911 Call Center Legislation: S. 1250 and H.R. 2898

911 Call Center Legislation: S. 1250 and H.R. 2898

Order Code RL32126
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
911 Call Center Legislation:
S. 1250 and H.R. 2898
Updated August 4, 2004
Linda K. Moore
Analyst in Telecommunications Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

911 Call Center Legislation: S. 1250 and H.R. 2898
Summary
Before Congress there now stand two bills that could strengthen 911 emergency
call centers (Public Safety Answering Points, PSAPs) with new planning efforts and
matching grant funds. In early 2003 Congress launched a bipartisan E911 (Enhanced
911) Caucus whose co-chairs subsequently introduced E911 legislation in both
chambers. Although the two bills are similar in intent and have parallel provisions,
there are also points of divergence with significant implications for emergency
communications policy. Enhanced 911 refers to the capability of identifying the
phone number and location of a call to a PSAP. The technology is widely used for
wireline calls and is now being implemented for wireless calls. Among the obstacles
encountered in the implementation of wireless E911 is the cost to PSAPs of
upgrading systems and supporting expanded operations.
Both S. 1250, the Enhanced 911 Emergency Communications Act of 2003, and
H.R. 2898, the E-911 Implementation Act of 2003, would include the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in programs to
establish and manage coordination and funding programs as specified in the bills.
Both bills propose 50-50 matching grants. Both bills would monitor state-authorized
phone bill surcharges collected for 911 funding and penalize those that divert these
funds to other purposes if they apply for grants.
The Senate bill supports “ubiquitous” enhanced 911 nationwide; grants could
be for any form of emergency communications, although preference would be given
to PSAPs. The bill separates the function of coordinating efforts to improve
emergency communications from that of providing funds. The House bill focuses on
wireless E911 technology for location identification and links the planning and
funding process in a Coordination Office. The Senate bill authorizes annual
appropriations for grants totaling up to $500 million. The House bill caps grants at
$100 million annually beginning in FY2004 and ending in 2008. The House bill
adds a section addressing wireless E911 implementation by certain rural carriers.
Both bills were reported out of committee and placed on the calendars for floor
action. On November 4, 2003 the House approved an amended version of H.R.
2898. The bill is awaiting action by the Senate. Observers report that the difference
in funding that would be authorized by the bills is the primary obstacle to passage.
Other legislation regarding call centers includes companion bills (S. 1630,
Senator Clinton and H.R. 3111, Representative Burr), that would facilitate the
availability of 211 call centers that support community needs for information and
referral, and a bill that would direct the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security to put in place an emergency alert system built around the capabilities of
private-sector call centers (H.R. 2250, Representative Meek of Florida). The
performance of 911 call centers on September 11, 2001 was criticized in The 9/11
Commission Report, with a recommendation that the role of call centers be
incorporated in planning for emergency response (p 318).
This report will be updated to follow legislative activity related to the two 911
call center bills.

Contents
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Role of Managing Partner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Diversion of 911 Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Summary of S. 1250 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Role of Managing Partner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Diversion of 911 Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate for S. 1250 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Summary of H.R. 2898 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Role of Managing Partner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Diversion of 911 Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Report on Tier III (Rural Areas) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate for H.R. 2898 . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Background on Key Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Legislation, Regulation and Federal Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Implementation: Phase I and Phase II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Location Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Location Technology and Rural Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Diversion of 911 Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Public Policy and Citizen-Activated Emergency Communications . . . . . . . 18
Technology Policy and Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Role of Federal Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
List of Tables
E911 Funds Diverted to General Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

911 Call Center Legislation:
S. 1250 and H.R. 2898
Overview
The 108th Congress is considering passage of its second piece of legislation in
less than five years with the intent of furthering the deployment of 911 services. The
bills under consideration focus on funding for 911 call centers, a measure not
included in the earlier legislation. Language in the new bills revisits one of the
sections of the earlier law: the need for federal leadership to coordinate state and
local efforts to provide 911 services, and in particular to extend 911 technology to
include calls from cell phones. Both bills propose to use matching grants to
encourage wireless 911 deployment, and also as a means of penalizing states that
have misused funds purportedly collected for 911 purposes. Although both bills
advocate federal leadership, neither bill proposes solutions that would build on
existing efforts by federal agencies, notably those of the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The
Bush Administration, in a letter dated September 30, 2003,1 has suggested that the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) at DOT be given a role
in providing direction. H.R. 2898 as amended and passed by the House would
provide for programs jointly administered by NHTSA and the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). The two bills and the
Bush Administration’s recommendations are not specific as to how proposed grants
could be leveraged to support a national policy regarding 911 call centers and other
citizen-activated emergency communications. The National Emergency Number
Association (NENA) has been circulating among members of Congress a position
paper that urges lawmakers to focus on the “essential practical policy elements” such
as assuring the creation of a National Coordinating Office. NENA also urges that
the focus of the grants be 911 systems, not just wireless 911.2
The Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999 (P.L.106-81)
mandated 911 as the universal emergency assistance number and encouraged the
deployment of enhanced 911 (E911) services. E911 refers to the capability of
identifying the phone number and location of a call. In P.L.106-81, the FCC was
charged with coordinating the efforts of key participants and encouraging state
participation in implementing technology for E911, including wireless E911. The
1 Letter to the Honorable W.J. “Billy” Tauzin, Chairman, Committee of Energy and
Commerce, signed by Theodore W. Kassinger, General Counsel, Department of Commerce
and Rosalind A. Knapp, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Transportation.
Referred to in the Committee markup of October 1, 2003.
2 “Discussion of Required Concepts and Agendas for Congressional 9-1-1 Legislation,”
available from Stephen R. Seitz, Director of Government Affairs, NENA, sseitz@nena.org.

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FCC narrowed its focus to efforts for regulation and compliance oversight for
wireless carriers, distancing itself from state programs.3 For regulatory purposes,
technical support for E911 by wireless carriers was divided into two phases by the
FCC. Phase I requires identification of the phone number and general location of
a wireless call to 911. Phase II sets more stringent standards for identifying the
location of a wireless caller. Implementation of Phase II was to have commenced
in October 2001 but has been hampered by delays from many causes.4 Among the
obstacles encountered in the implementation of wireless E911 is the cost to call
centers, known as Public Safety Answering Points, or PSAPs, of upgrading systems
and supporting expanded operations to receive and process Phase II. Nationwide, the
National Emergency Number Association has estimated that $3.6 billion is required
for 911 system upgrades, with operation and maintenance costs of $1.7 billion
annually.5
S. 1250 and H.R. 2898 — two bills that would aid 911 call centers — have
comparable intents but reflect different approaches in policy and oversight. S. 1250,
the Enhanced 911 Emergency Communications Act of 2003 (Senator Burns), was
reported out of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on August
26, 2003 without amendment and has been placed on the Senate Legislative
Calendar. H.R. 2898, the E-911 Implementation Act of 2003 (Representative
Shimkus), was introduced on July 25, 2003. It was the topic of a hearing on
September 11, 20036 and was amended in mark up on September 23 by the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet. The bill, as amended, was
approved by the full Committee on Energy and Commerce on October 1, 2003. The
bill was further amended and passed by the House on November 4, 2003. It is the
final version of the House bill that is discussed in this report along with S. 1250.
In the September 30, 2003 letter addressed to Chairman Tauzin of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Bush Administration expressed opinions
regarding some provisions of H.R. 2898. Two key suggestions from the
3 For example, in a letter on funding issues written in May 2001, the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau concluded that differences in state laws and regulations
governing 911, and the variety of existing agreements between telecommunications carriers
and PSAPs, “argue against a uniform federal mandate.” May 7, 2001, to the E-911 Program
Manager of King County, Washington. This letter can be accessed at
[http://www.fcc.gov/911/enhanced/releases.html#lt] under Letters, “King County.” (Viewed
June 17, 2004.)
4 Many of the obstacles are discussed in “Report on Technical and Operational Issues
Impacting the Provision of Wireless Enhanced 911 Services,” known as the Hatfield Report,
submitted to the FCC on October 15, 2002. Web access to the report can be found at
[http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=65132
96239]. (Viewed June 17, 2004.) The Hatfield Report is discussed in CRS Report RS21028,
Emergency Communications: Wireless Enhanced 911 Issue Update.
5 Reported in “Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared,”
report of a task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, released July 29, 2003,
at [http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Responders_TF.pdf]. (Viewed June 17, 2004.)
6 Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the
Internet, September 11, 2003 hearing, “H.R. 2898, The E-911 Implementation Act of 2003.”

