The Sudan Peace Process

The Sudan Peace Process

Order Code RL31947
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Sudan Peace Process
June 4, 2003
Ted Dagne
Specialist in African Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

The Sudan Peace Process
Summary
Sudan, geographically the largest country in Africa, has been intermittently
ravaged by civil war for four decades. More than two million people have died over
the past two decades due to war-related causes and famine, and millions have been
displaced from their homes. The 20-year civil war has been and continues to be a
major contributing factor to recurring humanitarian crisis. There have been many
failed attempts to end the civil war in southern Sudan, including efforts by Nigeria,
Kenya, Ethiopia, former President Jimmy Carter, and the United States.
In March 1994, the heads of state from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda
formed a mediation committee under the aegis of the Inter-Governmental Authority
for Development (IGAD) and held the first formal negotiations in March 1994. The
basis of these talks was a Declaration of Principles (DOP), which includes the right
of self-determination, separation of religion and the state (secularism), and a
scheduled referendum to be held in southern Sudan with secession as an option.
Although the National Islamic Front (NIF) government reluctantly accepted the DOP
in 1994, the government in Khartoum walked out on peace talks in September 1994,
and returned only in July 1997 after a series of military defeats.
The Clinton Administration adopted a policy of isolation and containment of
Sudan, while at the same time supporting the IGAD peace initiative. Relations for
most of the 1990s were dominated by concerns about Sudan’s radical Islamic agenda,
the civil war, human rights, and the NIF’s support for international terrorists and
terrorist organizations, including Osama bin Laden who lived in Sudan from 1991-
1996. In 1997, the Clinton Administration imposed comprehensive economic and
trade sanctions on Sudan. In 1999, the Clinton Administration appointed former
Congressman Harry Johnston Special Envoy for Sudan. Special Envoy Johnston
made several trips to Sudan and other countries in the region to rally support for the
IGAD peace process. By early 2000, serious dialogue on a wide range of issues
between the government of Sudan and the Clinton Administration began to take
place. Progress was made on counter-terrorism talks, while the IGAD peace process
stalled.
The Bush Administration has made Sudan a high priority and President Bush
has spoken on Sudan on a number of occasions. In September 2001, President Bush
appointed former Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy for Sudan to see if there
was a role for the United States in the peace process. The Bush Administration has
renewed sanctions imposed by the Clinton Administration, but has relaxed the travel
ban that had been imposed on Sudanese officials. Additionally, the Administration
has expanded dialogue with the Sudanese government on counter-terrorism and the
peace process. The United States is playing key roles in the current IGAD talks by
providing financial support and coordinating among key allies in Europe and the
Horn of Africa. In December 2002, the Bush Administration invited the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the government of Sudan for
two days of talks in Washington, D.C. On April 21, 2003, the Administration
submitted its report on Sudan, as required by the Sudan Peace Act (PL 107-245).
This report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents
The Conflict: Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Origin of the IGAD Peace Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Changing Dynamics: Recent U.S. Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Current IGAD Talks: Machakos I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Current IGAD Talks: Machakos II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Preliminary Agreement on Power-Sharing Arrangements: Third Session
of the IGAD Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Is Real Progress Being Made Between the Government of Sudan
and the SPLA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The Optimists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Pessimists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The End Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
List of Figures
Figure 1. Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Sudan Peace Process
The Conflict: Background1
In 1956, Sudan became the first country to achieve independence (from Britain
and Egypt) in sub-Saharan Africa. For almost four decades, the east African country
with a population of 35 million people has been the scene of intermittent conflict.
Since the current conflict erupted, more than two million people have died from war-
related causes and famine in southern Sudan, and an estimated four million have been
displaced. The Sudanese conflict is Africa's longest-running civil war. The sources
of the conflict are deeper and more complicated than indicated by the claims of
political leaders and some observers. Religion is a major factor because of the
Islamic fundamentalist agenda of the current government, dominated by the mostly
Muslim/Arab north. Southerners, who are Christian and traditional believers, reject
the Islamization of the country and favor a secular arrangement. Social and
economic disparities are also major contributing factors to the Sudanese conflict.
The abrogation in 1983 by then President Jaffer Nimeri of the 1972 Addis
Ababa agreement, which ended the first phase of the civil war in the south, is
considered a major triggering factor in the current civil war. Although the National
Islamic Front (NIF) government, which ousted the democratically elected civilian
government in 1989, has pursued the war in southern Sudan with vigor, previous
governments, both civilian and military, had also rejected southern demands for
autonomy and equality. Analysts point out that northern political leaders for decades
treated southerners as second-class citizens and did not see the south as an integral
part of the country. Southern political leaders argue that under successive civilian
and military governments, political elites in the north have made only superficial
attempts to address the grievances of the south without compromising the north's
dominant economic, political, and social status.
In recent years, most political leaders in the north, now in opposition to the
current government, say that mistakes were made in the treatment of the south and
that they are prepared to correct them. But the political mood among southerners has
sharply shifted in favor of separation from the north.2 The current government has
pursued the military option aggressively. Economic conditions have deteriorated
significantly, and hundreds of thousands of southern Sudanese are at risk of
1 For more on Sudan’s political situation, human rights and humanitarian issues, see CRS
Issue Brief IB98043, Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, and U.S. Policy, by Ted
Dagne.
2 See Dr. Francis Deng’s testimony before the House International Relations Committee,
June 5, 200, at [http://www.sudancare.org/HIRC060502/Deng.htm].

