. The group espoused anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist ideologies, and often attacked government and foreign establishments.(405) ELA has not claimed an attack since 1995.

RN surfaced in 1996 when it began claiming bomb attacks on foreign banks and state buildings in language that seemed similar to that used by the ELA.(406) For example, on May 11, 1997, RN attacked a Greek Coast Guard Office in Piraeus.(407) In 1998, RN struck a series of Greek government targets, including Athens court buildings and the office of a former Public Order Minister.(408) In the same year, RN bombed a Barclay's Bank branch in Piraeus, without causing any casualties, but severely damaging office equipment.(409) In its most infamous attack, RN bombed the Athens Intercontinental Hotel in March 1999 to protest NATO military action in Yugoslavia; a Greek woman was killed and a man was seriously wounded.(410) In 2000, RN bombed the offices of several Greek companies and attempted to bomb the office of a former minister. The targets have generally been associated with the Greek government or the United States/European Union.

RN has not claimed an attack since November 2000, so there is some question as to whether the group may have disbanded or become dormant.(411)

Favored Tactics. RN assailants primarily plant small, makeshift bombs and use timing devices to detonate the bombs or engage in arson attacks. RN tends to place warning calls to newspapers and police offices immediately prior to commencing an attack. The group generally strikes at obscure hours of the night.

Anti-American Activities. In December 1996, RN claimed a bomb attack on a Citibank branch in Athens. No one was injured, but there was damage to the office building. RN similarly detonated a makeshift bomb at the entrance of a building that had recently housed American Express offices.(412) In its most recent attacks against U.S. interests, RN again targeted Citigroup and also bombed the studio of a Greek-American sculptor in November 2000.(413)

Primary Area(s) of Operation. RN operates in Athens, Greece and the surrounding metropolitan area.

Strength and Composition. RN is believed to be a small group, although the exact number of members is unknown. Some estimates put membership at under 100.(414) Members tend to espouse leftist ideologies and are believed to have anti-establishment and anti-U.S./NATO/EU stances.(415)

Connections with Other Groups. As stated above, because the former ELA and RN apparently have shared a common political agenda, targeted similar interests, and executed similar attacks, analysts believe that RN is a successor to the group. Former members of ELA may now be members of RN.(416) This assertion has not been publicly confirmed, however. In addition, RN reportedly jointly launched an attack on Athens court buildings on July 13, 1998 with Liberation Struggle, an unknown group.(417)

State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding and Constituencies. RN's funding sources are unknown, but the State Department has said that the group is likely "self-sustaining."(418)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. Recently the Greek government has aggressively pursued measures against Greek terrorist organizations, especially 17 November (see below). As the Summer 2004 Olympics in Athens approach, the question of whether RN/ELA will target Western interests and Western citizens may be of concern.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31612(pdf), European Counter Terrorist Efforts since September 11: Political Will and Diverse Responses, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 17, 2002.

Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November, N17)

Goals and Objectives. 17 November is a tiny anti-Western, leftist terrorist organization that opposes the Greek establishment, Greek ties to the United States and the EU, and the Turkish presence in Cyprus. The group seeks the removal of U.S. military bases from Greece. It apparently derives its anti-American stance from U.S. backing of the Greek military junta that ruled the country from 1967 to 1974.(419)

Brief History. 17 November formed in 1975 and conducted more than 100 high profile attacks in Greece since then, killing a total of 23 people. The group attacked the Greek government as well as foreign government and private targets. In the summer of 2002, with the help of the FBI and Scotland Yard, Greek police arrested 14 members, including several key leaders. The arrests were very important, representing the first significant headway by the government against the group in over 26 years. As a result, Greek authorities have declared victory over 17 November; but the group has since issued a statement declaring that it is "still alive."

The Greek government is especially concerned about 17 November as the country prepares for the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens. The group had contributed to an impression among foreigners that Greece is unsafe, and the Greek government hopes that the 2002 arrests and 2003 convictions demonstrate a dramatic reduction in the threat and a serious national commitment to security.(420)

Favored Tactics. 17 November tends to favor symbolic attacks rather than attacks designed to coerce or cripple the Greek government or foreign interests.(421) Its attacks have involved assassinations and bombings.

Anti-American Activities. Four of the 23 killed in 17 November attacks have been U.S. citizens. In 1975, the group assassinated Richard Welch, CIA station chief in Athens.(422) The group's statements attack the United States and ties between Greece and the United States.

Areas of Operation. 17 November operates in Greece, primarily in Athens.

Strength and Composition. The group's strength is unknown, according to the State Department, but is presumed to be small.(423) Other sources estimate its strength at 20 or fewer members, many related to one another, and no more than 100 supporters.(424) A number of arrests in 2002 may have crippled the group and substantially reduced its numbers. Arrested members of the group have been strikingly ordinary, including school teachers, shop keepers, and a telephone operator, all of whom led ostensibly mundane lives in mainstream society.(425)

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. 17 November has no known ties to other terrorist group.(426)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The group is believed to fund itself through bank robberies.(427)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. While the Greek government has apparently made great strides in arresting members of this group and potentially crippling it, as the Summer 2004 Olympics in Athens approach, the question of its operating capability will loom large.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL31612(pdf), European Counter Terrorist Efforts since September 11: Political Will and Diverse, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 17, 2002.

Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F)

Names. DHKP/C, Devrimci Sol, Dev Sol, and Revolutionary Way.

Goals and Objectives. The RPLP/F is an anti-Western Marxist group determined to rid Turkey of Western influence in order to turn it into a socialist state. The group regards the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as imperialistic and is opposed to Turkey's membership in NATO.(428)

Brief History. Founded in 1978 as an offshoot of the Turkish People's Liberation Party, the RPLP/F (originally Devrimci Sol or Dev Sol) began as a national political movement and turned into a terrorist organization. The "Party" refers to the group's political wing, while the "Front" refers to its military operations.

The RPLP/F began its terrorist career by assassinating current and retired prominent Turkish officials, including the 1980 assassination of former premier Nihat Emir.(429) From 1981-1983, years of a military junta, the Turkish government managed to curtail the group's activities. However, by the late 1980's, the RPLP/F had recovered enough to carry out three simultaneous bombings against American economic interests (see below) and assassinate a former chief of the Turkish National Intelligence Agency in Istanbul.(430) Throughout the 1990's, the RPLP/F intensified its anti-Western activity but also developed internal factions.(431) Group members claimed the murder of a British businessman in Ankara in 1991, and in 2001 detonated a pipe bomb in a crowd of New Year's Eve celebrants, injuring ten.(432)

Favored Tactics. The RPLP/F has engaged in targeted assassinations, rocket attacks, and bombings.

Anti-American Activity. The RPLP/F has been anti-American since its founding and has attacked American officials and civilians. For example, in February 1990, RPLP/F assassinated two Defense Department Contractors to protest the Gulf War. A month later the group shot and injured a U.S. Air Force officer near Izmir. In 1992, RPLP/F members fired a rocket at the U.S. Consulate in Ankara which produced no casualties.(433)

Primary Areas of Operation. The RPLP/F is located in Turkey with headquarters in Germany. Within Turkey, the group is based around the Aegean region. Attempts to move the group toward the Mediterranean were limited by the government.(434)

Strength and Composition. Unknown.

Connections with Other Groups. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK or KADEK) provided a safe haven for the RPLP/F in Southeast Anatolia in the Black Sea region. The two groups signed a protocol in 1996 that would deepen cooperation between the two groups(435) However, cooperation has since broken down. (See PKK entry, above.)

State Supporters, Other Sources of Funding, and Constituencies. The RPLP/F has no known state supporters. It reportedly maintains fund raising operations in Western Europe.(436)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. This group has violently attacked Americans and American interests. It is opposed to the U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has assassinated Turkish, American, and British officials, though not since the early 1990s.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32058, "Terrorists and Suicide Attacks," by [author name scrubbed], updated August 28, 2003.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RL31794(pdf), Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of U.S. Forces, and Related Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated May 2, 2003.

CRS Report RL32071, Turkey: Update on Selected Issues, by [author name scrubbed], updated September 8, 2003.

Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)

Goals and Objectives. GSPC is a well-organized radical Islamic group in Algeria that aims to establish an Islamic state based on Islamic law.

