The FBI: Past, Present, and Future

The FBI: Past, Present, and Future

Order Code RL32095
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The FBI: Past, Present, and Future
October 2, 2003
Todd Masse
Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counterterrorism
Domestic Social Policy Division
William Krouse
Analyst in Social Legislation
Domestic Social Policy Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

The FBI: Past, Present, and Future
Summary
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the Nation’s premier law
enforcement organization responsible for gathering and reporting facts and compiling
evidence in cases involving federal jurisdiction. It has broad jurisdiction in federal
law enforcement and in national security, and is a statutory member of the U.S.
Intelligence Community. From its official inception in 1908, the FBI’s mission,
jurisdiction, and resources have grown substantially in parallel with the real or
perceived threats to American society, culture, political institutions, and overall
security. In FY2003 the organization has approximately 26,000 employees, about
12,000 of whom are Special Agents. The FBI has had many successes in countering
criminal and hostile foreign intelligence and terrorist activity in its storied history.
However, in its zeal to protect U.S. national security, the FBI occasionally exceeded
its mandate and infringed upon the protected rights of U.S. citizens. Currently, the
FBI is undergoing a massive reorganization to shift its culture from reaction to crimes
already committed to detection, deterrence and prevention of terrorist attacks against
U.S. interests. The FBI continues to be a major domestic and international force in
the war against terrorism. The FBI, one element of the U.S. Department of Justice,
is led by a Director appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The Director is appointed for a single 10-year term to insulate the
investigative agency from tacit or perceived political pressures. The FBI Director is
not a member of the President’s Cabinet, although he reports to one – the U.S.
Attorney General. The current organizational schema of the FBI has three main
elements: Headquarters, 56 Field Offices, and 45 Legal Attaches overseas. The
degree of autonomy with which field offices have operated with respect to
Headquarters has oscillated over time. Currently, Headquarters is assuming a more
assertive role in directing field activities and demanding accountability, particularly
with respect to the FBI’s national security responsibilities. While the FBI has long
had counterterrorism as a top tier priority, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
were a catalyst for developing a definitive list of ranked priorities. On May 29, 2002,
counterterrorism became the FBI’s sole number one priority. Other major priorities
include countering foreign intelligence activity directed against the United States,
countering cybercrime, and working against public corruption. The FBI’s priorities
continue to reflect its traditional law enforcement mission, but the FBI’s national
security mission has assumed an unprecedented degree of prominence. In order to
successfully implement its mission, the FBI has extensive relationships with other
federal executive agencies, including other members of the U.S. Intelligence
Community. It also has an important network of relationships with state and local
law enforcement, and overseas law enforcement agencies and security services.
Relevant pending bills include H.R. 1157, H.R. 2867, S. 410, S. 1158, S. 1440, S.
1507, and S. 1520. Issues for the Congress involve whether: (1) the FBI can
sufficiently adapt its law enforcement culture to deter, detect, and prevent terrorism;
(2) some of the FBI’s criminal jurisdiction should be devolved to state and local law
enforcement; (3) a statutory charter for the FBI should be developed; and (4) the
planned co-location of the FBI’s operational Counterterrorism Division with the
newly formed Terrorist Threat Integration Center provides an opportunity for foreign
intelligence entities to engage in domestic intelligence activities.

Contents
Brief History and Program Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Domestic Security and Counterintelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Organized Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Domestic Extremism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Counterterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
FBI Organization and Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Organization and Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
FBI Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
International Presence and Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Current Major Investigative Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
FBI Counterterrorism Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The Wake Up Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
U.S. Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Catalyst for a War of Indeterminate Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
FBI Counterintelligence Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Imbalances Between Dissent and Subversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
The Pendulum Swings Back: Oversight and Regulation . . . . . . . 26
Year of the Spy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Post Cold War Counterintelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
FBI Criminal Enterprises, White Collar,
Cyber and Other Federal Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Organized Criminal Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
White Collar Crime and Public Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Cybercrime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Other Significant Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
FBI Security Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Pertinent Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Investigative Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Congressional Oversight Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
The FBI in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix I: FBI Field Offices (By City Location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix II: FBI Directors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Appendix III: FBI Legal Attache Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
List of Figures
Figure 1. FBI Appropriations FY1940-2004* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Figure 2. Total Number of FBI Positions FY1940-2004* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 3. FBI Headquarters Organizational Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

The FBI: Past, Present, and Future
Brief History and Program Development
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency in the Department
of Justice (DOJ) which has the dual mission of protecting U.S. national security and
combating criminal activities. As a statutory member of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, it is charged with maintaining domestic security by investigating foreign
intelligence agents/officers and terrorists who pose a threat to U.S. national security.
The Bureau’s criminal investigative priorities include organized crime and drug
trafficking, public corruption, white collar crime, and civil rights violations. In
addition, the Bureau investigates significant federal crimes including, but not limited
to, kidnaping, extortion, bank robberies, child exploitation and pornography, and
international child abduction. The FBI also provides training and operational
assistance to state, local, and international law enforcement agencies.
The FBI’s expertise in national and international law enforcement may be taken
for granted today.1 Because the organization had relatively little jurisdiction in its
early years (a result of nascent federal criminal law development), the organization
demonstrated substantial creativity in using its existing authority to combat criminal
behavior. For example, in its infamous investigations into the organized crime and
gangster activities of John Dillinger (and others) in the early 20th Century, the FBI
(then known as the Bureau of Investigation) and Department of Justice relied on
jurisdiction in more discrete areas of crime such as fugitive status and interstate
motor vehicle theft to arrest and prosecute organized crime cases. More recently, the
FBI has developed into a national investigative agency and established a national
identification system, a uniform crime reporting system, as well as a forensic science
program that are heavily relied upon by state and local law enforcement. Some
would argue that by instituting rigorous law enforcement training and employment
qualifications, the FBI ushered in an era of unprecedented professionalism in law
enforcement.
Moreover, as the forces of globalization became prominent in the late 20th
Century, the FBI expanded its international influence by developing important
relationships with overseas law enforcement and security services. These
relationships continue to pay dividends in the war against terrorism2 today. The
1An official history of the FBI can be found at
[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/historymain.htm]. See also Athan Theoharis, The FBI:
An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide (1994).
2The term “terrorism,” as used in this report, means premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents. The term
“international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one
country. The term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or which has significant
(continued...)

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FBI’s recent arrest of a British national alleged to be smuggling shoulder fired
missiles into the United States is an example of how its national and international
cooperation with intelligence and law enforcement organizations is paying
dividends.3 As an organization that has been at the forefront of law enforcement and
domestic security in turbulent times, however, the FBI has also been through its share
of difficult times.
While the Bureau is considered one of the world’s premier investigative
agencies and has had numerous successes implementing its criminal and national
security missions, in recent years it has been criticized for its handling of a number
of cases. These cases include the Waco and Ruby Ridge sieges, the Oklahoma City
bombing documents, the Los Alamos National Laboratory espionage investigation,
the Atlanta Olympic Park bombing investigation, the Robert Hanssen spy case,4 the
degradation of the FBI crime lab, the improper use of confidential informants, and
the failure to secure and upgrade the agency’s computer systems. The September 11,
2001 attacks, moreover, are widely viewed as a systemic intelligence failure of the
U.S. Intelligence Community, of which the FBI is one component. Some Members
of Congress have called for increased oversight and explored proposals to reform or,
perhaps, dismantle elements of the FBI, transferring the agency’s domestic security
functions to another agency that could possibly resemble Britain’s MI-5.5
2(...continued)
subgroups which practice, international terrorism. See Title 22, U.S. Code, §2656f(d).
There are numerous definitions of terrorism found in U.S. law statutes and regulations. See
CRS Report RS21021, “Terrorism” and Related Terms in Statute and Regulation: Selected
Language, Sept. 26, 2001, by Elizabeth Martin.
3See “FBI Arrests British Man in Alleged Missile Plot,” New York Times, Aug. 12, 2003.
As early as May of last year, the FBI was alerting law enforcement to be on the lookout for
potential terrorist activities involving shoulder-fired missiles. See “FBI Warns of
Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat,” May 31, 2002, at [http:www.cnn.com]. In Nov. 2002 in
Mombasa, Kenya, a chartered Israeli passenger plane was targeted with a man portable air
defense (MANPAD) system. The rocket missed its target. See Thom Shanker, “Terror in
Africa: Security Concerns, Ideal Terror Weapons – Portable, Deadly, Plentiful Missiles,”
New York Times, Nov. 29, 2002, p. A32. The indictment of Hemant Lakhani can be found
at [http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/uslakhani81103cmp.pdf].
4See A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the
Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen, Department of Justice, Office of the
Inspector General, Report, Aug. 14, 2003. The unclassified executive summary of this report
can be found at [http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/03-08/final.pdf].
5See the “Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003,” (S. 410). See also
CRS Report RL 31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: The Applicability of
the MI-5 Model to the United States, May 19, 2003, by Todd Masse. S. 1520, the “9-11
Memorial Intelligence Reform Act,” proposes that the Attorney General, Director of
National Intelligence (a proposed position), and the Secretary of Homeland Security provide
a report to Congress which, among other factors, assesses the advisability of establishing a
new domestic intelligence agency, and the experiences of other democratic nations in
conducting domestic intelligence programs and activities. Similar recommendations were
made in the Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, a report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on
(continued...)

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The FBI’s investigative jurisdiction has grown significantly over time, and it is
governed by multiple congressional statutes.6 As this jurisdiction expanded, so too
did the organization’s budget and employees. From 1940 until FY2003, the FBI’s
total numbers of employees increased from roughly 2,400 to about 26,000, as its
budget increased from $9 million to more than $4 billion.7 Figures 1 and 2 below
depict the extent to which the FBI budget and numbers of employees increased over
time.
Figure 1. FBI Appropriations FY1940-2004*
5,000
4,000
3,000
illion
$ M
2,000
1,000
0
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Current $
Cons tant 03 $
* Fiscal Year 2004 is a requested amount.
5(...continued)
Intelligence and the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Dec. 2002.
6For general information on FBI jurisdiction see U.S. Code, Title 18 (Crimes and Criminal
Procedure), §3052; U.S. Code Title 28, (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure),§533; and Title
28 Code of Federal Regulations, §0.85.
7The FBI’s request for FY2004 is $4,639,569.00. See FBI Budget Submission: Estimates
for Fiscal Year 2004.

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Figure 2. Total Number of FBI
Positions FY1940-2004*
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
0
*
70
2
1940 195
1960 19
1980 1990 2000 2001 200
2003 2004
Source: Annual appropriations, and Athan G. Theoharis, et al., FBI: A Comprehensive Reference
Guide. Gross Domestic Product Deflators for current (FY2003 = 1.00) dollar adjustments were
derived from Budget of the U.S. Government: Fiscal Year 2004, Historical Tables, Office of
Management and Budget.
* Fiscal Year 2004 is a requested amount.
What follows in this section is a functional and chronological summary of the major
elements in the historical development of the FBI.
Domestic Security and Counterintelligence. Since its inception in
1908,8 the Bureau’s domestic security and counterintelligence missions have
expanded and contracted to meet internal and external exigencies. At times,
maintaining a proper balance between national security and preserving constitutional
rights – particularly those guaranteed under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments
(freedom of speech and assembly, protection against unreasonable search and seizure,
and due process) – has been a difficult proposition for the FBI in particular and for
the federal government as a whole.
Toward the end of the First World War, civil unrest and a series of bombings
prompted the Department of Justice, and its Bureau of Investigation (BI), to monitor
and arrest persons suspected of being anarchists, Bolsheviks, socialists, or of other
radical political beliefs under the 1917 Espionage Act and the 1918 Immigration Act.
The Bureau participated in round ups of draft dodgers (“slackers”) as well. In the
8Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte established the Bureau of Investigation in 1908,
when the Department of Justice hired 10 investigators who had previously worked as U.S.
Secret Service agents. Bonaparte was prompted to hire the investigators, because a rider in
an appropriations bill prohibited Justice from borrowing Secret Service agents from
Treasury for investigations. See S.Rept. 94-755, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports of
Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, Final Report of the Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S.
Senate, (Washington, Apr. 23, 1976), 989 p. (Hereafter cited as the Church Committee
Report)

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1920s, roundups of non-citizens suspected of subversion, known as “Palmer raids”
(named after former Attorney General Alexander Mitchell Palmer [1919-1921])
enjoyed public approval in the popular press, but later proved controversial with
revelations of civil rights violations and wrongful deportations. As a Justice
Department Attorney, J. Edgar Hoover headed the Department’s General Intelligence
Division, and played an integral role in these roundups and deportations.9
As the tide of public opinion turned against the federal government’s anti-Red
tactics, Hoover successfully distanced himself from these policies. Incoming
Attorney General, Harlan Fiske Stone, appointed Hoover acting and, then, permanent
Bureau Director in 1924. Hoover approached his new job with zeal and is largely
credited with remaking the Bureau by, among other factors, standardizing some
facets of BI operations and basing appointments and promotions on merit, rather than
political connections. Moreover, Hoover promoted the Bureau’s public image by
pursuing high-profile “public enemies” – depression era bank robbers and gangsters.
In 1933, the Bureau of Investigation was renamed the Division of Investigation. In
1935, it was renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
In 1936, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt charged the FBI with
investigating subversive activities as political unrest in Europe spilled over into
America.10 Such operations were aimed at not only fascist organizations like the
pro-Nazi German – American Bund, but at the Communist Party USA and other
leftist organizations as well.11 The end of the Second World War did not bring about
a reduction in FBI domestic security investigations. Instead, they increased as
U.S.-Soviet tensions mounted with revelations that U.S. atom bomb secrets were
betrayed to the Soviets and allegations that high-ranking U.S. officials may have been
communist agents.12 As a result, wartime domestic security operations were carried
9Numerous books have been written about Director Hoover. A select few include: Richard
Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover (1987), and Curt Gentry, J.
Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Streets, 1991.
10Among other legal authorities, the FBI’s jurisdiction to conduct such investigations was
included in appropriations act language that allowed the Secretary of State to request such
investigations. Then Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, consented. See Church Committee
Report.
11In addition, President Roosevelt accepted a proposal from Director Hoover to station FBI
agents in Latin America as intelligence operatives as part of the FBI’s Special Intelligence
Service in 1939. About 360 FBI agents were stationed in Latin America during the Second
World War as intelligence operatives. Such postings, however, exacerbated the growing
rivalry between Hoover and William J. Donovan, the founder of the wartime Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) – the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. The FBI
pulled out of Latin America at the end of the war, and foreign intelligence and espionage
matters were ultimately given to the Central Intelligence Agency, when that agency was
established in 1947. See Athan G. Theoharis, with Tony G. Poveda, Susan Rosenfeld, and
Richard Powers, The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide (2000).
12For an historical perspective on this era, see Ellen Schrecker, The Age of McCarthyism:
A Brief History with Documents (1994), Walter Goodman, The Committee: The
Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (1968), and
(continued...)