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starvation due to a serious humanitarian crisis, largely caused by the long conflict.
Meanwhile, the discovery of oil and revenues from oil have fueled the conflict.3
Origin of the IGAD Peace Process
Alarmed by the deepening
crisis and multiple failed
SPLA/SPLM
attempts by outside mediators,
members of the Inter-
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and
Governmental Authority for
its armed wing the Sudan People’s Liberation
Development (IGAD), a
Army (SPLA) was founded in 1983, after
regional organization that
southern troops mutinied to protest the
promotes cooperation and
imposition of Sharia laws by then President
development, formed a
Jaffer Nimeri. The SPLA received significant
mediation committee consisting
military assistance from Ethiopia and other
of two organs: a summit
African countries, and by the late 1980s was in
committee of heads of state
control of all of southern Sudan, except for the
from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya
regional capital, Juba, and other small garrison
and Uganda, and a standing
towns. In 1991, however, the SPLA split, when
committee composed of their
senior commanders formed their own faction.
mediators. Preliminary talks
The factional fighting that ensued almost
were held in November 1993
destroyed the southern liberation movement.
and January 1994, and formal
The SPLA lost almost all of its garrison towns
negotiations began in March
and was pushed by government forces to the
and May of the same year.
Ugandan border. By mid-1990s, the SPLA
Presented at the May meeting,
began to recover, and later recaptured most of
the Declaration of Principles
the towns it had lost to government forces.
(DOP)4 included the following
Under the leadership of the American-educated
provisions: the right of self-
leader, Dr. John Garang, the SPLA now
determination with national
controls a large swath of land in southern
unity as a high priority,
Sudan and has presence in the north as well.
separation of religion and state
(secularism), a system of
governance based on multiparty democracy, decentralization through a loose
federation or a confederacy, respect for human rights and a referendum to be held in
the south with secession as an option. The NIF government initially resisted the
DOP, particularly its endorsement of self-determination and secularism. The Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)5, the political arm of the South’s main armed
opposition force, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) accepted the DOP.
3 God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan. International Crisis Group
(ICG), 2002.
4 For more on IGAD’s role in the Sudan peace process and official IGAD documents, see
[http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/IGAD.html].
5 For background on the SPLM/A see Khalid, Mansour. John Garang Speaks, 1987.

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The IGAD peace process began with the view among the mediators that the
Sudan conflict was having serious repercussions not only in the country but also in
the region, and then sought to deal with the root causes of the conflict. Conditions
were ripe for talks since both sides were exhausted from years of fighting and some
members of the IGAD committee were seen by Khartoum as allies. In 1994,
however, relations between IGAD member Eritrea and Sudan began to deteriorate,
largely due to Sudan's support for an Eritrean opposition group, the Eritrea Islamic
Jihad. Meanwhile, serious opposition to the DOP began to emerge from the NIF
government. The most contentious issues were secularism and self-determination,
which the Khartoum government refused to concede.
In July 1994, the polarization of the two sides intensified after the Khartoum
government appointed a hard-line NIF member to its delegation. The Khartoum
delegation professed the government's commitment to Islamic law as part of a
religious and moral obligation to promote Islam in Sudan and throughout the
continent, and rejected self-determination as a ploy to split the country. In September
1994, President Moi of Kenya convened a meeting of the committee's heads of state,
Sudan's President Bashir and the leader of SPLM/A. The Khartoum government
walked out of these peace talks, rejecting the DOP. However, military setbacks and
intense international pressure forced the government back to the negotiating table in
Nairobi in 1997 and it formally accepted the DOP. The return to the IGAD process
was, in part, in recognition of the government’s failed effort to attract other
mediators, who might have been more supportive of NIF positions.
Further meetings in 1997-1998 sought to narrow divisions between the two
sides, with the government of Sudan formally agreeing to self-determination for the
south. The government of Sudan also appeared willing to compromise on some other
issues. In May 1998, the parties, despite some progress earlier, disagreed on which
territories were considered part of the south. The Khartoum delegation defined the
south as the three provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile,
established at independence in January 1956. The SPLM/A argued that Southern
Kordofan Province and Southern Blue Nile Province and other areas on the margins
of the three core provinces were also part of the south. There were also serious
disagreements on the duration of the interim period before a referendum on self
determination, and issues relating to interim arrangements were shelved by the
mediators in part to avoid a breakdown in the talks. The question of religion and
state remained unresolved.
The United States and the European Union praised Khartoum's acceptance of
self-determination as a major step forward. However, some observers characterized
the agreement on self-determination as a small step in the right direction after years
of stalled efforts. The most contentious and difficult issues were yet to be tackled by
IGAD mediators, including the separation of religion from politics and interim
arrangements prior to the referendum. Some observers argued that it was too soon
to judge whether the concession on self-determination represented a change in
Khartoum's position or a tactical move to buy more time. A follow-up meeting
between the parties took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in early August 1998. The
talks collapsed due to differences on the role of religion in politics. The parties also
disagreed again on the territorial definition of southern Sudan for the purpose of
referendum. In February 2000, the parties met in Nairobi but failed to make progress.

CRS-4
In early June 2001, President Moi reconvened the stalled IGAD peace talks in
Nairobi. No progress was made, according to a press release issued at the conclusion
of the talks. In January 2002, IGAD mandated President Moi to merge the IGAD
peace process with the Egypt-Libya Initiative (ELI), a peace initiative launched by
the governments of Egypt and Libya in 2000.6
Of all the past
Past Peace Efforts
peace efforts,7 the IGAD
peace process did the
! The Juba Conference (1947)
most to help narrow the

! The Khartoum Roundtable Conference (1965)
differences between the
! The Addis Ababa Agreement (1972)
government of Sudan
! The Koka Dam Declaration 1986
and the SPLM. But

! The DUP-SPLM Declaration
IGAD was never close to
! The Carter Center initiative (1989)
resolving the Sudanese
! The U.S. Initiative (1989-1990)
conflict because of

! The Abuja Peace Process (1992-1993)
m u l t i p l e f a c t o r s .

! The IGAD peace Process (1993-current)
Perhaps one of the most

! The Egypt-Libya initiative (2000-current)
serious obstacles to
peace in Sudan was the
government’s notion that the war could be won and the SPLM/A defeated. Indeed,
with the split of the SPLM/A in 1991 and its loss of allies in the region, the NIF
government had retaken most of the territory that had been under SPLM/A control
for years. By mid-1990s, however, the SPLA had retaken territories captured by the
government, once again changing the dynamics on the ground. Regional dynamics
in the conflict-prone Horn of Africa contributed to the persistence of the conflict.
Both the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A relied on the support of regional
actors, enabling both sides to survive setbacks and creating a sort of balance of power
between them. Shifting alliances, however, ensured continued instability in the
Sudan. The NIF’s flirtation with international terrorism and radical Islam contributed
to NIF isolation and limited its capabilities for defeating the SPLA. The policies of
the United States and its allies focused more on isolating Sudan than pursuing peace
efforts, some believe. Competing regional initiatives, such as the one pursued by
Egypt and Libya, however, undermined the IGAD efforts, according to observers and
U.S. officials.
Changing Dynamics: Recent U.S. Efforts
Beginning mid-1999, the government of Sudan sought to soften its image and
called for improved relations with the United States. The Clinton Administration
appointed former House Africa Subcommittee Chairman, Congressman Harry
Johnston, as Special Envoy to Sudan. Members of the European Union began a
6Alistair Lyon. Egypt, Libya Trying for Peace in Sudan. Reuters, October 18, 1999.
7For more on Sudan peace efforts, see Steven Wondu and Ann Lesch. Battle for Peace in
Sudan, 2000.