Brief History. GSPC formed when an estimated 600 militants split off from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA, see entry above) in 1996 during the bloody Algerian civil war. The group renounced GIA's massacres of civilians in the mid-1990s and promised a better organized campaign against the government and the military. By 1998, GSPC had apparently eclipsed GIA in power and popularity. By 2000, the group appeared to have taken over GIA's networks in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.(437) European officials have linked GSPC to numerous plots in Europe. Within Algeria, the group has reportedly been weakened by a government crackdown; however, it continues to attack soldiers and officials, with the frequency and violence of the attacks increasing noticeably in the summer of 2003. According to the U.S. State Department, GSPC is the most effective armed group remaining in Algeria.

Favored Tactics. The tactics of the GSPC are quite varied. Within Algeria, GSPC stages well-planned and executed ambushes of soldiers and officials. Beginning February 22, 2003, the group kidnapped several groups of European tourists in the Sahara desert (31 people in all; 30 were later freed, one perished), apparently seeking weapons and money.(438) It has set up roadblocks in remote regions, charging fees to passers-by. In Europe, the group is suspected of involvement in several major bombing plots.

Anti-American Activities. Shortly after 9/11, a GSPC leader threatened to retaliate should the United States interfere in Algeria or disrupt its overseas networks.(439) The group was suspected of plotting to blow up U.S. embassies in Paris and Rome in early 2002. In May 2003, African authorities foiled a plot to bomb the U.S. embassy in Mali. Documents found in Mali connected the plot to GSPC.(440)

Areas of Operation. The group's primary focus and area of operation is Algeria. Its main bases in Algeria have been in the mountainous regions east of Algiers. GSPC is also believed to maintain a network throughout Western Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. Individuals and cells connected to GSPC have been arrested across Western Europe.

Strength and Composition. GSPC is comprised mainly of Algerian Islamic fundamentalists. Algerian authorities estimate that it has between 100 and 300 militants.(441) According to the Algerian government, military raids and a recent amnesty period have reduced the group's numbers in Algeria.(442) European authorities have arrested more than 100 people with suspected GSPC ties, but the effect of these arrests on the group's ability to operate is unknown.

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. GSPC is believed to have extensive operational ties to Al Qaeda. According to one account, half of those arrested in Europe suspected of ties to Al Qaeda have been Algerians also associated with GSPC. In late 2002, Algerian authorities announced the arrest of a Yemeni Al Qaeda official who had been meeting with GSPC members in Algeria.(443)

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. GSPC's funding appears to come mainly from Algerian expatriates in Western Europe, particularly in France, and elsewhere. In Algeria, the group has also used kidnapping and smuggling to raise funds. The Algerian Government has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists in years past.(444) The GSPC was said to have been paid millions of dollars in ransom before most of the kidnapped European tourists were freed. (One person reportedly died of exposure.) Some media reports suggest Germany paid the ransom; others say Libya.(445) These reports have not been confirmed. Still other sources claim that the hostages were not ransomed but freed in a commando raid.(446)

Originally Designated as an FTO. March 27, 2002.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The GSPC's extensive operational ties to Al Qaeda make this group of particular concern to the United States. Its apparently extensive networks in networks in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa may provide an avenue for further attacks carried out on behalf of, or with links to, Al Qaeda.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], updated May 23, 2003.

CRS Report RL31247(pdf), Africa and the War on Terrorism, by [author name scrubbed], updated January 17, 2002.

CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman, updated February 13, 2003.

CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by [author name scrubbed], updated May 30, 2003.

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL)

Name(s). Sendero Luminoso, Shining Path, SL.

Goals and Objectives. Shining Path is a leftist organization in Peru. Its original goal was to overthrow the government and social structure of Peru and neighboring countries and replace them with a Maoist socialist system controlled by the indigenous peoples of the region. The group also opposes any foreign influence in Peru.

Brief History. SL was formed in the late 1960s by former university professor Abimael Guzman as a splinter group from the Communist Party of Peru. Although the group worked to bring about a Maoist revolution in Peru, its campaign did not turn into an armed conflict until 1980 when the group began to murder local officials in rural areas and assume their functions. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the group conducted numerous attacks in Peru, taking rural regions under its command. It was known for excessive brutality in bringing under its power the peasants in these regions. Indeed, SL has been responsible for one of the most violent terrorist insurgencies in the Western Hemisphere; at least 30,000 people have died since the group took up arms.(447) Areas that came under SL control included prime coca-growing regions, and the group acquired much of its funding by protecting the coca farmers from government eradication programs.(448)

The 1992 capture of the charismatic Guzman and a subsequent government crackdown sharply reduced the group's capabilities. While in prison, Guzman urged followers to end their campaign against the government. One faction heeded the call for cease fire, while another did not. In March 2002, just before President Bush visited Peru, a car bomb exploded near the U.S. Embassy, killing nine people and wounding thirty. Some observers believe that the group has recently begun to reconstitute itself after years of decline.(449)

In August of 2003, Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Committee released its report to the public stating that upwards of 69,000 people died in the struggle between the Shining Path and government security forces.(450) The report highlights the extreme brutality of the war and places blame on all sides.

Favored Tactics. Shining Path has favored car bombings and assassinations, as well as massacres using machetes.

Anti-American Activities. The group opposes any foreign influence in Peru, including that of the United States. In 1990, it attempted to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Lima using a car bomb. SL is also believed to be responsible for a 2002 car bomb attack near the U.S. Embassy three days before a visit to Lima by President George W. Bush.(451)

Areas of Operation. The group operates almost exclusively in Peru, and mainly in rural areas.

Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates the group's current strength at 400 to 500 members.(452) Its strength has been reduced sharply by arrests and defections; at its highpoint in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the group fielded as many as 10,000 militants, according to some accounts. The U.S. State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, states that membership has begun to grow recently, perhaps because SL has become more heavily involved in narco-trafficking.(453)

Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Shining Path is not known to have ties with other terrorist organizations.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. SL is not funded or supported by any foreign state. It receives much of its financing from coca farmers, who pay the group to protect them from government eradication programs. The groups also finances itself through robberies and extortion.(454)

Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997.

Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The question of whether the Shining Path could be reconstituting itself, even in a weaker form, has potential implications for the security of Western citizens and interests, as well as the future stability of the Peruvian government. Shining Path's involvement in narco-trafficking is also a worrisome element.

Other CRS Reports.

CRS Report RL32021, The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by [author name scrubbed], updated November 14, 2003.

CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark Sullivan, updated June 11, 2003.

CRS Report RL30918, Peru: Recovery From Crisis, [author name scrubbed], updated April 25, 2002.

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

Name(s). Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, the "Paramilitaries."

Goals and Objectives. Founded in 1997, the AUC is an umbrella organization for right-wing paramilitary groups which first began forming in the 1980s in order to protect the economic interests of wealthy land owners and combat Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) insurgents locally.(455)

Brief History. The AUC was founded by brothers Fidel and Carlos Castano in 1997. Groups subsumed by the AUC are believed to include the Peasant Self-Defense Group of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU), the Eastern Plains Self-Defense Group, the Cesar Self-Defense Group, the Middle Magdalena Self-Defense Group, Santander and Southern Cesar Self-Defense Group, Casanare Self-Defense Group, the Cundinamarca Self-Defense Group, the Pacific Bloc (including the "Frente Calima" in and around Cali), the Southern Bloc, and the"Frente Capital" forming in Bogota.(456)

The AUC targets real and perceived supporters of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), as well as political activists, police officials and judges. The group is known for its brutality and has killed more civilians than the leftist insurgencies have killed: in 2001, the AUC killed at least 1,015 civilians, compared to the 197 civilians killed by the FARC. The AUC also committed over 100 massacres in 2001, a tactic it used to displace large portions of the peasant population in order maintain firmer control over the major coca-growing lands. The U.S. State Department noted that the AUC was responsible for about 43 percent of Colombia's internally displaced people in 2001.(457) Co-founder Carlos Castano claims that drug- related activity supplies 70 percent of AUC's funding, while the rest is donated by sponsors.(458)

In 2001, Castano stepped down as head of military operations to devote more time to the political activities of the AUC. In 2002, the AUC signed a cease fire and is engaged in peace talks with the Colombian government. In July 2003, citing government progress in combating the ELN and FARC, the AUC agreed to demobilize.(459) In November 2003, a paramilitary group of some 850 members based near Medellin formally demobilized.(460)

Favored Tactics. The AUC has carried out indiscriminate bombing campaigns, assassinations, massacres of entire villages, and guerilla warfare.(461)

Anti-American Activities. The AUC specifically avoids American personnel or interests. However, human rights abuses and known ties to narcotics trafficking may have earned the AUC a place on the FTO list.