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over into peacetime. The FBI investigated “atomic spies” Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg, and the trial subsequently took place in 1950-1951. The trial resulted
in the execution of both Julius and Ethel for committing espionage against the United
States on behalf of the Soviet Union. Director Hoover opposed the execution of
Ethel Rosenberg warning that the public would be averse to taking the life of a
woman and a mother.13
From 1956 through 1971, the FBI conducted an intensive and largely successful
domestic security operation to neutralize, among other groups, the Communist Party
USA. Since the Party was viewed by many to be under direction of Soviet agents,
the FBI considered such investigations to fall under the rubric of the Bureau’s
counterintelligence program (hence COINTELPRO). During COINTELPRO, the
FBI used wire taps, listening devices, break ins, and other means of covert
surveillance – investigative techniques considered legitimate for “national security”
purposes. Other techniques were more questionable, among those used against civil
rights leaders, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. – the leader of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference. The FBI also monitored a wide range of anti-
Vietnam war activists. As the line between dissent and sedition blurred, the
American public was alarmed by allegations that the FBI was violating the
constitutional rights of citizens.
Former FBI Director Hoover died on May 2, 1972, on the eve of the Watergate
scandal. The Watergate hearings, along with the COINTELPRO revelations, focused
attention on FBI abuses of power. Following two acting directors, Clarence Kelley,
a former FBI Agent and Kansas City, Missouri police chief, was appointed FBI
Director (1973-1978). A career law enforcement professional, Kelly is credited with
restoring public faith in the FBI by instilling greater discipline in its ranks and
providing enhanced operational oversight.
Following Watergate, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government
Operations and the House Select Committee on Intelligence, known respectively as
the Church and Pike Committees for their Chairs – Senator Frank Church and
Representative Otis Pike – held a series of hearings examining the operations of U.S.
intelligence agencies, including FBI domestic security and counterintelligence
investigations.14 At the time of the hearings, (1976), Attorney General Levi
promulgated new domestic security guidelines which established parameters within
which it would be permissible for the FBI to conduct investigations into the “...use
of force or violence in violation of federal law to overthrow the government or
interfere with the activities of a foreign governments within the United States, to
substantially impair the federal government in order to influence its policies, or to
deprive others of their civil rights.”15 Watergate and other intelligence community
12(...continued)
Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the World: 1492 to Present (2003).
13Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover, p. 304.
14For Church Committee findings regarding the FBI, see the Church Committee Report.
15U.S. Congress FBI Domestic Security Guidelines: Oversight Hearings Before the
(continued...)

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abuses led to increased congressional oversight through the establishment of House
and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence and development of executive
guidelines and legislation for electronic surveillance.16 Notwithstanding the abuses
of the 1960s, the FBI had many successes in countering espionage activities
conducted by U.S. citizens on behalf of the Soviet Union. Some of the higher profile
Soviet espionage cases during this decade involved William Kampiles (a CIA
employee), Christopher Boyce (an employee of defense contractor TRW, Inc.), and
Edwin G. Moore, II (a retired CIA employee).17
During the 1980s, foreign intelligence agencies still aggressively engaged in
espionage against the United States, despite the fact that much of their support in the
guise of Communist and Socialist movements in the United States had been greatly
diminished. In 1985, known as the “Year of the Spy,” U.S. officials uncovered
several spies – most of whom were motivated by greed rather than ideology. In the
1990s both the FBI and the CIA again found themselves penetrated by employees
working on behalf of the Soviet Union, and the successor Russian Federation.
Aldrich Ames (CIA) and Robert Hanssen (FBI), both of whom worked at one point
in Soviet counterintelligence, committed espionage and did substantial damage to
U.S. national security. Their activities even led to the death of agents working on
behalf of the U.S. Government against the Soviet Union and Russia. In the
late1990s, the FBI was criticized for its handling of the Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) investigation, a case involving Wen Ho Lee, a cleared employee
of LANL’s sensitive “X” Division. After an embarrassing government case in which
58 of 59 counts18 of an indictment alleging espionage and inappropriate treatment of
classified information were dropped, Wen Ho Lee pled guilty to one count of
unlawfully collecting and storing classified information related to national defense
for which he was sentenced to time already served during pretrial detention and
released.
Organized Crime. In the late 1920s and 1930s the United States economy
went from boom to bust, as a period of relative wealth gave way to the great
depression. As the depression took hold, and joblessness soared to 25%, lawlessness
that had begun in the era of Prohibition swept across the country. Gangsters
notorious for bank robbing, kidnaping and other illegal activities became the FBI’s
primary focus. As mentioned above, because the FBI did not have broad jurisdiction
to combat organized crime at the time, it effectively and efficiently used those
15(...continued)
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House
of Representatives, 98th Congress, April 27, 1983, p.60.
16The two primary legal authorities governing electronic surveillance are Title III of the
1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18 USC, §2510 et seq.) for criminal
authorities, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 USC, §1801 et seq) for foreign
intelligence authorities.
17For a summary of espionage cases, see CRS Report 93-531, Individuals Arrested on
Charges of Espionage Against the United States Government: 1966-1993, Revised May 27,
1993, by Suzanne Cavanagh (available from the authors of this report).
18The indictment can be located at [http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel99/indictmenta.pdf].

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statutes that were available to it, such as the Federal Kidnaping Act passed by
Congress in response to the famous Lindbergh kidnaping case in 1932 and the
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, which made it a federal crime to transport a stolen
car across state lines, to combat gangsterism. In what some consider the heyday for
the FBI, the organization successfully neutralized the activities of such infamous
criminals as Bonnie and Clyde, John Dillinger, Charles Arthur (“Pretty Boy”) Floyd,
and George (“Machine Gun”) Kelly during this turbulent era.19
During the late 1950s and 1960s, the FBI conducted a series of high profile
investigations to combat organized crime. For many years, Director Hoover
discounted the existence of organized crime – national criminal syndicates, and
avoided narcotics investigations.20 Congressional hearings, however, confirmed the
existence of the Mafia and other organized crime syndicates. In the 1960s, at the
direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the FBI investigated Jimmy Hoffa
and the Teamsters for alleged mob ties. In 1970, Congress passed the
Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act (P.L. 91-452), giving
the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies new statutory laws by which they
could prosecute professional criminals. RICO enlarged the range of civil and
criminal penalties which may result from commission of federal and state crimes.21
In 1978, President Jimmy Carter appointed Judge William H. Webster as FBI
Director. Judge Webster successfully employed the RICO provisions to combat New
York City’s entrenched mob families. In the “Pizza Connection” case, the Gambino
family was prosecuted successfully. In another operation, the FBI investigated and
supported the successful prosecution of the Raymond Patriarca, Jr. family in New
England. The FBI also initiated undercover operations during which they used
middlemen to lure public figures into taking bribes. These investigations, known as
ABSCAM, were controversial, even though they eventually led to the successful
prosecution of one Senator and six Members of the House of Representatives, among
others.
Domestic Extremism. During the 1980s and the 1990s, the FBI and other
federal law enforcement agencies encountered an assorted array of groups opposed
to the federal government and mainstream American society. These groups ranged
from the militia movement to white supremacists inspired by the racial doctrines of
the Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan. Among others, they included the Posse Comitatus,
the Aryan Nations, the Silent Brotherhood, the Order, and the Christian Identity
Movement. As white supremacists, some of these groups anticipated a race war in
the United States as portrayed in William Pierce’s novel, The Turner Diaries. Yet
19For a summary of various high profile cases, see
[www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/famcases.htm].
20It is reputed that J.Edgar Hoover shunned drug investigations, because he feared the
corrupting effects that narcotics, like alcohol during Prohibition, might have on FBI Special
Agents. In part, this led to the formation of the Drug Enforcement Agency as a separate
agency for drug control within the Department of Justice. Drug control did not become a
priority for the FBI until 1987. See Ronald Kessler, The FBI, 1993.
21See CRS Report RS 20376, RICO: An Abridged Sketch, updated May 6, 2002, by Charles
Doyle.

CRS-9
another group, the Branch Davidians anticipated the apocalypse, though they were
not white supremacists. The FBI adopted special tactics designed to overcome these
groups with overwhelming force, but minimum violence, so that there would be little
injury and loss of life.22 In two cases, however, violence escalated dramatically,
leading to the sieges at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and the Branch Davidian compound near
Waco, Texas.23 Some critics assert that the Ruby Ridge and Waco sieges fueled
anti-government sentiment that led to the Oklahoma City and Atlanta Centennial
Park bombings. For various reasons, the FBI was criticized for its handling of each
of these cases. In 1996, however, the FBI and other federal law enforcement services
were able to defuse successfully another potential domestic extremist group – The
Montana Freeman – without any loss of life. Through patient negotiation and gradual
increases in pressure, to include cutting power provided to the Freeman compound
in Montana, the FBI and other law enforcement services brought the crisis to an end.
Counterterrorism. In the late 1980s and 1990s, the United States
increasingly became the target of Islamic radicals and terrorists. In February 26,
1993, a bomb was detonated in the basement parking garage of the World Trade
Center. The FBI-led investigation revealed a conspiracy centered around a small
group of Islamic radicals, who were followers of a Muslim extremist, the blind
Egyptian cleric, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.24 Ramzi Yousef, considered to have
been the mastermind of the bombing, escaped, but, in a major success for the FBI and
its Intelligence Community partners, he was captured in Pakistan in 1995.
Following the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, President Clinton
appointed Louis Freeh as FBI Director. A former judge and FBI Special Agent,
Director Freeh enjoyed working cases and was personally engaged in the
investigations of the Oklahoma City and Atlanta Centennial Park bombings. He also
increased the number of FBI Special Agents deployed abroad at foreign legations to
cope with the growing globalization of crime and to enforce U.S. extraterritoriality
laws.25 Director Freeh’s tenure saw a marked increase in the number of terrorist
attacks overseas on U.S. interests by Islamic radicals. Most, if not all, of these
attacks have been linked to al-Qaeda (The Base), a radical Islamic terrorist network
22Danny O. Coulson and Elaine Shannon, No Heroes, Inside the FBI’s Secret Counter-
Terror Force, (New York, 1999), p. 595.
23Other federal law enforcement agencies were involved in both incidents. For assessments
of Ruby Ridge, see The Department of Justice Ruby Ridge Report at
[http://web3.foxinternet.net/djf/ruby001.htm#tab]. The Report to the Deputy Attorney
General on the Events at Waco, Texas can be located at
[http://www.usdoj.gov/05publications/waco/wacothree.html]. See also hearings before the
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information, Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Oct. 19, 1995.
24In 1994, Rahman and several followers were convicted for a conspiracy to blow up the
Brooklyn Bridge and Lincoln and Holland tunnels in New York City.
25Extraterritoriality is defined as U.S. laws which provide federal jurisdiction over some
crimes committed outside the United States. See CRS Report 94-166-A, Extraterritorial
Application of American Criminal Law, updated Sept. 2, 2002, by Charles Doyle. See also,
CRS Report RL 31557, Terrorism and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases:
Recent Developments, Sept. 2, 2002, by Charles Doyle.

CRS-10
founded by Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi national and former heir to a multi-million
dollar fortune and construction company. As early as 1993, Bin Laden issued
fatwahs26 against U.S. troops in Somalia and Saudi Arabia. The FBI opened an
investigation into his activities in October 1995.27 On February 23, 1998, Bin Laden
and his lieutenant, Ayman Al Zawahiri, issued a fatwah declaring that it was “the
duty of all Muslims to kill Americans – including civilians – anywhere in the world
where they could be found.”28
President George W. Bush nominated Robert Mueller, III as FBI Director, and
he was sworn in on September 4, 2001. On September 11, 2001, Bin Laden’s
followers carried out the largest terrorist attack against the United States in its
history. Compounding this crisis, an unknown person or persons delivered anthrax
to several locations in the United States, including the Senate and House office
buildings, through the U.S. mail. Director Mueller, a former U.S. Attorney in San
Francisco, California, and U.S. Marine Corps officer, redeployed FBI Special Agents
to more effectively counter terrorism and foreign espionage. In addition, Director
Mueller has sought to strengthen the FBI’s capacity to counter cyber-based attacks
and other high-technology crime against the United States, and has worked to revamp
the FBI’s information technology infrastructure and security programs.
FBI Organization and Culture
How an entity organizes to implement its mission is critical to the organization’s
ultimate success. At the most general level, the FBI has three organizational
elements – its headquarters, field components, and Legal Attache offices. FBI
Headquarters establishes organizational direction and priorities, while overseeing and
managing the field’s implementation of priorities through investigations and
operations. With respect to its national security responsibilities, FBI Headquarters
is working to centralize and integrate accountability and authority. More important
than simple organizational flow charts, however, are the relationships and
communication between entities and hierarchical levels within an organization. The
culture and ethos of an organization also speaks to its inherent focus and mission-
based flexibility. What follows is an assessment of these issues with respect to the
FBI.
Organization and Jurisdiction. Since its creation in 1908, like many other
organizations of similar longevity, the FBI has been through numerous restructuring
initiatives. As outlined above, these organizational changes coupled with increased
federal criminal jurisdiction reflected an increase in real or perceived criminal and
26A fatwah is a legal statement in Islam issued by a mufti (religious leader) or a religious
lawyer on a specific issue.
27John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why
the FBI and CIA Failed To Stop It, (New York: Hyperion, 2002), p. 148.
28This fatwah can be located at [http://www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah.htm]. See also U.S.
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Congressional Statement before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Operations and
Terrorism, Al-Qaeda International, by J.T. Caruso, Acting Director, Counterterrorism
Division, FBI, (Washington: Dec. 18, 2001), p. 3.