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Administration concern the role of the managing partner in E911 coordination and
the manner in which grants should be managed.
Role of Managing Partner. Both S. 1250 and H.R. 2898 would direct the
NTIA of the Department of Commerce to establish and manage coordination and
funding programs. The Senate bill would have the NTIA create a Task Force and
specifies the composition of the Task Force in terms of representation.7 The House
bill would establish an E-911 Coordination Office to be jointly administered by the
NTIA and the NHTSA.8 The House bill is more specific than the Senate bill
regarding goals but silent on the means of involving the public safety community and
others in meeting the Office’s goals. The inclusion of the NHTSA in the
Coordination Office opens the possibility of outreach through the existing E911
Steering Council created by DOT.
The Bush Administration has suggested that an E-911 Joint Program Office be
created and administered by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Communications and Information, who directs the NTIA,9 and by the Administrator
of the NHTSA at DOT. The program would be located within NHTSA and would
coordinate with the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice and with the
FCC. In 2002, DOT began a program to foster cooperation and dialog among key
participants. Among other actions, a partnership between DOT and three public
safety associations was formed in support of a Wireless Implementation Program.10
Much of the recent 911 leadership from DOT has been provided by NHTSA as part
of its program for Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). The amended House bill
did incorporate the NHTSA into its proposed Coordination Office but took no action
on the Bush Administration’s other recommendations.
Grants. Both bills would provide for grants to aid PSAPs in the form of
matching grants to states and other entities. The Senate bill envisions “ubiquitous”
coverage for 911,11 mirroring language in P.L. 106-81.12 The Senate bill would
permit a broad range of programs for emergency communications that might be
eligible for grants13 but does direct that programs that include PSAPs be given
priority in grant-making decisions.14 The House bill specifies that grants are to go
7 S. 1250, Section 4, Section 158 (a) (1).
8 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158 (a) (1).
9 The Bush Administration has proposed eliminating the NTIA. The status of the NTIA
is discussed in CRS Report RS21469, The National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA): Budget, Programs and Issues, by Glenn McLoughlin
10 Details on DOT programs for E911 are at [http://www.itspublicsafety.net/wireless.htm]
or [http://www.nena.org/dot/]. (Viewed June 17, 2004.)
11 S. 1250, Enacting Clause and Section 3 (2).
12 P.L. 106-81, Enacting Clause and Section 3 (b).
13 S. 1250, Section 5, Section 159 (a) and (c).
14 S. 1250, Section 5, Section 159 (c) (1).

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to programs for Phase II of wireless E911 implementation,15 as well as stating
requirements for the management, planning and implementation of E911 services.16
The Senate legislation would authorize up to $500 million annually for grants under
the program;17 the House bill has a program with annual funding capped at $100
million.18 The desire to get the most value from a smaller dollar program and to
favor those who have invested in Phase I may explain in part the House Committee’s
focus on funding Phase II.
The Senate bill would separate the functions of the advisory Task Force from
the grant-making process, which is determined by the Director of the NTIA, in
consultation with the Director of Homeland Security.19 In the House bill, the
Coordination Office would be the conduit for grants but the scope of grants would
be determined jointly by the Director of the NTIA and the Administrator of the
NHTSA, consulting with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Chairman of
the FCC.20 Although both the Task Force and the Coordination Office are instructed
in the respective bills to facilitate coordination and communication21 among a
number of key stakeholders, it is not clear to what extent either of these bodies would
be able to guide national policy regarding the development of enhanced 911 or other
citizen-activated system, or to use the leverage of funding to accomplish policy goals.
How the grant-making program administrators would decide to interpret the funding
goals of the proposed law, as finally agreed, might become the primary policy tool
in the future implementation of 911 technology.
The Bush Administration, as stated in the above-referenced letter of September
30, would address “the problem of E-911 implementation within existing funding
rather than creating a new grant program” that could duplicate current efforts. Grants
programs at the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice are mentioned by the
Administration,22 as is a program proposed for NHTSA to coordinate 911 calls with
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) communications. The Administration suggests
that its proposed E-911 Joint Program Office could “leverage” these and other grants
programs, including one administered by a private foundation.23 The letter also states
the belief that “improved Federal leadership and coordination, within existing
resources, could significantly improve the implementation . . .” of E911. How
15 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (b) (1).
16 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (b) (3) and (4).
17 S. 1250, Section 5, Section 159 (e).
18 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (d) (1).
19 S. 1250, Section 5, Section 159 (a).
20 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158 (b) (1).
21 S. 1250, Section 4, Section 158 (b) and H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158 (a) (3).
22 The State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative at
the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Domestic Preparedness, and, at Justice,
the Local Law Enforcement Block Grants, the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law
Enforcement Assistance Program, and the COPS Law Enforcement Technology Grants.
23 Public Safety Foundation of America [http://www.psfa.us/]. (Viewed June 17, 2004.)

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leverage might be applied or the federal role improved is not specified in the letter
although it does suggest that “further study is warranted” of successful wireless E911
deployment, as the possible basis for federal efforts. There is no information on
possible criteria for grant eligibility other than that grants be denied when states or
localities have diverted E911 funds.