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“critical dialogue” with the
regime in Khartoum.8 In 2000,
U.N./U.S. Sanctions
then Assistant Secretary of
State for Africa, Susan Rice,
The United Nations imposed sanctions on the
met with Sudanese Foreign
government of Sudan, after the assassination
Minster and gave him a
attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
document which outlined U.S.
in Ethiopia in 1995. The government of Sudan
d e m a n d s f o r i m p r ov ed
was implicated in the assassination attempt.
relations. The government of
Washington also imposed a number of
Sudan agreed to implement
sanctions on the government of Sudan in
some of the reforms demanded
response to human rights violations and the
by Washington and agreed to
government’s support for international
stationing of U.S. counter-
terrorism. In November 1997, the Clinton
terrorism officials in Khartoum
Administration imposed comprehensive
to deal with the government of
economic and trade sanctions on Sudan.
Sudan on issues relating to
President Bush has renewed these sanctions in
international terrorism. Clinton
2002.
A d m i n i s t r at i o n o f f i ci al s
encouraged the SPLM/A and
the government of Sudan to
stick to one peace process, IGAD, and provided financial support to the IGAD Peace
Secretariat. Concerned about lack of progress in the peace process, Clinton
Administration officials also sought to bring the IGAD peace process to Washington,
D.C. and initially received the support of both the SPLM/A and the government of
Sudan. But the plan failed to materialize because of Khartoum’s insistence on the
lifting of U.S. and U.N. sanctions as a condition for its participation.
On September 6, 2001, President George W. Bush appointed former Senator
John Danforth as Special Envoy for peace in the Sudan. During a White House
ceremony, President Bush stated that "for nearly two decades, the government of
Sudan has waged a brutal and shameful war against its own people. And this is not
right, and this must stop." President Bush affirmed his Administration's commitment
to "bringing stability to the Sudan."9 In response, envoy Danforth stated that "the
effectiveness of America's efforts for peace in Sudan will depend on our
communication and cooperation with other interested countries, including the
European Union and countries neighboring Sudan, especially Egypt and Kenya." In
late November 2001, Danforth made his first visit to Sudan and other neighboring
countries to assess the Sudan peace process and humanitarian conditions. In
Khartoum, he met with President Bashir of Sudan and senior government officials.
He also met with senior officials of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM). In Nairobi, Kenya, he met with President Daniel arap Moi, and in Egypt
Danforth met with President Hosni Mubarak and senior government officials.
8 For more on the Clinton Administration’s policy toward Sudan, see CRS IB98043, Sudan:
Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, terrorism, and U.S. Policy, by Ted Dagne.
9Text of President Bush’s speech is available at White House website:
[http://www.whitehouse.gov].

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Danforth was given the mandate to ascertain if there was a role for the United
States to play in the peace process. As part of his mandate he first sought to test the
parties to the conflict to determine if they were serious about a negotiated settlement.
He proposed four confidence building measures. These included (1) a cease-fire in
the Nuba Mountains region to facilitate relief assistance; (2) the creation of "days of
tranquility" to administer immunizations and provide humanitarian relief assistance;
(3) an end to aerial bombardment of civilian targets; and (4) the creation of an
Eminent Persons Group on slavery in Sudan. Under the NIF government slavery had
become more widespread. Danforth successfully secured agreement from the parties
in all four areas. In April 2002, Danforth submitted his report to President Bush,
made a number of recommendations, and gave his assessment of the situation
concerning the peace process.
Danforth concluded that there is a role for the United States in the peace
process.10 The Danforth report recommended that the United States support the
IGAD peace process and help coordinate it with other initiatives. Some observers
interpreted his recommendation as an endorsement of constructive and energetic U.S.
engagement in the peace process, currently spearheaded by Kenya. Others saw a
rejection of a unilateral or U.S.-led peace initiative. The Danforth recommendation
reaffirms continued U.S. support of and preference for the IGAD peace process,
which had been pursued by the Clinton Administration for several years. The policy
to remain engaged in support of the IGAD peace process did not represent a change
in U.S. policy, although the levels of engagement and financial and political support
subsequently increased significantly. Another conclusion by Danforth was that the
war is not winnable by either side to the conflict. Thus, he concluded, a negotiated
settlement is the only option. This conclusion echos the long-standing conventional
wisdom that the war is stalemated.
Danforth and Bush
Administration official s
U.S.-Mediated Agreements
consider the Nuba cease fire
agreement as a success and
! The Nuba Ceasefire Agreement
suggest that the progress on the

! Days of Tranquility Agreement
other three confidence building

! The Civilian Protection Agreement
measures should be seen as an

! The Eminent Group to
Investigate
expression of the parties’
Slavery
continued commitment to a

! The Cessation of Hostility Agreement
n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t .
D a n f o r t h a n d B u s h
Administration officials suggest the Nuba cease-fire agreement is a model that can
be utilized to reach a comprehensive cease-fire agreement and as a breakthrough for
the peace process. SPLM/A officials were initially concerned, however, that they
might be coerced into a comprehensive cease-fire agreement without an overall
political settlement of the conflict. Some Sudan observers asserted that while the
Nuba cease-fire agreement paved the way for much needed humanitarian assistance
10Danforth’s report to President Bush is available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020514-11.html].

