Bomb-Making Online: Explosives, Free Speech, Criminal Law and the Internet

Bomb-Making Online: Explosives, Free Speech, Criminal Law and the Internet

Order Code RL32074
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Bomb-Making Online:
Explosives, Free Speech,
Criminal Law and the Internet
September 8, 2003
-name-r edacted-
Senior Specialist
American Law Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Bomb-Making Online: Explosives, Free Speech,
Criminal Law and the Internet
Summary
Subsection 842(p) of title 18 of the United States Code outlaws teaching,
demonstrating, or distributing information on how to make or use explosives,
destructive devices, or weapons of mass destruction either when the offender intends
the instruction or information to be used to commit a federal crime of violence or
when the offender knows that person to whom the instruction or information has
been given intends to use it to a commit a federal crime of violence.
Passage stretched over three Congresses, delayed in part by First Amendment
concerns, but ultimately bolstered by submission of the Justice Department report.
The report concluded that terrorists’ “cookbooks” were readily available – on the
Internet and elsewhere; that the information had been and would continue to be used
for criminal purposes; that existing federal law provided incomplete coverage; and
that a legislative fix would be possible without offending First Amendment free
speech principles.
First Amendment concerns centered on the Supreme Court’s Brandenburg
decision which comes with a requirement that any proscription of the advocacy of
crime must be limited to cases where incitement is intended to be and is likely to be
acted upon imminently. Subsequent judicial developments have been thought to
suggest greater flexibility where the advocacy takes the form of instructing particular
individuals in the commission of a specific offense.
Complementary federal offenses include bans on instruction in the use of
explosives in furtherance of a civil disorder and on providing material assistance to
terrorists and terrorist organizations. Moreover, federal law outlaws aiding and
abetting, or conspiring to commit any federal crime, or soliciting another to commit
any federal crime of violence. Bomb-making instruction might be part and parcel of
aiding and abetting, conspiring to commit, or soliciting the commission of a number
of underlying federal crimes involving the misuse of explosives or weapons of mass
destruction.
This report is available in an abridged version – without footnotes or appendix
as CRS Report RS21616, Bombs On Line: An Abridged Sketch of Federal Criminal
Law.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview of Subsection 842(p) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Path to Passage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
First Amendment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Complementary Prohibitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Complementary Offenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Bomb-Making Online: Explosives, Free
Speech, Criminal Law and the Internet
Introduction1
Within hours of the tragedy in Oklahoma City, the recipe for concocting a
similar homemade bomb had been posted on the Internet.2 There followed an
outpouring of explosives “cookbooks” and other “how to” manuals of destruction.3
This in turn triggered apprehension over how such potentially lethal information
might be used by hate groups and other terrorists as well as by juveniles with
exaggerated firecracker fascinations.4
In response, Congress ultimately passed 18 U.S.C. 842(p)(2) which outlaws
instruction in making or use of bombs (A) with the intent that the information be
used to commit a federal crime of violence5 or (B) with the knowledge that another
1 This report was prepared with the assistance of Isaac Natter, a summer law clerk in the
American Law Division.
2
Romero, Terror in Oklahoma City: Explosives Recipes Fill Books, Cyberspace . . . LOS
ANGELES TIMES 26 (April 23, 1995); see also, The Availability of Bomb-Making
Information on the Internet: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology , and
Government Information of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1995)(statement of Sen. Specter)(the hearings were originally announced and convened as
Mayhem Manuals on the Internet, but never printed under that caption).
3
Carnahan, Stores Increase Stock of Books on Killing, Bombs . . ., ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, 4A (Feb. 12, 1996); Romero, Terror in Oklahoma City . . . There's No Secret to
Making a Murderous Bomb, Just Browse in a Bookstore, or Surf the Internet, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, 26 (April 23, 1995).
4
The Availability of Bomb-Making Information on the Internet: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology , and Government Information of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); Bosworth, Teen Bomb-Builder Lost Fingers
. . . He Got Plans From Internet, Police Say, ST.LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 16A (Dec. 11,
1996); Horiuchi, Bomb Building Made Easy on the Internet . . . Bomb Making: Teens Learn
on Net Step by Step, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, A1 (Aug. 11, 1996); Scheets, Derwood Teen-ager
Held on Bomb Charges, WASHINGTON TIMES, A10 (Feb. 15, 1997); Susman, Hate, Murder
and Mayhem on the Net, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 62 (May 22, 1995).
5 “It shall be unlawful for any person – (A) to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an
explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction, or to distribute by any
means information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture or use of an explosive,
destructive device, or weapon of mass destruction, with the intent that the teaching,
demonstration, or information be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes
a Federal crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. 842(p)(2)(A).

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intends to use the information to commit a federal crime.6 This is a brief examination
of the legislation, of the process that lead to its enactment, of First Amendment
issues, and of other related federal criminal laws that proscribe the dissemination,
particularly by means of the Internet, of destructive information.
Overview of Subsection 842(p)
The elements of the two crimes proscribed in 18 U.S.C. 842(p) (2) might be
parsed as follows:
I. It is unlawful for
A. any person to
B. (1) teach or
(2) demonstrate or
(3) distribute by any means information pertaining in whole
or in part to
C. (1) making or
(2) using
D. (1) an explosive or
(2) destructive device or
(3) weapon of mass destruction
E. with the intent that
(1) the teaching, demonstration or information be used
(a) for or
(b) in furtherance of
(2) an activity that constitutes a federal crime of
violence
II. It is unlawful for
A. any person to
B. (1) teach or
(2) demonstrate or
(3) distribute by any means information pertaining in whole
or in part
C. to any person
D. (1) making or
(2) using
E. (1) an explosive or
(2) destructive device or
(3) weapon of mass destruction
6
“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . (B) to teach or demonstrate to any person the
making or use of an explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction, or to
distribute to any person, by any means, information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the
manufacture or use of an explosive, destructive device, or weapon of mass destruction,
knowing that such person intends to use the teaching, demonstration, or information for, or
in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C.
842(p)(2)(B).
“Any person who . . . (2) violates subsection (p)(2) of section 842, shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both,” 18 U.S.C. 844(a).