Funding Goals. The bills’ current differences in describing eligibility for
funding are noteworthy. The broad-based funding guidelines of the Senate bill are
consistent with its goal of ubiquity for 911 services, but could conceivably allow
grants for other purposes, such as the purchase of radios for police cars, that many
states and counties currently include in their 911 budgets. The House bill states that
its main purpose is to assist wireless 911.24 In describing requirements to qualify for
grants, the House bill further specifies wireless enhanced Phase II.25 Although
conceivably a program to install Phase I and Phase II technology as a single package
might be eligible, the House bill’s language seems to preclude the possibility of
grants, for example, for enhanced 911 for wireline, for Phase I of enhanced wireless
services, or for technology to serve special needs, such as for the hearing-impaired.
At the above-noted hearing on September 11, 2003 witnesses testified regarding the
importance of Phase I, providing reasons such as its use as the default standard when
Phase II technology solutions are incompatible.
The Senate bill states that ubiquity is the goal; the House bill focuses on
implementing advanced technology and rewarding those that have already begun the
implementation. With the current limitations of location identification technology
for wireless E911, ubiquity can only be achieved for Phase I of E911. Funding
primarily or exclusively the technology of Phase II, as the House bill would require,
would provide advanced technology to some wireless 911 callers but likely leave
others under-served. If an important objective of the funding plan is to reward states
and others that have already made substantial investments in wireless E911
technology, one approach that has been suggested is to create a sliding scale for
matching grants.26 With this formula, the federal government could provide matching
funds at higher percentage levels for programs for Phase II and other advanced E911
technologies. Also, funding for Phase I of E911 or even basic 911 might be
conditional on the submission of a detailed plan to move to Phase II in a timely
manner.
Diversion of 911 Funds. Almost all states have authorized some form of
surcharge on telephone bills for the purpose of funding 911, E911 or wireless E911.
There have been some cases where these funds have been transferred to the general
treasury. Both bills want to ensure that federal grants received through the program
Congress establishes are not used to replace monies that have been diverted from
funds collected for emergency communications by taxes, charges or fees on
telephone bills. The Senate bill seeks to protect from diversion funds designated for
24 H.R. 2898, Enacting Clause.
25 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (b) (1).
26 Proposed by the ComCARE Alliance,

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emergency communications, 911 or E-911.27 The House bill would monitor
surcharges “designated or presented as dedicated to deliver or improve E-911
services.”28
Auditing and Compliance for State Use of 911 Funds. The primary
tool in the Senate bill for ensuring that states do not misapply 911 funds is a process
of audits and reports that would identify states not eligible for matching grants.
Developing and administering this tool would be the responsibility of the FCC. The
Senate bill instructs the FCC, semi-annually, to determine the relevant charges that
are being levied in states and “political subdivisions of States”and audit the use of
revenues thus obtained.29 States would be required to certify annually to the FCC
that 911 funds as designated in the bill have been used appropriately.30 The bill’s
requirement for FCC audits at least every six months appears to be based on current
FCC auditing requirements for “E-rate” funds,31 and not on current accounting
practices of state audits of 911 funds. Many state programs dispense money through
counties and require only annual reports on expenditures, submitted after the end of
a calendar year. The bill does not specify how the FCC would establish timetables
to synchronize semi-annual audits, annual reports, and fiscal year federal grants
programs. In determining which states are eligible for funds, the FCC could find
itself in the role of arbitrator, not auditor. For example, is a state that borrowed 911
funds and repaid them within a year’s reporting span disqualified from applying for
a matching grant? What will be the status of states that diverted funds prior to the
passage of a 911 bill? If the Senate’s provision to include “political subdivisions”
in the audit and reporting process becomes the law, what leeway might the FCC give
to a state to take remedial action against a non-compliant subdivision, such as a
county, in order to approve the state for program eligibility?
The House bill would rely on self-certification in requiring that applicants for
matching grants certify annually that no revenue from E-911 surcharges — collected
for “a State or other taxing jurisdiction within which the applicant is located” — has
been applied to other purposes.32 Certification is to be made to the NTIA/NHTSA.
It is their administrators that would be responsible for determining if a state that has
received a grant has diverted E-911 funds.33 As with the Senate bill, the House bill
does not address issues such as states that have diverted funds prior to the bill’s
passage as law, remedial action, or timetables. Presumably states that raided other
911 funds (not “E-911” funds) could also be disqualified by the NTIA/NHTSA,
although the potential for a legal gray area and the possibility of litigation might
27 S. 1250, Section 6, Section 642 (a) (1) (A) (ii).
28 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (c) (1) (B).
29 S. 1250, Section 6, Section 642 (a).
30 S. 1250, Section 6, Section 642 (a) (2).
31 The E-rate program and problems with auditing it are discussed in CRS Issue Brief
IB98040, Telecommunications Discounts for Schools and Libraries: the ‘E-Rate’ Program
and Controversies, by Angele A. Gilroy.
32 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (c) (2).
33 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (c) (2) and (3).

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preclude such action. The September 30, 2003 letter from the Bush Administration
points out that the bill does not specify the mechanism that would be used to
determine non-compliance.
Penalties for States that Fail to Comply. The Senate bill would penalize
states, and others, that have raided funds designated for any aspect of 911
communications by withholding grant money — up to twice the amount that was
shown to be diverted — or by requiring repayment of the “appropriate” amount of
funds already disbursed.34 The House bill directs that a state or other entity that has
falsely certified as to the use of E911 funds would be ineligible for current and future
grants under the program and might be required to repay previous grants.35
Summary of S. 1250
S. 1250 was introduced by Senator Burns on June 12, 2003. The bill was
reported out of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on August
26, 2003, without amendment (S.Rept. 108-130).
Objective. The Senate bill’s objective, as stated, and as reaffirmed under
“Purposes,” is to “improve, enhance, and promote the Nation’s homeland security,
public safety and citizen-activated emergency response capabilities through the use
of enhanced 911 services. . .”36 The bill seeks to upgrade the technical capability of
PSAPs and to support “the construction and operation of a ubiquitous . . . system”37
and to “facilitate . . . deployment . . . in a ubiquitous and reliable infrastructure.”38
By stating that 911 “should be available to all citizens,”39 the bill seems to confirm
what more and more members of the public safety community are saying about 911:
for example, that the ability to make a 911 call is an entitlement and that provision
of 911 services is a public good.40 The Senate bill furthermore affirms the need for
federal as well as state and local resources and coordination in the implementation
of enhanced 911.41 The major programs required by the bill would 1) create an
Emergency Communications Task Force within the NTIA; 2) provide matching
grants for emergency communications; and, 3) track telephone bill surcharges
collected for states and communities to pay for emergency communications, 911, or
E911, with the objective of discouraging the diversion of these monies for other
purposes.
34 S. 1250, Section 6, Section 642 (c).
35 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (c) (4).
36 S. 1250, Enacting Clause.
37 S. 1250, Enacting Clause.
38 S. 1250, Section 3 (2).
39 S. 1250, Section (2) (1).
40 For example, statements by representative of the National Emergency Number
Association and the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials International
at an FCC-sponsored symposium on E911 coordination, April 29, 2003.
41 S. 1250, Section (2) (1).

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Role of Managing Partner. The Emergency Communications Task Force
would “provide advice and recommendations . . . to improve coordination and
communications between agencies and organizations involved in emergency
communications, including 911 services to enhance homeland security and public
safety.”42 An annual report would be submitted to Congress on Task Force activities
and recommendations.43 At least six federal agencies would be represented on the
Task Force, including those such as DOT and the FCC that have 911 programs, and
other agencies, such as the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, that have
programs covering emergency communications. Representatives from public safety
and the telecommunications industry would also be included.44
Grants. Eligible projects would receive federal funding of no more than 50%
of the cost.45 Grants would be administered under the direction of the NTIA, in
consultation with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), according to criteria
supplied by the Director of the NTIA.46 The Senate bill directs the NTIA to give
preference to applicants who coordinate with PSAPs and favor public-private
partnerships in the “construction, delivery and improvement of emergency
communications, including 911 services.”47 Grants could go to states, local
governments, or tribal organizations for planning, infrastructure improvements,
equipment purchases and personnel training and acquisition.48 The Emergency
Communications Task Force is not specifically designated to provide input into the
establishment of criteria for eligibility or prioritizing the grants process.