Primary Areas of Operation. AUC forces operate in the northwest Colombian departments of Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, and Bolivar.(462) Their presence has also been noted in the north and southwest, and fighting with FARC in 2000 in Putuyamo show AUC's willingness to battle FARC throughout the country.

Strength and Composition. The AUC membership has tripled in the last three years, with a reported strength of anywhere from 6,000 to 15,000 fighters.(463)

Connections with Other Groups. The AUC has no known connections with other terrorist groups. However, the group is intricately tied with Colombia drug producers.

State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. There is no known direct relationship between the AUC and a state sponsor. However, there have been accusations that paramilitary organizations receive support from Colombia's armed forces. Concerned that close collaboration between paramilitary and military forces was putting U.S. military aid to Colombia in the hands of the AUC, the U.S. government ordered the Armed Forces of Colombia to sever all ties with the AUC in order to qualify for U.S. aid.(464)

Originally Designated as an FTO. September 10, 2001.

Issues of Concern for Congress. The relationship between the Colombian government and paramilitary groups has been a serious concern of Congress in the past because of the possibility that U.S. dollars might end up supporting the AUC. The Colombian government's severing of those ties would remove this risk; however, congressional oversight will continue to be important.

Other CRS Products.

CRS Issue Brief IB88093, Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches, by Raphael Perl, October 16, 2003.

CRS Report RS21242(pdf), Colombia: The Uribe Administration and Congressional Concerns, Nina Serafino, updated June 14, 2002.

CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by [author name scrubbed], updated June 11, 2003.

Footnotes

1. (back) Noriyuki Katagiri, "In the Spotlight: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)," Center for Defense Information, October 9, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ano-pr.cfm.

2. (back) "Abu Nidal was 'bin Laden' of his Time," Reuters, Aug. 19, 2002

3. (back) Alan Philips, "Mystery End for Abu Nidal," The Daily Telegraph, Aug. 20, 2002.

4. (back) "Chronology of Abu Nidal's Major Attacks," The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 20, 2002.

5. (back) "Abu Nidal Shot Himself in the Mouth," Agence France Presse, Aug. 21, 2002.

6. (back) "Death of a Terrorist," Jane's Intelligence Review, Sept. 6, 2002.

7. (back) "Abu Nidal was 'bin Laden' of his Time," Reuters, Aug. 19, 2002

8. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, at http://www.periscope1.com.

9. (back) U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120. Also accessible at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/.

10. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

11. (back) "Death of a Terrorist," Jane's Intelligence Review, Sept. 6, 2002.

12. (back) Emily Clark,"In the Spotlight: Abu Sayyaf," Center for Defense Information, updated March 5, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/sayyaf.cfm, accessed July 15, 2003. See also U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 102.

13. (back) CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p.1.

14. (back) Anthony Davis, "Resilient Abu Sayyaf Group Resists Military Pressure," Jane's Intelligence Review, Sept. 1, 2003. See also "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Abu Sayyaf Group," The Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/abusayyaf2.html, accessed on July 15, 2003.

15. (back) Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, CRS Report RL31263, updated April 8, 2003, p. 3.

16. (back) Ibid.

17. (back) "U.S.-Philippines Sign Military Logistics Support Pact," Agence France Presse, Nov. 21, 2002.

18. (back) CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 9-13.

19. (back) Bradley Graham, "Hostage Dies, Wife Is Freed In Rescue; U.S. Missionaries Held 1 Year by Rebels," The Washington Post, June 8, 2002.

20. (back) Raymond Bonner and Eric Schmitt, "Philippine Officials Detail the Trap, Set with U.S. Help, that Snared a Rebel Leader," The New York Times, September 22, 2002, p. NE16; and Mark Lerner, "Hostage's Father Says Abu Sayyaf Broke Deal," The Washington Times, April 26, 2002, p. A15; cited in CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, [author name scrubbed], updated November 18, 2003, p. 11.

21. (back) CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 12.

22. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 102.

23. (back) CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 3.

24. (back) Anthony Davis, "Resilient Abu Sayyaf Group Resists Military Pressure," Jane's Intelligence Review, Sept. 1, 2003.

25. (back) See "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Abu Sayyaf Group," The Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/abusayyaf2.html, accessed on July 15, 2003.

26. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,pp. 101-102.

27. (back) CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 6.

28. (back) Ibid., p. 3.

29. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 102.

30. (back) CRS Report RL31263, "Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation," by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 5.

31. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

32. (back) "Palestinian Militant Groups 101," CNN, June 18, 2003.

33. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

34. (back) "al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade," Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/alaqsa_print.html, accessed July 14, 2003.

35. (back) Matthew Kalman, "Terrorist says orders come from Arafat; Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade leader says group is integral to Palestinian chief's Fatah," USA Today, March 14, 2002.

36. (back) Dan Rothem, "In the Spotlight: al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades," Center for Defense Information, June 10, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism.aqsa-pr.cfm, accessed July 14, 2003.

37. (back) "Foreign Worker Killed in West Bank," Associate Press, June 30, 2003.

38. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.102.

39. (back) "Martyrs of al-Aqsa," International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il, accessed July 14, 2003 .

40. (back) "Israel 1991 to Present; al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade," Palestine Facts, http://www.palestinefacts.org, accessed July 14, 2003.

41. (back) Yehuda Lancry, "Letter dated 16 January 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," January 16, 2002, accessible at http://domino.un.org.

42. (back) Yael Shahar, "The al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade: A political tool with an edge," International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, March 24, 2002.

43. (back) "Israel 1991 to Present; al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade," Palestine Facts, http://www.palestinefacts.org, accessed July 14, 2003.

44. (back) Lee Hockstader, "Israel Says Document Links Arafat, Terror," The Washington Post, April 3, 2002

45. (back) "Profile: al- Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade," BBC News.

46. (back) "New Bloodletting in Algeria," Newsday, January 5, 1998.

47. (back) See, for example: Habib Souaidia, The Dirty War and Nesroulah Youh, Who Killed in Bentalha: Chronicle of a Forecasted Massacre.

48. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003. See also Elaine Ganley, "Ahmed Ressam Followed Familiar Road Map to Terror," Associated Press, Dec. 18, 2001.

49. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.

50. (back) Ibid.

51. (back) "Al Qa'idah reportedly Trying to Unite Algeria's Armed Islamic Groups,"BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 8, 2002.

52. (back) "Former Islamist Chief Says bin Laden Offered to Help Topple Algerian Government," BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 12, 2002.

53. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.

54. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003.

55. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

56. (back) "Portraits of Groups U.S. Links to Terror," Agence France Presse, September 25, 2001.

57. (back) "Hundreds Attend Funeral of Palestinian Attacker of Russian Embassy in Beirut," Associated Press, January 7, 2000.

58. (back) Nicholas Blanford, "Lebanon Targets Islamic Radicals," The Christian Science Monitor, May 20, 2003.

59. (back) "Presumed Leader of Anti-U.S. Terror Group Arrested in Lebanon," Agence France Presse, October 18, 2003.

60. (back) Nicholas Blanford, "Lebanon Targets Islamic Radicals," The Christian Science Monitor, May 20, 2003.

61. (back) "The Military Balance," Institute for International and Strategic Studies, vol. 103. http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/. Table 41.

62. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.

63. (back) Jonathan Schanzer, "New Evidence of Wider Threats from Lebanon's Asbat al-Ansar," Analysis of Near East Policy from the Scholars and Associates of the Washington Institiute, Policywatch #79, October 3, 2003.

64. (back) Sarah Smiles and Linda Morris, "Islamic Youth Leader Charged with Terrorist Links," The Sydney Morning Herald, September 13, 2003.