CRS-11
national security threats to the United States. The FBI’s jurisdiction and
responsibilities are guided by a broad range of statutes and regulations that have
developed since its inception. Although prior Congresses have discussed the
development of a legislative charter for the FBI, no such single authoritative
document outlining FBI jurisdiction and responsibilities exists.29 Figure 3 below
reflects the current structure of the FBI.
29The FBI Charter Act of 1979 was developed in the wake of revelations in the 1960s and
early 1970s that the FBI and other U.S. intelligence agencies were investigating U.S. citizen
activity deemed then to be “subversive.” Subsequent investigation found many of the
government’s activities during this tumultuous period of U.S. history were indeed illegal.
For a summary of the FBI Charter Act, see “FBI Charter Act of 1979 (S. 1612),” Hearings
before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Congress, Aug., Sept., Oct. 1979.
Although the FBI Charter Act was referred to the Judiciary Committee and hearings were
held, it was not reported out of the Committee. For a summary of historical abuses
committed by U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies, see the Church Committee
Report.

CRS-12
Figure 3. FBI Headquarters
Organizational Chart
Director
Chief of Staff
SAC Advisory Committee
Inspection Division
Deputy Director
Office of Public Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs
Office of the Ombudsman
Office of General Counsel
Office of Equal Employment
Opportunity
Chief Information Officer
Office of Professional
Responsibility
Executive Assistant
Executive Assistant
Executive Assistant
Executive Assistant
Director for
Director for Law
Director for
Director for
Counter-Terrorism/
Enforcement
Intelligence
Administration
Counter-Intelligence
Services
Office of
Counter-
Counter-
Criminal
Office of
Office of
Cyber
Law
Investigation
Strategic
Terrorism
Intelligence
Intelligence
Division
Enforcement
Division
Planning
Division
Division
Coordination
Office of
International
Records
Administrative
Services
Operations
Management
Division
Division
Critical
Incident
Response
Group
Training
Laboratory
Security
Finance
Division
Division
Division
Division
Criminal
Investigative
Technologies
Information
Justice
Division
Resources
Information
Division
Services
Division
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation. Current as of July 1, 2003.

CRS-13
As Figure 3 illustrates, the FBI currently has four main directorates under which
all of its activities are organized. Each of the 56 field offices is engaged in
investigative and operational activities that support the programs around which FBI
Headquarters is organized. One recent major organizational and managerial change
is the conversion of the Executive Assistant Director (EAD) for Criminal
Investigations into an EAD for Intelligence.30 Responsibility and program
management for both the Criminal Investigative Programs and the Cyber Program
will be assumed by the the FBI Deputy Director. This issue is somewhat contentious
from a managerial and functional perspective.31 Functionally, at a time when there
is a general perception among some in law enforcement that the national security
mission is drawing resources from the FBI’s traditional criminal mission, the
organization dissolved an EAD for Criminal Investigations. One of the four existing
directorates is investigative and operational (Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence), with the other three (Law Enforcement Services,
Administration, and Intelligence) focusing on information sharing with state and
local law enforcement, organizational support activities, and intelligence
infrastructure development, respectively. Responsibility for criminal and cyber
investigations, the FBI’s other investigative/operational role, is now directed from
the Deputy Director’s office, as indicated above.
The FBI, an organization in the midst of a reorganization aimed at improving
its ability to detect, deter, and prevent another terrorist attack has 14 divisions (as
illustrated in Figure 3 above). Nationwide, the FBI conducts its investigations and
operations through 56 Field Offices and over 400 “resident agencies,” smaller offices
geographically dispersed around the country which report to one of the larger 56 field
offices.32 With the exception of the largest field offices in Washington (D.C.), New
30See testimony of FBI Director, Robert S. Mueller III on the FBI reorganization before the
House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003. The FBI has recently
appointed an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence. This position is responsible for
the FBI’s Office of Intelligence, the primary mission of which is to establish a formal
intelligence program within the FBI’s national security and criminal programs. Substantial
reorganizations require congressional approval, particularly if there are proposed changes
in how previously authorized and/or appropriated resources are allocated.
31There are different viewpoints on this initiative. From a management perspective, it could
be argued that the agency’s second official is in essence its chief operating officer (COO)
responsible for the daily operations of the FBI. The existence of a COO allows the Director
the time to engage and inform national level policymakers and congressional oversight
committees, and to develop broad strategy for the organization. Some may argue that
burdening a COO with specific programmatic responsibilities may force the executive to
focus undue time and emphasis on those programs to the potential detriment of the broader
organizational mission. However, it could also be argued that notwithstanding the
dissolution of the EAD for Criminal Investigations, the FBI has indeed increased its focus
on these matters by elevating them to the Deputy Director’s level.
32See Appendix I for a list of the 56 field offices by city location. See also testimony of FBI
Director, Robert S. Mueller, III on the FBI reorganization before the House Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003. As part of its ongoing reorganization, the
(continued...)

CRS-14
York and Los Angeles, which are led by Assistant Directors-In-Charge (ADICs),
each of the 56 field offices is led by a Special Agent-In-Charge (SAC). Offices led
by ADICs generally have program-oriented SACs who report to the ADICs. ADICs
and SACs report directly to the FBI Director and periodic (generally quarterly)
meetings are held during which all SACs and ADICs join with the Director to discuss
ongoing activities and FBI strategies.
FBI Leadership. The FBI is led by a Director, who is appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. The Director is appointed
for a single 10-year term. The 10-year appointment was passed by Congress in 1968
to take effect after the tenure of the sixth FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover, who led the
agency for nearly 48 years (1924-1972). The 10-year term was approved in an effort
to balance the independence necessary for an investigative agency with protection
against the accumulation of excessive power by one agency or individual.
Historically, no FBI director following Hoover (See Appendix II for a chronological
list) has served the full 10-year term. The median tenure for an FBI Director is six
years (including the anomalous nearly 48-year Hoover tenure and excluding six
acting directors).
Culture. The FBI has a rich culture that is dominated by the interests of law
enforcement and has developed over many years. “Fidelity, Bravery and Integrity”
are integrated in much of the training FBI employees receive. It is the preeminent
national, and arguably international, law enforcement entity. No other U.S.-based
organization has the same national and international law enforcement reach, power
and influence. Critics have argued, however, that notwithstanding, or perhaps
because of, this reactive law enforcement culture the FBI may not be well-equipped
for the preventative counterterrorism mission which is now its number one priority.33
The FBI and its supporters recognize the need for substantial change that builds on
existing strengths, but substantially redirects FBI activities from a reactive posture
to crimes already committed toward a proactive posture with a clear focus on
preventing terrorist attacks on U.S. interests. Some have observed that the outcome
of the ongoing reorganization activities at the FBI hinge largely on the extent to
which this cultural shift can be made, and on the establishment of an effective and
efficient intelligence program.34
32(...continued)
FBI is reconsidering its field office structure to determine if it reflects the Nation’s criminal
and national security priorities. According to Director Mueller, changes, such as the shifting
of population and crime patterns, are factors causing this reassessment of field structure.
33 See the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction (the “Gilmore” Commission), and Protecting America’s
Freedom in the Information Age (a report of the Markle Foundation Task Force). See also
William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for More Secure America, Yale University Press,
2003; and Senator John Edwards, “Iraq, Terrorism and U.S. Global Leadership,” speech
before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Oct. 7, 2002. See also Robert
Bryant, et al., “America Needs More Spies,” The Economist, July 10, 2003.
34The FBI has been a statutory member of the U.S. Intelligence Community since 1947 with
the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S. Code, §401), as amended. Some
(continued...)

CRS-15
The culture of intelligence driven organizations differs from those of pure law
enforcement organizations.35 While (foreign) intelligence36 organizations are
interested in long-term infiltration, active and passive monitoring, and deterrence, the
law enforcement bias is to arrest and prosecute. The primary goal of a (foreign)
intelligence organization is to: (1) determine what intelligence should be collected
to advance national interests; (2) systematically collect that raw intelligence; (3)
apply analytical tools to the raw information in the development of informed
judgements; and (4) to share that finished intelligence with national level
policymakers and other officials with a demonstrated need to know. “Tradecraft” or
the how, where and why intelligence gathering takes place, is of utmost importance.37
Recruitment of sources and penetration of groups operating in United States is highly
valued.38 There are fewer legal restrictions on overseas U.S. Intelligence Community
agency operations. By contrast, the primary goal of a (pure) law enforcement agency
is to respond to criminal activities, and to deter future crimes. In general, this goal
is achieved by rigorous investigation of criminal activities and close cooperation with
prosecution. Discrete cases are the driving factor in a law enforcement organization,
while broader trends and relationships among social variables, such as political,
economic, and military factors, drive intelligence organizations. When law
34(...continued)
would argue, however, that historically its criminal responsibilities eclipsed its intelligence
mission.
35For a brief assessment of the cultural differences between intelligence and law
enforcement see Siobhan Gorman, “FBI, CIA Remain Worlds Apart,” Government
Executive, Aug. 1, 2003. See also CRS Report RL30252, Intelligence and Law
Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S., updated Dec. 3, 2001, by
Richard A. Best, Jr. See also Mark Riebling, Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and
the CIA, (Knopf, 1994).
36Foreign Intelligence is defined as information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or
activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign
persons. See the National Security Act of 1947, (50 U.S. Code, Chapter 15, §401a).
Gathering of foreign intelligence within the United States is governed by, among other
sources, the classified U.S. Department of Justice’s Foreign Counterintelligence Manual,
and, for electronic surveillance, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.
Code, §1861), as amended. Gathering of foreign intelligence within the United States is
governed by, among other sources, the classified U.S. Department of Justice Foreign
Counterintelligence Manual, and, for electronic surveillance; physical searches; pen
registers and trap and trace devices; and access to “business records,” including any tangible
things to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person, or to protect
against international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S. Code, §1801 et. seq.), as amended.
37 For a brief discussion of how foreign intelligence tradecraft differs from Homeland
Security tradecraft, see Bruce Berkowitz, “A Fresh Start Against Terror,” New York Times,
Aug. 4, 2003, p. A17.
38Some have argued a sound metric for assessing performance of an intelligence driven
organization is the number of trusted penetrations the agency has recruited. In general,
foreign intelligence organizations tend to perform better than pure law enforcement agencies
in human asset recruitment. S. 1520, the “9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act,”
proposes the FBI enhance its efforts to penetrate terrorist organizations operating in the
United States through “all available means” of collection.

CRS-16
enforcement entities operate within the United States, civil liberties and the rights of
U.S. citizens are of paramount concern. As a result, the domestic environment, and
any intelligence gathering which takes place in the United States, is governed by a
complex range of investigative guidelines and statutes and constitutional limits.
As a hybrid law enforcement and intelligence organization, the FBI collects
criminal intelligence in support of its law enforcement mission, and foreign
intelligence in support of its national security mission. As such, it has a set of unique
advantages (familiarity with treating terrorism as both a crime and potential threat to
U.S. national security, awareness of the need to protect civil liberties) and challenges
(largely cultural) as it attempts to change the balance between these two missions.
The FBI’s membership in the U.S. Intelligence Community makes it responsible for
collecting, analyzing, exploiting and disseminating foreign intelligence. Its primary
national security mission areas have been and remain counterterrorism and
counterintelligence. As a result of this focus, and its prominent law enforcement
mission, the FBI has not historically been a substantial producer of foreign
intelligence. Moreover, because of its unique (domestic) law enforcement and
intelligence mission, the organization was, for the most part, the primary consumer
of its own raw and finished intelligence. Informing national policymakers about
pressing national security matters when action may not be immediately necessary has
historically not been a high FBI priority. Rather, the primary impetus for gathering
intelligence was to support a case. However, according to Director Mueller, the FBI
is now moving from thinking about “intelligence as a case,” to finding the
“intelligence in the case.”39 While some argue that intelligence is the more effective
discipline in countering terrorists who operate clandestinely, all elements of national
power (intelligence, law enforcement, military, diplomatic, economic) have a role to
play in combating terrorism.
An important element of an organization’s culture is not only the ethos of the
entity itself, but how its employees define themselves and interact with internal and
external stakeholders. As mentioned above, the FBI employs a broad range of
professionals that fall into two basic categories: Special Agents and professional
support. Generally, two professional support staff support each Agent.40 Agents are
sworn law enforcement officers who carry a badge and weapon and are authorized
to make arrests for many federal crimes, including recently added authority to make
arrests based on immigration violations.41 While the FBI continues to recruit lawyers
and accountants as Agents, it has diversified its recruitments to include linguists,
chemists and biologists, and international affairs experts, among others. New
39See “Combating Terrorism,” a Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, before the U.S. Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary, July 23, 2003.
40See P.L. 108-7, Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003. The FBI has approximately
26,000 total employees, out of which about 12,000 are Agents.
41This authority was recently provided to the FBI when, in Feb. 2003, Attorney General John
Ashcroft signed an order extending this power to the FBI. This power had heretofore been
reserved for Immigration and Naturalization Service Agents, some U.S. Customs Service
officials, and a small amount of Southern Florida law enforcement officers. See Dan Eggen,
“Rules on Detention Widened: FBI, Marshals Can Hold Foreigners,” Washington Post, Mar.
20, 2003, p. A11.

CRS-17
Agents are required to pass 16 weeks of academic and practical training at the FBI
Academy located at the Quantico Marine Base in Quantico, Virginia. Program-
specific training follows the 16 week program and continues throughout an Agent’s
career.
Professional support personnel cover myriad functions ranging from financial
and human resources support to physical surveillance, foreign language, and
intelligence analytical support. All-source intelligence analysts work closely with
Agents to provide tactical analytical support to ongoing national security and
criminal cases. They also provide strategic level analyses, such as criminal, terrorism
or foreign intelligence patterns of activity and/or trend analyses, and programmatic
analyses, to FBI executives and U.S. Intelligence Community policymakers.
Training for professional support varies depending on the position. In the wake of
September 11, 2001, the FBI has substantially increased training for new and existing
intelligence analysts at the FBI, to include an invigorated College of Analytical
Studies, an FBI program which leverages some Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
analytical training methodologies.42
International Presence and Role. Internationally, in the last decade the
FBI has significantly expanded its presence to 45 Legal Attache (LEGAT) offices.43
Legal Attaches are located within the U.S. Embassy overseas and report to the U.S.
Ambassador.44 Legats are integrated into the U.S. Embassy and serve the primary
role of developing and nurturing reciprocal relationships with foreign law
enforcement and security services in the mutual interest of investigating international
crime and terrorism. Legats gather information through overt liaison, but are not
engaged in clandestine intelligence collection. FBI officials project that by the end
of 2003 there will be approximately 133 Special Agents and 83 support personnel
stationed overseas in support of the international mission.45 Legats played a
prominent role in coordinating with overseas law enforcement and security services
during the investigation into the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (FBI case
name PENTTBOMB).46 Legats are also responsible for facilitating the placement of
42See Robert S. Mueller III, FBI Director, testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, “The War Against Terrorism: Working Together to Protect America,” Mar.
4, 2003.
43See Appendix III for an international map of the FBI’s Legal Attaches. There are 45
overseas Legal Attache offices and one domestic Legal Attache liaison office (Miami,
Florida).
44The FBI has a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. State Department
regarding the placement of Legats in U.S. Embassies. See John S. Pistole, testimony before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Diplomacy and the War Against
Terrorism,” Mar. 18, 2003.
45See testimony of Roderick L. Beverly, Special Agent-in-Charge, FBI Office of
International Operations, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security and Claims, May 13, 2003.
46The nomenclature of the PENTTBOMB case is as follows: “PENT” for Pentagon, and
“TT” for twin towers.