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F. knowing such person intends
(1) to use the teaching, demonstration or information
(a) for or
(b) in furtherance of
(2) an activity that constitutes a federal crime of
violence.
The statute imposes potential criminal liability on “any person,” that is, on any
individual as well as any nongovernmental, legal entity.7 The prohibited teaching,
demonstrating or distributing of information may be accomplished by means other
than the Internet, but it seems clear that Internet distribution is covered. In other
contexts, “distribution” has been construed to include electronic distribution (e.g., e-
mail).8 Perhaps more to the point, use of the Internet as a means of distribution was
the focal point of Congressional discussion throughout its legislative history.9
Although the provision explicitly refers to only two types of instructions – how to
make or how to use explosives and the like, a court might conclude that the
prohibitions include instructions on where and how to obtain the necessary
ingredients or on methods of escape following the forbidden use. In any event, the
other elements having been satisfied, such instructions are likely to be prosecutable
either as conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 844(n), or as aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. 2,
doctrines discussed at greater length below.
The provisions borrow the somewhat overlapping definitions of “explosives,”
“destructive devices,” and “weapons of mass destruction” from existing law, 18
U.S.C. 842(p)(1).
In doing so, they adopt the expansions, contractions, and
duplications found there. The explosives definition, for instance, includes fire
7
1 U.S.C. 1 (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context
indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals”); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 61 (1989)(“in common
usage, the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are
ordinarily construed to exclude it”).
8
United States v. Simmons, 262 F.3d 468, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2001). Because the provision
in question once called for a sentencing enhancement for distribution of pornography
including distribution for pecuniary gain, Simmons and several other cases involving Internet
distribution focus on whether the enhancement could be imposed only in the face of
distribution for gain, an issue that has only surfaced under the sentencing guidelines in
pornography cases, United States v. Brown, 333 F.3d 850, 853-54 (7th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Probel, 214 F.3d 1285, 1290-291 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hibbler, 159
F.3d 233, 237-38 (6th Cir. 1998).
9
145 Cong.Rec. H6771 (daily ed. Aug.2, 1999)(remarks of Rep.McCollum)(“With the
Internet, it has become all too easy to disseminate bomb-making information to anyone with
a personal computer”); 142 Cong.Rec. S3448 (daily ed. Apr.17, 1996)(remarks of
Sen.Biden)(“We have all heard about the bone-chilling information making its way over the
Internet, about explicit instructions about how to detonate pipe bombs and even, if you can
believe it baby food bombs. Senator Feinstein quoted an Internet posting that detailed how
to build and explode one of these things”).

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bombs.10 Destructive devices on the other hand are defined to include explosives and
incendiaries but exclude those that are not designed to be used as weapons.11
Destructive devices are also weapons of mass destruction along with chemical,
nuclear, and biological weapons.12
10
“[T]he term ‘explosive’ means gunpowders, powders used for blasting, all forms of high
explosives, blasting materials, fuzes (other than electric circuit breakers), detonators, and
other detonating agents, smokeless powders, other explosive or incendiary devices within
the meaning of paragraph (5) of section 232 of this title, and any chemical compounds,
mechanical mixture, or device that contains any oxidizing and combustible units, or other
ingredients, in such proportions, quantities, or packing that ignition by fire, by friction, by
concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of the compound, mixture, or device or any part
thereof may cause an explosion,”18 U.S.C. 844(j).
“The term ‘explosive or incendiary device’ means (A) dynamite and all other forms
of high explosives, (B) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile, or similar device, and (C) any
incendiary bomb or grenade, fire bomb, or similar device, including any device which (i)
consists of or includes a breakable container including a flammable liquid or compound, and
a wick composed of any material which, when ignited, is capable of igniting such flammable
liquid or compound, and (ii) can be carried or thrown by one individual acting alone,” 18
U.S.C. 232(5).
11
“The term ‘destructive device’ means – (A) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas –
(i) bomb, (ii) grenade, (iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, (iv)
missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, (v) mine,
or (vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses;
“(B) any type of weapon (other than a shotgun or a shotgun shell which the Secretary
finds is generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes) by whatever
name known which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the
action of an explosive or other propellant, and which has any barrel with a bore of more than
one-half inch in diameter; and
“(C) any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any
device into any destructive device described in subparagraph (A) or (B) and from which a
destructive device may be readily assembled.
“The term ‘destructive device’ shall not include any device which is neither designed
nor redesigned for use as a weapon; any device, although originally designed for use as a
weapon, which is redesigned for use as a signaling, pyrotechnic, line throwing, safety, or
similar device; surplus ordnance sold, loaned, or given by the Secretary of the Army
pursuant to the provisions of section 4684(2), 4685, or 4686 of title 10; or any other device
which the Secretary of the Treasury finds is not likely to be used as a weapon, is an antique,
or is a rifle which the owner intends to use solely for sporting, recreational or cultural
purposes,” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(4).
12
“[T]he term ‘weapon of mass destruction’ means – (A) any destructive device as defined
in section 921 of this title; (B) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or
serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous
chemicals, or their precursors; (C) any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector
(as those terms are defined in section 178 of this title); or (D) any weapon that is designed
to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life,” 2332a(c)(2).
“[T]he term ‘biological agent’ means any microorganism (including, but not limited
to, bacteria, viruses, fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa) or infectious substance, or any naturally
occurring, bioengineered or synthesized component of any such microorganism or infectious
substance, capable of causing – (A) death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a
human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism; (B) deterioration of food, water,
equipment, supplies, or material of any kind; or (C) deleterious alteration of the

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An instructor or distributor can only be prosecuted under the provisions if he
either (I) intends the instruction or information to be used for or in furtherance of a
federal crime of violence or (II) knows that the person to whom the instruction or
information is given intends it to be used for or in furtherance of a federal crime of
violence. A federal crime of violence is one that (a) “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another,” or (b) “is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense,” 18 U.S.C. 16; see also, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3).
Offenders are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years, and fine
of not more than $250,000 ($500,000 if the offender is an organization), 18 U.S.C.
844(a)(2); 3571. Anyone who conspires to violate the provisions,13 or aids and abets
a violation, is subject to the same penalties.14
Path to Passage
Passage did not come easily. Following the Senate hearings in the 104th
Congress, the Senate approved a provision that focused on the problem of Internet
bomb instruction as part of a comprehensive terrorism package, S. 735 (104th
Cong.). Offered as an amendment by Senator Feinstein, as passed by the Senate it
would have provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person to teach or demonstrate the making of
explosive materials, or to distribute by any means information pertaining to, in
whole or in part, the manufacture of explosives materials, if the person intends
or knows, that such explosive materials or information will be used for, or in
furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal criminal offense or a
environment;
“[T]he term ‘toxin’ means the toxic material or product of plants, animals,
microorganisms (including, but not limited to, bacteria, viruses, fungi, rickettsiae or
protozoa), or infectious substances, or a recombinant or synthesized molecule, whatever
their origin or method of production, includes – (A) any poisonous substance or biological
product that may be engineered as a result of biotechnology produced by a living organism;
or (B) any poisonous isomer or biological product, homolog, or derivative of such a
substance;
*
*
*
“[T]he term ‘vector’ means a living organism, or molecule, including a recombinant
or synthesized molecule, capable of carrying a biological agent or toxin to a host,” 18 U.S.C.
178(1), (2), (4).
13
“Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person who conspires to commit any
offense defined in this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties (other than the penalty
of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object
of the conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 844(n).
14
“(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever
willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be
an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal,” 18 U.S.C. 2.

