{ "id": "RL31794", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL31794", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 101548, "date": "2003-05-02", "retrieved": "2016-04-08T14:46:28.476544", "title": "Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of U.S. Forces, and Related Issues", "summary": "On March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament rejected a resolution authorizing the deployment of\nU.S.\nforces to Turkey to open a northern front in a war against Iraq. The rejection resulted from strains\nwithin the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), an inexperienced leadership, competing\ninfluences, and the overwhelming opposition of Turkish public opinion. Moreover, the powerful\nTurkish military had not actively supported the government's position before the vote, and the\nPresident had suggested that the resolution would be unconstitutional. \n For a long time, Turkey had serious concerns about the prospect of a second Gulf war, and\n these\naffected the vote in parliament and the negotiations with the United States for the troop deployment. \nConcerns included fear that a war would lead to an independent Iraqi Kurdish state and inspire the\nrevival of Turkish Kurdish separatism, worries over the fate of Iraqi Turkomans, who are ethnic kin\nof the Turks, potential economic losses, a potential refugee crisis on the Turkey-Iraq border, and\npossible detrimental effects on regional stability.\n The Bush Administration engaged in intensive diplomacy to gain Turkey's support. The\nnegotiations reportedly produced several tentative agreements. The parliamentary resolution that was\nrejected would have enabled a U.S. deployment of troops, planes, and helicopters to Turkey. The\nUnited States would have provided Turkey with a $6 billion assistance package, some of which\ncould have been used to support $24 billion loan guarantees. Until the funds were available, the\nAdministration would have provided a bridge loan of $8.5 billion. It also would have provided\nenhanced trade benefits to Turkish businesses. A memorandum of understanding was said to have\ndealt with Turkish troops in northern Iraq and their coordination with U.S. forces. But the\nagreements were never concluded. After the war began, the Administration only wanted access to\nTurkey's airspace, which was granted on March 21, 2003, and to prevent Turkish forces from\ninterfering in northern Iraq. Turkey agreed to provide food, fuel, and other non-lethal supplies for\nU.S. troops in northern Iraq. The United States will give Turkey $1 billion in aid, with which it can\nleverage $8.5 billion in loans.\n The Turkish parliament's failure to authorize the troop deployment has significant implications. \nTo govern effectively, the AKP needs to mend strains and rebuild its political standing. Moreover,\ndespite Turkey's increasing democratization, the AKP cannot ignore the military's great influence.\nThe prolonged negotiations and the legislative defeat strained bilateral U.S.-Turkish relations. Both\nsides developed hard feelings which may take time to overcome. Turkey may be deprived of some\ninfluence concerning postwar Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Iraqi Turkomans. It also lost the\nsubstantial aid package that had been tied to acceptance of the U.S. deployment, although a smaller\none has been appropriated.\n This report will not be updated. For background, see CRS Report RS21355(pdf) , Turkey's\nNovember 3, 2002 National Election .", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31794", "sha1": "e7988e5adca54b642493ff4f3e7652ab376819d5", "filename": "files/20030502_RL31794_e7988e5adca54b642493ff4f3e7652ab376819d5.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20030502_RL31794_e7988e5adca54b642493ff4f3e7652ab376819d5.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Constitutional Questions", "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "Middle Eastern Affairs" ] }