The amount authorized for appropriations is not to exceed $500 million in any
fiscal year; there is no sunset provision.49
Diversion of 911 Funds. The Communications Act of 1934 would be
amended to provide for a semi-annual review of 911 funds collected by states and
“political subdivisions of States,” as well as for other auditing and reporting steps to
be performed or administered by the FCC.50 States that were found to have diverted
funds originally collected to pay for emergency communications, 911 or enhanced
911 could lose federal matching grant funds and might be required to repay past
grants.51
42 S. 1250, Section 4, Section 158 (b).
43 S. 1250, Section 4, Section 158 (c).
44 S. 1250, Section 4, Section 158 (a).
45 S. 1250, Section 5, Section 159 (b).
46 S. 1250, Section 5, Section 159 (a).
47 S. 1250, Section 5, Section 159 (c).
48 S. 1250, Section 5, Section 159 (a).
49 S. 1250, Section 6, Section 642 (a).
50 S. 1250, Section 6, Section 642 (a).
51 S. 1250, Section 6, Section 642 (c).

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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate for S. 1250
The cost estimate performed by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has two
principal parts: the cost of providing the matching grants and the cost of auditing
states and others that are collecting telephone bill surcharges for 911. CBO estimates
that in FY2004, the NTIA would expend $208 million for administration and grant
distributions, rising to $511 million in 2008. The CBO estimates that the FCC would
spend $5 million a year on auditing and reporting functions. This estimate was based
on information provided by the FCC. CBO states that the amount is sufficient to
cover the cost of 50 auditors.
Summary of H.R. 2898
H.R. 2898 was introduced by Representative Shimkus on July 25, 2003. The
bill was marked up and amended on September 23 by the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and the Internet and by the full Committee on Energy and
Commerce on October 1 (H. Rept.108-311). On November 4, 2003, the House
agreed to pass the bill, as amended, by voice vote.
Objective. The purpose of H.R. 2898, quoted in its entirety, is “To improve
homeland security, public safety, and citizen activated emergency response through
the use of enhanced 911 wireless services, and for other purposes.”52 The bill would
encourage centralized planning for 911 by directing that grants go to entities that
have a plan for wireless enhanced 911 administered by a single coordinating body.53
Key provisions include 1) creating an E911 Implementation Coordination Office; 2)
providing matching grants for wireless Phase II programs; 3) requiring certification
from grants recipients that funds raised for E911 through surcharges to telephone
customers have not been used for other purposes, with penalties for false
certification; and 4) requiring a report from the FCC on the status or rural carriers in
the provision of Phase II of E911 and the Phase II technologies that are the “most
effective”54 for these carriers.
Role of Managing Partner. The Coordination Office would be created by
the Director (Assistant Secretary) of the NTIA and the Administrator of the NHTSA
with the objective of facilitating coordination and communication among key
stakeholders, as described in the bill.55 The grant process and provision of matching
funds would be specific responsibilities of the Office, although the Assistant
Secretary and Administrator are directed to consult with the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Chairman of the FCC regarding grants.56 Assistance in the
preparation of plans, review of grant applications and the disbursement of funds are
potential policy-making tools for the office.
52 H.R. 2898, Enacting Clause.
53 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (b) (3).
54 H.R. 2898, Section 3 (8).
55 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (a) (1).
56 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (b) (1).

CRS-10
Grants. Eligible projects would receive federal funding of no more than 50%
of the cost.57 Grants would be administered through the Coordination Office,
according to criteria supplied by the Director of the NTIA and the Administrator of
the NHSTA.58 These administrators would determine the grants in consultation with
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the Chairman of the
FCC.59 States and other entities would be eligible as long as they meet stipulated
eligibility requirements.

The amount authorized for appropriations is $100 million 60 for fiscal years 2004
to 2008.61
Diversion of 911 Funds. Applicants for grants would have to certify that
funds collected as surcharges for enhanced 911 have been used for that purpose.
Applicants who knowingly provide false information for certification would no
longer be eligible for grants and might be required to return previous awards.
Applicants would provide certification to the NTIA/NHTSA.62
Report on Tier III (Rural Areas). The FCC, to facilitate the administration
of regulating implementation of E911 by wireless carriers, has applied separate and
somewhat different oversight for carriers in Tiers I, and in Tiers II and III. Tier I
carriers are the six largest carriers (Verizon, AT&T Wireless, Cingular, Sprint,
Nextel, and T-Mobile) that collectively have about 75% of the wireless market
nationwide. Tier III carriers in the context of E911 are rural wireless carriers whose
primary markets are in sparsely-populated areas. Approximately 90 carriers that
serve markets of no more than 500,000 are being considered for some form of relief
from the FCC’s E911 rules.63
Responding to testimony and other information placed before Congress
regarding difficulties faced by Tier III carriers, H.R. 2898 would require a report
from the FCC on Tier III carriers and their implementation of Phase II.64 Most of the
information required by the bill concerns the waiver process. To protect themselves
from penalties for failure to meet the Phase I or Phase II requirements of the FCC,
carriers must request a waiver. The report required by Congress from the FCC, on
its administration of the waiver process for Tier III, is meant to help Congress
57 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (b) (2).
58 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (b) (1).
59 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (b) (4).
60 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (d) (1).
61 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (d) (2).
62 H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158, (c) (2).
63 “FCC Creates Window for Smallest Wireless Carriers to Demonstrate Unique E911
Circumstances,” October 10, 2003, at [http://www.fcc.gov/911/enhanced/releases.html#nr].
(Viewed June 17, 2004.)
64 H.R. 2898, Section 3.

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evaluate, among other things, whether the FCC is doing an “adequate job”65 in
assessing the deployment of E911 in rural areas. The clause also asks for a
discussion of the technologies that are the most effective for deploying Phase II in
rural areas.66 On November 18, 203, the FCC denied a “Petition for Forbearance”
from E911 accuracy requirements filed by 12 Tier III carriers.67
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate for H.R. 2898
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the cost to the NTIA of
administering the grants program and fulfilling other responsibilities would be $7
million annually. On the assumption that appropriations are made for the program,
CBO places the cost of the House 911 program at $45 million in 2004 and $453
million over 2004-2008.
Background on Key Issues
Legislation, Regulation and Federal Programs. The two federal
agencies with significant involvement in 911 currently are the FCC and DOT. The
NTIA has limited expertise in E911 but it has some programs that deal with federal-
state-local cooperation and, under the Office of Telecommunications and Information
Applications, with grant-making. Typically the NTIA deals with federal use of
telecommunications and the FCC with private sector and non-federal government
use.
NTIA. The NTIA was established, first by Executive Order and then by
statute,68 to provide a voice for the Executive Branch in the administration of
spectrum and telecommunications policy. It is a bureau of the Department of
Commerce. Outside the federal arena, the NTIA interacts primarily with state and
local emergency communications in matters regarding spectrum. It is active in public
safety programs for interoperability and integrated emergency communications
systems. The NTIA administers two grants programs: one to assist states and
communities with telecommunications and information technology; and one that has
gone primarily to fund digital technology for public television broadcasting.
FCC. The FCC, an independent agency, is empowered primarily through the
Communications Act of 1934. The FCC has typically been the agency Congress
relies on to provide oversight and leadership for telecommunications activities,
especially as regards consumer protection and public safety. The FCC was designated
by Congress in 1999 to fulfill this role in the deployment of 911.
65 Statement by Rep. Shimkus at the Committee of Energy and Commerce mark up of H.R.
2898, October 1, 2003.
66 H.R. 2898, Section 3 (8).
67 Rulings can be found by going to the FCC Electronic Document Management System
(EDOCS) on the FCC website [http://www.fcc.gov] under E-Filing. To search in EDOCS
insert 03-297 in the box marked “FCC.”
68 USC Title 47, Chapter 8, “National Telecommunications and Information
Administration.”