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criminal purpose affecting interstate commerce. §901, S. 735, 141 Cong.Rec.
S7875 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
The provision, which would have made violations punishable by imprisonment
for up to twenty years, was not uniformly applauded. Beyond the reservations
expressed on behalf of legitimate explosives manufacturers during Senate debate,15
commentators questioned the provision’s constitutionality.16
The proposal, as
amended, won Senate approval, 141 Cong.Rec. S7686 (daily ed. June 5, 1995), but
was dropped from the bill that emerged from conference in favor of a study.17 More
precisely, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 in its final form
did not outlaw Internet bomb making instructions but instead called upon the
Attorney General to study the conflict between the First Amendment’s protection of
communication and the use of modern technology for instruction in the criminal use
of explosives.18
From that point on, Senate backers sought a legislative vehicle to carry to
passage their proposal outlawing bomb- making instruction. Later the same year, the
Senate agreed to add it to the defense authorization bill, H.R. 3230 (104th Cong.),19
but again it was stripped out during conference.20 In the first session of the 105th
Congress, the Senate inserted it in the defense authorization bill for that year, H.R.
1211 (105th Cong.),21 only to have it removed once more during conference.22 In the
15
“There are a lot of explosives manufacturers and personnel who do teach others how to
make explosives and how to use them legitimately,” 141 Cong.Rec. S7684 (daily ed. June
5, 1995)(remarks of Sen. Hatch).
16
The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, 20 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE
JOURNAL 201, 245 (1996); Eaton, Closing the Barn Door After the Genie Is Out of the Bag:
Recognizing a "Futility Principle" in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 DEPAUL LAW
REVIEW 1, 45-9 (1995).
17
H.Rep.No. 104-518 at 121 (1996); 142 Cong.Rec. H3336 (daily ed. April 15, 1996).
During Senate consideration of the conference report, proponents tried unsuccessfully to
have the report returned to the conference committee with instructions to include the
Feinstein amendment, 142 Cong.Rec. S3448-450 (daily ed. April 17, 1996).
18 “Study. – The Attorney General, in consultation with such other officials and individuals
as the Attorney General considers appropriate, shall conduct a study concerning –(1) the
extent to which there is available to the public material in any medium (including print,
electronic, or film) that provides instruction on how to make bombs, destructive devices, or
weapons of mass destruction; (2) the extent to which information gained from such material
has been used in incidents of domestic or international terrorism; (3) the likelihood that such
information may be used in future incidents of terrorism; (4) the application of Federal laws
in effect on the date of enactment of this Act to such material; (5) the need and utility, if
any, for additional laws relating to such material; and (6) an assessment of the extent to
which the first amendment protects such material and its private and commercial
distribution,” §709, P.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1297 (1996).
19
142 Cong.Rec. S7271-274 (daily ed. June 28, 1996).
20
H.Rep.No.104-724, at 801 (1996); 142 Cong.Rec. H9303 (daily ed. July 30, 1996).
21
143 Cong.Rec. S5989-998 (daily ed. June 19, 1997).
22
H.Rep.No. 105-340, at 813 (1997); 143 Cong.Rec. H9405 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1997).

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second session, it was apparently added during Senate Judiciary Committee markup
to a House-passed private bill for the relief of the Kerr-McGee Corporation, H.R.
1211 (105th Cong.), which was placed on the Senate calendar without a written
report but which saw no further action.23
Supporters’ efforts were bolstered by the Justice Department’s submission of
the study it had been directed to conduct, Report on the Availability of Bombmaking
Information, the Extent to Which Its Dissemination Is Controlled by Federal Law,
and the Extent to Which Such Dissemination May Be Subject to Regulation
Consistent with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution: Prepared by
the United States Department of Justice as Required by Section 709(a) of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (April 1997)(DoJ Report).
The DoJ Report concluded that:
- “[A]nyone interested in manufacturing a bomb, dangerous weapon, or a
weapon of mass destruction can easily obtain detailed instructions from readily
accessible sources, such as legitimate reference books, the so-called
underground press, and the Internet”
- “Circumstantial evidence suggests that, in a number of crimes involving the
employment of such weapons and devices, defendants have relied upon such
material in manufacturing and use of such items”
- “Law enforcement agencies believe that, because the availability of
bombmaking information is becoming increasingly widespread (over the
Internet and from other sources), such published instructions will continue to
play a significant role in aiding those intent upon committing future acts of
terrorism and violence”
- “While current federal laws – such as those prohibiting conspiracy,
solicitation, aiding and abetting, providing material support for terrorist
activities, and unlawfully furthering civil disorders – may, in some instances,
proscribe the dissemination of bombmaking information, no extant federal
statute provides a satisfactory basis for prosecution in certain classes of cases
that Senators Feinstein and Biden have identified as particularly troublesome”
- “The Department of Justice agrees that it would be appropriate and beneficial
to adopt further legislation to address this problem directly, if that can be
accomplished in a manner that does not impermissibly restrict the wholly
legitimate publication and teaching of such information, or otherwise violate the
First Amendment”
- “The First Amendment would impose substantial constraints on any attempt
to proscribe indiscriminately the dissemination of bombmaking information.
The government generally may not, except in rare circumstances, punish
23
144 Cong.Rec. S6697 (daily ed. June 19, 1998); see also, 145 Cong.Rec. S2652 (daily
ed. Mar. 15, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Nickles)(noting inclusion of the Feinstein amendment
in H.R. 1211).

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persons either for advocating lawless action or for disseminating truthful
information – including information that would be dangerous if used – that such
persons have obtained lawfully. However, the constitutional analysis is quite
different where the government punishes speech that is an integral part of a
transaction involving conduct the government otherwise is empowered to
prohibit; such ‘speech acts’ – for instance, many cases of inchoate crimes such
as aiding and abetting and conspiracy – may be proscribed without much, if any,
concern about the First Amendment, since it is merely incidental that such
‘conduct’ takes the form of speech”
- “Senator Feinstein's proposal can withstand constitutional muster in most, if
not all, of its possible applications, if such legislation is slightly modified”
- “As modified, the proposed legislation would be likely to maximize the ability
of the Federal Government – consistent with free speech protections – to reach
cases where an individual disseminates information on how to manufacture or
use explosives or weapons of mass destruction either (i) with the intent that the
information be used to facilitate criminal conduct, or (ii) with the knowledge
that a particular recipient of the information intends to use it in furtherance of
criminal activity,” DoJ Report, at i-ii.
In the 106th Congress, the proposal, modified to reflect Justice Department
recommendations, returned as part of the Kerr-McGee private relief bill, S. 606
(106th Cong.).24 It subsequently passed both Houses with little comment,25 and was
signed by the President.26
First Amendment Considerations
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. U.S.Const. Amend.I.
The First Amendment speaks in absolute terms, but there is little dispute that
Congress may enact laws that regulate and even prohibit speech under some
circumstances. The difficulty has always been to identify those circumstances with
precision. This task has been further complicated by the unique circumstances
presented by the Internet and by the array of doctrines upon which the Supreme Court
might rely to evaluate First Amendment compliance in different factual settings.
24
145 Cong.Rec. S2651 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1999). The final version differed somewhat
from the Justice Department recommendations which would have been predicated upon an
intent or knowledge that the instruction would be used in connection with a federal crime
or with a state crime involving interstate commerce; the final version dropped the reference
to state crimes involving interstate commerce.
25
145 Cong.Rec. S8193-194 (daily ed. July 1, 1999); 145 Cong.Rec. H6770-771 (daily ed.
Aug.2, 1999),.
26 P.L. 106-54, 113 Stat. 398 (1999).