CRS-18
foreign law enforcement officers into annual FBI National Academy classes.47
Through this program, foreign law enforcement officers are trained in a broad range
of criminal procedures, with the attendant benefit of building a cadre of international
contacts the FBI leverages to mutual advantage in international criminal and related
investigations.
Current Major Investigative Programs
Robert S. Mueller, III became Director of the FBI on September 4, 2001, only
one week prior to the infamous terrorist attacks of September 11. Up until that point,
the FBI had national security responsibilities, including counterterrorism, in Tier I
of its (1998-2003) Strategic Plan’s Investigative Priorities. Tier I combined national
security responsibilities with other issues such as deterring criminal conspiracy;48
therefore, the clarity and focus of FBI priorities, arguably, remained nebulous. Nor
was it generally perceived within the FBI that working national security accounts
(counterterrorism and counterintelligence) was a career-enhancing endeavor. The
events of September 11 only made more stark the need to develop a definitive and
clarified list of new priorities for the FBI. Moreover, the recent Robert Hanssen
espionage case49 and the espionage investigation at Los Alamos National Laboratory,
also contributed to a perceived need for reprioritization, particularly of national
security-related issues at the FBI. As a result, on May 29, 2002, the FBI Director
announced the following 10 priorities:
! Protect the United States from terrorist attack.
! Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and
espionage.
! Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology
crimes.
! Combat public corruption at all levels.
! Protect civil rights.
! Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises.
! Combat major white-collar crime.
47Since its inception in 1935, over 2,000 foreign law enforcement officers from over 140
countries have participated in the National Academy. For additional information on the
National Academy see [http://www.fbi.gov/hq/td/academy/na/na.htm]. The FBI National
Academy should not be confused with the FBI Academy, established in 1920s, which has
as its primary purpose the training of new FBI Special Agents. In 1972, the FBI opened a
facility to train new Special Agents on the United States Marine Corps Base at Quantico,
Virginia.
48See Thomas J. Pickard, former Acting Director and Deputy Director FBI, testimony before
the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, “Re-authorization of the
FBI,” May 3, 2001.
49Robert Hanssen was an FBI Special Agent who had substantial expertise in
counterintelligence matters and had access to some of the most highly classified intelligence
in the U.S. government. Mr. Hanssen betrayed the trust put in him by the U.S. government
by committing espionage on behalf of the former Soviet Union and then Russia. For more
information on this case, see the U.S. Department of Justice’s indictment at
[http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/hanssen_indict.html].

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! Combat significant violent crime.
! Support federal, state, local and international partners.
! Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI’s mission.
As this prioritized list makes clear, while the FBI continues to dedicate a majority of
its time and resources to combating crime, its national security mission has been
dramatically elevated in stature and importance within the organization.50 What
follows then is a brief description of the top four FBI investigative programs:
Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Criminal and Cybercrime (including public
corruption), and Security.
FBI Counterterrorism Program.51 At the most generic level, there are two
types of terrorism that the FBI, and other U.S. governmental agencies, seek to counter
– domestic terrorism and international terrorism. The domestic terrorist threat can
be categorized as coming from extremists on polar opposites of the political
spectrum. That is, there are domestic groups that do not believe in the legitimacy of
the U.S. government, including its laws, currency and sovereignty and others that are
motivated by hatred of certain ethnic groups (generally referred to as “right wing”
extremists), while others are primarily oriented toward violent activities to advance
preferred social causes, such as liberation of the earth or animals from perceived
exploitation (generally referred to as “left wing” extremists). International terrorists
and terrorist groups are generally categorized as State Sponsors of Terrorism or
Foreign Terrorist Organizations.52 In FY2002, the FBI worked 12,512
50According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), from FY2002 to FY2003, the FBI
increased the allocation of FBI positions in the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and
cyber areas from 26% to 36%. See FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to
Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller
General of the United States, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the
Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations, June 18, 2003. Although the FBI’s number one
and two priorities are national security oriented, it does not necessarily follow that these two
priorities should consume a majority of FBI resources. The quality of the (human)
resources, targeting of these resources against greatest threats, and close collaboration
between these resources and other Intelligence Community assets, as well as state and local
law enforcement partners, may be better indicators of success in this area than raw financial
data.
51The FBI treats terrorism as both a federal crime and as a national security issue. Not all
terrorism is a grave threat to national security, but all terrorism, or activity in support of
terrorism, is criminal. This reflects the reality of the issue, that is, some prima facie
criminal activities, such as fraud and other illegal fund-raising techniques, are engaged in
domestically by those supporting terrorist activities at home or abroad. The fact that the
proceeds of these illegal activities may be used for violent or coercive activities directed
against U.S. citizens to achieve a desired political outcome, makes the activity inimical to
U.S. values and interests. Terrorism has the capacity to undermine national public and
private institutions and values and negatively affect national quality of life. As such,
multiple tools of statecraft, including law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, and military
force are used to counter terrorism.
52Two other “lists” have been created by the U.S. government as counterterrorism tools –
the Terrorism Exclusion List (TEL) which has immigration consequences for any aliens
(continued...)

CRS-20
counterterrorism investigations.53 An abbreviated version of the history of the FBI’s
Counterterrorism Program is illustrative.
The Wake Up Call. The FBI’s organization for countering terrorism has
shifted over time as the relative importance of terrorism as a national security and
criminal issue has changed. There have been three major periods in the development
of the existing Counterterrorism Program. The first period occurred in the early-to-
mid 1980s. During this period, the FBI’s counterterrorism program employed fewer
than 500 people.54 In the aftermath of the 1983 bombings of the U.S. Embassy (April
– 63 dead, 17 of whom were Americans) and then the U.S. Marine Corps (October
– 241 Marine personnel dead) barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, the FBI established a
Terrorism Section within its Criminal Investigative Division. Although the FBI has
long had the authority to investigate federal crimes not assigned to other U.S. law
enforcement entities, the passage of the Hostage Taking Act of 1984 and the
Omnibus Crime Bill of 1986 granted it the explicit authority for extraterritorial
investigation of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests and citizens overseas.55
U.S. Vulnerability. The second major period includes the early-to-mid 1990s.
During this period, the United States not only was attacked overseas, but perhaps
more importantly there were successful and significant terrorist attacks within the
United States. The two most prominent attacks during this period involved the
bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993 (an incident of international
terrorism in which six Americans died), and the April 1995 domestic terrorism attack
on the Alfred P. Murrah office building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (168
52(...continued)
“...who provide material assistance to, or solicit it for, designated organizations.” Executive
Order 13224, Terrorist Financing allows the U.S. government “... to block designees’ assets
in any financial institution in the United States, or held by any U.S. person.” See U.S.
Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. The second set of lists is what is
referred to as “Watch Lists.” These lists, of which there are approximately 12, were
established and are implemented by various executive agencies with intelligence,
counterterrorism, and law enforcement responsibilities. See GAO Report 03-322,
Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should be Consolidated to Promote Better
Integration and Sharing, Apr. 2003. S. 1520, the “9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act,”
proposes the establishment of a National Terrorist Watchlist Center, which would has as its
primary function the coordination and integration of all terrorist watchlists. On Sept. 16,
2003, the Department of Justice announced the creation of the Terrorist Screening Center,
“...a multi-agency center anchored by the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and
State, and the Intelligence Community, and administered by the FBI...” to “consolidate
terrorist watchlists and provide 24/7 operational support for thousands of federal screeners
across the country and around the world.” See Department of Justice News Release, Sept.
16, 2003.
53See FY2004 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 2-6.
54By contrast, in early 2003, the FBI dedicated approximately 3,000 field Agents to
counterterrorism. See Walker, June 18, 2003. See also Robert M. Blitzer, “Domestic
Intelligence Challenges in the 21st Century,” prepared for the Lexington Institute’s February
2003 conference Progress Towards Homeland Security: An Interim Report Card.
55Extraterritorial jurisdiction for acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries is
granted to the Attorney General pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Chapter 113B, §2332b.

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Americans perished). In part as a response, in 1996, the FBI established, with the
support of the Congress, its own Counterterrorism Center and devoted additional
international terrorism and domestic terrorism experts to combating terrorism. It was
also during this period that the FBI transferred responsibility for terrorism from its
Criminal Investigative Division to its National Security Division.
Catalyst for a War of Indeterminate Duration. The third period is the
late 1990s to 2001. It was during this period that loosely affiliated terrorist
organizations became more active and attacks became more deadly and
asymmetrical. The August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
(224 killed, 12 of whom were American) are largely attributed in part to an
increasingly aggressive al-Qaeda. In 1999, to provide enhanced focus on
counterterrorism, the FBI transferred its counterterrorism program from the National
Security Division to a newly established Counterterrorism Division. In October
2000, the USS Cole was attacked (17 servicemen dead) by al-Qaeda operatives as it
was in the Yemen’s Aden Harbor for refueling.56 Then, on September 11, 2001, acts
of violence directed against the United States were carried out with near
simultaneous attacks (an al-Qaeda hallmark) on the Pentagon, the World Trade
Center and a third target that was averted with a scuttling of the hijacked United
Flight 93 in rural Pennsylvania. As a result of the events of September 11, 2001
(approximately 3,000 dead, the majority of whom were American), many changes
have taken place and continue to be implemented, to shift the FBI from a reactive to
a proactive posture.
On May 22, 2002, FBI Director Mueller outlined a reorganization initiative at
the FBI. A primary theme of this reorganization is program centralization and the
establishment of a national intelligence program which rebalances the relationship
between FBI Headquarters and field offices. S. 1520, a bill to amend the National
Security Act of 1947 (short title “the 9-11 Memorial Intelligence Reform Act”)
proposes that the FBI take a number of actions to enhance its counterterrorism
capabilities, including clearly designating priorities for national terrorism and
enforcement of adherence by FBI field offices to such priorities, establishing and
maintaining a counterterrorism career track and formal training programs for Special
Agents and Analysts and improving its ability to penetrate terrorist organizations
operating in the United States. Some of these changes are in process. In addition to
those changes already outlined above, other major elements of this reorganization are
as follows:
! FBI Headquarters Organizational Changes. The Director established a new
EAD for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, among three other EADs.
Subsequently, the FBI Director has established an EAD for Intelligence whose
primary function will be to establish and implement a formal and systematic
Intelligence Program throughout the FBI. The extent to which this initiative
will be successful is largely dependent on whether the FBI’s strong law
enforcement culture accepts and adopts this new approach to intelligence.
56See CRS Report RS 20721, Terrorist Attack on the USS Cole: Background and Issues for
Congress, updated Jan. 30, 2001, by Ronald O’Rourke, and Raphael Perl.

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! Analytical Enhancements. In order to immediately meet the surge in demand
for real-time tactical and strategic counterterrorism analysis, the FBI requested
and received 25 analysts on temporary detail from the CIA. According to the
FBI, since September 11, 2001, it has increased the number of its Intelligence
Operations Specialists from 65 to 345 and increased the number of
Intelligence Research Specialists from 41 to 130.57 To meet the sustained
long-term need for counterterrorism analysis, for FY2004, the FBI has
requested 214 additional counterterrorism analysts, a number that would
quadruple the pre-September 11 number of counterterrorism analysts.58
These analysts will be part of the newly formed Analysis Branch of the FBI’s
Counterterrorism Division. Perhaps most importantly, analysis of foreign
threat intelligence gathered overseas and in the United States on terrorism will
be integrated in the newly established Terrorist Threat Integration Center
(TTIC), which reports to the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity
as the leader of the U.S. Intelligence Community.59 The Director of the TTIC
is a CIA employee detailed to the TTIC, while the Deputy Director is an FBI
employee detailed to the TTIC.60
57Until just recently, the FBI has had two categories of professional support employees who
engage in analysis. While Intelligence Research Specialists are all-source intelligence
analysts who engage in a full range of tactical, strategic and programmatic analysis,
Intelligence Operations Specialists are more tactically oriented and provide direct case and
operational support. The FBI is currently in the process of merging these two categories of
employees into one - intelligence analysts. The newly created Reports Officers generally
do not engage in traditional all source analysis; their focus is reviewing raw information in
a timely manner and understanding to whom (internally and externally) that information
must be disseminated.
58See Statement by FBI Director Robert Mueller regarding the Joint Intelligence Committee
Report into the Terrorist Attack of September 11, 2001, U.S. Department of Justice, FBI
Press Release, July 24, 2003.
59Currently, the Director of Central Intelligence serves as both the leader of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and as Director of the broader U.S. Intelligence Community. The
pending 9/11 Intelligence Memorial Reform Act (S. 1520) would create a Director of
National Intelligence, and that individual would be precluded from simultaneous service as
the Director of the CIA and Director of National Intelligence. Some have argued this
proposal would undermine the DCI’s power base. See Robert M. Gates, “How Not to
Reform Intelligence,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 3, 2003. Finally, while the TTIC reports
to the Director of Central Intelligence as leader of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the
organization has been categorized as a “joint venture” of U.S. Intelligence Community
participants.
60While there is widespread agreement on the need to have more integrated foreign and
domestic counterterrorism analytical effort, some observers are skeptical of the placement
of an intelligence analytical “fusion” center within the U.S. Intelligence Community. Some
believe placement of such a center within the U.S. Intelligence Community will undermine
intelligence sharing with state and local law enforcement. Moreover, according to the
Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) an Undersecretary of Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) was to be established within the newly created Department
to, inter alia, (1) assess the nature and scope of the terrorist threat to the Homeland; (2)
understand threats in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities of the Homeland; and (3)
(continued...)