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to the most neglected region of Sudan, the agreement was only a small step in the
right direction.
Danforth’s other three confidence building measures show limited progress. The
agreement on “days of tranquility” has been stalled. The civilian protection
agreement, which was designed to protect civilians from deliberate military attacks,
though signed by the parties in March 2002, did not issue its first report until
December 2002. The Eminent Persons Group, led by the United States with other
members of the international community to investigate slavery in Sudan, submitted
its findings and recommendations in May 2002. The Group concluded that “in a
significant number of cases, abduction is the first stage in a pattern of abuse that falls
under the definition of slavery in the International Slavery Convention of 1926 and
the Supplementary Convention of 1956.”11 The Group also affirmed the widely held
view that the government of Sudan provides direct support to armed groups engaged
in abduction and slavery. The Group made sweeping recommendations to address the
problem, but did not make specific proposals for an enforcement mechanism.
President Bush asked Senator Danforth to stay on as his envoy, although the
day-to-day work is being carried out by an inter-agency group. The State Department
has sent a senior diplomat to Khartoum and is expected to increase the number of
diplomats at the embassy. Moreover, the Administration has been actively engaged
in mobilizing the international community in support of the IGAD peace process.
The Bush Administration played key roles in strengthening the working relationship
of the so-called Troika: Norway, Britain, and the United States. Meanwhile, other
U.S. government agencies are expanding their activities in Sudan. USAID has
significantly increased its development programs in southern Sudan and U.S.
counter-terrorism experts continue their dialogue with their counterparts in
Khartoum. These multiple engagements, many believe, may enhance peace efforts,
and they have led to improved relations between the United States and the
government of Sudan.
The Current IGAD Talks: Machakos I 12
In late June 2002, IGAD mediators presented the government of Sudan and the
SPLM/A with a “Draft Sudan Peace Agreement” proposal. The Draft Proposal dealt
with a number of critical issues facing the two parties to the conflict. On the issue
of self-determination, the Draft Proposal altered the long-standing position of IGAD
and its Declaration of Principles. IGAD in its DOP specifically endorsed self-
determination for south Sudan. In contrast, the 2002 “Draft Sudan Peace
Agreement,” proposed a “Pre-Transition” period that would last about six months
and a “Transition” period that would last no more than four years. The Proposal did
not address the issue of a referendum directly and instead suggested that “the people
11The Eminent Persons Group report is available at
[http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8915.htm].
12 The Kenyan city of Machakos was the site of these talks. Sources used for this section are
U.S. officials, IGAD Peace Secretariat, SPLA officials, and regional experts.

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of southern Sudan shall be consulted; this popular consultation shall solicit the views
of southern Sudanese in regard to self-determination arrangements as set out in this
agreement.”
Members of the SPLM/A delegation and their supporters viewed the proposals
as unacceptable and a total abandonment of their basic right to determine their
political future. They objected to the proposed government structures and the
authority given to the “national government,” and to what they saw as the diminished
role for southerners within the proposed framework, asserting that southerners
would be getting less than what they got in the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. The
government of Sudan accepted the proposed draft agreement with a few amendments,
since the draft agreement was similar to the government’s previous offers. The
SPLM/A delegation expressed concerns and gave its response to the mediators,
arguing for a shorter transition period and demanding clarity on the issue of self-
determination.
The Draft Proposal was similar to an earlier proposal presented by the Kenyan
Special Envoy in early 2002. According to that proposal, self-determination would
be replaced by self-administration, and separation of religion and state would be
substituted for “religious tolerance.” In addition, the proposal called for a cease-fire
agreement before final political settlement, a position that has long been rejected by
the SPLM/A. Many observers argued then that the ill-fated proposal was a non-
starter, on grounds that the SPLM/A would not make concessions on these two
issues. Indeed, after a discussion between President Moi and the leader of the
SPLM/A, Dr. John Garang, President Moi agreed with Dr. Garang that this
agreement did not offer anything to southerners.
The SPLM/A and its supporters assumed that was the end of that proposal. But
the June Draft Proposal seemed to suggest, considering the similarities of the two,
that the earlier thinking was never abandoned by the mediators. According to some
observers, the strategy of the mediators appeared designed to appease the government
and seek concessions from southerners. This strategy appeared to presume that the
government was stronger and more cooperative than before; and that concessions had
to made to win the government’s acceptance without which there could be no deal.
Another assumption may have been that if the SPLM/A rejected this proposal, it
would be labeled as the obstacle to peace and would be isolated and marginalized.
But some analysts argue that this line of thinking achieved quite the opposite results:
it unified southerners and opened the door for more violence and intransigence.
Hours before the deadline for the signing of the Draft Agreement, the mediators
reportedly realized that the omission of self determination from the agreement was
a serious error and that the Draft Agreement altered IGAD’s longstanding support for
self determination and took inadequate account of the government of Sudan’s stated
acceptance of the proposal. The Draft Agreement was re-written and a new phase of
negotiations began. After a series of give and take discussions and intense pressure
on the parties, especially on the government of Sudan, the parties reached what some
see as a potentially historic agreement. On July 20, 2002, the government of Sudan
and the Sudan People's Liberation Army, after five weeks of talks in Machakos,

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Kenya, signed a Framework Agreement13 to end the war in southern Sudan. The
Machakos Protocol calls for a 6-year transition period and a referendum on the
political future of southern Sudan at the end of the transition period. The Agreement
establishes an independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission to monitor and
evaluate the implementation of a final peace agreement. The Machakos Protocol also
exempts southern Sudan from the Islamic law or Sharia. The United States, the
United Kingdom, and Norway participated as observers in the Machakos IGAD
negotiations.
The Framework Agreement is seen by the mediators and some observers as a
major breakthrough in the long stalled IGAD peace process. The government of
Sudan had favored the earlier Draft Agreement, which neglected self determination
for the South and down-played the separation of religion and the state. The
Framework Agreement by contrast gave both sides something to take back to their
constituencies. The government of Sudan was able to point to the fact that it could
continue its Sharia laws in the North, while the SPLM/A was able to emphasize the
agreement on a referendum to determine the political future of southern Sudan, after
a six year transition period. The SPLM/A appeared to have made important
concessions at Machakos, paving the way for the Framework Agreement. The
SPLM/A had long insisted on a short transition period, two to four years. The
government had long insisted on a ten year transition period. The SPLM/A accepted
a longer transition period in order to give unity a chance, according to members of
the SPLM/A delegation at the talks. The SPLM/A also abandoned its long standing
opposition to Sharia by agreeing to the continuation of Sharia laws in the North. The
government of Sudan’s acceptance of a referendum at the end of the transition period
was also seen as an important concession.
The Current IGAD Talks: Machakos II
The second phase of the negotiations in late 2002 proved difficult. There were
significant disagreements on a wide range of issues. The parties met to discuss the
transition period in mid-August 2002 and agreed to the following agenda: (1)
Structure of Government: (a) Power Sharing, Wealth Sharing, Human Rights, and
Judiciary and the Rule of Law; (2) Security Arrangements; (3) Modalities for
Implementing the Peace Agreement; (4) Regional and International Guarantee. The
first two weeks were designed for briefing and lectures by experts on a wide range
of issues relating to nation building and conflict resolution. Shortly after, the parties
were given a 51-page report called Draft Protocol on Power Sharing Within the
Framework of a Broad based Transitional Government of National Unity Between
the Government of Sudan and the SPLM.14 The parties were asked to respond to the
mediators’ draft.
13 Text of the Framework Agreement is available at
[http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8915.htm].
14Text of the agreement is available at
[http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/IGAD.html].