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The passage of the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999
(P.L.106-81) confirmed the support of Congress for nationwide implementation of
emergency call services. The law mandated 911 as the universal emergency
assistance number and encouraged the deployment of enhanced 911 services. The
law states (emphasis added): “The Federal Communications Commission shall
encourage and support efforts by States to deploy comprehensive end-to-end
emergency communications infrastructure and programs, based on coordinated
statewide plans, including seamless, ubiquitous, reliable wireless
telecommunications networks and enhanced wireless 9-1-1 service. In encouraging
and supporting that deployment, the Commission shall consult and cooperate with
State and local officials responsible for emergency services and public safety, the
telecommunications industry (specifically including the cellular and other wireless
telecommunications service providers), the motor vehicle manufacturing industry,
emergency medical service providers and emergency dispatch providers,
transportation officials, special 9-1-1 districts, public safety, fire service and law
enforcement officials, consumer groups, and hospital emergency and trauma care
personnel (including emergency physicians, trauma surgeons, and nurses). The
Commission shall encourage each State to develop and implement coordinated
statewide deployment plans, through an entity designated by the governor, and to
include representatives of the foregoing organizations and entities in development
and implementation of such plans.” 69
The FCC’s efforts both before and after passage of the act have focused on
developing performance standards for location-identification technology and
mandating compliance by wireless carriers with these and other requirements. Faced
with delays and technical problems, in 2002 the FCC requested a study on wireless E-
911 implementation. The study it commissioned, known as the Hatfield Report70
after its author, made several policy recommendations and observations that are
reflected in the two bills on 911 introduced in the 108th Congress. The Hatfield
Report recognized the need for federal leadership — a “champion” — in
implementing 911 and the role of 911 in homeland security. The Report
recommended that the FCC encourage the establishment of a “National 911 Program
Office” within DHS. In testimony before a Congressional hearing on June 4, 200371
Mr. Hatfield explained that the important point of the recommendation was that there
be federal leadership at the Department level. The Hatfield Report also confirmed
other studies’ findings about difficulties faced by PSAPs.72 These problems were
described in detail at the House June 4 hearing and were also the discussion of an
69 P.L. 106-81 Sec. 3 (b)
70 Released October 15, 2002; see footnote 4.
71 Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the
Internet, June 4, 2003 hearing, “Wireless E-911 Implementation: Progress & Remaining
Hurdles.”
72 For example, “NENA 9-1-1: Report Card to the Nation,” published by the National
Emergency Number Association [http://www.nena.org/Initiatives/RCN/RCN.htm] (viewed
June17, 2004) and CRS Report RS21222, Implementing Wireless Enhanced 911: Issues for
Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs).

CRS-13
earlier Senate hearing.73 The Hatfield Report, and subsequent testimony by Mr.
Hatfield, stressed the need for coordination among all stakeholders in planning and
implementing wireless enhanced 911 technology and services.
The FCC has responded to the Hatfield Report with several new initiatives to
bolster its role in supporting 911. These include creating an Enhanced 911 (E911)
Coordination Initiative to bring together relevant stakeholders to foster cooperation
and coordination. The first meeting was held on April 29, 2003. For a second
meeting, on October 29-30, the FCC collaborated with the National Governors
Association in an effort to include 911 representatives designated by each state and
territory. The FCC has also announced the creation of a 911 subcommittee for the
National Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC), a Federal Advisory
Committee that provides best practices and other guidelines for telecommunications
operations, including homeland security and public safety. The 911 subcommittee
will focus on technical issues regarding network architecture and standards. A key
priority will be to measure and improve the accuracy of location information for
wireless calls to 911.74 FCC Chairman Michael Powell reaffirmed his and the FCC’s
commitment to improving location technology at the Third Wireless E911
Coordination Initiative meeting, April 27-28, 2004.
Universal Service Administration Company. The FCC has oversight
responsibility for the Universal Service Administration Company (USAC) which
receives funds from the Universal Service Fund. Although not a grant-making
organization, USAC does receive applications from potential recipients and
determines how to provide subsidies for the benefit of designated groups such as
schools and libraries (E-Rate), rural health care agencies, telecommunications
companies, and low-income individuals.
DOT. The Department of Transportation (DOT) has recently become active in
encouraging the deployment of wireless E911. DOT has linked support of 911 and
wireless 911 to aspects of its highway programs since 1969. In April 2002,
Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta convened a Wireless E9-1-1 Stakeholder
Summit that led to the formation of a Steering Council of representatives of many of
the national stakeholder groups concerned with 911 issues. The Steering Council
established a Priority Action Plan to address six of the most urgent priorities for the
implementation of wireless E911; these are:
! Support for statewide coordination
! Support for stakeholders in order to facilitate coordination
! Examination of cost recovery and funding plans at the state level
! Knowledge transfer and outreach programs
! Coordinated deployment in both rural and urban areas
73 Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on
Communications, March 5, 2003 hearing, “E911 Implementation.”
74 Remarks of Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, before
the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials International, August 11, 2003.
[http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/powell/mkp_speeches_2003.html]. (Viewed June 17,
2004.)