65. (back) Schanzer, "New Evidence of Wider Threats from Lebanon's Asbat al-Ansar."

66. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103.

67. (back) Shawn Choy, "In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo," Center for Defense Information, July 23, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/AumShinrikyo-pr.cfm, accessed July 25, 2003.

68. (back) Steven Strasser, "Tokyo Grabs Doomsday Guru," Newsweek, v.125 No. 22, May 29, 1995.

69. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104.

70. (back) "New Aum Title Riles Namesakes," Mainichi Daily News, January 21, 2000.

71. (back) Hiroshi Matsubara, "Aum grows again, guru still revered," The Japan Times, Aug. 8, 2002.

72. (back) Ibid

73. (back) For this and other information about the cult's activities, see David E. Kaplan, "Aum Shinrikyo," Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, edited by Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 225-226

74. (back) "Aum Released Anthrax Virus in Tokyo in 1993," Japan Economic Newswire, July 25, 1995; and U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104.

75. (back) "Filthy Wars: Japan's Aum Shinrikyo Sect," Sunday Herald Sun, April 19, 1999.

76. (back) Shawn Choy, "In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo," Center for Defense Information, July 23, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/AumShinrikyo-pr.cfm, accessed July 25, 2003.

77. (back) Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press: New York, p. 123.

78. (back) Choy, "In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo."

79. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104.

80. (back) Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 122.

81. (back) "Russia has more Aum Shinrikyo Members than Japan, Orthodox Bishop Says," British Broadcasting Corporation, August 3, 2003.

82. (back) Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 122.

83. (back) Choy, "In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo."

84. (back) "Aum's True Colors," Mainichi Daily News, Oct. 2, 1999.

85. (back) Kaplan, "Aum Shinrikyo," in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 226.

86. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 105.

87. (back) "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)," The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation,
http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/eta.html, accessed on July 25, 2003.

88. (back) Support for the ETA does exist; however, it has been severely weakened. Ibid.

89. (back) Keith B. Richburg, "Long Basque Rebellion Losing Strength: International Effort Squeezes Underground Separatist Group," The Washington Post, December 11, 2003, p. A1.

90. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 105.

91. (back) David Trimble, "In Northern Ireland, A Question of Trust," The Washington Post, November 30, 2002.

92. (back) Tim Johnson, "Hand of Irish or Basque Terrorists Seen in Deadly Colombian Bombing," San Diego Union-Tribune, February 12, 2003.

93. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 105.

94. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

95. (back) "One Philippine soldier killed, eight injured in clash with communist rebels," Associated Press, April 17, 2003.

96. (back) Teresa Cerojano, "Arroyo orders action against communist rebels following deadly attack," Associated Press, June 27, 2003.

97. (back) "Philippine Exploratory Peace Talks Halted," Xinhua News Agency, Feb. 20, 2003. See also Jim Gomez, "Philippine troops and communist rebels clash near Manila, 24 killed," Associated Press, March 30, 2003.

98. (back) Lee Peart, "Philippines -- NPA Vows to Target US Troops in Philippines," WMRC Daily Analysis, March 28, 2003.

99. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 106.

100. (back) Ibid. See also Teresa Cerojano, "Arroyo orders action against communist rebels following deadly attack," Associated Press, June 27, 2003.

101. (back) CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and [author name scrubbed], updated November 18, 2003. See also Jim Gomez, "Philippine troops and communist rebels clash near Manila, 24 killed," Associated Press, March 30, 2003.

102. (back) Honesto C. General, "Is CPP/NPA a terrorist organization?," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 18, 2002.

103. (back) Sheikh Rahman is also a conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, for which he has been serving life in prison since 1995.

104. (back) William Farrell, "Egypt Reports Plot to Kill Aides at Sadat's Funeral," The New York Times, Oct. 31, 1981

105. (back) Lamia Radi, "Egypt Frees Islamic Militant Leader Jailed for Sadat Murder," Agence France Presse, Sept. 29, 2003.

106. (back) "Ethiopia Announces Arrests in Mubarak Assassination Bid," Agnence France Presse, Aug. 2, 1995.

107. (back) Radi, "Egypt Frees Islamic Militant Leader Jailed for Sadat Murder."

108. (back) "Egypt Arrest 45 Militants after Identifying One of the Luxor Attackers," Agence France Presse, Nov. 21, 1997.

109. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.106.

110. (back) "Most Jamma Leaders Favor End to All Attacks," Agence France Presse, Dec. 11, 1997.

111. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p.106

112. (back) "Urgent," Agence France Presse, Apr. 21, 1996.

113. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p 106.

114. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

115. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p 106.

116. (back) "In the Spotlight: al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya - Islamic Group," Center for Defense Information, December 2, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/algamaa-pr.cfm, accessed July 28, 2003.

117. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 106.

118. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

119. (back) Khaled Abou Toameh, "Cradle to Grave," The Jerusalem Post, Sept. 4, 1997.

120. (back) PR Kumaraswamy, "Hamas Emerges as Winner in Cairo Talks," Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1, 2003.

121. (back) Ramit Plushnick-Masti, "Unsuccessful Israeli strike on top Hamas leaders highlights difficulty of targeted killings," Associate Press Sept. 7, 2003.

122. (back) Samuel Katz, "Policing Israel's Front Line," The Washington Times, Sept. 22, 2002.

123. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

124. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 107.

125. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 107.

126. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com. See also Michael Donovan, "In the Spotlight: Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)," Center for Defense Information, updated June 23, 2003. Accessed at http://www.cdi.org, July 14, 2003.

127. (back) "Palestinian Islamic Jihad," International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il, accessed July 11, 2003.

128. (back) Massimo Calabresi, "A Hidden Hand in the Breakdown of Peace," Time Magazine, Feb. 28, 2000.

129. (back) Daniel Byman, "Should Hezbollah be Next?" Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 2003. See also "Hizballahland," Commentary from the American Jewish Committee, No. 1, Vol. 116, July 1, 2003, pg 56.

130. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003.

131. (back) T. Christian Miller, "Near Iraq, Syria Reportedly Still Quietly Backs Militants,"Los Angeles Times, August 12, 2003.

132. (back) See for example, "Again, Bush Warns Iran, Syria on Terrorism," Los Angeles Times, July 22, 2003.

133. (back) Steve Weizman, "Israel Accuses Saudis of Helping Palestinian Terror Attacks," Associate Press, May 6, 2002.

134. (back) Barry Schweid, "Powell Says He Has No Evidence that Israel Massacred Palestinians in Refugee Camp," Associate Press, Apr. 24, 2002.

135. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003.

136. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

137. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108.

138. (back) Dan Rotham, "In the Spotlight: Harakat ul Mujaheddin (HUM)," Center for Defense Information, updated July 8, 2002. Accessed at http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/harakat.cfm, July 15, 2003.

139. (back) "Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Ansar Change Names," The Press Trust of India, March 12, 2003.

140. (back) Kahn, Zarar. "Pakistan sentences men to death for bomb that killed French engineers." Associated Press. June 30. 2003.

141. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108.

142. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003, p. 18. See also Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 109.

143. (back) CRS Report RL31119,, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003, p. 18.

144. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 108.

145. (back) Dan Rotham, "In the Spotlight: Harakat ul Mujaheddin (HUM)," Center for Defense Information, updated July 8, 2002. Accessed at http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/harakat.cfm, July 15, 2003.

146. (back) "Hezbollah's Manifesto," available at http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm. See also U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108

147. (back) Hezbollah holds ten seats and its allies hold two.

148. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

149. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2002.

150. (back) "Terrorism Database." Periscope, USNI Database. http://www.periscope1.com.

151. (back) CIA report on Islamic Jihad. Central Intelligence Agency. Issue Date: Oct 4, 1984. Date Declassified: Mar 01, 1987. 6 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale Group, 2003.

152. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2002.

153. (back) "Singapore Says Hizballah Tried to From Terror Cell," Reuters, Jun. 8, 2002. See also "Hezbollah had plans to attack US, Israeli ships in Singapore," Agence France Presse, Jun 9, 2002.