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Under the current state of the law, it appears that Congress may only regulate
and prohibit instruction on the means and methods of violence when the instructor
intends the lessons to be acted upon or knows that they will be with some level of
specificity.
In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the petitioner had been
convicted of conspiring to teach and advocate the duty, necessity, desirability and
propriety of the violent overthrow of the government. The Court observed that the
“[o]verthrow of the Government by force and violence is certainly a substantial
enough interest of the Government to limit speech. . . . If the Government is aware
that a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to
commit them to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the
circumstances permit, action by the Government is required,” Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. at 509.
In a subsequent construction of the statute at issue in Dennis, the Court held that
the statute could not be construed to proscribe advocating and teaching the violent
overthrow of the government as an abstract principle unrelated to any intent to
stimulate action to that end, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), confirmed the reading of Yates for
constitutional purposes. “[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. . . . [T]he mere abstract
teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and
violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to
such action. A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes
upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments,”
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. at 447-48.27
Although Brandenburg seems the most logical point of reference in the Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence on questions involving bomb-making lessons on the
Internet, its exclusive application is hardly inevitable. It is not beyond the realm of
possibility that the Court would draw from some other of its First Amendment
doctrines in order to judge “dangerous” speech available electronically. Certainly,
both Members of the Court28 and commentators29 have questioned the wisdom of
27
Shortly thereafter, a federal statute outlawing instruction in the use of explosives in
furtherance of a civil disorder withstood First Amendment challenge in the lower federal
courts, United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972).
28
“[A]s broadcast, cable, and the cyber-technology of the Internet and the World Wide
Web approach the day of using a common receiver, we can hardly assume that standards for
judging the regulation of one of them will not have immense, but now unknown and
unknowable, effects on the others.
“Accordingly, in charting a course that will permit reasonable regulation in light of the
values in competition, we have to accept the likelihood that the media of communication
will become less categorical and more protean. Because we cannot be confident that for
purposes of judging speech restrictions it will continue to make sense to distinguish cable
from other technologies, and because we know that changes in these regulated technologies

CRS-10
uniform application of Brandenburg to the Internet.
Of course, other First Amendment landmarks, such as content-based standards
or public forum doctrines, may be even less forgiving that Brandenburg. A content-
based standard, for instance, may impose more demanding criteria for legislative
regulation than Brandenburg: the government has a compelling interest in protecting
the safety of Americans and their property from violent injury or damage, but
regulation would have to be narrowly tailored to service that interest.30
Another possible source of analytical support for resolution of First Amendment
questions raised by the Internet is the public forum doctrine. The public forum
doctrine refers to the First Amendment doctrine that describes the conditions under
which the government may limit the use of certain public property because of the
will enormously alter the structure of regulation itself, we should be shy about saying the
final word today about what will be accepted as reasonable tomorrow. In my own ignorance
I have to accept the real possibility that ‘if we had to decide today . . . just what the First
Amendment should mean in cyberspace, . . . we would get it fundamentally wrong.’
“The upshot of appreciating the fluidity of the subject that Congress must regulate is
simply to accept the fact that not every nuance of our old standard will necessarily do for
the new technology, and that a proper choice among existing doctrinal categories is not
obvious,” Denver Area Ed.Comm.Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 776-77 (1996) (Souter,
J., concurring) (quoting, Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1743, 1745
(1995)).
29
“In the twenty-first century, however, incitement is not only possible on street corners
and at political rallies. Individuals wishing to present inciting messages now have new
avenues for communication in cyberspace. The Internet is no less dangerous and no more
worthy of constitutional protection than a speaker who incites a riotous crowd to vandalize
the streets or attack police officers. The difference, however, is that incitement over the
Internet is often more difficult to assess. The unique speaker-audience relationship in
cyberspace requires courts to clarify the imminence requirement and to devise an incitement
standard that meets the new demands of the Internet.” Cronan, The Next Challenge for the
First Amendment: The Framework for an Incitement Standard, 51 CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW 425, 466 (2002); Planting the Seeds of Hatred: Why Imminence Should No
Longer Be Required to Impose Liability on Internet Communications, 29 CAPITAL
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 835, 855 (2002) (“Individuals should be held accountable for
what they advocate . . . . [T]hose who publicly advocate ideas through the Internet and other
forms ought to bear some responsibility if a causal link can be shown between their
advocacy and injuries that result to others”).
30
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 109 (1991), involving as it did an
attempted content-based regulation on expressions of the means and manner of criminal
conduct, might provide a nexus to the Court's content-based regulation line of cases. Simon
& Schuster, Inc. arose out of a New York statutory procedure for the confiscation of
prisoner literary royalties. The proceeds were dedicated to victim compensation, but only
the proceeds from those works that mentioned or described the commission of a crime were
seized. This, the Court concluded, imposed a financial burden upon certain forms of
expression based solely upon their content. Content-based regulation of speech can only
survive First Amendment scrutiny if it is based upon a compelling state interest and if it is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The New York statute failed because it was not
narrowly tailored only to ensure victim compensation, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. at 121-23.

