{
  "id": "RL32139",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL32139",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 104176,
      "date": "2003-11-04",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-08T14:35:09.194544",
      "title": "Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems (DREs): Analysis of Security Issues",
      "summary": "In July 2003, computer scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice Universities released a security\nanalysis of software purportedly from a direct recording electronic (DRE) touchscreen voting\nmachine of a major voting-system vendor. The study drew public attention to a long-simmering\ncontroversy about whether current DREs are vulnerable to tampering that could influence the\noutcome of an election. \n  Many innovations that have become familiar features of modern elections, such as the secret\nballot and mechanical lever voting machines, originated at least in part as a way to reduce election\nfraud and abuse. Computer-assisted counting of ballots, first used in the 1960s, can be done very\nrapidly and makes some kinds of tampering more difficult. However, it does not eliminate the\npotential for fraud, and it has created new possibilities for tampering through manipulation of the\ncounting software and hardware. DREs, introduced in the 1970s, are the first voting systems to be\ncompletely computerized. Touchscreen DREs are arguably the most versatile and user-friendly of\nany current voting system. Their use is expected to increase substantially under provisions of The\nHelp America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA,  P.L. 107-252 ), especially the requirement that, beginning\nin 2006, each polling place used in a federal election have at least one voting machine that is fully\naccessible for persons with disabilities. \n  With DREs, unlike document-ballot systems, the voter sees only a representation of the ballot;\nvotes are registered electronically. Some computer security experts believe that this and other\nfeatures of DREs make them more vulnerable to tampering than other kinds of voting systems,\nespecially through the use of malicious computer code. While there are some differences of opinion\namong experts about the extent and seriousness of those security concerns, there appears to be an\nemerging consensus that in general, current DREs do not adhere sufficiently to currently accepted\nsecurity principles for computer systems, especially given the central importance of voting systems\nto the functioning of democratic government. Others caution, however, that there are no\ndemonstrated cases of computer tampering in public elections, and any major changes that might be\nmade to improve security could have unanticipated negative effects of their own. Several proposals\nhave been made to improve the security of DREs and other computer-assisted voting systems. They\ninclude (1) ensuring that accepted security protocols are followed appropriately, (2) improving\nsecurity standards and certification of voting systems, (3) use of open-source computer code, and (4)\nimprovements in verifiability and transparency. \n  Much of the current debate has focused on which such proposals should be implemented and\nthrough what means -- in particular, whether federal involvement is necessary. Some states are\nalready addressing these issues. The Election Assistance Commission established by HAVA will\nhave some responsibilities relating to voting system security and could address this controversy\ndirectly. Some observers have also proposed federal funding for research and development in this\narea, while others have proposed legislative solutions including enhancement of the audit\nrequirements under HAVA.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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}