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In August 2002, however, tensions began to mount on the ground. Government
forces attacked a number of garrison towns controlled by the SPLM/A, and SPLM/A
forces retaliated by attacking the government’s main garrison town in Eastern
Equatoria, Torit. On September 2, 2002, a day after the capture of Torit, the
government of Sudan withdrew from the talks. In a press release, the government
stated that it had withdrawn because of SPLM positions on power sharing and the
status of the national capital (see below), even though most observers were convinced
the withdrawal was in reaction to the loss of Torit. The government of Sudan
demanded the withdrawal of the SPLM/A from Torit and a cease-fire agreement as
a condition for its return to the negotiations. In late September, the government
intensified its military campaign in the East and massed troops around Torit. In early
October 2002, the government of Sudan returned to the negotiations after its forces
re-captured Torit in southern Sudan. Based on what they characterized as a
confidence building measure, the SPLM/A reversed an earlier opposition and agreed
to a cessation of hostilities agreement.
The second phase of the negotiations at Machakos focused on a wide range of
issues relating to Power and Wealth Sharing arrangements.15 On the question of the
Presidency there were significant disagreements between the parties. The SPLM/A
initially proposed a rotation of the presidency during the interim period. The first
three years under Bashir’s presidency with the SPLM/A in the vice president slot,
and the reverse for the second half of the interim period. The government of Sudan
rejected the SPLM/A proposal. The SPLM/A then proposed that Bashir could keep
the presidency for the entire interim period provided that the SPLM/A was given the
first Vice President slot. The government was at first receptive to the idea, but then
rejected the SPLM/A proposal arguing that there should be several vice presidents
and the President (Bashir) should fill these slots. Members of the government’s
delegation expressed concerns that to give the first vice president slot to the SPLM/A
would be risky since in the event the president were incapacitated, the first vice
president (SPLM/A) would assume the presidency. The SPLM agreed to the
proposal of creating several vice president slots, but insisted that the first vice
president slot with genuine powers should be given to the SPLM.
There were also disagreements on Power Sharing arrangements in the
Executive, Legislature, the Civil Service, and the Judiciary. Both the government of
Sudan and the SPLM/A agreed on SPLM/A participation in all these government
structures. The SPLM/A argued that due to historical injustices, southerners should
get 40% of the seats in the Lower House and 50% in the Upper House. The SPLM/A
accepts the fact that southerners may only represent a third of the population, while
pointing out the absence of a reliable population census. The SPLM/A argues that
it is important to maintain a 50-50% representation in order to avoid abuses of power
by the majority in the Upper House. The government contends that southerners
represent less than 20% of the population and thus do not deserve to have 40/50% of
the seats in the Legislature. The mediators have proposed a 33% representation for
the SPLM/A. In the Executive (cabinet) and the Civil Service, the SPLM/A
15For more on Power and Wealth Sharing negotiations, see Power and Wealth Sharing:
Make or Brake Time in Sudan’s Peace Process, ICG. December 18, 2002.

CRS-11
demanded 40% of the positions in all levels, while the government of Sudan offered
20%.
Negotiations on the status of the national capital were also contentious. There
is agreement that the national capital would continue to be Khartoum. But the
SPLM/A insists that the national capital, which has a large population of non-Muslim
southern Sudanese, should be secular and not bound by the Sharia laws of Khartoum
State. At Machakos I both sides agreed that the South would be exempted from
Sharia and the North could have Sharia. But the status of the capital was not
discussed. As a counter-proposal, the SPLM/A suggested that an enclave in
Khartoum should be Sharia free and the rest of the capital could continue to have
Sharia. The government rejected the SPLM/A proposal and charged that discussion
on this issue could unravel agreements reached at Machakos I. Observers note that
while on the surface disagreement on this issue seems minor, the influencing factors
behind the disagreement are very serious. At the core of this debate is the role of
religion in politics, the very same issue that led to the second phase of the civil war,
after then President Nimeri imposed Sharia in the South in 1983.
On Wealth Sharing there was general agreement that more funds should be
allocated for southern Sudan. There were significant disagreements, however, on
ownership of natural resources, economic policy, and on revenue sharing. The
government of Sudan maintains that all unregistered land belongs to the state, while
the SPLM/A contends that land belongs to the community. The SPLM/A argues that
because of historical neglect of the south a significant share of revenues, especially
oil revenues, should go to the South. The SPLM/A demanded 60% of the revenues
from oil, while the government of Sudan offered 10%. The government contends
that the National Government will require significant funds to finance reconstruction
and development of the entire country during the transition period. Another
contentious issue was the Sudanese banking system and the recent introduction of a
new currency in southern Sudan by the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A argues that the
current banking system is based on Islamic laws and is incompatible with the
economic system in southern Sudan.
Preliminary Agreement on Power-Sharing16
Arrangements: Third Session of the IGAD Talks
The government of Sudan and the SPLM met in late January 2003, after several
days of delay due to disagreements on the agenda for the talks and because of
violations of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement by the government of Sudan. In
order to avoid future ceasefire violations, the mediators strengthened the Cessation
of Hostilities Agreement, signed in October 2002, by adding several provisions. The
new measures, agreed to on February 4, 2003, include the return of the civilian
population to their home areas, the return of territories taken in the recent attacks, and
the creation of a Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT).
16 Sources for this section are internal IGAD documents, interviews with SPLA, U.S., and
IGAD officials.