CRS-14
! Model location program
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) represents DOT
in support of 911 projects with the Association of Public-Safety Communications
Officials International (APCO), the National Emergency Number Association
(NENA), and the National Association of State 9-1-1 Administrators. The Public
Safety Foundation of America, formed by APCO, is not a DOT initiative but the
member organizations of the foundation’s Advisory Committee are also represented
on the DOT Steering Council. In 2003, the foundation gave over 50 grants totaling
over $3 million for 911 deployment, ranging from $5,489 to the Olmstead Township
Police Department (Ohio) to $500,000 for the Anchorage Police Department. Grants
can be for Phase I and/or Phase II, for planning, for strategic technology deployment
and for education.75
Congress. Congressional response to the Hatfield Report and other public
statements and reports included the creation of the 911 Caucus and introduction of
bills on 911 by the joint co-chairs.76 At the request of Senator Burns, the GAO
conducted a study on wireless E-911 implementation. The results of that study were
released in a GAO report entitled “Uneven Implementation of Wireless Enhanced 911
Raises Prospects of Piecemeal Availability for Years to Come.”77 The sole
recommendation of the report was that the “Department of Transportation work with
state officials and public safety groups to develop data identifying which PSAPs will
need to have E911 equipment upgrades.”
Implementation: Phase I and Phase II. For regulatory purposes, the FCC
divided wireless E911 implementation into two phases. Phase I covers the
implementation of call-back number identification and generalized location
information. Phase II requires more specific location information. Wireless carriers
were expected to provide Phase I capability to PSAPs in a short period of time;
provision of Phase II had a longer timetable for the carriers.
There is no FCC deadline for PSAP program implementation. Many PSAPs are
installing integrated wireless enhanced 911 call management systems that handle both
number identification and location information. Some PSAPS, especially those with
inadequate funding, have postponed equipment purchases until both Phase I and Phase
II services are available from all of their telecommunications providers. For this and
other reasons, it is estimated that 40% of PSAPs nationwide have Phase I capability,
while some states have no Phase I capability. In 2002, California, for example, is
recorded as having Phase I in 3.45% of its counties, Pennsylvania in 9.86%, Ohio in
9.09%. At the other end of the range, Texas had Phase I in 93.55% of counties,
75 A recently published report documents DOT activities and those of other organizations.
See “ Priority Action Plan” at [http://www.itspublicsafety.net/wireless_action.htm]. (Viewed
June 17, 2004.)
76 Sens. Burns and Clinton and Reps. Shimkus and Eshoo.
77 GAO-04-05, November 2003.

CRS-15
Tennessee in 88.89%, Michigan in 86.67% and Louisiana in 60.94%.78 These
statistics refer to counties, not PSAPs. At least 10% of 6,121 PSAPs counted by
NENA have implemented Phase II.79
NENA describes implementation of wireless 911 as three phases: the first phase
being the acceptance of both wireless and wireline calls, and the second and third
phases corresponding to Phases I and II.80 Requirements for Phase II promulgated by
the FCC, however, cover location accuracy for the telecommunications technologies
used by wireless carriers81 and are not fully applicable to PSAPs. Regulation of Phase
II for wireless carriers sets location-accuracy requirements that depend on the type of
technology used by the carrier. Implementation of Phase II for PSAPs includes steps
such as: negotiating with the carrier operating the landline switch that serves the
PSAP, installing hardware and software to receive location information, installing
mapping technology, training personnel, and negotiating with other participants
(notably Emergency Medical Services and hospitals) for end-to-end information
transfer.82 Furthermore, PSAPs have discovered that they need additional technology
to determine the accuracy of the location information they receive, since this is a
function of the technology used for the cell tower that transmits the 911 call.
Location Technology. Identifying the location of a cell phone is a
comparatively new technology. Most location identification technology is digital.
However, in the United States, 12% of mobile phone subscribers have analog-only
phones,83 creating an additional challenge to developing effective location technology.
Because some areas of the United States (such as rural areas, wilderness areas and
parkland) are served only by analog technology, many of the cell phones sold in the
United States are dual mode. “Mode” refers to the type of transmission technology
and a dual mode phone will work with both analog and digital service. Some
telecommunications systems, such as automotive telematics,84 depend on analog
technology to ensure complete coverage of the United States. The difference in digital
78 Information from a survey conducted by NENA and DOT from March to September 2002
at [http://nena.ddti.net/Reports/]. (Viewed June 17, 2004.)
79 Testimony of John B. Muleta, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and the Internet, September 11, 2003 hearing, “H.R. 2898, The E-911
Implementation Act of 2003.”
80 At [http://www.nena9-1-1.org/Wireless911/Overview.htm#Wireless 9-1-1 Requirements].
(Viewed June 17, 2004.)
81 Described in 47 CFR 20.18.
82 Montgomery County, Maryland, for example, is implementing E911 as part of a Public
Safety Data System, an end-to-end upgrade of its emergency communications infrastructure.
“Maryland county gets ready for enhanced 911 service,” September 15, 2003,
PostNewsweek Tech Media at [http://www.gcn.com/vol1_no1/daily-updates/23526-1.html].
(Viewed June 17, 2004.)
83 “FCC Adopts Annual Report on State of Competition in the Wireless Industry,” FCC
News, June 26, 2003 at [http://www.fcc.gov] under “Headlines,”
84 Currently offered as a subscriber service to owners of luxury cars, telematics combines
wireless and location-based technologies to provide customer and emergency support from
private call centers. Telematics is considered an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS).

CRS-16
and analog transmission technologies causes gaps in the potential effectiveness of
E911 coverage because they do not mesh seamlessly.
In addition to the different transmission modes for analog and digital technology,
there are four major digital standards85 generally used in the United States today, and
at least as many competing standards for the next generations of technology (Third
Generation, or 3G, and future technologies). As a consequence, the FCC location
requirements are linked to specific standards and technologies that are not
interoperable. A carrier is compliant with FCC accuracy requirements if it meets
standards for its own system. This means that a call to 911 placed on a Phase II-
compliant CDMA phone that is picked up by a Phase II-compliant TDMA cell tower
will be delivered to the designated PSAP with Phase I information, the default as
regulated by the FCC. Alternatively, the CDMA call might be routed through a
distant CDMA cell tower, delivering the call to a designated PSAP that may be in the
next state and a hundred or more miles away from the caller. The Global Positioning
System (GPS) technology that uses satellites to provide precise location information
can be incorporated into handsets as one approach to meeting FCC requirements but
GPS is not at present interoperable across all location-identification technologies.
Since Phase II deployment is still in the early stages, it may be some time before it will
be possible to measure the extent to which incompatible standards cause accurate
location information to be dropped from a 911 call.86 However, until solutions are
found and implemented that assure full interoperability and compatibility, 100%
compliance with Phase II by wireless carriers will not be the same as 100% provision
of wireless E911 location technology to PSAPs.
Other areas where location technology needs to be further developed in order to
provide ubiquitous 911 coverage include voice-over-Internet (VoIP), calls made by
devices used by the hearing-impaired, telematics, and data-only messages.
Location Technology and Rural Areas. Rural areas face a number of
problems in the implementation of wireless E911. Rural wireless carriers are often
disproportionately affected by the anomalies of location technology. Rural PSAPs are
handicapped in their ability to move to Phase II technology for reasons such as lack
of funds and insufficient digital infrastructure. Rural areas tend to have a low
population base and significant interstate highway traffic and these factors combine
to place disproportionate demands on local PSAPs.
Wireless carriers face specific problems in implementing Phase II location-
finding technology in rural areas. These include the use of analog as opposed to
digital cellular services; the cost of installing a sufficient number of cell towers to
provide triangulation for location technologies; and the predominance of cell towers
85 Known by their acronyms, they are GSM, iDEN, TDMA and CDMA.
86 A Consumer Reports survey conducted in Fall 2002 regarding 911 calls placed on wireless
phones found that 15% of callers had trouble connecting and 4% were unable to complete
the call. Consumer Reports, February 2003, Vol. 68, No. 2, page 12.