154. (back) "Hizbullah Vows to Retaliate," The Daily Star, Aug. 4, 2003. Available at http://www.hizbollah.org/english/frames/index_eg.htm

155. (back) Daniel Byman, "Should Hezbollah be Next?" Foreign Affairs, November-December 2003, Vol. 82, No. 6, pp. 54-67.

156. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108

157. (back) "The Military Balance," Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/. Table 41.

158. (back) "Iran, Syria, and bin Laden," The Washington Times, November 29, 2001.

159. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.108.

160. (back) Martin Sieff, "U.S. to Keep Pressure on Iran," Washington Times May 26, 1996. See also [author name scrubbed], "Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, CRS Report RL31119, updated February 13, 2002.

161. (back) Gary Wright and Eric Frazer, "Trial Starts for Two Accused of Hizballah Tie," The Charlotte Observer, May 20, 2002.

162. (back) "Iran, Syria, and bin Laden," The Washington Times, November 29, 2001.

163. (back) Byman, "Should Hezbollah be Next?"

164. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109.

165. (back) "In the Spotlight: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan." Center for Defense Information. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm. Updated Mar. 25, 2002. Accessed Oct. 27, 2003.

166. (back) "Terrorism Database." Periscope, USNI Database. http://www.periscope1.com.

167. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109.

168. (back) Audrey Cooper, "American Hostages Push Guard Off Cliff to Escape Militants," Chicago Tribune, Aug. 25, 2000.

169. (back) Mark Burgess, "In the Spotlight: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan." Center for Defense Information. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm. Updated Mar. 25, 2002. Accessed Oct. 27, 2003.

170. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109.

171. (back) Ibid

172. (back) "The Military Balance," Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/. Table 41.

173. (back) Raffi Khatchadourian, "Militants on the Steppes," The Nation, May 20, 2002.

174. (back) Ibid

175. (back) Prepared Testimony of Ralf Mutschke, Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, InterPol General Secretariat Before for the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, "The Threat Posed by the Convergence of the Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism," December 13, 2000.

176. (back) "Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Ansar Change Names," The Press Trust of India, March 12, 2003.

177. (back) Azhar was previously the leader of Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which was renamed Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) and then again renamed HUM in October 1997 when the HUA was designated a FTO. See B. Raman, "Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) -- A Backgrounder," South Asia Analysis Group, October http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper332.html, accessed July 31, 2003.

178. (back) Zahid Hussein, "Freed Militant Arrives in Paksitan," Associated Press, Jan. 6, 2000.

179. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

180. (back) "Jaish: Taliban's Twin, Harakat's New Avatar," Indian Express, Oct. 2, 2001.

181. (back) Neelesh Misra, "India Police Finger Attack Sponsors," Associated Press, Dec. 16, 2001.

182. (back) "Masood Azhar masterminded Parliament attack," Hindustan Times, May 15, 2002.

183. (back) B. Raman, "Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) -- A Backgrounder," South Asia Analysis Group, October http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper332.html, accessed July 31, 2003.

184. (back) Mujtaba Ali Ahmad, "2 Top Rebel Commanders Killed in Kashmir," Associated Press, Sept. 17, 2003.

185. (back) Husain Haggani, "Pakistan Frees Terrorist Leaders," Asian Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2003.

186. (back) "Jaish-e-Mohammed Mujahideen-e-Tanzeem," South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammed_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm#, accessed August 8, 2003.

187. (back) See CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed],, August 28, 2003.

188. (back) "Jaish-e-Mohammed," Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/jem.htm, accessed July 31, 2003.

189. (back) Paul Haven, "A Year After Pearl's Abduction, Questions Remain," Associated Press, Jan. 22, 2003.

190. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110.

191. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

192. (back) "Jaish-e-Mohammed," Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/jem.htm, accessed July 31, 2003.

193. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110.

194. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110; "Jaish-e-Mohammed Mujahideen-e-Tanzeem," South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammed_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm#, accessed August 8, 2003.

195. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

196. (back) Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Rama Lakshmi, "New Delhi Lays Blame," The Washington Post, December 29, 2001.

197. (back) "Terrorism: Questions and Answers," The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/jemaah.html, accessed on July 10, 2003.

198. (back) CRS Report RL31772, Terrorism in Southeast Asia,Mark Manyin, by Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and [author name scrubbed], updated November 18, 2003, p. 5.

199. (back) Ibid.

200. (back) Ibid.

201. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

202. (back) Shawn Donnan, "Terror Group May Have Been Born out of Afghan Jihad," Financial Times, Aug. 27, 2003.

203. (back) "Jemaah Islamiyah in East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous," International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 63, Aug. 26, 2003. Additional information about the Bali bombing and other recent attacks is available in CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and [author name scrubbed],, updated November 18, 2003, pp.6-8.

204. (back) Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, pp.7-8.

205. (back) "Indonesia Points to Jemaah over Marriott Attack," Reuters, Aug. 8, 2003.

206. (back) Romesh Ratnesar, "Confessions of an Al-Qaeda Terrorist," Time, September 23, 2002; cited in Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 6.

207. (back) "Indonesia Points to Jemaah over Marriott Attack," Reuters, Aug. 8, 2003.

208. (back) Shawn Donnan, "Terror Group May Have Been Born out of Afghan Jihad," Financial Times, Aug. 27, 2003.

209. (back) Alan Sipress and Ellen Nakashima, "Al-Qaeda Affiliate Training Indonesians on Philippine Island," The Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2003.

210. (back) John McBeth, "Indonesia-Easy Does It," The Far Eastern Economic Review, July 17, 2003.

211. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110.

212. (back) "Jemaah Islamiyyah: Damaged but Still Dangerous," International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 63, Jakarta/Brussels, Aug. 26, 2003.

213. (back) "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Jemaah Islamiyah," The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/jemaah.html, accessed on July 10, 2003.

214. (back) Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 6.

215. (back) "Singapore Government Reveals Extent of Islamic Terrorist Threat to South East Asia," Jane's Terrorism Intelligence Center, January 1, 2003. See also "Jemaah Islamiah Report Released," Radio Australia, available at http://abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/programs/s760988.htm.

216. (back) "Worldwide arrests to root out alQaeda since September 11, 2001" Agence France Presse, Sept. 14, 2002.

217. (back) "Moro Rebels Topple Down Electric Posts," Financial Times Information Global News Wire, May 16, 2003. See also Anthony Davis, "Blast Suggests MILF-JI Links," Jane's Intelligence Review, May, 1, 2003.

218. (back) For additional information about the MILF see the Abu Sayyaf entry, above.

219. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com. See also "Arrests in Connection with Assassination of Speaker of Parliament," The Independent- London, Oct. 29, 1990.

220. (back) "Egypt's Brutal Response to Militants: Tactics Used to Counter Opponents at Home Contrast with Appeals for U.S. Restraint," The Washington Post, October 7, 2001, p.A25.

221. (back) "Al-Jihad," International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il accessed October 27, 2003.

222. (back) Anthony Keats, "In the Spotlight: Al-Jihad." http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/aljihad.cfm. Accessed October 15, 2003.

223. (back) "Terrorism Database." Periscope, USNI Database. http://www.periscope1.com. See also Anthony Keats, "In the Spotlight: Al-Jihad," Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism, accessed October 15, 2003.

224. (back) Philip Shenon, "U.S. Embassy Halts Business in Albania," The New York Times, Aug. 15, 1998.

225. (back) David Cloud and Brian Duffy, "Egyptian Group Draws Scrutiny in Bomb Probe," The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 14, 1998. See also "Embassy Bombings; Egyptian Group now Top Suspect," Knight Ridder, Aug. 15, 1998.

226. (back) Lenny Savino and Jonathan Landay, "Al-Jihad Suspects in 'Cole' Bombing, "Knight-Ridder, Oct. 20, 2000. See also "Authorities Reportedly Arrest Jihad Suspects Linked to Cole Blast," BBC, Oct. 28, 2000.

227. (back) Marcus Gee, "The Hydra's Ten Biggest Heads," The Globe and Mail, Sept. 29, 2001. See also Michael Elliott, "The Hate Club," Time Magazine Vol. 158, Issue 21, Nov. 12, 2001.

228. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 111.

229. (back) Anthony Keats, "In the Spotlight: Al-Jihad." Center for Defense Information. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism. Accessed October 15, 2003.