CRS-11
traditional use of such locations for public discourse. In the case of a public forum,
the government’s “right to limit protected expressive activity is sharply
circumscribed: it may impose reasonable, content-neutral time, place and manner
restrictions . . . but it may regulate expressive content only if such a restriction is
necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest,” Capitol Square
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995).
Although not publicly owned, the government has long regulated telephone
communications, one of the essential components of the Internet. Moreover, there
can be little doubt that under many circumstances, the Internet is just as likely to
provide the forum for public political debate as the city park.31
A majority of the
Members of the Court, however, has recently announced that the public forum
doctrine does not apply to the Internet when access is provided through a public
library.32 If the Internet entered from a public library cannot be considered a public
forum, Internet entrance from a private home presumably cannot.
Some commentators have suggested that Brandenburg should be adjusted in an
Internet context to mute its imminence demands. The Brandenburg line consists of
cases involving the advocacy of a political philosophy with violent attributes. The
First Amendment stands as one of the principal guardians of the robust political
debate essential to the well being of a democracy. Some might argue that touching
upon political discourse as they do, the principles these cases announce might not be
as readily applicable to instruction in the means and methods of violence unrelated
to any such political underpinnings.33
31
See generally, Goldstone, The Public Forum Doctrine in the Age of the Information
Superhighway (Where Are the Public Forums on the Information Superhighway?), 46
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 335 (1995).
32
United States v. American Library Ass'n, 123 S.Ct. 2297, 2304 (2003)(“Internet access
in public libraries is neither a traditional nor a designated public forum”)(Rehnquist, Ch.J,
with O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.)(announcing the judgment of the Court); 123 S.Ct.
at 2310 (“In determining whether the statute's conditions consequently violate the First
Amendment, the plurality first finds the public forum doctrine inapplicable and then holds
that the statutory provisions are constitutional. I agree with both determinations”) (Breyer,
J.)(concurring in the judgment).
33
See e.g., Redlich & Lurie, First Amendment Issues Presented by the "Information
Superhighway", 25 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW 1446, 1456-457 (1995)(“Courts may have
to grapple with the regulation of communications on the electronic superhighway that
advocate illegal conduct. This issue has arisen recently in connection with the use of the
Internet as an organizational and communications tool by anti-government militias. Existing
Supreme Court precedents – read restrictively – preclude the regulation of speech
advocating illegal activity absent the demonstration of a risk of `imminent' wrongdoing
accompanied by words of incitement. However, it may be difficult to establish such a risk
of imminent harm arising from the electronic advocacy of criminal acts. It may be next to
impossible to establish how the potentially vast, but anonymous, audience for a
communication soliciting illegal conduct is likely to respond. Thus, communications such
as the posting of bomb-making instructions on the Internet during the weeks prior to the
Oklahoma City bombing might fall outside the government’s regulatory power. On the
other hand, the courts may find that the current First Amendment doctrine, fashioned to
some extent as a reaction to the McCarthy era, must be modified to take into account the

CRS-12
The courts, however, seem to continue to acknowledge the prominence of
Brandenburg even in an Internet context. As the Court observed when it found
constitutionally wanting the Child Pornography Prevention Act's efforts to regulate
“virtual” Internet pornography:
[T]he Court’s First Amendment cases draw vital distinctions between
words and deeds, between ideas and conduct. The government may not prohibit
speech because it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed at
some indefinite future time.
The government may suppress speech for
advocating the use of force or a violation of law only if “such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such actions.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
curiam). There is here no attempt, incitement, solicitation, or conspiracy. The
Government has shown no more than a remote connection between speech that
might encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse. Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002)(other internal citations
omitted and emphasis added).
Consistent with the sentiment italicized above – that Brandenburg is different
when there is conspiracy, attempt, incitement or solicitation – the lower federal
courts have rejected First Amendment arguments grounded in Brandenburg that
involve instruction knowingly directed to the commission of a specific, concrete
offense: where the defendant’s advocacy or instruction was coupled with direct
assistance in the preparation of tax fraud,34 where the instruction was directed to the
efforts of a particular individual's manufacture of illicit drugs,35 and where the
defendant taught members of a particular group how to construct bombs for use in
an anticipated civil disorder.36
The DoJ Report summarizing its understanding of the state of the law as of 1997
seems to reflect a like view:
transformation of communications technology”). In this regard, however, it is difficult to
see how the Internet is any different than a book, newspaper, pamphlet, each of which may
ultimately have a vast audience spread over a considerable period of time.
34
United States v. Fletcher, 322 F.3d 508, 515 (8th Cir. 2003)(“There was ample evidence
that Mr. Fletcher did not merely advocate, through speech violation of the tax laws. . . . [A]s
a result of Mr. Fletcher’s seminars (where he explained how to convert ordinary personal
expenditures into [fraudulent] tax deductible business expenses) and his follow-up meetings
with clients, his clients not only retain [his firm’s] tax services for the current year, they
began the process of filing amended tax returns for previous years. In these circumstances,
Mr. Fletcher’s speech is not entitled to first amendment protection”); see also, United States
v. Knapp, 25 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.3d 1275, 1277-
278 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 215, 217 (4th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Buttorff, 752 F.2d 619, 624
(8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1066 (5th Cir. 1985)(noting that
the tax instructions cases frequently involved false or misleading speech thus beyond the
pale for that reason alone).
35
United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842-43 (9th Cir. 1982).
36
United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1112 (5th Cir. 1972).

CRS-13
The distinction recognized in Brandenburg between advocacy of, and
preparation for, unlawful conduct, was exemplified in Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203 (1961), a case in which the Court carefully distinguished between
teaching of abstract doctrine – punishment of which is subject to substantial
constitutional constraints – and the teaching of the techniques of unlawful
conduct, which can much more easily be proscribed. Id. at 233-34. As to the
former, the Court has developed the Brandenburg test, which asks whether the
danger is intended, likely and imminent. But the constraints of the First
Amendment do not apply when the teaching goes beyond the theory itself to
explanation of basic strategy. Scales, 367 U.S. at 244. At that point, the
teaching – if it is done with the purpose of preparing a group for unlawful action
– is not much different than the information conveyed in a typical aiding and
abetting case; accordingly, the Brandenburg protections should largely be
inapposite. See, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 331-33 (1957)(systematic
teaching in classes to develop in the members of a group a readiness to engage
in unlawful conduct at the crucial time could be punished, even if that conduct
was to occur only the time was ripe). DoJ Report, at xxxiii-xxxiv (internal
quotation marks omitted).37
As noted earlier, the DoJ Report concluded that “Senator Feinstein’s proposal
can withstand constitutional muster in most, if not all, of its possible applications, if
such legislation is slightly modified,” DoJ Report, at ii.
Complementary Prohibitions
Federal law has for some time prohibited instructing others in the use of
explosives in furtherance of a civil disturbance, 18 U.S.C. 231.38 More recently,
Congress has outlawed providing material support to terrorists or terrorist
organizations in language sweeping enough to include support in the form of
instruction or information on how to make or use explosives, destructive devices and
weapons of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. 2339A, 2339B.
It is also a federal crime to command, aid and abet another in the commission
of a federal offense, 18 U.S.C. 2,39 to conspire with another to commit such an
37
Soon after release of the DoJ Report, the Fourth Circuit found that a how-to-commit-
murder-for-hire manual was not entitled to First Amendment protection where the publisher
stipulated that it “intended to attract and assist criminals and would-be criminals who desire
information and instruction on how to commit crimes” and that it “intended and had
knowledge that [the publication] would be used upon receipt, by criminals and would-be
criminals to plan and execute the crime of murder for hire,” Rice v. Paladin Enterprises,
Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 241-49 (4th Cir. 1997).
38
The texts of various existing prohibitions have been appended at the end of this report,
arranged in the order in which they appear in the report.
39 Section 2 actually outlaws aiding, abetting, commanding, and counseling the commission
of an underlying federal crime, but the Justice Department has observed that it is “not aware
of any modern case in which culpability under §2 was premised solely on counseling in the
form of encouragement (or advocating that a crime be committed), without any actual aid
or assistance to the principal,” DoJ Report, at xxxiii n.61.