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! Investigative Enhancements. With respect to field Agents dedicated to the
FBI’s three highest priorities (counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber-
crime), the FBI has increased this number from approximately 2,376 Agents
in FY02 to 3,308 Agents in FY03, a 39% increase in 1 year.61 Intelligence
squads, including supporting Reports Officers, also have been established at
FBI field offices to ensure that this important function is given appropriate
attention.
! Re-engineering Projects. The FBI Director has about 40 ongoing or
completed re-engineering projects designed to improve the focus, information
technology,62 and business practices at the organization. Six projects have
been completed, eight additional projects are in the final stages of completion,
and work continues on the remainder.63
Counterterrorism and counterintelligence share the same basic discipline, that
is, efforts in both areas are supported by clandestine intelligence activity and may or
may not be state sponsored.
FBI Counterintelligence Program.
The FBI’s Counterintelligence
Program64 developed largely as a response to real or perceived threats to U.S. national
60(...continued)
integrate relevant information, analyses and vulnerability assessments to identify priorities
for protective measures. IAIP is a member of the TTIC and the U.S. Intelligence
Community. For additional information on TTIC, see CRS Report RS 21283, Homeland
Security: Intelligence Support, updated June 23, 2003, by Richard A. Best, Jr. See also,
Joint Hearing on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, House Select Committee on
Homeland Security and the House Judiciary Committee, July 22, 2003.
61See General Accounting Office (GAO), FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts
to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, testimony of David Walker before the House
Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary,
June 18, 2003.
62The Trilogy project is the FBI’s overarching initiative to improve its antiquated
information technology infrastructure. Broadly speaking, the goals are to improve
information connectivity between and among national and international FBI entities, the
U.S. Intelligence Community and, where appropriate, state and local law enforcement
agencies. Another important element of this program is to re-engineer FBI information
systems so that information can be readily captured and retrieved for timely analytical
exploitation. For additional information see, Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
Management of Information Technology Investments, Report No. 03-09, Dec. 2002, U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General.
63For a list of these projects see, Dick Thornburgh, Chairman, National Academy of Public
Administration Panel of FBI Reorganization, testimony before the House Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Committee on
Appropriations, June 18, 2003.
64Counterintelligence is defined as information gathered and activities conducted to protect
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or
on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or international terrorist activities,
but not including personnel, physical, document, or communications security programs. See
Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, Dec. 4, 1981. See also
(continued...)

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security as a result of the clandestine foreign intelligence activities directed against
the United States. The goal of counterintelligence is to neutralize, deter, detect and
prevent, where possible, foreign intelligence activity directed against U.S. interests.
Notwithstanding the end of the Cold War, counterintelligence remains a vital U.S.
national security function, as nation states and sub-national actors continue to act in
their own parochial self interest.65 Moreover, as the world’s dominant economic and
military power, the United States remains a target for foreign intelligence activity
from a broad range of countries. Although espionage66 cases are the very public face
of counterintelligence, the majority of counterintelligence cases never reach
prosecution.
History. The FBI’s history illustrates that during times of national crisis its
domestic intelligence activities have occasionally circumvented constitutional norms.
On balance, however, enhanced Attorney General Guidelines covering a broad range
of issues such as legal predicates for initiating counterintelligence investigations, the
establishment of congressional intelligence committees, as well as the passage of
statutes governing electronic surveillance,67 have strengthened the legal, regulatory
and oversight environment in which the FBI must operate.
Imbalances Between Dissent and Subversion. As alluded to above,
historically, the FBI (and other intelligence agencies) have been engaged in
intelligence activities directed against individuals based solely on their exercising
First Amendment constitutional rights.68 The “Palmer Raids” took place in 1919-
1921, as the FBI’s “Radical Division” (later renamed the General Intelligence
Division) sought to round up “anarchist” and “revolutionary” aliens. It was alleged
that these individuals, some of whom belonged to the Communist Party of America,
were actively engaged in supporting the violent overthrow of the U.S. government.
In fact, although many of the individuals subject to the raids may have had political
beliefs that were inconsistent with those of contemporary governing authorities,
subsequent investigation revealed that many of the so-called radicals were U.S.
64(...continued)
National Security Act of 1947, (50 U.S. Code, Chapter 15, §401a).
65See David Szady, Assistant FBI Director Counterintelligence Division, “Changes the FBI
is Making to the Counterintelligence Program,” statement before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Apr. 9, 2002.
66In general, there are two categories of espionage – that which involves the unlawful
transfer of classified national defense information to an unauthorized third party (see 18
U.S. Code, Chapter 37, §§793, 794, and 798), and that which involves theft of commercial
trade secret information which is categorized as “economic espionage.” Economic
espionage was codified in 1996 (see 18 U.S. Code, Chapter 90, §1831).
67The landmark statute in this case is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
amended by P.L. 107-56, which stipulates that a court order must be granted prior to
collecting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.
68See Tony Poveda, Lawlessness and Reform: The FBI in Transition, Brooks/Cole
Publishing, 1990.

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citizens who were not actively engaged in any Communist activity to overthrow the
U.S. government.69
Throughout the Cold War as the FBI fought an intense counterintelligence battle
against the hostile intelligence activities of the Soviet Union and its client states, the
FBI occasionally would become involved in domestic intelligence activities
inappropriately and in contravention of the basic tenets of an open democracy. Some
of these activities included:
! COINTELPRO. During the 1956-1971 era, the FBI developed and
implemented its infamous Counterintelligence program or COINTELPRO.
Through this program, the FBI investigated those involved in vaguely defined
“subversive” activities, including U.S. citizens engaged in legitimate political
discourse and advocacy, such as civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr.70
In March 1971, antiwar activists broke into the FBI field office in Media,
Pennsylvania and stole about 1,000 classified documents that chronicled the
FBI’s surreptitious surveillance of anti-Vietnam War activists. These
documents were incrementally leaked to the press.
! CISPES. In the early 1980s, the FBI investigated the domestic activities of
a group know as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador
(CISPES), a group engaged in fund-raising activity in the United States with
remittance payments to El Salvador. The purpose of the initial investigation
was to determine if CISPES had violated the Foreign Agent Registration
Act.71 Subsequently, in 1983 the FBI opened a broader investigation to
determine if the organization was engaged in international terrorist activity.
Although a congressional investigation concluded that the FBI’s investigation
did not reflect “significant FBI political or ideological bias...,” its activities
“resulted in the investigation of domestic political activities protected by the
First Amendment that should not have come under governmental scrutiny.”72
! Library Awareness Program. In late 1980s, the New York Office of the FBI
Counterintelligence Program initiated what became known as the Library
Awareness Program. Through this program FBI Agents visited certain
libraries within the New York area to make librarians aware that Intelligence
Officers of the (former) Soviet Union, may attempt to spot, assess, and recruit
librarians and/or students as intelligence agents of the Soviet Union. This FBI
initiative was predicated on prior Soviet hostile intelligence activity which
demonstrated that known intelligence officers sought to fulfill Soviet
intelligence collection requirements regarding U.S. high technology before it
became classified or restricted by tasking librarians or students at technical
69See Edwin Hoyt Palmer, The Palmer Raids,1919-1921: An Attempt to Suppress Dissent,
Seabury Press, 1969.
70For further information on the history of COINTELPRO, see Church Committee Report.
71The Foreign Agent Registration Act requires that persons acting as foreign agents (as
defined by the Act) register with the U.S. Department of Justice for among other reasons,
transparency (see 22 U.S. Code, §611).
72See “The FBI and CISPES,” a report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. (S. Prt.
101-46, July 1989).

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libraries. Some civil libertarians and other library groups believed that even
though this program was not national in scope, it risked undermining the
democratic ideal of openness, particularly because it might impinge on the
sharing of open, unclassified information.73
These FBI activities and those of other intelligence agencies in the Watergate era, a
time characterized by general mistrust of the government, led to increased oversight
of the FBI.
The Pendulum Swings Back: Oversight and Regulation. In the wake
of these and other scandals, both the executive and legislative branches of
government took action to protect the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. Former
Attorney General Edward Hirsch Levi (1975-1977) issued “Domestic Security
Investigations” Guidelines (also known as the “Levi” Guidelines) which clarified FBI
authorities in this area. Nearly six years later, in 1983, these Guidelines were
updated and incorporated into the Attorney General Guidelines on “General Crimes,
Racketeering, Enterprises, and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations.”74 In the
mid-1970s the Congress established two permanent select committees to conduct
oversight of U.S. intelligence activities. Later, in 1978, the Congress passed the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA [P.L.95-511]) to establish legal
standards and criteria for electronic surveillance of foreign intelligence activities in
the United States.75 Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities,
signed in 1981, also prevents members of the U.S. Intelligence Community from
conducting, inter alia, electronic surveillance in the United States, unless expressly
73The USA PATRIOT ACT (P.L. 107-56) §215 amended the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S. Code §1861) to allow the Director of the FBI (or a
designee) to make an application for an order requiring the production of “...any tangible
things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items)...” for an authorized
international terrorism or counterintelligence investigation. This remains contentious today,
and there are at least three bills pending in the108th Congress (S. 1158, S. 1507, and
H.R.1157) which would either exempt bookstores and libraries from orders requiring the
production of any tangible things for certain foreign intelligence investigations, or amend
the standards for such orders. Recently, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and
six Muslim groups sued the U.S. government arguing that these elements of the PATRIOT
Act are unconstitutional on the grounds that they violate the privacy, due process, and free
speech rights of Americans. See Eric Lichblau, “Suit Challenges Constitutionality of
Powers in Antiterrorism Law,” New York Times, July 31, 2003.
74See “FBI Domestic Security Guidelines,” Oversight hearings before the Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights, House Committee on the Judiciary, House Representatives,
Apr. 27, 1983. The 1976 and 1983 versions of the domestic security guidelines were
subsequently updated and modified by both Attorneys General Richard Thornburgh (1989)
and Janet Reno (1994).
75Some elements of FISA were recently amended in the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56),
in the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2002 (P.L.107-108), and in the Homeland
Security Act of 202 (P.L. 107-296). See CRS Report RL30465, The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions,
updated Mar. 31, 2003, by Elizabeth Bazan. See also CRS Report RL 31200, Terrorism:
Section by Section Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act, updated Dec. 10, 2001, by Charles
Doyle.

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authorized by the Attorney General and subject to probable cause legal standards.76
It was within this newly regulated environment that the FBI’s Counterintelligence
program would have some of its highest profile successes – investigations and
prosecutions of espionage.
Year of the Spy. In comparison to the early 1950s when the only executions
for the crime of espionage took place in the United States, the period of the late
1960s through the mid-1970s can be aptly characterized as relatively quiescent from
a counterespionage perspective. During the 1966-1975 period there were five arrests
for espionage and related charges. It was not until the late 1970s that the Justice
Department, under former Attorney General Griffin Bell (1977-1979), assumed a
more aggressive posture against espionage. As implemented by Judge William
Webster, FBI Director from 1978 to1987, the FBI’s Counterintelligence program was
invigorated. As counterintelligence cases can be relatively slow in pace due to their
intelligence nature and relatively high legal thresholds for successful conviction, the
FBI’s aggressive investigation bore significant fruit in the mid -1980s. In 1985
alone, the FBI arrested 11 individuals for espionage; and the year was dubbed the
“Year of the Spy.” The John Walker espionage ring alone accounted for the
indictment of four individuals who were either convicted of or pleaded guilty to
charges of espionage. John Walker was a U.S. Navy warrant officer with a top secret
clearance and access to cryptography codes, a position which allowed him access to
some of the most important national security secrets the nation had. He committed
espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union from the late 1960s until he was arrested.
Other espionage arrests in 1985 included Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a CIA employee (on
behalf of the People’s Republic of China), Jonathan Pollard, an intelligence analyst
with the Naval Investigative Service (on behalf of Israel), and Ronald Pelton, a
former National Security Agency communications specialist (on behalf of the Soviet
Union).77
Post Cold War Counterintelligence. When the former Soviet Union
dissolved in 1991, the FBI, like many agencies in the federal bureaucracy that were
targeted, staffed and trained to contain the Soviet threat, had to reassess its approach
and priorities for counterintelligence. The Department of Justice led an effort to
reassess the new international environment and target its counterintelligence
resources accordingly. The bipolar world had dissolved with the passing of the
Soviet Union and was replaced with a multipolar world. The new world was far less
certain and far more complex than the well tested boundaries of international
behavior that had evolved since 1945. The end result of the Department of
Justice/FBI counterintelligence review was a concept known as the National Security
Threat List (NSTL).78 Flexible enough to incorporate a broader array of
“non-traditional” threats (that is, those foreign powers that did not traditionally target
76See Executive Order 12333, §§2.4 and 2.5.
77See CRS Report 93-531, Individuals Arrested on Charges of Espionage Against the United
States Government: 1966-1993, Revised May 27, 1993, by Suzanne Cavanagh (available
from the authors of this report). For a compilation of espionage cases through 1999, see
[http://www.dss.mil/training/espionage].
78See Pat Watson, “The FBI’s Changing Mission in the 1990s,” Consortium for the Study
of Intelligence, Mar. 24, 1992.