CRS-12
The government of Sudan and the SPLM delegations met in Karen, Kenya in
late January-early February 2003 to discuss power and wealth sharing arrangements
for the Interim Period. The parties reached agreement in principle on some aspects
of power and wealth sharing, but remained far apart on a number of key issues. In
previous talks, the negotiations were stalled because the parties could not agree on
allocation of parliamentary seats, civil service positions for Southern Sudanese, share
of revenues from oil and other resources, and power- sharing arrangements in the
Executive. During the recent talks, the parties agreed to move away from
percentages and agreed on a formula of “equitable” power and wealth sharing
arrangements. While there appears to be broad understanding and agreement about
the formula, the prospects for misinterpretations are substantial. The mediators
appear eager to reach agreements where possible and avoid contentious issues,
leaving unresolved issues for a later date. The limited success on power and wealth
sharing issues hinges completely on the idea of “equitable” sharing of power and
wealth. The real challenge is likely to come when the parties begin to discuss what
“equitable” means to each side. The SPLM asserts that decades of neglect of and
discrimination against the South should be compensated by giving Southerners more
than what they have been offered in the past. The government of Sudan argues that
other Sudanese communities also deserve attention.
The mediators hope to bridge the gap between the two sides once they secure
agreement on the key issues of power and wealth sharing, the national capital, the
marginalized areas of the Nuba Mountains, Abyei, and Southern Blue Nile, and final
security arrangements. The parties have begun discussion on the marginalized areas
after days of wrangling over the composition of the delegations and agenda for the
talks. The government of Sudan insisted that members of the delegation of the other
side should consist of and should be led by people from the respective areas.
Members of the SPLM delegation argued that the government of Sudan should not
dictate the makeup of the SPLM delegation since the Movement is not dictating the
composition of the government’s delegation. The SPLM later agreed to the
government’s demand. The delegations then adopted an agenda for the talks, after
they agreed to discuss the three areas in three subcommittees for the regions
consisting of eight individuals from each side.
The mediators and some observers are cautiously optimistic about the talks,
although the optimism seems to reflect simply the fact that the talks are on-going and
have not collapsed.17 There has not been a major breakthrough in the talks since the
parties signed the Framework Agreement on self-determination and religion and state
in July 2002. In the January-February talks, the parties agreed to establish a National
Unity Government and bicameral legislature. The parties also agreed to hold
elections during the interim period, after rehabilitation, reconstruction, and
repatriation in Southern Sudan. The structure of the government and the relationship
between the governing entities is not clear. The National Unity Government would
consist of the current government and the SPLM. It is not clear, however, what role,
if any, other opposition groups would have in the National Unity Government. The
broad outline agreement is vague about what specific role the SPLM would have in
17 See Special Envoy Lazaro Sumbeiywo’s letter to Secretary of State Powell, available at
[http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/su/c9101.htm].

CRS-13
the Executive, although the parties have agreed President Omar Bashir would remain
the head of government during the interim period. The mediators hope that the
decision-making process in the Executive would be one of respect for authority and
partnership.
The parties agreed to “equitable” representation in both chambers of the
legislature without specifying the composition of the parties. The mediators
attempted to clarify what they meant by “equitable” sharing of power in the
Legislature and Executive. The mediators assert that “relevant considerations shall
be taken into account in determining what constitutes equitable representation.”
What is meant by “relevant considerations” is not clear, however. Some aspects of
the agreement on the National Civil Service shed light on what is considered
“relevant considerations.” According to the agreement, several principles shall be
applied in determining the level of representation and the number of positions that
could be allocated for Southern Sudanese. These principles include: “imbalances and
disadvantages which exist must be redressed; merit is important and training is
necessary; fair competition for jobs; no level of government shall discriminate
against any qualified Sudanese citizen on the basis of religion, ethnicity, region,
gender, or political beliefs; and the National Civil Service will fairly represent all the
people of the Sudan.” This general outline of the guiding principles appears to
satisfy the demands of the parties. The government is likely to emphasize fair
representation of the people of Sudan, merit and fair competition, since Northerners
are better educated and have more experience in government service. The SPLM,
on the other hand, is likely to focus more on the need to redress decades-old neglect
and discrimination, and effective utilization of affirmative action for Southerners.
The proposed Executive will consist of the President, Vice President(s), and a
Council of Ministers. The parties have yet to agree on the role and number of vice
presidents. The SPLM had initially proposed a rotation of the presidency and after
a contentious debate dropped its proposal. It is not clear under the current
arrangement if the SPLM would get the Vice President position, with executive
powers, or take one of several Vice President positions. The Executive will have
broad powers in matters of national security and administration of the federal
government. Allocation of cabinet positions is expected to be addressed before a
final peace agreement is signed. The mediators deliberately avoided dealing with
allocation of posts in the National Unity Government because the parties could not
agree in previous talks. The reluctance by the government of Sudan to accept a
rotational presidency in the initial phase of the talks and disagreement over the
powers of the Vice President has contributed to an erosion of confidence between the
parties and uncertainty about the commitment of the government of Sudan to a real
power-sharing arrangement with the SPLM. The leader of the SPLM, Dr. John
Garang, is under intense internal and external pressure not to make further
concessions. Some senior members of the Movement contend that the SPLM has
made a number of important concessions, while the government of Sudan continued
to hardened its positions. In March 2003, at a leadership council meeting in Southern
Sudan, the SPLM leadership acknowledged that unwarranted concessions were made
during the January talks and that corrective measures would be taken.
The parties made some progress in the wealth-sharing talks, although final
agreement was not reached. Using the same formulation of “equitable” sharing, the

CRS-14
parties dropped the contentious formula of percentage sharing of wealth. The SPLM
in the earlier talks had demanded 60% of the oil revenues, while the government
offered 10%. The current preliminary agreement states that “the sharing and
allocation of wealth shall be based on the premise that all parts of Sudan are entitled
to development.” The agreement also emphasizes that “the parties agree that the
Southern Sudan faces serious needs.” The agreement gives the National Unity
Government broad powers to collect taxes and manage national resources. On the
issue of land ownership, the parties agreed that “the regulation of land tenure, usage
and exercise of rights in lands is to be a concurrent competency exercised at the
appropriate levels of government.” The agreement on land ownership is vague and
vulnerable to various interpretations by the parties. The parties may construe the
phrase “concurrent competence..at the appropriate levels of government” to mean in
the case of the government of Sudan the National Unity Government in which the
current government is expected to dominate and the SPLM could interpret the phrase
as one that gives authority to the government of Southern Sudan.
The parties agreed that existing oil contracts “shall not be subject to re-
negotiations.” Some top SPLM leaders contend that the Movement gave too much
by allowing existing contracts to stay in place. The SPLM and human rights
organizations have repeatedly accused oil companies operating in Sudan of
supporting the government of Sudan’s “scorched earth”18 policy in the oil-producing
regions of Southern Sudan. It is not clear what role the government of Southern
Sudan would have in new contracts. It is also not clear if the parties’ interpretation
of “concurrent competence” applies to oil resources. Moreover, the parties agreed
that “if contracts are deemed to have fundamental social and environmental
problems, the government of Sudan will implement the necessary remedial
measures.” The negative social and environmental impact in the oil-producing
regions in Southern Sudan has been reported on by human rights organizations.19
The SPLM is likely to use this provision to influence new contract negotiations and
re-negotiate existing contracts with oil companies.
The parties agreed to establish a Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring
Commission (FFAMC). The Commission is directed to ensure fair allocation of
funds to the states/regions, and the government of Southern Sudan. The formula the
parties agreed to in determining the amount of allocation of funds is largely based
on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), although final agreement is not reached on
this provision. According to this formulation, 0.6% of the GDP will go to the
government of Southern Sudan for basic government functions in 2003. An
estimated 3% (2003), 3.2% (2004), 3.4% (2005), 3.6% (2006), and 3.4% (2007) of
the GDP will go for repatriation, rehabilitation, resettlement, reintegration, and
reconstruction purposes. Based on this formulation and assuming growth in GDP,
the government of Southern Sudan could receive an estimated $615 million in 2003,
$713 million in 2004, $837 million in 2005, $972.9 million in 2006, and $1.04
18Christian Aid. The Scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan, March 2001.
19 Amnesty International. Oil in Sudan: Deteriorating Human Rights, June 2000.