CRS-17
placed along major highways,87 also a complication for proper triangulation. FCC
rules permit a wireless carrier to meet location-accuracy requirements by averaging
location performance systemwide. For a variety of reasons, location identification in
urban areas provides a much greater degree of accuracy than for rural areas. Carriers
that specialize in meeting the niche market needs of rural customers do not have the
option of averaging their system’s accuracy with better-performing data from urban
areas. Many are struggling to meet the FCC’s requirements for accuracy in location
identification, even though they are providing the same level of accuracy in rural areas
as the national carriers.88
Diversion of 911 Funds. The bulk of the costs for implementing wireless
E911 is covered by the telecommunications industry and by consumers, primarily as
taxpayers at the state and local level but potentially also as purchasers of wireless
handsets and subscriber services, since some of the carriers’ costs for E911 technology
may be passed along as price increases. One common source of funds is a surcharge
on telephone bills collected at the local or state level, or both. Most states have some
form of 911 fund that receives revenue from a surcharge on telephone bills.89
Another source at the local or county level is an increase in property taxes with the
additional monies going to an E911 fund. Some capital programs have been funded
through municipal or state bonds, or bake sales and fish fries. One PSAP mortgaged
the building that houses its call center to raise the funds to upgrade to E911. Annual
operating costs for PSAPs tend to increase at a rate well above inflation, in part
because of increased charges from local switches seeking to recover their E911
investments; these incremental costs might be met by the local annual budget instead
of a 911 fund.90
According to the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association (CTIA),
of the 18 states known to have wireless E911 programs funded at the state level, nine
have transferred these funds to a general fund in recent years. There is little other
concrete data on the subject but there have been reports of other states that are raiding
911 funds. Conversely, states have also voted extra funding from general budgets in
order to meet E911 goals. Virginia and Maryland, two of the states identified as
treating 911 funds as general revenue, have also used general budget money to pay for
E911 infrastructure.
87 Sometimes referred to as a “string of pearls” because of the placement of cell towers in
a continuous line.
88 See comments, Tier III Coalition for Wireless E911, December 3, 2002, on the FCC
Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS), proceeding “02-46” at
[http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=65133
90405]. (Viewed June 17, 2004.)
89 An overview of surcharges, by state, is available on the NENA website at
[http://www.nena.org/dot/index.htm] under “9-1-1 Surcharges.” (Viewed June 17, 2004.)
90 Information obtained by CRS through a series of telephone conversations ongoing since
December 2001. Telephone sources include emergency communications managers in
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota and Virginia.

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The following table was prepared in early 2003 and is not comprehensive.
California, for example, borrowed $63.1 million from its 911 fund in 2003. The fund
collects about $130 million a year. Reportedly, California plans to phase in wireless
E911 as more consumers switch to new phones with “GPS-based systems” and will
not need to apply for a federal grant in order to fund the process.91 On a smaller scale,
the Maine Legislature voted to transfer $123,301 to the 2003 General Fund from the
state’s Emergency Services Communication Bureau’s E-911 Fund.92
E911 Funds Diverted to General Funding
State
Amount(s)
Year(s)
California
$50 million
2001
District of Columbia
$9.45 million over three
2000-2003
years
Maryland
$1 million
2002
North Carolina
$2.5 million; $5 million
2001; 2002
New York
$45 million;
2001;
$162 million
1991-2000
Oregon
$7 million
2002
South Carolina
$5 million
2003
Texas
$40 million
2001
Virginia
$30 million
2002
Source: CTIA, March 2003
Public Policy and Citizen-Activated Emergency
Communications
The 911 bills propose solutions that could offer leadership capable of combining
technical proficiency and vision at the macro policy level and could provide funding
for grants that can be used to reinforce policy decisions.
Technology Policy and Vision. The federal managing partner that provides
leadership for 911 must understand current 911 technology — both its potential and
its limitations — and where 911 call centers fit into a broader national policy for
emergency communications and citizen-activated calls for assistance.
91 Epstein, Edward, “911 Cell Phone Plan Gets a Push,” San Francisco Chronicle, August
11, 2003, page A4.
92 Maine 2003 Legislative Service, 121th Legislature, 2003 Me. Legis. Serv. Ch. 2 (H.P.
372) (L.D. 483) (WEST), Sec. AA-3, West Group 2003.

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With the formation of a technical subcommittee to pursue issues raised in the
Hatfield Report and by others, the FCC has tacitly acknowledged that there is still
much to be done in developing E911 technology for wireless calls. Examples of
technical issues still ahead include better coverage in rural areas, an E911 interface for
the different types of cell phone standards and technologies, better procedures for
back-up, database expansion and integration, system digitization, development of a
network backbone and improved capacity to avoid dropped calls. Some of these will
be looked at by the FCC, some by DOT, and some by associations such as NENA.93
The managing partner for 911 may also want to use its position in support of
citizen-activated calls for help to include 211 call centers. The 211 dialing code is
reserved by the FCC on a provisional basis as a universal number for community
information and referral.94 The 211 call centers support a variety of social service hot
lines and can also be used to provide information and guidance in emergency
situations. On September 17, 2003 companion bills were introduced in the House
(H.R. 3111, Representative Burr) and Senate (S. 1630, Senator Clinton) to facilitate
nationwide availability of 211. The bills recognize the potential role of 211 call
centers in providing “community preparedness and response.”95 A grants program
would be administered by the Department of Commerce. Applicants would have to
include information about cooperation, if any, with other call centers, including 911.
Some public safety associations96 envision robust emergency communications systems
that link first responders and health facilities with emergency call centers that are
linked to all-hazard warning systems. Call centers are identified as a pivotal link in
an end-to-end network of emergency communications, information, response, and
post-incident care. A report by the Wireless Emergency Response Team (WERT)
discusses the valuable service provided to victims of the World Trade Center attack
through a call center provided by BellSouth.97 The report urges that national planning
for emergency preparedness and response include the mobilization of private-sector
call centers to field calls for information and assistance for non-life-threatening
needs.98 A bill introduced by Representative Meek of Florida (H.R. 2250) proposes
using the resources of the “national private sector networks” of call centers to provide
telephoned warnings as an emergency alert system. The system, dubbed READICall
for Responsive Emergency Alert and Dissemination of Information Call, would set
up procedures to initiate an emergency alert call to every telephone subscriber.
93 NENA, “Future E 9-1-1 & Emergency Telecommunications Evolution: Technical Future
Pah Plan Concept” [http://www.nena9-1-1.org/9-1-1TechStandards/future_path_plan.htm].
(Viewed June 17, 2004.)
94 More information is on the FCC website at Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau,
Consumer Alerts and Fact Sheets, [http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/211.html].
(Viewed June 17, 2004.)
95 S. 1630, Section 2 (9) and H.R. 3111, Section 2 (9).
96 For example, NENA, the ComCARE Alliance and the Partnership for Public Warning.
97 Wireless Emergency Response Team (WERT), Final Report for the September 11, 2001
New York City World Trade Center Terrorist Attack, October 2001, Section 3.14, page18,
at [http://www.nric.org/meetings/docs/wert_final_report.pdf ] (viewed June17, 2004).
98 ibid., Section 1, Recommendation PCC-2, page 9 and Section 6, Public Call Center, page
40 et seq.