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the United States with their foreign intelligence resources), the NSTL is composed
of two elements: (1) a classified list of countries whose demonstrated level of
activity directed against the United States warrants special attention and monitoring,
and (2) an unclassified “Issues List,” which provides the predicate for opening an
investigation on any foreign power engaged in activity outlined by the eight issues.79
Some of the higher profile cases during this era include:
! Aldrich Hazen Ames. Aldrich Ames was a CIA, Directorate of Operations
Officer who worked on intelligence matters relating to the Soviet Union. In
his later career he had responsibilities related to Soviet counterintelligence,
which afforded him access to the identities of some of the Soviet sources who
had been recruited and operated by U.S. intelligence agencies. From 1985 to
1994, Ames committed espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union and then
Russia. He was arrested in 1994, and was convicted of one count of espionage
under 18 U.S. Code §794(c).
! Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). LANL is one of the world’s
preeminent nuclear weapons design and testing facilities. In the late 1990s,
DOE intelligence and counterintelligence officials alleged that highly
classified documents concerning the design of the W-88 nuclear warhead may
have been made available to China.80 Wen Ho Lee was a naturalized U.S.
citizen of Taiwanese origin who worked at LANL’s Applied Physics or “X”
Division, which has expertise involving all aspects of nuclear weapons
physics and a lead role in assessing the safety and reliability of the nuclear
stockpile. Based on a DOE Administrative Inquiry, and subsequent FBI full
foreign counterintelligence investigation, in December 1999, Lee was indicted
on 59 counts of violating the Atomic Energy Act and committing espionage
(42 U.S. Code §2276 and 18 U.S. Code, §§793(c) and 793 (e), respectively).
Based on FBI testimony to a federal judge that Lee posed a flight risk, he was
arrested and placed in solitary confinement for 9 months. The case became
contentious and public, as it was alleged by Lee’s defense attorneys that racial
profiling played a role in his indictment. Moreover, investigative agencies
never located tapes onto which the indictment alleged that Lee downloaded
classified information and removed it from Los Alamos National Laboratory.
In the end, he pled guilty to one count of unlawfully collecting and keeping
classified information relating to the national defense and was sentenced to
time served during his pretrial detention. The remaining 58 of 59 counts were
dropped.
79These issues are: Terrorism, Espionage, Proliferation, Economic Espionage, Targeting the
National Information Infrastructure, Targeting the U.S. Government, Perception
Management, and Foreign Intelligence Activities. See
[http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/ansir.htm].
80See U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (the “Cox” report),
which can be accessed through http://hillsource.house.gov/CoxReport/cont/gncont.html.
For a critical review of the handling of this case see The Attorney General’s Review Team
on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation (“Bellows” report),
May 2000. Much of this report is classified, but a redacted version can be viewed at
[http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/bellows.htm].

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! Robert Hanssen. As mentioned above, former FBI Agent Robert Hanssen
was convicted of committing espionage on behalf of the former Soviet Union
and then Russia in the late 1980s, and then again in the late 1990s. Like
Aldrich Ames, Hanssen’s insider access through his FBI position allowed him
to be a valuable Russian agent. Tipped off that the FBI had a “mole” in its
ranks by a U.S. Intelligence Community-controlled double agent, Hanssen’s
espionage career was halted in February 2001. He is now serving a life
sentence without parole, the result of a plea bargain with the U.S. Department
of Justice.
In early 2003, the FBI’s Counterintelligence program developed a Strategic Plan
outlining the FBI’s perception of top foreign intelligence threats, and therefore, its
top counterintelligence priorities. According to Director Mueller, these threats and
resultant counterintelligence priorities include: (1) the potential for an agent of a
hostile group to enhance its capability to produce or use a weapon of mass
destruction; (2) the potential for a foreign agent to penetrate the U.S. Intelligence
Community (for espionage purposes); (3) targeting of government supported research
and development; and (4) compromise of U.S. Critical National Assets.81 Other
important recent changes in the Counterintelligence program include the
establishment of a Counterespionage Section to manage classic (national defense
information) and economic espionage cases, and a centralization of the program, with
FBI Headquarters taking a more direct role in setting priorities and allowing FBI field
offices some degree of autonomy in how they implement these national priorities.
FBI Criminal Enterprises, White Collar, Cyber and Other Federal
Crimes.
The FBI’s major criminal responsibilities include investigating organized
criminal enterprises, white collar crime, public corruption, civil rights violations, and
a host of other crimes that often fall within the jurisdiction of state and local law
enforcement, but are either committed across state borders or are so complex in
nature that federal involvement is appropriate. Such crimes include kidnaping,
extortion, bank robberies, child exploitation and pornography, and international child
abduction. In FY2002, out of a $5.1 billion budget and 28,277 funded positions,82
the FBI obligated over half of its funding and positions to combat criminal
enterprises, and other federal crimes.83
81See Robert S. Mueller III, “FBI’s Fiscal Year 2004 Budget,” testimony before the House
Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Mar. 27, 2003. A Critical National Asset is
defined as those “... persons, information, assets, activity, research and development
technology, infrastructure, economic or security interests whose compromise would do
damage to the survival of the United States.”
82The number of “funded positions” an agency has does not always correlate directly to the
number of on board employees an agency has, as hiring and attrition are fluid and ongoing
processes.
83U.S. Department of Justice, 2004 Congressional Authorization and Budget Submission,
Volume II, Federal Bureau of Investigation, (Washington, Feb. 2003), pp. 1-7 and pp. 1-9.

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Organized Criminal Enterprises. The FBI defines “organized criminal
enterprises” as continuing and self-perpetuating criminal conspiracies by groups that
are hierarchical in structure, and employ the use and threat of violence to maintain
their power base. Through investigation and prosecution, the FBI’s Organized Crime
program seeks to disrupt the largest criminal enterprises. In FY2002, the FBI worked
nearly 4,087 organized crime cases, of which 956 ended in a conviction or a pre-trial
diversion.84
It is noteworthy that as part of every major crime law Congress passed, the FBI
received enhanced capacity to combat organized crime. Specifically, two laws
passed by Congress gave the Department of Justice and the FBI the tools to more
effectively combat organized crime. In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-351). Title III of this Act defined for
the first time parameters within which federal law enforcement could engage in
electronic surveillance during criminal investigations.85 In 1970, Congress passed
the Racketeering-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act (P.L. 91-452),
giving federal law enforcement new statutory laws by which they could prosecute
professional criminals, who are linked to a pattern of criminal activity.86 Crimes
covered by RICO include, but are not limited to, sports bribery, counterfeiting,
embezzlement of union funds, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, obstruction
of justice, murder for hire, drug trafficking, prostitution, sexual exploitation of
children, alien smuggling, trafficking in counterfeit goods, theft from interstate
shipments, and interstate transportation of stolen property. State crimes covered by
RICO include murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, and
drug trafficking.
Factors that perpetuate organized crime include social and economic instability
in the newly emerging post-Soviet nation states; increased cross-border commerce;
the development of the Internet; widespread use of electronic banking; increased ease
and frequency of international travel; the continuing profitability of international drug
trafficking; and the possible proliferation of nuclear, chemical. and biological
weapons of mass destruction. According to the FBI, the principal organized crime
groups–that are not primarily involved in drug trafficking – include: (1) La Cosa
Nostra and other Italian organized crime groups; (2) Russian and Eastern European
crime groups; and (3) East Asian crime groups. While these groups are identified
with ethnic groups, their associates are often of other backgrounds. Some observers
note that increasingly these groups are specializing in order to carve out market
niches. For example, the Russian mob is known to produce high quality forged
842004 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 2-11. Pre-trial diversions usually include cases where
the U.S. Attorney decides to postpone prosecution depending upon the offender agreeing
to testify, or agreeing to accept certain probation-like conditions, or both.
85For further information, see CRS Report 98-327, Privacy: An Abbreviated Outline of
Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, by Gina Stevens
and Charles Doyle.
86For further information, see CRS Report RS20376, RICO: An Abridged Sketch, by Charles
Doyle.

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documents. They are also cooperating with one another to a greater degree than in
the past.87 A brief summary of these groups and others follow.
La Cosa Nostra (LCN) emerged as a national criminal threat in the 1950s and
1960s. These groups are involved in a wide variety of on-going criminal enterprises
that include illegal gambling, prostitution, drug trafficking, theft, fraud, extortion,
public corruption, and the infiltration of labor unions.
Russian and Eastern European criminal enterprises emerged following the
break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. These groups are sophisticated and specialize
in international money laundering, bank fraud, and forgery. They conduct the bulk
of their activities in the former Soviet Union, but they are also highly mobile and
have been active in the United States.88
East Asian criminal enterprises include the Chinese Triads and Japanese
Yakuza. They also includes smaller, but often more violent, gangs from Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Their criminal activities include narcotics trafficking,
financial crimes, prostitution, public corruption, and alien smuggling.
Drug trafficking organizations. There are several major Mexican, Colombian,
Jamaican, and Dominican drug trafficking organizations. According to GAO, since
September 11, 2001, about 40% of FBI Special Agent positions dedicated to drug
enforcement have been shifted to either the national security or counterterrorism
programs. At the end of FY2002, the FBI had 1,379 agents positions allocated to
drug cases, by the second quarter of FY2003, it only had 823 agents working these
matters.89 The number of newly opened drug cases is expected to drop sharply in
FY2003 to just over 300, as compared to 944 cases in FY2002, 1,413 in FY2001, and
1,825 in FY2000.90 In FY2002, the FBI worked 10,132 open drug cases, of which
nearly 3,906 ended in convictions or pre-trial diversions.91
Other Violent Gangs. In recent decades, law enforcement agencies have noted
a rise in violent street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs. Los
Angeles is the center of gang phenomenon, but there has been significant migration
of street gangs from larger to smaller urban areas. Such street gangs would include
the Bloods, the Crips, Folk Nation, the People Nation, the18th Street Gang, and the
Mara Salvatrucha. Many of these street gangs are run by prison gangs, as older gang
members are incarcerated but continue to run gang operations from prison. Outlaw
87Jeffrey Robinson, The Merger: How Organized Crime is Taking Over Canada and the
World, 1999.
88For a description of gasoline bootlegging scams carried out by Russian organized crime
groups, see Robert I. Friedman, Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob Has Invaded America,
(New York: Mar. 2000), 266 p.
89U.S. General Accounting Office, FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to
Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, GAO-03-759T, (Washington, June 18, 2003),
p. 16.
90Ibid., pp. 18.
912004 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 2-11.

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motorcycle gangs continue to pose a threat as well. They include, among others, the
Hells Angels, the Bandidos, the Pagans, and the Warlocks. Since motorcycle gangs
often engage in interstate narcotics trafficking – particularly methamphetamine – and
prostitution, they have been the target of major FBI investigations. In FY2002, the
FBI worked 1,832 gang-related cases, of which 956 ended in convictions or pre-trial
diversions.92
White Collar Crime and Public Corruption. White collar crime refers to
non-violent fraudulent enterprises committed by persons while engaged in legitimate
occupations. Such crimes range from small-time embezzlements to corporate
malfeasance, and are committed in every major sector of the economy. They include
health care fraud, public corruption, financial institution fraud, insurance fraud,
securities and commodities fraud, telemarketing fraud, bankruptcy fraud,
environmental crimes, money laundering, and intellectual property rights. There is
a widespread public perception, moreover, that high-level white collar and public
corruption crimes go unpunished.93 Three areas of “white collar” crime present the
greatest challenge to the FBI. They include health care fraud, public corruption, and
corporate and securities fraud. In FY2002, the FBI worked 42,738 white collar crime
cases, of which 6,918 resulted in convictions or pre-trial diversions.94
Health Care Fraud. In Calendar Year (CY) 2000, fraud in the burgeoning $1.3
trillion health care sector had become so lucrative that law enforcement agencies95
documented the migration of some crime groups from drug trafficking and other
criminal enterprises to health care fraud. Health care fraud involves making false
claims to health care insurers, including Medicare and Medicaid. The Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) estimate that health care expenditures will
exceed $2 trillion by CY2006.96 A recent audit of the Medicare fee-for-services
program reported that out of $192 billion in claims paid in CY2001, over $12 billion
in claims, or 6% were paid in error, without proper documentation, or were
fraudulent.97 The National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association estimates that at least
3% of health care outlays, or $39 billion was lost to outright fraud in CY2000.98
92Ibid., pp. 2-11.
93David Burnham, “The FBI: A Special Report,” The Nation, (Aug. 11-18, 1997), p. 12.
942004 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 2-10, 2-11.
95The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, including its Office of Inspector
General, participates in combating healthcare fraud.
96Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
National Health Care Expenditures Projections Tables, Table 1, click on
[http://cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/projections-2001/t1.asp].
97Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, Improper Fiscal
Year 2001 Medicare Fee-For-Service Payments, Report A-17-01-02002, (Washington,
February 21, 2002), click on [http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/cms/a0102002.pdf], cited
in National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, Health Care Fraud: A Serious and Costly
Reality for All Americans, p. 2, click on [http://www.nhcaa.org/pdf/all_about_hcf.pdf].
98National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, Health Care Fraud, p. 2, click on
(continued...)

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Other estimates place the losses in the 10% range, or $130 billion per year.99 Health
care fraud includes the following scams:
! billing for services never provided;
! billing for higher reimbursed services than actually performed (upcoding);
! performing unnecessary services simply to generate billings;
! misrepresenting treatments as medically necessary to obtain coverage; and
! referring patients to ancillary providers in return for a kickback.
Congress included provisions to combat fraud in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-191; HIPAA). Beside making health care
fraud a federal crime, the Act established a dedicated funding stream, which is used
to fund FBI efforts to detect and investigate fraud in the Medicare and Medicaid
programs. Prior to the Act, funding for health care fraud investigations were directly
appropriated. For 2003, the FBI anticipated that it would receive $114 million from
HIPAA, supporting 878 positions (507 agents).100
Public Corruption. The FBI is responsible for investigating public corruption
cases that involve federal, state and local public servants entrusted with the safety
and protection of the citizenry and public property. In addition to independent
inspectors general at federal agencies, the FBI is perhaps the only agency that is
positioned to investigate pervasive corruption and restore the public’s faith in public
institutions. Its role, however, in policing such corruption has been controversial.
When such investigations are ill conceived, poorly managed, or perceived as
politically motivated, they actually undermine the public’s faith in the federal
government’s ability to effectively police the Nation. Perhaps the most well known
public corruption investigation was ABSCAM, an undercover operation in which the
FBI used middlemen to lure public figures into taking bribes. While controversial,
ABSCAM led to the successful prosecution of one Senator and six Members of the
House of Representatives, among others. More recently, an FBI investigation
resulted in the conviction of Congressman James A. Traficant on multiple counts,
including bribery, tax evasion, and racketeering. In FY2002, the FBI worked 2,344
public corruption cases, of which 631 resulted in convictions or pre-trial
diversions.101
Corporate Fraud and Securities. In July 2002, the FBI established a corporate
fraud task force and, since that date, 45 of 56 FBI field offices have participated in
some part of task force operations. As of February 2003, the FBI had opened more
than 50 corporate fraud investigations. Among others, the FBI is currently
investigating Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International, Rite Aid, Qwest
Communications, Peregrine Systems, K-Mart, ImClone Systems, Global Crossing,
98(...continued)
[http://www.nhcaa.org/pdf/all_about_hcf.pdf].
99Ibid., p. 2.
1002003 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 3-4.
1012004 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 2-10.