CRS-15
billion in 2007.20 The parties also agreed on the contentious issue of external debt.
The SPLM had consistently argued that the South would not be responsible for the
external debt of Sudan since these funds were used to subjugate Southerners and that
the funds were never used to develop the South. The SPLM delegation dropped its
opposition to the assumption of responsibility for the external debt after several days
of debate.
Is Real Progress Being Made Between the Government of
Sudan and the SPLA?
Many observers and the parties to the conflict agree that negotiations between
the government of Sudan and the SPLA have made some progress over the past
several months.21 The mediators are portraying a positive picture and appear
determined to keep the parties engaged in the negotiations. However, the optimistic
scenario of peace within reach is not shared by some observers who believe that the
Sudan conflict may require more time to resolve. Some analysts are concerned that
in the absence of trust between the parties and mounting tensions, the talks might
collapse. Some SPLM leaders charge that the government of Sudan is dragging out
the talks in order to launch a full scale attack against the South. According to some
U.S. officials and regional experts, the government of Sudan seems to be under
intense pressure from within to finish off the SPLA militarily rather than to make
concessions and threaten the unity of the country. Indeed, there were no major
breakthrough agreements since July 2002. There was small, yet incremental progress
made in the last round of talks. The parties, moreover, seem committed to continuing
the negotiations.
The most notable achievements of the negotiations thus far are improved
humanitarian conditions, relative peace and stability in South Sudan, and the asserted
desire of the parties to reach a just and lasting peace. In recent months, humanitarian
conditions have improved significantly. Large scale suffering and death by starvation
is becoming a thing of the past, with humanitarian assistance being delivered to the
needy largely unimpeded.22 Moreover, there has been no major military confrontation
between the government of Sudan and the SPLA since the signing of the Cessation
of Hostilities Agreement in October 2002, although government forces and allied
militia attacked SPLA forces on a number of occasions in Western Upper Nile in late
2002. The last six months have been a notably peaceful and stable period in
Southern Sudan. Fewer civilians have been targeted by government forces in the last
several months than at anytime in the past decade, although civilians in Western
20 Interview with senior SPLA officials in Washington, March-April 2003.
21See a speech by the Foreign Minister of Sudan, Mustafa Ismail, at the Woodrow Wilson
Center, May 21, 2003.
22 See the testimony by Roger Winter, Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and
Humanitarian Assistance (USAID), before the House Africa Subcommittee. May 13, 2003.
Available at [http://www.usaid.gov/press/spe_test/testimony/2003/ty030513_1.html].

CRS-16
Upper Nile reportedly continue to suffer from government-instigated violence and
a policy of displacement.23
The Optimists. The optimists argue that a peace agreement could be reached
by the end of June 2003.24 They assert that agreements or understanding have been
reached on a wide range of issues. Indeed, comparisons of current negotiations to
previous attempts, including the Nigeria-sponsored Abuja peace process and the
Egypt-Libya Initiative, suggest that the current IGAD-led talks have achieved much
more than the others. Moreover, the parties to the conflict seem to be more
committed this time around than on previous occasions. While the parties may not
be absolutely certain of the end game, there are reported signs that the parties could
be preparing themselves politically and psychologically for an eventual settlement.
This is seen as a major departure for both sides from their previously held positions.
Indeed, both sides have their respective hardliners, who continue to undermine the
process. What observers see as new and interesting about this process is the fact that
these factions do not appear to enjoy strong support within their respective camps and
therefore are less likely to succeed.
Analysts believe that external factors are also influencing the negotiations for
the better. Shifting alliances in the region have had a positive impact on the peace
process. Improved relations between longtime arch enemies Uganda and Sudan, for
example, have helped those within the NIF who have been urging diplomatic
solutions with regional actors and negotiations with the SPLA. The two-year war
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which led to the dissolution of the Frontline States
assembled against the NIF regime in Khartoum, helped the NIF regime improve
relations with neighboring Ethiopia. Moreover, Sudan’s rapprochement with Egypt
strengthened the standing of the government of Sudan in the Arab world. Meanwhile,
SPLM’s careful courting of the Egyptian government in recent years, which eased
Cairo’s fear of a divided Sudan, may have contributed to the limited success of the
IGAD-led peace process.
Some observers, who are cautiously optimistic, acknowledge that although
progress was made in the initial talks, there have been no breakthroughs in recent
months. These observers see that the lack of progress concerning the security
arrangement, the three disputed areas (the Nuba Mountains, Abyei, and Southern
Blue Nile), and the status of the national capital as due in large part to the difficult
nature of the issues. Solving these issues, they argue, will require assertive and
forceful engagement by the United States and its peace partners. President Bashir of
Sudan and the leader of the SPLM, Dr. John Garang, have met twice since the
signing of the Framework Agreement in July 2002 in an effort to build confidence
between the two leaders. The parties also may also have made more progress on
some of the most contentious issues behind closed doors than is publicly known. The
second round of talks on wealth and power sharing, for example, concluded with
major disagreements on a wide range of issues. A follow-up meeting, with technical
23For a detailed description of conditions in southern Sudan, see the Bush Administration
reports to Congress. They can be found at [http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/su/c9101.htm].
24 In early April 2003, President Bashir and Dr. John Garang, after a summit in Kenya,
stated that an agreement can be reached by the end of June 2003.