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Leadership. Regarding the legislation discussed here, there are four proposals
for providing leadership in connection with funding for 911 grants. These each
provide different roles for federal leadership, formulating and directing 911 and
emergency communications policy, and for the use of funds to influence policy
decisions.
! A Task Force to guide the nation toward ubiquitous 911 would be
comprised of specific government agencies and representatives of
911 stakeholders; broad-based funding would be provided under the
direction of the NTIA, in consultation with DHS; draft legislation
would provide no direct connection between policy-making and
funding. Authorized funding of up to $500 million a year. (Senate
bill.)
! A Coordination Council would be jointly created by the NTIA and
NHTSA to support wireless E911; targeted funding for Phase II
would favor state planning and control; Coordination Council would
have a role in funding but criteria are to be established by
NTIA/NHTSA and administered in consultation with DHS and the
FCC; NTIA/NHTSA would have the key role in policy and funding.
Authorized funding of up to $100 million annually until October 1,
2008. (House bill.)
! A Joint Program Office would share responsibility between the
Departments of Commerce and Transportation, with the program
residing in NHTSA; there would be consultation with the
Departments of Homeland Security and Justice and the FCC; funding
from existing programs would be “leveraged” by Joint Program; there
is no indication of criteria for eligibility or of dollar amounts to be
designated for E911. Joint Program would be in effect for three
years. (Administration proposal.)
! A National Coordinating Office would build a “coordinating body
and expertise within the federal government” to focus resources and
leadership on deploying 911 technologies. Grant authority would be
permanent and would be used to advance important objectives for the
deployment of 911, such as standards. Grants would be for all
aspects of 911 implementation, including supporting the development
of 911 technology for emerging technologies such as Voice Over
Internet Protocol. (NENA.)99
There are several options for shaping the leadership of a national 911 initiative
in the above proposed courses. For example, only the House bill has language that
clearly connects the 911 program leadership to the use of funding decisions as a tool
to direct policy. The Bush Administration proposal is the only one that identifies any
federal program for E911 deployment, in this case the ones coordinated under the
99 “Discussion of Required Concepts and Agendas for Congressional 9-1-1 Legislation,”
available from Stephen R. Seitz, Director of Government Affairs, NENA, sseitz@nena.org.

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direction of DOT. It would build on recent initiatives by DOT/NHTSA, but suggests
that further study might be needed. Although the FCC could be involved through a
Task Force or as a consultant for funding, no guidance is provided by any of the three
plans as to how to incorporate the existing 911 programs of the FCC into a new 911
program.
A blended approach has been suggested that would combine elements of the
three proposals summarized above and bring the FCC more directly into the decision-
making mainstream. A National Coordinating Office that resides at NHTSA would
benefit from the momentum and goodwill built by DOT over the last year. For
example, the DOT Steering Council provides the type of wide representation of
stakeholders sought by S. 1250 in its Task Force. The FCC might be a third partner
in a National Coordinating Office. It could bring to the effort a number of useful
resources and regulatory clout with the wireless carriers. It has a base of technical
proficiency that could be put to good use in a common policy initiative. The FCC has
announced two programs that, if successfully implemented, will draw on resources of
state governments and the private sector. The FCC-sponsored meeting on October 29-
30, 2003 brought together some key stakeholders, including a number representing
state governments. The formation of an E911 subcommittee as part of the National
Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC) to develop best practices and other
guidelines represents a significant level of private-public cooperation and commitment
of resources. Using a National Coordinating Office to harness the FCC’s role as
regulator could assist E911 policy-making both by providing a new source of input
into FCC regulatory decisions as well as benefitting from the agency’s regulatory
authority. Furthermore, it could be counter-productive if the FCC continued its non-
regulatory activities in E911 as a parallel but separate effort. The goal of greater
cooperation and coordination at the state level could be weakened if there is one
program directed by the FCC and another by the NTIA or NTIA/NHTSA.
Funding. Both the House and Senate bills plan for a matching grants program
exclusively for 911. The Bush Administration believes such an approach would be
a duplication of efforts and lists several programs as possible candidates for funding
E911. Grants programs at the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice
mentioned as possible alternatives are themselves at the center of debate on proposals
to restructure funding to first responders.100 Unless the Administration’s proposed
E-911 National Coordinating Office were given a muscular role in Homeland Security
or Justice grants programs, funding goals that might be used to shape E911 policy
could be submerged by the larger programs and their goals. An example for
“leveraging” existing grants programs, provided by the Administration, would be to
add “911 upgrades” to the Allowable Equipment list for Interoperable
Communications Equipment in the State Homeland Security Grant Program
administered by the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP). This program requires
that 80% of funds must go to local communities. What modifications might have to
be made to the Program’s rules to accommodate the bills’ intent of “enhancing
emergency communications services through planning, infrastructure improvements,
equipment purchases, and personnel training and acquisition”(language in both
100 See CRS Report RL31475, First Responder Initiative: Policy Issues and Options, by Ben
Canada.

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bills)101 or to fund a state-operated 911 program? Would ODP be able to make those
changes? The Administration in its letter to Congress also suggests that some
programs at the Department of Justice (DOJ) are “sufficiently broad” and might
“conceivably” be used to help fund 911. Conceivably this could happen, especially
if additional funds are provided; most of the monies presently distributed through DOJ
are either earmarked or used to fund ongoing programs that would have to be cut to
accommodate 911 expenditures.
NHTSA could be a good candidate to administer an E911 grants program for an
initial period (such as the three years suggested by the Bush Administration for a Joint
Program Office). If NHTSA were to administer such a program, the link between
technical expertise and financial power could be strong and effective. Paired with
NHTSA efforts to include EMS in 911 planning, a vision of strong support for 911
could have some clout. DOT also has the policy tool of highway funds to guide state
behavior regarding E911. The NTIA, on the other hand, has the background and
experience in telecommunications networks to provide leadership for the longer term.
It, or its successor, might be the best choice to manage a 911 program that meets some
of Congress’ goals, as outlined in the proposed S. 1250, and also in P.L 106-81.
Role of Federal Policy. Placing 911 within another funding program that
does not have emergency call centers as its focus could eliminate the possibility of
creating a federal policy for communications between citizens and emergency
personnel. A question for a policy decision is raised: Is a separate funding program
— used as an incentive to implement policy — necessary? Another policy question
concerns the scope of the language of the bills: Does Congress want specifically to
allow financial support for national or regional programs? Many consider these as
important as those at the state and local level. Areas where federal leadership at the
national or regional level has been recommended for E911, by a variety of groups,
include standardization of the “product” (the management of the emergency call);
training; consumer education; location mapping; replacement of analog technology
with digital technology; upgrading of digital capabilities to handle all types of
message formats (Internet, short message service, pagers, other); back-up call centers;
network backbones; international agreements covering 911 calls that cross borders;
and greater end-to-end connectivity among all types of emergency services. The 9/11
Commission Report102 writes of the often inadequate response of the 911 call centers
serving New York City.103 The analysis of the 911 response recommends: “In
planning for future disasters, it is important to integrate those taking 911 calls into the
emergency response team and to involve them in providing up-to-date information and
assistance to the public.”104
101 S. 1250, Section 5, Section 159 (a) and H.R. 2898, Section 2, Section 158 (b) (1).
102 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Official Government Edition, 2004.
103 Op. cit., pp. 286-287;295; 306.
104 Op cit., p. 318.