CRS-14
offense, 18 U.S.C. 371, or to solicit another to commit a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C.
373.
Instruction in the construction or use of explosives may often occur under
circumstances where it constitutes aiding or abetting, or conspiracy to commit, or
solicitation to commit other federal crimes of violence.
In such cases the government would be required to prove both the elements of
instigational offense (conspiracy, solicitation, or aiding/abetting) as well as at least
some elements of the underlying offense. Thus in order to aid and abet, one must “in
some sort associate himself with the venture, participate in it as in something that he
wishes to bring about, [and] seek by his action to make it succeed.”40 One may be
guilty of commanding or aiding and abetting any federal crime, including those
involving the unlawful use of fire or explosives.41 Liability requires the commission
of the crime by someone other than the defendant.42 Although one who aids and
abets need not participate in all aspects of the underlying crime, he must “participate
at some stage accompanied by knowledge of the result and intent to bring about that
result.”43
On the other hand, mere presence or even knowledge is by itself
insufficient, the defendant must somehow have acted to make crime enterprise
succeed.44
The criminal liability of a co-conspirator is comparable. A co-conspirator may
be held vicariously liable for the reasonably foreseeable crimes committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy.45 The government must establish an agreement
between the defendant and some other individual to commit a federal crime, an intent
on the part of the defendant that the underlying crime be committed, and depending
upon the statute perhaps an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy committed by
one of the conspirators.46
In order to establish that an accused has committed solicitation in violation of
18 U.S.C. 373, the prosecution must show (1) that he intended that someone else
40
Nye & New v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949); United States v. Hamilton, 334
F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)(the government must prove that “the underlying crime was
committed by a person other than the defendant, that the defendant knew of the crime, and
that the defendant acted with the intent to contribute to the success of the underlying
crime”).
41
United States v. Duke, 255 F.3d 656, 657 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Arocena, 778
F.2d 943, 949-50 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Yost, 24 F.3d 99, 104 (10th Cir. 1994).
42
United States v. Hamilton, 334 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Lozano-
Hernandez, 90 F.3d 785, 790 (11th Cir. 1996).
43
United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 335 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 1996).
44
United States v. Downs-Moses, 329 F.3d 253, 261 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v.
Griffin, 324 F.3d 330, 357 (5th Cir. 2003).
45
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946); United States v. Curtis, 324
F.3d 501, 506 (7th Cir. 2003).
46
United States v. Ramirez-Velasquez, 322 F.3d 868, 880 (5th Cir. 2003); United States
v.Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Josleyn, 99 F.3d 1182, 1189 (1st
Cir. 1996).

CRS-15
commit a violent federal crime, and (2) that he induced or otherwise attempted to
persuade the other person to commit the offense.47 In doing so, it must present
evidence that “strongly corroborates” the intent of the accused.48 Like conspiracy and
unlike aiding and abetting, the crime of solicitation does not require that the
underlying offense have been committed.49
Federal law contains a fairly wide range of statutes outlawing bombing, bomb
threats and other misconduct involving explosives and weapons of mass destruction
which might supply the underlying predicate offense for an aiding and abetting,
conspiracy, or solicitation charge based on instructions in bomb construction or use.
It is, for example, a federal crime
• to bomb or attempt to bomb federal property, 18 U.S.C. 844(f);
• to possess a bomb in an airport, 18 U.S.C. 844(g);
• to use explosives to commit any other federal felony, 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(1);
• to carry a bomb across state lines with the intent to injure person or property,
18 U.S.C. 844(h)(2);
• to bomb property that is part of or is used in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C.
844(i); or
• to steal explosives from interstate commerce or from a licensed dealer, 18
U.S.C. 844(k),(l).
There are also federal laws covering materials capable of producing catastrophic
results. It is, for example, a federal crime
• to develop or possess biological weapons, 18 U.S.C. 175;
• to develop or possess chemical weapons, 18 U.S.C. 229;
• to possess nuclear material without official authorization, 18 U.S.C. 831; or
• to use weapons of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. 2332a.
Of course, there are separate federal laws that proscribe murder and assault
committed against federal officials or foreign dignitaries, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 111, 112,
1114, 1116; committed during the course of a bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113; or in
violation of civil rights, 18 U.S.C. 241, 242, 245; or occurring in a host of other
jurisdictional circumstances, any of which could be, but need not be, committed
through the use of explosives.
47
United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Polk, 118
F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rahman, 34 F.3d 1331, 1337 (7th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Buckalew, 859 F.2d 1052, 1053 (1st Cir. 1988).
48
United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d at 996; United States v. Rahman, 34 F.3d at 1337;
United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir. 1989). This might include evidence
that the accused sought commission of the underlying offense by offering payment, by threat
or repeated solicitations, by providing tools or instrumentalities for commission of the
underlying offense, or by directing the solicitations to one believed to have previously
committed a similar crime, United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 1052, 1053 (1st Cir. 1988);
United States v. Gabriel, 810 F.2d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 1987), both citing, S.Rep.No. 97-307
at 183 (1982).
49
United States v. Devorkin, 159 F.3d 465, 467 (9th Cir. 1998).

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Appendix
Complementary Offenses.
18 U.S.C. 231. Civil Disorders
(a)(1) Whoever teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application,
or making of any firearm or explosive or incendiary device, or technique capable of
causing injury or death to persons, knowing or having reason to know or intending
that the same will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil
disorder which may in any way or degree obstruct, delay, or adversely affect
commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce or the conduct
or performance of any federally protected function; or
(2) Whoever transports or manufactures for transportation in commerce any
firearm, or explosive or incendiary device, knowing or having reason to know or
intending that the same will be used unlawfully in furtherance of a civil disorder; .
. .
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
. . .
For purposes of this chapter:
(1) The term "civil disorder" means any public disturbance involving acts of
violence by assemblages of three or more persons, which causes an immediate danger
of or results in damage or injury to the property or person of any other individual.
(2) The term "commerce" means commerce (A) between any State or the
District of Columbia and any place outside thereof; (B) between points within any
State or the District of Columbia, but through any place outside thereof; or (C)
wholly within the District of Columbia.
(3) The term "federally protected function" means any function, operation, or
action carried out, under the laws of the United States, by any department, agency,
or instrumentality of the United States or by an officer or employee thereof; and such
term shall specifically include, but not be limited to, the collection and distribution
of the United States mails.
(4) The term "firearm" means any weapon which is designed to or may readily
be converted to expel any projectile by the action of an explosive; or the frame or
receiver of any such weapon.
(5) The term "explosive or incendiary device" means (A) dynamite and all other
forms of high explosives, (B) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile, or similar
device, and (C) any incendiary bomb or grenade, fire bomb, or similar device,
including any device which (i) consists of or includes a breakable container including
a flammable liquid or compound, and a wick composed of any material which, when
ignited, is capable of igniting such flammable liquid or compound, and (ii) can be
carried or thrown by one individual acting alone.
*
*
*
(8) The term "State" includes a State of the United States, and any
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States," 18 U.S.C. 232.
18 U.S.C. 2339A. Providing material support to terrorists
(a) Offense. – Whoever provides material support or resources or conceals or
disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources,
knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out,
a violation of section 32, 37, 81, 175, 229, 351, 831, 842(m) or (n), 844(f) or (i),