CRS-17
support by the World Bank and the IMF, on the same issues reportedly produced
significant results, but the agreements have not been made public.
The Pessimists. Pessimists emphasize that significant challenges remain to
any peace settlement in Sudan. Some analysts and Sudanese opposition groups are
not convinced that the government of Sudan is truly committed to a just and lasting
peace. They argue that its apparent change in behavior is temporary and tactical in
large part out of fear of sanctions that might be imposed by the United States.
Indeed, the foot dragging on political reform and counter-terrorism cooperation by
the Sudanese government abruptly ended shortly after the September 11th terrorist
attacks. One serious concern is that a faction led by First Vice President Osman Taha
is opposed to the peace process, according to regional observers and U.S. officials.
This faction, the core of the Islamist wing of the government, reportedly prefers to
pursue the military option, especially in light of increased oil revenues. In recent
years, the government of Sudan has purchased sophisticated weapon systems,
including helicopter gunships and has significantly expanded its domestic production
of weapon systems.25 Moreover, some observers suggest that the Islamists fear that
a peace agreement with the SPLA could weaken the Islamic Movement and
eventually end their grip on power. Some have suggested that Vice President Taha
is concerned that if there is a peace agreement he would have to give up the vice
president slot to the SPLA, as the negotiations on power sharing seem to suggest. In
recent weeks, however, Taha has suggested that he now supports the peace process
and would like to play a direct role in the talks.
Several other factors could also complicate a final deal between the SPLA and
the government of Sudan. The North is increasingly divided. The traditional parties,
the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), are splintering and remain
outside the peace process. The recent meeting of the National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) in Eritrea clearly demonstrated the potential pitfalls if Northern groups
opposing the government of Sudan remain outside the peace process. Many NDA
members are unhappy that the SPLA unilaterally signed agreements with the
government of Sudan and consider the acceptance of Sharia (Islamic law) in the
North as a serious mistake. In early 2003, a major rebellion in Darfur State erupted,
forcing government forces to deploy to an area that had been peaceful for years. The
Darfur crisis has serious consequences for the government of Sudan.26 The rebellion
appears to enjoy popular public support and has gained ground against government
forces. The majority of the people in Darfur are of African and Muslim decent.
Moreover, the backbone of the Sudan army comes from the Darfur region, leading
some observers to speculate that the unexpected success of the rebels may be
attributed to the support they may have received from the Sudanese army itself. The
rebellion also is reportedly receiving assistance from Chad. The Zagawa are a major
tribe in the rebellion and the tribe of President Idris Deby of Chad.
The End Game. The end game is likely to be more contentious as the parties
attempt to resolve difficult issues. The most contentious issue will be security
25 Stratfor. Sudan and Russia Forging New Ties Around Oil and Arms. January 22, 2002.
26 Ceasefire Reportedly Breaks Down in Darfur, March 20, 2003. U.N. Integrated Regional
Information Networks.

CRS-18
arrangements in the interim period. The government of Sudan would like to see a
unified army, while the SPLA insists in keeping its army during the interim period.
The SPLA is unlikely to give up on this issue, and powerful forces in the government
of Sudan are vehemently opposed to a two-army arrangement, arguing that this would
be tantamount to an independent South. The difficulty in resolving this issue lies in
the deep mistrust that exists between the North and the South. A key element of the
1972 Agreement that ended the first phase of the Sudan conflict was the maintenance
of a unified army. The SPLA leadership believes now that was a mistake and may
have contributed to the intransigence of the North once the South disarmed.
Observers agree that the two-decade war has destroyed much of the trust between the
two parties and that the interim period should be used to build trust between the
parties. Furthermore, the SPLA argues that the July Framework Agreement provides
southern Sudanese the right to hold a referendum to decide their association with the
North. Creating a unified army now, they contend, could impact the conduct and
outcome of the referendum.
Some observers believe that a solution can be found without jeopardizing a final
peace agreement. They argue that even if the opposing sides maintained two armies
they could still establish joint national institutions, unified military command, a
national police force, a national training center, and joint border patrol. But for this
scenario to work, they assert, a direct and robust engagement by the United States in
the peace process is pivotal. They believe that American engagement is more
relevant now in light of the change in leadership in Kenya. The IGAD Special
Envoy, General Sumbeiywo, who was close to Kenya’s former President Moi and
had the strong backing of the government, does not enjoy the same level of access to
the new Kenyan leadership. Kenya’s ne President Mwai Kibaki also is not thought
to be as committed to the Sudan peace process as former President Moi, who was
personally involved in the peace process for almost a decade.
Some observers have suggested that the United States, with the blessing of
IGAD and the parties, host a discussion on security arrangements in Washington.
They maintain that the parties are more likely to embrace a session in Washington,
believing that direct American engagement could make the United States a guarantor
of a peace agreement. Indeed, the Bush Administration’s engagement in the peace
process has been cited as a major contributing factor to progress in the peace
process. The Bush Administration has helped bridge the gap between the United
States and its European allies over Sudan policy, paving the way for improved
cooperation in the peace process. Other U.S. government agencies are expanding
their activities in Sudan, reportedly making a tangible difference for many
impoverished Sudanese. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
has significantly increased its development programs in southern Sudan, and U.S.
counter-terrorism experts continue their dialogue with their counterparts in
Khartoum.
On April 21, 2003, the Bush Administration submitted its report on Sudan, as
required by the Sudan Peace Act (PL 107-245). Section 6 (b) (1) (A) of the Act
states that “the President shall make a determination and certify in writing to the
appropriate congressional committees within 6 months after the date of enactment
of this Act, and each six months thereafter, that the government of Sudan and the

CRS-19
SPLM are negotiating in good faith and that negotiations should continue.”27 Section
8 of the Act requires the President to report on humanitarian access and aerial
bombardment of civilian targets. Section 11 of the Act requires that the President
submit a report on possible war crimes. In these reports, the Administration certified
that both parties were negotiating in good faith and that negotiations should continue.
The Administration based its determinations on four key findings: (1) current
negotiations offer the best opportunity for a peaceful resolution of the conflict; (2)
the negotiations have made “steady progress” on a wide range of issues, including
power and wealth sharing, cease-fire modalities, humanitarian access, self-
determination for the South and exemption of southern Sudan from Sharia laws; (3)
the parties to the conflict are committed to continuing the negotiations; and (4) the
mediators and the parties to the conflict believe that a just and lasting solution can
be found. The next certification is due in October 2003. If a peace agreement is not
reached by October 2003, the Bush Administration could impose sanctions on the
government of Sudan, as called for in the Sudan Peace Act.
27The Sudan report can be found at [http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/su/c9101.htm].

CRS-20
Figure 1. Sudan