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Dynegy, Duke Power, and CMS Energy Corporation.102 Of these investigations, 13
involve estimated losses to investors that exceed $100 million.103 In the wake of
these corporate scandals, Congress increased penalties for certain types of securities-
related fraud in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (P.L. 107-204).104 To address corporate
crime, the FBI has formulated a four-part plan. First, the FBI is working to increase
liaisons with other agencies that work corporate and security fraud. Such agencies
would include the Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S. Postal Service,
State Attorney General offices, and other state agencies. Second, the Bureau is
increasing training for Agents and Analysts in the areas of corporate fraud, securities
fraud, and money laundering. Third, the Bureau is establishing a corporate fraud
“reserve team,”consisting of 304 agents and over 300 financial analysts with
investigative expertise in the area of corporate and securities fraud. This team will
be available to be deployed as needed in the case of large and complex investigations
on the scale of Enron or WorldCom. Fourth, the FBI intends to hire additional agents
and analysts who can be dedicated to the corporate fraud reserve team.105
Cybercrime. Cyberspace has been described as the “nervous system” of our
Nation’s critical infrastructures. Cyberspace essentially consists of hundreds of
thousands of computers, networks, and routers that are linked together in a massive
telecommunications grid known as the Internet. Enemies of the United States can
conduct espionage and prepare for cyber strikes against the United States through the
Internet.106 Criminals, moreover, have exploited computers and the Internet to
engage in identity theft and other types of fraud. Consequently, cyber security has
become a national priority and the Executive Branch has formulated a National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.107 To reduce threats and vulnerabilities, the National
Strategy calls for enhancing law enforcement’s capabilities to prevent and prosecute
cyberspace attacks. The FBI has a prominent role to play in this area.
Following September 11th, the reorganization of the FBI included the creation
of Cyber Division, as the Bureau prioritized cybercrime. Within the Cyber Division,
the FBI established a Computer Investigation Threat Assessment Center (CITAC) to
conduct and coordinate all investigations involving foreign terrorists or powers that
threaten or attack the integrity of our Nation’s information systems. While the newly
created Department of Homeland Security is responsible for protecting the Nation’s
102For further information, see CRS Report RS21269, Accounting Problems Reported in
Major Companies Since Enron, by Mark Jickling.
103U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Corporate Fraud Hotline
Press Release, (Washington, Feb. 5, 2003) 1 p.
[http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel03/mueller022503.htm].
104For further information, see CRS Report RL31554, Corporate Accountability: Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-204), by Michael V. Seitzinger and Elizabeth B. Bazan.
105FBI Budget Submission, pp. 5-12.
106For information on one international dimension of this issue, see Ariana Eunjung Cha,
“Internet Dreams Turn to Crime: Russian Start-Up Firm Targeted U.S. Companies,” a three-
part series of articles in the Washington Post, beginning May 18, 2003.
107The White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, (Washington, Feb. 2003),
60 p. Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf].

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cyber infrastructure,108 the FBI’s Cyber Division is responsible for investigating
federal crimes that have a cyber nexus.109 Cyber-related investigations could include:
! violations of intellectual property rights, including theft of trade and signal
secrets;
! software copyright infringements;
! Internet and online credit/debit card fraud;
! Internet and online identity theft and fraud; and
! online child pornography.
Since investigations handled by the Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and
Criminal Investigations Divisions could also involve cyber-related elements, the
Cyber Division supports these divisions with technical assistance. Besides
conducting cybercrime investigations, the Cyber Division is working to maintain the
necessary public/private alliances, provide education and training, and stay abreast
of the emerging technologies.
In partnership with the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C), the FBI
also established the Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) in 1999. The IFCC is
a collection point of valuable cybercrime intelligence. Complaints include computer
intrusions, identity theft, intellectual property rights violations, economic espionage,
credit card fraud, child pornography, and online extortion. In CY2002, the FBI
received more than 75,000 fraud complaints. Of these complaints, more that 48,000
were referred to other law enforcement agencies for follow up – triple the referral rate
in CY2001. A recent IFCC report estimated that cyber-related fraud from referred
cases amounted to $54 million in losses in CY2001, as compared to $17 million in
CY2000. The most frequently reported complaints involved Internet auction fraud
(46%), non-delivery of merchandise and non-payment (31%), and credit/debit card
fraud (12%). In FY2003, the FBI and the Office of Management and Budget is
conducting a performance and analysis review test on the cybercrime program.
Performance measures for this program will be incorporated into the FY2005 budget
submission.
Other Significant Crime. Other crime areas of significant concern for the
FBI include civil rights/hate crimes; crimes against children, including abduction
cases, sexual exploitation, and child pornography; and Indian country law
enforcement.
Civil Rights/Hate Crimes. The FBI is also responsible for investigating certain
civil rights violations, which for operational purposes are divided into four
108The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) transferred the National Infrastructure
Protection Center (NIPC), to the Department of Homeland Security. NIPC was formed to
detect, deter, assess, and warn computer users as to cyber threats and to investigate and
prosecute unlawful computer intrusions. According to the DOJ FY2004 Budget Summary,
NIPC’s transfer to DHS’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
included about $51 million and 307 positions.
109For further information, see CRS Report RS20830, Cybercrime: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C.
1030 and Related Federal Criminal Laws, by Charles Doyle.

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categories: hate crimes, color of law/police misconduct, freedom of access to clinic
entrances, and involuntary servitude/slavery.110 The Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act (P.L. 103-322) defines a “hate crime” as:
a crime in which the defendant intentionally selects a victim, or in the case
of property crime, the property that is the object of the crime, because of
the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person (§280003).
In FY2002, the FBI worked 3,485 civil rights or hate crime cases, of which 186
resulted in convictions or pre-trial diversions.111
Crimes Against Children. The FBI launched the Innocent Images National
Initiative (IINI) to lead multi-agency undercover operations to identify child
pornographers and others that use the Internet to lure children into sexually abusive
situations. Under Director Louis Freeh, as has been continued under Director Robert
Mueller, it became a matter of policy for the FBI to lend immediate assistance to state
and local authorities in cases of child abduction – particularly those 12 years old or
younger, since it is extremely critical to resolve such cases within the first 24 hours.
In FY1996, the FBI pursued about 113 child pornography cases. In FY2002, the
Bureau worked 2,704 Innocent Images cases and 1,775 other child exploitation cases.
Of these cases, 660 Innocent Images and 194 other child exploitation cases ended in
convictions or pre-trial diversions.112
FBI Security Program.
As the Nation’s lead counterintelligence
organization, the FBI is an obvious target for foreign intelligence agencies and others
seeking to compromise U.S. national security. Efforts to assess the FBI security
program were initiated in the Fall of 1999. These efforts were intensified following
the arrest of Robert Hanssen in February 2001 and the September 11th attacks. By
April 2001, a FBI task force concluded that a single executive should be responsible
for the FBI Security program. At that time, the security function was diffused and
scattered in several Bureau divisions, and no single Bureau executive was responsible
for security. In March 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft established a
Commission for the Review of FBI Security Programs. Former FBI and CIA
Director, Judge William Webster headed the Commission.
In March 2002, Judge Webster’s Commission issued its findings. Among other
findings, the Commission found that Robert Hanssen had exploited his access to the
FBI’s Automated Case Support (ACS) system to breach most security fire walls and
compiled highly sensitive information regarding FBI counterintelligence operations.
He later sold this information to the Soviets and, then, the Russians. In addition,
Judge Webster testified that in the days immediately following September 11 the FBI
110A “color of law” investigation involves instances when persons operating under the “color
of law,” e.g., police officers, willfully deprive, or cause to be deprived, any person of their
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or other U.S. laws.
1112004 FBI Budget Submission, pp. 2-11.
112Ibid., pp. 2-11.

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had dropped all ACS fire walls in the interest of sharing all relevant leads. In so
doing, any FBI employee with access to the ACS could have accessed all the FBI
foreign intelligence case files – an alarming vulnerability.
The Webster Commission’s Review of FBI Security Programs included
recommendations regarding systems, personnel, and document security.113 In
addition, the Commission recommended that the FBI security programs should be
integrated into a single office that reports to the Director. Two measures, S. 1440
and its pending companion bill, H.R. 2867, the “FBI Reform Act of 2003" would
adopt some of the changes recommended in the Webster Commission, including the
establishment of a counterintelligence screening polygraph program.114 In response
to the Webster Commission recommendations, the FBI has enhanced computer audit
procedures, expanded the use of polygraphs, and increased the frequency of employee
reinvestigations for sensitive positions. As part of the recent FBI reorganization, a
stand-alone Security Division has been established under the Executive Assistant
Director for Administration. This Division is currently headed by a CIA intelligence
executive. Observers note, however, that no security program can guarantee against
a “trusted insider” who, for whatever motivation, might compromise the FBI or the
Nation’s security. Notwithstanding these limitations, the Assistant Director for
Security recently testified that the FBI is committed to changing its security culture
to more quickly detect those who may compromise sensitive information.115
Pertinent Relationships
Notwithstanding the 10-year appointment of the FBI Director, the FBI does not
operate in a vacuum. In order to most effectively and efficiently implement its
mission, the FBI must have sound relationships with a broad range of national and
international agencies and organizations. The first of these is its parent organization,
the U.S. Department of Justice. As one element of the Department of Justice, at the
policy level the FBI’s requested budget is set by the Department and approved by the
Office of Management and Budget. The Director of the FBI reports to the Attorney
General. While the Attorney General is a member of the president’s cabinet, the FBI
Director is not. Therefore, policymaking on matters concerning the FBI’s mission
areas is developed by the Attorney General with substantial input from the Director.
At the operational level, FBI Agents work closely with U.S. Attorneys to provide
evidence and facts in support of potential prosecutions.
Investigative Relationships. From a counterterrorism perspective, the FBI
also works closely with a broad range of national and international organizations,
including important relationships with other elements of the U.S. Intelligence
113U.S. Department of Justice, A Review of FBI Security Programs, (Washington: Mar.
2002), p. 25. [http://www.usdoj.gov/05publications/websterreport.pdf].
114Other matters included in this proposed legislation include protection for FBI whistle
blowers, establishment of career paths for FBI security professionals, and allowing the
disciplinary suspension of FBI Senior Executive Service Members for 14 days or less.
115U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Testimony by Kenneth H.
Senser before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Review of the FBI Security Program and
Its Transformation, (Washington: July 18, 2001).

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Community. The FBI has substantial interaction with the CIA, NSA, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Since the mid-1990s, the FBI and CIA have
exchanged senior level management, as well as Agents and Analysts in both the
Counterterrorist and Counterintelligence Centers housed at the CIA.
Certain entities within the FBI, including the National Infrastructure Protection
Center (NIPC), were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
FBI Agents work closely with DHS immigration and customs professionals on
matters pertaining to national security. From a counterterrorism analytical
perspective, the FBI works closely with DHS, among other agencies, through
participation in the aforementioned Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
Conceptually, the FBI conducts all-source counterterrorism analysis, while the DHS-
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate’s analysis is designed
to contribute to these threat assessments while building upon them to conduct
(internal infrastructure) vulnerability assessments.
State and local law enforcement are another important FBI relationship in the
War Against Terrorism and in complex criminal cases in which the FBI has
jurisdiction. While the FBI has a reputation for being reluctant to share information,
it is now working to integrate state and local law enforcement personnel into its 84
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).116 Moreover, it has established a separate
office, the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, to ensure a two-way flow of
germane information to state and local law enforcement officials. Counterterrorism
threat and vulnerability assessment data are shared by FBI and DHS personnel with
state and local law enforcement and private sector entities as appropriate. Finally,
as mentioned above, the FBI has many close international law enforcement and
security service relationships developed through its Legal Attache program.
Congressional Oversight Relationships. From a congressional
perspective, the FBI and its activities are subject to extensive oversight from a variety
of committees and subcommittees. In the last 5 years, the FBI has provided official
testimony to congressional committee hearings open to the public on over 100
occasions. Unofficial briefings to Members of Congress and their staff, as well as
responses to congressional inquiries made directly to the FBI Director far surpass the
numbers of official statements at congressional hearings. These oversight
committees include, but are not limited to, House and Senate Judiciary Committees,
116Joint Terrorism Task Forces are mechanisms used by the FBI to integrate federal, state
and local law enforcement efforts in the prevention of terrorism. According to the FBI,
these task forces “...are important ‘force multipliers’ in the war on terror, pooling multi-
agency expertise....” They are also the primary conduit through which intelligence sharing
is coordinated. State and local law enforcement officials are required to have a top secret
security clearance to be a member of the JTTFs. See testimony of Larry A. Mefford, FBI
Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security, September
23, 2003. For a state and local perspective on the effectiveness of JTTFs, see Protecting
Your Community From Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement - Volume 1 -
Local-Federal Partnerships, Police Executive Research Forum, supported by a Cooperative
Agreement with the U.S. Justice Department’s Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services, at [http://policeforum.mn-8.net/default.asp?link=].

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Appropriations, Armed Services, Select Committees on Intelligence, as well as
House Governmental Reform, Senate Governmental Affairs, House Select
Committee on Homeland Security, House International Relations Committee, and the
Senate Foreign Relations Committees. Given the FBI’s law enforcement and
national security mission, in general, the committees with the greatest amount of
interaction with the FBI tend to be the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees.
The FBI in Transition
As domestic and international criminal and national security trends have
changed and the FBI’s jurisdiction expanded over time, the organization has been
through multiple periods of transition. One could argue, however, that the current
period of transition is at least as portentous as those which the FBI has experienced
before. Some have argued that the FBI’s reactive law enforcement culture, with its
alleged predilection for information collection, but not sharing, may be so resistant
to change that the organization may ultimately prove itself incapable of adapting to
a preventative counterterrorism and intelligence mission.117 Others have argued that
the FBI’s case orientation and culture is not in need of changing; indeed, the culture
and ability to build complex cases that withstand legal and constitutional scrutiny is
an unassailable asset in the War Against Terrorism.118 While the changes that the
FBI has made thus far have generally been received positively by groups which have
reviewed them,119 the extent to which the organization can reform itself to effectively
and efficiently advance the preventative counterterrorism mission is an open
question.120 In addition to the question of whether the FBI can succeed in making the
117See, Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction (the “Gilmore” Commission), and Protecting America’s
Freedom in the Information Age (a report of the Markle Foundation Task Force). See also
William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for More Secure America, Yale University Press
2003, and Senator John Edwards, “Iraq, Terrorism and U.S. Global Leadership,” speech
before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Oct. 7, 2002.
118See testimony of Nancy L. Savage, President, Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents
Association, before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003.
119See Dick Thornburgh, Chairman National Academy of Public Administration Panel of
FBI Reorganization, testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003.
120In a recent article in The Economist, six senior experts in intelligence and law
enforcement, including a recent former Deputy Director of the FBI who also previously
served as Assistant Director for both the FBI’s Criminal Investigative and National Security
Divisions stated that while FBI’s preliminary (reorganization) steps are “...welcome, they
are nonetheless very modest.” The article continues “The FBI should be regarded as having
been granted a last chance to succeed before the (counterterrorism and counterintelligence)
mission should be permanently removed and its jurisdiction given to a new domestic
security service.” The authors state that the adoption of the British model of conducting
domestic intelligence, as implemented by the British Security Service (MI-5), is not
appropriate – “... not for now at least.” See Robert Bryant, et al., “America Needs More
Spies,” in The Economist, July 10, 2003. See CRS Report RL 31920, Domestic Intelligence
in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, May 19, 2003,
(continued...)