CRS-17
930(c), 956, 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 1993, 2155,
2156, 2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332f, or 2340A of this title, section 236 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284), or section 46502 or 60123(b) of
title 49, or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment of an escape from
the commission of any such violation, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not
more than 10 years, or both. A violation of this section may be prosecuted in any
Federal judicial district in which the underlying offense was committed, or in any
other Federal judicial district as provided by law.
(b) Definition. – In this section, the term "material support or resources" means
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, expert advice and assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or
religious materials. 18 U.S.C. 2339A.
18 U.S.C. 2339B. Providing material support or resources to designated foreign
terrorist organizations
(a) Prohibited activities.– (1) Unlawful conduct.–Whoever, within the United
States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly provides material
support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do
so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
*
*
*
(g) Definitions. – As used in this section . . .(4) the term 'material support or
resources' has the same meaning as in section 2339A.
18 U.S.C. 2. Aiding and Abetting
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by
him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a
principal.
18 U.S.C. 371. Conspiracy
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the
conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not
exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
18 U.S.C. 373(a). Solicitation
Whoever, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a
felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against property or against the person of another in violation of the laws of the
United States, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent, solicits,
commands, induces, or otherwise endeavors to persuade such other person to engage
in such conduct, shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of

CRS-18
imprisonment or (notwithstanding section 3571) fined not more than one-half of the
maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the crime solicited, or both; or if the
crime solicited is punishable by life imprisonment or death, shall be imprisoned for
not more than twenty years.
18 U.S.C. 844(f). Bombing Federal Property
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by
means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other personal or real property
in whole or in part owned, possessed, or used by, or leased to, the United States, any
department or agency thereof, or any institution or organization receiving Federal
financial assistance shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, fined the greater
of the fine under this title or the cost of repairing or replacing any property that is
damaged or destroyed, or both; and if personal injury results to any person including
any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be imprisoned for not more than 40 years, fined
the greater of the fine under this title or the cost of repairing or replacing any property
that is damaged or destroyed, or both; and if death results to any person, including
any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years,
or to the death penalty or to life imprisonment.
18 U.S.C. 844(g). Possession of a Bomb in an Airport
(g)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), whoever possesses an explosive in
an airport that is subject to the regulatory authority of the Federal Aviation
Administration, or in any building in whole or in part owned, possessed, or used by,
or leased to, the United States or any department or agency thereof, except with the
written consent of the agency, department, or other person responsible for the
management of such building or airport, shall be imprisoned for not more than five
years, or fined under this title, or both.
(2) The provisions of this subsection shall not be applicable to – (A) the
possession of ammunition (as that term is defined in regulations issued pursuant to
this chapter) in an airport that is subject to the regulatory authority of the Federal
Aviation Administration if such ammunition is either in checked baggage or in a
closed container; or (B) the possession of an explosive in an airport if the packaging
and transportation of such explosive is exempt from, or subject to and in accordance
with, regulations of the Research and Special Projects Administration for the
handling of hazardous materials pursuant to chapter 51 of title 49.
18 U.S.C. 844(h). Use of a Bomb During the Commission of a Federal Offense
Whoever – (1) uses fire or an explosive to commit any felony which may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States, or
(2) carries an explosive during the commission of any felony which may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States, including a felony which provides for an
enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or
device shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to
imprisonment for 5 years but not more than 15 years. In the case of a second or
subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for 10 years but not more than 25 years. Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of
any person convicted of a violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of

CRS-19
imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other term
of imprisonment including that imposed for the felony in which the explosive was
used or carried," 18 U.S.C. 844(h).
18 U.S.C. 844(d). Interstate Transportation of a Bomb
Whoever transports or receives, or attempts to transport or receive, in interstate
or foreign commerce any explosive with the knowledge or intent that it will be used
to kill, injure, or intimidate any individual or unlawfully to damage or destroy any
building, vehicle, or other real or personal property, shall be imprisoned for not more
than ten years, or fined under this title, or both; and if personal injury results to any
person including any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate
result of conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be imprisoned for not more than
twenty years or fined under this title, or both; and if death results to any person,
including any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result
of conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be subject to imprisonment for any
term of years, or to the death penalty or to life imprisonment.
18 U.S.C. 844(i). Bombing Interstate Property
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by
means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property
used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign
commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, fined the greater of the
fine under this title or the cost of repairing or replacing any property that is damaged
or destroyed, or both; and if personal injury results to any person, including any
public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be imprisoned for not more than 40 years, fined
the greater of the fine under this title or the cost of repairing or replacing any property
that is damaged or destroyed, or both; and if death results to any person, including
any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall also be subject to imprisonment for any term of
years, or to the death penalty or to life imprisonment. No person shall be prosecuted,
tried, or punished for any noncapital offense under this subsection unless the
indictment is found or the information is instituted within 7 years after the date on
which the offense was committed.
18 U.S.C. 844(k),(l). Theft of Explosives
(k) A person who steals any explosives materials which are moving as, or are
a part of, or which have moved in, interstate or foreign commerce shall be
imprisoned for not more than 10 years, fined under this title, or both.
(l) A person who steals any explosive material from a licensed importer,
licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, or from any permittee shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both," 18 U.S.C. 844(k),(l).
18 U.S.C. 175. Biological Weapons
(a) In general. – Whoever knowingly develops, produces, stockpiles, transfers,
acquires, retains, or possesses any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use
as a weapon, or knowingly assists a foreign state or any organization to do so, or
attempts, threatens, or conspires to do the same, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both. There is extraterritorial Federal