230. (back) [author name scrubbed]pkin, "Two Leaders of Terrorist Organization al-Qaeda Operating in Iran," Associated Press, August 28, 2002.

231. (back) "Iran List has 225 Names," Associated Pres, October 27, 2003.

232. (back) Periscope, USNI Database. "Terrorism Database." http://www.periscope1.com.

233. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003, p. 21.

234. (back) David Kocieniewski and Kevin McCoy, "Old Evidence Hints at Trade Center Blast," The Seattle Times, May 29, 1993. See also Jeanne King, "Accused Killer of Kahane also Focus in Trade Center Bombing," Reuters, March 5, 1993.

235. (back) Dina Kraft, "Slain Settler Leader Followed Father's Path," Assoc. Press, Dec. 31, 2000.

236. (back) Katzman, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, p. 21.

237. (back) "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Kach, Kahane Chai," The Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/kkc.html, accessed on August 6, 2003.

238. (back) Vivienne Walt, "Israeli Turnabout Alleged," USA Today, May 17, 2002.

239. (back) "U.S. Representative Darrell Issa Holds News Conference on Bomb Threat," Federal Documents Clearinghouse, Dec. 12, 2001. See also Aldrin Brown, "2 Leaders of Jewish Group Accused of Anti-Arab Bomb Plot," The Orange County Register, Dec. 13, 2001.

240. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, U.S. State Department, April 2003, pp. 112.

241. (back) Periscope, USNI Database. "Terrorism Database." http://www.periscope1.com.

242. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003, p. 27.

243. (back) "U.S. Welcomes Ocalan Capture," Agence France Presse Feb. 16, 1999.

244. (back) Louis Meixler, "Kurdish Rebel Group Dissolves Itself," Associated Press, Nov. 11, 2003. See also, "Turkish Kurd Rebel Group Disbands," Dow Jones, Nov. 11, 2003.

245. (back) Periscope, USNI Database. "Terrorism Database." http://scope1.com

246. (back) "Ankara Accuses Syria of Backing Rebel Kurd Group," Reuters, Jan. 7, 1996. See also "Turkey Syria, Lebanon to Stop Activity of Terrorist Group," BBC, Dec. 27, 2001.

247. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 112. See also "The Military Balance," Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/. Table 41.

248. (back) Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question, Oxford, England: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998. See also Nadire Matar, "Syria and Iran with Iraq on Kurdish Issue," Inter-Press Service, Aug. 22, 1994. Michael Radu, "The Rise and Fall of the PKK," Orbis, Vol. 5, Issue. 1, Jan. 1, 2001.

249. (back) "Terror Organizations in Turkey: Islamic Terror Organizations/ Leftist Terror Organizations - DHKP/C." http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/organisations/dhkpc.html. Accessed October 16, 2003.

250. (back) Ibid., p. 31. See also Periscope, USNI Database. "Terrorism Database." http://www.periscope1.com.

251. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.

252. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.

253. (back) Chris Kraul and Mubashir Zaidi, India, Pakistan will try again to reach peace," San Jose Mercury News, May 3, 2003.

254. (back) CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], updated March 8, 2004.

255. (back) Husain Haqqani, "Pakistan Frees Terrorist Leaders," Asian Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2003.

256. (back) "Alleged U.S. Militants Arrested," Associate Press, June 28, 2003.

257. (back) Eric Lichtblau, "4 Terror Suspects Ordered Released Pending Trials," The New York Times, July 3, 2003.

258. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.

259. (back) Ibid.

260. (back) Ibid.

261. (back) Dan Rothem, "CDI Fact Sheet: Lashkar e Taiba," Center for Defense Information, updated August 12, 2002. Accessed at http://www.cdi.org, July 28, 2003.

262. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 113.

263. (back) "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)," The Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/harakat.html , accessed on July 25, 2003.

264. (back) Stephen Collinson, "US designates Pakistani-based Sunni extremists as terror group." Agence France Presse. January 30, 2002.

265. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 114.

266. (back) Ibid.

267. (back) Anthony Keats, "CDI Fact Sheet:Lashkar I Jangvi," Center for Defense Information, updated March 3, 2003. Accessed at http://www.cdi.org, July 25, 2003.

268. (back) Ibid.

269. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 114.

270. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 114.

271. (back) Keats, "CDI Fact Sheet:Lashkar I Jangvi."

272. (back) CRS Report RL31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed], November 5, 2003, p. 4.

273. (back) Kim Barker, "In War Torn Sri Lanka, Truce Holds Day by Day," Chicago Tribune, April 4, 2002. See also Catherine Philip, "Sri Lanka and Tamil Tigers Ready to End 19-Year War and Share Power," The Times, December 6, 2002. See also Amal Jayasinge and Edward Luce, "Tamil Tigers Emerge from the Shadows," Financial Times, April 5, 2002.

274. (back) Amy Waldman, "Sri Lanka to Explore a New Government," The New York Times, December 6, 2002.

275. (back) Frances Harrison, "Sri Lanka Peace Moves Attacked," BBC News, April 8, 2003.

276. (back) CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by [author name scrubbed], August 28, 2003.

277. (back) Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, "We Know Terrorism," The Washington Post, Nov. 7, 2001.

278. (back) Amy Waldman, "Masters of Suicide Bombing," The New York Times, January 14, 2003.

279. (back) CRS Report RL31707, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed], updated May 30, 2003, p. 4.

280. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 115.

281. (back) "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," The Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/tamiltigers.html , accessed on August 11, 2003.

282. (back) Waldman, "Masters of Suicide Bombing." See also Amal Jayasinghe, "Tamil Tigers Mark Suicide Anniversary," Agence France Presse, July 5, 2003.

283. (back) Kronstadt, Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations, p. 4.

284. (back) Raymond Bonner, "Sri Lanka's Ruthless Tigers Easily Armed by Unchecked Market," Chicago Tribune Mar. 8, 1998. See also Peter Goodspeed, "Tamil Tigers' Leader Poised for Dramatic Comeback," National Post, May 17, 2000.

285. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 115.

286. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003, p. 28.

287. (back) CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Policy Concerns and Responses, by [author name scrubbed], updated October 24, 2003.

288. (back) Geoff Hutchinson, "France Targets Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization," Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Jun. 18, 2003.

289. (back) Elaine Sciolino, "Iranian Opposition Movement's Many Faces," The New York Times, June 29, 2003.

290. (back) "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Is Mujahedeen e-Khalq a Terrorist Group?" The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, http://www.terrorismanswers.org/home/, accessed on August 5, 2003.

291. (back) "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Mujahedeen e-Khalq," The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/mujahedeen.html, accessed on August 5, 2003.

292. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 116.

293. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 116.

294. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003, p. 29.

295. (back) Elaine Sciolino, "Iranian Opposition Movement's Many Faces," The New York Times, June 29, 2003.

296. (back) Their website is located at http://www.iran-e-azad.org/english/ncri.html.

297. (back) U.S. Department of State, "Designation of National Council of Resistance and National Council of Resistance of Iran Under Executive Order 13224,"Press Statement, August 15, 2003.

298. (back) U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, "Designation of National Council of Resistance in Iran, National Council of Resistance and Peoples Mujahedin of Iran under Executive Order 13224," August 15, 2003, #JS-664, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js664.htm. For an explanation of the meaning of this designation and the terrorist lists, see CRS Report RL32120, The "FTO List" and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by [author name scrubbed], October 21, 2003, pp. 3-5.

299. (back) "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: FARC, ELN, AUC," The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/farc.html, accessed on July 14, 2003.

300. (back) Shawn Choey, "In the Spotlight: The National Liberation Army," Center for Defense Information, updated June 23, 2003, available at http://www.cdi.org, accessed on July 14, 2003.

301. (back) Ibid.

302. (back) "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: FARC, ELN, AUC," The Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/farc.html, accessed on July 14, 2003.

303. (back) "National Liberation Army," International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il, accessed October 27, 2003.

304. (back) "Colombia's ELN Rebels Move Into Bolivia," EFE News Service June 16, 2003.

305. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 116.

306. (back) "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: FARC, ELN, AUC," The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/farc.html accessed on July 14, 2003.

307. (back) Ibid.