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transformation from reactive to proactive bias in the national security realm, there is
the issue of the extent to which the FBI should balance its national security
responsibilities with its traditional criminal pursuit mission. As mentioned above,
there is some concern that the movement of investigative resources from the FBI’s
traditional criminal mission to the counterterrorism and counterintelligence mission
may undermine the agency’s ability to aggressively counter crime.121
Issues for Congress
! Is the FBI the appropriate agency to fight terrorism against U.S. interests?
Can an organization with a strong and proud law enforcement culture be
retrained to engage in the more subtle discipline of gathering and exploiting
foreign intelligence domestically, where the end goal may not necessarily be
prosecution, but preemption as well as continued collection and exploitation?
Can the relatively autonomous relationships between FBI Headquarters and
the 56 field offices be successfully rebalanced so centralized priorities
established at HQ, are vigorously and successfully implemented locally? The
ongoing reformation of the FBI presents multiple opportunities for oversight.
! Are there some federal crimes for which the FBI has jurisdiction that should
be devolved to state and local law enforcement? If so, should additional
resources be provided to the federal, state and local law enforcement agencies
to support training? If not, does the FBI need additional criminal resources
given that it may be unlikely that the reprogramming of resources from the
criminal to the national security divisions of the FBI in the wake of September
11 will be reversed?
! Given the expansive mosaic of FBI jurisdiction in criminal and national
security realms, would a legislative charter clarify and more centrally codify
the organization’s roles/responsibilities and jurisdiction?
! If the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, which has operational responsibilities
within the United States, is eventually to be “co-located” with the existing
TTIC, what implications, if any, does this have for the potential of U.S.
foreign intelligence organizations becoming involved in domestic intelligence
activities precluded pursuant to Executive Order 12333?122
120(...continued)
by Todd Masse. See also Gregory F. Treverton, “Time to Spy in America,” Government
Executive, Sept. 2003.
121See Gary Fields and John R. Wilke, “FBI’s New Focus Places Burden on Local Police,”
Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2003, p. A1.
122Executive Order 12333 and other guidelines and statutes prevent federal agencies
authorized to conduct foreign intelligence overseas from operating in the United States.
However, the FBI, a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, is primarily charged with
domestic intelligence operations. If an entire operational division of the FBI is “co-
located”with what is largely a foreign threat intelligence entity (the TTIC), it is not
inconceivable that cooperation in foreign and domestic intelligence activities may exceed
(continued...)

CRS-41
Appendix I: FBI Field Offices (By City Location)
A
FBI Birmingham
http://chicago.fbi.gov
FBI Albany
Room 1400
(312) 431-1333
200 McCarty Avenue
2121 8th. Avenue N.
Albany, New York 12209
Birmingham, Alabama
FBI Cincinnati
http://albany.fbi.gov
35203-2396
Room 9000
(518) 465-7551
http://birmingham.fbi.gov
550 Main Street
(205) 326-6166
C i n c i n n a t i , O h i o
FBI Albuquerque
45202-8501
Suite 300
FBI Boston
http://cincinnati.fbi.gov
4 1 5 S i l v e r A v e n u e ,
Suite 600
(513) 421-4310
Southwest
One Center Plaza
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Boston, Massachusetts
FBI Cleveland
87102
02108
Federal Office Building
http://albuquerque.fbi.gov
http://boston.fbi.gov
1501 Lakeside Avenue
(505) 224-2000
(617) 742-5533
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
http://cleveland.fbi.gov
FBI Anchorage
FBI Buffalo
(216) 522-1400
101 East Sixth Avenue
One FBI Plaza
A n c h o r a g e , A l a s k a
B u f f a l o , N e w Y o r k
FBI Columbia
99501-2524
14202-2698
151 Westpark Blvd
http://anchorage.fbi.gov
http://buffalo.fbi.gov
Columbia, South Carolina
(907) 258-5322
(716) 856-7800
29210-3857
http://columbia.fbi.gov
FBI Atlanta
C
(803) 551-4200
Suite 400
FBI Charlotte

2635 Century Parkway,
Suite 900, Wachovia
D
Northeast
Building
FBI Dallas
A t l a n t a , G e o r g i a
400 South Tyron Street
One Justice Way
30345-3112
Charlotte, North Carolina
Dallas, Texas 75220
http://atlanta.fbi.gov
28285-0001
http://dallas.fbi.gov
(404) 679-9000
http://charlotte.fbi.gov
(972) 559-5000
(704) 377-9200
B
FBI Denver
FBI Baltimore
FBI Chicago
Federal Office Building,
7142 Ambassador Road
Room 905
Room 1823
B a l t i m o r e , M a r y l a n d
E.M. Dirksen Federal Office
1961 Stout St. 18th. Floor
21244-2754
Building
Denver, Colorado
http://baltimore.fbi.gov
219 South Dearborn Street
80294-1823
(410) 265-8080
C h i c a g o , I l l i n o i s
http://denver.fbi.gov
60604-1702
(303) 629-7171
122(...continued)
analysis and bleed into joint intelligence operations within the United States. While these
types of joint operations may well be warranted given the nature of the terrorist threat facing
the Nation, an explicit and statutory authorization of such joint operations would increase
transparency and jurisdictional clarity, as well as guard against potential abuses or excesses
domestically.

CRS-42
FBI Detroit
FBI Jacksonville
Los Angeles, California
2 6 t h . F l o o r , P . V .
Suite 200
90024-3672
McNamara FOB
7820 Arlington Expressway
http://losangeles.fbi.gov
477 Michigan Avenue
J a c k s o n v i l l e , F l o r i d a
(310) 477-6565
Detroit, Michigan 48226
32211-7499
http://detroit.fbi.gov
http://jacksonville.fbi.gov
FBI Louisville
(313) 965-2323
(904) 721-1211
Room 500
600 Martin Luther King Jr.
E
K
Place
FBI El Paso
FBI Kansas City
Lo u i s v i l l e, K en t u ck y
660 S. Mesa Hills Drive
1300 Summit
40202-2231
El Paso, Texas 79912-5533
Kansas City, Missouri
http://louisville.fbi.gov
http://elpaso.fbi.gov
64105-1362
(502) 583-3941
(915) 832-5000
http://kansascity.fbi.gov

(816) 512-8200
M
H
FBI Memphis
FBI Honolulu
FBI Knoxville
Suite 3000, Eagle Crest
Room 4-230, Kalanianaole
Suite 600, John J. Duncan
Bldg.
FOB
FOB
225 North Humphreys
300 Ala Moana Boulevard
710 Locust Street
Blvd.
H o n o l u l u , H a w a i i
K n o x v i l l e, T en n es s ee
M e m ph i s , T e n n e s s e e
96850-0053
37902-2537
38120-2107
http://honolulu.fbi.gov
http://knoxville.fbi.gov
http://memphis.fbi.gov
(808) 566-4300
(865) 544-0751
(901) 747-4300
FBI Houston
L
FBI North Miami Beach
2500 East TC Jester
FBI Las Vegas
16320 Northwest Second
Houston, Texas 77008-1300
John Lawrence Bailey
Avenue
http://houston.fbi.gov
Building
North Miami Beach,
(713) 693-5000
700 East Charleston
Florida 33169-6508

Boulevard
http://miami.fbi.gov
I
L a s V e g a s , N e v a d a
(305) 944-9101
FBI Indianapolis
89104-1545
Room 679, FOB
http://lasvegas.fbi.gov
FBI Milwaukee
575 North Pennsylvania
(702) 385-1281
Suite 600
Street
330 East Kilbourn Avenue
In d i a n a p o l i s , In d i a n a
FBI Little Rock
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
46204-1585
Suite 200
53202-6627
http://indianapolis.fbi.gov
Two Financial Centre
http://milwaukee.fbi.gov
(317) 639-3301
10825 Financial Centre
(414) 276-4684
Parkway
J
Little Rock, Arkansas
FBI Minneapolis
FBI Jackson
72211-3552
Suite 1100
Room 1553, FOB
http://littlerock.fbi.gov
111 Washington Avenue,
100 West Capitol Street
(501) 221-9100
South
J a c k s o n , M i s s i s s i p p i
Minneapolis, Minnesota
39269-1601
FBI Los Angeles
55401-2176
http://jackson.fbi.gov
Suite 1700, FOB
http://minneapolis.fbi.gov
(601) 948-5000
11000 Wilshire Boulevard
(612) 376-3200

CRS-43
FBI Mobile
FBI Omaha
Sacramento, California
One St. Louis Centre
10755 Burt Street
95841-4205
1 St. Louis Street, 3rd. Floor
O m a h a , N e b r a s k a
http://sacramento.fbi.gov
M o b i l e , A l a b a m a
68114-2000
(916) 481-9110
36602-3930
http://omaha.fbi.gov
http://mobile.fbi.gov
(402) 493-8688
FBI St. Louis
(334) 438-3674
2222 Market Street
P
S t . Lo u i s , M i s s o u r i
N
FBI Philadelphia
63103-2516
FBI Newark
8th. Floor
http://stlouis.fbi.gov
1 Gateway Center, 22nd.
William J. Green Jr. FOB
(314) 231-4324
Floor
600 Arch Street
Newark, New J ersey
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
FBI Salt Lake City
07102-9889
19106
Suite 1200, 257 Towers
http://newark.fbi.gov
http://philadelphia.fbi.gov
Bldg.
(973) 792-3000
(215) 418-4000
257 East, 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
FBI New Haven
FBI Phoenix
84111-2048
600 State Street
Suite 400
http://saltlakecity.fbi.gov
New Haven, Connecticut
201 East Indianola Avenue
(801) 579-1400
06511-6505
P h o e n i x , A r i z o n a
(203) 777-6311
85012-2080
FBI San Antonio
http://phoenix.fbi.gov
Suite 200
FBI New Orleans
(602) 279-5511
U . S . P o s t O f f i c e
2901 Leon C. Simon Dr.
Courthouse Bldg.
New Orleans, Louisiana
FBI Pittsburgh
615 East Houston Street
70126
3311 East Carson St.
S an Antonio, Tex as
http://neworleans.fbi.gov
Pittsburgh, PA 15203
78205-9998
(504) 816-3000
http://pittsburgh.fbi.gov
http://sanantonio.fbi.gov

(412) 432-4000
(210) 225-6741
FBI New York
26 Federal Plaza, 23rd. Floor
FBI Portland
FBI San Diego
New York, New York
Suite 400, Crown Plaza
Federal Office Building
10278-0004
Building
9797 Aero Drive
http://newyork.fbi.gov
1500 Southwest 1st Avenue
San Diego, California
P o r t l a n d , O r e g o n
92123-1800
FBI Norfolk
97201-5828
http://sandiego.fbi.gov
150 Corporate Boulevard
http://portland.fbi.gov
(858) 565-1255
N o r f o l k , V i r g i n i a
(503) 224-4181
23502-4999

FBI San Francisco
http://norfolk.fbi.gov
R
450 Golden Gate Avenue,
(757) 455-0100
FBI Richmond
13th. Floor

1970 E. Parham Road
San Francisco, California
O
Richmond, Virginia 23228
94102-9523
FBI Oklahoma City
http://richmond.fbi.gov
http://sanfrancisco.fbi.gov
3301 West Memorial Drive
(804) 261-1044
(415) 553-7400
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
73134
S
http://oklahomacity.fbi.gov
FBI Sacramento
(405) 290-7770 FBI
4500 Orange Grove Avenue

CRS-44
FBI San Juan
Room 526, U.S. Federal
Bldg. 150 Carlos Chardon
Avenue Hato Rey
San Juan, Puerto Rico
00918-1716
http://sanjuan.fbi.gov
(787) 754-6000
FBI Seattle
1110 Third Avenue
S e a t t l e , W a s h i n g t o n
98101-2904
http://seattle.fbi.gov
(206) 622-0460
FBI Springfield
Suite 400
400 West Monroe Street
S p r i n g f i e l d , I l l i n o i s
62704-1800
http://springfield.fbi.gov
(217) 522-9675

T
FBI Tampa
Room 610, FOB
500 Zack Street
Tampa, Florida 33602-3917
http://tampa.fbi.gov
(813) 273-4566
W
FBI Washington
Washington Metropolitan
Field Office
601 4th Street, N.W.
W a s h i n g t o n , D . C .
20535-0002
http://washingtondc.fbi.gov
(202) 278-2000
Source: http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm

CRS-45
Appendix II: FBI Directors
1.
Robert S. Mueller, III, 2001-present
2.
Thomas J. Pickard (Acting), 2001
3.
Louis J. Freeh, 1993-2001
4.
Floyd I. Clarke (Acting), 1993
5.
William S. Sessions, 1987-1993
6.
John Otto (Acting), 1987
7.
William H. Webster, 1978-1987
8.
Clarence M. Kelley, 1973-1978
9.
William D. Ruckelshaus (Acting), 1973
10. L. Patrick Gray (Acting), 1972-1973
11. J. Edgar Hoover, 1924-1972
12. William J. Burns, 1921-1924
13. William J. Flynn, 1919-1921
14. William E. Allen (Acting), 1919
15. Alexander Bruce Bielaski, 1912-1919
16. Stanley Finch, 1908 - 1912
Source: www.FBI.gov/libref/directors/directmain.htm

CRS-46
Appendix III: FBI Legal Attache Offices
/