{ "id": "RL32171", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL32171", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 101837, "date": "2005-01-24", "retrieved": "2016-04-07T19:55:49.773029", "title": "Limiting Court Jurisdiction Over Federal Constitutional Issues: \"Court-Stripping\"", "summary": "Over the years, various proposals have been made to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts to\nhear\ncases regarding particular areas of constitutional law such as busing, abortion, prayer in school, and\nmost recently, reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. Several such proposals passed the House in the\n108th Congress, including an amendment to H.R. 2799 to limit the use of funds to\nenforce a federal court decision regarding the Pledge of Allegiance; H.R. 2028 , to limit\nthe jurisdiction of federal courts to hear cases regarding the Pledge of Allegiance; and\n H.R. 3313 , to limit federal court jurisdiction over questions regarding the Defense of\nMarriage Act. Generally, proponents of these proposals are critical of specific decisions made by\nthe federal courts in that particular substantive area, and the proposals are usually intended to express\ndisagreement with cases in those areas and/or to influence the results or applications of such cases. \nProposals of this type are often referred to as \u201ccourt-stripping\u201d legislation. The label\narises from the\nfact that many of these proposals invoke the Congress\u2019s power to regulate federal court\njurisdiction,\ni.e., the courts\u2019 power to consider cases of a particular class and in a particular procedural\nposture.\nIt should be noted, however, that some proposals characterized as \u201ccourt-stripping,\u201d\nrather than\nfocusing on jurisdiction, address what remedies are available to litigants or what procedures must\nbe followed to bring constitutional cases. Although the United States Congress has broad authority\nto regulate in all three of these areas of judicial power -- jurisdiction, procedure and remedies -- this\nauthority is generally used to address broader issues of court efficiency and resource allocation. This\nreport, however, is limited to proposals to allocate judicial power in a way that affects or influences\nthe result in cases concerning specific constitutional issues.\n \n There are at least three different types of \u201ccourt-stripping\u201d proposals: (1) limiting\nthe\njurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, (2) limiting the jurisdiction of all federal courts, and (3)\nlimiting the jurisdiction of both state and federal courts together. While the Congress has broad\nauthority under Article III of the Constitution to regulate the jurisdiction, procedures and remedies\navailable in state and federal courts, this power is generally not used as a means to affect substantive\nlaw. Consequently, the federal courts have only rarely faced the question of what happens when the\nCongress acts under Article III to limit substantive litigation, and the Supreme Court has not squarely\nfaced a modern law limiting jurisdiction to affect or influence litigation of constitutional questions.\nThus, an analysis of these proposals relies to some extent on textual analysis and scholarly\ndiscussion. Congress\u2019s authority to limit the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts appears\nrelatively\nbroad, so that laws limiting the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts would appear to raise fewer\nconstitutional issues. Significant constitutional questions arise, however, with regard to whether\nCongress could eliminate both inferior federal court and Supreme Court review of constitutional\nmatters. Further, elimination of review of constitutional issues by any court -- state or federal court\n-- seems the least likely to survive constitutional scrutiny. Various commentators, however, have\nsuggested that limiting jurisdiction for any court for a particular class of cases raises questions\nregarding both the separation of powers doctrine and the Equal Protection Clause.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL32171", "sha1": "982b3f56fd71a0bd5d1f61120f5fe0f59c422889", "filename": "files/20050124_RL32171_982b3f56fd71a0bd5d1f61120f5fe0f59c422889.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL32171", "sha1": "deb635e2c3b81224f215675c32838e03976ceef5", "filename": "files/20050124_RL32171_deb635e2c3b81224f215675c32838e03976ceef5.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc821480/", "id": "RL32171_2003Dec11", "date": "2003-12-11", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Limiting Court Jurisdiction Over Federal Constitutional Issues: \u201cCourt-Stripping\u201d", "summary": "This report discusses various proposals that have been made to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear cases regarding particular areas of constitutional law such as busing, abortion, prayer in school, and most recently, reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. Proposals of this type are often referred to as \u201ccourt-stripping\u201d legislation.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20031211_RL32171_64ef6fab0cc07903934d4f56ddf1f11e4f92b5fa.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20031211_RL32171_64ef6fab0cc07903934d4f56ddf1f11e4f92b5fa.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Law", "name": "Law" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Jurisdiction", "name": "Jurisdiction" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Constitutional law", "name": "Constitutional law" } ] } ], "topics": [ "Constitutional Questions", "Intelligence and National Security" ] }