308. (back) Michael Donovan, "In the Spotlight: Palestinian Islamic Jihad," Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pij.cfm, accessed on April 29, 2003.

309. (back) Liza Porteus, "Profile: Palestinian Islamic Jihad," Fox News, February 20, 2003.

310. (back) "Cease-fire give hope for Mideast peace plan," Chicago Tribune, June 30, 2003.

311. (back) Matthew Gutman, "Cease-fire is dead, Jihad tells 'Post'," Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2003.

312. (back) Jeff Jacoby, "Palestinian Terrorism, American Blood," Boston Globe, October 19, 2003.

313. (back) Ibrahim Barzak, "Islamic Jihad: Won't Target Americans," Associated Press, February 21, 2003.

314. (back) Ibid.

315. (back) "Islamic Jihad leader in Damascus says Palestinian Authority 'has retreated,'" BBC, Aug. 2, 2001.

316. (back) Michael Donovan, "In the Spotlight: Palestinian Islamic Jihad," Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pij.cfm, accessed on April 29, 2003.

317. (back) Ibid.

318. (back) "Palestinian Islamic Jihad," International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il, accessed July 11, 2003.

319. (back) Massimo Calabresi, "A Hidden Hand in the Breakdown of Peace," Time Magazine, February 28, 2000.

320. (back) Daniel Byman, "Should Hezbollah be Next?" Foreign Affairs, November-December 2003, Vol. 82, No. 6, pp. 54-67. See also http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pij.cfm "Hizbollahland," Commentary from the American Jewish Committee, No. 1, Vol. 116, July 1, 2003, pg 56.

321. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 117.

322. (back) Ibid.

323. (back) "Israel Says U.S. Should End Dialogue with PLO," Reuters, May 30, 1990. See also "4 PLO Guerrillas Killed," Associated Press, May 30, 1990.

324. (back) "Israel Says Uncovered Iraqi-Backed Militant Cell," Reuters, Nov. 25, 2001. See also Israel arrests Iraq-supported Palestinian Cell," Agence France Presse, Nov. 25, 2001.

325. (back) "U.S. Forces Capture Terrorist Abu Abbas in Baghdad," U.S. Department of State, Press Releases and Documents, Apr. 16, 2003.

326. (back) "A Terrorist Nabbed, Abu Abbas Should be Brought to Justice," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Apr. 17, 2003.

327. (back) "Israelis Shoot 2 Guerillas in Balloon," The Globe and Mail, Apr. 17, 1981. See also Periscope, USNI Database. "Terrorism Database." http://www.periscope1.com.

328. (back) "4 PLO Guerrillas Killed," Associated Press, May 30, 1990.

329. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 117.

330. (back) "The Military Balance," Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/. Table 41.

331. (back) Grace Chu, "In the Spotlight: PLF," Center for Defense Information, November 14, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/plf.cfm.

332. (back) Raymond Bonner, "Once Wanted, Mastermind Of Ship Attack Is Unwanted," The New York Times, November 3, 2003. See also "A Terrorist Nabbed, Abu Abbas Should be Brought to Justice," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Apr. 17, 2003.

333. (back) Niles Lathem, "Achilles Terror-Heel Captured," New York Post, Apr. 16, 2003. See also Melissa Radler, "Powell Presents 'Irrefutable' Evidence on Iraq," Jerusalem Post, February 3, 2003.

334. (back) "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il, accessed on October 27, 2003.

335. (back) "Outflanking Arafat," The Guardian, October 18, 2001.

336. (back) Periscope, USNI Database. "Terrorism Database." http://www.periscope1.com.

337. (back) "Radical Group's Record of Terror-Japanese Red Army," South China Morning Post, Sept. 18, 1994. See also Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp.187-189.

338. (back) "Abu Ali Mustafa, Pragmatist Killed by Israel after Leading PFLP," Agence France Presse, August 21, 2001.

339. (back) Miral Fahmy, "Palestinians Attack Arafat for PFLP Arrest,"Reuters, January 17, 2002.

340. (back) "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il, accessed October 27, 2003.

341. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 117-118.

342. (back) Ibid.

343. (back) Strindberg, Anders. "The Damascus Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces." The Journal of Palestinian Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Spring 2000), p. 60.

344. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 117-118.

345. (back) Sophia Aldape, "In the Spotlight: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command," Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/pflp.cfm, accessed October 15, 2003.

346. (back) "Rival Palestinian Guerrilla Groups Battle," The New York Times, Dec. 22, 1976.

347. (back) "Besieged Arafat seeks ceasefire in fighting to salvage PLO unity," The New York Times, November 24, 1983. See also "PLO factions to leave Tripoli within 2 weeks," Associated Press, November 26, 1983.

348. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003

349. (back) "Radical Palestinian Group Claims Deadly West Bank Attack," Agence France Presse, November 18, 2003.

350. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 118.

351. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 118.

352. (back) Ibid. See also "The Military Balance," Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/. Table 41.

353. (back) Anders Strindberg, "The Damascus Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces." The Journal of Palestinian Studies. Spring 2000 v29 i3 p60.

354. (back) David Tal, "The International Dimension of PFLP-GC Activity," The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies Project on Low Intensity Warfare, International Terrorism, 1989, pp 61-77.

355. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003

356. (back) David Tal, "The International Dimension of PFLP-GC Activity," The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies Project on Low Intensity Warfare, International Terrorism, 1989. P61-77.

357. (back) Anders Strindberg, "The Damascus Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces," The Journal of Palestinian Studies, Vol. 29, No.3 (Spring 2000), p. 60.

358. (back) Periscope, USNI Database. "Terrorism Database." http://www.periscope1.com; and U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 118-119.

359. (back) Ibid.

360. (back) From the Second Fatwa, issued February 23, 1998, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html, accessed February 5, 2004.

361. (back) Estimates of the total number of fighters trained in Afghanistan vary greatly. On this issue, see CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], p. 3-4. According to one source, nearly half of the fighting force came from bin Laden's native Saudi Arabia. Others came from Algeria and from Egypt, with thousands more coming from other Muslim countries such as Yemen, Pakistan and the Sudan. "Al-Qaeda," International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il/

362. (back) Colin McCullough, Anthony Keats, and Mark Burgess, "In the Spotlight: al'Qaeda," Center for Defense Information, Dec. 30, 2002 http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/alqaeda.cfm. Accessed October 15, 2003. See also "Al-Qaeda," International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il/

363. (back) CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003.

364. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

365. (back) See [author name scrubbed], Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context, CRS Report RL31831, March 28, 2003, p. 3.

366. (back) Colin McCullough, Anthony Keats, and Mark Burgess, "In the Spotlight: al'Qaeda," Center for Defense Information, Dec. 30, 2002 http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/alqaeda.cfm.

367. (back) This is a very incomplete list of Al Qaeda-associated attacks. For more information, see U.S. Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism annual report for various years.

368. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 118-119.

369. (back) International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2002-2003 (Oxford University Press, May 2003), p.9.

370. (back) German Intelligence cited in The Atlantic Online, "Atlantic Unbound: Terrorism's CEO," interview with Peter Bergen, accessed at http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/interviews/int2002-01-09 on May 16, 2003.

371. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

372. (back) [author name scrubbed], Al-Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict, CRS Report RS21529, updated May 23, 2003.

373. (back) Ibid.

374. (back) "Al-Qaeda," International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il/.

375. (back) CRS Rerport RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by [author name scrubbed], updated February 13, 2003.

376. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 118-119.

377. (back) "Bin Laden's Roots as an Engineer," Engineering News-Record, Vol. 247, No. 14, Oct. 1, 2001.

378. (back) Peter Shinkle, "U.S. Officials Hunt for the Location of Terrorists' Assets," Knight-Ridder, September 15, 2001. See also Borzou Daragahi, "Financing Terror," Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2001.

379. (back) Donna Abu Nasr, "Bin Laden's Riches Vast," Associated Press, September 19, 2001. See also Borzou Daragahi, "Financing Terror," Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2001.

380. (back) Monica Anatalio, "In the Spotlight: Real IRA," Center for Defense Information, updated August 19, 2002, http://www.cdi.org, accessed on August 13, 2003.

381. (back) From CAIN Web Services, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/omagh/dead.htm, accessed on December 1, 2003.