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jurisdiction over an offense under this section committed by or against a national of
the United States.
(b) Additional offense. – Whoever knowingly possesses any biological agent,
toxin, or delivery system of a type or in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is
not reasonably justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other
peaceful purpose, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years,
or both.
In this subsection, the terms "biological agent" and "toxin" do not
encompass any biological agent or toxin that is in its naturally occurring
environment, if the biological agent or toxin has not been cultivated, collected, or
otherwise extracted from its natural source.
(c) Definition. – For purposes of this section, the term "for use as a weapon"
includes the development, production, transfer, acquisition, retention, or possession
of any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for other than prophylactic,
protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purposes.
18 U.S.C. 229. Chemical Weapons
(a) Unlawful conduct. – Except as provided in subsection (b), it shall be
unlawful for any person knowingly –
(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly,
receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical
weapon; or
(2) to assist or induce, in any way, any person to violate paragraph (1), or to
attempt or conspire to violate paragraph (1).
(b) Exempted agencies and persons. –
(1) In general. – Subsection (a) does not apply to the retention, ownership,
possession, transfer, or receipt of a chemical weapon by a department, agency, or
other entity of the United States, or by a person described in paragraph (2), pending
destruction of the weapon.
(2) Exempted persons.--A person referred to in paragraph (1) is – (A) any
person, including a member of the Armed Forces of the United States, who is
authorized by law or by an appropriate officer of the United States to retain, own,
possess, transfer, or receive the chemical weapon; or (B) in an emergency situation,
any otherwise nonculpable person if the person is attempting to destroy or seize the
weapon.
(c) Jurisdiction. – Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) is within the jurisdiction of
the United States if the prohibited conduct –
(1) takes place in the United States;
(2) takes place outside of the United States and is committed by a national of the
United States;
(3) is committed against a national of the United States while the national is
outside the United States; or
(4) is committed against any property that is owned, leased, or used by the
United States or by any department or agency of the United States, whether the
property is within or outside the United States.
18 U.S.C. 831. Nuclear Material

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(a) Whoever, if one of the circumstances described in subsection (c) of this
section occurs –
(1) without lawful authority, intentionally receives, possesses, uses, transfers,
alters, disposes of, or disperses any nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material
and – (A) thereby knowingly causes the death of or serious bodily injury to any
person or substantial damage to property or to the environment; or (B) circumstances
exist, or have been represented to the defendant to exist, that are likely to cause the
death of or serious bodily injury to any person or substantial damage to property or
to the environment;
(2) with intent to deprive another of nuclear material, knowingly – (A) takes and
carries away nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material of another without
authority; (B) makes an unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer, of nuclear material
or nuclear byproduct material belonging to another; or (C) uses fraud and thereby
obtains nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material belonging to another;
(3) knowingly – (A) uses force; or (B) threatens or places another in fear that
any person other than the actor will imminently be subject to bodily injury; and
thereby takes nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material belonging to another
from the person or presence of any other;
(4) intentionally intimidates any person and thereby obtains nuclear material or
nuclear byproduct material belonging to another;
(5) with intent to compel any person, international organization, or
governmental entity to do or refrain from doing any act, knowingly threatens to
engage in conduct described in paragraph (2) (A) or (3) of this subsection;
(6) knowingly threatens to use nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material
to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person or substantial damage to
property or to the environment under circumstances in which the threat may
reasonably be understood as an expression of serious purposes;
(7) attempts to commit an offense under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this
subsection; or
(8) is a party to a conspiracy of two or more persons to commit an offense under
paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this subsection, if any of the parties intentionally
engages in any conduct in furtherance of such offense;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) The punishment for an offense under –
(1) paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a) of this section is – (A) a fine
under this title; and (B) imprisonment – (i) for any term of years or for life (I) if,
while committing the offense, the offender knowingly causes the death of any person;
or (II) if, while committing an offense under paragraph (1) or (3) of subsection (a) of
this section, the offender, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the life of an individual, knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby recklessly
causes the death of or serious bodily injury to any person; and (ii) for not more than
20 years in any other case; and
(2) paragraph (8) of subsection (a) of this section is – (A) a fine under this title;
and (B) imprisonment – (i) for not more than 20 years if the offense which is the
object of the conspiracy is punishable under paragraph (1)(B)(i); and (ii) for not more
than 10 years in any other case.
(c) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) of this section are that –

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(1) the offense is committed in the United States or the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or the special aircraft jurisdiction of the
United States (as defined in section 46501 of title 49);
(2) an offender or a victim is – (A) a national of the United States; or (B) a
United States corporation or other legal entity;
(3) after the conduct required for the offense occurs the defendant is found in
the United States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the
United States;
(4) the conduct required for the offense occurs with respect to the carriage of a
consignment of nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material by any means of
transportation intended to go beyond the territory of the state where the shipment
originates beginning with the departure from a facility of the shipper in that state and
ending with the arrival at a facility of the receiver within the state of ultimate
destination and either of such states is the United States; or
(5) either – (A) the government entity under subsection (a)(5) is the United
States; or (B) the threat under subsection (a)(6) is directed at the United States.
*
*
*
(f) As used in this section –
(1) the term "nuclear material" means material containing any – (A) plutonium;
(B) uranium not in the form of ore or ore residue that contains the mixture of isotopes
as occurring in nature; (C) enriched uranium, defined as uranium that contains the
isotope 233 or 235 or both in such amount that the abundance ratio of the sum of
those isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the
isotope 238 occurring in nature; or (D) uranium 233;
(2) the term "nuclear byproduct material" means any material containing any
radioactive isotope created through an irradiation process in the operation of a
nuclear reactor or accelerator;
(3) the term "international organization" means a public international
organization designated as such pursuant to section 1 of the International
Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288) or a public organization created
pursuant to treaty or other agreement under international law as an instrument
through or by which two or more foreign governments engage in some aspect of their
conduct of international affairs;
(4) the term "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which involves – (A)
a substantial risk of death; (B) extreme physical pain; (C) protracted and obvious
disfigurement; or (D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily
member, organ, or mental faculty;
(5) the term "bodily injury" means – (A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or
disfigurement; (B) physical pain; (C) illness; (D) impairment of a function of a bodily
member, organ, or mental faculty; or (E) any other injury to the body, no matter how
temporary;
(6) the term "national of the United States" has the same meaning as in section
101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22); and
(7) the term "United States corporation or other legal entity" means any
corporation or other legal entity organized under the laws of United States or any
State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or district of the United States.
18 U.S.C. 2332a. Weapons of Mass Destruction
(a) Offense against a national of the United States or within the United States.
– A person who, without lawful authority, uses, threatens, or attempts or conspires

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to use, a weapon of mass destruction (other than a chemical weapon as that term is
defined in section 229F) –
(1) against a national of the United States while such national is outside of the
United States;
(2) against any person within the United States, and the results of such use affect
interstate or foreign commerce or, in the case of a threat, attempt, or conspiracy,
would have affected interstate or foreign commerce; or
(3) against any property that is owned, leased or used by the United States or by
any department or agency of the United States, whether the property is within or
outside of the United States,
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be
punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
(b) Offense by national of the United States outside of the United States.--Any
national of the United States who, without lawful authority, uses, or threatens,
attempts, or conspires to use, a weapon of mass destruction (other than a chemical
weapon (as that term is defined in section 229F)) outside of the United States shall
be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, and if death results, shall be punished
by death, or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
(c) Definitions. – For purposes of this section – (1) the term "national of the United
States" has the meaning given in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)); and
(2) the term "weapon of mass destruction" means – (A) any destructive device
as defined in section 921 of this title; (B) any weapon that is designed or intended to
cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of
toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors; (C) any weapon involving a
biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are defined in section 178 of this
title); or (D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a
level dangerous to human life.

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