382. (back) "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: IRA Splinter Groups," The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation,
http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/realira.html, accessed on December 17, 2003; and U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120.

383. (back) Monica Anatalio, "In the Spotlight: Real IRA," Center for Defense Information, updated August 19, 2002, http://www.cdi.org, accessed on August 13, 2003.

384. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120.

385. (back) Henry McDonald, "Manhunt for Real IRA's Bomb Expert in West Bank," The Observer, July 13, 2003.

386. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120.

387. (back) "Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Narcoterrorism," The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, http://www.cfrterrorism.org/terrorism/narcoterrorism2.html, accessed on December 19, 2003.

388. (back) Ibid.

389. (back) From the official FARC website, http://www.farcep.org, accessed July 16, 2003.

390. (back) Victoria Garcia, "In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)," Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org, accessed on May 7, 2002.

391. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120.

392. (back) Victoria Garcia, "In the Spotlight: United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)," Center for Defense Information, September 23, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist.cfm, accessed October 15, 2003.

393. (back) Ibid.

394. (back) Andrew Selsky, "Worries growing for U.S. hostages -- Colombian rebels vow to kill three Americans if rescuers get too close," Associated Press, May 11, 2003.

395. (back) Catherine Wilson, "First rebel extradited by Colombia appears in US court," Associated Press, June 6, 2003.

396. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.120. See also the Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, "Terrorism: Q & A,", http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/farc, accessed on July 16, 2003.

397. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.120.

398. (back) "The Military Balance," Institute for International and Strategic Studies, vol. 103. http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/. Table 41.

399. (back) "Links with Drug-Trafficking Colombian Guerillas Likely to have Been," Irish Times, Aug. 15, 2001.

400. (back) See Tim Johnson, "Hand of Irish or Basque Terrorists Seen in Deadly Colombian Bombing," San Diego Union-Tribune, February 12, 2003.

401. (back) Victoria Garcia, "In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)," Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org, accessed on May 7, 2002.

402. (back) Ibid.

403. (back) Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, "Terrorism: Q & A,", http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/farc, accessed on July 16, 2003.

404. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

405. (back) Theodora Ruhs, "In the Spotlight: The Revolutionary Nuclei," Center for Defense Information, September 2, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism, accessed on July 7, 2003.

406. (back) Ibid.

407. (back) "Obscure terrorist group claims twin bombings of Piraeus banks," Athens News, December 30, 1998.

408. (back) Ibid.

409. (back) "Anarchist Groups Claims Responsibility for Explosions in Athens," Xinhua New Agency, Dec. 29, 1998.

410. (back) "Greek police defuse makeshift bomb," Reuters News, October 14, 2000.

411. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 121.

412. (back) "Xinhua World News Summary at 1500 GMT," Xinhua News Agency, December 29, 1998.

413. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 121.

414. (back) "The Military Balance," Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/. Table 41.

415. (back) Ibid.

416. (back) Theodora Ruhs, "In the Spotlight: The Revolutionary Nuclei," Center for Defense Information, September 2, 2002.

417. (back) "Obscure terrorist group claims twin bombings of Piraeus banks," Athens News, December 30, 1998.

418. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism,2002, p. 121.

419. (back) Anthee Carassava, "Tight Security at N17 Terror Trial," CNN.com/World, March 3, 2003

420. (back) Alan Abrahamson, "Athens Makes Security 'Priority No. 1,'" Los Angeles Times, August 13, 2003.

421. (back) Shawn Choy, "In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Organization 17 November," Center for Defense Information, updated August 5, 2002, http://www.cdi.org, accessed on August 13, 2003.

422. (back) "Assassination of CIA Agent Richard Welch Scores Agency's 'Carelessness'" The New York Times, Dec. 31, 1975.

423. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 122.

424. (back) Shawn Choy, "In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Organization 17 November," Center for Defense Information, updated August 5, 2002, http://www.cdi.org, accessed on August 13, 2003.

425. (back) Ibid.

426. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 122.

427. (back) Ibid.

428. (back) "Terror Organizations in Turkey: Islamic Terror Organizations/ Leftist Terror Organizations - DHKP/C, " http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/organisations/dhkpc.html accessed October 16, 2003.

429. (back) "Police authorities say 8 leftists belonging to Marxist group Dev Sol have been Arrested," The New York Times, Oct. 4, 1980.

430. (back) "Police Boost Protection after Ex-Intelligence Agent Killed," Reuters, Sept. 28, 1990.

431. (back) Noriyuki Katagiri, "In the Spotlight: Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front," Center for Defense Information, Nov. 4, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist.cfm accessed on October 15, 2003.

432. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

433. (back) Noriyuki Katagiri, "In the Spotlight: Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front," Center for Defense Information, Nov. 4, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist.cfm. Accessed October 15, 2003.

434. (back) "Terror Organizations in Turkey: Islamic Terror Organizations/ Leftist Terror Organizations - DHKP/C." http://www.teror.gen.tr/english/organisations/dhkpc.html accessed on October 16, 2003.

435. (back) Ibid.

436. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

437. (back) Anthony Keats, "In the Spotlight: The Salafist Group for Call and Combat," Center For Defense Information, January 14, 2003, http://www.cdi.org accessed on July 8, 2003.

438. (back) "Commando Raid Frees Algeria Hostages," The Guardian, May 14, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,955738,00.html, accessed on December 23, 2003.

439. (back) Jonathan Schanzer, "Algeria's GSPC and America's War on Terror," The Washington Institute, October 15, 2002, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org, accessed on July 8, 2003.

440. (back) Elsie Theodore, "Truck Bomb Plot Against U.S. Embassy in Mali Averted," Dow Jones International News, June 5, 2003.

441. (back) Jonathan Schanzer, "Algeria's GSPC and America's War on Terror," The Washington Institute, October 15, 2002, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org, accessed on July 8, 2003.

442. (back) Hassane Meftani, "Group Linked to Al-Qaeda at Center of Algerian Kidnapping,"Associated Press Newswires, May 14, 2003.

443. (back) BBC News, "Profile: Algeria's Salafist Group," updated May 14, 2003.

444. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 123,

445. (back) BBC News, "Sahara hostage tells of ordeal," May 15, 2003; accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3030683.stm on December 23, 2003; and Tony Patterson, "Libya claims lead role in negotiations that freed Sahara hostages," The Independent, August 20, 2003, p. 9.

446. (back) BBC News, "Algeria Denies Hostages Freed," May 19, 2003; accessed at http://news.bbs.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3040255.stm on December 23, 2003. See CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by [author name scrubbed], updated November 20, 2003, p. 3.

447. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 123.

448. (back) See Alberto Bolivar, "Peru," Combatting Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries," edited by Yonah Alexander (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2002), pp. 84-115.

449. (back) Council on Foreign Relations/Markle Foundation, Terrorism Questions and Answers, accessed at http://www.cfrterrorism.org/groups/shiningpath.html on December 17, 2003.

450. (back) "Shining Path Revisited," The Economist, Sept. 6, 2003.

451. (back) "Peru Arrests Shining Path Car Bomb Suspects," Reuters, Jun. 12, 2002.

452. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 124.

453. (back) Ibid.

454. (back) Shawn Choy, "CDI Fact Sheet: Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, or SL)," Center for Defense Information, updated July 1, 2002. Accessed at http://www.cdi.org, July 28, 2003.

455. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, p. 124

456. (back) "United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia." International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism. http://www.ict.org.il/.

457. (back) Victoria Garcia, "In the Spotlight: United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC),"Center for Defense Information, September 23, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist.cfm, accessed October 15, 2003.

458. (back) "Colombian Warlord Admits Business Ties," Reuters, Sept. 6, 2000.

459. (back) "Colombian Paramilitaries to Demobilize-Keep Arms." Agence France Presse. July 16, 2003.

460. (back) "Colombian Paramilitaries to Begin Disarming November 25," Agence France Presse, November 14, 2003.

461. (back) U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 124.

462. (back) "Terrorism Database," Periscope, USNI Database, http://www.periscope1.com.

463. (back) Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 124.

464. (back) "U.S. Clears $42 million for Colombian Military," Reuters, September. 9, 2002.

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